MORE THAN COMBATING TERRORISM: THE FORCE SECURITY CONCEPT AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

BY

JEFFREY M. ROTE

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More Than Combating Terrorism: The Force Security Concept And The Role Of Intelligence

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Significant enhancements to DOD force protection programs have occurred since the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing, but serious shortfalls remain. Differing definitions of force protection and the scope of the threat have caused confusion and have hampered the development of intelligence support efforts. DOD force protection programs are too narrowly defined, and intelligence support is fragmented and uneven. Current efforts focus on the terrorist threat, and most programs have overlooked other significant risks.

DOD personnel and facilities face an increasingly complex threat environment. While terrorism represents the most serious threat, it is not the only risk. Civil wars, insurgencies, and riots pose additional hazards. Hostile intelligence activities, crime, disease, environmental hazards, and war debris also threaten DOD personnel and facilities. These risks are part of a total "force security" threat that includes hazards, other than force-on-force actions.

DOD must establish a uniform program to counter the security threat to U.S. forces. Force protection doctrine must be
clarified and the full range of security risks recognized. Defense Intelligence must leverage emerging analytical and production technologies to provide timely, accessible, and integrated assessments of the entire threat environment.
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MORE THAN COMBATING TERRORISM: THE FORCE SECURITY CONCEPT AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

"The challenge I’ve given everyone is to ensure that we, the American forces, become the recognized experts on force protection." "We’re the recognized experts in almost every other field -- whether its submarine operations, amphibious operations, air combat or armored mobile warfare." "...We need to quickly change the mindset of our people and develop the expertise so when someone says, “I really want to know how to protect myself properly,” they come to the United States...."

— General John M. Shalikashvili

The Legacy Of Khobar Towers

At approximately 2230 on 25 June 1996 a massive improvised truck bomb exploded outside the perimeter fence of the Khobar Towers housing area in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Khobar Towers, located on King Abd Al-Aziz air base, housed personnel of the U.S. Air Force’s 4404th Wing (Provisional), U.S. Army, and allied military personnel supporting air operations over Iraq. The explosion killed 19 U.S. personnel and injured several hundred others. The terrorist attack was the most deadly incident involving U.S. citizens in the Middle East since the October 1983 bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon.

Significant enhancements have been made to DOD force protection efforts since the Khobar Towers bombing, but serious shortfalls remain. Differing definitions of force protection
continue to hamper the development of a comprehensive security effort. Current efforts remain narrowly focused on the terrorist threat while ignoring other significant risks to U.S. forces. Intelligence support is fragmented and uneven. New ideas and terminology are required to respond to the increasingly complex and ambiguous security environment confronting U.S. forces overseas.

The Khobar Towers bombing was not the first lethal terrorist attack against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel in Saudi Arabia. Just six months earlier a bomb exploded outside the headquarters of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) in Riyadh, the U.S. military aid mission to the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The OPM/SANG attack killed five DOD personnel and injured 42.

Although it was tragic and inflicted a significant loss of life, the Khobar Towers attack did not represent a new threat to DOD personnel and facilities. In the period between the Marine Corps bombing in Beirut and the OPM/SANG bombing, 49 DOD personnel were killed and 254 injured in terrorist attacks overseas. These attacks were condemned and their victims mourned, but none of the incidents provoked a thorough examination of how DOD protects its personnel.

The Khobar Towers bombing would be different. The relatively large loss of life coupled with a charged political climate in Congress and increased expectations of casualty free military
operations, would prompt the first major independent examination of an anti-DOD terrorist attack since the Beirut bombing. Within the year, three studies of the Khobar Towers bombing were completed. Numerous findings and recommendations resulted, new organizations and procedures created, and ultimately the 4044th Commander was denied promotion because of the attack.

The primary investigation, led by retired U.S. Army General Wayne A. Downing, identified several weaknesses in DOD’s force protection posture. The Downing inquiry found that while force protection was an issue that required a comprehensive approach, the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to protect forces varied widely among DOD organizations. The investigation concluded that the Intelligence Community provided strategic warning of the threat, but it also noted that the ability of the national and theater intelligence community to conduct detailed, long-term analyses of terrorist intentions and capabilities were deficient. The Downing report emphasized the need for a comprehensive and consistent force protection effort based on a foundation of excellent strategic and tactical intelligence.

