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22000022 Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian
23 Feb 88 p 1

[Summary] On 10 February 1988, the State Council released Kamen Stamenkov Ivchev as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Angola and appointed Stancho Mikhaylov Stankov as his successor.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Summaries of Major EINHEIT Articles, February 1988
23000053 East Berlin EINHEIT in German
Vol 43 No 2, Feb 88 (signed to press 13 Jan 88)
pp 98, 192

[A New Sector and New Tasks in the Peace Struggle]

[Text] The positive outcome of the USSR-US summit is a success of the peace forces in the broadest sense. Of decisive importance to it were the initiatives from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states and the consolidation of socialism. Under more favorable terms and encouraged by the first real nuclear disarmament step, the worldwide peace movement is tackling the clearly delineated, newly defined tasks of the new phase. Wary of new “catch-up” rearmament in NATO, it is reinforcing its efforts toward further disarmament steps.

[Summary of article by Manfred Feist, political scientist, member of and department manager in the SED Central Committee; pp 108-113]

Socialism—A Society That Needs Peace and Creates Peace

[Text] The treaty signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on 8 December last year about liquidating the medium and shorter range Soviet and U.S. nuclear missiles—an important advance on the fiercely contested road to reliably ensuring peace, a victory by which all have won. What explains socialism’s vital interest in peace and its historic responsibility for securing it permanently?

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Rolf Reissig, director of the Institute for Scientific Communism in the SED Central Committee’s Social Sciences Academy and chairman of the council for scientific communism; pp 120-125]

The Need for Peace and Contemporary Capitalism

[Text] On the assumption that there is no acceptable alternative today to the survival of mankind, the article explores such highly topical questions as whether the drive for expansion and violence inherent in the nature of imperialism needs lead to an arms build-up and confrontation policy. Are armament, militarism, and war indispensable existential conditions and developmental requirements for today’s capitalism? Why is it in the vital interest of both systems to conduct their contest exclusively by peaceful means?

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Klaus Daemichen, head of the research and science development department of the Central Institute for Higher Education, and Prof Dr Hans-Juergen Schulz, director of the Central Institute for Higher Education and member of the GDR’s Pedagogical Sciences Academy; pp 130-135]

The Integration of Science, Higher Education, and Production

[Text] On the assumption that there is no acceptable alternative today to the survival of mankind, the article explores such highly topical questions as whether the drive for expansion and violence inherent in the nature of imperialism needs lead to an arms build-up and confrontation policy. Are armament, militarism, and war indispensable existential conditions and developmental requirements for today’s capitalism? Why is it in the vital interest of both systems to conduct their contest exclusively by peaceful means?

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Gudrun Langendorf, deputy research director at the SED Central Committee’s Social Sciences Academy, and Prof Dr Gerd-Rainer Radtke, instructor at the Institute for the Political Economy of Socialism in the SED Central Committee’s Social Sciences Academy; pp 136-142]

Modern Information Technology and Socialist Democracy in Production

[Text] Our socialist democracy effectively ensures the creative participation by millions of working people in shaping our society, especially their active participation in production management and planning. What new possibilities are provided by modern information technology for further perfecting socialist democracy? What demands does that make on the production managers? Why does precisely through that technology the working people's democratic participation become an efficiency factor of a new quality?
The Triumphant March of the Ideas of the Communist Manifesto

[Text] Since the birth certificate of scientific socialism was published in 1848 generations of socialists have gained knowledge and insights, militant resolve and confidence from the Manifesto. What explains the triumphant march of this little book that truly has made, and is making, world history. How do Marx and Engels explain the peace mission of the working class in it?

Crisis Processes in the Capitalist Economy

[Text] Bourgeois economic prognoses today are marked by uncertainty, and by the agreement, however, that the capitalist world is heading for another recession. This article analyzes the stock exchange crash and the dollar plunge, their effects on economic growth and the business cycle, the linkage between cyclical and structural crises under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution and of the imperialist arms build-up, as well as new elements in the course of the cycle. Capitalism is shown to be unable to combine scientific-technical progress with social progress.

Ideologies and Values in the Spiritual Struggle of Our Time

[Text] Securing peace today without sharing, without joint operations by diverse class forces, parties and states is as impossible as it is without ideological activities and ideological struggle. Why is the ideological confrontation over the basic issues to be resolved in the development of humanity unavoidable and yet no obstacle to a broad, worldwide coalition of reason and realism in international relations? Why do value concepts and orientations gain increasing weight in it? What are socialist ideology and the reality of socialism putting into it?
Central Committee Politburo Sessions

12 January—The Politburo reviewed modifications to the “Plan of Execution for the Second Stage of Economic Reform.” Discussed was implementation of the decisions of the Tenth Congress and Politburo resolutions regarding personnel policy in the party and state. Opinions and motions were heard from members of party management who a week earlier visited worksites to review the progress of the institution of group forms of work organization and the effects of employee inventiveness.

Conferences and Meetings

5 January—Members of party management spent time with worker crews interested in instituting group forms of work organization and technological progress. Those visiting were: Wojciech Jaruzelski at two Warsaw enterprises—“Polam” High-melting Metal Works and “Hydomat”; Jozef Baryla at the “Iskra” Roller Bearing Factory in Kielce; Jozef Czyrek at Warsaw’s “Metalexport”; Jan Glowczyk at the Provincial Union Producer Cooperatives Maintenance and Repair Plant in Tomaszow Mazowiecki and the “Ploma” Mining Machine Factory in Piotrkow; Zbigniew Messner at the “Telkon-PZT State Teletransmission Works in Warsaw; Alfred Miodowicz at the Truck Factory in Lublin; Zygmunt Muranski at the “Defum” Machine Tool Factory in Dabrowa Gornicza; Marian Orzechowski at the “Apator” Pomeranian Electrical Appliance Works in Torun; Florian Siwicki at the “Mesko” Metal Works in Skarzysko-Kamienna; Zofia Stepien at the “Mystal” Myszkowski Metallurgical Works (Czestochowa Province); Marian Wozniak and Andrzej Wasilewski at the “Ema-Elester” Electrical Appliance Works and with the employees of two graphics plants; they also met with representatives of creative circles in Lodz; Stanislaw Bejger at the Heroes of Westerplatte Northern Shipyard in Gdansk; Janusz Kubasiewicz at the “Zremb” Construction Mechanization Works in Warsaw; Manfred Gorywoda at the “Zgoda” Technical Fittings Works in Swietochłowice and the “Pokoj” Foundry in Ruda Slaska; Gabriela Rembisz at the “Tonzil” Speaker Production Works in Wrzesnia; Stanislaw Ciosek at the “Apena” Electrical Appliance Factory in Bielsko-Bialy.

8 January—Central Committee [KC] First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski hosted Dymiter Staniszev, secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BPK] KC, who headed the Bulgarian delegation to the Joint Interparty Commission of the PZPR and BPK. Participating in the meeting were Politburo member and KC secretary Jozef Czyrek and the directors of the foreign divisions of both central committees, Konstantin Atanasov and Ernest Kucza.

11 January—the KC Commission on Interparty Affairs discussed proposals for changes in electoral laws for people’s councils and territorial self-management. KC secretary and commission deputy chairman Kazimierz Cypryniak led the discussion.

13 January—the KC International Commission discussed crucial goals for PRL foreign policy and the PZPR’s international activity.

KC secretary Andrzej Wasilewski met with socialist state embassy representatives involved in cultural problems and with directors of culture and information centers in Poland.

15 January—Discussed at a meeting of superintendents of education and upbringing and rectors of higher schools was the plan of basic courses of action for the department of national education. Politburo member and KC secretary Tadeusz Porebski participated in the meeting.

Units and Organizations

6 January—The Provincial Committee in Sieradz discussed issues in education and upbringing of school age youth.

8 January—The Provincial Committee in Koszalin discussed directions for cultural development in the province to the year 2000. Participating in the session were KC secretary Andrzej Wasilewski and director of the KC Cultural Division Tadeusz Sawic.

9 January—In Gdynia a ceremony took place incorporating into the PRL’s fleet the missile equipped Polish Navy Ship “Warszawa.” Participating in the ceremony was a delegation from the capital, including deputy Politburo member and first secretary of the Warsaw Committee Janusz Kubasiewicz, and the coastal community with deputy Politburo member and first secretary of the Gdansk Provincial Committee Stanislaw Bejger.

16 January—In Krakow’s “KUZNICA” a two-day meeting of the Polish Publicists’ Group under the KC Cultural Division concluded. Elected chairman of the group was EXPRESS WIECZORNY editor in chief Ryszard Lukasiewicz, Slawomir Tabkowski, director of the Propaganda Division, participated in the session.
Interparty Cooperation

7-8 January—The third meeting of the Joint Interparty Commission of the PZPR and BPK took place in Warsaw under the chairmanship of Politburo member and PZPR KC secretary Jozef Czyrek and BPK KC secretary Dymiter Staniszew.

9 January—Alfred Miodowicz, PZPR KC Politburo member and OPZZ chairman, paid a daylong working visit to Prague. He held discussions with Mirslav Zardil, member of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party KC secretariat and chairman of the Czech Central Council on Trade Unions.

10 January—Gustav Husak, president of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic, celebrated his 75th birthday. For the occasion Wojciech Jaruzelski sent him a congratulatory telegram on behalf of the PZPR KC and the Council of State.

Politburo member and deputy speaker of the Sejm Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski concluded a weeklong visit in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Supreme Council. Rakowski was hosted by Politburo member and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Andrei Gromyko. He also met with Soviet Communist Party KC secretary Anatoly Lukianov.

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—continued evaluating the achievements of Polish foreign policy and economic cooperation with other countries.

Plenary Meetings of the CKKR

28 January. The CKKR [Central Control and Auditing Commission] discussed at its meeting the goals of the commission in a period of reforming the economy and democratizing socio-political activities.

Meeting of the Central Commission for Cooperation of the PZPR, the ZSL, and the SD

18 January. A meeting of the Central Commission for Cooperation of the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD was held with the participation of other charter members of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth]. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Jozef Czyrek, Marian Orzechowski, Tadeusz Porebski and Marian Wozniak took part in the meeting on behalf of the PZPR. The commission heard a report by Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski on the outline of foreign policy in 1988; reviewed the course and results of the official visit in the PRP of Foreign Minister of the FRG H. D. Genscher; heard a report on the modified plan of implementing the second stage of the economic reform and the foundations of the income and price policy.

Conferences and Meetings

20 January. A seminar for journalists devoted to the issues of the second stage of economic reform and its implementation programs was held in Warsaw with government leaders participating. Members of the PZPR CC Politburo, CC Secretaries Jan Glowczyk and Marian Wozniak discussed issues associated with political and propaganda activities.

20-21 January. In Warsaw, a conference of provincial party committees’ secretaries for propaganda was held, in which members of the Politburo, CC Secretaries Jozef Czyrek and Jan Glowczyk, as well as CC Secretary Andrzej Wasilewski, participated. Current tasks of the party and provincial echelons in implementing the resolutions of the 6th PZPR CC Plenum were discussed.

21 January. A 30th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Contemporary Publishing House was held. Member of the Politburo, Deputy Marshal of the Sejm Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski took part in the meeting.

21-22 January. A seminar for the leadership cadre of interprovincial and provincial party schools was held at the PZPR CC building. Among others, Head of the Political-Organizational Department of the CC Stanislaw Gabrielski and ANS [Academy of Social Sciences] Rector Jarema Maciszewski met with the participants in the seminar.
23 January. A meeting on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of TV news was held at the TV headquarters. It was attended by members of the highest party and government authorities: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Zbigniew Messner, Roman Malinowski, Tadeusz W. Młynczak, Jan Glowczyk and Janusz Kubasiewicz.

22-23 January. An annual briefing for the leading cadres of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was held. First Secretary of the PZPR CC, Gen. Army Wojciech Jaruzelski met with the participants of the conference. Head of the ministry, Gen. Arms Czesław Kiszczak chaired the proceedings.

29 January. The PZPR CC Commission for Social Policy and Health Care discussed the outline of the draft for a reform of the health care system. Member of the Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of State Kazimierz Bacikowski chaired the proceedings.

30 January. First PZPR CC Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski received Chairman of the Central Board of the Soviet-Polish Friendship Association Aleksandr Aksonov, chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television of the USSR. Member of the Politburo, CC Secretary Jan Glowczyk, Chairman of the Main Board of the TPPR [Polish-Soviet Friendship Association] Henryk Bednarski, Head of the PZPR CC Foreign Department Ernest Kucza and Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television Janusz Roszkowski took part in the meeting.

In Echelons and Organizations

18 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Zamosc discussed issues in education. Head of the PZPR CC Department of Science, Education and Scientific-Technical Progress Boguslaw Kedzia took part in the proceedings.

20 January. At a field meeting at the Hard Coal Mine “Barbara-Chorzow,” the PZPR CC Commission for Mining, Raw Materials and the Power Industry discussed a long-range program for hard coal mining and ecological protection of Silesia. Member of the CC Politburo Zygmunt Muranski chaired the proceedings, which were attended by alternate member of the PZPR CC Politburo, First Secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Katowice Manfred Gorywoda.

21 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Poznan discussed the main obstacles to the process of implementing the second stage of the economic reform in enterprises of the province. CC Politburo alternate member Gabriela Rembisz took part in the proceedings.

—The PZPR Provincial Committee in Szczecin pondered ways to implement the resolution of the 6th PZPR CC Plenum most efficiently.

23 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Biala Podlaska discussed tasks associated with implementing the second stage of the economic reform.

—The PZPR Provincial Committee in Pila discussed the tasks of the provincial party organization in enhancing the processes of socialist renewal in light of the resolution of the 6th PZPR CC plenum.

—The PZPR Provincial Committee in Tarnow conducted a self-evaluation of the efficiency of party work last year and outlined goals for the current year.

—the college party organization at the Jagiellonian University discussed the question of the future of Polish science on the eve of the second stage of economic reform. Member of the Politburo, CC Secretary Tadeusz Porebski took part in the meeting.

25 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Przemysl discussed the main items of the draft 1988 annual plan for the province.

27 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Bielsko Biala discussed the ideological and indoctrination activity of the provincial party organization.

—in Stalowa Wola, the Provincial PZPR Committee plenum and the Tarnobrzeg Provincial People’s Council met in a joint session. Issues of environmental protection were discussed. Member of PZPR CC Politburo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of State Kazimierz Bacikowski participated in the proceedings.

28 January. The Krakow PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of the 10th PZPR Congress resolution with regard to health care. Head of the CC Department of Propaganda Slawomir Tabkowski took part in the proceedings.

29 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Ostrowołka discussed goals of implementing the second stage of economic reform in the province. Member of the CC Politburo, CC Secretary Jozef Czyrek took part in the proceedings.

—The PZPR Provincial Committee in Katowice analyzed and evaluated the non-productive, social role of the enterprise under the reform. Members of the CC Politburo Alfred Miodowicz and Zygmunt Muranski took part in the proceedings chaired by alternate Politburo member, First Secretary of the Provincial Committee Manfred Gorywoda. Head of the CC Economic Department Marek Holdakowski attended.

30 January. The PZPR Provincial Committee in Skierniewice discussed tasks of the provincial party organization in carrying out the resolution of the 6th PZPR CC Plenum. Member of the PZPR CC Politburo, Deputy Marshal of the Sejm Mieczysław F. Rakowski took part in the proceedings.
Interparty Cooperation

26 January. General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Nicolae Ceausescu turned 70. On this occasion, First Secretary of the PZPR CC, Chairman of the Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski sent a congratulatory message to the celebrant. The Council of State of the PRP awarded N. Ceausescu the Great Sash of the Order of Merit of the PRP.

28 January. Politburo member, CC Secretary Jozef Czyrek received a delegation of the Costa Rican People's Party, members of the CRPP Politburo M. Sobrado and A. Vasquez. The delegation also held talks with heads of PZPR CC departments: Foreign—E. Kucz, Political-Organizational—S. Gabrielski and Ideological—A. Czyz.

29 January. A delegation of PZPR CC including member of the Politburo, CC Secretary Jozef Baryla was received by Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Milos Jakes. He also had talks with CPC CC Secretaries Mikulas Benio and Jindrich Polednik.

PZPR Voivodship Plenary Sessions Held, Reported

Organization, Work Practices Stressed
26000167 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 25 Jan 88 p 2

[Excerpts] The topic considered during the plenary session of the PZPR KW [Voivodship Committee] in Biala Podlaska on 23 January was what to do so that an economic mechanism for administering things would acquire necessary momentum.

The necessity for increasing the rate of change and associating the basis of reform with the capabilities of enterprises was widely discussed for several hours. The introduction to this was the report of the Costa Rican People's Party, members of the CRPP Politburo M. Sobrado and A. Vasquez. The delegation also held talks with heads of PZPR CC departments: Foreign—E. Kucz, Political-Organizational—S. Gabrielski and Ideological—A. Czyz.

29 January. A delegation of PZPR CC including member of the Politburo, CC Secretary Jozef Baryla was received by Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Milos Jakes. He also had talks with CPC CC Secretaries Mikulas Benio and Jindrich Polednik.

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Tarnow Notes Membership Growth
26000167 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 25 Jan 88 p 2

[Text] At the plenary session of the party KW [Voivodship Committee] in Tarnow, secretaries of the party organizations and the members of the Voivodship Committee did a self-evaluation of the effectiveness of party work for last year. Tasks for the current year were also defined.

A growth of nearly 1.5 percent in party membership was cause for satisfaction. Among other things, 32 new POP [Primary Party Organizations] were formed, and the number of villages headed by an administrator in which there were no primary party organizations declined. By the end of 1987 there were a total of 24,169 members and candidates in voivodship party organizations.

Implementation of joint ZSL [United Peasant Party] and SD [Democratic Party] policies for shaping socioeconomic changes also brought measurable results. Despite large losses arising from unfavorable weather conditions and raw-material shortages, industrial production increased last year by nearly 2 percent, and this exception is thanks to greater work output. The value of
exports rose 50 percent compared with 1986. One must also count as a plus the social activity of villagers who did welfare work valued at 2.3 billion zloty.

Inspired by the party, a social committee for restoration of Old Tarnow monuments began operation, and a voivodship branch of the Society for Union with “Polonia” was formed. Before long the I. Paderewski House of Artistic Creation in Kasna will be repaid. In spite of these reasons for contentment there are many matters which were not solved. For example, too little is happening in the area of technical improvements, improving the quality of production, and conservation of supplies, materials, and energy.

Przemysl Stresses Agricultural Development
26000167 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
26 Jan 88 p 2

[Excerpts] The basic principles of the proposal for the voivodship’s one-year plan for this year were discussed at the PZPR KW [Voivodship Committee] plenum on 25 January in Przemysl.

Both the objective tasks and principles of management defined in the action plan of the voivodship party organization for 1986-90 were expressed in the proposal for this plan.

In the plan proposal the most attention was given to the further development of agriculture, and also of the communal farm. On the other hand, too little space was devoted to an entire set of questions concerning forest management, criticized Tadeusz Lokaj, a forest inspector from Bircza.

Noted Marxist on ‘Information Access’ as Determining Socialism’s Future
26000165a Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 4, 24 Jan 88 pp 4-6

[Interview with Professor Adam Schaff by Piotr Andrze-
jawski and Janusz Michalak]

[Text] [Question] Stefan Kisielewski, your neighbor from this same street, says to all concerned that Marxism is a mistake of history. In one of his recent books he recalls a conversation with you on that subject, carried on, it appears, in an airplane.

[Answer] Not in an airplane—here. On that couch where you are sitting we have often talked and had a few vodkas. We see each other and even like each other. Even though I think he is a bit light-headed with his anti-Communism.

[Question] What do you tell him when it comes to an “exchange of arguments?”

[Answer] When we are alone, we do not talk about those things. He sees me as a lunatic who believes, in spite of everything, that Marxism is not dead and I pay him back in kind. But I think he is too intelligent to really believe what he says sometimes. But Kisiel is not the “problem.”

[Question] In that case, let us move on to you. You appear to us to be a man full of contradictions. No doubt you know that a wide array of opinions is circulating about you. For example, it is said that in the 1950s you were a so-called orthodox Marxist, a dogmatist, yet later, especially after 1968, your name was mentioned more and more often in the context of suspicions of revisionism. How do you see yourself?

[Answer] I think those opinions are ridiculous. I am first of all a Communist. I have belonged to the movement since I was 18. Before the war I was a member of the Communist Party of Poland and did time for my convictions. Until I was dismissed from the party in 1984, I had been formally associated with the movement for 53 years. Yet, in my opinion, formal membership is not the most important thing. One can be a party member and at the same time an utter cad with nothing in common with Communist ideology. I, on the other hand, have a great deal “in common” with it; I profess it. And I am acknowledged as that kind of Communist in the world, in Western Europe, in Latin America. Everywhere—and this is not a boast—I am seen as number one, one might say the pope of Marxism. No, I am not a man full of contradictions. On the contrary, I am very single mind-
ed. For example, I would like to meet someone from his own field who could publish his book again 30 years later without changing anything. Because I can.

[Question] In the postwar years you were director of the Institute of Social Studies of the PZPR Central Committee and all our postwar academic youth studied from your textbook, “Introduction to the Theory of Marxism.” Yet, at that time too, there were infringements of law and order, Home Army soldiers were repressed and there were trials and arrests.

[Answer] Do not forget, gentlemen, that I am not responsible for that—neither for the Home Army nor the other things. I am accountable only for what occurred in the field of science. And here I assure you that Poland—against the background of other countries with so-called real socialism—was a completely exceptional country. We were able to keep the old intelligentsia, restore the old schools, publications, almost everything that had existed. We even protected ideologically distant friends, including Catholic philosophers. We all knew then that when you needed to get something, permission to travel abroad, or an allocation of paper for a book, you had to go to Schaff, who had power. Not administratice power, of course, but at that time I was a kind of gray eminence whom Bierut and Gomolka and Ochab had to reckon with.
[Question] But did activity in such an exposed position, at that particular time, not require certain cautions in favor of reality which, generally speaking, had strayed from the slogans that were propagated publicly?

[Answer] It required no such thing. That was the point of the whole thing—that Poland was a country totally different from neighboring states, and from today's perspective we should appreciate this difference.

[Question] Berman promulgated similar arguments in a memorable interview with Toranska.

[Answer] And he spoke the truth. Our school—the Institute of Social Studies—was very open; we were able to bring in books and periodicals that others could not, non-party professors lectured there and so on. It was a school at the highest level, which later paid off in the emergence of important scientific schools and the release of well prepared graduates. From that time to this day there has probably not been a Politburo or government without graduates of that school. This includes dissidents too, with Kolakowski and Baczka in the forefront. All of them came out of my stable.

[Question] Since things were going so well, was 1956 a shock to you?

[Answer] Yes, but for a completely different reason than you think. The reason for the shock was not October because we knew much earlier what was afoot, but the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's secret report.

[Question] You knew nothing earlier about the crimes of the Stalinist era?

[Answer] My wife asks me the same question. She is your age, much younger than I. And I answer that I did not know. It turns out that we did not know about a lot of things. I am learning about many things concerning Poland only today, from readings that I should have had behind me long ago. From Anders, Bor-Komorowski and others.

[Question] At that time you and people like you were in a real ivory tower?

[Answer] Not at all. I knew all the world literature and had traveled quite a lot around the world. But please take into consideration that I had my own convictions. And I was aware of the class struggle that was really under way at that time. And that was not nonsense. Today, of course, my view of that period is more complete. If you were familiar with my books that have not been published in Poland, you would know that I raise a much more penetrating question: how could it happen that a marvelous idea that had been operating for more than a hundred years, that had millions of advocates all over the world, could produce such tragic consequences?

[Question] And how do you answer it?

[Answer] I explain it by the fact that everything that happened and that is contrary to fundamental principles and the entire Marxist ideology arises above all from the fact that the revolution was executed in countries that did not have the appropriate conditions for it. Russia was a backward country in general and, according to the assumptions of the theorists, it was not at all prepared for revolution. Moreover, the leaders there knew this very well. But they reckoned that they would become the "spark of revolution" all over the West. Poland and other Eastern European countries were not prepared to adopt socialism after the war either.

[Question] In your opinion, does this mean that the Communists should not have assumed power at that time?

[Answer] Marxism does not say that socialist revolution is the only form of revolution. The Communists at that time should have assisted in the creation of a popular democratic system in our country, as was announced. The doctrine promulgated earlier did not anticipate building socialism, in the full meaning of the word, immediately in Poland. There is not even one document, neither during the war nor afterward, and it is not in the July Manifesto.

[Question] But this is explained by reason of political tactics. It was not discussed or written about so as not to stimulate the people's awareness, so as to conform the language of propaganda to the country's state of political consciousness at the time.

[Answer] Not true. The immediate introduction of socialism into Poland was not talked about because it was well known that it was impossible to do that. The turnabout came only in 1948, when Stalin, in the face of another impending world war, spat on the whole ideology and decided simply to "secure" the situation for himself on territories separating the Soviet Union from its potential enemies. And that was a serious mistake. Even then, without being a Marxist, one could foresee that this would have to be paid for in the future. And we are still paying today.

[Question] Today you promulgate these arguments, yet at that time, in the 1950s, you were—as you said yourself—a prominent person. Are there any of your writings from that period that you are ashamed of today?

[Answer] There are no such books. There are only those that I would not publish today because I would write them differently. But I believe they have retained their value. The joke is that my books are found almost throughout the whole world like fresh bread, yet they are not published in Poland.

[Question] Surely you know why. They are encumbered, you are encumbered by the charge of "revisionism."
[Answer] Just as it is untrue that in the 1950s I cultivated some sort of dogmatism, it is also untrue that I switched over to revisionism.

[Question] Yet your books were and still are attacked. As early as the mid-1960s your book “Marxism and the Human Individual” created quite a stir.

[Answer] But that book is among the classic works of Marxist philosophy and anthropology today.

[Question] But it did not please Kliszka and others.

[Answer] Gentlemen, there is never a shortage of fools. Besides, every “church” looks after the purity of the line of the current period. Except that I do not care about that. I will tell you that in any case they urgently want to publish that book in the Soviet Union. Prof Rumiancev, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, has traveled to Poland three times to obtain an assurance that our leadership is not opposed to it. He did not get that assurance; he shrugged and told me: we wanted to, but we cannot.

[Question] A great deal of space in NOWE DROGI was devoted to a discussion on the arguments in that book.

[Answer] And that is very good. First the book was published, then it was discussed. I would have nothing against continuing to proceed in this way, instead of slandering a book with which the reader is unfamiliar because it is not published here. That discussion was organized in a very elegant way, with participants chosen in equal proportions—advocates and opponents. The latter, in certain instances, played the role of mercenaries.

[Question] Are you denying your opponents’ sincerity of intention?

