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REENGINEERING DOD INSTALLATION INFRASTRUCTURE

BY

JAMES O. RIMEL, SR

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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The Quadrennial Defense Review has mandated civilian and military personnel reductions within the Department of Defense. Many DoD installations are implementing these personnel reductions by imposing an across the board, equal percentage cut. Using an across the board, equal percentage cut fails to take into consideration that some elements of the installation infrastructure, still have the same mission without an equivalent reduction in required services to be provided. This is most critical when implemented on a Public Safety organization (which contains, Law Enforcement, Fire Protection and Prevention, Emergency Medical Service, Safety and Environmental Health). This paper provides logical alternatives to reduce manpower and still provide a safe working and living environment on our DoD installations.
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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a number of outcomes that have a direct impact on the National and Military Strategy of the United States. The reduced risk of war with the Soviet Union, conventional or nuclear, has resulted in the drawdown of our total military strength. The disappearance of this traditional threat will have a continued positive effect for the United States’ economic growth, debt reduction and a possible increase in ability to lend and provide aid to struggling new nations. The outlook, however, may not be as positive as it could be, that is, if our nation reduces its military and the military infrastructure (Department of Defense Installations) without conducting adequate risk assessment, particularly threats to our installations.

While acknowledging the reduction of a threat world wide, the Department of Defense has not initiated the necessary studies that are prerequisite to the reduction of the Department of Defense Installation infrastructure. Of most particular concern, is the rather haphazard drawdown of civilian and military positions that manage and operate these installations. This paper will consider the drawdown and the study that has supported it and the new threats to installation security. Once this has been
done, logical alternatives will be provided to manpower reductions which will still maintain DoD Installations as safe living and working environments.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the DoD system, personnel reductions have been occurring. The primary reason for these reductions is the new post cold war National and Military Strategy. A portion of our new military strategy requires the re-allocation of resources to provide funding for the development of new and highly sophisticated weapon systems, to include the reduction of personnel, both military and civilian. Such reductions will provide an improved balance of personnel to afford the research and development of new weapons systems and will enable us to shape, respond and prepare our military for the current and future threats to world peace. To do so requires a reduction in overall resourcing that will increase the opportunity to "trim the tail (support structure) and modestly in the tooth (combat power)." \(^1\)

A major driver for these reductions is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR mandated changes are real and will direct our military well into the future. The Chairman of the Joint Chefs of Staff, John M
Shalikashvili has gone on record as follows. "I strongly encourage a cooperative effort by the Executive Branch and Congress to follow through on the reengineering of our infrastructure. The most prudent solution to fulfilling all three parts of the strategy is to preserve the teeth by cutting the tail. We need to get every dollar we can by reducing our infrastructure— to include committing ourselves to a major reengineering. The pattern of the last four years is likely to continue—investment programs will be cut and the force of the future will be sold to pay current operations and support bills. In short, we will not be able to realize the promise inherent in the Revolution in Military Affairs unless we embrace the Revolution in Business Affairs."²

Three major issues were identified from the Chairman's quotation that are critical for this paper and will be implemented within the recommendations portion. They are Reengineering, Outsourcing and Business Affairs. However, it is necessary to define these terms (issues), as they apply to this paper. Reengineering, is a process by which a function or mission is examined and then it is determine how to streamline and (reduce time, steps and paperwork involved) consolidate with other functions to reduce necessary manpower, the goal is to achieve reduced costs and resources, while providing a continuously improved product or result.
Outsourcing, is the politically correct term for contracting out (privatizing), in other words allowing the commercial business industry to perform government functions or missions, for which the government then pays for the service (vice managing and operating the function or mission). This should only apply when competitive conditions exist. *Business Affairs,* refers to improvements such as “reducing overhead and streamlining infrastructure; taking maximum advantage of acquisition reform; leveraging commercial technology, dual-use technology, and open systems; reducing unneeded standards and specifications; utilizing integrated process and product development, and increasing cooperative development programs with allies.”

