The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ANOTHER WAY TO MANAGE INSTALLATIONS: SAGEGUARDING SCARCE RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE

BY

WESLEY E. HOOD

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1998

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
Another Way to Manage Installations: Safeguarding Scarce Resources for the Future

by

Wesley E. Hood

COL Dan W. Henk
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
Senior military leaders spend an inordinate amount of time and effort on the management of the day-to-day operation of the places where military personnel and their families live, work, and play. This research paper will propose and analyze two controversial measures that will, if implemented, release senior leaders to more pressing duties and also help to make the Department of Defense more efficient in the way that it manages real estate and resources. The first of these two measures is to turn the management of all Department of Defense real estate holdings over to civilians who are trained and experienced in the "city" management skills needed to efficiently care for our facilities on a daily basis. This will remove the requirement for general officers to command installations and for senior field grade officers to command garrison activities. The second measure is the proposal that the Department of Defense completely divest itself of all of its real estate holdings, turning them over to another federal agency, such as the General Services Administration, for day-to-day management.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................ 3

ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION .............................................. 8
  MANAGEMENT ............................................................ 8
  TENANCY ............................................................... 8
  DIVESTITURE ........................................................... 8

SOME ANSWERS .......................................................... 9
  MANAGEMENT ............................................................ 9
  TENANCY ............................................................... 13
  DIVESTITURE ........................................................... 15
  SECURITY ............................................................... 19
  QUALITY OF LIFE ...................................................... 21

COURSES OF ACTION .................................................... 21
  STATUS QUO - DO NOTHING ........................................... 22
  STUDY IT - DO A LITTLE .............................................. 22
  TAKE ACTION - DO IT BIG ........................................... 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................... 24

ENDNOTES ................................................................. 25

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................ 28
The resources saved today can be used to establish the capabilities we will need in the 21st century... additional resources for defense are unlikely at best. Therefore, we must make the hard divestiture decisions today that will ensure our success tomorrow. (Emphasis added by author)

−Philip A. Odeen

INTRODUCTION

As the United States military establishment continues to downsize in the wake of the Cold War, and as budgets for Defense related activities continue to decline, the Department of Defense increasingly is obliged to maximize efficiency in all of its operations. This includes the “Institutional Army” as well as the Combat Arms. In fact, there probably is more potential for realizing additional efficiencies in the “Institutional Army,” because its function is so similar to private sector commercial activities.

A declining budget is only one aspect of the increasing requirement for efficiency. Few of the military missions have gone away while the military structure of the United States has gotten smaller. Missions of the United States armed forces actually have increased. Service operations tempo (OPTEMPO) - a measure of how “busy” units are - and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) - a measure of how “busy” individual soldiers are - have both increased dramatically in the post Cold War era. Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are faced with unprecedented,
consecutive deployments, exercises, and training events following each other in rapid succession. This is particularly true for personnel in shortage or "high demand" specialties. The high PERSTEMPO has been blamed for a variety of serious problems, ranging from the inability of the Services to retain sufficient quality personnel, to an increase in domestic violence in military communities. The increasing pace effects not only soldiers, but senior leaders as well. In fact, PERSTEMPO among senior Army leaders may be worse than it is among other ranks, given the increased level of responsibilities and the decisions required at their level. There is little indication that the demands will lessen in the foreseeable future. Thus, efforts to relieve soldiers and senior leaders from the more mundane housekeeping tasks will necessarily allow them to devote their knowledge, expertise, time and efforts to their more important duties.

This research paper will propose and analyze two controversial measures that will, if implemented, release senior leaders to more pressing duties and also help to make the Department of Defense more efficient in the way that it manages real estate and resources. The first is to turn over the management of all Department of Defense real estate to civil servants who are trained and experienced in the "city" management skills needed to efficiently care for military facilities. This will remove the requirement for general officers to command
installations and for senior field grade officers to command garrison activities. The second measure is a Department of Defense divestiture of its real estate holdings, turning them over to another federal agency, such as the General Services Administration, for day-to-day management.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of the Department of Defense, the individual services have maintained their own separate installations. Beginning with the Republic in the late 18th century, Army installations were separate from Naval installations; each was commanded or managed by a senior officer of that service. This practice has evolved into a system of separate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps installations throughout the world. Maintaining such separate facilities made excellent sense in the late 18th century, due to the small size of the two services, and the limited scope of the service missions at that time.

