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THE WAR ON DRUGS: WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE NATIONAL GUARD PLAY?

BY

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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Billions of dollars and many innocent lives have been lost to the "War on Drugs." The dollars have been committed to a strategy that places emphasis on supply reduction. Supply reduction is based upon two premises: 1) Total elimination of illegal drugs that enter the United States or 2) a significant elimination of the drugs that enter the United States resulting in illegal drugs pricing themselves out of circulation. The National Guard has participated in the "War on Drugs" since the end of the 1980s. It has participated by supporting law enforcement agencies with several approved missions. These missions are approved yearly by the Secretary of Defense. Each of the 50 states and 4 territories have participated since 1989. Each state and territory must submit a yearly plan and budget that is approved by each governor through National Guard Bureau to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There are six categories of missions through which National Guard personnel can provide support to either law enforcement or community organizations. The first five categories of missions pertain to a supply reduction strategy and the last category of missions pertains to a demand reduction strategy. The supply reduction missions are oriented to support law enforcement agencies and the demand reduction missions are oriented to community support activities. The funding for National
Guard participation has paralleled historical congressional funding for counter-drug activity, in that the majority (90%) of the funding is for supply reduction strategies with the minority portion (10%) going to demand reduction strategies. Presidential administrations since the early 1980s have committed billions of dollars to supply reduction strategies that have failed. These strategies have not been able to eliminate illegal drugs from entering the country nor have they been able to eliminate a significant amount of illegal drugs so that illegal drugs would become cost prohibitive to the American populace. Because the National Guard’s support has been mostly in the area of supply reduction, it is supporting a losing proposition. It is time to remove the National Guard funding for counter-supply strategies and give it to programs that have shown success. Those are programs where communities have been able to mobilize governmental and non-governmental organizations through a demand reduction strategy. Employing these programs, the City of New York has been able to reduce crime significantly over the last several years. These are also programs where communities have mobilized both public and private organizations to reduce illegal drug consumption through a demand reduction strategy. Because there is such a small portion of discretionary spending available in the federal budget, none of it can be given to programs that have shown no success. The premise of this paper therefore, is to eliminate the National Guard participation in counter-supply operations and move the funding to programs that can attack the problem in a more efficient and effective manner, and to shift the National Guard’s emphasis from counter-supply strategy to a counter-demand strategy.
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Introduction

This country has struggled with drug abuse for 8 decades and has spent billions of dollars on strategies that mandate a collaborative effort between demand reduction and supply reduction strategies.\(^1\) Despite these efforts, illegal drug use continues to be one of America’s most hideous problems. Programs that have reduced casual drug use have given American’s false hope that the war was being won, but in many ways the situation is getting worse.\(^2\) The war on drugs has failed to reduce the number of chronic, hard-core drug users.\(^3\) It has also failed to reduce drug consumption among our youth. In fact, recent figures indicate that drug consumption among our youth is up.\(^4\) This paper will review the current National Drug Control Policy, the strategies of supply and demand reduction, the participation of the National Guard in the War on Drugs based upon supply reduction premises, and will make a recommendation concerning the future participation by the National Guard in the “War on Drugs.”

History of the Counter-Supply Strategy

The National Drug Control Strategy originates from a long history of United States’ strategies toward drug control. The following paragraphs discuss some of the history behind the supply-side strategy and discuss its failure. This discourse is necessary to lay the basis for discussion of the current policy.

The popular view that other countries are largely responsible for America’s drug problems has deep historic roots.\(^5\) When the first drug laws were adopted early in this century, drugs were associated with immigrant groups and minorities; opium with Chinese laborers in the West; cocaine with blacks; and marijuana with Mexican
immigrants in the Southwest. These drugs were seen as foreign threats to America’s social fabric, undermining traditional moral values and political stability. Today the perceived link between foreigners and drugs still prompts the U.S. government to use diplomacy, coercion, money and even military force to try to stop drugs from entering the country.

The supply-side approach is logically compelling. If there were no drugs coming in, the argument goes, then there would be no drug problem. And even if foreign drugs cannot be eliminated entirely, the laws of the marketplace dictate that reducing the supply will drive up the price, which in turn will deter potential users from trying drugs and force addicts to either go “cold turkey” or seek treatment. The assumption is that curtailing foreign supplies is the most effective way to cut drug abuse in the United States.