The problem with DoD’s approach to reductions is that it is not done in an efficient business like fashion, particularly when it comes to personnel reductions. Rather than review and redesign key installation functions, DoD too often institutes across the board cuts. Perhaps the greatest concern is that personnel reductions have been done without consideration for installation security. In most cases, Commanders have been directed to reduce civilian positions by applying a flat percentage reduction across the board. Too often this is done without serious consideration of institutional functions that will
allow for adequate protection.

The military commander traditionally informs the civilian manager, here is your percentage of the cuts, advise me of which positions you will be eliminating. Each individual manager of an installation function is required to take the same percentage of reduction (Example, 15% reduction of each directorate). In almost all instances this reduction process has absolutely no value added, if in fact your plan is to make reductions and at the same time provide a quality service to your customers, who in most cases are the warfighters and their families.

Examples of these across the board reductions are many but, the impact of such reductions is seldom considered from the standpoint of Public Safety and Installation security.

Public Safety within the Department of Defense framework, involve Law Enforcement activities, Fire Protection and Prevention service, Emergency Medical Service and Safety and Environmental Health functions. To understand how across the board cuts degrade these capabilities, the missions performed will be examined in detail. Beginning with Law Enforcement.
It is important to recognize that no Continental United States (CONUS), Department of Defense Installation, has experienced any directed or implied reduction in services required to be provided. Installations still have the same amount of fund handling activities, medical facilities, training facilities, housing quarters, office complexes (housing sensitive working areas), supply distribution and storage facilities and critical utility sites. All require specific numbers of necessary protection and or prevention professionals, to administer the related working responsibilities. Law Enforcement, Fire, Emergency Medical, as well as Safety and Environmental Health Service, have not been directed to reduce provided services. In two of these areas, Fire Service and Safety and Environmental Health, the risk for damage by fire or injury due to accidents has increased through the mere aging and deteriorating conditions of the installation’s structures.

Law Enforcement, like other Department of Defense organizations and agencies, have developed formulas that assist them in determining the number of law enforcement personnel necessary to perform these missions, which will provide a quality service and properly protect assets. Where formulas do not exist, the Department of Defense and other governing
agencies have enacted regulations and instructions to determine the proper number of personnel necessary to perform the mission.

Some functions have external organization which provide standards. The Fire Service is governed by Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI 6055.1 & 5) and National Fire Prevention Association Standard (Standard 1201), both of which direct the minimum number of Firefighters necessary per shift. Emergency Medical Service is governed by the State Emergency Medical Act (Act 45, within the State of Pennsylvania), which directs the number of personnel required to respond on an emergency medical call and the specific level of certified training required by the individuals. Safety and Environmental Health are governed by Office of Safety and Health Administration Standard (29CFR). This standard does not mandate specific numbers of personnel but does mandate, based on activities performed on the installation, the specific safety disciplines that must be represented by a Safety Professional.

All of these standards have been developed to ensure organizations (DoD) meet the legal standards and provide a safe and healthy working and living environment for our employees and residents. They also reduce the possibilities of legal action based on negligent staffing and performance.
When DoD ignores such standards and applies illogical and arbitrary percentage reductions in personnel, the capability of providing quality service to our customers is diminished and the proper physical security and environmental safety posture of the installations is reduced.

Reductions in Law enforcement personnel are particularly a problem because, even though the threat of Super Power confrontation is substantially reduced, the domestic threat has increased.

THREATS

In today's environment of terrorism (domestic and international) and crime (against people and facilities), Department of Defense Installations are continuously at risk of becoming a targets of these aggressive acts. Government activities of the United States are a prime target because we have many symbolic targets and are blamed for many of the world ills. In addition, we allow maximum freedom, have world wide interests, and provide unequaled media attention to many violent events.