There have been some exceptions to the general rule, such as the stationing of Marine Corps personnel on Naval bases, Navy medical personnel assigned with Fleet Marine Force units, or the close proximity of Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, but these serve important functional interrelationships and are in fact the exceptions rather than the rule. Even when organizations from
the different services share a single installation, the situation rarely has resulted in any deliberately planned efficiencies. The units of different services typically maintain duplicate, redundant functions that are still "service-pure" in nature.

At first glance, the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps may appear to be more combined in nature than that of the other Services. This is misleading simply because the Department of the Navy is the only two-service military department found in the United States. The Department of the Navy will continue to set aside certain functions that will almost always be performed by Marine Corps personnel on Naval installations purely because it is part of their historical tradition and culture.

In this era of military downsizing and the combining of service functions, certain facilities are sometimes shared by co-located installations (such as a neighboring Army and Air Force base), but they are still service-pure installations located in close proximity to each other. Ironically, many of these individual installations are not used to anywhere near their capacities. There is considerable merit in their consolidation.

If the installations themselves reflect less than the most efficient and rational usage, the situation is worse in that it absorbs the time and talents of many senior military leaders. General Officers, Colonels and senior Lieutenant Colonels manage these pieces of real estate on a daily basis. It hardly needs to
be noted that managing a "military city" is not a core competency for senior military leaders. An analogy drawn from the private sector may be illustrative. Few large municipalities in the United States would turn for management to a twenty-year police veteran, or to a long time member of the fire department. While these individuals certainly should have detailed knowledge of the requirements of their individual functions, they do not have the expertise to take on management of an entire large city. They simply do not have the knowledge of all the important and necessary areas needed to efficiently do the job. Yet the Army routinely makes such assignments.

To manage its installations, the Army centrally selects an outstanding Colonel or senior Lieutenant Colonel and assigns him or her as the garrison commander for an installation. General Officers become Installation Commanders purely by the "luck of the draw" in their individual assignments, which will be discussed later in this paper. The requirements and problems of the military installation and any "city" are virtually the same, but few officers are fully prepared to take on these duties.\(^3\) The officers are experts in their chosen branches and functional areas, not as city managers. Even with the two and a half weeks of training provided by the Army to newly selected garrison commanders their qualifications for this role are questionable at best. It is true that many military garrison and installation staffs are heavily civilianized, and that these civilians provide
a source of institutional knowledge to help new commanders perform their duties. Most of these civilian specialists, however, are experts in relatively narrow functional areas. Very few are expert at all of the city management skills needed to run the entire military installation.

The two and a half week Garrison Precommand Course (GPC) is an intensive course that covers personnel, financial, facilities, engineering, environmental, morale, welfare and recreation management, and other topics.\(^4\) It focuses on real world issues, problems, options and relationships, and is conducted in a hands-on environment which includes field trips, staff walks and roundtable discussions with currently serving garrison commanders. It is an excellent program. It cannot, however, duplicate the education and experience normally expected of civilian city managers. Nor can it fully prepare the selected commanders for the rigors and challenges of their new positions.\(^5\) When this is added to the current Army policy of rotating commanders every two or three years, it is apparent that the military services will constantly be training new commanders, yet expecting a level of expertise that takes their civilian counterparts years of education and experience to attain. The $500,000 dollars\(^6\) spent to conduct four two and a half week courses every year for the new garrison commanders could be better used to meet any number of shortfalls in the Army budget.
The General Officer Installation Management Course (GOIC) was chartered to meet the needs of general officers who command installations. It is a four and one half day course conducted jointly by the Army Management Staff College at Fort Belvoir, VA, and the Army Community and Family Support Center Training Center at Falls Church, VA. The Chief of Staff, Army, has made this a mandatory training requirement for all general officers who are installation commanders or deputy commanders, and major Army command (MACOM) staff principals who have installation management responsibilities. As was previously suggested in relation to the Garrison Precommand Course, the funds and valuable time expended to train these senior Army leaders could be put to better use by the Army elsewhere.