[Answer] Of some of them, yes. Afterwards many of them came up to me with justifications. It was not a clear example of a violation of these people’s natures. Well, there has never been a shortage of skunks here. It is enough to read Gombrowicz, Mrozek or Witkacy. My books speak for me and they are profoundly Marxist. Of course, I write a bit differently today, simply because I know more. Man is not a cow that continually chews the same cud.

[Question] The charge of revisionism was raised again after your book “The Communist Movement at the Crossroads” was published abroad in the early 1980s. In 1984 you were dismissed from the party.

[Answer] But one has nothing to do with the other. I was expelled from the party on the basis of one key charge, the fact that I gave an interview to NEWSWEEK in which I appealed to Reagan to lift the sanctions, to change his policy toward Poland. In it I said that Solidarity is a thing of the past and that the battle in Poland today is being waged between the “hardliners” and the “liberals.” And if Reagan wanted to have a positive influence on the course of the situation, then he should support those who want reform, led by General Jaruzelski. For that I was dismissed from the party, which one can confirm from reading the grounds for that decision in TRYBUNA LUDU. In time the person who contributed substantially to the decision had to leave the top levels of authority, as did those who supported him. I remained outside the party and I function as a non-party Marxist who lives a normal life in a country that is not at all normal.

[Question] Your dismissal from the party occurred shortly after you—supposedly—proposed Gen Jaruzelski as a candidate for the Nobel Prize.

[Answer] That was not the case and had nothing to do with it. In 1982, shortly after the imposition of martial law in Poland, I took part in a discussion on Austrian television, in which some extremist proposed awarding some prize—not the Nobel—to Walesa. I said then that General Jaruzelski should be the one to get a prize for preserving Poland and peace in Europe.

[Question] Professor, in your recent works, in a time when it appears that capitalism is doing very well, you predict a crisis in that system, you foresee the occurrence of fundamental social and political changes in the next 20 years. And computers ostensibly will be at fault for all this.

[Answer] The scientific and technological revolution that is taking place in the world, in my opinion, will cause a universal cultural crisis—affecting not just capitalism—that will inevitably entail a change in socio-economic structures. The unemployment caused by structural automation will lead to the point where a basic income without work will be established for everyone, which will mean a new distribution of public income. So a new system must be born. The only question is, what kind? I think that if it were not for the profound crisis in the Communist movement in the world, it would be a socialist system.

[Question] But the working class, in the traditional sense, is disappearing in modern countries. What kind of socialist system could there be without a working class?

[Answer] That is the real question. What kind? After all, socialism need not be tied to the existence of a working class.

[Question] In that case, what happens to the dictatorship of the proletariat?

[Answer] It is no doubt impossible.

[Question] So on what basis do you say that it could be a socialist system?
On the day preceding the first day of the new year elections to the people's councils were published. The premises of the changes in the laws for conducting the elections held in 1984 and Sejm were heading in the same direction which was demonstrated in an exemplary way by the 2nd PRON Congress held in May 1987.

Other political powers, especially those concentrated in the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] were heading in the same direction which was demonstrated in an exemplary way by the 2nd PRON Congress held in May 1987.

The political will to accomplish changes in the election laws was supported by the experiences from the last council elections held in 1984 and Sejm elections held in 1983. The changes introduced at that time in the election laws are insufficient under today's politically altered conditions. The corrections should be far deeper and more extensive.

They are the result of the necessity for change in the functioning of the people's councils which in the second phase of the economic reform will play the part of the chief organizer of local self-government which is to solve the basic problems of life faced by city and village dwellers. The intended expansion of the council's powers, especially those on the base level, will only then have the effect expected by society when council members
who are fully competent and have the confidence of the voters choose to take advantage of this. They must in fact be elected by the voters.

The projected changes in the law are creating the conditions for true elections on a scale heretofore unknown in the daily political life of our country.

The Colleges and the Candidates

The institution which creates a certain mistrust in a part of society is the Electoral College. This mistrust was due to the often unclear composition of the Colleges, the closed door or secretive ways of conducting their work, and the lack of clear criteria in establishing the list of candidates.

These fears may be dismissed as groundless under the new practice which is being created - though at this time remains theoretical - by the projected changes in the law.

The composition of the colleges has been clearly set out in the law: 3/5 will be representatives of PRON and its signatories (PZPR, ZSL [United Peasant Party], SD [Democratic Party], PAX ["Pax" Publishing Institute], ChSS [Christian Social Association], and PZKS [Polish Catholic-Social Union] and 2/5 will be representatives from labor unions, farmers' organizations, veterans', women's, and youth groups. The proportions are due to the weight of each "member" of the college in the unarguably political process of elections.

The conduct of work by the colleges, as well as the criteria which they are to use, is to a large measure specified through the acceptance of the condition that the list of candidates may only contain the names of persons who have not had legitimate objections lodged against them at the pre-election meetings. The placement or non-placement of candidates on the list must be communicated by the college to the organizations that nominated the candidates. To put it simply - the decisions must be accompanied by an explanation.

In practice there exists a real factor which shapes the "cleansing of the electoral atmosphere." This will not completely eliminate a certain intimate nature of the debate which always surrounds personal matters but it protects against unsubstantiated or local influences on the decisions.

This has a greater meaning because it will significantly expand the circle of those lawfully authorized to nominate candidates for the people's councils. According to these premises the right to nominate candidates for the people's councils belongs to political, social and professional organizations, the provincial PRON councils, citizens' caucuses under the leadership of WRN [Vojvodship People's Council], and self-governments in cities and villages.

It is worthwhile to note not just the term "social organizations" (a concept that includes much) but first of all - if one can express it this way - the newly authorized institutions: the caucus and the self-government.

The citizens' consulting caucuses at the leading WRN will group unconventional people who wield influence in their community and who will no doubt wish to nominate as candidates to the people's council from among persons who were not taken into account at such occasions, who were troublesome to the local administration. But one has to pay attention to the opinions of the caucus.

Another new "contracting party in elections" is the self-government of the inhabitants of cities and villages. Practically every gathering of apartment development dwellers or villagers will be able to nominate their candidates, who will be equally treated in further eliminations. The massiveness of this opportunity in shaping the composition of the people's councils has its expression.

The introduced principle of consultation with the nominees for candidates before entering their names by the colleges onto the final list has, under existing conditions, a chance to become an institution of "pre-election", but one not overly burdened by formal demands.

We Will Choose

How will we choose the new people's council members? To this simple question the proposed changes in the law have an answer which is radically different from recent experience. This can be summed up as: "We will simply choose!" No other possibilities will be given to us! Why?

After the principle of having two candidates for each office is followed, the names on the voting list will be arranged in alphabetical order. (It is true that a second variant allows for the current method, or having the names listed in a sequence ordered by the electoral college. However, one should not expect that this would gain social approval in the consultations and in the further work on the law as this is an anachronism under the present day conditions).

And since the order will be alphabetical then the voter must clearly demonstrate his preferences for whom he is voting and whom he is crossing out.

The alphabetical order of the candidates' list, with the cancellation of preference in the election for the candidates listed first will create, as we read in the "Premises for Changes in the Election Law for People's Councils", conditions and incentive for an active stance by the electorate which would be based on the independent forming of opinion about the candidates and its expression during voting. This should also encourage an
increase in activity by the candidates seeking the same office. The expected result of this change in the election law is the strengthening of the councils' ties with the voters.

It is simply impossible to overvalue these new principles and unqualified arguments. An active stance by the voters, an independent opinion about the candidates, competition for votes, rivalry between the candidates... no, we have never had anything like this before! But it is coming, overturning the old stereotypes of election campaigns whose meaning was the acceptance of programs not of real persons who had specific values, competence, character... The choice of one from between two signifies this.

There is another consequence to this fact: the secrecy of elections. This is not just a right of the voter but his duty to enter a curtained cubicle where the ballot may be marked without any inhibition. Ballots without markings on them will not be counted for any candidate, they will be proof of non voting.

The proposals for changes which we have chosen to present testify eloquently to the political will for democratization of the election law which is one of the basic citizens' rights.

There are, of course, many more proposals. Just to mention the possibility of conducting new elections a month before the end of the old term of office for the people's councils, to escape a much too long space between terms (it is amazing that no one thought of such a simple solution before!), or the realization of the method for the recall of a council member by the voters, while the old processes were, through their complicated nature, essentially an unusable structure....

All these proposals for changes in the election laws for the people's councils will no doubt meet with a rousing reception among the council members and social activists. After all, they are the result of good and bad experiences that we have had up until now, and these changes must serve to promote the election of the very best peoples' council members and create good councils - competent, independent, and tightly linked to the local elections of the national government organs and regional self-government bodies.

Comments, resolutions, and opinions about the published proposals will enrich the work on the project for the new regulations - the election laws for people's councils - which the National Council will present shortly to the PRL Sejm.
We can only speak of introducing certain economic elements into our work. Which ones? First of all - accounting. We must know (because we do not) how much each procedure costs us, each operation in a hospital, what is the cost of each diagnosis, each x-ray and other tests; in short - everything, so that we can manage our money more effectively for the benefit of the sick.

Each hospital had a budget which was divided into a multitude of compartments, each with its specific purpose - not even a single zloty could be moved from one to another. If one ran out then there was a shortage, if there was money left in another then it would be wasted...

Each hospital had a budget which was divided into a multitude of compartments, each with its specific purpose - not even a single zloty could be moved from one to another. If one ran out then there was a shortage, if there was money left in another then it would be wasted...

The health service is not a factory which functions exclusively on the basis of efficiency, yield, and profit. Our main object of interest are sick people, and our profit lies in the help and relief that we can give them. We can only speak of introducing certain economic elements into our work. Which ones? First of all - accounting. We must know (because we do not) how much each procedure costs us, each operation in a hospital, what is the cost of each diagnosis, each x-ray and other tests; in short - everything, so that we can manage our money more effectively for the benefit of the sick.

The crux of the matter is: who pays for it. In this case it is society through taxes and the budget or the patients themselves. In my opinion, the main source of funds should still be the central budget and the regional budgets. The next source ZUS [Social Security Agency], the social insurance, must be activated and this requires a separate legislative solution. Further down there all kinds of foundations, charities, drives as I have already mentioned and finally, paid services rendered by the health service to enterprises which do not have their own staffs of doctors or lab personnel. At the very end are services paid for by the patients themselves. In what form? I do not see it for medical procedures or consultations but for example: for food service in a sanatorium or hospital, or for the services of a specialist requested by the patient...

What about medication?

There are two problems connected with drugs. First, their market price. In most cases this is low, much under their production costs. The result is that the producers find the production unprofitable, they produce for export and do not fill the domestic orders. The prices must be raised. The second is recompensation. I believe that medication should be dispensed for free, or for a small symbolic payment, to retirees, pensioners, the chronically ill, children, student youth, and hospital patients; this is obvious. Outside of this all should pay, with no exceptions.

Not accounting for their professional or enterprise privileges?

I said: all without exception. Any enclave of privilege is, in my opinion, socially harmful and cannot be tolerated.

In several projected schemes the authors propose the adoption of a system of refunds for health care and medication used by many West European countries. The patient pays his doctor and the insurance agency refunds the payment, or the doctor (analytical lab, x-ray etc.) renders the service and then bills the insurance. Was such a solution considered?

Yes. We came to the conclusion that this would require the establishment of a large financial-bookkeeping department which would have to be assisted by a computer system. This we probably cannot afford.
[Question] Now a question of an organizational nature: many doctors are demanding the dissolution of the ZOZ, they consider it a mistake, a bureaucracy, extremely expensive and unnecessary, one that even takes away the independence of walk-in clinic managers, hospital directors, ward heads who are not permitted anything but are responsible for everything. What is your comment to this?

[Answer] I do not think that we can afford a radical reorganization. This would require at least a two year transition period of disorder which the fragile state of our health service, nor of the patients, could not endure. But if a provincial or a city government decides that in their jurisdiction the ZOZ is not effective, and that they could do better without it, I will not object. In all, I am a supporter of local solutions which spring from the initiatives of the executors rather than of central directives which come from Warsaw. At this time I must qualify something: all this that I am telling you are my intentions which will be presented in the form of a project and this then will form the shape of an act of normalization.

[Question] But when will this finally happen?

[Answer] In the near future. I am still in the process of discussion and consultation, many physicians have a lot to say, I have spoken with many; I would like the project not to be just the work of the ministry functionaries but that it should come into being with the participation of those who must bring it to life. The project will be ready in March.

[Question] What do you think about cooperative and private health care? Do you agree with the proposals that speak about the formation of offices, walk-in clinics, and even hospitals using the resources from specially formed foundations by partnerships or physicians' cooperatives (real ones, not make-believe ones as it had been up to now) or by the [Catholic] Church? Could they be incorporated into the governmental health service by way of refunding a part of the cost of health care to its patients by the social insurance?

[Answer] I must reply in the negative; there can be no privatization of the social health service. There can be no takeovers of its functioning units or shrinkage in its cadres. The creation of new units is possible as long as they do not affect the existing national ones. If they act in concordance and help - why not? This would be very desirable and socially beneficial.

[Question] At the end, a shameful and sad matter - the pay scales in the health service. As is known, the personnel in white finally received a decent raise. From the other point of view are you aware that taking into consideration the rate at which all salaries have been going up, the average rate of pay in the health service is still below the average rate of pay for the entire economy? We don't know, but are the doctors and nurses supposed to be sad or glad...

[Answer] But I must say that the average raise (with derivatives and supplement for inflation) is 64 percent, that is 14,900, and could not be greater. You are familiar with the nation's economic condition, and you know that we have a hole in the budget. We need maximum savings in the budget; pay increases come from the budget and this is negative flow, they could not be any larger. I would like to add that in the expected economic reform there will be a mechanism for annual raises in pay for the health service, just like the teachers have. I am dreaming about a pay system where a physicians pay would be composed of two parts: one, the smaller part, based on the formal qualifications and length of service and a second variable part based on effectiveness which would be from 100 to 200 percent of the first. This would be a strong stimulus for good work and those who were the best, the exceptional, would earn a high salary which they deserve. But to bring this system to life we must show one limiting factor: we need a trifle, another 100 billion zloty... This is but another illustration of the proposition that the improvement in the health service is dependent on the improvement of the entire economy.

A moment ago I said "I am dreaming". To make this more exact, this idea is no longer among the proposals. We tried this "effectiveness" system in several units. It works superbly, even from the viewpoint of salary. I will only say that a director of a hospital, which was overloaded with work due to the closing of an adjacent facility, earned a monthly income of about 100,000 zloty.

I do not doubt that this system will be expanded in the future to encompass the entire health service. There must be enough money to expand employment. I would like to reach a point where the analytical laboratories would function for 20 hours a day, the walk-in clinics were open at least 20 hours a day, diagnostic equipment be utilized on a two shift basis. In a word: to eliminate the lines of patients in waiting rooms. At the same time the basic health services should assume 80 percent of the burden for patient care...

[Question] You are the third minister to tell me that it should be so. But it either does not want to or it can't?

[Answer] To do this we must have the right conditions and it must be worthwhile for us to do so. This is what we are trying to accomplish. This is for the good of the patients, who are now wandering between walk-in clinics, consultation rooms and consultants, and to give some relief to the overloaded hospitals - often due to the poor performance by those involved in basic medicine.

I think that despite the colossal shortages in materials, equipment, finances, the health service can perform a lot better. We have a really good cadre of doctors and
nurses. If these people were utilized in a sensible way, the proper conditions were created, they could be mobilized into action and they would give the desired result. We wish to create the conditions for this mobilization. Their names: decentralization of resources, decentralization of decisions. In another way: freedom to act and responsibility.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

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ROMANIA

Historical Overview of Ceausescu’s Political Career
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[Article by Ion Ardeleanu: “Heroical, Patriotic Work”]

[Text] All our people pay homage to their beloved leader, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, whose heroic work, dedicated with patriotic and communist devotion for over 55 years to the cause of developing the fatherland and building a socialist and communist society on Romania’s soil, has invested and continues to invest the contemporary history with its most profound sense. His life is a lofty model of devotion to the cause of the people and his monumental theoretical work is the basis for building the new socialist system in our country.

The date of 26 January 1918, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, whose heroic work, dedicated with patriotic and communist devotion for over 55 years to the cause of developing the fatherland and building a socialist and communist society on Romania’s soil, has invested and continues to invest the contemporary history with its most profound sense. His life is a lofty model of devotion to the cause of the people and his monumental theoretical work is the basis for building the new socialist system in our country.

The rebellion against injustice and against those who oppressed masses in general were waging intense struggles. Young Nicolae Ceausescu worked hard in various workshops and factories in Bucharest and learned the meaning of the workers’ great demonstrations and strikes. He joined the revolutionary movement body and soul.

“I struggled in the ranks of the revolutionary movement,” Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated, “and did my duty as a faithful soldier of the party and a devoted son of the people. I did everything I could for the cause of our nation’s well-being and happiness.” As early as in 1930, at the age of 12, he actively participated in the life and struggle of the revolutionary trade unionist youth, in the great deployment of workers’ forces, strikes and demonstrations, and protest meetings of the Bucharest workers organized in revolutionary trade unions. These events gave him complete faith in the workers class, something that had a decisive impact on his development as a relentless struggler for the cause of social and national liberation.

At the beginning of 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany and the threat of the brown plague gradually began, in the following years, to threaten Romania, too, the revolutionary and antifascist class actions gained an extensive scope. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was among the forefront ranks of those broad mass actions.

In 1933 he joined the Union of Communist Youth [UCY]. From the very beginning he distinguished himself by his revolutionary spirit and his devotion and dedication to the cause of the workers class. As a proof of the esteem and trust he enjoyed among the workers ever since his youth, in June 1933 he was elected delegate of the democratic youth of Bucharest to the conference of Romanian antifascist fighters. On that occasion, although he was only 15 years old, he was elected member of the National Antifascist Committee.

Shortly after that the Youth National Antifascist Committee was established, an organization that embodied the patriotic and democratic spirit of the young workers and their determination to energetically struggle against the fascist and revisionist threat, and for peace and understanding among nations. In the summer and fall of 1933, amid powerful class struggles in Bucharest and in other cities, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu organized and led many important youth actions and actions by the antifascist movement, and was among the leadership of that broad organization and of the National Antifascist Committee.

Nicolae Ceausescu the revolutionary activist brilliantly passed his first tests in the most demanding school—the school of revolutionary fighters. On 23 November 1933 he was arrested and brought to the Ilfov Court for “inciting to strike.” He was freed thanks to the protests signed by many workers and published in the democratic and progressive press of the time. The confrontation with the authorities further cemented his will and determination, and his revolutionary spirit.

On 27 June 1934 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was arrested in Craiova, where he had come as a youth representative to testify for the leaders of the workers struggles of January-February 1933. The young communist did not let himself be intimidated by police interrogation, and he resolutely stated that he had been “delegated by the Bucharest workers organizations to go to
Craiova in order to file those protests and make statements in favor of the Grivita railroad workers.” The Craiova authorities alerted the bodies of reprisal against him with the following notification: “We want to call your attention to the communist Nicolae Ceausescu so that you can take appropriate measures. He was guilty of expressing worker solidarity with the railway workers sentenced, was brought before the Court in Craiova, and returned to Bucharest upon being released.” In the language of the respective authorities that meant incessant harassment and persecution.

The string of arrests continued and, on 26 August 1934 he was again tried by the War Council of the Second Army Corps for disseminating “revolutionary material.” One month later, on 20 September 1934, the National Antifascist Committee held an important meeting at its headquarters on 9, Foișor Street in Bucharest. On the pretext that the meeting was held without prior authorization from the police commissioner, the repressive bodies ravaged the building and arrested the participants. After adding the description “dangerous communist agitator” to his record, the authorities ordered “the expulsion of the communist Nicolae Ceausescu and his shipment, under escort, to his native village.” Despite the interdiction and the supervision, the young communist activist did not put up with the house arrest. He returned to Bucharest shortly thereafter and resumed his revolutionary activities with unabated energy and dedication.

His rich experience in the area of antifascist struggle bore fruit not only in Bucharest, but in many other localities in the Arges, Prahova, Dimbovita, and Mehedinți Counties. Wherever the party needs were the greatest he was present with advice and actions; he organized, mobilized, and trained for struggle fresh cadres of youth communists and antifascist activists. As a participant in the 1935 meetings of the Mehedinti county organization of the UCY, held in the safe house on Vulturii Street in Drobeta-Turnu Severin, and as a communist youth instructor for Oltenia, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu channeled the youth revolutionary activities on the path of antifascist struggle, something that explains the efficient contribution of the revolutionary youth to the partial parliamentary elections campaign in that county, which was organized and led by the RCP in January-February of the following year. In that campaign, the united democratic and antifascist forces won a prestigious victory. In those circumstances, the themes of the conspirational meetings was marked by the emphasis that Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu placed on the need for workers and antifascist unity of action, and by his recommendation to combine the underground work with the legal opportunities offered by the activities of the mass and cultural organizations active in various areas. In 1935 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was successively secretary of the Bucharest organization of the UCY, of the Oltenia Regional Committee, and of the Prahova Regional Committee.

On 15 January 1936 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was arrested in the Ulmi commune, Dimbovita County, where he had attended an illegal meeting of the underground Dimbovita UCY organization. Together with other revolutionary activists he was referred to the War Council of the Brasov Fifth Army Corps.

The trial was held at the Military Court in Brasov on 27 May-5 June 1936. The accused were the young communists and UCY members and antifascist activists who had been arrested in the Ulmi commune and in other towns of Prahova and Dimbovita Counties in January 1936.

The Romanian public tensely followed the trial. Many major newspapers, such as DIMINEATA, ADEVARUL, ZORILE, KRONSTADTER ZEITUNG, GAZETA TRANSILVANIEI, and others sent press correspondents to report about the judicial frame-up and about the manner in which the accused had raised against the fascist threat in our country. A suggestive report by writer Eugen Jebeleanu, entitled “Impressions from a Trial,” appeared in the magazine CUVENT LIBER. The author had been profoundly impressed by the revolutionary dedication of the accusation. He penned an admirable portrait-document of the young communist Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, who had led the entire group of communist and antifascist activists. “Ceausescu,” the author noted, “is a child. But a child with a surprising intelligence and maturity... He is 19 years old, but he has seen and experienced as much as a 90 year old.”

The courage, determination, and principled political activities of the communist and antifascist activists, led by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, elicited an extensive reaction to the Brasov trial from the democratic public opinion, and bolstered the movement of solidarity with the jailed revolutionary activists.

The trial panel focused its attention on the leader of the accused, the revolutionary activist Nicolae Ceausescu, who boldly and resolutely rejected all the accusations, while at the same time revealing the abuses to which they had been subjected during their detention.
Because of his attitude of comradely solidarity, the revolutionary activist Nicolae Ceausescu was tried immediately and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment. On the last day of the trial, the prosecutor invoked the political heads of indictment featured in the trial order and particularly insisted on the fact that Nicolae Ceausescu was an "active member and good communist and antifascist propagandist, who had long been known as such to the security and justice bodies." Alongside the comrades with whom he had shared the ordeal of the trial, on 5 June 1936 the communist Nicolae Ceausescu was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment, a 2,000 lei fine, and 1 year of forced residence in his native village. To that were added the 6 months imprisonment to which he had been sentenced for solidarity with the a comrade sentenced during the trial.

On 15 August 1936 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, together with other communist and antifascist activists sentenced at the Brașov trial stepped through the gates of the Doftana prison. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out, the revolutionary struggle and life among the prison and camp collectives "were a good political and ideological school of education in the spirit of the principles of socialist and communist ethics and equity. The revolutionary activists and the communists put the interests of the masses above everything else, struggled against their oppressors, sacrificed everything, often sharing their last piece of bread, but held aloft the banner of the revolutionary struggle. I want to particularly mention the life that was organized in prisons in the spirit of the principles of communist ethics, which gave strength and power to the prisoners to withstand the persecutions, hunger, and miserable conditions, to hold high the banner of revolutionary struggle, and not for a moment to bow their heads in front of the exploiting classes."

On 8 December 1938, released from Doftana, the communist fighter Nicolae Ceausescu adjusted to the new conditions of activity with the enthusiasm and dedication characteristic of a revolutionary steeled in harsh class struggles. He was appointed by the party to guide the activities of various workers' trades. He struggled to ensure that they acquire a pronounced revolutionary character and promote the general and specific interests of the working people. At the same time, he began working to reorganize the UCY.

During this time, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's passion, dedication, and spirit of sacrifice combined with special organizational abilities, power of analysis, discrimination, and far-sightedness in the implementation of the party's strategies and tactics.

The scope of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's heroic revolutionary and communist activities is highlighted by the dramatic situation in which Romania found itself at the time following the deterioration of the international situation after Hitlerite Germany occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia and after the outbreak of World War II. At that time, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's presence expressed the decisive role of the communists among the workers, the youth, and the intellectuals for mobilizing them to struggle to defend Romania's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The impressive revolutionary value of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's actions and the prestige enjoyed by this relentless communist fighter among the party activists and among the workers were forcefully illustrated by the remarkable scope of the antifascist and anti-war demonstration held in Bucharest on 1 May 1939.

Thus, the organization of the intensive antifascist demonstrations of 1 May 1939 was among the efforts made by the communists to alert people to the fascist threat and to mobilize all the Romanian people in the resolute antifascist struggle in defense of major national interests. These landmarks of the activities of the RCP and the other revolutionary forces, and the patriotic and antifascist mood of the masses highlight the organic link between the scope and character of the demonstrations of May 1st 1939, and the entire political-organizational work carried out by the communists to turn them into a high form of expression of the most important aspirations for freedom and peace of the masses and of the entire nation.

The government wanted to give the May 1st 1939 demonstrations an official character of support for the monarchy. At the same time, it wanted them as an expression of national solidarity at a time when the Romanian people saw their free and independent existence threatened. The authorities allowed the holding of a general congress of the guilds, meetings of representatives of clerks and artisans from the entire country, and street demonstrations on May 1st 1939. Indoor meetings and field outings were authorized in 84 other localities.

The merit of the RCP and of the Bucharest party organizations was to have carried out intensive organizational and propaganda work, through which they succeeded in transforming the authorized events into forceful demonstrations of protest against the royal dictatorship and the danger of fascism and war, and for safeguarding Romania's national independence and sovereignty. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu played a decisive part during the period of preparations. He repeatedly demonstrated his revolutionary determination and intransigence, tact and broad political vision, and exceptional organizational talents. An essential contribution to the organization of the demonstrations was made within the Bucharest youth organization by Comrade Elena Petrescu (Ceausescu).

The events of May 1st 1939, which unfolded under the imprint of the unity of action among communists, socialists, and social-democrats, crowned the extensive political, organizational, and propaganda activities carried out by the RCP.
On 1 May 1939 Bucharest witnessed one of the most impressive events; as SCINTEIA reported, "thousands upon thousands of workers, artisans, clerks, and intellectuals, working, peasant, and intellectual women, masses of young antifascist workers" united their voices and linked arms to form a "genuine brotherhood of antifascist struggle." The demonstrators firmly spoke out against any concessions toward the revisionist fascist states and for a policy of alliance with the democratic countries. Everywhere they chanted: "We want respect for our borders! Long live Romania's territorial integrity! Let us stand up to the aggressor! We want resistance against the planned attack of the fascist powers! We do not want war! We want alliance with the democratic countries!" Once again it was thus proven that the workers can respond enthusiastically when it is a matter of showing feelings and demonstrating for an ideal shared not only by the workers, but by the entire nation.