The supply-side approach to drugs has powerful political appeal. Blaming foreigners for America’s recurring drug epidemics provides convenient, if distant, targets for public anger that might otherwise be directed toward elected officials. Getting foreign farmers to stop growing drug crops seems easier than curbing America’s appetite for drugs. Intercepting incoming drugs in the air or on the high seas appears to be the kind of technological challenge Americans are uniquely capable of meeting.

The supply-side approach to drug control has been thoroughly tested by both Republican and Democratic administrations. President Richard Nixon, faced with rising heroin and marijuana use in the late 1960s, closed a key U.S.—Mexican border crossing to convince Mexico to take action against illegal drug production. He also stepped up
diplomatic pressure against Turkey, a major opium source for the notorious “French Connection” heroin traffickers, and provided narcotics-control assistance to Mexico and Turkey. Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter continued programs of crop eradication, substitution, and overseas law-enforcement spending tens of millions of dollars during the 1970s.

President Ronald Reagan gave unprecedented resources to supply-control efforts. Just as he intended to shield the United States from Soviet missiles though the Strategic Defense Initiative, so too, did Reagan try to seal the borders against the flow of drugs that threatened the nation’s security. Funding for interdiction and international supply-control programs jumped from $416 million in 1981 to $1.6 billion in 1987, constituting about one-third of total federal antidrug spending.

President George Bush followed similar policies. He, like the presidents before him, continued to fund the supply side strategy disproportionately and continue heavy military involvement in the “War on Drugs” from the supply side. In September 1989, in his first televised presidential address, Bush announced that, “we will for the first time make available the appropriate resources of America’s Armed Forces. We will intensify our efforts against drug smugglers on the high seas, in international airspace, and at our borders.”

President Bill Clinton was the first president to start increasing the demand reduction portion of the counter drug budget. He proposed a new supply/demand mix which was a dramatic shift in program emphasis in favor of treatment and prevention programs. He was committed to closing the gap between the budget for supply-side and
demand-side strategies. Although this shift showed initial promise, in reality, as I will discuss in depth, later, in practice the Clinton administration is still committed to a supply-side strategy.

The National Drug Control Strategy

After all this discussion of the history of supply-side strategies, it is necessary to discuss the current 1997 Drug Control Strategy. A National Drug Control Strategy has been published since 1970. The 1997 National Drug Control Strategy was published February of 1997 and outlines this nation’s strategy towards the reduction of illegal drug consumption. It describes the following: the purpose and nature of the strategy; America’s Drug Abuse Profile; strategic goals and objectives; a comprehensive approach; and resources to implement the strategy.

Section I describes the purpose and nature of the strategy and lays the foundation for the document. It emphasizes the duty of the government which is to protect its citizens. The Constitution of the United States— as interpreted over 208 years ago—articulates the obligation of the federal government to uphold the public good, providing a bulwark against all threats, foreign and domestic.\(^\text{14}\) The purpose and nature section also discusses the evolution of the National Drug Control Strategy, the mandate for the strategy, and the elements of the 1997 Drug Control Strategy.

Section II of the document describes America’s drug abuse profile. It presents much data concerning the use of illegal drugs. It also discusses trends in youth drug use, consequences of illicit drug use and health consequences. There is also a section on the cost of drug-related crime. Two significant findings are important and are discussed in
this section. The most alarming trend is that even though overall drug consumption is
down there is increasing use of illegal drugs, tobacco, and alcohol among youth. The
second significant finding is that illegal drugs remain available. Illegal drugs continue to
be readily available almost anywhere in the United States.

Section III describes the strategic goals and objectives. These goals are exactly
the same as the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy except that goal number one is
stated somewhat differently. The goals are as follows: 1) educate and enable America’s
youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco; 2) increase the safety of
America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; 3) reduce
health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; 4) shield America’s air, land, and
sea frontiers from the drug threat; and 5) break foreign and domestic drug sources of
supply.

In the goals and objectives section there is also a discussion of demand and supply
reduction. The demand reduction section emphasizes prevention and treatment, and the
supply reduction emphasizes the prevention of drugs entering the United States.