According to recent Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) report, bombings or attempted bombings increased from 2,098 in 1990 to 3199 in 1994, a 52% increase. Property damage from bombings rose $7.5
million, with 308 people injured and 31 killed. Not included in the report was the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Why are bombings increasing? Some ATF experts call attention to the ready availability of materials and easy access to instructions and explosive information on the internet. The threat real or potential, to DoD facilities, employees, residents and facility users is growing as documented by the following incidents:

March 1995, Central Minnesota. Two members of the Anti-Tax Minnesota Militia, the Patriots Council, were convicted of making an illegal batch of ricin, a toxic derivative of the castor bean. They planned to use it against Law-Enforcement Officers who had served legal papers on members of the group. According to trial testimony, members of the group planned to poison U.S. Agents by placing ricin on doorknobs and, in addition, blow up a federal building.

November 1995. Muskogee, Oklahoma. A self-proclaimed "anti-government prophet," and three others are charged with plotting a series of bombings against abortion clinics, homosexual gathering places, welfare offices and offices of the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center. The four members of the Oklahoma Constitutional Militia were arrested before any of their plans were carried out and charged with conspiracy to manufacture and possess bombs to blow up federal offices in several cities.

December 1995. Reno, Nevada. Two unemployed and heavily indebted construction workers attempted to bomb the Reno, Nevada, office of the Internal Revenue Service. The pair placed a bomb made of about 100 pounds of fertilizer and kerosene with a lit fuse in a parking lot next to the IRS building. The triggering mechanism, however, failed and the bomb did not ignite. Authorities on the scene believe that many deaths and injuries would have occurred had it gone off. One of the subjects was described by an assistant U.S. Attorney as a man obsessed with the IRS who boasted that he had not paid taxes since 1985.
January 1996. Espanola, New Mexico. A bomb exploded outside of a U.S. Forest Service headquarters. The blast caused $25,000 damage to the offices but no injuries as it occurred on a Saturday night. A Forest Service employee in Nevada has been targeted twice. His unoccupied was hit by a pipe bomb in March 1995 and another blew up a van parked outside his house in August. His wife and daughter were at home, but not injured. The Forest Service has been involved in local controversies over Federal land management, grazing, and logging issues.10

April 1996. Vacaville, California. The Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health office received a threat from a caller who said “You guys are all dead. Timothy McVeigh lives on.” Several hours later a bomb exploded in the truck of a federal employee injuring him and his wife. The employee, an inspector at the mine office, and his wife were driving home when they heard an explosion and lost control of the vehicle. They escaped the truck before it burned, but were hospitalized.11

May 1996. Laredo, Texas. An explosion blew out the windows of a five-story office building which was the location of an FBI field office staffed by 12 agents. There were no injuries or structural damage. It is not known whether the FBI was the intended target; the building housed a bank and several other offices. An anonymous caller claiming responsibility for the blast said he belonged to “Organization 544.”12

August 1996. Austin, Texas. An individual was sentenced to more than 20 years for plotting to bomb the office of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service in Austin. The subject, a car salesman, had been convicted on six counts of explosives and firearms violations. Evidence presented at the trial showed that he had planned to plant more than thousand pounds of explosives in the IRS service center.13

October 1996. Clarksburg, West Virginia. Seven men having connections with a local anti-government paramilitary group were arrested on charges of plotting to blow up the Criminal Justice Information Services Division complex near Clarksburg. The arrests were made as members of the West Virginia Mountaineer Militia were assembling large quantities of explosives and blasting caps. The Militia leader is alleged to have obtained blueprints of the FBI facility from a Clarksburg firefighter.
Plastic explosives were confiscated by law enforcement officials at five locations in West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.\textsuperscript{14}

In the Clarksburg case, effective preventative law enforcement action surely saved many lives. In several instances, domestic terrorists were apprehended before they could implement their deadly plans. The above examples are not the complete story. Reports of other arrests related to terrorist conspiracies or to the illegal possession of explosives are appearing frequently in the press and news wires.