Being among the few demonstrations held in Europe after fascism took the offensive after Munich, the revolutionary events of May 1st 1939 in Romania elicited a strong echo abroad; major newspapers in various countries carried reports and commentaries highlighting the scope and significance of the demonstration of the Bucharest workers within the general antifascist struggle of the Romanian people. Thus, IZVESTYIA of May 4th 1939 and Britain's DAILY HERALD of May 2d 1939 reported that "20,000 workers participated in the May 1st demonstrations in Bucharest. The demonstration was staged under the banner of antifascist slogans." The Swiss magazine RUNDSCHAU of 25 May 1939 stated that "The May 1st demonstrations held in Bucharest and other cities underscored the intensified antifascist activities of the masses and the increased influence of the communist party... Many billboards gave voice to the need to defend the country's independence and integrity, demanding the abrogation of the economic treaty with Germany, and alliance with France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union."

The antifascist demonstration of May 1st 1939 was an earnest signal sent by Romania to Europe and to the world, urging united efforts to preempt the unleashing of the world war by Hitlerite Germany. To the progressive international conscience it presented the image of a nation profoundly attached to the ideals of national freedom and independence.

At the time, one of the most important tasks of the RCP was to rebuild the revolutionary organization of the youth. The reorganization of the UCY was entrusted to a central commission, at the head of which the party leadership appointed the communist activist Nicolae Ceausescu. The conclusions and lessons culled from the analysis of the political campaign to prepare and hold the great antifascist and antiaxis demonstration of May 1st 1939 in Bucharest, presented by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the commission in charge of rebuilding the communist youth organization, served as the basis for the activities subsequently carried out along this line.

In recognition of the political maturity and dedication to the cause of the workers class which distinguished him in the revolutionary, antifascist movement, and of his essential contribution to the reorganization of the UCY, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was elected secretary of the UCY.

The first document signed by the UCY Central Committee elected at the reorganization conference was an appeal to the youth, which stated: "Young workers, the UCY calls you to the forefront of the struggle, to the leadership of the Romanian youth... to struggle for the professional, cultural, and political rights and liberties of the exploited youth."

The reorganized UCY forged ahead with greater dedication, mobilizing and reorganizing the young workers for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the masses and of all the Romanian people amid conditions that had become extremely difficult after the expansion of Hitlerite aggression and the increased revisionist threat, which endangered the independence and national existence of the Romanian state and people.

The determination with which Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu continued on his revolutionary path and his intensive activities caused him to be tried in absentia on 22 March 1939 and 16 March 1940. For all the progressive and democratic forces, primarily for the RCP, the establishment of the military-fascist dictatorship in September 1940, Romania's joining the Axis, and the fact that the country was pushed into the Hitlerite war on the USSR against the people's wishes, marked the beginning of a period in which the anticomunist and antidemocratic reprisals were intensified to the maximum.

Continuously pursued by the repressive authorities under sentence no. 2,696 of the Military Court of the Second Army Corps of Bucharest, on 22 August 1939 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was sentenced in absentia to 3 years imprisonment, 3 years of house arrest, a 20,000 lei fine, and 5,000 lei in court expenses. It was only in the summer of 1940, on 29th July, that the State Security police managed to arrest Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in an illegal party house on 19, Bibescu Street. He was tried immediately and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, and so began the ordeal of years spent in prison for the cause of Romania's wellbeing. He was first put into compulsory quarantine at Vacaresti, then sent to the Jilava prison (August 1st 1940-February 20th 1942), and to Caransebes (February 21st 1942-July 21st 1943). Under order no. 31,050 of the Ministry of the Interior, between August 9th 1943 and August 4th 1944 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu—labeled a "notorious communist"—was detained in the Targu Jiu camp for political prisoners. In the leadership of the camp party organization, alongside other reliable cadres of the communist party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu made an important contribution to hammering out the political and tactical line of the camp party organization and to
Preparing the events that culminated in the 23 August 1944 antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation.

During the heated days of August 1944, together with other party militants, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu led the ranks of the struggle for the fatherland's liberation. On behalf of the RCP, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu spoke at the big workers meetings held in Bucharest on 30-31 August 1944. Comrade Elena Ceausescu, too, was among the leaders of those major workers events. The UCY leadership was entrusted to Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the communist activist whose organizational experience, working power, spirit of discrimination, and political competence had already been brilliantly realized in the revolutionary activities of the underground period. As secretary general of the UCY, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu worked relentlessly to broadly involve the young generation in the great struggles that followed. All forces and energies were put at the service of the revolution: the armed struggle, revolutionary passion, creative elan, talent, and enthusiasm. The first president of socialist Romania of today intensively worked to organize and dynamize the patriotic potential of the youth, mobilizing them to the struggle against the fascist enemy, for the complete liberation of the fatherland, for defeating the Nazi Reich, and for laying the foundations of a better future for the entire nation.

During those years, characterized by the unprecedented upsurge of the revolutionary struggle aimed at putting the state power in the hands of the workers class, at the democratization of the country, and at rebuilding the economy destroyed by the war, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was among the front lines. Simultaneously, he carried out responsible tasks in the Dobruja and Oltenia party organizations. At the RCP National Conference of 16-21 October 1945 Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was elected member of the RCP Central Committee, and in November 1946 he was elected deputy for Olt to the Assembly of Deputies. In May 1948 he was appointed deputy minister at the Ministry of Agriculture, and in March 1950 he became deputy minister of defense. Until 1954 he also led the Army Higher Political Directorate. In April 1954, at a plenum of the RCP Central Committee, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, member of the Politbureau, was elected secretary of the RCP Central Committee.

The Ninth RCP Congress was held on 19-24 July 1965. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu presented the Central Committee report on the activities carried out by the party in the period between the eighth and ninth congresses. The report was a document of an exceptional political, ideological, theoretical, and practical importance which marked the beginning of a new stage in all the party and state activities and opened up the way for unprecedented rejuvenating changes. The congress elected Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu at the head of the party leadership.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the most beloved son of the people, was elected to the high position of president of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Our people and the entire party unanimously recognize and appreciate Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's invaluable theoretical and practical contribution to establishing and successfully achieving the economic basis of socialism in Romania and to elaborating and promoting the most viable ways and solutions for the fatherland's development and for its resolute progress along the path of socialism.

The historic era opened up by the ninth party congress, the richest in achievements in our entire national history, is decisively dominated by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's strong personality. It bears the imprint of his revolutionary thinking and actions, which are based on the creative application of the principles of historical and dialectical materialism and of scientific socialism to the specific conditions prevailing in our country.

Ennobling our history with his immortal work, at the head of the party and the country Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu wisely, clear-sightedly, and dynamically guides the destiny of the Romanian people in the contemporary era. He symbolizes the mind and feelings of the people, their ideals of freedom, peace, and progress, and Romania's present and future destiny itself. The Nicolae Ceausescu era embodies the fresh breath of the heights to which the country has been raised. At the same time, it is the Romanian people's source of confidence in socialist Romania's continuous and vigorous progress, and the source of eternally new and lasting historic achievements. In all his aspirations and in everything that he pursues with special scientific boldness, characteristic of the personality of an untiring militant for the cause of the workers class and the people, the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu directs his actions and deeds at Romania's progress, independence, and sovereignty.

On this January 26th 1988 anniversary dear to the party, the workers class, the peasantry, and the intellectuals, all the people pay homage to the leader, the RCP secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, being fully engaged in implementing the program designed to build the most just systems—the socialist and communist systems on the beloved soil of the fatherland.

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Dissident Petrescu Interviewed by French Paper
35190040 Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Feb 88 p 6

[Article by Dan Petrescu, a Romanian teacher and writer: "Anatomy of Romanian Difficulties." Arrested for having given an interview to LIBERATION (27 January 1987 issue), he was recently released, but is under house arrest in Iasi (northeastern region of Romania). For the time being, his phone has been disconnected.]
In an article secretly taken out of Romania, dissident Dan Petrescu wonders how his country reached a crisis which appears endless. Confronted by the moral decay of a people, the product of a regime stricken by paranoid delirium, how does one resist?

Forgetting criteria and definitions, let us note at a glance the solid entrenchment of Romania under the sign of evil. It involves a multiple and generalized evil, which goes from the ugliness of towns to people's faces, the destruction of the language to those of institutions, and a systematic damper on values to the appearance of a new human type adapted, through a total absence of scruples and moral complexity, to events perfectly unsuitable to any form of social normality.

How can a political regime, isolated in its own delirium and apparently condemned by the majority of the population, maintain itself in power? Firstly, through highly developed repressive mechanisms. However, the full power of the secret police has already become a cliche, the ultimate proof being that almost all of the opponents of the regime are still alive.

Romania must confront an extremely complex reality; namely, corruption, at all levels; economic, political, social and moral. In other words, besides the high officials, there are people—more than one might suspect—privileged by the regime; it must be acknowledged that, in our country's current living conditions, privileges begin very low: Some are satisfied with a job ensuring them a full pay, others are happy if an acquaintance takes them twice a month to some shop, well camouflaged under the party wing, from which they come out with 10 kilos of meat. Refinement begins when one learns how to go about getting coffee and cigarettes. In a process of rising devaluation (the "price" of an ordinary consultation at the Iassy polyclinic went from 800 to 1,000 lei, etc.), money gives way to barter and to exchanging contacts, with the result that, humanly speaking, due to the general poverty, we are all capable at some point of sullying our conscience.

We thus reach a vicious circle which feeds upon its own operation and expands intensively as it operates: The system makes the appearance of moral decadence possible and moral decadence maintains the system. At the top, it is represented by the reign of the Ceausescu clan. That the clan has headed the country for such a long time is due to the very foundations of the system, abnormal in their essence; if a less than second-rate individual and his family show themselves capable of maintaining themselves at the helm of a European nation, a new pattern of social success is launched and hierarchically transmitted to the lower echelons: All standards are reversed, social selection being implemented in the image of the person who orders it. In that context, evil begins at the top.

The pattern of rewarded evil is contagious; it has, in particular, the ability of using advantageously all that is opposed to it; the regime hates "cases," but if they surface anyway, they will be manipulated by changing the situation to their benefit, these cases being very well rated in the relations with the free world; if need be, one can influence their appearance and, at times, they can be exported, usually when negotiating the clause of most favored nation for Romania.

The role of the intelligentsia is also compromised; 10 years ago, or even longer than that, extreme specialization, which was at the same time a way of refusing ideological indoctrination, was the form of resistance attempted by the most honest of our intellectuals. Today, it is no longer possible for several reasons: The free distribution of information is greatly hindered; the level of the people's poverty condemns any attempt to abstain; and the best books published, even if they are dictated by an attitude different from that of the regime, do, in fact, justify it, by serving as propaganda. Furthermore, the regime is viewing the writing profession with increasing disdain, for its civil servants have also begun to write, directly or through a third party, and they have no difficulty publishing their work. The range of people engaged in the epidemic of this type of writing is broad: From the official censor supervising a literary review, who, on the occasion of an anniversary of the presidential family, discovers a desire to become a "versifier" whose few childish verses, that no one has had the courage to refuse, are published on the front page; to the childish novels signed by Dumitru Popescu and never proposed for discussion by our critics. And what could be said about the "aphorist," Marin Voiculescu, the author of a large unpremeditated comedy, whom no one has had the courage to touch, for he is a professor at the "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy?

However, to relate in details the evil endured in Romania is already to rationalize it excessively. Once described and understood, the evil is half accepted. The simple fact of analyzing it succinctly to make it understandable is contaminating; the unavoidably intellectual means of working out the problem of evil suffer from a certain utopia attending the intellectual process in general, because, for an intellectual, everything is resolved and completed once his discourse has been delivered in the most accomplished form that he can produce. Despite any illusion of having settled any given issue in whatever domain once and for all, the intellectual's victory is purely rhetorical. Furthermore, the intellectual's discourse has a certain civility which is uniquely its own, and, when applied to inhumanity, does it not mean that inhumanity is being tamed by capturing it in "civilized" forms?

We must confess that, tormented by these scruples, two images of the Romanian social reality of these past few weeks have haunted us with their absolute contrast; we will therefore describe them as dryly as possible, for, as intrinsic raw images, they escape categories and concepts but, on the other hand, by their radical difference, they could provoke the spark which could guide us toward a better life.
In the autumn of 1987, therefore, during the usual deliberations of the leadership cadres in the rural community, the peasants were advised by their representatives not to contract to deliver their plum crops to the state, for the state had no obligation to ensure their sustenance (bread at the most, they were told, with the added proviso that even for bread it was not too certain); consequently, they should keep their plums and dry them, in order to have something to eat this winter.

In Brasov, on 15 December 1987, workers who had been taken by force to the polls upon leaving work, so as to be able to claim later that they had enthusiastically participated in the elections, stormed the regional party headquarters where they found a table richly laid out with food for the local officials' victory celebration at the polls. Hence their anger.

There is only one conclusion; nothing more is to be expected from the present regime; on the contrary, all these surfeited people with servants' souls have entered a stage of blatant cynicism; they defy the entire world with their impertinence and the more we continue to kneel, the more they hold us in contempt.

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Ministry for Contracting, Acquisition of Agricultural Products
27000052 Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 2, 20 Jan 88 pp 1-6

[Text]

Decree of the State Council Concerning the Establishment of the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products

The State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1. To coordinate and improve the contracting and acquisition of agricultural products, the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is established on this date. The ministry shall assume the activities of contracting and acquisition from the Ministry of the Food Industry and Acquisition of Agricultural Products which will change its name to the Ministry of the Food Industry, and from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry and the Ministry of Light Industry.

Article 2. The responsibilities and the organization and functioning methods of the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products and of the Ministry of the Food Industry will be established by State Council decree.

Nicolae Ceausescu, President
The Socialist Republic of Romania
Bucharest, 18 January 1988 No 2
Article 5. The Ministry of Agriculture is to ensure planned agricultural production in socialist agricultural enterprises and to take all necessary measures so that these units respect established norms in contracting to deliver produce to the central state reserve and execute, on time and in conditions of highest quality, the obligations to deliver the contracted agricultural products.

Article 6. The peoples councils are responsible for all activities of the socialist agricultural enterprises and for those of other agricultural producers. They are to meet the territorial plan for agriculture, to fulfill the tasks regarding the creation of a central state reserve of agricultural products, to carry out the program for self-provision, to properly organize and execute agricultural work and to ensure appropriate and efficient land use in their territorial-administrative enterprises.

The peoples councils are to ensure that the activities of state and cooperative enterprises in signing and fulfilling contracts for delivery of agricultural products are carried out in appropriate fashion. They are to monitor and supervise adherence to legal stipulations in this regard.

The committees and executive bureaus of peoples councils are to establish and communicate to every member farm of agricultural production cooperatives and to every private producer, the plans for breeding and raising animals and the plan of obligations to contract and deliver agricultural products to the central state reserve. They are also to maintain data on these obligations.

Article 7. The unique state and cooperative agro-industrial councils coordinate and direct the economic activity of all socialist units within their structure. They are responsible for all agricultural work being done on time and in proper fashion as well as for all agricultural units to completely fulfill their obligations to deliver vegetal and animal agricultural products according to the plan and the stipulations for contracts signed within the contacting system.

Article 8. The state agricultural enterprises are to deliver to the central state reserve, all of the agricultural production realized.

The cooperative agricultural enterprises are to contract and deliver to the central state reserve the agricultural production realized, except for those quantities set aside as payment in kind to the members of the cooperatives and to other categories of workers according to the law.

Members of agricultural production cooperatives and private producers are to contract for and deliver to the central state reserve, the quantities of agricultural products established by law.

Article 9. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to direct all necessary technical and organizational measures at the socialist agricultural enterprises and at other agricultural producers so that planned production is achieved and the obligations to deliver to the central state reserve the vegetal and animal products contracted for are fully met.

Article 10. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to direct, lead and supervise the activities of its subordinate organizations and, as plan designee, is responsible for the fulfillment of the plan in its area of responsibility.

Article 11. The socialist organizations which contract to acquire agricultural products are to take possession, on time and under the best possible conditions, of all vegetal and animal products contracted for as well as of other quantities of products offered by agricultural producers at established prices. They are to grant to socialist agricultural enterprises and other producers the incentives established by law to stimulate increased agricultural production and to enrich the central state reserve with the greatest possible quantities of agro-food products.

Article 12. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to function as the central coordinating body for the activities in its jurisdiction carried out in units subordinate to other central or local state organizations as well those of cooperative and mass organizations.

Article 13. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to ensure that laws, decrees and decisions of the Council of Ministers are followed in the course of its activities.

The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to cooperate with other ministries and central bodies as well as with local organizations in fulfilling its obligations.

Chapter II

Article 14. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to execute within its jurisdiction the responsibilities established by this decree.

Section I

Regarding the contracting and acquisition of agricultural products for the central state reserve:
Article 15. As the sole contractor, the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to organize and ensure the signing of contracts with socialist agricultural enterprises and other producers for delivery to the central state reserve of the following products:

a) cereals, leguminous peas and beans, oil-bearing seeds, technical plants, flax fibers and hemp, as well as cotton from all categories of producers;

b) legumes, fruits, potatoes, and table grapes both for the domestic market and export, from all categories of producers;

c) hay, from private and other producers;

d) straw, reeds and cornstalks, from all categories of producers;

e) medicinal and aromatic plants, both cultivated and wild, from all categories of producers;

f) wool, hides from cows, sheep, goats and pigs, pelts from sheep, goats, mink, rabbits and other small animals, and animal hairs and silkworm cocoons from all categories of producers;

g) fowl, eggs, domestic rabbits and other small animals from members of agricultural production cooperatives and from private producers;

h) honey and apiarian products from all categories of producers.

Article 16. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products bears total responsibility for the contracting and acquisition of agricultural products for the central state reserve, and as such:

a) is to establish, along with other interested central organizations, the territorial allocation of the tasks to create the central state reserve of agricultural products called for in the unified national plan of socio-economic development;

b) is to oversee the material base of contracts to deliver agricultural products to the central state reserve, the placement of crops and the cultivation of planned acreage, the provision and use of varieties and hybrids with superior biological qualities, and the execution, according to established norms, of agricultural work—preparation of the soil, sowing at the optimum time, appropriate thinning, fertilization with natural and chemical fertilizers according to the plan, the fight against diseases, pests and weeds, and the maintenance of crops;

c) is to maintain comprehensive data on contracts and deliveries to the central state reserve;

d) is to organize comprehensive data by storage facilities of all production in its area of responsibility;

Article 17. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, together with the Ministry of Agriculture, is to carry out and is to be responsible for the evaluation of crops in the field, according to the law, and for the accuracy of the data in the evaluation and in the balances of products maintained.

Article 18. In its function as sole bearer of responsibility for contracting and the acquisition of agricultural products, the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products can authorize the Central Union of Cooperatives for the Production, Acquisition and Delivery of Goods, the Ministry of Silviculture, and the Association of Beekeepers to carry out in their enterprises, the contracting and acquisition of certain animal and vegetal agricultural products.

Article 19. The Central Union of Cooperatives for the Production, Acquisition and Delivery of Goods and other central organizations are, in conformity with the mandate delegated to them and together with the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, to be responsible for the total fulfillment of obligations in the contracting and delivery of agricultural products to the central state reserve.

The organizations which are to contract and acquire agricultural products in accordance with the mandate received, must sign economical delivery contracts with the beneficiary organizations for the quantities stipulated in the plan.

Section II

Regarding the receiving, storing, safeguarding, preserving, and delivery of agricultural products:

Article 20. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is to be responsible for the entire activity of receiving, storing, safeguarding and preserving agricultural products for the central state reserve. To this end:

a) it is to ensure that there be full takeover of all agricultural products in its domain destined for delivery to the central state reserve, of those products destined for the stations for mechanized agriculture, as payment in kind for work done for the agricultural production cooperatives and for other producers, as well as of those payments in kind left for the grist mills;

b) it is to ensure the proper functioning of silos, of its own receiving and storage stations, as well as the acceptance of the quantity and quality of agricultural products in its jurisdiction that are to be turned over to the central state reserve, according to law;
c) it is to supervise and bear responsibility for the quantity and quality of products deposited in its own storage facilities and to take measures to guard against any loss or depreciation;

d) it is to establish technical norms regarding the storage, safeguarding and preservation of vegetal agricultural products, that will be binding for all organizations which store such produce;

e) it is to supervise the manner in which cooperatives for the production, acquisition and delivery of goods and in which other organizations store and safeguard vegetal agricultural products from the population on the basis of its mandate;

f) it is to ensure, according to the law, delivery to the beneficiaries of agricultural products in its jurisdiction;

g) it is to ensure the delivery for export, of agricultural products in its jurisdiction according to the terms and conditions established in the foreign contracts;

h) it is to supervise and take measure to ensure adherence to legal norms concerning the transport of vegetal and animal products in its jurisdiction;

i) it is to supervise in agricultural production enterprises, respect for the destinations of production which are established through audits, and to turn over to the central state reserve the undeclared portions left over.

Section III

Regarding the creation and maintenance of the state reserve of agro-food products:

Article 21. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is responsible for the creation and maintenance, in accordance with the law, of the state reserve of agro-food products. To this end:

a) it is to ensure that the state reserve obtains agro-food products required to rapidly and efficiently satisfy certain needs of the national economy;

b) it is to draft proposals for the nomenclature, levels, minimum stocks, maintenance regulations, and annual, 5-year and long range plans for the composition of the state reserves of agro-food products;

c) it is to establish, annually, together with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Food Industry, the varieties of agro-food products to be placed on the approved listing for inclusion in the state reserve;

d) it is to direct and supervise storage activities and maintenance of agro-food products and it is to establish, in accordance with the law, the annual plan for replenishing them;

e) it is to review the proposals of other ministries regarding withdrawals, either as loans or grants, from the state reserve of certain quantities of agro-food products; it is to execute the approved loans and it is to ensure that these loans are repaid within the established time;

f) it is to ensure the integrity and safeguard the quality of state reserve agro-food products and it is to establish, with the concurrence of producing and consuming ministries, the conditions and terms for safeguarding the quality of products;

g) it is to establish mandatory technical norms regarding storage in the state reserve of agro-food products maintained in its own units or in those of other organizations;

h) it is to propose construction of new storage facilities in concert with the rate of growth of agro-food stocks in the state reserve and rational use of existing storage facilities.

Section IV

Regarding concentrated fodder production:

Article 22. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, has the following responsibilities in the area of concentrated fodder production:

a) it is to ensure concentrated fodder production, the production of concentrated protein, vitamins and minerals, and biologically stimulating fodders, in the approved varieties;

b) it is to ensure the provision of raw materials necessary for the production of concentrated fodders;

c) it is to ensure the delivery of concentrated fodder to the socialist agricultural enterprises entitled to receive them, in accordance with the law;

d) it is to ensure strict respect of the amounts and consumption approved for each category of fodder and it is to verify the manner in which the cultivated concentrated fodders are used;

e) monthly, it is to present for approval, together with the Ministry of Agriculture, usage proposals for the concentrated fodders and sources for meeting this usage.

Section V

Other responsibilities:

Article 23. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products has the following further responsibilities:

a) it is to draft its own annual, 5-year and long-term plans and it is to allocate to its subordinate units, the economic and financial plan indicators;
b) it is to be responsible for developing and implementing raw material consumption norms; it is to take measures to continuously reduce the consumption of materials, energy and labor and it is to ensure the recovery and reuse of recyclable materials;

c) it is to develop technical and economic documentation for investment; it is to be responsible for planned construction under state control as well as for capital repairs;

d) it is to develop proposals for standardizing and improving storage spaces, equipment and machinery for receiving, conditioning and safeguarding agricultural products;

e) it is to develop proposals for state standards, rules and regulations concerning the quality of products in its nomenclature, and technologies for the storage, conditioning, safeguarding and conservation of these products;

f) it is to organize and coordinate cooperative activities and economic, technical and scientific cooperation with other ministries and central organizations in the country, as well as with foreign partners, within its area of activity;

g) it is to develop programs of scientific research in its area of activity, to ensure their implementation and use in production; it is to concern itself with the introduction of technical scientific and economic advances in its subordinate units, and it is to direct inventions and innovations;

h) it is to determine required transportation facilities for its subordinate units, according to established norms;

i) it is to analyze periodic reviews and critiques of its subordinate units and to organize those which refer to the activities of the ministry as a whole;

j) it is to exercise, according to the law, powers concerning prices and tariffs in its jurisdiction;

k) it is responsible for applying party and state policy concerning personnel and pay, to which end:

— it is to establish unitary criteria for the selection, training, advanced training and promotion of personnel in its jurisdiction and it is to oversee the application of these criteria;

— it is to establish its long-term personnel requirements and it is to ensure, along with the Ministry of Education and Training, the training, professionalization and multi-qualification of personnel in its jurisdiction;

— it is to staff its own apparatus; it is to name the leadership organizations in the units directly subordinate to it, in accordance with the law;

— it is to participate in the development of proposals regarding improvements to the pay scale, organizing studies in this area;

— it is to ensure even application within its jurisdiction of norms concerning pay by scale, piecemeal, and by the job;

— it is to establish, according to the law, measures to protect the workers and to ensure the best possible working conditions to prevent work-related accidents and illnesses at its subordinate units; it is to establish general measures to continuously improve the working and living conditions of its personnel;

— it is to meet any other responsibilities set by law.

Chapter III

Organization and Operations

Article 24. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is headed by a leadership council which decides general matters regarding the activity of the ministry; its executive bureau provides the collective leadership of the ministry's strategic activities and ensures that the decisions of the leadership council are implemented.

The ministry's leadership council and its executive bureau, which are both deliberative bodies, are organized and operate according to State Council Decree No 76/1973 regarding the management of ministries and other central organizations of state administration based on the principle of collective leadership.

Article 25. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is lead by a minister and three deputy ministers.

The deputy ministers are named by presidential decree and their responsibilities are established by the ministry's leadership council.

Article 26. The minister represents the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products in its relations with the other organs and organizations of the country as well as in its international relations.

Article 27. Within the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products there function, according the State Council Decree No 78/1973, a technical-economic council which is a working body attached to the collective leadership organizations of the ministry.