The examination of the Khobar Towers bombing brought force protection to the fore as one of the most important topics within the Defense Department. Suddenly, a subject previously afforded relatively low priority received widespread attention, increased funding, and senior-level involvement. Force protection, once
described by one observer, as the "stepchild of military operations" was now the favorite son.\textsuperscript{5}

The Multidimensional Threat

The emphasis on force protection was long overdue. The threat to U.S. forces overseas has been persistent, diverse, and increasing. Since the end of the Cold War, the operational tempo of U.S. forces and the number of overseas deployments have steadily increased. The Congressional Research Service found that the U.S. Armed Forces participated in 36 major foreign missions from 1990 to 1997 compared to 22 operations between 1980 and 1989.\textsuperscript{6} According to the U.S. Special Operations Command, DOD Special Forces personnel deployed to over 140 countries in 1996. Many of these deployments were in "parts of the world plagued by disease, starvation, poverty, and civil strife."\textsuperscript{7} The U.S. Army reported that approximately 35,000 soldiers deployed to over 70 countries in 1996.\textsuperscript{8} The other Services have experienced similar increases in overseas missions.

U.S. military deployments range from small teams to large elements, increasingly include Reserve and National Guard personnel, and last from a matter of days to more than a year. Most deployments involve operations other than war and other non-traditional tasks. There has been a dramatic increase in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations worldwide that have resulted from rising nationalistic, ethnic, religious, political
and economic strife. Peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other non-traditional operations tend to last longer and can involve significant risk since they frequently place U.S. forces in remote and unfamiliar environments and often in areas of high or ambiguous threat. U.S. forces trained and equipped to deploy and operate on traditional battlefields and bases increasingly face unfamiliar threats and risks and an environment where there are no front lines and no secure rear areas.

In many areas the promise of a “New World Order” has descended into a “New World of Disorder.” Large swaths of the world are a tableau of failed and failing states, civil wars and insurgencies, petty and organized crime, hazardous environments, disease, and desperate poverty. Ethnic, religious, economic, and nationalist conflicts, once held in check by the Cold War, have vigorously reemerged. For every Rwanda, Bosnia, and Algeria that makes the media’s spotlight, several other tragedies fail to catch the Western eye.

On every continent there are countries suffering from fractured societies, where central authority and basic law and order have collapsed. Lawless elements ranging from urban gangs and paramilitary thugs to criminals and terrorists share authority with insurgents and warring factions of varying discipline. The central government often is unable or unwilling to provide protection and security.
The threat in this world of disorder is extensive and varied. By the beginning of 1998, the U.S. Department of State had issued advisories regarding hazardous conditions in 32 countries. Some countries suffer from one risk such as terrorism or crime, many others make the list for multiple hazards. Scores of other countries have similar problems but they have not reached the threshold required for a formal warning.

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Figure 1: State Department Warnings and Announcements
The State Department's warnings depict a dismal situation in many parts of the world. The hazards range from the conventional to the non-traditional and include long-standing as well as emerging threats. Collectively they pose a serious risk to U.S. military operations overseas.

**War, Civil War, and Insurgency**

The world remains plagued by armed conflict and the nature of conflict appears to be changing from armed encounters between states to civil wars, guerrilla actions, and insurgencies. Tensions fueled by ethnic hatred, ideology, political infighting, religious intolerance, and economic disparity continue to spark violence. Of the 80 conflicts recorded since 1945, only 28 have been wars between the conventional military forces of two states. The rest involved guerrilla armies or insurgents, and today insurgencies and civil wars of varying intensity stretch from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan, from Liberia to Cambodia.

The number, duration, and intensity of these conflicts have been on the increase. In 1993, 42 countries were involved in major conflicts and 37 countries were engaged in smaller confrontations. The developing world has been the battlefield for most of these disputes. For a variety of reasons, there is no way to determine accurately the number killed and injured in these conflicts. Frequently, foreigners become the target or the
inadvertent victims of this violence. Rarely do U.S. forces deploy to a country that is free of some form of war, civil war, or insurgency.