Herein lies the real crux of the issue. Is this the best, most cost-effective usage of the country's professional military leaders? Should the Army spend half a million dollars a year to train officers for a two-year assignment best handled by career experts? Does this provide the most effective management of military real estate? Can the Nation afford to use the valuable and expensive services of our senior officers for routine garrison or "city" management tasks when their services already are critically needed in more pressing, war-fighting military roles?
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

Several separate questions must be addressed in any effort to ameliorate this situation.

MANAGEMENT

Should our senior military leaders manage government real estate? Might not the United States be better served if these officers were left to deal with military issues and the management of real estate were left to qualified civilian civil servants?

TENANCY

Is it important to maintain service-pure installations, or is it possible that the different services could inhabit the same installations with little or no degradation of function, and thereby more efficiently and effectively use the resources available to the Department of Defense? In fact, could not other government agencies besides the Department of Defense also inhabit these installations without any degradation of functions?

DIVESTITURE

Should the Department of Defense own and manage the physical locations where military forces live, work, and play? Might the United States be better served if the Department of Defense concerned itself solely with the problems of defending the nation
and left the "housekeeping" functions of facilities and bases to another government agency?

SOME ANSWERS

MANAGEMENT

For some years, the Army has recognized that the roles of garrison and installation commanders are "city" management skills. The first Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), Major General John H. Little, noted that Army officers who managed these installations had to balance competing demands for attention and resources, including housing for 165,000 families, barracks for 360,000 single soldiers, more than one billion square feet of buildings, enough paved roads to cross America two dozen times, and do all this on posts that covered more land area than New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware and Rhode Island combined.9

Senior military leaders spend an inordinate amount of time and effort on the management of the day-to-day operation of the places where military personnel and their families live, work, and play. For instance, there is no authorized position for a general officer whose duty description is described simply as "Installation Commander." In most cases these senior leaders are assigned to an important war-fighting position, such as Corps
Commander or Division Commander and their installation management duties come because they happen to also be the senior general officer assigned to the installation. Several general officers recently admitted that they spend approximately 45 to 55 percent of their time on the management of their installation, as opposed to devoting the time to their combat units.\textsuperscript{10} During the author’s personal discussions with other general officers ranges as high as 75 percent have been given.\textsuperscript{11} Much of this time is spent in public relations activities, and in resolving routine issues with the communities surrounding a given installation. This is far too much time taken away from a general officer’s primary responsibilities, those of a senior Army leader charged with war-fighting. The job of “Installation Commander,” however, sometimes involves issues of such complexity and magnitude that it requires one hundred percent of the commander’s time as well.

Through the 1970s and 1980s, general officers had complained that they spent far too much time dealing with installation management issues, taking them away from their primary mission of training their soldiers and officers.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, they argued that a Division Commander’s time is better spent in preparing that division for deployment and success on the battlefield, than in negotiations with the surrounding community on issues of noise abatement, utilities costs, or endangered species protection. The nation could be better served with the
creation of a civilian corps of "city managers" entrusted with such duties.

Other than tradition, there is no inherent requirement for a military installation to be commanded by a general officer. Tradition alone dictates that a garrison activity must be commanded by a senior field grade officer. However, there are vested service interests in maintaining the status quo. The military management of posts and garrisons provides command positions, opportunities, and perceived prestige. But this is not the same thing as responsible, cost-effective management of public assets. Some would argue that there is an intangible value to these traditions, that the bond formed between a local municipality and "its" post, "its" general, is an important part of the heritage of this country and its armed forces. They would also say that the civilian community will not accept a civilian as the ultimate authority over military bases, that the elected officials will always seek out the senior officer to resolve issues. While this argument may have some merit, tradition should not compromise efficiency in the management of military installations. Elected officials have routinely dealt with other civilians when dealing with all other departments of the federal government outside of Defense. From Justice to Agriculture to the National Air and Space Administration, the leadership of these agencies is all civilian. They have been accepted by the local populace surrounding their installations, why would the
same not be true for a civilian manager of an installation formerly managed by a military officer? The savings in all resources that could accrue from these changes would increase readiness and reduce PERSTEMPO. It may also attenuate OPTEMPO if sufficient personnel are released from installation management functions.