During the same time frame, in Las Vegas, New Mexico, a district attorney’s office was hit with molotov cocktails. A Romanian immigrant was stopped as he attempts to board a flight at Tampa and is arrested for carrying five hand-made explosive devices, weapons, and 180 rounds of ammunition. A man identified as a member of an anti-government Freeman group was apprehended in Topeka, Kansas, after authorities found a bomb-triggering device in his car. In April of 1996, two members of the Georgia Republic Militia were arrested after plotting to make dozens of pipe bombs. The accused claim they were arming themselves for war against the United Nations and the New World Order. In June, 12 members of the so-called Viper Militia in Phoenix were arrested for conspiracy to make bombs and other weapons. On November 17, three of the members were convicted for
conspiring to use deadly weapons. In July 1996, the FBI arrested eight people including four members of an anti-government militia in Bellingham, Washington, for possession of guns and explosives. The eight are accused of arming themselves for a clash with the government. In the same month, four members of the Washington State Militia and four members of a Seattle-based Freeman group were arrested on Federal conspiracy charges. The eight are accused of arming themselves for war against the U.S. Government or the United Nations. In September, a Staten Island, New York, man who was stockpiling weapons for “an up-coming battle with a secret organization was arrested by ATF agents”.\textsuperscript{15} As recently as March 1998, evidence of the continuing terrorist threat was demonstrated when DoD closed the Pentagon to the public, in reaction to an alleged threat.

Many of the potential threats are from the militia movement. The growth of an irregular but organized militia represents one of the most significant social trends of the 1990s. The significance of this threat is due less to the actual size of the movement - by all measures, militia membership remains an almost imperceptible percentage of the population - than it is to the potential for death and destruction emanating from the most radical elements of the movement.\textsuperscript{16}
Militia members generally maintain strong Christian beliefs and justify their actions by claiming to be ardent defenders of the Constitution. They often compare the American Colonial period (1607 - 1783) to their present existence by relating significant Colonial dates and events to lend historical weight to their own beliefs and actions. Many militias claim to represent the ideological legacy of the founding fathers tracing their core beliefs to select writings and speeches that predate the Revolutionary War. Colonists at that time rebelled against the tyranny of King George III and what they saw as the British government’s practice of oppression and unjust taxation. Various present day militias pattern their actions on what they believe their ideological ancestors would do if they were alive today. Using their interpretation of constitutional rights and privileges as their calling, militia members and anti-government extremists have challenged federal and state laws and questioned the authority of elected officials to govern, tax and maintain order. Clearly the militia movement does represent a severe threat to law enforcement and government. (See illustration 1.)

In addition to the militia another threat exists from hate groups. These groups, whose bigotry stems from a variety of unrelated ideologies, include the Ku Klux Klan and offshoots of independent gangs of racist youths and
religious groups that hide their bigotry in quasi-theological terms. It is important to note that some members of hate groups and militias have been identified as members of our Armed Forces in both the active and reserve components. These groups are in many cases fairly elusive as they change leadership and locations rapidly. As illustration 2 depicts, however, many of these groups have identified roots to certain areas of the United States. Of particular note is the close geographic association these groups have to DoD installations, which further supports the threat they pose to the Department of Defense in general and Installations in particular.

Random acts of terrorist activity continue, as evidenced by the Olympic bombing in Atlanta, recent bombings of Abortions clinics, bombing of the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City bombing and the Unibomber, to mention just a few. What can we expect in the future? It is likely that more terrorists acts will be predominately be anti-U.S. Government. We will also witness more spectacular acts and more lethal acts. All government buildings are targets as are Government Officials.

Domestic and International Terrorist attacks as well as attacks from the Militia and Hate groups are not the only threats facing DoD Installations. Installations have to contend with local criminal activity such as; theft,
robbery, intentional destruction of government property as well as crimes against persons. All of these situations require a rapid and effective DoD police response.

Threats towards DoD installations can also be identified which are not criminal acts. Since DoD installations are aging at a rapid pace, coupled with dwindling resources for maintenance and repair there is an increased probability of fire damage and accidents.

What does all this mean in terms of effective protection as we undergo mandated personnel reductions? Quite simply installations must undergo effective risk management evaluations and institute creative employment of our Public Safety resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were developed to provide an adequate level of public safety service to protect DoD Installations from the threat of domestic terrorism and general crime.

