Soviet Union
Political Affairs

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Komsomol Central Committee Discusses Organizational Questions
90US1030A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: “In the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau”]

[Text] The VLKSM Central Committee Bureau reviewed the question “On the Creation of a VLKSM Central Committee and USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor] Youth Institute and Youth Scientific Research Center.” Their formation has been brought about by the necessity of the effective scientific and personnel support for the elaboration and realization of a youth policy in accordance with the decisions of the VLKSM 21st Congress.

A proposal was supported regarding the creation beginning 10 June 1990 of a Youth Institute as a USSR higher educational institution of the first category and which would be a juristic person. The Youth Institute is a public-state educational, scientific, production complex which operates on the basis of property contributions by the VLKSM and the USSR Goskomtrud, a provisional regulation regarding higher educational institutions and its own statutes.

G.S. Golovachev has been confirmed as rector of the institute. At the recommendation of the rector, I.M. Ilyinskiy has been confirmed as director of the Youth Institute’s NITs [Scientific Research Center].

The VLKSM Central Committee Bureau simultaneously approved a decision regarding the elimination as of 20 August 1990 of the VKSh [Higher Komsomol School] and the VKSh’s Scientific Research Center attached to the VLKSM Central Committee.

The VLKSM Central Committee Bureau discussed proposals from a number of Western European partner youth organizations regarding health care for children from areas which suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The VLKSM Central Committee is ready to allocate for these purposes R 1.0 million to be directed towards the treatment of one thousand individuals.

The question “On the Draft Statute Regarding Permanent VLKSM Central Committee Commissions and Soviets” was examined; commissions and soviets are being created for the purposes of the development of democratization in the activities of the VLKSM and execution of the functions defined by the komsomol’s 21st Congress.

The basic tasks and powers of the permanent commissions and soviets, the principles of their formation and model regulations of their work were defined.

The VLKSM Central Committee Bureau discussed the question “On the Reorganization of the VLKSM Central Committee Apparatus.” In accordance with the decisions of the 1st VLKSM Central Committee Plenum proposals on the new structure and staffing of the VLKSM Central Committee apparatus were prepared. A significant reduction in the number of ranking officials is planned.

A continuation of the review of this question is planned for sessions of the VLKSM Central Committee permanent commissions and soviets and will be submitted at the 2d VLKSM Central Committee Plenum.

The decision was made to rename the NECHERNOZEMYE magazine as the YOUTH OF RUSSIA.

The VLKSM Central Committee Bureau identified the questions submitted for review by the plenums and the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau as well as the main measures for the June-December 1990 period.
Armenian KGB Chief Responds to Criticism
90UN2118A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
19 May 90 p 3


[Text] Many arrows have recently been loosed at the organs of state security, and much criticism expressed. In this connection, I would like to share with readers some basic directions of our work under the complex and tense circumstances prevailing in our republic.

First of all, it must be honestly admitted that this criticism is partially justified and valid. We attribute it to the general restructuring processes under way in both the republic and, naturally, in our committee. It is, so to speak, growing pains, the struggle with existing stereotypes, persistent concepts and habits. Yet most of the criticism is simply unwarranted, since it is partially based on lack of information, on an ignorance of the concrete tasks of the Committee for State Security, and sometimes on malicious faultfinding. Evaluating this situation self-critically, I should also like to note that there is still inadequate glasnost in our work, we have little communication with work collectives and people. This also is a cause for the not always justified curtain of secrecy, which allows dishonest persons who wish us evil to speculate on people’s ignorance, to ascribe to the KGB the most improbable actions, including provocation of interethnic conflicts, antisocial phenomena, taking an “anti-Armenian” line, etc.

Speaking of the basic tasks and directions of work of the Committee for State Security, I would like to stress that the Chekists direct the bulk of their efforts inwards, and defend the security of the republic and the nation against hostile actions of enemy special services. This is activity in the area of intelligence, counter-intelligence, protection of the State border and of state and military secrets, protection of communications lines and so forth. It is a huge volume of work in the interests of both our republic and the entire Soviet Union.

Various conjectures are spread about concerning huge expenditures for the maintenance and activities of the organs of state security. Allow me to cite the convincing words of member of the USSR President’s Council, Chairman of the KGB V. A. Kryuchkov in a meeting with people’s deputies: “Compared with other organizations, it can be said that the KGB is the most profitable organization in the USSR.” These are not just words. Through its activities of intelligence and the struggle against contraband, hard currency operations and organized crime, the KGB not only recovers the state’s expenditures for itself, but also yields a sizable profit. I can say with full certainty that the multinational personnel of Armenian Chekists also make a worthwhile contribution.

In accordance with new laws, the republic KGB must also combat violent actions to change the Soviet constitutional system, meaning those organizations and persons advocating and undertaking practical steps towards the violent—I underscore, violent—alteration of the Soviet system.

Chekists perform considerable work in ensuring the security of transport and the most important industrial and power facilities, especially in defending them from sabotage and preventing hijackings.

In the last two years, our efforts to combat organized crime, racketeering and banditry have grown considerably. Certain positive results have also been achieved in this sphere.

Even a brief list of these tasks leaves no doubt that the Committee for State Security defends the vital interests of the Armenian people and our entire Soviet Union. And I firmly reject the statements of “experts” on problems of state security who accuse us of betraying the interests of the Armenian people. Incidentally, we do not claim to evaluate the situation in areas outside of our competence. I think that specialists from other fields of knowledge and activity should also be more modest and refrain from recommendations on questions with which they are not fully familiar. This will appear more constructive and ethical.

Speaking of the growth of crime in the republic, an idea of the scale it has attained recently can be gathered from the fact that criminal elements possess a huge quantity of arms, explosives and ammunition. Crimes are committed each day using weapons; readers are aware of many of them.

Various allusions to the necessity for armed groups for “self-defense” are fully unfounded and will collapse in the face of current processes and events. The following example is convincing proof of this.

From January of this year until the present, 9 persons have been killed and 59 wounded (including 5 soldiers) in the border areas with Azerbaijan as a result of 102 interethnic clashes. In addition, as of May 15 there were 73 crimes committed using firearms and 27 explosions, again since January.

As a result, 28 persons were killed and 75 wounded. These figures speak for themselves; let the reader draw the conclusions.

Taking of hostages has increased, as well as threats against military personnel and members of their family, including members of the republic KGB.

As a result of the complete absence of punishment, the actions of certain criminals are becoming increasingly daring, blatant and open. The directors of armed groups recently created a so-called “military tribunal,” meant to pass sentence on criminals committing unsanctioned or hooligan-like actions. We can already confidently predict
the explosions of violence that will occur during and after the time when the verdicts of this “tribunal” are carried out.

Along with the sharp growth in crime, the republic is seeing increasing confrontations between various armed groups; this internecine warfare also leads to armed clashes and human casualties.