The Department of Defense has already trained some new garrison commanders in civilian programs alongside civilian city managers. This is much the same as programs which provide military officers training with industry to obtain certain skills for highly technical specialties. This type of training can be effective for installation or garrison commanders because the facilities that they will manage, and the functions that they will perform, are so closely related to those of their civilian counterparts. Such training has been provided to too few garrison commanders, however, and is not likely to be increased because of the cost and time involved.

Why not recognize the need for a Department of Defense civilian corps of career city managers? The Department of the Army has attempted to do exactly this with the creation of it's civilian Career Field 29 (Civilian Executive Assistant - Base Operations). While this program certainly is a step in the right direction, it has been slow to mature for a variety of reasons, and without additional emphasis will not mature in the foreseeable future. If the intent of this program were to come
to fruition, it would spare the general officers and senior field grade officers now assigned to real estate management duties for assignments where their expertise is better used.

TENANCY

It matters little, if at all, whether a field artillery battalion of the United States Army is located adjacent to a United States Air Force weather squadron, or to a United States Navy special warfare group, or to a United States Marine Corps reconnaissance battalion if each can perform its mission, and as long as the basic needs of each of these varied units are satisfied. Some service-peculiar functional facilities such as airfields, ports, and firing ranges must be separately accommodated, but many of the service housekeeping functions are very similar. It is not only possible but increasingly desirable for varied forces to share installations. In fact, a Department of Justice training facility or a Department of Agriculture field station could also occupy space on some military installations, with the added benefit of their contributing resources to the installation’s budget. An existing (but all too infrequent) example of this would be the Federal Bureau of Investigation training center on the Quantico Marine Corps base in Virginia.

Previous efforts to consolidate like activities and functions between services have met with mixed success. Military leaders tend to be skeptical of the benefits of such changes, fearing the potential loss of valuable resources, and reacting
with the typical question: “What am I going to lose this time?”

Throughout 1995, Fort Lewis, WA investigated the feasibility of “partnering” with nearby McChord Air Force Base. This effort sought to share base operations resources in order to gain efficiencies and save money for both installations. Ultimately, refuse collection and disposal were the only areas in which they were able to “partner,” in this case by negotiating a contract with a private sector contractor. The balance of the plan never got off the ground, largely due to the Air Force’s unwillingness to participate in the working group. This hesitation and lack of willingness to consolidate is not unique to the Air Force. Virtually all of the Services prefer to retain their own base operations support independent of the other Services.

Some installation commanders have found that by combining their installation headquarters requirements with those of their tenants, they can gain unit cost economies and lower management cost and numbers of contracts. A garrison commander of Redstone Arsenal in the early 1990’s, for instance, found that there were redundant security guard requirements between the installation itself and several diverse tenant activities. Combining the guard forces reduced the total number of personnel required, thereby realizing savings. Some installations also are forming cooperative agreements between the services or with local civilian communities for fire protection, recreation, and other community-based services. Some are reaching out to the other...
military services to achieve better economies of scale to provide and receive support services and supplies.17 Active and reserve component organizations have shared some of the same facilities very successfully for many years. There is no reason that the same types of sharing could not work with more diverse tenant organizations, including those belonging to other federal or state government agencies.

Within the walls of one building on Fort Belvoir, Virginia, lies an excellent example of how this could work. Humphrey's Hall, the former home of the United States Army Engineer School, now houses the Army Management Staff College, a portion of the Civilian Personnel Operations Center training facility, the Department of the Army Inspector General Training Institute, the Department of Treasury Inspector General Auditor Training Institute, and the (civilian contractor-run) Army Force Management School. If all of these varied activities can successfully live within the walls of a single building, could not the same be true of the area inside the boundaries of other "military" installations?