Section IV is a comprehensive approach to goals and objectives stated in section
III. This section discusses in some detail the programs necessary to achieve the goals and
objectives. Its initiatives are youth oriented, reduction of drug-related crime and
violence, reduction of health and social problems, the shielding of our frontiers, the
reduction of drug availability, and the discussion of other initiatives. Again, one can
see that the approaches are divided between demand and supply reduction.
Section V briefly describes the resources to implement the strategy. Fiscal years 1996, 1997 and 1998 are presented. To support all the goals for Fiscal Year 1998, the President requested $16.0 billion to fund drug control efforts. It is significant to note that the ratio of supply reduction funding to demand reduction funding is three to two and has been that way for the last two years and is programmed that way in 1998. Funding for supply reduction has exceeded demand reduction since 1976.

Presidential Clinton’s Budget

President Bill Clinton’s 1998 budget is one that also supports the interdiction effort. It contains the following language:

“The Administration has launched a multi-faceted international strategy, making it harder for traffickers to smuggle illicit drugs into the United States for sale. Southern tier of the United States: The Administration is working to stem the flow of narcotics through land and seaports along the Nation’s Southern tier. The budget would reinforce efforts by the Customs Service to strengthen border enforcement along the Southern tier by providing $36 million for increased drug interdiction efforts. The budget also increases support for other Southwest border interdiction efforts, including $16 million for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), $46 million for DEA’s and the FBI’s Southwest border drug interdiction efforts, and $47 million for Coast Guard interdiction activities.”
An analysis of this strategy proves that the Clinton administration is still very much committed to the supply-side philosophy to solve the drug problem in this country.

The Supply-side Strategy Scorecard

Since we have committed so much of drug control budget to the supply-side it is a fair question to find out what it has bought us? What is the supply-control scorecard?

Since 1981, American taxpayers have spent $23 billion on international drug control.21 Yet drug supplies have increased substantially both at home and abroad. Worldwide opium production has more than doubled in the past decade and now exceeds 3,400 tons per year, the equivalent of 340 tons of heroin.22 From 1984 to 1994, coca production almost doubled, although the United States provided more than $2 billion in narcotics-control assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, the world’s largest coca producers.23 Meanwhile drug prices in the United States have fallen precipitously. Heroin now sells for less than half its 1981 street price, and heroin purity exceeds 60 per cent in many cities, compared with only 7 per cent in 1981.24 Cocaine prices have dropped by two-thirds. The administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Thomas Constantine, testified before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in March 1995 that “drug availability and purity of cocaine and heroin are at an all-time high.25

Some congressional critics blame the apparent failure of interdiction on a lack of resources, arguing that budget cuts of one-third since 1992 have hindered federal efforts to intercept foreign drug traffic.26 Others blame Clinton’s strategic shift away from
efforts to interrupt drug traffic through the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico in favor of trying to eliminate production of drugs in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The underlying problem is not operational. Increased resources and better implementation will not make foreign supply control efforts more successful in driving up drug prices in the United States.

The Supply-side Premises

The supply-side has two premises. If there were no drugs coming in, the argument goes, then there would be no drug problem. The second premise is that if foreign drugs cannot be eliminated entirely, the laws of the market place dictate that reducing the supply will drive up the price, which in turn will deter potential users from trying drugs and force addicts to either go "cold turkey" or seek treatment. The critical assumption is that curtailing foreign supplies is the most effective way to cut drug abuse in the United States.

One sign of a successful law-enforcement war on drugs should be rising prices for the out-lawed substances. If federal agents are successfully sealing the border and police efforts are genuinely making trafficking riskier, drugs should become more expensive. As the price data below for cocaine indicates, it hasn’t worked out that way. Similar trends can also be observed for other illegal drugs, such as marijuana, LSD, and heroin.

**Average Retail Price for One Kilogram of Cocaine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NATIONAL PRICE RANGE (In nominal dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>11,000-40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11,000-40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11,000-42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10,500-40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10,500-40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10,500-36,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Drug Enforcement Agency and the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
The supply-side strategy is fatally flawed for several reasons. The economics of drug cultivation mitigated against sustained reductions in supply. If drug producing area is wiped out, it can easily be replaced. Drugs can be grown very inexpensively almost anywhere in the world, and the huge profits provide poor farmers a strong economic reason and incentive to grow these illegal drugs. Drug crops are the mainstay of many poor countries, where farmers have few comparable alternatives. In Bolivia, for example, where the per capita gross national product is $770 a year, an acre of coca yields $475 annually, compared with $35-$250 for crops such as bananas and grapefruit.