In these conditions, the Committee for State Security maintains a principled position: a stolen and illegally obtained weapon must be voluntarily surrendered; otherwise, it will be confiscated in accordance with the laws in effect. I am confident that this position fully accords with the interests of the Armenian people and is supported by the majority of the public. I would like to stress that I am not referring to repression of members of informal organizations, but prevention of criminal actions in strict accordance with the law.

Today, all kinds of criminal acts using weapons are justified by words on the need for self-defense. But how can we explain the armed attack on the Yerevan party city committee and the central committee of the republic's Komsomol? No epithets can be used as justification in this case.

How, for example, can the actions be justified of four arrested participants in a robbery attack on border guards? The republic's KGB records reveal that around 30 bandits armed with automatic weapons and pistols have attacked Chekists during the investigations. And a few days ago the brother of one of those arrested shot a young woman with a pistol. A sensible question arises to those defending these people: what are these armed people protecting themselves from in Yerevan with such a quantity of weapons?

And the recent armed confrontation between two battling bandit groups in the Artashatsk rayon, resulting in the deaths of innocent people? Maybe in that case as well someone will assert that the huge quantity of arms in the Artashatsk rayon is intended to defend the Armenian people?

Or another example of the attitudes of individual fighters towards their countrymen. On May 11, four strangers drove up to the home of refugees in a village of the Krasnoselsk rayon in a UAZ car with a sign “Ayastan.” They introduced themselves as “fida’ins” and demanded that the refugees return to the neighboring republic. During the argument a grenade was tossed into the house, causing material damage. Fortunately, nobody was injured.

Information available to the Committee for State Security enables us to correctly evaluate the actions of persons who from good and patriotic motivations this winter defended the population in the regions bordering on Azerbaijan. But it is impossible to justify past and continuing lawlessness (including the seizure of weapons). The blame here lies above all on the republic's Party, soviet and law enforcement organs.

The situation currently is that the units of the internal armed forces and the Soviet Army stationed in the regions bordering the neighboring republic can fully ensure people's safety; the presence there of armed groups merely inflames the situation. Many cases are known of fighters opening fire first on population centers of the neighboring republic, thus provoking new clashes. Figuratively speaking, can the teakettle be kept boiling like this, and is it to someone's advantage?

We now know for certain that most residents of the border zones are tired of the constant fear and tension. They want to peacefully till the soil, though many fear to say so openly. Think of it: we have gotten to the point where people are afraid to say that they want peace!

We are also well aware of groups and organizations which use weapons for threats and blackmail in solving their own dubious political goals and tasks.

In any case, the evaluations and decisions on such matters must be undertaken by law enforcement organs, by people who are competent in legal questions. Each person must do his job, in just the same way that the Committee for State Security is not justified in interfering, for example, in questions of education or esthetic upbringing.

The mass media and journalists must play a very active role in the republic's work to clean up the situation. Much depends on the printed word in the present complex, explosive environment. The public of various countries, as well as foreign correspondents and diplomats in Moscow, often judge the situation in the republic, region and country from our newspapers and magazines. Sometimes a small, apparently insignificant remark shapes the reputation of the Armenian people, the concept of its honor and dignity.

In this regard, I would like to ask certain of our journalists not to glorify terror and violence in either the past or the present, not to create new worries for us, but to participate through their living, true and considered writing in solving the very complex problems facing the republic.

History cannot be forgotten. But we shall never recover from the wounds inflicted on us if we constantly search for guilty persons behind someone else's fence and point to the lessons of history. In this regard I should cite as an example the words of Samvel Geborkyan in the newspaper GAYK of May 13, 1990, regarding the Artashatsk events: "And instead of turning to our own conscience, we gaze with eyes clouded by hate at all those surrounding us, we painfully search for the guilty parties on long-overgrown crossroads of history. We try to blame the Romans, Byzantines, Persians, Turks, Russians—anyone but ourselves."

Beautiful words. And I would subscribe to them without a second thought, although the article overall contains controversial sections and dubious evaluations with which I cannot agree.
With regard to recent discussions at the session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on the question of creating a new organ in the republic, a Council of Defense or Council of National Security, and the criticisms of some deputies regarding the KGB organs' subordination to Moscow, I would like to stress the following: as in the past, the new USSR Law “On Delimitation of the Competencies Between the USSR and Federation Subjects,” management of USSR state security is exclusively assigned to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In accordance with the decision of the USSR's highest lawmaking body, state security, like national defense, is the common concern of all the republics, of the entire Union, and cannot be distributed among national apartments.

As regards the republic's complete independence and sovereignty, here again we must start from realities. Soviet Armenia is presently an inseparable part of the USSR, and thus all aspects of its social-political and spiritual life are inseparably linked with the profound processes under way throughout the country.

In addition, the development of our federation has resulted in extensive integration of the union republics, the comprehensive strengthening of the bonds of their economies and social infrastructure. If a large enterprise in one corner of the country goes into a skid, a related enterprise in a distant oblast or rayon suffers. I am not going to evaluate this situation here, but I will say that imperfections in our economic mechanism have been particularly felt in our republic in connection with the unprecedented blockade of Armenia. I see the path to resolving the problems in the perfection of the economic mechanism, the gradual development of the republic's economic independence and political sovereignty, and a fundamental renewal of the Soviet federation.

Unfortunately, some hotheads understand by sovereignty and independence the necessity for immediate secession from the USSR. The unreasonable nature of such a suicidal step is obvious today, not only to us but to all political parties and public organizations of the diaspora. None of the “hotheads” has accused these latter of betraying the interests of the Armenian people.

Each person can interpret the people's interests in his own way. But this does not justify branding as “traitors of the nation” people who honestly perform their duty in accordance with the law. Such irresponsible statements are very reminiscent of the dark period of repressions, justified by the struggle against “enemies of the people.” Manipulations by such expressions in no way reflect the true situation, but are merely aimed at blackening the officials bravely opposing individual actions of the leaders of informal movements. Many of them, by the way, love to talk about democracy but consider it unacceptable for anyone to dare to deviate from the line they espouse. In such cases, labels are used such as “traitors of the people,” “lackeys of Moscow,” and others.

These tactics are far from the truly democratic methods of struggle.

In conclusion, I wish to note that our basic political line is to attain a stable peace in the region and to give people the chance to live and work in peace, in order to lead the republic out of economic chaos and moral crisis.

We do not and cannot retreat from this policy. And we shall not accommodate those who urge the people to armed conflicts, who constantly keep the republic in a tense state, thus pursuing their own ambitious goals.

I am sure that the majority will agree with me, that the tasks of the organs of state security and, above all, the need to put an end to the orgy of violence, irresponsibility and lawlessness, fully meet the interests of the Armenian people, who have endured so much pain and suffering in their time.