DIVESTITURE

In this time of declining resources, it may be time to consider a more centralized system of management for all federal installations. In other words, it may now be time to question the propriety of allowing Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, and all of the other varied agencies and departments of
the United States federal government to maintain and manage all of their own, specific and separate real estate and housing operations. Perhaps it is time for a single government agency to manage all real estate for the federal government. This may be a logical role for the General Services Administration. If not, a new organization may be required. Analysis of this suggestion is beyond the scope of this research paper, but it is clear to this author that a single agency managing all federal real estate could provide substantial cost savings and is an idea that deserves serious study and consideration.

The Department of Defense currently finds itself in a situation in which it is obliged to maintain more real estate than it can afford and to maintain expensive facilities that have limited mission importance. As recently as April 22, 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen was quoted as saying:

...Congress must allow the Defense Department to close military bases we no longer need. Since the height of the Cold War, reductions in Defense’s overall budget (40 percent) and forces (36 percent) have far outpaced the reductions in our base infrastructure (21 percent). This causes a tremendous drain on the Defense Department’s resources, forcing us to use people and money that are desperately needed for other pressing needs, such as building modern weapons.

This requirement is imposed by a Congress that is understandably as concerned about jobs of constituents as by the needs of the Services. However, the situation causes an unnecessary and unfortunate drain of funds and manpower needed to manage and maintain unproductive, redundant facilities.
Ironically, during formulation of the Fiscal Year 1997 (FY97) Defense budget, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds were reduced by both Senate and House committees. The bulk of the O&M funds are used to maintain installations. Congress apparently wants the installations maintained, but intends to keep Defense budgets as small as possible for the foreseeable future. This seriously frustrates ongoing Department of Defense efforts to provide the most cost-effective defense to the nation.

The inherent contradictions in the current situation have been documented by objective observers. For instance, in addressing the military’s infrastructure problem, the 1997 National Defense Panel (NDP) stated that fundamental reform was the key to effective transformation of the Department of Defense for the years 2010-2020. The Panel further noted that the Department of Defense is burdened by a far-flung support infrastructure that is ponderous, bureaucratic, and unaffordable. The panel report argued that unless its costs are cut sharply, the Department of Defense will lack the funds to invest in the future. In response to the Panel’s report, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen expressed his particular “...support [for] the NDP’s view that fundamental reform of the Defense Department’s support infrastructure, including two additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, is key to an effective transformation strategy.” The Secretary reaffirmed this view in his endorsement of the NDP report sent to
Nor was this view confined to the Executive Branch. At least one Congressman concurred with panel criticism of Congress for not approving additional base closures, stating that the defense budget was already inadequate to support military modernization and simultaneously maintain excess infrastructure.

One profound reform clearly could be transfer of responsibility for managing Department of Defense installations to a small, dedicated civilian corps of city managers, trained and experienced in the functions necessary to manage such "military cities." However, that measure alone will not achieve the economies available to a thoroughgoing consolidation of property and elimination of excess.

A separate government agency, tasked with being the landlord for federal property makes economic sense, and may in fact ultimately be one answer to the politically explosive issue of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), at least as far as the Department of Defense is concerned. If another agency of the federal government "owns" the real estate and is tasked with its efficient operation, the Department of Defense no longer has to be concerned with how many bases it maintains nor with how to pay for them. This possibility warrants serious study. It may free the military to pay more attention to the important business of defending the nation.
SECURITY

Some may argue that the proposed changes would have a detrimental effect on the security of military installations, asserting that civilians do not have the same work ethic or sense of urgency as their military counterparts when it comes to security issues. They may argue that departments of the federal government other than Defense do not have the same security requirements or concerns and that combining services is analogous to "mixing apples and oranges." Some will say that the security requirements peculiar to the individual services will not be fully met. These arguments are easily refuted by historical example and clear precedent. Civilians have been a part of the armed forces of the United States since their inception. Civilian employees have exhibited the same sense of urgency and patriotism as uniformed service members. Civilians have been heavily and deeply involved in all aspects of military security, ranging from service as gate guards on military installations to membership in the most covert, most secret intelligence and security organizations.