The second reason that supply-side strategy fails is that the United States consumes a relatively small portion of the worldwide drug production. The great bulk of foreign drug production is consumed in countries other than the United States--often in the regions where the drug crops are grown. Domestic marijuana consumption accounts for 817 tons per and as much as half of that total is grown illegally in the United States. We are attempting to interdict drugs that are already here from coming into this country.

A third reason that supply-side strategy fails is that America’s annual drug demand can be supplied from a relatively small growing area and transported in a few places. Eliminating the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is difficult because such a small amount of drugs are required to satisfy the current demand and huge amounts are manufactured.

A fourth reason that supply-side strategy fails is that the price structure of the drug market severely limits the potential impact of interdiction and source-country programs.
Somewhere between a bar in La Paz and the streets of England this substance called cocaine adds 1,400 per cent to its value.\(^{39}\) What adds most of the value to the coca is the personal risk faced by each human link in the chain from the processor, through exporter, importer, wholesaler and street retailer.\(^{40}\) The producers of the drugs receive a relatively small portion of the sale of illegal drugs. The largest portion of the profits of the sale of drugs is made on the streets. The total cost of cultivating, refining, and smuggling cocaine to the United States accounts for less than 12 per cent of the retail price in the United States.\(^{41}\) One can then determine that even if the supply of cocaine to the United States was reduced by 50% it would have very little impact on the price of cocaine on the market. Some have even estimated that it would only have about a five percent increase on the price. The interdiction effort, even if successful, can only have a small impact on the economics of the price of drugs on the street. Thus, one of the major premises of supply reduction, that the lack of availability will cause a significant increase in price and therefore reduce consumption, is a flawed concept.

**Military Involvement, The Beginning**

At this point it is important to discuss how the military became involved in the Drug War. The Defense Department initially resisted congressional efforts to enlist the military in the drug war. However, when faced with major budget cuts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Defense Department decided that the “War on Drugs” may be the only war in town and saw it as a way to maintain its operational levels.\(^{42}\)

During the Reagan era, the war on drugs became increasingly lop-sided.\(^{43}\) More and more of the national drug control budget was spent beefing up supply side programs.
military involvement was primarily the product of a congressional and public outcry to save America from the drug scourge.

What is the military involvement in the War on Drugs? There are two types of warriors fighting this war. There are the Active Duty warriors who are governed by the guidelines of Title 10 U. S. Code and there are the National Guard warriors who are governed by the guidelines of Title 32 U. S. Code.

With President Ronald Reagan's declaration of the "War on Drugs" on August 4, 1986, and his subsequent issuance of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 on September 14, 1986, he officially identified international drug trafficking as a threat to U. S. National security. According to NSDD 221, all elements of national power, including the Department of Defense were directed to be employed to counter the threat of illicit drugs.

Controversy abounds to the legality or validity of the use of the armed forces to execute the "War on Drugs." Many would argue that this mission is not appropriate for military forces, especially those in a constitutional democracy, where the concept of martial law strikes at the very fiber of our societal values. Concern exists that the execution of such a mission would erode the nation's military readiness and would negatively impact the warfighting capability of the profession of arms.

An examination of the Constitution of the United States is helpful in analyzing the validity of these concerns. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, of the Constitution proclaims that Congress shall have the power "to raise and support armies ...." Article I, Section 8, Clause 13, declares that Congress shall have the power "to provide for calling for the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."
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Chapter 8, Title 10, United States Code (USC) provides for the use of active duty military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement agencies.\(^52\) Section 3-75 of Chapter 8 restricts the direct participation of the Active Components in search, seizure,
and arrest, or other similar activity in accordance with the provisions of the doctrine of "Posse Comitatus."^{53}

Chapter 8, Title 10, USC, Section 374, provides an enhanced drug interdiction and enforcement role for the members of the National Guard under state control. It emphasizes that Federal law does not prescribe any limitations on the authority of the National Guard to perform law enforcement functions authorized by the laws of the state concerned. In this regard, the National Guard is not subject to the provisions of "Posse Comitatus."^{54}

In 1989, Congress passed additional regulations to define and clarify the role of the Department of Defense in the counter-drug effort. This regulation, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989, specified three basic DOD responsibilities:

1. To be the lead agency for the detection and maintaining of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs to the United States.