Azerbaijani Party, Informal Groups Hold Conference on Current Problems

90US1039A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHII in Russian 17 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A. F. Dashdamirov by S. Abdullayeva: “Azerbaijan: Dialogue or Confrontation?: Conversation Between Our Correspondent and A. F. Dashdamirov, Secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee”]

[Text] [S. Abdullayeva] Afrand Fridunovich, in the central press, as well as in a number of foreign publications, there has been mention of a conference on scientific theory that was held in Moscow, at the Azerbaijani permanent representation. Participants in that conference, “The Sociopolitical Crisis in Azerbaijan and the Paths Out of It,” included representatives of various public movements and political organizations that currently exist in the republic—the Communist Party, the People's Front, the Social Democrats, the Party of National Consent, the Greens movement, etc. You also took part in that conference. The universal interest that people have shown in that meeting is completely understandable. The Azerbaijani public is waiting for an answer to the questions, “What will we have tomorrow—civil peace or civil war? Is there a way out of the political crisis?” Do you think that the conference succeeded in answering those questions?

[A. Dashdamirov] It would be a great simplification to give a single blanket answer to questions like that. There are no ready answers to them. We must be able to approach those answers by way of the most thorough work of the mind and heart, by way of the analysis and interpretation of the real-life situations. The interest in the conference at the permanent representation and the attention paid to it, which we can see demonstrated in the republic, actually are completely understandable and natural. Because we are talking about nothing more or less than the prospects for our political development, the stability of the situation in the republic, and, consequently, in the final analysis, the welfare and tranquility of every family and every person living in Azerbaijan. Incidentally, this is not the only important factor. Many people (for good reason) link their hopes for civil peace
and national consent with the establishment of a constructive dialogue between the leadership of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee and the NFA [Azerbaijani People's Front] and other political organizations and movements, with cooperation among them. And this is actually necessary.

The future will show the extent to which the conference promoted the establishment of that cooperation. In any case, the reports, communiques, and statements that were heard at that conference contained a large number of interesting ideas, views, and worthwhile suggestions.

Obviously, a scientific conference is not the place for political negotiations. Moreover, no such goal was set. The most important thing is that, for the first time after the January events, people of various occupations, views, and convictions, including several party workers, gathered in order, by working together, to discuss and interpret the causes and scope of the tragedy and the ways to pull the republic out of the critical situation that was created. The meeting demonstrated that, after the moral shock that the Azerbaijani nation withstood in January, we have regained our voice and the ability to reason, to discuss, and to listen to one another. Another very important factor is the fact that the conference participants were able to make our pain and our problems known to the Muscovites, or at least to a segment of the Moscow scientific public.

For me, as a conference participant, a circumstance that was especially interesting was the fact that the participants represented a broad palette of points of view and evaluations that reflect the positions and opinions of various groups of our public. Obviously, there were many opinions on one and the same question. That is democratic, and that is why so much is being said about pluralism. But not all of them can simultaneously express the truth. As a rule, there are never two truths with regard to a single question. Consequently, one person is more right, and another is less right. One person is closer to the truth, and another is seriously in error. There were honest attempts to analyze the situation that had developed and there were also naive statements. Incidentally, unscrupulous judgments were also expressed. So the measure of the rightness and the measure of the error of a particular conference participant, if they are added up, provide useful information concerning the state of public opinion and concerning our people's moods.

[S. Abdullayeva] The broad range of the points of view at the conference actually reflects the diversity of the opinions that currently exist in the republic. Today, for example, there are heated debates in progress concerning the questions of why the tragedy occurred and who is to blame for what happened. Attempts are being made to determine the measure of responsibility for the January events that is borne by the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee, the People's Front, and other informal organizations. There was also a discussion concerning this at the conference...

[A. Dashdamirov] Yes, but I would like to warn that, in evaluating such complicated and contradictory events, one should not allow oneself to be one-sided. Any attempt to reduce everything to a single cause, to explain what happened as being the fault of a single individual or a single agency, will only lead to delusion whether or not one wishes to. And the simpler the explanation that is proposed, the farther it will be from the truth.

The Azerbaijani CP Central Committee showed itself to be a model of the honest, well-principled analysis of its own mistakes and shortcomings. It recognized them at the plenum that was held in March. At that plenum it was openly stated that many facts that exerted a serious influence upon the negative development of events had not been evaluated promptly, and that the Central Committee and its Bureau had been unable to make the demands being advanced by life the basis of a realistic policy. The Central Committee leadership had failed to demonstrate its readiness to assume the responsibility for the making of independent decisions with regard to the "Karabakh problem." It was admitted that the party committees ignored for too long the need for a dialogue with the Azerbaijani People's Front. Sharp criticism was leveled at the activity of the republic's party, soviet, economic, and law-enforcement agencies, the shortcomings in which activity hindered the prevention of the political crisis and the prevention of the destabilization of Azerbaijan's economy. Steps were taken to reinforce a number of them with new cadres. That is mentioned in detail in the published resolution of the Bureau of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee, entitled "Serious Shortcomings in the Activity of the Republic's Party, Soviet, Economic, and Law-Enforcement Agencies That Led to the Political Crisis and the Destabilization of Azerbaijan's Economy."

But we do not know anything to indicate that the same kind of well-principled and self-critical analysis of its own activity was made by the People's Front, or by its splinter groups or local branches. Possibly attempts were actually made, at some meetings within the organization, to interpret their own actions critically, but no publicity was given to this. Please understand me correctly: we are not attempting to shift our share of the responsibility onto the shoulders of others, but justice requires everyone to evaluate critically his own practical activity. Without that manifestation of political sincerity and maturity on the part of the NFA, it is difficult to count on any constructive dialogue.

The Communist Party cannot bear the one-sided responsibility for confrontation with other public movements, for the disparity that they show between word and deed, or for the manifestations of irresponsibility and extremism on the part of individual representatives of those movements and organizations. Last year's events convince us that the endless accusations leveled at the Communist Party, the inflation of our mistakes and shortcomings, and the failure to mention their own errors and omissions not only hamper the dialogue, but also, in general, divert one's attention from the chief questions—what kind of future we want to see for our
nation, how to achieve real sovereignty, how to defend the republic's integrity and dignity, and how to revive the humanitarian traditions of the Azerbaijani nation.

[S. Abdullayeva] Nevertheless, as the conference has shown, are dialogue and the steps taken by both sides to meet one another halfway possible, or is the only possibility political confrontation, which, as has been attested to by experience, threatens us with many misfortunes?

[A. Dashdamirov] The contacts, meetings, and interaction are not only possible, but are absolutely necessary, and the leadership of the KPA [Azerbaijani Communist Party] Central Committee has repeatedly demonstrated that readiness. As far as the conference is concerned, the representatives of various movements and organizations who participated in its work unanimously stated that they were in favor of regular contacts and dialogue. This coincidence of approaches is undoubtedly an extremely positive phenomenon. But, as life demonstrates, simply wanting something is not enough. It is necessary for all of us—and at all levels—to learn how to work together to find a meaningful basis for cooperation.