Recommendations will be provided in three separate categories:

**Reengineering - Civilian Positions**

Goal- Reduction of civilian positions
Regionalization - Consolidation of Services

Goal- Reduction of civilian positions

Conversion - Replacing military with civilian

Goal- Returning military to warfighting units

Reengineering

DoD Public Safety, as described within this paper, is a very crucial area of the DoD Installation infrastructure, as has been previously explained. Given the environment of mandated personnel reductions currently facing Installation Commanders, it is evident that even public safety must participate. To do this one must leave the current paradigm and reengineer the duties performed by each of the public safety elements. The following specific examples are provided with estimated personnel savings.

Consolidation of duties. Currently the Fire Protection, Law Enforcement and Safety personnel are separate entities, however some duties are closely related and could be performed by anyone of the elements.

Inspections

DoD instructions mandate each installation’s fire service must have a complement of Fire Inspectors, dedicated to conducting fire hazard inspections. But the installation’s fire service is not the only organization
conducting inspections. Both the Law Enforcement (physical security and crime prevention) and Safety elements are also required to conduct inspections and do so with higher graded specialist than the fire inspectors. Since fire inspectors are mandated by DoD instruction and are currently conducting inspections, they could be crossed trained and provided a check list of Security and Safety weaknesses and conduct three inspections at once. By cross training the goal is not to make fire inspectors subject matter experts in these related fields, but to create a generalist able to recognize related violations and issue competent recommendations for correction. Violations discovered that appear to be out of the range of competency to the fire inspector could be provided to the subject matter expert for resolution.

This process has been implemented by the Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna Pennsylvania (DDSP) and resulted in a number of positive outcomes. The Fire Inspectors have increased their value to the organization by becoming multi-talented, violation reporting has become standardized, Safety and Physical Security professional personnel have been able to dedicate more hours to resolving critical issues resulting in an increase in the security and safety posture of the installation. Additionally the Security and
Safety elements did not have to increase their respective staffs when two additional depots were subordinated to DDSP.

Fire and Police Dispatching

Currently most installations have separate fire and police incident radio dispatching units. Consolidation of these functions into one dispatching unit can result in reduced manpower needs, if the dispatching is conducted by non-uniformed personnel. Consolidation of fire and police uniformed dispatchers was implemented by the DDSP and resulted in an increase in 4300 productive fire training hours annually. Additionally, a related savings was experienced when management was able to negotiate with DDSP’s fire union, an agreement which allows the organization to operate with two less fire fighters than required by minimum manning requirements and still perform all required missions, meeting the legal requirements mandated by OSHA and NFPA. Having taken part in the referenced negotiations, it was obvious that the separate fire dispatching was a duty the fire fighters believed limited their productivity and were satisfied that having Police dispatch Fire emergencies was a win win situations.

Emergency Fire, Police and Medical Response
DoD Police Officers can be crossed trained in specific fire fighting duties, which will allow fire fighting crews to remain intact and focus specifically on fire suppression with the legally mandated number of personnel responding on the initial attack. Some of the duties the police could be trained to perform are: accurately describing via the radio critical information pertaining to size, nature and severity of a fire, pulling five inch supply line from responding engines and attaching it to fire hydrants, assisting with placement of ladders at the fire scene, maintaining adequate compressed air supplies for firefighters during extended fire operations until relieved by assisting paid or volunteer companies, conducting initial patient assessment, performing CPR, and providing tactical support for fire personnel at major incidents.

The reverse of this situation can also benefit police operations. Fire Fighters can be crossed trained to canvas neighborhoods following major crimes to locate possible witnesses. Fire Fighters could also be crossed trained to provide crime scene photographic services, video tape crime scenes and conduct evidence collection. Implementation of these recommendations would result in personnel reductions below minimum manning within the fire service, ability to assign more personnel to major incidents quickly and in a
manner that specialist in a particular field of endeavor can focus on their primary duty while being supported by their co-workers from other type units and a reduction in overtime, by eliminating the necessity to call back off duty personnel during major incidents.