Article 28. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products has the following organizational structure:

a) The General Economic Directorate for the Contracting, Acquisition, Receiving, Safeguarding and Delivery of Cereals and Technical Plants;
b) The General Economic Directorate for the Contracting, Acquisition, Receiving, Safeguarding and Delivery of Legumes, Potatoes, Fruits and Medicinal Plants;

c) The General Economic Directorate for the Contracting, Take Over, Safeguarding, Processing and Delivery of Fodders;

d) The Economic Directorate for the Contracting, Acquisition, Receiving, Safeguarding and Delivery of Hides, Furs, Wool, Flax and Hemp Fibers, Cotton and Other Products;

e) The State Reserve Service for Agro-Food Products;

f) The Plan, Finance and Prices Directorate;

g) The Organizational, Work Rules, Pay, Personnel-Training and Juridical Service;

h) The Ministry Supervisory Body;

i) The Technical-Material Supply and Transport Service;

j) The Mechanical-Energy and Investments Service;

k) The Secretariat-Administrative Service.

The organizational structure by work unit and the maximum number of personnel in the ministry are as given in the annexes No 1 and No 2. (Footnote *) (The annexes will be provided to the institutions involved.)

The directorates listed in paragraphs a-d above operate on the principle of self-management and economic and financial self-administration; they are juridical persons and fulfill responsibilities which, by law, are ascribed to centrals.

The responsibilities and operating principles of the divisions of the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products are established, according to statutes, through the organization and operation rule which is approved by the ministry’s leadership council.

Article 29. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products has subordinate to it the units listed in annex No 3.

Article 30. Within the directorates listed in article 29, paragraphs a-d, in the organizational structure of the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, there will be a central agent to perform contracting; the agent will have functions similar to an inspector general and primary inspector of the specialty, as described in annex VI, chapter I, paragraph A, positions 30 and 31 of the Law of Compensation According to the Quality and Quantity of Work, No 57/1974.

Article 31. The organizational structures of the enterprises for the contracting, acquisition and safeguarding of agricultural products, approved in State Council Decree No 162/1973 which establishes structural norms for economic enterprises, include a state agent’s office to monitor the holdings of the central state reserve and an accounting and reports office.

The state agent’s office will have one or two positions for every state and cooperative agro-industrial council.

The function of the state agent is similar to the functions of principal inspectors I and II in the county inspectorate for quality control of products, as described in annex VI, chapter IV, paragraph A, position 2 of Law No 57/1974.

Article 32. Personnel in the ministry supervisory corp and in the state agent’s office as described in articles 30 and 31, have the power to apply the contravening sanctions established in Law No 4/1970 regarding the organization of production and labor in agriculture and in other normative acts in their area of jurisdiction.

In cases where encroachments on the law have the character of violations, the personnel in the ministry supervisory corp and in the state agent’s office are obliged to inform law-enforcement agencies.

Article 33. Salary and, where appropriate, management compensation for personnel in ministry management and for managers and those performing technical, economic and other specialty work are provided in accordance with fulfillment of the indicators listed in annex No 4. (Footnote *) (The annex will be provided to the institutions involved.)

Article 34. Effective on the date of this decree, the following organizations are disestablished:

a) The Central for Legumes and Fruit, Bucharest, within the Ministry of Agriculture, The General Economic Directorate for Horticulture;

The agricultural production activities of units subordinate to the Central for Legumes and Fruit, Bucharest, along with all agricultural lands and other related possessions are removed from the Ministry of Agriculture system.

The fruit and legume processing activities that are executed outside of storage facilities, along with other related possessions, are removed from the Ministry of the Food Industry system;

b) The Bucharest Concentrated Fodder Central, subordinate to the Ministry of the Food Industry and of the Acquisition of Agricultural Products, The General Economic Directorate for the Acquisition of Agricultural Products;
c) The Trust for the Acquisition and Pre-processing of Animal Raw Materials, Bucharest, subordinate to the Ministry of Light Industry;

d) The Bucharest "Plafar" Trust, subordinate to the Ministry of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industries.

Article 35. The activities of the centrals and trusts which were disestablished in accordance with article 34, as well as their subordinate units, are transferred to the similar economic directorates in the organizational structure of the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products.

Article 36. Annex No 2, the Organizational Structure of Enterprises for Legumes and Fruits, of State Council Decree No 434/1986, is modified and superseded by annex No 5. (Footnote *) (The annex will be provided to the institutions involved.)

Article 37. The complexes for producing, exploiting and processing legumes and fruits within the production structures of legume and fruit enterprises have their designators changed to "complexes for the contracting and acquisition of legumes and fruits;" they will have as their object the contracting and acquisition of legumes, fruits, potatoes and table grapes, as well as the processing of certain products in their storage facilities; they maintain their previously approved organizational grade levels.

Article 38. The assets and liabilities established in the 31 December 1987 audits, along with the economic-financial plan indicators and the contracts in force, of the units disestablished, as well as their related activities which were taken over as set down in this decree, are transferred from the ministries which had these units and activities in their subordination, to the ministries which assumed them based on protocol.

The personnel who transfer to the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, as well as those who transfer to other units as a result of this decree's provisions are considered transferred in the interest of service.

Article 39. Personnel transferred in the interest of service or who are assigned to lower paying positions in the same organizations as a result of the provisions of this decree, are entitled to the rights designated in article 21 of State Council Decree No 162/1973.

Article 40. The provisions of State Council Decree No 367/1980 concerning certain measures for the responsible use of personnel in socialist institutions, the validity of which was extended by State Council Decree No 329/1987, do not apply until 31 December 1988 to the positions in the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products as well as to those of other units from which or to which personnel were transferred as the result of this decree's provisions.

Article 41. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products establishes the annual quota for the income of units subordinate to the economic directorates to cover their expenses.

Article 42. The Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products is provided with seven automobiles to be maintained in its own stock, of which four are for the economic directorates and two are to be used for inspections and quality control of agro-food stocks in the state reserve.

As an exception to the legal provisions, the enterprises for the contracting, acquisition and safeguarding of agricultural products are provided two automobiles for work purposes, one of which will be used for contracting work and for inspection of central state reserve assets. This use will correspond to annex 2 of State Council Decree No 277/1979 regarding the rationing of fuels and the economical use of vehicular assets.

Article 43. The annex to State Council Decree No 410/1985 now include point 18 which reads, "18. Workers in the units, including their subordinate units, which are within the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products."

Article 44. The State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance, on the basis of proposals by the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products and by the other interested central organs, will, within 60 days of the date of this decree, forward for approval, modifications to the plan's economic and financial indicators and to the volume and structure of the state budget for 1988, taking into account the effects of maintaining the budget balance approved.

Article 45. The provisions of laws, decrees and other normative acts regarding the contracting and acquisition of agricultural products for the central state reserve that were enumerated in article 15 of this decree, apply as appropriate to the Ministry for Contracting and Acquisition of Agricultural Products, according to its function.

Article 46. Effective with the date of this decree, the normative acts and legal stipulations listed in annex No 6, as well as any other contrary dispositions, are abrogated.

Article 47. Annexes No 1-6 are an integral part of this decree.

Nicolae Ceausescu, President
The Socialist Republic of Romania
Bucharest, 18 January 1988 No 3

12280
YUGOSLAVIA

Ethical Crisis Traced to Society in Transition
28000067 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
31 Dec 87/1-3 Jan 88 p 11

[Article by Radomir D. Lukic: “Obvious Moral Crisis”; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] We need not hope for a solution until there is consolidation of the corresponding economic, political and, in general terms, social system, but this is not on the horizon.

Besides the political, economic and other crises, our society today is also being beaten about by an obvious moral crisis. It goes without saying that there is no society without morals, nor is this the case with our contemporary society. There are indeed morals in it. However, there is not enough of that morality that is desirable, the kind that is considered necessary in a self-management socialist society—thus, there is no socialist self-management morality.

This assertion presupposes, of course, that one knows exactly what socialist self-management morality is. It must be said that neither theory nor practice have as of yet defined this concept precisely, nor have they been capable of doing so, for the simple reason that this society of ours is only now at its inception, and in its short history it has undergone tumultuous changes that have often been contradictory. This is the simplest answer to the question of why this desirable morality is lacking.

However, no particular social morality, including the socialist self-management one, is fully independent. It is more or less the case that every concrete moral system contains universal elements of morality that are found in every individual moral system of all societies in general, or at least in the moral systems of societies at the same level of development. The crisis in our moral system is reflected in part by the fact that these universal elements of morality, the elements found as far back as in the “Ten Commandments,” are more or less lacking.

What Has Self-Management Turned Into?

This crisis, which is very serious and much more detrimental to society than is generally thought, can only be explained in terms of our social development. We will be presenting here only the most essential points.

As early as in pre-war Yugoslavia, there was a crisis of morality stemming from the advancement of the bourgeois moral system of the developed society and the destruction of the patriarchal, predominantly rural and petty bourgeois (“bazaar”) moral system. Just as developed capitalism did not exist, there was also no developed bourgeois morality. The morality of the peasantry and the bazaar was the egotistic morality of limited communities in villages and small towns, which regarded morality as applying only to the members of their immediate communities, and which assumed that universal elements of morality did not apply to anyone beyond those immediate communities.

The revolutionary movement and the revolution itself forcibly upset this moral system, and set up the foundation for a revolutionary morality that was egalitarian and ascetic and sought to sacrifice the individual for the benefit of the community. But this moral system was also unable to prevail, first and foremost because of ideological conflicts as well as the moral system in 1948, and subsequently as a result of the rapid changes in the social situation of the main revolutionary group, which took power into its hands and rapidly assumed the form of a bureaucracy and technocracy.

The proclamation of self-management in 1950 to a certain extent provided the foundation for the development of a socialist moral system in the new democratic direction, and thus the foundation for its strengthening as well, but this proceeded with major difficulties, especially in the creation of a clearly defined self-management system in the economy. On the other hand, the collectivization of agriculture in 1949 was a major blow to the alliance between peasants and workers. The peasant naturally stopped believing that he could stay in the village, and came to the cities in massive numbers, contributing his own rural, narrow-minded morality to self-management and the self-management moral system. In this way, self-management was transformed into a management system more or less by group ownership, with the mutual exploitation of numerous selfish Basic Organizations of Associated Labor. In the disorder that ensued, the large masses of peasants found themselves thrown off track, and to a certain extent they lost the character of an organized social community. The old morality has been destroyed, the new urban self-management morality has not yet been created, and thus both the old and the new morality function poorly in the new social (self-management) context.

Moral “Disorder”

A new obstacle to the development and consolidation of a mixture of the morality of the peasantry and bazaar the one hand, and the morality of the bureaucracy and technocracy on the other, came from the economic crisis, which brought with it a crisis in socialist ideology in general, and thus a search for new paths of socialism. It turned out that the building of socialism is a much longer and more complicated process than had been thought, so that certain elements of economic relations in particular—but of other social relations as well—began to return, albeit in a new form, to a manner considered to be capitalistic. In our country, this has manifested itself bitterly in the ideological clashes between the planned-contractual economy and the market economy, which is bringing with it a certain bitter opposition of moral systems.
What has emerged is a severe moral crisis, moral "disorder," and very little of the desired socialist self-management moral system has been realized. Indeed, the serious moral infractions against these socialist self-management morals and against the universal morals are eliciting sharp public criticism, but to no avail. If one adds to this the political conflicts, nationalism, the influence of increasingly powerful anti-socialist ideologies and the total passivity of society in the area of moral education and upbringing, as well as the failure to impose sanctions on serious moral infractions committed by numerous "powerful people" protecting their own power, it is quite understandable that we are in a moral crisis. We need not hope for a solution until there is consolidation of the corresponding economic, political and overall social system in general. For this to happen, however, this system must be defined precisely, and the main forces of society must be in agreement. And this is not on the horizon. We will have to continue for some time living with the moral crisis, next to all the other ones that are tormenting us.

12271

Poll Results on Reasons for Leaving LC Viewed
28000079 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 Jan 88 pp 11-12

[Article by Slobodan Inic: "Communists and Party Members"]

[Text] If one is to believe Ignazije Silone, in the near future a merciless struggle will be conducted between present and former communists.

Does this mean that there will be no peace for the citizens again?

Nevertheless, no matter how much it has appeared that such a premonition could come true, I believe that before that there is a much more interesting story about former and present communists and party members in connection with the course of DANAS's survey on "Why I Am No Longer/Still Am a Member of the LCY."

Undoubtedly, more and more people are leaving the LC, for different reasons. Particularly prominent among them are people who have been, with their names and career in that respect, part of the identity of the LC's structure, power, intellect, and reputation. What is happening now is that many of them are overcoming their original fear of dropping out and becoming separated from the party. Of course, there are also many people who are remaining, who have both their own personal reasons and others. All of them, both one group and the other, both ex-communists and communists, both non-party members and party members, have their own arguments. We will not argue against them here, against either side, but rather comment in very general terms on the situation into which the LC has fallen, pulling society in after it, on the basis of the authenticity of their statements.

Nevertheless, if we were to form an opinion, if only for a moment, a more cheerful approach is appropriate. Actually, if it were possible in some way to conceive of an LC as being better, but not a better LC, then it would be possible to surmise that those who are not in it should be in it instead, or at least not less than those who are, and vice versa. All of that is highly arbitrary, of course.

Communist Party Typology

What do we face first of all? At first glance, it is a question of rejecting a typology that no longer implies the identity of "communist" and "party," except in what one might say is an almost ideal and exceptional case, the party communist type. In all other cases, that connection has been broken. Such a typology, according to the criterion of personal communist "belief," as well as party credentials (or lack of them), could appear approximately as follows:

—Non-party communists (among whom the so-called left-wingers are particularly prominent).

In this case, the political emphasis is on the second word. Such a type is characteristic of the situation upon entering or before entering the party, although there is also the situation in which the status of a non-party communist is a lasting one or at least somewhat lasting.

—Party non-communists (they are also called "dues-payers," while as far as I am concerned they are only evidence of how the people of Yugoslavia have drowned in the party).

Just as the non-party communists show that not all communists are party members, the category of party non-communists demonstrates that not all party members are communists. The former, probably, for the reason that the existing LC organization is not sufficiently "united" and "communist," and the latter, perhaps, only because there is no other party.

—Party communists ("organized communist party members").

Here I see that the embryo of a non-party communist, with further maturation, ends in the shell, or what is communist merges with what is party. This is the ideal and most fortunate relationship between personal communist belief and the "program organizational" essence of the LC. In any case, this is one of the factors that influence the strength and stability of any party, regardless of its ideology and organization. The most stable political parties are those which achieve the greatest possible identification between personal belief and party philosophy on a fairly widespread scale among their
membership. In my opinion, the absence or weakening of the connection between the communist and the party is probably the weakest aspect today in the development of the LC.

—Communists outside the party (here we have “unorganized” communists for the second time).

In this case, the party shell is cracked open, in view of the failure of what is communist under its auspices, or when the party form comes to contradict personal communist beliefs.

What is characteristic of this case, not as a rule, because we will also see the following type, which differs from it, is that the communist outside the party remains a communist—a former party member, but he is really and currently still a communist.

—Ex-communists outside the party (“unorganized former communists”).

Now we have the case of both a former party member and a former communist. As a rule, such a person feels that his former belief was wrong, and that his membership in the LC was time that was irretrievably wasted.

—Non-communist citizens (“individual for the people”).

The fate of the ex-communist outside the party is to return to the people; he ceases to be politically active, and I call that status a non-communist citizen. For him, all the adventures are over, and he usually surrenders himself to his own private life, either material or intellectual. Admittedly, this is only one of the solutions that an ex-communist outside the party leans toward. The other is much more active and politically oriented toward the struggle against communism, and his former party and communist beliefs. That is the category of:

—Anti-communist citizens (with a political program or without one).

Naturally, I am not attributing to this category the politically pejorative semantics which the LCY’s political spokesmen aim at. I consider it to be mundane and common, and it is only for lack of a better expression that I am using this already worn-out concept. Naturally, the mention of this category—and we must mention it—is not aimed at upsetting people with such an orientation or providing arguments for all those who will attack them, but rather at generalizing a type of communist party evolution in a sociological analysis. The category of anti-communist citizens may be composed of both active and passive, organized and unorganized, civil and political anti-communists. It is perhaps more important, however, to establish two subcategories of anti-communists, in view of the criterion of the acceptance or nonacceptance of other political and doctrinal beliefs. I thus distinguish so-called elemental and raw anti-communists, who do not have or who do not adopt any other ideological basis for their new beliefs, but only the strength of their own opposition in a simple and one-sided view.

They are no longer communists, but their anti-communism is still more than non-communism, and could not be identified with any other clearer and more recognizable doctrinal orientation. Just as they were once elemental communists, they are now elemental anti-communists.

I call the second subcategory of anti-communists, which is more differentiated, the doctrinal anti-communists. They become more ideologically flexible, and more rapidly adopt other political and ideological views. With the loss of their former beliefs, they more easily accept the doctrinal outlook of other workers’ parties (socialists, social democrats, or radicals), or else in this respect become democrats, liberals, etc. It is interesting that we have not had any studies of this type of development, from communist to anti-communist, and that even the DANAS survey did not offer us any example of a participant with that view, naturally, assuming that such a person would have agreed to speak publicly for the newspapers.

From Here to the Promised Land

The structure of the reasons of all those who left the LC on various grounds, either voluntarily or by an executive decision of the party, is unusually complex, and it is almost impossible to enumerate all of them. Just the necessary indications may lead us to partial understanding. For example, only great “fascination” could lead to great “disappointment,” with respect to the type of statement that tells us about the unusual cherishing of the ideals that a party was able to associate with itself. From today’s standpoint, I would say that the “fascination” itself was abnormal, so that the “disappointment” is in a way “normal.” The ideal-based ideological and logical motivational structure, as a rule, ends with a crash for a “party” man. People who were trained and joined the party in the spirit of the popular verse “There is nothing better than the party...,” or “Nothing is better or dearer than to call oneself a member of the Communist Party,” must perceive not only the failure of their ideals and political existence, but also the frustration of their humanity, no matter how much someone today, when much of this is clear, has agreed or disagreed with that approach at this time.

I would like to stress my sympathy for that position of the former “party member,” people who went to “find the world” (Marx), but not agreement with them, since all great ideas are not just betrayed, whether one is speaking of the leadership or the party; such ideas themselves, on the contrary, have been faced with objective obstacles to their realization. Naturally, we should not be ready to reject immediately the ideal/ideas of the
Communist Party/LCY, which it reflected for decades and which were not fulfilled, nor should we condemn the people who did not attain them, since such ideal/ideas apparently have defects within themselves which have prevented their realization. Couldn’t they also have inevitable defects? But people whose ideas and ideology have been formed in the spirit, once again, of the popular verse “The party leads us forward with Tito to welfare, happiness, and freedom,” find it difficult to accept all of the disruptions represented by Kardelj’s “liberal” credo that an individual cannot be brought happiness by the state or the party, but only by himself. Finally! But that could have been said at the very beginning, around 1944, since this was known without having to wait for someone to “think of it.” Naturally, it is even more difficult for them when they compare that welfare, happiness, and freedom with the real social situation. Everyone has a right to ideals, but no one has the right to bestow them on others, since the idealists themselves may certainly suffer the most some day from their “gifts.”

Those who left the LC, whether their farewell to the party resulted from a conflict situation, or whether they did it more peacefully and without trouble, claim that the main reason for that act was that the party did not fulfill certain goals, ideals, and values that it promised. Let us take just the example of equality. I wonder, however: could it have done so? Some of the promises have not been unfulfilled because they were not fulfilled, but rather because they simply were and are infeasible. The idea of equality is such an infeasible idea, at least as it was conceived and in its entirety. Above all, people are not equal by nature, just similar. Next, excessive equality will do more harm to the country’s economy than it will contribute to it. Finally, equality can be reached only through more and more equality, not suddenly and completely. Equality is achieved as a tendency, and through inequality, just as socialism, perhaps, is reached through “nonsocialism.” My main criticism of the doctrine of the LC is that it wanted to reach socialism through one lesson about socialism (the “socialist lesson”) and through socialism. Of course, the statements are completely justified concerning the type of equality that capitalism has already achieved, as well as those new inequalities that could not be defended even in capitalism.

Search for Identity

There have been more and more statements by former party members about how the LC does not have “freedom of thought,” which is true, to put it mildly. Nevertheless, that problem is much older than their knowledge and experience. Naturally, they are only bringing it up to date in their own time. It only shows once again that any communist party, including the LC, functions in accordance with the leadership structure of power and furthermore shows intolerance toward other and different opinions. As I have already said, however, the problem is much older. At the moment when freedom of opinion is abolished for another, it is simultaneously abolished for the one who would deny it to the other. I am still thinking about the question of how communists can think that they are fighting for freedom in society and the state if they do not have it completely within their own ranks.

In the desire to take over all representation of interests in society, and to present particular interests (the “working class”) as the interests of the people, as a general political entity, communist parties take a risk, since it is almost impossible, of representing everything and representing nothing, of betraying the interests of those for whom they came to power, and at the same time unsuccessfully representing the interests of the people (and the nation), whose support is extremely important in order to rule at all. To the extent that the LC tries to cover all interests horizontally through its representation, as if by some rule, it will also vertically (“radically”) lose the support of the working classes that it represents by definition. That is why the LC is weak and strong at the same time. It is weak because it admittedly offers an illusory idea that it can represent all interests (“Communist Party, fragrant flower, the whole people moves with you”); it is strong because this works for it until the ideological guise of the overall representation of society’s interest structure shatters after a conflict with the same, but now actual, structure of unusually diverse interests. I can only add to this that communist parties also have a responsibility for criticism, not only from their own ranks of those social strata, criticism that could guide calm souls, in some other situation, to the possible subjects of a possible but now abolished political pluralism. That is the price of their political monopoly.

I would be opposed, however, to the conclusion that only those who are willing to swallow everything should remain in the LC. First of all, there are incomparably more people who are still remaining in it and who still believe that it is nevertheless capable of making new social changes, since, according to some statements, there is no alternative social force besides it that is capable of getting out of this crisis. No matter how much one could criticize this view for not seeing that a society is bad if its development depends exclusively on one political force, it remains to be seen how that political force will demonstrate its capability, and when.
Legal Theorist Interviewed on Ownership Concepts
2800078 Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 88 pp 15-17

[Interview with legal theorist Andrija Gams: “Who Our Property Belongs To,” by Milorad Vucelic]

[Text]

[Question] Those familiar with your work and the readers of your book “Ownership” know that you are one of the most persistent critics of the nonownership concept of social ownership.

[Answer] This is a question of criticism of the theory of social ownership, i.e., the nonownership concept of social ownership. That concept contains serious contradictions, and one of them is that this mistaken concept of ownership is foreseen only when communism is achieved worldwide. In that concept, I saw many problems, which I have by no means been able to bring into accordance with legal science and its general results, both in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world.

[Question] Can this theory of social ownership as everyone’s and no one’s be linked to a monopoly of political power?

[Answer] Although Rousseau’s ideas of mutuality and solidarity are often mentioned in the preambles of our constitutions, our system itself, under which the commune is the basic social community and the bearer of social power, is actually an embodiment of Prudhonist principles. We are building our society in accordance with the principle that people, in order to wield power more directly, associate in the smallest possible communities—the commune and the basic organization of associated labor. Broader organizations and the entire delegate system, etc., develop afterwards from these cells.

It is incomprehensible (theoretically, of course) how a concept and principles that aspire to create a new democracy, in a very radical manner, furthermore, can be combined with the traces and remnants of Stalinism in our system, reflected in the monopoly of state and political power, in the desire for the party to control a large number of social activities, especially those which affect precisely the issue of power.

[Question] In your opinion, what are the prerequisites for several elements of political voluntarism and legal nihilism in our political system?

[Answer] As is well known, private ownership is nothing more than a normative expression of a commodity. In our economic system, we want to achieve the withering away of the state and ownership through a commodity market and the market, and thus through the same instruments and economic and social institutions which, according to Marx, are the basic source and expression of alienation. As a result of that, we have created a completely incoherent and uncoordinated commodity economy. In an economic system conceived in such a manner, the workers at an enterprise (or informal groups that have actual power), while it is doing business successfully, appropriate for themselves the income and the positive results of their labor. With respect to losses, however, those losses are borne by society. A private owner appropriates the gains or profit only if he works successfully, and if he works poorly, he pays for the losses with the objects of his ownership, and this forces him to be careful, efficient, and economical. Why would workers in our system be economical and operate efficiently, when they do not pay for the consequences of their negligent operation? That is the reason for inefficient investments, enormous extravagance, high business entertainment expenses, and many other negative phenomena which are constantly being discussed.

Furthermore, we have an inadequately organized social system in which the commune is also supposed to solve the problems of the environment, air pollution, maintaining the purity of rivers, and a whole range of other issues which would otherwise have to be resolved from the center; and it is precisely because things are being “resolved” in the current manner that we have all of these catastrophic results. It is not centralism at all, but inevitability. On the other hand, because of that system we also have a whole range of violations of such legacies of civilization as man’s freedom and security, the infringement of his personal rights and his personal property sphere, the possibility of a right to criticism, free association, and free expression of his opinions... All of these contradictions also lead to the infringement of rights, so that our legal system does not function as it should function in a modern state at today’s level of the development of production forces.

[Question] To what extent is the 1974 Constitution responsible for the social crisis in Yugoslavia?

[Answer] Before I answer that question directly, I must say that a public discussion was organized when all the previous constitutions were being changed, and that this was absent when the constitution you mentioned was adopted. Besides, in March 1971, we at the Law School in Belgrade discussed constitutional amendments, and for that reason many of us who participated in those discussions were fired, and some were declared to be morally and politically unsuitable, and forbidden to teach. At that time, I was expelled from the party, and retired prematurely.

For a long time it was said that that constitution was the result of a sort of unofficial plebiscite. That is out of the question. That constitution was imposed from above. As you could see, criticism of the constitutional amendments at that time was considered an anti-party position. And as we know, some of the participants in that discussion at the Law School suffered much more serious consequences.
[Question] Are there any scholarly arguments that can be used to defend maintaining the present constitutional position of the Serbian SR?

[Answer] Insofar as I understand the history of that issue, Vojvodina and Kosovo are legitimate parts of Serbia. The AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] documents do not mention the autonomous provinces acquiring any of the sovereign rights that they have today and which make them de facto republics.

[Question] In the concluding portion of your book, you think that first “it is necessary to clarify who wants Yugoslavia to be a modern European state, a united although of course a federal state, with all of the necessary legal apparatus that a modern state must have.”

[Answer] Primarily, I think that “consensus” is what prevents our state from functioning as a modern state. While all the republics are members of the federation, it is possible to use consensus to restrain and prevent any attempt to carry out certain ideas which affect the functioning of the whole and which benefit the whole.

A federation has to exist in our country, for many reasons. Today, however, our country does not have a federation, and instead we have a confederation. It is not viable today precisely because of the demands of the times and modern technology. The state is increasingly becoming the regulator of social relationships, and not primarily and exclusively a repressive guardian of class relationships. The regulatory role of the state is expanding more and more in the world. We have state intervention in the economy, social relationships, social security, education, environmental protection, the further development of technology, and the preservation and development of cultural values—the functions that a modern state today must perform, and which are performed more successfully, more cheaply, more scrupulously, and more efficiently, when this is done on a large scale. For instance, we have often left one of the most vital issues, the issue of education, exclusively in the jurisdiction of undeveloped opstinas, and this really produces very bad consequences.