Proceeding from this assumption, during our discussions I made a number of suggestions about areas in which we could work together. Essentially speaking, they consist in taking specific, real-life, vitally important questions and defining the share of one's participation in deciding them, by coordinating the joint actions.

For example, the state of emergency in Baku. What must be done to lift it? Because the simple act of repealing the state of emergency in a situation that developed in real life will not do anything automatically to change or improve anything. Currently we have been speaking a lot about the consolidation of healthy forces. But that does not occur in a vacuum. Consolidation is possible around common values, on the basis of joint actions, the necessity of which is obvious to everyone and is not subject to doubt. It is necessary for every administrative agency, every sociopolitical formation, and every public organization to define its measure of responsibility for public order and its share of participation in the process of normalizing the situation. Obviously, these questions must be discussed. It is necessary to work jointly to develop approaches in common, but, most important, to act constructively.

Or another point for the application of common efforts. A component part of the normalization process is the stabilization of people's migration, the cessation of the unfounded departure of Russians and the Russian-speaking population from Baku and other rayons in our republic. The Azerbaijani CP Central Committee expressed its position with regard to this question in a resolution enacted jointly with the republic's Council of Ministers. We are doing quite a bit to stop the departure of the Russian-speaking population. But these actions by no means exhaust our possibilities. Much can also be done by the public organizations and movements existing in the republic. They also must define their share of the labor and efforts so that we can guarantee peace and normal psychological conditions for the life of people of various nationalities.

The most acute and most urgent nationwide problem and task is the improvement of the situation in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], the overcoming of interethnic conflicts. In recent months the republic leadership, the Republic Organizing Committee for NKAO, party, soviet, and economic agencies, and a number of public organizations have been doing a lot to resolve this task. But no one should remain aloof from participating in it, and that includes the NFA. The conviction exists at Azerbaijani CP Central Committee that this problem requires the broadest and most regular consultations and the active participation of the public, primarily the scientific public. We are seeking the optimal forms for conducting public consultations dealing with problems of normalizing the situation in NKAO and we are counting on their effectiveness.

Exactly the same situation pertains to questions of the economic, ideological, and spiritual spheres, and to problems of the democratization of political life. Dialogue is possible if there are a meaningful foundation and specific recommendations, if there is a desire to find points of contact. From now on, unlike the situation in the past, the discussion can and must be of this kind—constructive dialogue, joint work, and creative efforts to deal with those problems whose resolution is necessary for our nation. That, in brief, is the essence of the basic views and suggestions that I expressed at the conference.

At the same time it must be noted that apparently a few people failed to carry out the necessary restructuring of their way of thinking. One sometimes observes attempts to occupy a position that is purely a carping one, that makes claims, that points out, that demands. But by no means a position that strives for cooperation or for making one's own contribution to the common job. That should not be. If played in that key, no dialogue will result. Because that kind of dialogue is not constructive. It is necessary to learn lessons from the past. Acting only with the use of methods that exert forceful pressure on the party and soviet agencies, forcing them to move ahead practically under the threat of physical reprisal for their actions, and sometimes offering them to the nation as their conquests, as the result of a demonstration of force, is not democracy, is not renewal. All this has already happened, and everyone knows what it led to. In the final analysis, it is the road of people carrying out a putsch. Incidentally, this was also mentioned by the conference participants themselves. It seems to me that it is necessary to dissociate oneself from political extremes, from methods of violence and threats. This is in the interests of the movement itself, in the interest of deepening the democratic processes. Moreover, it is in our common interests to create those conditions and those guarantees that will assure that in the future any violence, regardless of who it proceeds from—whether
"from the top" or "from the bottom"—will come up against the solid road block of real, viable democratic institutions.

[S. Abdullayeva] It seems to me that you have come right up to such a concept as political responsibility...

[A. Dashdamirov] Incidentally, one of the reports given at the conference was devoted specifically to the problem of the political responsibility of public figures. So I think that the events that occurred in our republic indicated quite obviously that, if there are inflated political claims and a lack of political responsibility for every public step that a person takes, something terrible can happen. We are at a very complicated stage in our development, when tremendous, powerful popular forces are breaking out to the surface in order to enrich history by their creation. But they cannot turn out to be an uncontrollable destructive force. When the nation is disturbed by the Karabakh events, when it is dissatisfied with the situation in the republic, it can easily be led out onto the streets, but it is much more complicated to control that mass of humanity, to prevent the outbursting of energy from turning into a force that crushes absolutely everything. This requires a tremendous amount of political skill, the ability at any moment, even the most critical one, not to lose contact with the nation, the ability not to allow the uncontrollable forces to absorb themselves. It requires the ability to see clearly the consequences of one's actions and the boldness to admit one's own mistakes publicly. It seems to me that all these components make up the concept of political responsibility, without which there can be no normal, democratic political life.

There is yet another aspect that is important. It is currently fashionable to criticize the Communist Party, to accuse it of all the misfortunes, and to reduce its complicated and heroic history simply to the tragic events. There is much that is true and just in this criticism. But one must also not fail to note the phenomenon when there one observes the substitution or shifting of the responsibility borne by those political leaders who turned society from the path of socialist construction to the present-day generation of the party of Communists, a party which itself suffered in the process of those deformations. In exactly the same way we observe the substitution of the responsibility borne by overzealous party functionaries by the responsibility borne by hundreds of thousands of honest and rank-and-file Communists. There are figures who are speculating on this, who do not want to understand what a dangerous and dishonest game this is.

[S. Abdullayeva] But doesn't it seem to you that this same approach is also used frequently when evaluating the activities of the People's Front?

[A. Dashdamirov] I agree. It is inadmissible to apply wholesale evaluations to such a mass movement. It is necessary to differentiate clearly between the healthy forces existing in the People's Front and the frankly destructive, extremist elements that discredit the democratic movement. But at the same time they coexist under the same roof. True, new political groups are forming as offshoots of the NFA, and other movements are springing up, but as yet there has been no political-ideological demarcation.

Let us not forget that we are all children of the same time, the product and offspring of the same political system. Everyone together but each in his own way, we carry the load of the heritage from the past, and together we must find the ways and means to revive and develop the nation. National and state sovereignty, the freedom and independence of the nation, and the republic's economic prosperity and spiritual flourishing—these concepts that are familiar to everyone must be given real, vital content, and must be made a reality. This is a tremendous job that requires the mobilization of everyone's efforts and all our forces and means.