**Terrorism**

Terrorism remains the most serious threat to DOD personnel and facilities worldwide. A DOD official noted that for a person who joined the armed services in 1977 and served 20 years the odds of being a terrorist victim were greater than dying in combat. DOD personnel have been the frequent targets of terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Greece, Turkey, and Pakistan, but terrorists operate throughout the world. The number of terrorist groups is in the hundreds. The most dangerous can operate regionally and globally. For every attack against DOD personnel and facilities that results in casualties, there are numerous incidents without injuries, and countless threats. Terrorist attacks against U.S. forces are likely to continue and terrorism will remain a significant security challenge.

**Civil Unrest**

Civil disturbances occur frequently throughout the lesser-developed world. Riots and protests break out quickly and are often violent. U.S. citizens are frequently the victims of protests. Americans often become targets of opportunity. Civil unrest can emerge from seemingly stable countries. Civil strife
has recently occurred in Kenya, Indonesia, and Pakistan because of political turmoil and economic uncertainty. In the first two weeks of 1998, the Overseas Security Advisory Council reported 105 security incidents worldwide. These incidents included protests and demonstrations in Chile, Indonesia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Ecuador, Mexico, and India.

Crime

Whether practiced by highly organized elements or common street banditry, crime is an increasing threat to U.S. military personnel overseas. In many areas of the globe, U.S. forces and facilities are more vulnerable to criminals than to conventional armed forces, warring factions, or terrorists. Crime poses a dual threat to U.S. forces. Individual personnel are potential robbery and assault victims while facilities and equipment are at risk from theft and pilfering. Throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia crime is becoming pandemic. An estimated 5,700 organized criminal gangs were identified within Russia alone in 1994. It was further believed that over 300 of these groups were able to operate throughout Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Petty and violent crime is rife in West Africa, where Nigerian-based swindles and criminal syndicates have become legendary. The Department of State prohibited direct flights between Nigeria and the U.S. for many years due to safety concerns and crime near the Lagos airport. Harassment,
shakedowns, and armed assaults against foreigners by uniformed personnel, armed gangs, and others occur frequently throughout Africa and Asia.

War Debris

Land mines and unexploded ordnance often are termed the most insidious weapons since they linger long after the fighting has ended and they primarily injure civilians. The United Nations estimates that more than 110 million active mines are scattered in 70 countries worldwide. Every year approximately 26,000 people are killed or injured by land mine explosions. At the current rate of clearing operations, it would take 1,100 years to rid the world of mines — provided no additional mines were laid, but it is estimated that 20 new mines are laid for every one cleared. Iran, Angola, and Afghanistan have the most mines, each with between 10-16 million mines within their countries. Other, unexpected countries also have sizable mine problems, some dating to World War II. Since there seldom are reliable records of minefields, even the deployment of professional military forces to an area with known mines pose a risk. It is estimated that 26% of the casualties suffered by U.S. forces in Somalia were caused by land mines, and the majority of the security incidents involving U.S. forces in Bosnia appear to have involved mines.
Hostile Intelligence Activities

Espionage is the most traditional security threat facing U.S. forces, and all military operations encounter hostile intelligence activities. U.S. military forces face a multidiscipline hostile intelligence threat composed of human, signal, and imagery intelligence activities. Many countries possess this multidiscipline capability; other, less developed countries may field a more primitive intelligence effort based on low-level human sources, and observation. Although less sophisticated, these efforts pose a significant risk to the operational security of U.S. forces, as was demonstrated in Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE.

Disease

Despite significant international efforts and medical advances, infectious disease is still a serious problem in most of the world. Viruses that are more virulent are joining long-standing illnesses such as cholera, yellow fever, and malaria. According to the Centers for Disease Control, cholera affects 65 countries worldwide, yellow fever is present in 17 countries, and the plague endures in Vietnam. A host of extremely hazardous insect, water, and food-borne diseases that potentially threaten the health of DOD personnel are found in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) continues to ravage Africa and Southeast Asia. Two-thirds of the 15 million people infected with HIV are in Africa. By 1993 upwards of 40% of childbearing age women in African cities carried the disease. Third World militaries, in particular, are confronting high rates of HIV/AIDS infection.