2. To integrate command, control, communications, and intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective communications network.

3. To approve and fund state governor's plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of the state drug interdiction and enforcement operations.

**Counter-Drug Missions**

In the counter-drug arena, there are basically two mission categories, with multiple missions included under each category. The two mission categories are counter-
supply operations and counter-demand operations. Unilateral military action is precluded in either category. Military action must be conducted in response to a request for assistance and in support of federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies or other civil entities.

**National Guard Participation**

I would like to next discuss how the National Guard is involved in the War on Drugs. Discussion of the National Guard’s involvement will include statutory authority, funding levels, approved missions and the support that can be provided by the National Guard.

Section 112, Title 32, United States Code (32 USC 112) is the authority for the Counterdrug Support Program. The National Guard provides counterdrug support to Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and to Community Based Organizations (CBOs) that request Drug Demand Reduction assistance. National Guard personnel engaged in counterdrug support activities for which federal funding is provided by 32 USC 112 must be acting in support of LEAs. When a counterdrug nexus exists as the primary purpose, support may be provided to a CBO. When using 32 USC 112 funds, states may execute only those missions which have been approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) within the Governors’ State Plans, in conformity with the mission definitions in National Guard Regulation 500-2.

The funding history for the National Guard’s participation in counterdrug activity is depicted in the following chart:
The desired annual funding level for the National Guard participation is $200 million. According to COL G. B. Clawson, Director of the Counterdrug Directorate at the National Guard Bureau, an annual funding level of 200 million will allow the National Guard to adequately support all requests from law enforcement and communities for support in both in supply reduction and demand reduction. The actual missions that are approved for National Guard participation is listed in the next paragraph.

The National Guard is organized and positioned in 3,200 plus communities across America. The National Guard can officer facilities, equipment and trained citizen soldiers/airmen who are a dedicated cadre of drug free National Guard personnel who can assist civil authorities in making societal changes. There are six category of missions that are approved for National Guard participation. There are six categories of missions. The first five categories deal with counter-supply operations and the last category deals with counter-demand operations. They are listed as follows from NGR 500-2:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 1</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 1</td>
<td>Program Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterdrug Coordination, Liaison and Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 2</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2a</td>
<td>Technical Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguist Support (Translator Support)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2b</td>
<td>Intelligence Analyst Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2c</td>
<td>Operational/Investigative Case Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2d</td>
<td>Communications Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2e</td>
<td>Engineer Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 2f</td>
<td>Subsurface/Diver Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 3</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 3a</td>
<td>General Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Cannabis Suppression/Eradication Operations Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 3b</td>
<td>Transportation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 3c</td>
<td>Maintenance/Logistical Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 3d</td>
<td>Cargo/Mall Inspection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 4</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 4a</td>
<td>Counterdrug-related Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training LEA/Military Personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 5</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 5a</td>
<td>Reconnaissance/Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 5b</td>
<td>Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category 6</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission 6a</td>
<td>Demand Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Based Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 6b</td>
<td>Educational Institution Demand Reduction Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 6c</td>
<td>Informational Demand Reduction Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 6d</td>
<td>Leadership Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission 6e</td>
<td>Coalition Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned earlier, the first five mission categories are counter-supply operations. The major objective of counter-supply operations is to reduce and ultimately eliminate the production and proliferation of illegal and illicit drugs, internal and external to the boundaries of the United States. Key missions for the military in this arena include: inspection, surveillance, interdiction, transportation, eradication and disposition. This list is not all-inclusive; it simply represents those missions that the military is currently performing and is best suited to perform in response to civil-military coordination.
The five most requested missions from law enforcement are as follows: 1) Intelligence support in terms of assistance in case analysis, 2) linguist support, 3) assistance on the Ports of Entry (inspection of vehicles), 4) ground reconnaissance, 5) marijuana eradication. The sixth mission category is counter-demand operations. The major objective of counter-demand operations is to reduce the demand and use of illegal and illicit drugs, internal and external to the boundaries of the United States. Key missions for the military include: prevention, mentoring of youth and coordination with community demand reduction organizations. Again, these missions are not all-inclusive, but do represent some of the major missions. I will discuss demand reduction initiatives again in more detail.