Previous discussion noted that the basing of units from different services on installations does not present an insurmountable problem. United States military doctrine increasingly emphasizes that the different services will fight future wars as a cohesive "joint service team." It seems intuitively obvious that common basing will contribute to a
necessary attitude of "jointness" and cooperation among the Services.

But what about security of military activities on installations no longer "owned" and managed by the Department of Defense? Actually, the same arguments would apply if the Department of Defense divested itself of ownership. For example, the Department of Energy is responsible for the installations where the United States builds and stores nuclear weapons payloads and triggering devices. Other departments of the federal government (such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation) have security requirements that are every bit as important and demanding as those of the Department of Defense. Adequacy of security does not depend inherently on Department of Defense "ownership" of the installations in question. Nor are the measures necessary for securing these various activities fundamentally different. So, while security should always be an area of concern, it is not a valid argument against relinquishing Department of Defense control of installations to another executive branch agency.

There are precedents to divestiture. For instance, an agreement was reached between the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) during the 1980's whereby State would take control of all overseas DIA (i.e. Defense Department) real estate used to support Defense Attaché personnel. Prior to
this agreement, DIA had separately managed these housing operations, duplicating the efforts of the Department of State.\textsuperscript{24}

QUALITY OF LIFE

Senior Army leaders also have responsibilities for maintaining the quality of life for our soldiers, civilians and their families. Some would argue that by not being in "command" of the installation or garrison, these leaders could not assure adequate "Quality of Life" for service members. They might further argue that quality of life issues cannot be separated from "command". While commanders frequently are the authorities who ultimately resolve quality of life issues, this is inherent in their role as senior Army leaders, not in the fact that they are in command of an installation or a garrison activity. Removing the real estate maintenance and management responsibilities does not make a general officer any less a commander, nor does it remove his ability to rectify quality of life issues that arise. Too, it is rarely the general officer who actually resolves such issues. The mechanism for resolving "Quality of Life" issues will not fundamentally change if installations and garrisons are managed by civilians (or even by another government agency).

COURSES OF ACTION

This discussion has suggested that the current system of managing military real estate is inefficient and unnecessarily
expensive. It also has suggested that the declining defense budgets and increasing military missions of the post Cold War era provide a rationale for significant change. What, then, are the logical options?

STATUS QUO - DO NOTHING

One course of action is to maintain the status quo. Why change a system that works? This argument would find many proponents. While there is merit to this argument, continuing the current system may have a severe long-term downside in PERSTEMPO and availability of funding for the Department of Defense's core war-fighting responsibilities. In an era of shrinking resources, new thinking is needed. The Department of Defense is encouraging innovation in every other area of military endeavor. No system is so efficient and cost effective that it cannot be improved upon. This system could be improved upon a great deal.

STUDY IT - DO A LITTLE

A second course of action would be to reinvigorate the Army's commitment to creation of a corps of civilian installation managers. Simultaneously, the Department of Defense would study existing examples of base consolidation and sharing to derive lessons-learned to apply elsewhere. This could be supplemented with limited experimentation to assess what consolidation seems to work and which does not. The approach seems to conform to the views of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, who has stated
that the Department of Defense must investigate new joint
operational concepts, apply advanced technologies in new ways,
and explore different organizational structures. However, this
approach also conforms to an inherent bureaucratic bias against
fundamental change - even when that change is clearly warranted.
There are already sufficient examples which point to
potentialities, such as the earlier cited situation at Fort
Belvoir. Fundamental, beneficial change does not require another
Department of Defense study. It is important to avoid the
precedented tendency to "study" issues to death instead of taking
action when it is indicated.