As vitally as he needs bread, man needs constructive ideas, a clear vision of his goal, an assurance about his future. This, properly speaking, is the origin of the most disturbing question: what kind of society do we want to see our society become? What must our republic and our nation become after they have passed through the crucible of perestroika and democratization? Naturally, we do not feel that we have at our disposal the answers to all the questions. Like the rest of the country, our republic is only at the very beginning of the path. Much will have to be thought out carefully and discussed many times as we attempt to combine together into a single complex the general historical, global problems of the socialist path of development with the historical and national peculiarities and the traditions of the Azerbaijan nation, and with its fundamental interests and needs, putting them at the center of all our searches and conceptions. We must concentrate in this large-scale task the intellectual efforts of our scientific and ideological cadres, the public, and all kinds of movements, as well as the fundamental and applied research in various areas of social science, and broad democratic discussions.

What I have said can be viewed also as an invitation to continue the discussion that was begun in Moscow, an invitation extended to all thinking people who cherish our republic's historic fates.

Azerbaijan Passes Law On Changes, Additions To Constitution

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[Changes and additions to Azerbaijan SSR constitution]

[Text] For purposes of the development of socialist democracy, self-rule of the people, improvement of the structure and activities of the soviets of people's deputies and the organs of justice and based on the interests of assuring the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR, its territorial integrity, the effective implementation in the republic of political and economic transformations,
strengthening the constitutional system, the defense of rights and freedoms of the citizens, an improvement in cooperation between the highest organs of state power and rule of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. Introduce the following changes and additions to the constitution (basic law) of the Azerbaijan SSR:

   1. Articles 6, 7 of Chapter I, Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 of Chapter 2, Article 49 of Chapter 6 will read as follows:

   "Article 6. The Azerbaijan Communist Party, other political parties as well as labor union, youth, other public organizations and mass movements participate in the elaboration of state policy and in the management of state and public affairs through their representatives elected in the soviets of people's deputies as well as other ways.

   Article 7. All political parties, other public organizations and mass movements, in carrying out functions stipulated by their programs and statutes, operate within the framework of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR.

   The creation and activities of parties, organizations and movements whose goal is the forcible change of the constitutional order and integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR, the undermining of its security, and the arousal of social, nationalistic and religious discord will not be allowed."

   "Article 10. The economic system of the Azerbaijan SSR develops on the basis of ownership by its citizens and collective and state ownership.

   The Azerbaijan SSR will create the conditions necessary for the development of a variety of forms of ownership and will ensure their equal protection.

   The land, its mineral wealth, waters, the coastal shelf of the Caspian Sea, plant and animal life and other natural resources are its national treasure, the inalienable property of the people of the Azerbaijan SSR and constitute state property of the Azerbaijan SSR and are provided by the Azerbaijan SSR soviets of people's deputies for use by its citizens, enterprises and organizations.

   The people of the Azerbaijan SSR, as represented by the highest organs of state power and rule of the Azerbaijan SSR, have the inalienable right to dispose of the republic's natural resources and its potential in the industrial and social spheres.

   The procedure for ownership, use and disposal of natural resources of the Azerbaijan SSR, its potential in the industrial and social spheres is established by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

   Article 11. The property of a citizen of the Azerbaijan SSR is his personal property and is used for the satisfaction of material and spiritual needs as well as the independent conduct of economic and other activities not forbidden by law.

   A citizen's property may include any consumer goods or property for purposes of production acquired through earned income and other legal means with the exception of those types of property whose acquisition and ownership are not permitted.

   For the operation of peasant and individual auxiliary farms and other purposes stipulated by law, citizens have the right to life-long, inheritable ownership and usage of land plots.

   The right to pass on to heirs and to inherit a citizen's property is recognized and protected by law.

   Article 12. Collective property is ownership by lease-system enterprises, collective enterprises, cooperatives, joint-stock companies, economic organizations and other associations.

   Collective ownership is created through the voluntary unification of the property of citizens and organizations and also through the transformation of the forms of state ownership stipulated by law.

   Article 13. Property of the Azerbaijan SSR including property of the Nakhichevan ASSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the property of the administrative-territorial entities (communal property) is state property of the Azerbaijan SSR.

   Within the framework of the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR, property held jointly by the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR, union republics, foreign states, their juristic persons and citizens, and international organizations can be located within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR."

   "Article 49. Citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR have the right to form political parties, other public organizations and mass movements which promote the development of political activism and volunteer work, and the satisfaction of their varied interests.

   Public organizations are guaranteed the necessary conditions for the successful completion of the tasks stipulated in their statutes."

2. Articles 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76 of Chapter 7 will read as follows:

   "Article 68. The Azerbaijan SSR is a sovereign socialist state. For the purposes of ensuring successful social-economic development, the external security and freedom of national development, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as a result of free self-determination of its people, on the basis of voluntariness and equality, having signed the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, together with the Soviet Socialist Republics of the:

   Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
   Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
   Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
   Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic,
united to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - a unified, multinational state.

The sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR is expressed in the independent exercise by the Azerbaijan SSR over its entire territory of the highest legislative, executive and judicial authority in the interests of all the people of the republic.

The Azerbaijan SSR independently resolves all questions associated with political, economic and social-cultural construction in the republic, its national-state and administrative-territorial structure. Any interference in the resolution of issues, which are the inalienable right of the Azerbaijan SSR, is unacceptable and must be considered a violation of its sovereign rights.

The competency of the Azerbaijan SSR is limited only on issues which are voluntarily delegated by the Azerbaijan SSR to the USSR.

The constitutional-legal status of the Azerbaijan SSR cannot be changed without the approval of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Relations between the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR are built on a contractual basis, proceeding from the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR and the sovereignty of the USSR.

Relations between the Azerbaijan SSR with the union republics are built on principles of equality, collaboration, mutual respect of sovereign rights and the non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 69. The Azerbaijan SSR retains the right to freely leave the USSR. This right is to be carried out through a vote by the people (referendum) among the entire population of the republic, held through a decision of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The decision to hold a referendum is made by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet at its own initiative or by a written demand signed by one-tenth of the citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR who permanently reside in the republic and who have the right to vote according to legislation of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 70. The sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR applies to all the territory in the republic including the Nakhichevan ASSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast which are an integral and inalienable part of the Azerbaijan SSR.

The territory of the Azerbaijan SSR is inviolable and cannot be changed without its consent expressed by a vote of the people (referendum) among its entire population held by a decision of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The borders of the Azerbaijan SSR with other union republics can be changed only by mutual consent of the corresponding republics.

Any appeals and actions directed at the forcible violation of the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR are inadmissible and are punishable by law.

Article 71. The Azerbaijan SSR participates in the resolution of issues pertaining to governing the USSR at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, in the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the Council of the Federation, in the government of the USSR and other organs of the USSR.

The Azerbaijan SSR implements measures to ensure the economic independence of the republic, guarantees the economic, social and cultural development in its territory, and monitors the activities of all enterprises, institutions and organizations located in its territory.