There also is increasing concern that long-standing diseases are becoming more resistant to treatment. New forms of malaria that are proving difficult to counter are emerging. In 1975, the number of malaria cases in India increased to 9 million, compared to 1 million in 1961, despite suppression campaigns. The possibility that new communicable diseases will emerge for which no proven treatment exists is also a concern. During the first two weeks in 1998, the World Health Organization reported outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever in Kenya and Somalia, a virulent flu virus in Hong Kong, and cholera in Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chile. The optimistic belief that we could eliminate or control disease is fading; we may be losing the battle.

Environmental Hazards

The physical environment itself may pose an increasing risk to U.S. military forces. Apart from traditional considerations such as weather and climate, environmental pollution may represent an emerging threat to U.S. forces. Severe
environmental problems have altered the quality of life in many parts of the world. Approximately 16% of the territory of the former Soviet Union is an ecological crisis area. The situation is similarly poor throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia as the environmental abuse that occurred throughout the Communist era is now affecting the health of millions. Chronic respiratory disease and other illnesses caused by industrial emissions have increased in many Eastern European countries. Czechoslovakia has reported significant increases in respiratory diseases, digestive illnesses, cancers, heart problems, and birth defects linked to the poor environmental quality in the country. In Uzbekistan, infant mortality rates have increased 50% from 1970 to 1986. Forty percent of Poland's waterways are so contaminated that they cannot be used even for industrial purposes. Soil and water conditions are hazardous in many areas because of unregulated dumping of toxic wastes.

Illegal and undocumented dumping of hazardous waste represents a potentially serious hazard to U.S. forces. Until outlawed in 1995 by the Basel Convention, industrial wastes were routinely exported and dumped in lesser-developed countries. The trade in toxic wastes was on a global scale. Illegal disposal occurred in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Highly publicized cases involved Lebanon, Italy, Albania, Nigeria, Djibouti, Peru, and Syria. The disposed
materials included highly toxic PCBs, pesticides, dioxin, lead, mercury, radiological, and medical wastes.

The scope of illegal dumping is difficult to quantify; however, according to Greenpeace over 5.2 million tons of toxic wastes were exported between 1986 and the early 1990's.\textsuperscript{31} Officials in Kazakhstan reportedly know of 529 radioactive waste sites containing approximately 8 million tons of hazardous waste.\textsuperscript{32} Although agreements have outlawed the international shipment of toxic wastes, continued illegal dumping is likely to avoid the high cost of safe disposal. In addition, unsafe dumping within countries will remain a potential hazard as many nations maintain lower environmental standards and often fail to enforce regulations. To illustrate this risk, Russian police discovered over 50 tons of radioactive sludge stored in leaky barrels at a factory southwest of Moscow in 1995.\textsuperscript{33}

Adverse health effects have been reported as a result of the toxic waste trade. In West Africa, a shipment of incinerator waste caused vegetation to die and illnesses to develop near an illegal dump in Guinea.\textsuperscript{34} In 1988, 400 barrels of toxic materials washed ashore on the Turkish Black Sea coast, reportedly numerous people became sick after exposure to the contents.\textsuperscript{35} Similar illnesses were reported in Lebanon after people were exposed to illegal waste dumps.

While the concept that the quality of the environment is an emerging hazard to U.S. forces may be difficult to grasp, the
extensive environmental degradation that exists in many countries guarantees that identifying and assessing environmental pollution risks will increasingly concern U.S. forces overseas. The controversy over the possible effect on U.S. soldiers of the widespread oil fires and other environmental hazards encountered during the Gulf War may be a harbinger of future problems.

The U.S. Military in the New Threat Environment

Collectively these diverse issues constitute a new threat environment for U.S. military forces overseas in which each country is unique. In some countries, the risk is one-dimensional. Elsewhere, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and other hazards present a multi-faceted threat environment. Unfortunately, the multi-threat environment is increasingly the norm. Whether it is terrorism in Saudi Arabia, land mines in Angola or crime in Nigeria, U.S. forces face a dynamic and varied security threat while deployed overseas.