While the countries of Europe and the world are achieving a greater degree of unity and forming alliances, jointly conducting scientific research, and creating joint education programs, we are restricting markets, and returning to models that were completely obsolete even in the 19th century.

In addition to the issues of national defense, etc., the state, precisely as a united whole, must have certain economic powers. In the West today there is planning, a uniform financial policy, a uniform tax policy, uniform basic plans, and long-term investments. That exists in the West, but we have the luxury of having every opstina able to do what it wants.

[Question] How do you view the problems of the relationship of private ownership and socialism?

[Answer] We definitely have to answer the question of whether the basic position of party doctrine, that private ownership is incompatible with socialism, is true.

Even before the war, before I joined the Communist Party, I was inclined toward social democracy, and I liked the section in the German Weimer Constitution that says that private ownership is permitted but that it must be under the control of the community, i.e., the state, and that it must serve that community.

Accordingly, private ownership can and must exist, and it is possible to develop socialist ideas on that basis. Finally, the demand and goal of socialism is not that we associate in one manner or another, and that we be associated in one organized form or another (because if everything is not in this or that form, then it is not self-management, it is not orthodox, it is not socialist, and it is not socialism). A socialist society is that society which, to the greatest possible extent, develops the material welfare of its members, the freedom of individuals, and the freedom and democratic integration of the individual into society, and creates the conditions and opportunities for an individual to influence political decisions as much as possible, and for power to be under the control of those in whose name it is exercised, because any power that is not restricted tends toward corruption.

In the final analysis, a socialist society has a certain number of goals which are achieved and fulfilled by a welfare state. We must create opportunities for strengthening private ownership, so-called small business, and we have to advocate strengthening the economic initiative of individuals, which is presently blocked in many respects precisely by the communal system, which only wants to grab as much as possible from private enterprises. I believe that this is only a transitional phenomenon, however. It is necessary to make it possible for individuals' savings to go directly into the economy, and not into consumption, as is the case in our country. It is being done today by many socialist countries, including Hungary and China. These processes are particularly intensive in China, which passed through the darkest period of Stalinism in the form of the Cultural Revolution, but now clearly sees the direction in which socialism has to develop.

In view of the tradition from 1948 onwards, we perhaps have several of the conditions necessary for developing more rapidly and freeing ourselves from various dogmatic prejudices, and now we should really make use of the opportunity to have the changes in the Constitution adopted in the interest of everyone and the whole, and not have them serve only the interests of certain narrow circles.
[Question] Do you advocate the affirmation of only private ownership, or are you still talking about the coexistence of social and private ownership in our model of socialism?

[Answer] We must allow more scope to private ownership, because we see that the private ownership system in the West has achieved certain results. A society has been created in which to a great extent there is economic security, etc., for individuals, which has never been achieved before in history. Accordingly, as an economic factor, private ownership appears to be more efficient than social ownership. Of course, it is impossible to ignore the great heritage of socialists, according to which private ownership, in the manner previously described, must serve the community.

Social ownership, of course, can and must exist. The latest results of technology, microelectronics, and computer science actually encourage the existence of large enterprises, which can and should be socially owned. Those enterprises, however, must be handled in accordance with the principles and latest results of science, and not in accordance with any random and voluntaristic concepts, or through any self-management forms and formulas which actually hinder the activity of the enterprises and which are contrary to the demands of the modern science of enterprise management.

[Question] You have had many experiences, problems, and conflicts in your life. What helped you to endure and persist?

[Answer] It cannot be said that I was actually in any tragic situations, but I have had both great obstacles and great difficulties, the details of which I do not want to go into at this time. Science has never been a source of earnings for me, and I have never viewed science as a sort of basis for a social position. For me, science has been a vocation, and engaging in that vocation was, for me, service to an ideal, which every person must have, since without ideals a person is empty, without content. Accordingly, I have viewed and do view my scholarly position as a vocation, and for that reason I sincerely fought for those scientific postulates that I believed to represent scientific truths.

But, independently of these spicy stories, if we were to judge the matter only according to what appeared in most of the Yugoslav newspapers the following day, we might think that at least half of the interview with foreign reporters granted by Dusan Ckrebic and Ivan Brigic on the Eleventh Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [CC LCY] was not an exception to the rule in that regard. A woman correspondent from the London Times—not satisfied with the replies given by Brigic to the question as to whether Fadil Hoxha had mentioned Tito and Petar Stambolic in the letter which he recently sent in connection with his responsibility for the situation in Kosovo to the Chairmanship of the CC LCY—made the following statement: "We do not get any specific answers and therefore it is a waste of time to ask any questions." Pressured by questions put to him by still other reporters, it is nevertheless true that Brigic did end up finally saying that Fadil Hoxha had sought to "make his responsibility objective," that he had claimed that he had brought his positions before the highest organs of the federation and of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and that no one there had disassociated himself from those positions, that in his letter he had referred to the members of those organs during the times when he himself was part of them, and among those he had referred to he had also included Tito and Kardelj.

What we are dealing with is the part of the interview which has to do with the Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. If we exclude VJESNIK, which gave a detailed report, the other newspapers did not even record that part of the press conference.

BORBA and VEČERNJE NOVOSTI reported in a cursory manner on TANJUG's communication (even though their reporters were present at the press conference).

POLITIKA and EKSPRES POLITIKA published the statements of their reporters but without even a single word on the content of the discussion which had to do with the current events in the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Indeed, those two newspapers published the question asked by the reporters from the Soviet agency TASS: whether the Chairmanship of the CC LCY will

TANJUG Domestic Press Reporting Criticized for Omissions
28000053 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
15 Dec 87 p 28

[Article by Slavko Curuvija: "Instead of the Truth, TANJUG's Report Gives Us Nonsensical Communiques"]

[Text] The press conferences given by our politicians to foreign reporters are interesting political events. Among other things, this is because foreign journalists are always aware of and are supposed to present even those questions which probably would not be dispensed with by their Yugoslav colleagues on account of their current understanding of the political beliefs of the reporters.

In these situations, it is truly interesting to hear how and in what manner Yugoslav officials are perceived by world opinion which to them does not always appear to be clear. There is insufficient understanding of some of their constant and general replies to entirely specific and contemporary questions.

Last year's interview with foreign reporters granted by Dusan Ckrebic and Ivan Brigic on the Eleventh Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [CC LCY] was not an exception to the rule in that regard. A woman correspondent from the London Times—not satisfied with the replies given by Brigic to the question as to whether Fadil Hoxha had mentioned Tito and Petar Stambolic in the letter which he recently sent in connection with his responsibility for the situation in Kosovo to the Chairmanship of the CC LCY—made the following statement: "We do not get any specific answers and therefore it is a waste of time to ask any questions." Pressured by questions put to him by still other reporters, it is nevertheless true that Brigic did end up finally saying that Fadil Hoxha had sought to "make his responsibility objective," that he had claimed that he had brought his positions before the highest organs of the federation and of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and that no one there had disassociated himself from those positions, that in his letter he had referred to the members of those organs during the times when he himself was part of them, and among those he had referred to he had also included Tito and Kardelj.

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take care of the situation in the Socialist Republic of Serbia? But they only published that part of the reply by Brbic in which he said that “there is no reason for the CC LCY to deal with this issue in particular.”

The entire reply, however, sounded somewhat different: He will not consider this question to be excessive, but he said quite clearly that this will be examined “as an ordinary matter,” in the forthcoming discussions on the realization of the role of the League of Communists, which also came under discussion, at the initiative of Dusan Dragosavac and Petar Matic, at the eleventh meeting.

The CC LCY has the right and the obligation to examine the political situation in the League of Communists of the republics and of the provinces, and “in the next few months there will be more of these kinds of discussions, which can only serve to strengthen the LCY.”

While, therefore, the greater part of the Yugoslav press, as someone said, kept majestically quiet about matters which were also of great interest to the Yugoslav public, on that same evening all of that was already reported by various foreign radio stations which can also be heard in Yugoslavia, and on the following day also in the foreign newspapers, and these kinds of questions were also asked: Why didn’t the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia react to the accusations sent to the address of Ivan Stambolic? Why must the disagreement in the Central Committee of the party result in the resignation of the president of the country, when officially it is being sought more and more to separate the country from the party (by the reporter from the Italian newspaper REPUBLICA)? Why are the debates concerning the responsibility of Ivan Stambolic taking place only in the narrow area of Serbia and why is the first letter of Ivan Stambolic referred to as secret (by the reporter from LE MONDE)? Afterwards, the same reporter asked how the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia is elected and how he is removed from office.

From the manner in which Dusan Ckrebic replied to these questions it was not even possible to assume that in that conversation there might be something that Yugoslav readers did not have a right to know. Quite to the contrary, Ckrebic said that he would be “pleased to reply” to them, even though they were not directly related to the subject matter of the eleventh meeting of the CC LCY. Indeed, anyone who listened attentively from the side was able to hear the opinions of some people on the payroll of the Information and Propaganda Department of the CC LCY that the director of the International Press Center had to request the foreign reporters to please not ask such questions.

Be that as it may, Ckrebic answered those questions. It thus became known, for example, that just after 19 hours of deliberations of that body the participants in the Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia had become aware of Stambolic’s famous “secret letter” to the Municipal Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade. Ckrebic’s opinion had also become known (probably not only the opinion of Ckrebic) that the meeting of the Chairmanship of the Municipal Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, which had preceded the known events that unfurled as the result of that letter and the pressure that it created, “cannot be regular.”

In the last analysis, the content of the letter was not the essential factor, said Ckrebic, but rather the fact that the authority of a high-level official had been resorted in order to make the discussion turn in the other direction. The “paternalistic method on the part of the League of Communists” was essential. Ckrebic stated that he did not know that “such an attempt at irregular control” had been noted in the practice of the League of Communists, and that it had not been politically criticized.

He went on to explain that the procedure for electing and removing from office the President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia was really simple (by means of an open vote at a meeting of the Presidency itself). This was not the case, as he had stated, also for the procedure in selecting and removing from office members of the Presidency. The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia issues a resolution to that effect by secret vote.

As regards the question dealing with the “lack of reaction on the part of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia” Ckrebic clarified that requests for the resignation of Ivan Stambolic had created two possibilities, which were his resignation, or the application of the conventional procedure leading to his removal from office. He added: how things would then proceed depended on what would happen.

Dusan Ckrebic considered the relationship between the party and the political errors of high-level government officials in the following terms: We strive to have the party separate from the government, but this cannot be achieved overnight. There are extremely important functions in the government which are carried out by prominent members of the League of Communists. When these members come into conflict with the League of Communists, then the question arises as to whether they should continue to be in such positions.

The secret omission of such information in the individual newspapers partially offset the knowledge of the fact that the editorial boards of the newspapers had received a communication via telex from the Information and Propaganda Department of the CC LCY that the director of the International Press Center had to request the foreign reporters to please not ask such questions.

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there was a justified suspicion that some editorial boards would have actually omitted that part of the discussions even if that telex suggestion that was so difficult to understand had not existed. Let us say, for example, that this is what would have been done by the editorial boards which had also omitted that half of a sentence from the statement made by Dusan Dragosavac at the eleventh meeting of the CC LCY that the status in the League of Communists should also be debated because of the political clashes in the action of the LCY."

It had not been very easy for some newspapers to accept that communication from the apparatus of the CC LCY, judging by the commentary which was published by VECERNJE NOVOSTI two days after the press conference. BORBA also conveyed that commentary. Nenad Stefanovic, the author of the commentary, wrote the following, among other things:

"It has nevertheless been shown that it appears to be difficult to free oneself from the old habits according to which our officials invariably discuss things more openly and sincerely with foreign reporters than they do with Yugoslav reporters. Because of this, one might once again reach the conclusion of one's own accord that we have one truth for the international public and another truth for the national public. We are also taking into consideration the fact that our press is relatively young and the possibility that even without the proper reasons and clarifications it might at any time be "authorized to pass over in silence" that which is stated in public... ."

Indeed, the author of the commentary considers that one lesson could also be drawn from all of this: "it is not always such a bad thing that our press is divided and that we always find someone who stands out and violates the agreement, sometimes because of his professional instinct and sometimes because of his ethnic instinct."

Actually, the Slovenian journalists were not satisfied with "their" law even at the time of its enactment, but still there were few people who expected that a revision could come so quickly, although this is nothing unusual for our normativistic practice. What, then, is being proposed by the Society of Slovenian Journalists? First, that the penalty of imprisonment for insult, slander, and insulting accusation through public speech be replaced by a fine or in the extreme case that the fine be at least an alternative possibility. At present, that is, most crimes of this kind carry a penalty of imprisonment not to exceed 3 years. The society also feels that the legal provision should be deleted in the republic Criminal Code which carries a penalty of imprisonment not to exceed 3 years for defamation of SR Slovenia, the other republics and provinces, their symbols and highest bodies, or representatives of those bodies. It is particularly unacceptable that use is not made for such examples of the clause which in a case of insult precludes punishment if the insult occurred in a scientific, literary, or artistic work, in serious criticism, in a newspaper account, etc. If the republics and their symbols must at all be protected against defamation by law, at least the special protection for the highest bodies and their representatives should be omitted unless they have been insulted with the obvious intention of insulting the republic thereby. The Society of Slovenian Journalists backs up its proposal by pointing to the fact that the law protects the reputation of the republic or the state, while criticism of its incompetent or even dishonest representative, if it is insulting, does not necessarily and automatically mean an insult to the state, but sometimes exactly the opposite: preservation of the reputation of the state which is being ruined because of its incompetent or dishonorable representatives.

The Right to Criticism

But as for insults and similar acts against government bodies and officials, the journalistic society feels that criminal liability should be narrowed essentially and should exist only for the case of flagrant and indisputable insult with crude language and the like. That would preclude to the greatest degree the possibility of criminal prosecution because of political criticism. The same expressions which might be offensive to an "ordinary" man or citizen need not automatically be taken as insults if used in the criticism of government bodies and officials. There also should be appreciation in this connection of the significant fact that a man's honor and good name are protected by the Constitution, but that is not the case with the honor and good name of government bodies, officials, and so on. The reason for this is so that their protection does not in practice result in the restriction and violation of a much more important right, and that is the right of citizens to criticize government bodies and officials.

The society of journalists is also against the judicial theory and practice whereby the Executive Council is included among the highest bodies of the state, since
under the Constitution it is not a supreme body, but is subordinate to the Assembly. There is also opposition to automatism in criminal prosecution, and the proposal is that the public prosecutor institute proceedings in such cases only in agreement with the party who possibly has been injured, but not by virtue of his official duty. It is unacceptable for the law to carry a threat for the spreading of untruthful reports which could be the cause of serious indisposition or disturbance of citizens or which are uttered with the intention of frustrating the decisions and measures of government and judicial bodies. In any case, it would be best, in the view of the Society of Slovenian Journalists, to simply delete that legal norm as a whole.

All of these legal norms are to be found mainly in the republic Law on Public Information and also in the republic Criminal Code, and that is why the society of journalists feels that the two laws should be revised at one and the same time, and the Law on Misdemeanors along with them.

The proposals of the society of journalists notably did not include criticism of federal criminal legislation, especially Article 133, which has been very greatly and bitterly debated in Slovenia. Boris Bergant, president of Slovenian journalists, feels that amendment of federal legislation, not only the Criminal Code, but also the Law on Information, would be an excessively protracted procedure with an uncertain result, and that is why it is better to begin work immediately to revise the republic legislation.

Pavle Car, republic public prosecutor, thinks somewhat differently. Protection of the freedom of public speech and the punishment of its abuse cannot be a matter of just one republic, but rather this should after all be resolved on a broader basis. He feels that extensive interpretation of the loose and extensible provisions of Articles 114, 133, and 134 of the SFRY Criminal Code indicates the possibility of violating certain basic human and civil rights and freedoms. Acts committed with hostile intention must be punishable, but not acts committed with possible intent. Article 114 pertains to hostile propaganda, and Article 134 to the incitement of ethnic, racial, or religious enmity, division, or intolerance, while hostile propaganda is punishable under Article 133.

What Is Censorship?

With respect to the crimes of insult and slander Pavle Car cautions that the provisions in the republic Criminal Code are based on Article 157 of the SFRY Criminal Code, which pertains to insulting the SFRY. Car agrees that it ought to be possible in the case of insults of this kind to preclude legal accountability if the insult occurred in a scientific, journalistic, or similar work. He also agrees with the proposal of the journalists that the spreading of false and untruthful reports should no longer be punishable because of possible significant indisposition or disturbance of citizens. Car also calls attention to the provision in the republic Law on Public Information which provides a ban on the publication and spreading of certain information.

“This is outright censorship,” the Slovenian public prosecutor says, “and it is permitted only in wartime, and it is therefore unconstitutional.”

The most interesting thing here is that Car destroys almost entirely Article 98 of the republic Law on Public Information, since that is the article under which the public prosecutor prohibits the publication and spread of certain information. Car feels that punishment under the Criminal Code is sufficient for information which defames the SFRY, SR Slovenia, the other republics or provinces, their highest bodies or representatives of those bodies. But that law punishes an act already committed. The victims of the other verbal crimes are also protected by means of criminal proceedings. The ban on the spreading of untruthful disturbing reports and information has no constitutional basis, so that according to the public prosecutor of SR Slovenia there should be a legal prohibition against the publication and spreading of only those documents or data which have been officially classified as a state secret, military secret, trade secret, or official secret.

The federal public prosecutor has also been informed about these radical proposals concerning the present level legislation. Car said that his document was described in a meeting held in the office of the federal public prosecutor as out-of-place and that for the moment he has been successful only in his proposal that the document be placed ad acta and that it nevertheless be debated in the public prosecutors' offices of the republics and provinces.

How an Editor in Chief Is To Be Chosen

In a separate document Pavle Car explained the agreement among public prosecutors in Slovenia about basic points of departure for the temporary ban on distribution of printed matter. Under that agreement there must be a criminal act as grounds for such a ban, since freedom of the press is one of the basic constitutional freedoms and can be abused only by the kind of socially dangerous act which is automatically prosecuted as a crime. Accordingly, the public prosecutor can decide on the ban only in a case when he has sufficient reasons to judge that the printed matter contains objective signs of the criminal act which has been mentioned. Opinion, however, may not be grounds for banning printed material, it has been agreed in the Public Prosecutor's Office of Slovenia. Accordingly, it is prohibited to spread only untruthful reports and information which are disturbing, and opinion may be the basis for a ban only in the case when it represents an insulting value judgment in the form of a crime which must be prosecuted by law.
As far as the possible consequences of publishing printed matter is concerned, in pronouncing the measure of a temporary ban the public prosecutors in Slovenia must be mindful of whether the publication would have serious consequences. Such an assessment may be subjective and objective. The consequences must be foreseeable in a realistic context. Accordingly, serious consequences might be impediments in diplomatic relations because of an offense to the head of a foreign state, divulging a military secret, spreading untruthful reports or data concerning infectious diseases, an incursion of foreign armed forces, and so on. This would undoubtedly cause unrest, demonstrations, and a violation of public order and peace.

Although there are also other interesting things in the proposals to amend the legislation on journalism, for example, that public scrutiny of the work of various bodies must be guaranteed by the obligation that they be required to respond in public to questions put publicly, that the provision be deleted under which journalists and other persons taking part in public information must reinforce the socialist system of self-management and preserve human dignity and the general interests of society (which the Society of Slovenian Journalists explains by the opinion that journalists are professionals, not sociopolitical personnel, and in their work they must be guided by the principles of journalistic ethics), or that editors-in-chief and responsible editors be chosen in a public competition on the basis of the work program they propose, and that when the choice is being made editorial staffs may also express their opinion—the verbal crime and its punishment will undoubtedly be the central point of the debate within the Socialist Alliance of Slovenia.
YUGOSLAVIA

Rationale for New Supersonic Aircraft Aired
28000075 Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian
26 Dec 87 pp 46-47

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: “The Airplane From Zajcja Dobrava”]

[Text] Is it possible for us to build a supersonic aircraft, a plane that now costs $2 billion and a plane such as neither the Soviets nor the Americans could build? That is one of the questions that was heard at a “political picnic” in a park near Ljubljana, at a picnic which was one of the interesting political events of 1987. The problem is not with those who put such questions, but rather the problem is when answers are given by those who, to put it mildly, do not know a “tank from a bathtub.” Of course, I do not favor an elitist or monopolistic access to professional topics: I am only advocating a basic measure of familiarity with the problems when public statements are made....

A few years ago I asked a U.S. senator in Washington who at that time headed the Senate committee for monitoring expenditure of the Pentagon’s military budget, that is, I asked a man who was a politician and who, as such was the most responsible for where the money went for the American Armed Forces, what he thought about the future of the F-18 “Hornet” airplane? Would it be built only by the Navy or would there also be a ground forces version of the plane? The man looked at me blankly, laughed, and said: “You know, I am chairman of the Senate committee for monitoring the military budget, but I am neither a technical nor a military expert. If you are interested in the future of the F-18 aircraft, my military adviser will give you a professional opinion on that.” And actually, in 3 days I received at the desk of my hotel a thick yellow envelope with the details that interested me. The professional analysis was signed by an Air Force lieutenant colonel, the military consultant of the senator mentioned.

Let me not go on, the “picnic theses” about the new Yugoslav aircraft are nothing specific to Zajcja Dobrava alone. The Yugoslav public also entertained this question during 1987: “What do we need with an aircraft that flies so fast when neither the Americans nor the Soviets are producing such fast planes?” Or, “When the Israelis have given up and backed off from their ‘Lavi’ plane, where will we get the money to make our own supersonic aircraft?”

First of all, the program for the new Yugoslav aircraft talks about a supersonic plane, but it does not speak about any “Mach 3,” since no one in the world is striving for that anymore. High speed is indeed no longer the most important characteristic of today’s modern fighters. The time of the “aircraft-rockets” has gone irrecoverably. The fact that we refer to the new airplane or the NA [new aircraft] project as a supersonic means only that its maximum speed should be about Mach 2, and that is the speed of almost all present and future modern fighters. In this, all are equal: the Soviets and Americans, the French and British, the Swedes and Israelis....

It was the Israelis that were the subject of many comments because they decided to give up the “Lavi” aircraft when a prototype had already been built. But that is not a good example. That is, if we recall: the Americans gave about $1.5 billion for the “Lavi” program, and it was the Americans who insisted that the “Lavi” be given up. Why? First of all, the “Lavi” might have been competition for them on the world warplane market. Second, the American aircraft industry wants to keep on selling its F-15 and F-16 planes to Israel, and that business could be jeopardized if the Israelis began to produce the “Lavi” in series production. Instead of the “Lavi” Tel Aviv will get the most recent versions of the F-16 and military balance with its neighbors will not be jeopardized. The Israelis perceived the halt of the project of the new airplane as a blow to the country’s technological independence, as a renunciation of the future, although whenever things have been critical for Israel from the military standpoint, the Americans have found ways of helping out quickly and effectively. In the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 1973, at moments when the Israeli Air Force had suffered large losses and the front in the Sinai was bending, American aircraft without insignia and with pilots who spoke Hebrew and English flew directly to the front from American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and from American bases in Spain. The Arabs wondered in amazement where Israel all of a sudden so many new aircraft and pilots and where the “Maverick” missiles came from? The result is well-known.

Of the other countries which have planned or are planning new warplanes Japan has for a long time been producing the American F-15 “Eagle” fighters under license. In Turkey the first domestic fighter recently took off; it was built under American license for the F-16 plane. Even the Swedes are continuing their program to develop the new Jas-39 “gripen” fighter. The French are continuing with their program of the “Rafale” aircraft, the Egyptians are preparing to produce under license the American F-16 fighter. Some of those countries are richer and technologically more advanced than Yugoslavia, others are not, but they are still undertaking their own production of new warplanes. Where are we in all this? What are the prospects that the YU-supersonic will take off?

It has been well-known for several years that we want a new domestic aircraft from the fact that the most distinguished military leaders of our country have said so publicly on several occasions. It has been said that this is an opportunity for a scientific and technological leap by Yugoslav industry as a whole. Someone might perhaps ask why the “Yu-Eureka” should be a new aircraft? It is generally known that in the world inventions in the field of the warplane industry are applied most rapidly in the
That we should give up importing foreign technology, foreign policy in the world. Of course, this does not mean development and of a country's independent position in independence of world centers of technological power. That is a precondition of independent socioeconomic level of engineering and technological development and defense, since otherwise there will not even be "picnics" military alliance, and we must have airplanes for foreign exchange, but this is a rarity.

Sometimes the supplier will sell us the "tourist version" of the warplane, that in addition to the plane "as a necessity" we will also be sold field kitchens (since this presumably has to accompany the plane), ordinary steel ladders to enter the cabin, plastic covers for engine intakes, and various other doodads. And all of this has brought substantial foreign exchange to the government. Should we stop with what has already been achieved? At a time when all neighboring countries (except Albania and Austria) have already introduced in their operational formations completely new generations of aircraft, we dare not lag behind. There are only two possible solutions: produce our own multipurpose plane or buy one abroad. Lagging behind others (neighbors) is a factor that directly provokes their strategies and plans. What does it mean to purchase a plane abroad? If our present strategy (in effect and adopted at present) is to rely on our own resources, then we should go full speed ahead to carry out the program for the new YU-aircraft. But if in the end we have to buy some foreign plane, that would be because of the urgency of the need and international circumstances. A purchase abroad is always a risk that the supplier will sell us the "tourist version" of the warplane, that in addition to the plane "as a necessity" we will also be sold field kitchens (since this supposedly has to accompany the plane), ordinary steel ladders to enter the cabin, plastic covers for engine intakes, and various other doodads. And all of this has to be paid for in foreign exchange, since today a warplane is usually paid for in cash. Exceptions? If you are a member of a military alliance, if you are purchasing a relatively small number of aircraft, and the supplier owes you foreign exchange, but this is a rarity.

Since we do not intend to become a member of any military alliance, and we must have airplanes for defense, since otherwise there will not even be "picnics" in Zajcja Dobrava, we have to achieve the corresponding level of engineering and technological development and independence of world centers of technological power. That is a precondition of independent socioeconomic development and of a country's independent position in foreign policy in the world. Of course, this does not mean that we should give up importing foreign technology, since we need it for our development, but this must take place with monitoring and selected purchases, adaptation of what has been imported to our own conditions, and at the same time we must guarantee the right to our own innovations in the products covered by licenses we have taken. For our new aircraft we must also determine the contractors and subcontractors as soon as possible and the basic technology. There have already been offers: the British are offering their engines and electronics, and there are also certain American, West German, and French firms interested. The French aircraft industry is particularly interested in development of the YU-supersonic: that is, the SNECMA Engine Factory which is offering for our airplane the M88 engine, which is said to be the best engine in the world. That engine is supposed to go in the French "Rafale" fighter. The French are also offering the most modern electronics, and all of that to be produced under their licenses in Yugoslavia. What would that kind of transfer of experience and knowledge mean for our industry? Probably a great deal, especially since almost the entire Yugoslav economy could be involved in those programs.