Article 72. The following areas are subject to the authority of the Azerbaijan SSR and its highest organs of state power and rule:

1. Ratification of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the introduction of changes;
2. Monitoring adherence to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and laws of the Azerbaijan SSR and ensuring the adherence of the constitution and laws of the Nakhichevan ASSR to the constitution and laws of the Azerbaijan SSR;
3. Formation of autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts as part of the composition of the Azerbaijan SSR and their dissolution, the resolution of other issues of the national-state structure of the Azerbaijan SSR;
4. Legislation of the Azerbaijan SSR;
5. Defense of the republic's sovereignty, state order, rights and freedoms of its citizens;
6. Establishment of the procedure for the organization and operation of higher and local organs of state power and rule;
7. Pursuit of a unified social-economic policy, the management of the economy of the Azerbaijan SSR; ensuring scientific-technical progress; the implementation of measures on the rational use and the preservation of natural resources;
8. Elaboration and ratification of promising state plans and programs for the economic and social development of the Azerbaijan SSR, the state budget of the Azerbaijan SSR and the approval of reports on their implementation; supervision of the implementation of the state budget of the Nakhichevan ASSR, the budgets of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, rayons and cities of republic subordination;

9. Establishment of control over the activities of financial-credit institutions, republic income allocated to the state budget of the Azerbaijan SSR and the state budget of the USSR;

10. Supervision of industries of the republic's economy, supervision of housing and communal housing affairs, commerce and public catering, domestic services to the population, housing construction and the organization of public services and amenities in cities and other populated areas, highway construction and transportation in the Azerbaijan SSR;

11. Establishment of procedures for the possession, utilization and disposal of all natural resources of the Azerbaijan SSR, its potential in the production and social spheres; the implementation of ecological policy;

12. Supervision of public education, cultural and scientific organizations and institutions of the Azerbaijan SSR, health care, physical culture and sport, social welfare, the defense of monuments of history, culture and nature;

13. Supervision of the organs of internal affairs and state security;

14. Creation of a constitutional oversight committee;

15. Granting amnesty and pardons to citizens convicted by the courts of the Azerbaijan SSR;

16. Supervision of political, economic, scientific and cultural contacts with foreign countries;

17. Representation of the republic in international affairs;

18. Resolution of other issues of republic significance.

"Article 73. The state language of the Azerbaijan SSR is the Azerbaijani language.

The Azerbaijan SSR ensures the use of the Azerbaijani language in state and public organs, cultural, educational and other institutions and demonstrates the state’s concern for its utmost development.

The Azerbaijan SSR ensures the free use and development of the Russian language and other languages used by the population."

"Article 75. The laws of the Azerbaijan SSR operate on the entire territory of the Azerbaijan SSR. The laws of the USSR which do not exceed the authority of the USSR and which do not violate the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR operate on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR."

"Article 76. The sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR are protected by the Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR."

3. Chapter 10 will read as follows:

"Chapter 10

System and Principles of the Operation of the Soviets of People's Deputies

Article 85. The Soviets of people's deputies - Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet, local Soviets of people's deputies - Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, rayon, city, rayon Soviets in cities, village and rural Soviets of people's deputies comprise a unified system of representative organs of state power of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 86. The term of office for the Azerbaijan SSR Soviets of people's deputies is five years.

Elections of people's deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR and Nakhichevan ASSR, local Soviets of people's deputies are called not later than three months before the expiration of their term of office.

The term and procedure for calling elections of people's deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR and Nakhichevan ASSR and local Soviets of people's deputies are determined by corresponding laws of the Azerbaijan SSR and Nakhichevan ASSR.

Article 87. The most important issues of republican and local significance are decided accordingly at sessions of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet and local Soviets of people's deputies or are submitted by them to referendums.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet and local Soviets of people's deputies are elected directly by the voters.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet elects the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet elects the Chairman of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet, local Soviets of people's deputies elect the chairmen of the Soviets.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet and local Soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of city (cities of rayon subordination), village and rural Soviets, form their own presidiums.

The Soviets of people's deputies form permanent commissions, create executive, administrative as well as other organs subordinate to them.

Officials elected or appointed by the Soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of judges, cannot occupy their positions for more than two terms consecutively.
Any official must be removed from his positive before the end of his term in case of failure to fulfill his duties in a satisfactory manner.

Article 88. Soviets of people's deputies form organs of people's control, which combine state control with public control of workers from enterprises, institutions and organizations.

The organs of people's control monitor adherence to the requirements of legislation, state programs and assignments; lead the fight against violations of state discipline, manifestations of local interests taking precedence, an overly departmental approach to business associated with mismanagement and wasteful expenditures, red tape and bureaucratism; coordinate the work of other organs of control; promote the improvement of the structure and work of the state apparatus.

Article 89. The Soviets of people's deputies, both directly and through the organs which they create, supervise in their territory all branches of state, economic and social-cultural construction, make decisions, ensure their implementation, and monitor the process of implementing their decisions.

Article 90. The activities of the Soviets of people's deputies are based on the collective, free, business-like discussion and resolution of issues, glasnost, regular reports of the executive and administrative organs, and other organs created by the Soviets to them and the population, an extensive recruitment of citizens for participation in their work.

The Soviets of people's deputies and the organs created by them take into account public opinion, submit the most important issues of republic and local significance to the citizens for discussion, systematically inform the citizens about their work and decisions which have been reached.

4. Chapter 13 should read as follows:

"Chapter 13
Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet

Article 104. The highest organ of state power of the Azerbaijan SSR is the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet has the authority to review and resolve any issue except for issues which have been delegated by the republic to the USSR for resolution.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet has exclusive authority over the following:

1. Ratification of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution, introduction of changes;

2. Formation of autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR as well as their dissolution, the resolution of other questions regarding the national-state structure of the Azerbaijan SSR.

3. Determination of procedures regarding questions of the administrative-territorial structure of the Azerbaijan SSR; the establishment and changing of borders and rayon divisions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast; the formation and dissolution of rayons, cities, rayons in cities and villages; the establishment of the subordination status of cities; the naming and renaming of rayons, cities and rayons in cities, villages and other populated areas;

4. Approval of rayon divisions, formation of cities, changing the subordination status of cities, naming and renaming rayons, cities and also renaming other populated areas of the Nakhichevan ASSR.

5. Review of questions regarding a change in the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR with other union republics; regarding a change in the state borders of the USSR in cases which entail a change in the Azerbaijan SSR territory.

6. Participation in the determination of the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, the formation of the fundamental directions of internal and external political activities of the Azerbaijan SSR.