DOD personnel are especially vulnerable in this new environment. Their close and visible association with the U.S. and U.S. policies -- military personnel practically wear the American flag on their sleeves -- very often make U.S. military personnel lighting rods for protest when introduced into an area. Often, groups that are not inherently anti-U.S. will target U.S. personnel solely to achieve publicity. Moreover, U.S. military forces are at risk regardless of the mission profile. DOD
personnel have been threatened and attacked while conducting conventional operations and exercises as well as humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

In many parts of the world, distinctions between terrorists, insurgents, and criminals increasingly blur as they all conduct bombings, robberies, and armed assaults. This violent milieu, termed the "frontiers of anarchy" by Robert Kaplan, and populated with what Ralph Peters has labeled the "new warrior class" is the new operating environment for U.S. military forces. While the Khobar towers bombing underscored the serious threat from terrorism, the risks to U.S. forces in this new environment are wide-ranging and transcend the terrorist threat. This multifaceted threat reinforces the need for comprehensive and consistent doctrine and an integrated intelligence effort designed to protect DOD personnel and facilities overseas.

New Initiatives, Old Problems

In the aftermath of the Khobar Towers bombing, a large number of force protection initiatives gained quick approval. These new efforts spanned DOD, including the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Unified Commands. Among the most important of the post-Khobar initiatives was the appointment of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to serve as DOD's "principal advisor with responsibility for all force protection matters." The CJCS was directed to review and coordinate force protection programs
within DOD, monitor Service programs for adequacy, and to elevate force protection as a topic to be addressed within the Joint Requirements Oversight Board.\textsuperscript{39} The Chairman created the position of Deputy Director for Combating Terrorism (J-34) to handle increased force protection responsibilities within the Joint Staff.\textsuperscript{40}

The Army revised its Combating Terrorism Directive, now called the "Army Force Protection Program."\textsuperscript{41} The Air Force created several organizations including a Security Forces Group and a Force Protection Battlelab to examine new procedures and techniques.\textsuperscript{42} The Unified Commands obtained increased funding and 58 additional specialists to improve their force protection efforts.\textsuperscript{43} Finally, the Intelligence Community received new resources for collection, research, and analysis of terrorism.

In spite of the post-Khobar Towers expansion of DOD force protection programs, there remain significant shortfalls and gaps. The fundamental weakness is that the force protection concept has not been well developed or articulated. A variety of DOD, Joint Staff, and Service publications address force protection issues, but a coherent, consistent, and overarching view of the topic has yet to emerge. This lack of clarity has caused confusion and has hindered the development of comprehensive intelligence support to force protection requirements. Existing programs focus almost exclusively on the terrorist threat and ignore other serious security risks to U.S.
forces. A common vision of force protection and the threat spectrum must be developed to maintain the momentum brought about by the Khobar Towers tragedy and further enhance the security of U.S. forces.

Defining Terms -- From Force Protection to Force Security

According to DOD and Joint Staff publications, force protection is a:

"Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs." 44

The current definition is insufficient, misleading, and often misinterpreted. Force protection remains a chameleon's term within DOD. It means different things to different people. No two Army manuals define force protection the same way, and this inconsistency exists throughout DOD. 45 This confusion over the definition and scope of force protection has impeded the development of comprehensive security programs and intelligence products to support the protection of deployed forces. A new concept is required to clarify the issue.

Two principal approaches to force protection are prevalent within DOD. One position is to embrace any issue that effects the fighting potential of U.S. forces. 46 This view places a
variety of topics under the force protection rubric, including actions to counter enemy military operations, ballistic missile defense, morale and welfare concerns, and safety programs, along with more familiar threats such as terrorism.

This expansive operational concept is included in a variety of publications and regulations. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, lists operations security and deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide as components of force protection. The Army’s 10th Mountain Division’s after-action report concerning Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia listed rules of engagement, morale, welfare, and recreation activities, pastoral care, base camp construction and operation, safety, medical operations, and rear detachment operations under force protection. An examination of professional articles addressing force protection also reveals this expansive interpretation.

The other, narrow position views force protection as synonymous with terrorism and anti-terrorism measures. Sometimes crime and subversion will be included, but the focus remains on the terrorist threat. This attitude is extremely prevalent and is evident in most of the initiatives that follow the Khobar Towers bombing.