Yugoslavia has a long tradition in aircraft production, and over the last 15 years we have been exporting a larger number of combat planes and spare parts and have been repairing foreign aircraft, above all those of the non-aligned countries, training foreign pilots, and all of this has brought substantial foreign exchange to the government. Should we stop with what has already been achieved? At a time when all neighboring countries (except Albania and Austria) have already introduced in their operational formations completely new generations of aircraft, we dare not lag behind. There are only two possible solutions: produce our own multipurpose plane or buy one abroad. Lagging behind others (neighbors) is a factor that directly provokes their strategies and plans. What does it mean to purchase a plane abroad? If our present strategy (in effect and adopted at present) is to rely on our own resources, then we should go full speed ahead to carry out the program for the new YU-aircraft. But if in the end we have to buy some foreign plane, that would be because of the urgency of the need and international circumstances. A purchase abroad is always a risk that the supplier will sell us the "tourist version" of the warplane, that in addition to the plane "as a necessity" we will also be sold field kitchens (since this supposedly has to accompany the plane), ordinary steel ladders to enter the cabin, plastic covers for engine intakes, and various other doodads. And all of this has to be paid for in foreign exchange, since today a warplane is usually paid for in cash. Exceptions? If you are a member of a military alliance, if you are purchasing a relatively small number of aircraft, and the supplier owes you foreign exchange, but this is a rarity.

Through the development of the domestic aircraft "Galeb," "Supergaleb," and "Orao" the Yugoslav aircraft industry raised the general technological level of many of our factories, and work organizations equipped themselves to produce more than 250 expensive aircraft devices produced by only a dozen or so large aviation industries in the world. "Soko" in Mostar, "Prva Peteletka" in Trstenik, and "Utva" are factories which have broadened their building precisely thanks to the "Oral" project. New technologies have also been mastered: chemical milling, metal bonding, sandwich constructions, and the use of machine tools with numeric control. Today our factories are producing parts even for Boeing, McDonell Douglas, and for the French aircraft industry...

The prestigious journal AIR INTERNATIONAL wrote a year ago: "In no field of Yugoslav industry has such an important advance been recorded as in the production of military aircraft." Another world journal INTERAVIA also wrote last year: "The Yugoslav aircraft industry has slowly made its way to the top rank in the world. The Yugoslavs are already using composite material quite competently, they have mastered the technique of making fiberglass panels and also the process of shaping the canopies, and they are now working on the use of plastics reinforced with carbon fibers."

Four years usually pass from the initial idea and decision to develop an aircraft to the first flight of the prototype, and from then to entry of the first series-produced aircraft into armament another 4 years will pass. Two more years are then needed to bring series production up to rated capacity and to train flight personnel and technical personnel so as to get the optimum out of operational use of the new aircraft. As we see, the road is rather long, and that is the world average. Without the development of new technologies such as the use of
carbon, lithium, and other advances we cannot enter the 21st century with production programs which have great importance in all fields of Yugoslavia's development.

Might it be said that the material conditions and personnel exist for future development of the Yugoslav aircraft industry and indeed of the rest of industry. It should be said that socioeconomic relations and self-management relations in the military industry have developed on the foundations of the Law on Associated Labor, a social compact and three system-related laws have been adopted which as a body regulate the area of development, production, and sale of armament and military equipment. A study has also been made of development of the military-economic complex up to the year 2000. Thanks to all of this the military-economic complex will continue in the future to fulfill all tasks in defense of the country, above all within the conception of relying on our own resources, which is contributing quite a bit to Yugoslavia's economic stabilization. New investments will make it possible to install up-to-date production equipment and devices that will improve quality, reduce machining time, increase the volume of production, and raise the general technical level of the defense industry and work organizations engaged in special-purpose production. Future development of the military-economic complex is based on use of the country's development capability, production capability, and other resources so as to increase and improve the equipping of our armed forces with armament and military equipment produced within the country, to reduce imports, to increase exports, and on behalf of further development of the military industry and society and the country as a whole. In the coming period the programmatic orientation of the military engineering institutes, development organizations, the factories of the military industry, and other scientific research, development, and production organizations working for military needs will be adopted on behalf of specialization, better utilization of personnel, equipment, and resources.

Our capabilities for developing and exploiting new engineering and technology, with 25,000 researchers and modern and sizable industrial capacities, are very significant and must be optimally utilized. In the development and production of armament and military equipment, and that would also include warplanes, viewed as a whole, we have so far achieved a higher degree of technical and technological independence than have other similar branches of Yugoslav industry, and this has resulted from our strategy of defense, which guarantees the technical foundation of the conception of nationwide defense.

Military and civilian teams of scientists have been carefully examining all the plans of the program for the new warplane, the YU-supersonic. All the phases and intermediate phases of this program are being carefully evaluated, and the feasibility of production of the YU-supersonic is being studied. When the expert evaluation is done, alternatives will be offered to the country's highest political leadership, and it will then have to decide whether we will have a domestic multipurpose plane or not. The armed forces certainly will not undertake that program if the scientific data show that this would not pay off. The experts must have the decisive word here, since the challenges of the technological revolution are great, and we must have the answers. Otherwise we will definitively lag behind the advanced world.

07045

Commentary on New Law Governing Coastal Waters
28000068 Belgrade MORNARICKI GLASNIK in Serbo-Croatian No 6, 1987 pp 860-873

[Article by Dr Bogoljub Mijuskovic, retired colonel: "Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of Yugoslavia Under the New Law"]

[Text] In a session held 23 July 1987 the SFRY Assembly adopted the new Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Footnote 1). The law took effect on 2 August 1987, and the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY (Footnote 2) which had been in effect all of 22 years ceased to be valid on that day.

The progress of engineering and technology and development international relations have changed conditions in the world in many respects since that time. Many enactments of classical international law of the sea, and to some extent even our own domestic law of the sea, have become out-of-date with the passage of time or have become too narrow. After 9 years of work and difficult negotiations about 160 states participating in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1982 the new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our country ratified that convention on 27 November 1985 (Footnote 3). The United Nations Convention on the Right of the Sea (1982) is viewed by many as the most important international treaty concluded since the United Nations Charter (Footnote 4). One of the reasons for enactment of the new Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY is in fact to bring its relevant provisions into conformity with that convention.

Aside from its strictly legal importance, present-day international law of the sea also has its broader economic, military, sociological, and political significance. It regulates the relations of states with respect to all forms of use and usage of the entire space of the sea and under the sea.

The new Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY regulates navigation in our coastal waters, the entry and stay of foreign warships and other ships in coastal waters, the repair of foreign vessels in our ship repair yards and shipyards, as well as other
relations which were previously regulated by the law in effect and have been taken up unchanged into the new law. For example, Yugoslavia's borders at sea have remained the same.

The maritime chart "Adriatic Sea" S-101, in the scale of 1:750,000, published by the Naval Hydrographic Institute, constitutes an integral part of the new law.

Within the space of this paper we will examine as a whole the legal arrangements in our coastal waters and epicontinental zone and the status of various types of vessels, offering a brief introductory presentation as to how these various matters have been regulated in the international law of the sea.

Coastal Waters of the SFRY

Coastal waters is a term that covers both internal parts of the sea and territorial waters under the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY. The very expression "coastal waters" is specific to Yugoslav legislation. Although this expression is not recognized in international law, it does not contradict it, since it is in essence a collective term covering inland parts of the sea and the territorial waters of the SFRY, and it is meant to emphasize that both of these areas belong to our coast, that is, that they are an integral part of the state territory of Yugoslavia, which is altogether in conformity with international law in effect. This is defined as follows in the new law:

"The sovereignty of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter 'the SFRY') on the seas extends to the coastal waters of the SFRY, the airspace over them, and to the bottom and subterranean space under that sea.

"Coastal waters of the SFRY are made up of internal parts of the sea and territorial waters." (Article 1)

Coastal waters are not regulated as a single zone, but rather in two ways: the one which applies to inland parts of the sea and the one which prevails in territorial waters. Before examining each of these separately, let us briefly go on to see the importance of other key expressions used in the new law.

Definitions of Vessels

In present-day international law of the sea, as well as in our own domestic law of the sea, all ships are classified into three groups which have the legal status of merchant vessel, warship, or public vessel.

Under the provisions of Article 2 of the new law, foreign vessels are defined as follows:

1) a foreign merchant vessel is a ship which has foreign nationality, but is used for commercial purposes, or other foreign vessel not covered by Subparagraphs 2) through 5) of this article;

2) foreign fishing vessel is a vessel which has foreign nationality, but is intended and equipped for fishing or catching other live creatures in the sea and on the sea bottom;

3) foreign yacht is a vessel which has a foreign nationality, but is used for noneconomic purposes, for pleasure, sport, or recreation;

4) foreign warship is a vessel, including a submarine, which belongs to the armed forces of a foreign state, carries external signs of recognition of a warship and its nationality, is under the command of a military officer, and has a military crew;

5) formation of foreign warships is a group of several foreign warships sailing together under the command of a single officer;

6) a foreign public vessel is a vessel owned or used by a foreign state, but is not a warship, and is used exclusively for noneconomic purposes of the foreign state;

7) nuclear vessel is a vessel with nuclear propulsion or a vessel equipped with a source of nuclear energy;

8) research vessel is a ship or other floating vessel equipped for scientific or other explorations or exploitation of the sea, the seabed, and the subterranean space under the seabed."

In the space of this article we cannot enter into any great detail in analyzing the definitions given above. However, it is worth noting at once that the definition of a foreign merchant vessel has been mistakenly phrased in the second part, which reads: "...or other foreign vessel not covered by Subparagraphs 2) through 5) of this article." It follows from the definition so phrased that a foreign public vessel under Subparagraph 6) would also be a foreign merchant vessel, which is wrong and contradicts the very term. A foreign public vessel as defined in Subparagraph 6) of the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone cannot by any means be included under the concept of a merchant vessel and still less included under the legal status of a merchant vessel. In the international law of the sea and also in our own domestic law as well a merchant vessel is defined among other things as a vessel which is neither a warship nor a public vessel. A merchant vessel is defined in legal terms as any vessel which is neither a warship nor a public vessel, including merchant vessels owned by or under administration of a state if they are being used for commercial purposes. The essential difference between a public vessel and a merchant vessel is that the former is used for noneconomic purposes, and the latter is specifically used for commercial purposes. (Footnote 3)
As for the definition of the foreign warship, as phrased in Article 2, Subparagraph 4, of the new law, it can be said that it does not conform in all elements to the definition of warship contained in Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which sets a broader condition with respect to the crew—that the vessel "has a crew subject to the discipline of regular armed forces"; (Footnote 6) while our new Law on Coastal Waters explicitly prescribes that such a vessel "has a military crew." We believe there is no need to explain the difference.

1. Internal Parts of the Sea of the SFRY

I. The Concept

Internal parts of the sea (in English "internal waters" [this term adopted hereafter in this translation], in French "eaux interieures," in Russian "vnutrenniye vody" and "natsionalniye vody") are parts of the sea which are in such close connection to the mainland area of a coastal state that it has the greatest interest in them and therefore completely rules that space. Under the international law now in effect internal waters are just as much under the sovereignty of a coastal state as its mainland territory. By contrast with territorial waters, foreign vessels do not have the right of passage through them even though such passage be innocent. A coastal state may completely regulate the navigation of foreign vessels in its internal waters, but in so doing it must not make a distinction (exercise discrimination) between vessels of different flags.

Internal waters include ports, bays, estuaries, landlocked seas, the sea between islands and the coast of the continental part of the mainland. The outer boundary of internal waters is at the same time the base (starting) line for measuring the width of the territorial waters of the coastal state.

Every state defines the area and limits of its internal waters in its domestic statutes, in conformity with the rules of the international law of the sea. According to the rules of the Geneva Convention on Territorial Waters and the Outer Zone of the Sea dating from 1958 and the analogous rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea dating from 1982, a coastal state has the right to include in its internal waters even broader areas of the sea if the coast is uneven and cuts deeply into the mainland of a coastal state or if there are a number of islands along the coast and quite close to it. In that case, the boundary of internal waters may be determined by the method of straight baselines connecting the most salient points. But when drawn, those straight baselines must not depart to a considerable extent from the general direction of the coast, thank to the markedly indented nature of our coast, have been established by the method of straight baselines. (Footnote 8)

2. The Boundary of the Internal Waters of the SFRY

Under the new Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY, Yugoslavia's internal waters embrace the following:

1) ports and bays on the coast of the mainland and islands;
2) river estuaries;
3) parts of the sea between the coast of the mainland and the baseline of territorial waters connecting these points on the shore of the mainland and the shore of the island:

a) Cape Mendra—Cape Platamuni,
b) Cape Zarubaca—the southeastern promontory of the island Mrkan—the southern promontory of the island Sv. Andrije—Cape Gruj (island Mrjet),
c) Cape Korizmeni (island Mrjet)—island Glavat—Cape Struga (island Lastovo)—Cape Veljeg more (island Lastovo)—the southeastern promontory of the island Kopiste—Cape Velo dance (island Korcula)—Cape Proizd—the southwestern promontory of the island Vodnjak—Cape Rat (island Drvenik Mali)—the reef Mulo—the reef Blitvenica—island Purara—island Balun—island Mrtovac—island Garmenjak veli—point on Dugi otok with the coordinates 43 degrees 53 minutes 12 seconds north and 15 degrees 10 minutes east,
d) Cape Veljeg rat (Dugi otok)—the reef Masarine—Cape Margarina (island Susak)—the shoals Albanez—island Gruj—the reef Sv. Ivana in the open sea—the shoals Mramori—island Albanez—Cape Kastanjija. (Footnote 9)

In that way, that is, by the method of straight baselines, all of our islands are covered except Palagruza, Vis, Bisevo, Svetac, Susac, Brusnik, and Jabuka, which are thrust out far into the open sea, so that the rules of the international law of the sea which prescribe that baselines must not be drawn as to considerably depart from the general direction of the coast cannot in the strict view be applied to them.

The internal waters of the SFRY also include all ports and bays which under the rules of the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY and the rules of international law must be included in internal waters, such as the Bay of Traste, Boka Kotorska, the Bay of Piran, Kopar Bay, and so on.
In the law of the sea the term “bay” does not include everything referred to by that term in geography. In the law of the sea only a clearly distinguished indentation that cuts deeply into the mainland can be regarded as a bay. These indentations must fulfill three conditions to qualify as bays:

1) the entrance to the bay and its entire coast must belong to the same state;

2) the entrance to the bay must not be broader than 24 nautical miles;

3) the area of the indentation must be equal to or greater than the area of a semicircle whose diameter is a line drawn across the entrance to the bay.

These conditions do not apply to what are so-called historical bays, whose status has not yet been resolved in a generally acceptable way in the international law of the sea. (Footnote 10)

3. Entry and Stay of Foreign Vessels in the Internal Waters of the SFRY

The entrance and stay of foreign vessels in our internal waters are regulated according to types of vessels depending on whether it is a question of a merchant vessel, fishing vessel, public vessel, yacht, warship, nuclear vessel, or research vessel.

A foreign merchant vessel may sail into internal waters of the SFRY to enter one of its ports designated for international maritime transportation, and a foreign yacht may do so to enter other ports as well, in accordance with the regulations governing inland and maritime navigation. In the course of navigation through our internal waters the foreign vessel must take the shortest route. The Federal Committee for Transportation and Communications may define for foreign merchant vessels some other method of navigation if the interests of defense of the country or safety of navigation so require.

Special regulations apply to the navigation of a foreign warship, foreign public vessel, foreign nuclear vessel, or foreign research vessel through the internal waters of Yugoslavia. Passage of these vessels through internal waters is prohibited, and they may enter them to stay only if they obtain a prior permit to do so from the competent federal authority (except for fishing vessels, over which the republic authority has jurisdiction). The permit for a foreign warship is issued by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense in agreement with the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. Entry and Stay of Foreign Warships

The legal position of a war vessel differs essentially from the status of a merchant vessel (Footnote 11). A merchant vessel is in principle under jurisdiction of the coastal state while it is in its internal waters, but a warship is not. A warship is part of the armed forces of its own state. It always remains in the closest association to it wherever it is located and cannot be made subordinate to any authority of foreign states, and in international law the principle was adopted long ago that warships enjoy immunity, which means that they are always under the jurisdiction of their own state wherever they are located, even while they are located in the coastal waters of a foreign state (but in this case immunity is limited to their internal autonomy).

The coastal state does not have police power or judicial authority over a foreign warship and its crew, nor over the members of that crew while they are making an official visit to the mainland. However, in the case of a hostile act of a foreign warship threatening the security of the coastal state (for example, an attempt at forcible debarkation, bombardment, etc.), which is considered an aggressive act in international law, even extreme measures are permitted against such a vessel (Footnote 12): force can be opposed with force.

With respect to navigation of foreign warships through our internal waters there are special regulations with numerous restrictions. Under the new law foreign warships of the same nationality may not be permitted more than four visits a year. The visit or stay in internal waters of the SFRY may not be permitted at all to a foreign nuclear warship, foreign warship carrying nuclear armament, and a special-purpose vessel which by its presence represents a danger to the security of the SFRY. (Footnote 13) A nuclear vessel in and of itself represents a potential danger to the environment.

Further restrictions have been established with respect to the tonnage of foreign warships; a permit may not be granted for a foreign warship to enter the internal waters of Yugoslavia if it has a tonnage greater than 10,000 tons or a submarine with a surface displacement greater than 4,000 tons. (Footnote 14) This for all practical purposes has excluded from visiting our internal waters aircraft carriers and other very large foreign surface warships and large submarines.

These restrictions prevent visits of foreign warships which by their size, armament, and equipment might represent a demonstration of military force and which by their very presence could be a danger to the security of the SFRY.

As an exception the Federal Executive Council may in certain cases, if particular interests of the SFRY so require, permit the visit of a foreign warship even though the conditions prescribed by these provisions have not been fulfilled.

The visit or stay of a foreign warship in the internal waters of the SFRY may not be permitted if such a vessel, its boat or aircraft, or its crew have before the intended entry participated in or if after the stay they are to participate in military or other activities that could be harmful to the general interests or political reputation of
the SFRY. It is spelled out that a visit or stay of a foreign warship in the internal waters of the SFRY already permitted may be canceled for those same reasons.

These restrictions are an innovation in our maritime legislation, but they are in conformity with the peaceful and nonaligned policy of the SFRY.

4. Repair of Foreign Warships and Other Vessels in Naval Repair Yards and Shipyards of the SFRY

Under the provisions of our previous Law on Coastal Waters, foreign warships could be repaired only in our naval repair yards designated by the Federal Executive Council, with a number of rather rigid restrictions as to the number of vessels being repaired, the length of repairs and the like, while the repair of foreign merchant vessels, foreign yachts, foreign public vessels, foreign fishing vessels, and foreign research vessels was not regulated by that law.

The important development of our shipbuilding and the economic interests of the SFRY have required that the opportunity for repair of foreign warships and other vessels in our country be broadened, which will facilitate a larger inflow of foreign exchange along with better utilization of available capacity of our numerous shipyards and repair yards and, particularly important, employment of our manpower. The reasons, then, are purely economic in nature. Every other motive of a political or military nature has been excluded as it would violate the independent and nonaligned policy of our country. This clearly follows from the provisions of the new law which set up a number of conditions and restrictions.

Those same restrictions and exceptions which apply to the visit of foreign warships to our internal waters are also prescribed for the repair of foreign warships in our naval repair yards and shipyards. Thus the repair of a foreign naval warship, foreign warship carrying nuclear armament, and special-purpose ship whose presence represents a danger to the security of the SFRY may not be permitted, nor that of surface warships with full displacement exceeding 10,000 tons or submarines exceeding 4,000 tons of surface displacement.

The prohibitions also cover all forms of activity which might harm the reputation or interests of the SFRY, which are grounds for not being able to permit repairs of a foreign vessel or canceling repairs for which a permit has already been issued. Those activities would include aggression of the state to which the foreign vessel belongs against another state as a grave crime against the peace and the most drastic form of violation of international relations. This clearly follows from the provisions of Article 9, Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 9, of the new law.

Foreign warships may be repaired in naval repair yards and shipyards designated by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, up to the limit of their available capacity. More than three foreign warships of the same nationality may not be undergoing repairs in the coastal waters of the SFRY at the same time. The repair of a foreign warship may last as long as is necessary to perform it, but not longer than 16 months.

A foreign warship shall be repaired on the basis of a contract concluded with the authorized representative of that vessel by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense or authorized federal organization with jurisdiction over the sale and reserves of special-purpose products.

A foreign vessel issued a permit for repairs must immediately upon entering the designated Yugoslav port unload fuel, ammunition, and other war materiel at the place designated by our competent military commander. Only as many members of the crew as necessary for performance of repairs may remain on a ship taken in for repairs, but not to exceed one-third of the total number of members of the crew. In this way, the combat readiness of the foreign warship is for all practical purposes neutralized during the entire duration of its repairs.

Yugoslav statutes apply to our workers who are working on the repair of a foreign vessel.

During repairs the crew of a foreign warship may stay and move about in the port where their ship is being repaired. On request of the commander of the foreign warship, our military commander with jurisdiction over the port where repairs are being performed, in agreement with the competent law enforcement agency, may allow certain members of the crew to move even outside the port.

II. Territorial Waters of the SFRY

1. Concept and Legal Status

Territorial waters (in English “territorial sea,” in French “mer territoriale,” in Russian “teritoriyalnoye more”) is the zone of a certain width extending along internal waters and the low-water line along the coast (where there are no internal waters). It is a part of the national territory of the coastal state, under its sovereignty, but by contrast with internal waters, that space is not completely on a par with the mainland territory, since foreign vessels have the right of innocent passage in territorial waters. The sovereignty of the coastal state also extends to the airspace over its territorial waters, to the bottom, and underground beneath that bottom.

The width of territorial waters is measured in the direction of the open sea from the baseline which constitutes the border of internal waters and the low-water line along the coast as shown on large-scale marine charts. The outer boundary of territorial waters is the line along which the distance of every point from the nearest point of the baseline is equal to the width of territorial waters.
The outer boundary of territorial waters is at the same time the national border of the coastal state on the sea. The sovereignty of the coastal state ceases at that border.

The width of territorial waters was until quite recently the most debatable question in the history of the international law of the sea. The problem was finally solved in the provision of Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which reads:

Every state has the right to determine the width of its territorial waters to a limit which does not exceed 12 nautical miles measured from the baselines defined in conformity with this convention.

However, the convention has not yet taken effect, and in present practice of states there have remained widely differing widths of territorial waters from the smallest of 3 nautical miles all the way to the greatest of 200 miles (13 states have this width) (Footnote 15). The coastal states of the Mediterranean Sea today have the following widths of territorial waters:

6 nautical miles: Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel.

12 nautical miles: Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Malta, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Cyprus.

15 nautical miles: Albania.

35 nautical miles: Syria.

2. Boundaries of the Territorial Waters of the SFRY

The territorial waters of the SFRY embrace a zone of the sea whose width amounts to 12 miles reckoned from the baseline, in the direction of the open sea. The baseline consists of the border of internal waters and the low-water line (Footnote 16) along the coast of the mainland and island (where there are no internal waters). The outer limits of our territorial waters is the line each of whose points is 12 nautical miles distant from the nearest point of the baseline. The outer limit of the territorial waters of the SFRY is at the same time the national boundary on the sea of Yugoslavia.

3. Innocent Passage

By contrast with internal waters, in the territorial waters of the SFRY there exists the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels under the conditions and restrictions established by the provisions of the new Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY and the rules of the international law of the sea.

The term "innocent passage of a vessel" means the navigation of a foreign vessel through the territorial waters of Yugoslavia without entering internal waters or in order to enter them or to sail out of those waters to the open sea, all of this provided that it does not affect the order, peace, or security of the SFRY. In practical terms this means that a foreign vessel must in sailing through our territorial waters abide by all regulations of the SFRY governing conditions in those waters.

Many states stipulate that innocent passage of foreign warships requires issuance of a prior permit, others seek notification, and some allow innocent passage of foreign warships without either, as was provided in our previous Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone (Footnote 17). However, the new law has established the obligation of notification, which reads as follows:

The federal administrative agency competent for foreign affairs shall be notified of the intention of innocent passage of a foreign warship through the territorial waters of the SFRY by the state to whom that vessel belongs no later than 24 hours before the vessel is to enter territorial waters of the SFRY. (Footnote 18)

A foreign vessel must make innocent passage without interruption. Innocent passage also includes stopping and anchoring if these are dictated by the circumstances of navigation or force majeure or accident at sea or in order to offer assistance to persons, vessels, or aircraft which have been in danger or in trouble.

The law prescribes in detail the conditions of innocent passage, and this is done according to the type of foreign vessel. The right to innocent passage through territorial waters is restricted to three foreign warships of the same nationality at one time. Foreign warships, foreign tankers, foreign nuclear vessels, and other foreign vessels carrying nuclear or other dangerous or harmful materials must in innocent passage through territorial waters of the SFRY keep to the shipping routes designated in a specific regulation by the Federal Committee for Transportation and Communications in agreement with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. Those shipping routes must be shown on the marine chart "Adriatic Sea" S-101, in the scale 1:750,000, issued by the Naval Hydrographic Institute.

In the course of innocent passage through territorial waters of the SFRY a foreign submarine must sail the entire time on the surface of the sea and fly the flag of its state.

Special regulations have also been prescribed for the navigation of foreign fishing vessels in order to prevent fishing in our waters that is not allowed. They are required to stow shipping equipment away in ship stores or to seal such equipment and to take the shortest route without stopping, at a speed at least as great as that speed which is economical.

Innocent passage is completely regulated by the new law. Its content is defined in the same way as in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), i.e., by enumerating the activities of the foreign vessel which
are not considered innocent. In the context of the provisions of Article 18 of the new law the passage of a foreign vessel shall not be considered innocent if it engages in any of these activities:

1) a threat of force or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social system established by the SFRY Constitution or any other behavior violating the principles of international law;
2) any exercise or training with weapons of any kind;
3) any gathering of intelligence or data which might harm the defense or security of the SFRY;
4) any propaganda activity detrimental to the defense or security of the SFRY;
5) takeoff or landing of any aircraft or the taking of such aircraft on board the vessel;
6) launching or lowering any military device or taking such a device on board the vessel;
7) the loading or unloading of cargo, money, or people contrary to the customs, tax, public health, and other regulations of the SFRY or regulations on the entry and stay of foreign nationals in the SFRY;
8) any intentional or any other substantial pollution of the sea or environment;
9) any fishing or catching of other living creatures in the sea;
10) any exploration or measurement;
11) any activity for the purpose of unauthorized connection to any system of communication or any other system or devices of the SFRY;
12) any other activity not directly related to passage.