7. Election of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

8. Election of deputy chairmen of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

9. Appointment of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijan SSR;

10. Approval of the membership of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, the institution of changes in that body; the formation and dissolution of Azerbaijan SSR ministries and Azerbaijan SSR state committees at the suggestion of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers;

11. Election of the Azerbaijan SSR Committee of People's Control;

12. Election of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court, judges of the Baku City Court and people's judges of rayon (city) people's courts; the appointment of the Azerbaijan SSR Chief State Arbitrator;

13. Review of questions regarding the candidacy for the position of Azerbaijan SSR Procurator at the recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijan SSR and regarding the removal of the Azerbaijan SSR Procurator from his duties;

14. Election of the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee at the recommendation of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

15. Calling of elections of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies and approval of the membership of the Central
Electoral Commission for the election of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies, the calling of elections to local soviets of people's deputies;

16. Regular hearings of reports from organs elected or formed by it, as well as from officials appointed or elected by it;

17. Ensuring the unity of legislative regulation in the entire territory of the Azerbaijan SSR; the ratification of Azerbaijan SSR codes;

18. Implementation of legislative regulation of the procedure for carrying out the rights, freedoms, and obligations of citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR, Azerbaijan SSR citizen relations, Azerbaijan SSR property relations, the organization of management of the economy and social-cultural construction, the budget-financial system, wage system and price formation, taxation, environmental protection as well as other relations within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR;

19. Establishment of the procedure for ownership, utilization and disposal of all natural resources of the republic, its potential in the production and social spheres;

20. Establishment of control over the activities of financial-credit institutions and republic income allocated to the Azerbaijan SSR state budget and the USSR state budget;

21. Approval of promising state plans and the most important programs of economic and social development of the Azerbaijan SSR; approval of state plans for economic and social development of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR state budget; exercising control over fulfillment of the plans and budget;

22. Resolution of issues associated with ensuring equal rights for USSR citizens of all nationalities on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR;

23. Interpretation of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and laws of the Azerbaijan SSR;

24. Establishment of procedures for the organization and operation of the higher and local organs of state power and rule of the Azerbaijan SSR; directing the activities of local soviets of people's deputies;

25. Determination of the legal status of public organizations of Azerbaijan SSR citizens;

26. Resolution of issues concerning the opening of diplomatic missions, consulates, offices of international organizations, Azerbaijan SSR trade representations;

27. Ratification and repudiation of international treaties of the Azerbaijan SSR;

28. Examination of issues concerning the granting of loans, economic and other forms of assistance by foreign states to the Azerbaijan SSR, as well as the signing of agreements concerning state loans and credits obtained from foreign sources;

29. Establishment of orders and medals, other state awards and the establishment of honorary titles of the Azerbaijan SSR;

30. Participation in the elaboration of basic measures in the field of defense and ensuring the state security of the USSR;

31. Carrying out legislative initiatives in the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet;

32. Resolution of the issue regarding confidence in the government of the Azerbaijan SSR or its individual members;

33. Issuance of acts regarding amnesty for individuals convicted by Azerbaijan SSR courts;

34. Repeal of instructions issued by the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet; resolutions and instructions of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers;

35. Repeal of resolutions and instructions of the Nakhichevan ASSR Council of Ministers, decisions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, rayon and city (of rayons and cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies in case of a discrepancy with the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR;

36. Suspension of acts and submission to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, USSR Supreme Soviet and President of the USSR, the question concerning the repeal of acts approved by these entities which exceed the authority of the USSR and violate the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR.

37. Suspension of and submission of proposals regarding the repeal of USSR Council of Ministers resolutions and instructions which exceed the authority of the USSR and violate the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR, as well as the suspension of acts issued by ministries, USSR state committees and agencies that contradict the laws of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR;

38. Decisions regarding the holding of nation-wide votes (referendums);

39. Approval of a decision by the President of the Azerbaijan SSR regarding the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of presidential rule.

40. Examination of a proposal by the President of the USSR regarding the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of presidential rule in the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet approves Azerbaijan SSR laws and resolutions.
Laws of the Azerbaijan SSR are mandatory on the entire territory of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 105. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is comprised of 360 people's deputies.

Article 106. The first session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is called no later than two months after the elections.

At the recommendation of the Mandate Commission which it elected, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet decides whether to recognize the authority of the deputies and, in case of a violation of electoral legislation - whether to declare the elections of individual deputies invalid.

Article 107. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is called to its regular spring and fall sessions by the Chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet.

Special sessions are called by the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet at his initiative or at the suggestion of the President of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet or not less than one-third of the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies.

Article 108. The first session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet after the elections is conducted by the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission on the Election of Azerbaijan SSR People's Deputies and then by the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet or his deputy.

Article 109. A session of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet consists of conferences of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet as well as conferences of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet permanent commissions which are held between them.

Article 110. The right of legislative initiative in the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet belongs to the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies, the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions, the President of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, the Nakhichevan ASSR represented by the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast represented by the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast People's Deputies, the Azerbaijan SSR Committee of People's Control, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court, the Azerbaijan SSR Procurator, and the Azerbaijan SSR Chief State Arbitrator.

Public organizations as represented by their republic organs and the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences also have the right of legislative initiative.

Article 111. Draft laws, submitted for review to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, are discussed at its sessions.

An Azerbaijan SSR law is considered ratified if the majority of the total number of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies vote for it.

Drafts of laws and other very important issues of the republic's state life can be submitted to nation-wide discussion by a decision of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 112. The Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, headed by the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, is created for organizing the work of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.


Upon expiration of the term of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet maintains its powers until the first session of the newly elected Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 113. The Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet organizes preparation for the conferences of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet session; coordinates the activities of the permanent commissions; organizes the preparation for and holds nationwide votes (referendums), as well as nation-wide discussions of Azerbaijan SSR draft laws and other important issues of state life; ensures the publication of Azerbaijan SSR laws and other acts ratified by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the Azerbaijan SSR in the Azerbaijani, Russian and other languages used by the population of the republic.

Article 114. The Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is elected by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet from among the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies by secret ballot for a term of five years and not more than two consecutive terms. At any time he can be recalled by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet by secret ballot.

The Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet is accountable to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet issues resolutions on the convocation of sessions of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and issues instructions on other matters.

Article 115. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet elects permanent commissions from among the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies to conduct legislative work, to conduct preliminary review and preparation of issues pertaining to the operation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet as well as for assisting the implementation of Azerbaijan SSR laws and other decisions approved by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and for monitoring the activities of state organs and organizations.
The term for individuals elected to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee is 10 years.

Individuals elected to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee cannot simultaneously be members of organs whose acts fall under supervision of the committee.

Individuals elected to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee are independent in carrying out their responsibilities and are subordinate only to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution.