The Directive appointing the CJCS as the focal point for “force protection” is titled the “DOD Combating Terrorism Program.” It uses force protection and combating terrorism interchangeably. Although established to address “force
protection" issues within DOD, the J-34 is termed the "Combating Terrorism Directorate," and the focus of its effort has been the terrorist threat and anti-terrorism measures.

Which approach to the issue is more useful: the expansive operational view or the narrow terrorism-centric approach? Is either approach adequate to address the current threat? The expansive interpretation of the term is correct, as any effort to defend forces from a threat or hazard is "force protection." However, when used in this manner, force protection becomes an amorphous umbrella phrase that includes anything from theater missile defense to defensive driving programs. While a valid concept, it lacks utility, as it is too broad. By indistinguishably mixing the operational and security components of force protection, it dilutes the issue. This approach fails to recognize the unique nature of each element and increases the risk that both will be inadequately addressed.

The narrow interpretation of force protection also is lacking. It has resulted in extensive terrorism-related intelligence and anti-terrorism programs, but other serious threats to U.S. forces receive little or no systematic attention. With this current strategy, we are guarding against one threat while leaving ourselves vulnerable to other security hazards. Given the wide range of threats facing U.S. forces, a more comprehensive view of the issue is required.
The DOD's definition of force protection is contradictory, but it is still useful. First, according to the current definition, force protection is a security program. It does not address conventional military threats such as missile defense. Nor does it include safety or morale and welfare concerns. Terrorism is an important element but it is not the only threat addressed, since force protection "operates in all situations and locations." Listing the elements of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services reinforces the emphasis on multi-faceted security requirements. Finally, intelligence and counterintelligence are key to the success of force protection efforts.

As currently defined, force protection is a comprehensive security program designed to protect U.S. forces from select hazards. However, the use of the broader, legitimate force protection label is inconsistent with this definition. Applying an all-embracing term to describe a narrower band of requirements has confused the issue and has hampered the development of effective security programs within DOD. New, more precise, terminology is required to delineate the security requirements stated in the current definition from the sweeping need to protect the force. If force protection is the suitable designation for all the actions and programs that protect the force, then "force security" is a more appropriate term for the
subset of force protection designed to respond to the full-range of security-related threats facing U.S. forces overseas.

**Force Protection:** Measures taken to conserve the fighting potential of a military force. Force Protection seeks to minimize the effect of all threats and hazards to DOD personnel, facilities, automated systems, equipment, operations, and interests through the application of offensive and defensive operations and programs across the spectrum of conflict.

**Force Security:** A subset of Force Protection. Force security is an integrated security program designed to protect DOD personnel, facilities, automated systems, equipment, and operations, and interests from threats and hazards other than traditional force-on-force actions. Force security is accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and is supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

Figure 2: Force Protection and Force Security

"Force security" is a component of force protection that addresses threats and external hazards outside of the bounds of traditional force-on-force engagements. These hazards include conventional threats such as war, civil war, and insurgencies (when U.S. forces are non-combatants). It also includes non-traditional, asymmetric risks posed by terrorism, hostile intelligence activities, war debris, crime, environmental hazards, disease, and medical risks that confront U.S. forces.
The Critical Role of Intelligence

The force security threat is dangerous, dynamic, variable, often hidden, and non-traditional in nature. This makes intelligence the critical element of an effective force protection effort as it aids mission planning by determining the nature and intensity of particular threats in a specific deployment area. Intelligence must provide the informational foundation for the commander’s risk assessment and support force protection decisions. Accurate threat assessments aid in determining whether to approve a deployment and the type of security protection to order for the mission. In this
environment, reducing the "unknowns" -- and hence the risk to deployed U.S. forces -- will remain a fundamental task for Defense Intelligence.

The intelligence effort in support of force security extends across a broad range of requirements. Commanders and decision makers need a complete, accurate, and timely strategic assessment of the force security threat before a deployment as well as continuing real-time estimates through the course of an operation until mission accomplishment. Intelligence organizations must provide a dynamic and integrated assessment of the threat that is timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and accessible. It also requires that the Defense Intelligence Production Community dedicate resources to produce force security assessments on those areas in which there is likely DOD involvement.