**Regionalization**

DoD has a program to allow for interservice and intragovernmental cooperation, as provided for within DoD Instruction, 4000.19, titled, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support, dated Aug 1995. This instruction allows for “DoD activities to provide requested support to other DoD activities when the head of the requesting activity determines it would be in the best interest of the United States Government, and the head of the supplying activity determines capabilities exist to provide the support without jeopardizing assigned missions”. This guidance further provides that “DoD activities that agree to facilitate communications and cooperation among DoD and other Federal activities in their geographical area may be designated the DoD executive agent for a Joint Interservice Regional Support Group (JIRSG) in their region. JIRSGs will facilitate communication and cooperation among area Commanders, Directors and Activity Representatives with similar interests or responsibilities.
JIRSGs customarily sponsor meetings, workshops, and conferences to share ideas for solving common problems and identify opportunities for improving support and efficiency through the use of support agreements. When requested, JIRSGs will evaluate proposed ideas for cooperative ventures and facilitate implementation of ideas approved by the participating activities". Support categories that may be included in JIRSG review and recommended for immediate study in this particular geographic region (US Army Garrison, Carlisle, Naval Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg and the Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, New Cumberland) include:

Audio and Visual Information Support
Chapel and Chaplain Services
Clubs
Command Support
Common Use Facility Construction, Operations, Maintenance and Repair
Communication Services
Community Relations
Disaster Preparedness
Education Services
Entomology Services
Facility Construction and Major Repair

Fire Protection

Housing and Lodging Services

Legal Services

Mail Services

Military Support

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities

Occupational and Industrial Health Services

Police Services

Public Affairs

Purchasing and Contracting Services

Safety Services

Security Services

Each of the above support categories are fully explained within the JIRSG Instruction and are not listed here.

To just provide a cursory evaluation of the benefits of a JIRSG cooperative agreement in this geographic area, as defined above, the following possible savings could be realized quickly:

One regional Police Chief vice current three.
One regional Fire Chief vice current three.

One regional Safety Manager vice current three.

Reduced Police and Fire overtime. Personnel resources could be shared by reassigning individual personnel to another installation for a specific shift, from a member organization having additional personnel on a shift due to schedule rotation.

The possible savings to the US Government in general and the taxpayer in particular could be substantial and warrants immediate consideration.

CONVERSION

Conversion of military positions to civilian positions will not result in a direct dollar savings in the installation budget but would be reflected in the Service authorization. More importantly, such an action would directly support the return of Warfighters to Warfighting units.

During the Defense Management Reviews of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was and still is the policy of the Department (Department of Defense), to substitute civilian manpower for military manpower in positions which do not specifically require a military incumbent. This is based on the
overall assessment that on average, a civilian work force is less costly than a military work force and overhead support related functions can be performed by civilians as opposed to military personnel. These functions include installation management, management headquarters for support commands, telecommunications, contracting, as well as other support functions. Furthermore, with the impending end strength reductions that must be taken in military personnel, it is reasonable to assume that warfighting billets will be reduced and by substituting military billets with civilian billets, the Military Departments should then be able to make greater use of military personnel assets within their assigned missions. The process has been initiated at the highest level of DoD Command Structure as evidenced by the recent announcement by the Secretary of Defense, “that he was reducing the staffing within the Pentagon and returning military personnel performing administrative duties, to the warfighting units”.