TAKE ACTION - DO IT BIG

Another course of action would be to remove military
officers and Department of Defense civilian personnel from the
business of managing military cities. This approach would
include creation of a new government activity to oversee and
manage all United States federal government real estate, one that
is charged with the effective and efficient use of those
facilities while also ensuring that these facilities are fully
utilized. This agency would be the "landlord" for most executive
branch installations. Perhaps that agency already exists in the
General Services Administration. Perhaps a new entity is
required. Only a detailed, serious study of this course of
action will provide the answer.
CONCLUSION

Good stewardship of national resources requires that the Department of Defense and the nation take an aggressive approach to these issues. The nation’s senior soldiers should not be assigned as landlords and mayors. They should be working in their branch specialties, training American soldiers to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

The Department of Defense should divest itself of most if not all of its real estate as soon as the transfer of these holdings can be arranged. This will not happen overnight, in fact far from it. Implementation of this recommendation may require a national debate. Certainly it would require careful attention by the legislative and executive branches of the national government. But the time to act is now, prior to the necessity for “quick fixes” in times of crisis. Crises seem to come far too quickly and close together in the post Cold War world for the United States to continue to respond as we have always done in the past. Let’s be proactive this time rather than reactive. Let the debate begin!

Word Count: 5555
ENDNOTES


Webster defines an Installation as "Land and improvements installed thereon devoted to military purposes," and a Garrison as "A group of people associated with a military installation." These definitions hold for the purposes of this paper.

Multiple discussions between the author, former and future installation and garrison commanders, and subject matter experts from the installation management career field. Held at Fort Belvoir, VA and Washington DC during the period April 1994 to April 1995, and at Carlisle Barracks, PA on various occasions during the period July 1997 to April 1998.

Personal knowledge of the author based upon experience gained as the Director of this program for it’s first year of existence. The Garrison Precommand Course has trained a total of 178 students since its inception in 1994. Most classes contain 15 to 20 attendees. The program cost approximately $650,000 dollars in its first year, with subsequent years being funded at approximately $500,000 dollars per year. These costs are only for the presentation of the course curriculum itself and do not address the costs for salary, benefits, travel or per diem for the attending students.

Author developed the concept plan for the Garrison Precommand Course (GPC) and led the development team at Army Management Staff College that wrote, validated and presented the curriculum for the first full year of the course’s existence.

Susan C. Foster, GS-14, DAC, former Department Chairman, Army Management Staff College and Director, Garrison Precommand Course and General Officer Installation Management Course, interview by author, 10 March 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

From February 1995 through February 1998, 15 GOIC courses have trained 98 General Officer and Senior Executive Service (SES) students. Class sizes have ranged from 4 to 9, with most classes between 6 and 8 students.

Author led the joint team from Army Management Staff College and Army Community and Family Support Center Training Center that developed the concept, and wrote and presented the curriculum for the General Officer Installation Management Course (GOIC) for the course’s validation session and its first presentation to a student population.


Foster, op cit.

Discussions between the author, LTG(Ret) Richard G. Trefrey (former Inspector General of the Army) and MG(Ret) Richard S. Siegfried (then assigned as the Deputy Inspector General of the Army), held in Washington DC during April 1994.

Personal observations of the author while assigned in a United States Army Reserve capacity (Colonel, USAR) as Deputy Director, Operations Division, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), Department of the Army Staff, during the period February 1995 to February 1997.


Multiple interviews of garrison command group and staff personnel conducted at Redstone Arsenal, AL on 10 and 11 April 1994.

Little, 18.


COL Dan W. Henk and COL Larry M. Wortzel, former Defense Attachés, interview by author, 23 April 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Foster, Susan C., GS-14, DAC, former Director, General Officer Installation Command course. Interview by author, 10 March 1998, Carlisle, PA.


Henk, COL Dan W. and COL Larry M. Wortzel, former Defense Attachés. Interview by author, 23 April 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA.


Lis, John. “BENS President McInerney Hails NDP Call to Reduce Defense Infrastructure to Fund 21st Century Military.” 1


Siegfried, Richard S., MG(Ret), former Deputy Inspector General of the Army. Multiple interviews by author, April 1994, Washington DC.


Trefrey, Richard G., LTG(Ret), former Inspector General of the Army. Multiple interviews by author, April 1994, Washington DC.