4. Right of Expulsion
Provisions on expulsion of a foreign vessel are prescribed in Article 30 of the new law. They have been taken over unchanged from the law that was previously in effect. Extensive articles have recently been published on expulsion of foreign vessels in MORNARICKI GLASNIK, and all of which has been said there is still relevant today (Footnote 19).

III. The Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY
The epicontinental zone of the SFRY accordingly embraces the seabed and subterranean space beneath the sea from the outer limit of territorial waters of the SFRY all the way to the boundary line dividing the epicontinental zone of Yugoslavia and Italy as established by the Agreement Between the Government of the SFRY and the Government of the Republic of Italy on Demarcation of the Epicontinental Zone Between the Two Countries, signed in Rome on 8 January 1968, which took effect on 21 January 1970. The principle of the midline and the rule that every island has its epicontinental zone were mainly applied in the demarcation. The line of demarcation has been drawn on marine charts which are an integral part of the agreement. In that way, the entire bottom and subterranean area of the open sea of the Adriatic lying between Yugoslavia and Italy are covered by the epicontinental zones of the two countries, which does not affect the legal status and rules applying to the high seas above them.

Yugoslavia has sovereign rights over its epicontinental zone with respect to exploration and exploitation of the natural and other resources of that zone. Those natural resources include ore and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subterranean area beneath it and live organisms which in the stage in which they are taken are immobile on the bottom of the sea or can move only in physical contact with it. Archeological and other submerged objects are covered by other resources.

This paper has given a brief survey of the legal framework affecting our coastal waters and epicontinental zone. Some questions have not been covered (because of the limited space). A detailed study, then, would require using the new law with the sublegal statutes which regulate in detail its application concerning the entry, passage, and stay of foreign vessels in coastal waters and other activities in our waters.

Footnotes
1. The law was published in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 49, 25 Jul 87.
3. The convention will take effect 1 year after 60 states have ratified or joined in it. So far 34 states have done so.
6. For more detail see the definition of a warship in the convention referred to.

8. Under the more recent legislation of Italy and Albania the straight baselines encompassing internal waters depart considerably from the general direction of the coast at many places. For example, along the entire Apennine Peninsula and the entire coast of Sicily Italy has included in baselines all indentations and even many islands far from the mainland. We feel that such practice is not in accord with the international law in effect. Numerous baselines drawn by Albania are also questionable (the 1976 amendment to the law on the border dated 9 March 1970). For more detail on this see: D. Rudolf, op. cit., pp 30-33.

9. See Article 3 of the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY.

10. For more detail on this see: D. Rudolf, op. cit., pp 25-29.


13. Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY.


15. For more detail on territorial waters in international law see: D. Rudolf, op. cit., pp 56-110.

16. The provision of Article 16, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 1, of the new law, just as in the earlier law, reads "...lowest tides," which is wrong. For more detail on this see: M. Tesic, "Coastal Waters and Epicontinental Zone in Geography and Maritime Law," MG, No 6, 1974, pp 958-974.


18. Article 17, Paragraph 3, of the Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY.


Bibliography

1. Law on Coastal Waters and the Epicontinental Zone of the SFRY, SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 49, 25 July 1987.


GDR Supplies USSR With Merchant Ships

With delivery of the Lo/Ro model 18 multiple-use freighters Zhitomir to the Black Sea Lines of Odessa on 20 July 1987 and Baltiysk to the Baltic Lines of Lenin-grad in November, the Warnow Shipyards State Enterprise in Warnemünde raised its cumulative production of this model to 15 ships. The great versatility of these ships, which have high-performance handling equipment for vertical lading and 3-part, 45-ton angled stern ramps for horizontal lading, and the drive-on/drive-off configuration of their tweendecks, assure high adaptability to varied consignments.

The Elbe Shipyards State Enterprise at Boizenburg/Ross-lau continued a tried and true design, the Bifa 302, with delivery of the four inland passenger ships: Rus (to Volga Lines of Gorki, 20 March 1987), Lenin (to Volga Lines of Gorki, 30 June 1987), Sergei Kirov (to Northwest Lines of Leningrad, fourth quarter of 1987) and Marshal Rybalko (to Ukrainian Inland Lines of Kherson, fourth quarter of 1987). With these deliveries, the Soviet inland fleet has now put into service 37 vessels of this design, built for 332 cabin passengers, when the predecessor model 301, designed for 360 passengers, is included in the count. In addition, the yards delivered 170 deadweight-ton inland/coastal freighters to Rech-flot, and thus raised the production run to date for this design (including the refrigerated-containership variant) to 63 units.

These shipbuilding achievements express in measurable form the way in which the employees of the National Shipbuilding Combine are carrying out the economic masterplan in the 70th year of the Great Socialist October Revolution. These achievements are at the same time a massive contribution to the strengthening of the material and technical underpinnings of Soviet maritime and inland navigation and high-seas fisheries.
Table 1. Trailership Series From Neptune Shipyards State Enterprise of Rostock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Home Port</th>
<th>Delivered On</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kara Karaev</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>Baku</td>
<td>09.08.1984</td>
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<td>Glinka</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>Baku</td>
<td>20.02.1985</td>
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<td>Dargomijsky</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>Zhdanov</td>
<td>31.05.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borodin</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Klapypeda</td>
<td>31.07.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musorgsky</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>Leningrad</td>
<td>29.11.1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchaikovsky</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>Riga</td>
<td>31.03.1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachmaninoff</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>10.08.1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimsky-Korsakov</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>30.12.1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novikov</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolai Chernyshevsky</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>30.09.1987</td>
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Table 2. The 12 Atlantic 833 Fisheries Research Vessels From the People's Shipyards State Enterprise of Stralsund

<table>
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<th>Delivered On</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Professor Marti</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>06.03.1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantida</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>30.03.1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor Kaganovsky</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>31.03.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimitri Stefanov</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>Kerch</td>
<td>30.04.1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Kizevetter</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>15.05.1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fritjof Nansen</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
<td>27.05.1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantnipro</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>09.06.1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor Levanidov</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>26.06.1987</td>
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<td>Ignat Pavlyuchenkov</td>
<td>779</td>
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<td>Tinro</td>
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<td>Professor Soldatov</td>
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<td>Pinro</td>
<td>782</td>
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13070/08309

POLAND

Economic Realities Force Retreat on Soviet Joint Venture Plans

[Article by Jerzy Baczynski: “Promising Defeat”]

[Text] Something unprecedented has happened. First, in 1986, the governments of Poland and the USSR ceremoniously signed an agreement on setting up joint enterprises on the territories of both countries. A dozen months later, they are talking rather openly about failure and disappointment, at least on our side. Recently, a representative of the ministry for economic cooperation with foreign countries admitted in the presence of many journalists that the expectations have exceeded the possibilities, that systemic differences and economic barriers between our countries were underestimated, and that the list of projects was oversized. All of that is true. Nonetheless, I do regard the results of the agreement signed by the two heads of governments, so far mediocre, as one of the most promising phenomena in the history of Polish-Soviet economic relations.

The beginning of the entire affair was typical, conforming to the traditions and forms of mutual contacts in effect for decades. The governments of the PRP and the USSR, “pursuant to the provisions of the friendship treaty... striving to further develop and enhance socialist integration... implementing the long-range program... proceeding from the need... and in consideration of the intent of Polish and Soviet enterprises...”, agreed to set up joint international enterprises and organizations.

As always, the true motives were much more mundane than the ones described in the preamble of the agreement. Until now, Polish-Soviet economic cooperation has been played out almost exclusively in the central echelons, through intergovernmental agreements, or at the level of sectors and branches of industry represented by respective ministries. The much-advertised cases of direct cooperation by enterprises (incidentally, the same year after year) involved more often than not the so-called exchange of experience and joint social actions.

However, the reforms underway in Poland and those initiated in the USSR have caused a reassessment by both sides. If autonomous enterprises are to be the main players in economic activity, the opportunity for direct contacts with foreign partners should be provided for them. Let them negotiate manager-to-manager if they see
a chance to strike a deal. The government and the ministries need not, and maybe even should not, come between the enterprises in order to impose, order and mediate.

**Twelve Selections**

This, in short, was "the original idea." Thus, it was resolved to support various forms of cooperation between enterprises of Poland and the USSR and, at the same time, set up joint enterprises under Polish-Soviet management. This plan enjoyed full support of the authorities of both countries as a manifestation of "transition to a higher form of economic cooperation." Considerable hopes were pinned on it from the economic, political and propaganda standpoints. However, all the good will and commitment of the partners notwithstanding, a mistake was made at the very outset. An attempt was made to introduce "the new" by using old methods. The candidates for founding joint enterprises were hand-picked "from the top," on the basis of information available to and convictions of the central planners.

As early as February and May 1986, the first intergovernmental agreements were signed providing for setting up 5 Polish-Soviet enterprises: production of cosmetics and household chemicals (with the Krakow factory "Pollena-Miraculum" participating from our side); production of electromagnetic clutches (in Ostrzeszow); potato derivatives (in Woskrzenice Duze), transverse helicoidal gears ("Avia" in Warsaw) and a cotton spinning mill in Biala Podlaska.

The guidelines for creating such enterprises were detailed several months later, in an agreement signed by the two prime ministers on 15 October 1986. An annex to this agreement mentioned 7 more candidates for Polish-Soviet enterprises: the fruit and vegetable-processing plant in Polaniec, pectin production in Jedlnisko, the highway transportation enterprise in Gora Kalwaria, a machine tool repair facility in Warsaw, production of hydraulic power equipment in Lodz and two enterprises on the USSR territory (extraction of starch from potatoes and processing of oleiferous seeds). This is how 5 enterprises came to be 12. This information was released to the public. It appeared that the issue had been resolved and all that remained was to wait for the ribbon-cutting ceremony, since the two government had made a selection and ratified it. Unfortunately, real sizing-up, evaluations and analyses got underway only after the agreements were signed.

**Peeling the Onion**

First of all, it turned out that Polish law does not provide for "joint international enterprises." To be sure, a law on companies with the participation of foreign capital (joint ventures) has just been adopted; however, in this case the subject was different. Since the USSR did not allow companies with [foreign] capital investment on its territory, it was resolved that joint enterprises will be set up on the basis of an international agreement (the companies would only need to register). Preparing regulations on the status of "international enterprises" took almost a year. The Council of Ministers adopted a related resolution in late September 1987.

Meanwhile, groups of Polish and Soviet specialists started evaluating the government project without waiting for legal arrangements to be made. The endeavor resembled the process of peeling an onion. As soon as one problem was solved, a new, more difficult and unpleasant one, surfaced. In some cases, it turned out that nothing at all remained of the subject of interest after a series of successive analyses.

Certainly, a couple or, say, a dozen years ago, the signing of an intergovernmental agreement would have meant the creation of joint enterprises regardless of detailed calculations. However, this time around, the agreement provided that the enterprises were to operate on the basis of "complete profitability and self-financing" to the benefit of both parties. Therefore, the final decisions hinged on the successful completion of technical, legal, economic, financial, tax and customs coordination.

The lack of mutual currency convertibility turned out to be a stumbling block almost impossible to overcome. How is the value of contributions by both parties to be calculated—in rubles, dollars, zlotys? Also, what is the rate of exchange—each country has its own rates? In what currency should outlays and profits be calculated? In general, how should the value be measured of buildings, equipment (e.g. wholly amortized, but still in operation), as well as technology, know-how and inventions contributed by the parties?

It was also discussed who and in what proportion would cover the costs of preparing "the technical-economic outline of the enterprise," if it is found to be inexpedient. The amount of contributions in hard currency, guidelines for setting prices for materials and final products, profit distribution and forms of taxation on enterprises caused controversy. This is hardly surprising: the experts were left to navigate in uncharted waters. Until that time, the parties were not fully aware of the barriers separating the economies of the two countries. The weaknesses and shortcomings of "the process of integration," beginning from technical standards through statistical reporting procedures and all the way to economic, organizational and even psychological, language and communicative barriers became apparent only in practice, when joint enterprises were being discussed.

**Verification**

They managed to clear up and resolve some issues at numerous meetings of ministers, deputy ministers and experts from the two countries. Other issues (the question of currency convertibility, to mention one) were acknowledged for now to have no solution, and the effort was redirected towards a search for temporary, alternate and partial arrangements.
The fact that the Council of Ministers decided to nominate a government commissioner for cooperation and joint enterprises shows how complicated the task at hand was. These responsibilities were entrusted to Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade (currently—of Cooperation with Foreign Countries) Zdzislaw Kurowski. Together with an interministerial team, the commissioner is charged with, among other things, preparing drafts and proposals for the legal regulations and systemic arrangements needed to facilitate direct cooperation by enterprises and setting up joint organizations and production units.

A dozen or so months after the intergovernmental agreement and setting up joint organizations and production units, it was determined that a considerable part of the projects selected “do not have prospects.” Construction of a joint cotton spinning mill in Biala Podlaska was recognized to be unprofitable. In the case of the highway transportation enterprise hauling fruit and vegetables in Gora Kalwaria, “the Soviet side gave up further negotiations.” With regard to the Hydraulic Power Equipment Enterprise in Lodz, “the draft of setting up a joint enterprise was abandoned.” In its turn, the Polish side gave up the plan to build a plant extracting starch from potatoes in the USSR, because “we are not interested in such deliveries.” The plan for processing oleiferous seeds (mainly rapeseed) at a joint enterprise in the USSR met the same fate... As recently as 2 weeks ago, the plan for building a potato-processing plant in Woskrzenice Duże was believed to be unrealistic and unprofitable. About 400 million zlotys had already been spent on preparing successive versions of the project outline. Yet, the calculations had shown unequivocally that there was no chance of achieving profitability and self-financing at the enterprise due to low subsidized prices for potato products in the USSR, where 80 percent of the output was supposed to be sold. A switch to contract prices, which again gave Woskrzenice a chance, was negotiated as late as the end of January of this year during a visit to Moscow by Minister of Agriculture Stanislaw Zieba.

Other projects from the government list are still being considered and scrutinized. The “Ponar-Ostrzeszow” Enterprise may sign an agreement on cooperation with a Soviet partner but in the form of an investment company, a joint venture, rather than in the form of an “international enterprise” (the interest in the latter arrangement dwindled considerably when it turned out that it did not mean generous subsidies from the central planner). Be that as it may, so far only one joint Polish-Soviet enterprise, “Pollena-Miraculum” in Krakow, out of the 12 proposed has been set up.

Only “Miraculum”

The charter was signed on 10 December of last year, and the agreement took effect on 1 January. “Pollena-Miraculum” ceased its legal existence, becoming an international company. Strong motivation for both parties is the only reason why they managed to successfully overcome all barriers in this case. For “Pollena,” entering into an arrangement with the Soviet partner offered a chance to complete an investment project on hold since 1981, for which the factory itself did not have adequate funds. For its part, the Soviet Union, a long-time importer of “Miraculum” products, was interested in considerably greater deliveries by this enterprise.

It was resolved that the original capital of the joint enterprise would amount to almost 11 billion zlotys, or 113 million transferable rubles, of which the Soviet partner will contribute 40 percent, and the Polish partner—60 percent. Both parties will also come up with $2.5 million each to cover the hard-currency outlay of the enterprise. The contribution by “Miraculum” includes the value of the factory assets to date, appraised to be about 42 million rubles, whereas the Soviet contribution will consist mainly of machinery, equipment and raw materials deliveries. Proportions of contributions are also the criterion for profit distribution.

When the investment project is completed, which is scheduled for 1992, the value of output from the enterprise will increase 4-fold, and exports to the USSR—6-fold, to the level of 70 million rubles a year. Production lines will not be changed in a major way. The “Miraculum” will deliver lotions for adults and children, bath oil, shampoos, oils and emulsions to the USSR and for the domestic market. The modernized part of the factory will produce deodorants, perfume and ladies’ cosmetics. The outlay incurred will be recouped within 5 years.

Pursuant to the 1987 resolution by the Council of Ministers, which sets forth the conditions for operations by “international enterprises,” a Pole is the general director of the company, and a citizen of the USSR is his deputy. A board of trustees including four persons from each side is appointed. The Employee Council of the enterprise currently in office will dissolve upon discharging its responsibilities (among other things, distributing profit for 1987), and in its place a workforce council will be formed as a consultative and advisory organ for the general director.

No Forced Solutions

What will happen to other joint enterprise projects? Talks regarding several of the “12 enterprises” are still underway. However, new and more interesting propositions are sought, such as making ladies’ garments in an enterprise on the territory of the USSR, processing synthetic fiber or producing personal computers, because the consensus pretty much is that the original list was not completely thought through. A majority of projects brought up by the two parties are discarded after the first consultation, but fresh ideas keep coming.

Minister Kurowski affirms that no pressure will be exerted in order to artificially quicken this process. Economic considerations should be decisive in every
case. In view of difficulties with objective measures for profitability, such projects should be selected which allow the two partners to solve important problems, as was the case with the “Miraculum.”

“At present, we cannot force enterprises to engage in direct international cooperation or to set up joint organizations. What remains is to create legal and economic conditions so that the interests of enterprises coincide with those of the state, and joint enterprises are equally attractive for both parties.”

This is why I believe that something important has occurred in Polish-Soviet economic relations, despite the failures that have taken place, and “the defeat” of an intergovernmental agreement is, basically, promising.

9761

ROMANIA

Balanced Countrywide Distribution of Production Force Under Way
27000034 Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian
No 20, 25 Oct 87 pp 9-13

[Article by Nicolae Ionescu, director general of the Central Directorate of Statistics: “Balanced, Proportional Socioeconomic Development of All Areas of the Country”]

[Text] The problems of regional allocation of the production forces and those of socioeconomic development of the areas, regions and localities are now objects of the efforts and studies of a great many specialists and statesmen or national and international organizations for purposes of socioeconomic rationalization of the regional units in keeping with the nature of the existing social system, with each country’s stage of development and immediate and long-range tasks and objectives, and with its views on the rates and particular ways of national economic development.

The Inherited Burden of the Past

At the beginning of this century, the problems of regional distribution of the production forces were confined to those of locating industrial enterprises near the raw material sources and commodity markets, and rationalizing the process was primarily a matter of minimizing the outlays on raw materials and shipping and of increasing the profits. Under the capitalist system, industrial development, the accentuated social division of labor, and more intensive specialization and cooperation in production extended the problems of regional distribution of the production forces to include all market problems, such as those of supply and demand, price setting, recruitment, training and use of the labor force, etc. Nevertheless under the system based on exploitation and oppression, even in its stages of intensive development, regional allocation of the production forces was still subordinated to one and the same objective of maximizing profits.

The appearance of the socialist system with its new and objective laws led to formation and development of a new idea of regional distribution of the production forces. To be sure this new view was also subordinated to an optimum, but it was approached in the interests of the working class and the entire people, it included both economic and social elements, and it was based on the fundamental aim of the new system, that of maximizing the national income and the living standard accordingly. That general optimum requires rationalizing a number of criteria, from high growth rates of the national economy, constant improvement of its structures, better use of the natural resources and manpower in all areas and regions of the country, and complete and highly productive use of the acquired fixed assets to steady growth of materialized labor and the national income.

Whereas there are no differences among the countries that have begun to build the new society as to the main purpose of regional distribution of the production forces, there is a great diversity in their ways, means and rates of rationalizing their regional allocation, which diversity is chiefly determined by the levels of socioeconomic development of the various areas and regions, the geographic distribution of the natural and manpower resources, the extent and efficiency of use of the resources that society can allocate for the purpose, and the priorities of the objectives entered in each country’s program for socialist construction.

As we know, most countries, including Romania, that have embarked upon socialist construction have inherited from the capitalist system not only underdeveloped economies with unsuitable sectorial structures but also unequal regional distributions of their production forces.

The historic act of 23 August 1944 occurred in Romania at one of the lowest points in its evolution. The bourgeois-landowner regime left us a precarious economy exhausted by the long years of war and characterized by a low level of production forces in which a backward agriculture predominated. Against the background of an inadequate technical inventory and a poorly qualified labor force in which the agricultural population was predominant, there was a very low social productivity of labor with all its bad effects upon the national income and the living standard. This unsatisfactory general situation was aggravated by a quite unsuitable regional distribution of the production forces that even further accentuated the country’s socioeconomic backwardness. Nicolae Ceausescu said, “It is well known that Romania emerged from the war ruined and exhausted, that economic chaos and poverty prevailed in the land, and that the working masses were struggling in black squalor.”
In 1945 only 26 percent of the value of Romania's social product came from industry and nearly three-fourths of it came from the other sectors, especially agriculture. The population employed in industry and the nonagricultural sectors amounted to only 23.6 percent of the total employed population, over three-fourths of which was in agriculture. There were also great discrepancies in the regional distribution of workers, between 23 salaried persons per 1,000 inhabitants in Olt County and 182 of them in Brasov County, or eight times more.

In 1945 industry was heavily concentrated in eight counties (Arad, Brasov, Cluj, Caras-Severin, Hunedoara, Prahova, Sibiu and Timis counties) and in Bucharest municipality as well. Together they produced over 52 percent of the national industrial output and employed 286,000 persons, or 58.9 percent of the total personnel employed in industry, while only 29 percent of the national population lived in those counties. The value of the per capita industrial output is even more representative of the discrepancies in the regional distribution of industry. While the national average per capita industrial output was 730 lei, it was 86 lei in Jalomita County and 93 lei in Vaslui County, or 8.5 times less and 7.8 times less respectively than the national average and 38 and 35 times less respectively than in Hunedoara County.

Agriculture was also in a state of blatant backwardness. There were only 9,000 single tractors for an agricultural area of about 14 million hectares, averaging one tractor for 1,076 hectares of arable land. The regional distribution of tractors shows that there was one tractor for about 2,000 hectares of arable land in Dobrogea, for 1,820-2,200 hectares in the counties of Moldavia, for 855-1,114 hectares in those of Wallachia and Oltenia, and for 760-1,110 hectares in those of Transylvania and the western part of the country. The same unsatisfactory situation was also true of the other agricultural machines.

The backward state of agriculture was mainly due to the production relations typical of the capitalist system and to the considerable feudal remnants. More than half (54 percent) of the total 2.3 million landowners (a figure that does not include peasants completely without land) owned less than 3 hectares, while 7,800 landowners held more than 50 hectares, including 215 big landowners who held more than 1,000 hectares. Meanwhile the entire tractor park belonged to the big landowners. Most of the small farmers owning less than 1 hectare and about half of those owning 1-3 hectares did not even have any draft animals.

The other sectors of material production were also underdeveloped. Because of the low national income, which could not provide the necessary resources for an accumulation fund meeting the requirements, construction work was also limited, seasonal and done mostly manually. Transportation over short distances and in the agricultural and forestry establishments was chiefly by animal traction and over long distances by the unequally distributed railways with a limited geographic density.

Due to the small number of motor vehicles and roads, automotive transportation was insignificant and largely unmodernized, and sea and air transportation was almost nonexistent.

There were also regional inequalities in the degree of urbanization, first in the number and geographic distribution of cities, second in their sizes and populations, and third in the extent of their municipal-town planning facilities, most of them being market centers. Romania was one of the European countries with limited town planning, with all the bad economic, social and cultural effects of that situation. In 1945 the urban population was 22.8 percent of the total national population, with values between 6.1 percent in Gorj County and 34.2 percent in Braila County. About half of the total urban population of 3.6 million was concentrated in Bucharest municipality and Cluj, Constanta, Dolj, Iasi, Prahova and Timis counties.

The underdevelopment and unequal geographic distribution of the production forces as well as limited urbanization and unfavorable effects upon public education and health protection. Only 15.5 percent of the national population was in education in 1945, and the following counties were below that standard: Giurgiu (11.1 percent), Teleorman (11.4 percent), Arad (11.9 percent), Olt (13.2 percent), Bihor (13.3 percent), Vilea (13.6 percent) and Maramures (13.8 percent). The number of inhabitants to one physician was between 678 and 5,308, differing radically from one county to another.

A New, Scientific Viewpoint

Ever since it was founded the RCP had made it the major aim of its entire policy to establish and develop the socialist system on Romanian soil, and its theoretical and practical activity covered all aspects of socialist construction including those of harmonious and balanced allocation of the production forces throughout the country. In the first years of socialist construction the policy of more rational distribution of the new economic capacities resulted in a more pronounced development of some cities which, alongside the industrialization process, also benefited by a number of services and social facilities. But because of the limited national income and resources that could be allocated to accumulation and the large and less efficient regional-administrative structures of the time, as well as the ideas about the role and importance of accumulation and the rates and proportions of national economic development, considerable discrepancies in the development of the various areas of the country, and even in that of some cities and localities within the same administrative regions, continued to persist until the Ninth Party Congress.

The innovative, dynamic and vigorous influence of the Ninth Party Congress on all economic, social and political activity in Romania was very pronounced in the
process of intensive development of the production forces and their rational distribution and coordination throughout Romania, with major favorable and direct effects upon the all-around progress of all the regional-administrative units. Those achievements were based on Nicolae Ceausescu's prodigious theoretical and practical work, in which he emphasizes questions of harmonious, balanced regional distribution of the production forces throughout the country, regional planning, and modernization of urban and rural localities.

By virtue of its productive factors, rational and balanced allocation of the production forces throughout Romania means an objective socioeconomic process, improvement of the regional economic and social structures based on the general view of development of the national economy as a whole and especially of the production forces, shaping the structures according to the economic sectors and subsectors, better use of natural resources and manpower, growth of the social product, national income and economic effectiveness, and improvement of the entire people's standards of material and cultural civilization on that basis.

In Nicolae Ceausescu's view, the questions of harmonious, balanced distribution of the production forces throughout the country are directly related to socialist construction and to intensive development of the production forces as a whole, constituting a long-range process with guidelines to be precisely determined. And harmonious regional distribution of the production forces is fundamental to all Romanian citizens' full equality of rights with no discrimination and to their exercise of the broadest democratic rights and freedoms. Nicolae Ceausescu says, "Socialist construction calls for intensive development of the production forces throughout Romania from a uniform and broad viewpoint. That is the only way to raise the standard of civilization of all localities, to stop the migration of the population to the big cities, to harmoniously reform the whole structure and society, and to bring about full equality of all Romanian citizens in their living and working conditions, exercise of their rights, and their advancement in social activity."

Of course balanced development of the whole national territory does not mean standardization of the economic structures in every county, municipality, city and commune or repetition in every county of the structures on the national level, but comprehensive and differentiated development of the regional units while attaining certain levels, however, and keeping within certain limits of some socioeconomic indicators determining the degree of regional development, so that those levels can be equalized in the future. Moreover in the party's view of regional development must be accomplished at rates differentiated from one regional unit to another according to the level reached at a given point and in consideration of their distinctive social and economic features, the presence and geographic distribution of natural resources, the density and locations of communication lines, the hydrographic system, the climatic and soil conditions, etc. In the course of harmonious, balanced development of the production forces consideration must be given to growing urbanization due to the structural changes in distribution of the population between agriculture and the nonagricultural sectors, rational use of lands for building new economic or social-cultural capacities, and allocation of the capacities in general industrial districts. And finally, construction of large apartment houses requires development of the street, water and sewer systems and other utilities, with restriction of the limits of the localities and consideration of all the other factors in region planning and urban and rural town planning.