**Operational Employment**

Let me give some more detail concerning the operations in which the Active Army and the National Guard may support law enforcement in the counter-supply operations. An example of typical Active Duty operations is usually managed by Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 or Joint Task Force 6. Let me use JTF 6 as an example of an active duty operation.

JTF 6 is a joint task force that was established in El Paso, Texas in 1989 to support the interdiction effort along the Southwest border to support law enforcement operations mainly in the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. The mission of JTF 6 was to coordinate the military support to law enforcement along the Southwest border. The concept was that JTF 6 would coordinate all military support in
this region to include the National Guard. This was not feasible, because it is important to note that there were already established counter-supply operations in each of these states via the National Guard prior to JTF 6 becoming active in the effort. JTF 6 did provide the coordination required for all active component forces being deployed on the Southwest border.

Texas took the lead with JTF 6 and coordinated many of its counter-supply operations through JTF 6 and established a command and control headquarters in El Paso for all operations that it executed in Texas. Through the use of satellite communications, it was able to provide command and control to outpost/listening post operations (OP/LP) throughout the entire state of Texas if so desired. Texas was doing the politically right thing by taking JTF-6 under its wings and teaching it the business of counter-drug operations. So the Active Component got involved in counter-supply operations via the National Guard and mainly the Texas National Guard.

The “War on Drugs” was active in the California National Guard at this time also. The California National Guard was the initiator of the Out Post/Listening Post (OP/LP) operations and had continuous OP/LP operations during 1990 in the deserts of southern California. They had a fully coordinated effort with law enforcement. In the 1990-1991 time-frame the National Guard is an active player in counter-supply operations in the states of California and Texas.

The Arizona National Guard arrived late to the initiative. They eventually started providing support to law enforcement much like Texas and California. Arizona was the last of the four states to provide this type of support. They were last of the four states to
perform OP/LP operations. Their counter-drug coordinator made trips to New Mexico and Texas to gain a better understanding of the operations.

It is necessary also to discuss the New Mexico National Guard's participation. It is easy for me to discuss the details of the New Mexico Army National Guard's participation in the counter-supply operations from 1990 to 1991 because I was the Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer for the New Mexico Army National Guard during this time-frame.

I initiated the New Mexico Army National Guard's support to law enforcement in the state of New Mexico. I can still remember the summer of 1990. I arrived to Santa Fe in June and was informed that I had a budget of $250,000 to spend before 30 September 1990. I immediately formulated a plan by making contact with law enforcement in the Carlsbad, NM and Hobbs, NM area. I had been informed that the Sheriff in Carlsbad wanted to run and OP/LP operation south of Hobbs. They had some intelligence that drugs were being flown in from Mexico straight north over Marfa, Texas and landing south of Hobbs for distribution into the southern portion of the United States.

The New Mexico Army National Guard was now ready to execute its first mission in support of counter-supply operations. The players were the United States Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), the Eddy County Sheriff’s Department and the New Mexico Army National Guard with 30 soldiers. The Border Patrol brought in 10 of its top law enforcement officers. This tactical unit is the Border Patrol’s finest drug law enforcement officers. Most of the members of this unit were 6 feet tall or taller and most of them weighted more than 200 pounds. They had a complete arsenal of weapons.
The force deploy for nine days in September of 1990. I can still remember the mission, because I was in charge of the National Guard support to over all operation. Those were exciting times, because the New Mexico Army National Guard was helping to fight in the “War on Drugs.” The mission finally ended with no drug forfeitures and no arrests. Why do I tell you all this? Because this is the typical mission that the National Guard used to execute in support of law enforcement in the counter-supply arena.

The problem is that no longer is the National Guard effective in countering the flow of illicit drugs. Its mission in support to law enforcement has evolved into one of administrative support. Throughout my tenure (1990-1992), we had only 5 personnel working administrative support (the typical personnel, operations and logistics functions). The New Mexico Army National Guard has evolved into an operations of approximately 100 personnel of which 90 percent are providing either administrative support to the counter-supply operations in Santa Fe, New Mexico or to law enforcement throughout the state of New Mexico. There are very few field soldiers left on the payroll. The sad note is that this is the way the program has evolved in most National Guard states and the story on active duty is even worse. The JTF-6 operation in El Paso, Texas is an operation of more than 300 officers and soldiers.