Using the US Army Garrison, Carlisle, as a limited case study, the following military positions could be for converted to civilian positions. Effected positions will be depicted by Paragraph, Line, Position and Grade of the incumbent military position followed by the suggested civilian replacement position.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Garrison Commander</td>
<td>05/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Garrison Manager</td>
<td>GS14/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>Civilian Executive Officer</td>
<td>GS13/14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eliminate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>02   &amp; E01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Chief Legal Counsel</td>
<td>GS13/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>Legal Counsel</td>
<td>GS12/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Provost Marshall</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Director Public Safety</td>
<td>GS13/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020A</td>
<td>01-07</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>E3 - E7</td>
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<tr>
<td>020A</td>
<td>01-07</td>
<td>DoD Civilian Police</td>
<td>GS5/8</td>
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<tr>
<td>020B</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Opn NCO</td>
<td>E7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020B</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Police Chief</td>
<td>GS10/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020C</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>MP Investigator</td>
<td>E5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020C</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Investigator (Civ)</td>
<td>GS9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020D</td>
<td>01/02</td>
<td>Physical Security Insp</td>
<td>E6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020D</td>
<td>01/02</td>
<td>Physical Security Specialist(Civ)</td>
<td>GS7/9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022</td>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters Company, eliminate or reduce based on remaining assigned military, or transfer the duties to a Military Member of the US Army War College staff.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other positions could be identified and converted based on an in-depth</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
reengineering effort. Many questions would arise if a serious effort to convert military positions to civilian positions was initiated. They can be answered if the current paradigm is illuminated and out of the box solutions are sought. Example; the Garrison Commander Position can not be converted, as he has UCMJ authority over the military assigned to the garrison. Answer, why does UCMJ authority have to be vested in the Garrison Commander, the War College has an abundance of qualified officers who could be assigned this authority, similar to the Commander of Fort Huachuca who I believe serves a dual role as Installation Commander and the Commander of Military Intelligence.

CONCLUSION

This paper has identified the requirement for reduction of civilian billets and how to do so in a realistic and logical fashion with due consideration for the existing threats. It has also suggested and demonstrated ways to achieve these reductions while still providing quality service. As an aside, this paper has also provided information to enable Installations Commanders or Managers a serious opportunity to reduce their overhead
(personnel) costs over and above those currently being mandated by being resourceful and entering into a JIRSG study.

Owing to the US Army War College's eminence as an educational institution dedicated to the art of strategic thinking, I strongly recommend the US Army Garrison and the Army War College, implement the recommended changes, which will establish a standard of excellence to be emulated by other DoD Installations.

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4 Security Awareness Bulletin #3-96, Department of Defense Security Institute, Richmond, VA, article, Combating Terrorism, p. 19.
5 Ibid., p. 19.
6 Ibid., p. 19.
7 Ibid., p. 19.
8 Ibid., p. 19.
9 Ibid., p. 19.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
11 Ibid., p. 20.
12 Ibid., p. 20.
13 Ibid., p. 20.
15 Ibid., p. 21.
17 Ibid., p. 23
The Militia Threat Assessment Typology

Category I Militia Groups
- Conduct paramilitary training
- Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
- Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
- Engage in no known criminal activity.

Category II Militia Groups
- Conduct paramilitary training
- Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
- Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
- Engage in criminal activity to acquire weapons and explosives. Criminal activity may range from minor firearms violations, e.g., illicit weapons sales and transfer, to illegal firearms modifications and property crimes.

Category III Militia Groups
- Conduct paramilitary training
- Base their organizational philosophies on extreme antigovernment rhetoric, denoting deep suspicion and paranoia. Group may direct threats toward specific individuals or institutional targets
- Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation, but response plans are highly detailed and may include an escalation of overt acts beyond planning, such as testing explosive devices, gathering intelligence, and identifying/conducting surveillance of potential targets
- Engage in criminal activity, ranging from property crimes to crimes of interpersonal violence, e.g., resisting arrest, armed robberies, burglaries, and attempts to provoke confrontations with government officials.

Category IV Militia Groups
- Demonstrate many of the same traits and characteristics as category III groups but are likely to be smaller, more isolated cells or fringe groups whose members have grown frustrated with their peers' unwillingness to pursue a more aggressive strategy. Unlike militias in the other categories, category IV groups often maintain an openly offensive, rather than defensive, posture
- May grow out of other less threatening militia groups or may evolve independently from any other group associations
- Often attract individuals with frank mental disorders. These individuals may either act alone or with a small number of associates who share similar paranoid/disordered beliefs
- Plot and engage in serious criminal activity, e.g., homicide, bombings, and other acts of a terrorist nature.
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