Effective intelligence support to force security requirements must synchronize intelligence capabilities and assets at the national, theater, and tactical levels. No echelon is able to portray the complete threat situation; each brings specific systems, access, and skills to bear on the problem. National-level intelligence dominates in the pre-deployment and early phases of an operation. Tactical intelligence will assume the predominant -- but not exclusive -- role once human intelligence collection begins within the mission area. However, capabilities at both levels are critical throughout any mission.
Counterintelligence (CI) plays a vital role in analyzing the force security threat. CI personnel perform a variety of functions, including analysis, conducting CI Force Protection Source Operations, deb briefings, screening of refugees and detainees, and investigations. CI focuses on "how the enemy sees us" as opposed to the traditional intelligence focus of "how we see the enemy." While the CI discipline plays a critical role in analyzing the force security threat and friendly vulnerabilities, positive foreign intelligence is also a crucial element. Foreign intelligence components provide access to a variety of positive collection and analytical resources that are essential in assessing the full range of force security issues. The CI/positive intelligence combination produces a synergy that is critical to success. One cannot operate without the other.

Intelligence Shortfalls

Despite the operational priority afforded to force protection and countering the multifaceted force security threat, there are gaps in intelligence support to this important mission area. While the terrorist threat is systematically covered, the Defense Intelligence Community has not addressed the full-range of force security threats. Terrorism is the only component of the force security threat for which there is a fully developed threat assessment methodology. Terrorism assessment procedures and a methodology that establishes threat levels and assessment
guidelines are mandated by DOD Directive and apply throughout DOD. Baseline assessments of the terrorist threat are produced worldwide within a DOD-wide established methodology, on an established schedule, and are readily available through automated systems. Intelligence analysis and production on the other force security threats, however, remain ad hoc and fragmented. There is no formal methodology for assessing the majority of the threat categories. Coverage is limited, and many countries lack assessments. In many cases, there is no established product format, producer, or production schedule, and existing products are not integrated. Users must search and compile information from various sources to build a comprehensive picture of the threat environment.

There are emerging bright spots, however. Digital production and dissemination of CI products have increased. Defense Intelligence elements are addressing additional aspects of the force security threat, such as war debris. Despite shortfalls in current efforts, recent developments in the Defense Intelligence Community have enhanced its ability to provide integrated intelligence support to force security requirements. The fielding of the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), the Intelligence Link (Intelink), the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA), and the establishment of the DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP), provide the framework for integrated intelligence support in this critical area.
JDISS currently provides to deployed forces access to automated intelligence support systems and databases. JIVA, when fully developed, will enable worldwide electronic, interactive intelligence production and collaboration. Intelink is the intelligence community's version of the World Wide Web; it provides on-demand access to a variety of classified products and services and holds the promise of revolutionizing intelligence dissemination. Finally, the DODIPP coordinates Defense Intelligence production by assigning production responsibilities and requirements among DOD's 14 intelligence production centers. Successful application of these production and dissemination procedures and tools can greatly enhance intelligence support to force security requirements. However, Defense Intelligence producers fall far short of the requirement to provide comprehensive, consistent, and easily integrated assessments of the force security threat.

Integrated Intelligence Production

The Defense Intelligence Community faces several challenges in order to furnish comprehensive force security intelligence support. A successful force security threat assessment program has several components. Assessment methodologies must be established, the various constituents of the threat identified and evaluated, producers, product formats and production schedules designated, and the most appropriate production medium
and dissemination process selected. The resources, organizations, procedures, and technology required to provide U.S. forces with accurate, timely, and accessible assessments of the force security threat already exist. A program to take advantage of these developments must be established.

Force security threat assessments must take advantage of on-line production and dissemination capabilities. Traditional hard copy production techniques are inadequate for force security issues. On-line digital production supports the requirement for maintaining the worldwide coverage, frequent updating, and accessibility demanded by consumers. Several DOD intelligence production systems, such as the Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (MDITDS), support on-line production and tie products directly to Intelink for dissemination. Currently, Defense Intelligence Agency analysts are preparing terrorism and hostile intelligence assessments using the MDITDS/Intelink production capability to great success. The new JIVA production environment will enhance these capabilities.