So the counter-supply operation in the United States Army has evolved into a highly bureaucratic operation. Why has this happened? The military is a highly bureaucratic organization. The military loves to form bureaucracies to perform its functions. If not curtailed, it will continue to grow. The fact that the military is
bureaucratic and forms its solutions around creating positions is not right or wrong. It is simply the way a bureaucratic organization accomplishes its mission.

Bureaucratic organizations grew out of the Bureaucratic School of Thought which was originated by classical theorists such as Max Weber and President Woodrow Wilson. It believes that there are universal principles such as division of work, unity of command, unity of direction, centralization, the scalar chain, that if followed will result in a highly efficient organization. These universal principles are what causes bureaucratic organizations to attempt to grow.

Success Stories

What is the solution? What part should the military play in the “War on Drugs?”

Before I answer this question, it is important to discuss what is working. I submit that there are some real success stories in American cities and the majority of the success stories are related to drug demand reduction on the drug prevention side and community policing programs on the law enforcement prevention side. It is important to note that no government (Federal, State or local) cannot solve the problem by itself.

In his 1994 strategy President Clinton correctly argues that the most effective strategies for preventing drug use and keeping drugs out of neighborhoods and schools are those that mobilize all elements of a community coalitions. The best of these coalitions establish and sustain a strong partnership among business, schools, religious groups, social services organizations, law enforcement, the media, and community residents to help rid the neighborhood of drugs and drug-related violence. In this way,
they keep the community safe and free from the fear that pervades communities plagued by drug problems.

Robin Garr provides a set of principles to guide a bottoms up strategy. Robin Garr is a Pulitzer Price winning Louisville journalist who spent four years studying nonprofit organizations around the country whose efforts were oriented towards fighting hunger and poverty. He is the author of the book *Reinvesting in America: The Grassroots Movements That Are Feeding the Hungry, Housing the Homeless, and Putting the Americans Back to Work*. The Grassroots Movements are feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, and putting Americans back to work. While big government seems helpless in the face of so many of our social ills, creative and committed pioneers at the local level are finding solutions. He argues that government should support community organizations that are guided by clear objectives, foster self-reliance by building people’s strengths, use a holistic approach, bring the full range of tools to bear on each individual’s problems, deal with individuals, one-on-one, focus on prevention, and demonstrate strong leadership.

Let me put some meat into what Mr. Garr says. In 1991, then Major General Edward D. Baca, the Adjutant General of New Mexico asked me to write a drug demand reduction initiative for the New Mexico Army National Guard. LTG Baca, the Chief of National Guard Bureau, knew in 1991 that the solution to the drug problem in the United States was not on the supply side, but on the demand reduction side.

In the process of writing this plan, I spoke to various agencies in the City of Santa Fe. One of those agencies was the Big Brother/Big Sister program. They had a very
impressive story that I need to share in this paper. Anytime they had placed a high school person with either a big brother or big sister, that individual never failed to graduate from high school. That is a phenomenal statement when you consider that the high school drop out rate in cities these days approaches 7.7% for White non-Hispanics, 13.7% for Black non-Hispanics, and 29.4% for Hispanics. Big Brother/Big Sister is an example of an organization that fosters self-reliance by building people’s strengths, uses a holistic approach, brings the full range of tools to bear on each individual’s problems, deals with individuals, one-on-one, focuses on prevention, and demonstrates strong leadership. Big Brother/Big Sister is certainly an example of what Mr. Garr was describing.

Next, let me discuss successful community policing initiatives. New York City certainly stands out. New York City, through its community policing program, has set a standard for others to emulate. Listed below are some statistics that validate this statement:

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<td>Murder/non-negligent manslaughter</td>
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<td>23,300</td>
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<td>Forcible rape</td>
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<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
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<td>-4.3</td>
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<td>13,989,550</td>
<td>13,867,090</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
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*New York's decline of 86,363 index crimes from 1994-95 represents 70 percent of the nationwide decline of 122,460 index crimes. Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation.*
New York’s reduction in crime rate has certainly set a high standard for other cities to achieve. The reason for this reduction in crime has been the community policing initiative started by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. The addition of 30,000 police officers has allowed Mayor Guiliani to attack what he calls the quality of life crimes. The presence of these additional police officers has caused the citizens of New York to feel safer on the streets. “One of the reasons we’ve been able to decrease crime is a complete focus on minor crimes—quality-of-life crimes that drive people crazy,” says New York Police Department spokesman Lenny Alcivar. From the statistics listed earlier, one would agree that they are safer. The point to understand from all this is that these are police officers that have been added to the police force, these are not soldiers in support of police officers.