In President Nicolae Ceausescu's view, regional socioeconomic development and planning of the national territory and of the network of urban and rural localities are two inseparable aspects of modernization of the national economy in the stage of building the fully developed socialist society, and their harmonious combination makes the whole process more dynamic and more socially and economically effective.

Regional planning and urban and rural town planning, which are extensive and lengthy processes, must produce a network of geographically well-located urban and rural localities that is closely correlated with the natural and migratory movement of the population and with the distribution of the production forces and is determined by the demographic, economic and social factors. As Nicolae Ceausescu said, urbanization must not become an uncontrolled process leading both to excessive concentration of the population in a few large cities and to depopulation of the rural localities. It should bring about growth of the urban population through development of the existing cities on the basis of natural growth and migratory movements, within limits correlated with development of the production forces, and also through the rise of new cities in the course of economic and social-cultural development of some rural localities.

Development of cities and development of the production forces, especially the industrial ones, are closely connected and interdependent, and construction of new capacities makes it necessary to construct a corresponding social infrastructure. Concentration of industrial activities in industrial districts within the cities reflects a scientific view of completely systematized development, an economic and organizational view as well as one for uniform solution of social problems.

Radical Nationwide Changes

The strategy of creating harmonious and balanced regional socioeconomic structures, devised with the party general secretary's telling contribution, harmonizes the macroeconomic elements with the microeconomic ones and the economic criteria with the social ones deeply rooted in the present and widely open to the future. The theoretical and practical aspects of this
strategic model, intended for all-around development of all regional-administrative units and their best integration in the unified national economic complex, are governed by the consistent policy of rational, harmonious and balanced distribution of the production forces throughout the country. The party secretary general said, "We are concerned with rational allocation of the production forces throughout the country for purposes of harmonious development and socioeconomic improvement of all counties and equal living and working conditions for all citizens of all nationalities, in order to further improve the entire people's material and cultural living standard as the supreme goal of party policy and the essence of the fully developed socialist society that we are successfully building in Romania."

The application of the Romanian model of regional socioeconomic development devised by Nicolae Ceausescu brings out a number of major trends characteristic of the originality and effectiveness of this very far-reaching process vital to construction of the socialist system in Romania.

The main trend in Romania's all-around socioeconomic development is the priority on the progress, balance and harmony of the production forces in all counties and localities of Romania, lending that principle a specific content in reference to the facts of Romanian society and the immediate and long-range tasks of socialist construction. Nicolae Ceausescu approached the economic category of the production forces and their potential for furthering progress and civilization, as well as their further development, in the light of the dialectical connection and balance among their structural elements, always allowing for the fact that a correct policy of developing the production forces has to be verified by its effects upon socioeconomic development as a whole, by high rates and optimal proportions of economic growth, and by improvement of the people's material and cultural living standard.

Internal effort plays a critical part in the strategy of developing and modernizing the production forces as a dialectical unity of the internal and external factors, for which purpose a policy based on a high rate of accumulation has been and is promoted. Investments have been the chief economic means of implementing the policy of rational, harmonious and balanced distribution of the production forces throughout the country, and for purposes of balanced development of all areas of the country and reduction of the gaps among counties, major investment funds were allocated with a priority on the underdeveloped counties. In 1966-1985 some counties logged growth rates of investments far above the national annual average rate of 7.9 percent, such as Bistrita-Nasaud and Covasna (13.2 percent), Gorj (12.2 percent), Salaj (12 percent), Satu Mare (11 percent), Giurgiu (11.5 percent), Dimbovita (11.9 percent), Mehedinti (12.2 percent), Tulcea (11.4 percent), and Vaslui (11 percent). Meanwhile, in order to make better use of the more developed counties' existing economic and natural conditions in view of their contributions to national economic development (Brasov, Cluj, Hunedoara, Prahova, Timis and Sibiu counties and Bucharest municipality), major funds were invested both in construction of new capacities and in modernizing and developing the existing ones.

For consistently rapid regional development of the production forces and more effective efforts to that end, most of the funds invested in the socialist sector were allocated to the material production sectors and especially to industry, whose share in the total investments in the whole national economy exceeded 50 percent in the 1966-1985 period. That proportion was differentiated regionally according to the local conditions and the possibilities of using the natural resources and manpower to develop the technical-material base and to produce an optimal economy in each county.

Effectiveness, the major aim of the investment process, is reflected in the huge volume of fixed assets activated in the last 20 years. The invested sums resulted in about 8,000 major industrial and agrozootechnical production capacities, nearly 3 million dwellings and many other social-cultural capacities. Whereas in 1945 the value of the fixed assets did not exceed 20 billion lei in any county, now there is no county with less.

The party and its secretary general consider industrialization the main point in the strategy of rapid development of the production forces and reduction of the economic gaps among the various areas and localities. In their view, industry is the motive force of the whole economy, as the sector with the latest technical-scientific advances and capable of furthering the dynamic development of the other sectors of the national economy and securing a high productivity of materialized labor, the social product and the national income.

The emphasis on industrialization and development and modernization of the industrial production forces in the general strategy for Romanian society's development is due both to their decisive role in meeting the various needs of productive and individual consumption as fully as possible and to the effects that industry has, from intensive and harmonious development of the entire economy to rapid urbanization of the nation, from change of the social-professional structure of the population to gradual elimination of the essential differences between physical and intellectual work, from growth of labor productivity to reduction of the work week, and from enhancing the general material and cultural welfare to securing national independence and strengthening the national defense capability.

The formation of strong industrial districts and centers in all counties is characteristic of the improved regional distribution of the production forces. Counties that used to be underdeveloped and devoid of industry like Alba,
Arages, Buzau, Bistrita-Nasaud, Covasna, Dolj, Dimbovita, Galati, Harghita, Ialomita, Iasi, Olt, Satu Mare, Teleorman, Tulcea and Vaslui now have strong industrial units and are contributing considerably to the nation’s industrial output. Along with the swift growth of the industrial output throughout the economy, growth rates above the national average have been logged by Arages, Bistrita-Nasaud, Covasna, Dolj, Galati, Ialomita, Iasi, Olt, Satu Mare, Salaj, Tulcea and Vaslui counties especially.

The high growth rates of the industrial potentials of all the counties and especially of those underdeveloped in the past lessened the differences among their contributions to the national industrial output and led to economic-industrial homogenizing of the areas and localities of Romania.

The policy of balanced and harmonious regional development of industry is intended not only to increase the gross output but also to form a modern regional structure and to further the subsectors that promote technical progress, make better use of the natural conditions and labor resources, and provide possibilities for supply and sales of the products. According to those criteria the metallurgical industry was expanded in Galati, Calarasi, Salaj, Teleorman, Bistrita-Nasaud and Tulcea counties, the tractor building industry in Harghita, Dolj and Timis counties, the bearings industry in Vaslui, Teleorman and Suceava counties, the electronic and electrical engineering industry in Arages, Bistrita-Nasaud, Bihor, Botosani, Buzau, Covasna, Ialomita, Iasi, Mures and Vaslui counties, the petrochemical industry in Arages, Bihor and Constanta counties, the chemical fertilizers industry in Arad, Bacau, Braila, Dolj, Iasi, Tulcea, Vilcea and Mures counties, etc.

Continued industrialization and the strategy of both general and regional socioeconomic development are characterized by increasingly rapid incorporation of science and advanced technologies and equipment and change of the industrial production structure to meet the demands of the new technical-scientific revolution and of a greater efficiency comparable with that obtained in the economically advanced countries.

Once some effective industrial districts were formed, there was an intensive concentration of production in large, highly specialized enterprises able to make full use of the advantages of large-scale production and modern technology. Production and labor were better organized and specialization and cooperation among enterprises of the same production structure were accentuated, as well as better use of material and labor resources.

Balanced and rational distribution of the production forces is also objectively required by the need of developing and modernizing agriculture, which is a far-reaching process calling for extensive changes in that sector’s technical-material base. In the party secretary general’s view, consolidation of the role of agriculture as a basic sector of the national economy heavily depends upon the new agrarian revolution, which is expected to produce higher and stable agricultural outputs and a general change in the entire peasantry’s living and working conditions. To aid the application of the most advanced technologies for agricultural production, adequate mechanization facilities were created as well as effective machine-tractor stations equipped with whole sets of highly productive agricultural machines and evenly allocated throughout the country.

In view of the great effect of climatic and soil conditions upon the levels of agricultural outputs and the need of stable and secure yields regardless of the climatic conditions, the program to supply agricultural machines and tractors was accompanied by a vast program for improvements for irrigation, checking soil erosion, draining lands with excessive moisture, and improving agricultural lands by applying fertilizers and performing soil-improvement operations.

Large modern irrigation systems were installed in the counties with water resources and favorable natural conditions, such as Braila, Calarasi, Constanta, Dolj, Giurgiu, Ialomita, Olt, Teleorman and Tulcea. The area improved for irrigation in those counties alone (2 million hectares) is about 10 times greater than the total area improved for irrigation in Romania in 1965. Major drainage projects were implemented on the agricultural lands in Braila, Buzau, Tulcea, Arges, Vrancea, Olt, Ialomita, Brasov, Bihor, Satu Mare and other counties. Extensive lands were reclaimed in the area alone (Valea lui Mihai, Oltenia, the lower Siret, the Danube Delta, etc.). More intensive efforts were made in all counties to augment the agricultural and arable area by restricting the buildable limits of localities, systematizing the road networks, and reclaiming large areas for agriculture by means of extensive soil-improvement operations.

Thanks to development of the technical-material base, application of advanced technologies, rational administration of chemical and natural fertilizers, use of seeds in the higher biological categories, the most complete and intensive use possible of the productive potential of the land reserve, and the increased livestock production and numbers of livestock, the gross agricultural output showed major gains in all counties.

Introduction of the principle of regional self-supply stimulated a general development of agriculture and an optimal balance between the two subsectors of agricultural production, namely crop and livestock production, as well as a suitable crop structure of bread grains, technical plants, vineyards and orchards. Meanwhile consideration was and is given to the interdependence of industry, agriculture and other sectors in securing the progress of the economy as a whole and to the need of a balanced development of all sectors on a national and local scale.
Every County To Be Fully Developed

The party and its secretary general see a close connection between all-around development of the production forces, industry, agriculture and the other sectors of material production and their correct regional distribution. It is actually a matter of two inseparable aspects of construction of the fully developed socialist society. Nicolae Ceausescu says, “Our first consideration is all-around development of the production forces, industry, agriculture and the other sectors of material production, on the Marxist-Leninist principle that development of the production forces is essential to any society's progress and especially to that of socialist society, and accordingly also to preparations for communist construction. Our second consideration is the correct regional distribution of the production forces, which will create jobs for workers in all areas of the country and secure the presence of the working class in all counties from the social point of view as well. Actually the problem of developing all counties and all areas of the country is also not only a practical problem but also a theoretical one.”

This approach to development of the regional-administrative units, economic, political and social, can provide them with a comprehensive structure wherein industry, agriculture and the other sectors producing material values will form a harmonious whole that can implement the reproduction process efficiently and can be integrated in the existing structures on the national level. In correlation with development of material production, the regional units are to develop scientific research, education, culture, art and the health-protection units and provide a background favorable to development of people's personalities and to their active participation in socioeconomic activities.

Moreover the concept of comprehensiveness also includes harmonizing the connections among the component elements of the production forces, namely the means of labor, objects of labor, science and the labor force, and coordinating them as their interdependences are intensified. Coordination of those elements as well as a structure of the production forces that is suited to their component elements is essential to application of the production forces' capacity for furthering progress and civilization. Of course the mere existence of improved production means is not enough. Conditions must also be created for their further development in step with the technical-scientific revolution and the raw material base and the skilled labor force must be provided for.

All-around development of the production forces in every county and a dynamic balance among the economic sectors, especially between industry and agriculture, for purposes of harmonious change of the whole economic structure are to be finalized by economic homogenizing of all areas of Romania as the objective basis of social homogenizing.

In formulating the concept of economic and social homogenizing, Nicolae Ceausescu scientifically determined the optimal ratio between the size of the population and the level of development as a critical factor in rational regional distribution of the production forces, in maximizing the use of natural and manpower resources, and in socioeconomic improvement of all areas and localities. In consideration of the varying economic potentials and sizes of the populations of the counties as well as the need of all-around development of each county's economy, the 12th RCP Congress called for a gross output of at least 70,000 lei per capita for the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan. That indicator is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the one in the previous five-year plan, which specified a minimum industrial output of about 10 billion lei in every county, and it provided for a broader structure of the local economies and a better balancing of the regional structures.

The rapid progress of the production forces, their harmonious regional distribution, and the quantitative and qualitative changes in the development of industry, agriculture and the other economic sectors were accompanied by major social effects helping to accomplish some of the major aims of the Romanian socialist system, namely access of all Romanian citizens to jobs and incomes and equal living and working conditions for the inhabitants of all areas of Romania.

The changes in the structure and extent of employment of the labor force in all counties are significant in this respect. There has been and is a trend toward more accelerated growth of the number of workers in the counties that used to have lower levels of economic development and employment of the labor force. In the last 20 years increases above the national average in the numbers of workers were logged primarily by Salaj, Gorj, Bistrita-Nasaud, Olt, Buzau, Botosani, Covasna, Giurgiu, Vâlcea, Dâmbovita, Vaslui, Constanța, Satu Mare and Mehedinti counties.

The consistent emphasis on full use of the existing regional resources and balanced development of all areas and localities is also reflected in the important qualitative changes in the improvement of the occupational structure and of the training of personnel in the economy, in the general growth of worker's incomes, and in the material and cultural living standard of the population throughout the country. The optimal combination of the material and human factors improved the ratio between the population employed in agricultural activities and that in the nonagricultural ones, as the proportion of the latter increased in all counties in the 1965-1985 period.

The rapid economic development of the whole national territory through allocation of economic capacities in all areas of Romania resulted in extensive urbanization, which was integrated in a unified concept of urban and rural town planning. In the years of socialist construction
and especially after the Ninth RCP Congress, 54 localities became cities, and now there are 237 cities in Romania compared with 148 in 1945 and 183 in 1965.

Along with the increase in the number of cities under the impetus of expanded social and economic activities, their populations also increased and there were important changes in their grouping according to size of population.

The accentuation of urbanization is indicated by the growth of the urban population, from 22.8 percent of the total population in 1945 to more than 50 percent at present. High urbanization rates have been shown by Gorj, Harghita, Maramures, Covasna, Bistrița-Nasaud, Caras-Severin, Alba, Salaj and Ialomița counties.

Allocation of productive activities in industrial districts or zones permitted uniform solution of problems of water and gas supply, sewerage, central heating, public transportation, purification of residual waters, etc., as well as regional planning in zones with distinct functions such as residential zones, zones for productive activities, and administrative, cultural, educational, commercial, recreational and other zones.

Improvement of regional distribution of the production forces is a lengthy process involving a huge volume of material, financial and manpower resources that is actually never finished. It goes on constantly, being directly determined by the continuous progress of the production forces. The differences in performance of this process from one stage to another lie in its extent, quality and efficiency, which are on ever higher levels.

The 13th Party Conference specified new and important objectives in this field. Its directives for the current five-year plan call for consistent continuation of the policy of rational allocation of the production forces throughout the country as a major requirement for implementing the provisions of the RCP Program for Building the Fully Developed Socialist Society and for Romania's Advance Toward Communism.

According to the provisions of the current five-year plan, in 1990 a per capita volume of economic activity amounting to at least 80,000 lei will be performed in all counties, including 50,000 lei in industrial output. Housing construction will be expanded and diversified in accordance with the provisions of the national program for regional planning and urban and rural town planning, while 750,000 more dwellings will be built, 100,000 of which will be built in communes. Rural town planning will be intensified by concentrating isolated villages and farms in large communes and by restricting the limits of the localities. The new dwellings to be constructed will have from two to four levels.

By its rates and proportions the Directive-Program for Regional Socioeconomic Development in the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan denotes a higher stage in solution of the many complicated problems presented by improvement of the socioeconomic structures throughout Romania. That program, which is being successfully implemented, brings out once again the scientific and realistic character of the views of the party and its secretary general on this subject, vies governed by the central idea of providing better and better living and working conditions for all Romanian citizens of all nationalities and for the entire people.

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YUGOSLAVIA

Causes of Persistent Food Shortages Traced
28000077 Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jan 88 pp 14-16

[Article by Dusan Sekulic: "The Rider on a Shod Cow"]

[Text] We have a shortage of milk because there are too many oxen, say the humorists. Resigned, growing old and appreciably poorer over the last 2 years, the peasants say that it is clear even to a fool that this country is a household without a head, and when there is no head of the household, the members of the household are hungry.

The milk shortage is actually only the clearly visible and white tip of an immense iceberg on which our ship has already been wrecked, and wrong navigation is naturally to blame for the accident. The crisis in food production is evident first with milk because it cannot be stored in silos like wheat and then consumed in a year or 2; nor can it be brought home in sizable quantities from peasant relatives and stored in freezers. It is produced today for the next day and it cannot stand on the shelves of stores. A dropoff of production of a few percentage points is immediately felt as an undersupplied market, and the universal acquired reflex of socialism "there are no goods—there are lines," operates instantly. So that no one should think at this point that our peasants are just waiting for their stock market computer to show a drop in prices of a few percentage points, whereupon they immediately stop milking, it should be emphasized that the milk shortage was prepared more than a year ago, following a scenario which has been repeated no one knows how many times, since the time when the private farmer producing for the market was proclaimed a kulak.

A Cow in the Bank

Although milk does not represent any considerable percentage of the total cost of living of the average family, it is on the list of goods whose prices are set by the government. This is all the more incomprehensible when we realize that in and of itself it certainly is not a strategic raw material of either agriculture itself or of the national economy. For example, the entire present disturbance on the market could be eliminated with some $7 million of imported milk, which is a ridiculous sum
What Would Uncle Brka Say?

All things considered, these are the catastrophic results of a policy which the peasants say could not have been better devised by our worst enemy. We have already said it, milk is only the tip of the iceberg. We have found the same incredible stupidities, tantamount to deliberate sabotage, in every branch of agricultural production. For example, Yugoslavia has the lowest wheat yields in Europe; nevertheless, about 6 million tons are produced, and although about 4 million are enough for food, wheat is still imported. Or: anyone who now has fattened hogs for sale will get at the most 1,200 dinars per kilogram, since that is what the FEC has ordered, but the simplest calculation shows that production costs at least 1,600 dinars per kilogram.... And if the latter resulted in less expensive meat, perhaps Uncle Stalin's logic would perhaps have made some sense. But alas: with earnings one-tenth of those in the rest of Europe Yugoslavia is producing food that is twice as expensive as Europe and America!

More than 80 percent of basic market surpluses are produced on the private holding, since more than that percentage of the arable land belongs to the private farmers. The average size of the private landholding of the farmer who lives off it amounts to only 3 hectares, while the average size of individual parcels is less than 1 hectare. Even in Vojvodina the average holding of the private farmer is barely 4.5 hectares. Almost a million tractors are to be found on those dwarfish holdings, not to mention all the other machines which have been purchased over the last 2 decades. The effects of this machinery have been catastrophically bad, and that has automatically made production more expensive. This has created a gap which in technological terms could be measured in centuries between the farmers from Bavanište, who use a pneumatic machine to sow wheat, and the peasant from Ritovek, 10 km away as the crow flies on the right bank of the Danube, who sows it by hand.

Government by the Latifundistas

The agricultural combines, with their tens and hundreds of thousands of hectares of the best land, socialist latifundias, as it has been put by Dr Dragan Veselinov, are suffering from an incurable disease. The kolkhoz syndrome, which derives from the feeling that what is everyone's is no one's, has hopelessly infected our socialized farms as well, as has happened everywhere under socialism, which is why today a socialist state can be infallibly identified by whether it is capable of producing enough food for its population. The "latifundistas" first gave up livestock raising wherever they were able, and for intensive field crops and industrial crops they present a bill to society on the cost principle: pay as much as it cost me. They then include in the bill all of the poor organization, lack of incentive, theft, and waste. It is enough to go to any village to see the ruined empty stables and pigpens and expensive machinery rusting in the snow and rain, by contrast with the private livestock

compared to the costs of importing coffee, which is certainly easier to do without than milk. But milk has another characteristic: it is produced mostly in the stables of private farmers. That is, when a pest belonging to the species "cabineticus bureaucraticus" undertakes to total up the effects of an economy in ruins, attempting to stretch things as far as he can, so that in a few years everything will still be the same, in a panicky effort to postpone the moment when a person with a normal salary will begin to be hungry, he attains the summit of his political wisdom in what he thinks to be a crafty and painless attempt to fleece the private peasants. Ninety percent of the livestock population is in private hands—aha, this is the place to tighten up! It was in fact Comrade Stalin who proclaimed something like that to be correct regardless of the consequences.

But the consequences lie not only in the fact that the milk was turned into cheese and kajmak or was poured into the troughs for the hogs in an impulsive outburst of disgust because of the nonsensical farm "policy." Perhaps they do not know it in the FEC, but milk even now still comes from cows. The things that go along with a cow are, first, a calf; and then feed, care, and work. The average cow costs about a million dinars. Our population of approximately 1.8 million spotted cows and white cows produces about 4.5 billion liters of milk a year, i.e., on the average slightly more than 2,000 liters each, since what we drink is not only the milk from those fine and monstrous cages of the Beograd Agricultural Combine, but also the milk from ordinary peasant cows, which have been milked after first being used the entire day under the yoke as draft animals wearing shoes. If he knows how to count—and no one would deny that he does—the peasant would have to conclude that in all of last year he could have earned at the most about 500,000 dinars by milking his cow. If he had sold the cow and put the million dinars in a time deposit, he would have gotten 1.5 million, which he would not have had to do any work, nor would he have consumed any livestock feed. "So here, I am taking my cows to the bank, and you send my greetings to Branko!" said a prestigious cooperative member from Skela, one of the directors of the Obrenovac "Dragan Markovic" Combine, showing a bag full of money from the dairy cows which he had sent to the slaughterhouse. In the Obrenovac region about 1,000 of the total of 7,000 dairy cows were slaughtered this summer and fall. This can be confidently taken as the average for all of Yugoslavia—except Slovenia, of course.

A quarter of a million dairy cows fewer, among them certainly some that were purchased for hard currency and also those paid for with the contribution for development of livestock raising taken from the entire labor force in Serbia for several years, means that the deficiency of milk production will last 3 years, until new dairy cows are raised. But that also means about 500,000 kg less beef every year, since there will be fewer calves to fatten.
things would come to the surface. It clearly feels that the strengthening of the private holding, since then many women. It is quite certain that that lobby would not like operation, and the director of any industrial plant which cooperative, the director of the combine's own farming every village has at least three: the director of the agricultural combines are the most powerful economic force in Vojvodina; their professional managers are the strongest influence there, but still it results mostly from the fact that several officials for life who in their young days were the servants of rich large landholders still have a strong sense, with the help of the encroaching poverty, has a chance to triumph. That leaves only Vojvodina that has remained consistently against increasing the maximum landholding. This might be interpreted in terms of the fact that several officials for life who in their young days were the servants of rich large landholders still have a strong influence there, but still it results mostly from the strength of the combine-latifundista lobby. The agricultural combines are the most powerful economic force in Vojvodina: their professional managers are the strongest political grouping. In Banat they say that once there was one large landowner for every three villages, but now every village has at least three: the director of the cooperative, the director of the combine's own farming operation, and the director of any industrial plant which has been located here to save money by employing women. It is quite certain that that lobby would not like a strengthening of the private holding, since then many things would come to the surface. It clearly feels that the results that would soon be forthcoming if the peasant had an opportunity to cultivate 40 hectares or more would raise the issue for society: How long are we going to put up with the present-day latifundias? After all, some socialist countries have already undertaken to divide up socialized land for kolkhoz members to cultivate and have achieved extremely good results. Then the question would be raised of the existence of all three "entities in reproduction," the bankrupted political processing plants which have survived by plundering cropping, and all these business boards, official offices, limousines—in short, the existence of this power.

Without Protection

In order to justify the desire to set relations in concrete, in Vojvodina they have been appealing to "science" and "ideology." "Science" says that it would be harmful to turn toward the system of the private farmer, since presumably a few dozen hectares would require a great deal of manpower from outside, and they do not blush because of the fact that there is that much land per member of the labor force in the shaky combines. "Ideology" adds a fear of stratification and a fear that the landowners will hire the poor people, even if the poor people would still have no place to find work. That is probably the summit of inconsistency: in a country where unemployment is one of the basic political problems everything is being done to prevent creation of jobs in one of the most important sectors of the economy! But the irony is in the fact that there actually cannot be any higher employment here anywhere: with a landholding of 300 hectares an American farmer, whose wife does not work in the fields, employees one seasonal worker on the average. In western Europe farmers represent only 4 percent of the population, and that includes both owners and workers together.

It has gone so far that the Commission for Agriculture of the SFRY Assembly, knowing about the hardheadedness in Vojvodina, proposed that amendments be made in the Constitution that would restrict the power of the republics and provinces to set the maximum landholding in their legislation at less than 15 hectares. Provision has in any case been made for the Constitution to leave that issue to local laws. But there is still a chance that in the haggling over other issues the maximum landholding will be "sold in trade."

If there is anyone who does not know it, we will tell them that 10 hectares of the best Vojvodina land cost about 40 million dinars at this moment, that is, less than a two-room apartment in Belgrade. We say this just to illustrate the kind of possible enrichment we are talking about.

Regardless of various attempts to cloud things over, such as: the maximum is not important, other issues need to be resolved first, land consolidation, irrigation, inheritance—the maximum landholding is still the basic issue concerning the future destiny of agriculture and the
production of food. Is it natural to expect a young man to accept before he has reached the age of maturity a lifelong limit on his economic career and success: to accept a perpetually determined place as a third-class citizen, just because he wants to remain on his father's farm? Can we expect young people and capable food producers to reconcile themselves to the fact that every pancake man or sausagemaker is for them a lord and master?

But it would be a mistake to think that merely liberating the initiative of the private farmers would be enough to straighten things out in agriculture. Our society lacks what even the most radical capitalist countries have had for a long time: a system to protect both the producers and consumers of food. There is not a country in Europe aside from ours which is importing milk. There is not a country in the world which is not among the most backward that does not protect its food producers against cyclical crises. Two-thirds of the budget of the European Community is spent to subsidize farmers. There is not a country in the world that would allow traumas like this because of milk; traumas that would have been avoided if there had been 500 freight cars of powdered milk in a government silo....
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