An essential goal is to provide "one-stop shopping" for finished intelligence concerning the force security threat. An integrated "Force Security Threat Matrix" provides this integrated view of a threat environment in a particular country. The threat matrix would be available on Intelink as an HTML-based table listing the assessed threat levels for each category by
country. Linked to the matrix are the underlying full-text assessments. By clicking on the threat level, the user can

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>War Civil War</th>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>War Debris</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Overall Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: A Force Security Threat Matrix

access the threat assessment as well as recent security-related incidents for that category. The table includes an "Overall Threat" category to stress the highest threat within a country. The matrix provides easy access to current, integrated force security assessments and information that support a variety of needs. It will afford a visualization of the entire "force security battlefield."

Force security production responsibilities would be assigned and managed as part of the DODIPP's shared production framework. Defense Intelligence elements would assume production responsibility for threat categories based on organizational capabilities and expertise. Primary and collateral producers
share production requirements on a collaborative basis with Reserve intelligence elements augmenting full-time capabilities as required. The primary DODIPP producer, in conjunction with the appropriate user community, establishes a consistent assessment methodology for each threat component for use by the entire Defense Intelligence Community. Without a uniform process, differing threat levels and definitions will flourish and sow confusion. The system developed for terrorism, adjusted as required for each assessment category, can serve as a model. Threat levels ranging from Negligible to Critical are established for each issue area. The assigned threat level for each category drives the production and update schedule; higher threat components are updated more frequently than lower threat areas. Analysts would produce and update the force security assessments on-line, taking advantage of the digital production capabilities found within MDITDS and JIVA, and greatly streamlining the production cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Component</th>
<th>Primary Producer</th>
<th>Collateral Producer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War/Civil War</td>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>NGIC</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Debris</td>
<td>NGIC</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>DIA/AFMIC</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Intelligence</td>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Service CI Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>DIA/AFMIC</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Service CI Elements</td>
<td>Regional JICs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Nominal Force Security Threat Assessment Producers
Maintaining the Momentum

The U.S. will continue to be an active player in world affairs and DOD personnel, facilities, and operations will remain at risk from the full range of force security threats in the years ahead. While the initiatives set into motion by the Khobar Towers bombing to improve our force protection posture have yielded much progress, there is much more to be done. The DOD as a whole must establish a sweeping and uniform program to counter the threat to the security of U.S. forces. The Defense Intelligence Community must provide the comprehensive force security intelligence required by commanders and other DOD decision makers.

The key to success will be the innovation that enables us to discard imperfect and outdated concepts and methods of operation. DOD must clarify force protection doctrine and establish a coherent definition of the issue that includes the full range of security risks confronting U.S. forces. Commanders require a complete view of the force security threat, from terrorism to crime, and the Defense Intelligence Community needs to respond with new products and dissemination techniques. Innovative and cooperative intelligence production and dissemination procedures made possible by emerging technologies are the key to future success. It is essential that the Defense Intelligence Community leverage its extensive analytical and production resources to
provide U.S. forces an assessment of the entire threat environment. The mission is more than combating terrorism.

We must also recognize that we cannot expect to avert every threat to the security of U.S. forces. Warring factions, insurgents, criminals, and demonstrators will target DOD personnel and facilities. War Debris, disease, and environmental hazards will place U.S. forces in increasing jeopardy in many areas of the world. The momentum gained as a result of the Khobar Towers tragedy can be used to limit the effect of force security threats against U.S. forces. Through the continued development of current initiatives, enhanced doctrine, and creative application of emerging technologies and superior intelligence capabilities we can meet General Shalikasvili’s challenge to create the finest force protection program in the world. A program that would assist in protecting U.S. forces from the wide-ranging force security threat. A force protection program that would be emulated by others.

Text Word Count = 5983
ENDNOTES


11 Ibid.


19 Ibid. They include Cyprus (16,000), Azerbaijan (100,000), Colombia (1,500), Denmark (9,900), Egypt (23,000,000), Ecuador (60,000), Georgia (150,000), Ukraine (1,000,000), and Latvia (17,000).


25 Ibid.


Ibid.


52 “Military Intelligence Expands Collection and Analysis Focus,” Signal (October 1997), 23.

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