The National Guard’s Role

Another example of a community based organization is the National Guard. The National Guard is present in 2,700 communities throughout the country with 3,200 units. This presence can range from a small detachment of 50 individuals to a company or battery of 100 to 200 individuals to a battalion of 500 individuals.

The soldiers in these organizations possess the characteristics and leadership qualities that can be used to mobilize community organizations to satisfy those principles provided by Mr. Garr. The National Guard can help in the established of the objectives for each community where they are present. National Guard officers and noncommissioned officers are trained to due military planning for mobilization in preparation for war. This training can certainly be applied to community mobilization
planning. These soldiers have a "can do" attitude that be used to foster self-reliance and build people's strengths.

The National Guard is also trained in using a holistic approach to problem solving and could support any private or public organization charged with community mobilization planning. Because members of the National Guard come from many backgrounds and many diverse cultures, they bring with them the full range of tools with which to work on people problems and to deal with the individual. There are many talented individuals in the National Guard, whose talents can be used to work one-on-one with youth in order to enhance the prevention of drug consumption. The National Guard is an ideal community-based organization to deploy in the "War on Drugs" via the counter-demand strategy.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on this analysis, I recommend that the National Guard participation in the "War on Drugs" be changed from a counter-supply strategy to a counter-demand strategy. The main justification for the recommendation is that the supply side strategy does not work. Billions of dollars have been committed to the supply side strategy and it has been a failure. Why should we continue to commit millions of dollars to a strategy we know does not work? The National Guard's participation has been 90% dedicated to the supply side and only 10% or less to the demand reduction strategy. The desired funding level for National Guard participation is $200 million dollars per year, with only 10% of that funding to go to demand reduction. These percentages need to be reversed to 90% for a demand reduction strategy and 10% for a supply reduction strategy. This can
best be summarized by a statement made in US News and World Report. Drug analysts, who usually play down the success of interdiction efforts, point out that even the U. S. military has failed to materially stem the flow of drugs into the country. Among the skeptical are a number of military officials. Eventually, says one JTF-6 staff member, “we’d like to get out of this business.”

The second justification for the recommendation is that the military tends to build bureaucracies. These bureaucracies are not cost effective. We end up with multiple headquarters of personnel waiting on law enforcement to make requests to these headquarters for support. The tendency is to grow these headquarters larger than they need to be. This is the nature of bureaucracies. Precious funding is wasted with these headquarters.

With the National Guard shifting its strategy to counter-demand, the full-time administrative support structure and the requisite funding is minimal. Much of the participation by the National Guard in counter-demand missions can be on a volunteer basis, and it is these volunteers who will be the foot soldiers in the battle. Minimum funding is required for personnel to facilitate the coordination between the National Guard and the community based organizations.

What is the solution? In summary, the success stories need to be funded. The National Guard’s participation in the “War on Drugs” should change from counter-supply to counter-demand, and in doing so, the majority of the of the funding that has been given to the National Guard counter-supply operations should be redistributed to other efforts such as Big Brother/Big Sister and to our local communities that are involved in
community mobilization and who the National Guard will support. Additional funding should also be given to cities for additional law enforcement so that these cities can achieve the success of New York City. The only requirement is that the National Guard be provided enough funding so that facilitators can be hired to assist with the community mobilization process. This can be as few as one individual per state and territory.

The billions of dollars and lives that have been lost to the “War on Drugs” are gone. History has shown us that the counter-supply strategy has failed. The National Guard supporting a failed strategy is wrong. The National Guard can use its soldiers in its 2,700 communities to end the demand for illegal drugs and finally win the “War on Drugs,” to rid our communities and our Nation of the vile and dangerous threat of illegal drug use as a threat to our National Security.
ENDNOTES

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 25.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 122.
15 Ibid., 13.
16 Ibid., 21.
17 Ibid., 30-31.
18 Ibid., 41-57.
19 Ibid., 63.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 125.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 121.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 126.
35 Ibid., 127.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
ENDNOTES

42 Ibid., 123.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 U. S. Constitution.
51 Ibid.
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54 Ibid., p. 101.
62 Ibid., 291.
65 Ibid.
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