Article 119. The Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee:

1. The committee, at the instruction of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, presents the Supreme Soviet with findings regarding the adherence to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution of Azerbaijan SSR draft laws and other acts which are submitted for review to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

2. The committee, at the suggestion of not less than one-fifth of the Azerbaijan SSR people’s deputies, the President of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, presents the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet with its findings regarding the adherence to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution of Azerbaijan SSR laws and other acts approved by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, of the adherence of resolutions and instructions of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers to Azerbaijan SSR laws; of the adherence of international treaties and other obligations of the Azerbaijan SSR to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and laws;

3. The committee, at the suggestion of not less than one-fifth of the Azerbaijan SSR people’s deputies, the President of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions, presents its findings to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet regarding the violation of the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR by the laws of the USSR, decrees of the President of the USSR, acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet and its councils; regarding the USSR exceeding its authority in these laws, decrees and acts. At the initiative of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers the committee presents its findings regarding the violation of the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR by USSR Council of Ministers resolutions and instructions; regarding contradictions between the acts of USSR ministries, state committees and agencies and the laws of the USSR and Azerbaijan SSR;

4. The committee, at the instruction of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, at the suggestion of the President
of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, presents its findings to the Azerbai-
jan SSR Supreme Soviet regarding the adherence to
the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the laws of the
Azerbaijan SSR, the laws of the Nakhichevan ASSR,
and the adherence to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution:

5. The committee, at the instruction of the Azerbaijan
SSR Supreme Soviet, at the suggestion of the President
of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Chairman of the Azerbaijan
SSR Supreme Soviet, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme
Soviet permanent commissions, the Azerbaijan SSR
Council of Ministers, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme
Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
Soviet of People's Deputies, the Azerbaijan SSR Commi-

Article 119. The Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Over-
sight Committee also has the right at its own initiative to
present findings to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet
and the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers regarding
the adherence to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and
laws of the Azerbaijan SSR of acts issued by organs and
officials which are accountable to them.

If an act or individual portions of the act are discovered
to be in conflict with the Azerbaijan SSR constitution
or the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR
Constitutional Oversight Committee sends its finding to
the organ which issued the act for elimination of the
conflict. The approval by the committee of such a
finding suspends the act or portions of that act which
conflict with the Azerbaijan SSR constitution or a law of
the Azerbaijan SSR. The act or portions of that act,
which the committee finds in violation of the rights and
freedoms of citizens, become invalid from the moment
such a finding is approved.

The organ which issued the act brings it in accordance
with the Azerbaijan SSR constitution or the law of the
Azerbaijan SSR. If the conflict cannot be eliminated, the
Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee
recommends to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet or
the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers the repeal of
the acts issued by organs or officials accountable to them
which are in conflict with the Azerbaijan SSR constitu-
tion or law of the Azerbaijan SSR.

A finding of the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Over-
sight Committee can be overturned only by a decision of
the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet approved by two-
thirds of the total number of Azerbaijan SSR people's
deputies.

The organization and operational procedures of the
Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee are
defined by the Azerbaijan SSR Law On Constitutional
Oversight.

Article 120. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet exer-
cises control over all state organs accountable to it.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the President
of the Azerbaijan SSR direct the activities of the Azer-
baijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The organization and operational procedures of the
organs of people's control are defined by the "Law On
People's Oversight in the USSR."

Article 121. Operational procedures of the Azerbaijan
SSR Supreme Soviet and its organs are defined by the
Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet regulations and other
laws of the Azerbaijan SSR approved on the basis of the
Azerbaijan SSR constitution.

5. Chapter 13 with the following content will be added
to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution:

"Chapter 13. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 121. The head of the Azerbaijan state - the
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic is the President of
the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 121. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR can be
an Azerbaij an SSR citizen no younger than 35 years and
no older than 65 years of age. The same individual
cannot be President of the Azerbaijan SSR for more than
two consecutive terms.

The President of the Azerbaijan SSR is elected by the
citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR on the basis of the right
to a general, equal and direct secret ballot election to a
term of five years. There is no limit to the number of can-
didates to the position of President of the Azerbaijan SSR.
Elections for President of the Azerbaijan SSR are con-
sidered valid if no less than 50 percent of the voters
participated in them. The winner of the election is that
candidate who receives more than half of the votes of the
voters taking part in the election.

The procedure for elections for the post of President of
the Azerbaijan SSR is defined by Azerbaijan SSR law.

The President of the Azerbaijan SSR cannot be an
Azerbaijan SSR people's deputy or a deputy of the local
Azerbaijan SSR soviets of people's deputies.

The person who is the President of the Azerbaijan SSR
only receives a salary for that post.

Article 121. At the beginning of his term the President
of the Azerbaijan SSR takes an oath at a session of the
Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.
Article 121. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR:

1. Is the guarantor of respect for the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR;

2. Ensures the defense of the state sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR, of the security and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR;

3. Represents the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic within the republic, in its interrelations with the USSR, the union republics and in international relations;

4. Ensures the interaction of the higher organs of state power and rule of the Azerbaijan SSR;

5. Presents to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet annual reports on the state of the republic, informs the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet about the most important issues of domestic and foreign policy of the Azerbaijan SSR;

6. Presents for approval of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet candidacies for the posts of Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, Azerbaijan SSR Chief State Arbiterator; recommends to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet the dismissal of the officials indicated above, with the exception of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

7. With the approval of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the President submits to the USSR General Procurator nominations to the post of Azerbaijan SSR Procurator and places before the USSR General Procurator the issue of the dismissal of the Azerbaijan SSR Procurator;

8. Places before the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet the issue of the resignation or accepts the resignation of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers; in coordination with the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers the President dismisses and appoints members of the Azerbaijan SSR government with subsequent submission for confirmation by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet;

9. Signs laws of the Azerbaijan SSR; has the right within two weeks to return a law with his objections to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet for further discussion and voting. If the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet upholds the previously approved decision by a two-thirds majority, the President of the Azerbaijan SSR signs the law;

10. Can propose to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet the suspension of laws approved by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, other acts of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its councils, the President of the USSR, the USSR Council of Ministers, ministries, USSR state committees and agencies, if they go beyond the authority of the USSR or violate the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR;

11. Has the right to suspend resolutions and instructions of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers;

12. Conducts negotiations and signs international agreements of the Azerbaijan SSR; accepts the credentials and letters of recall of accredited diplomatic representations of foreign states; appoints and recalls diplomatic and consular representatives of the Azerbaijan SSR in foreign states and international organizations;

13. Confers orders and medals of the Azerbaijan SSR and honorary titles of the Azerbaijan SSR;

14. Resolves issues of citizenship of the Azerbaijan SSR, emigration and loss of citizenship of the Azerbaijan SSR, concession of asylum;

15. Pardons individuals convicted by the courts of the Azerbaijan SSR;

16. In the interests of defending the Azerbaijan SSR and the security of its citizens, the President warns of the announcement of a state of emergency in particular locations, and if necessary, introduces it with an immediate submission of the decision for approval by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet. A resolution of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet on this issue is approved by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies.

In cases indicated in the first part of this particular point, the President can introduce provisional presidential rule.

The conditions of a state of emergency as well as presidential rule introduced by the President of the Azerbaijan SSR are established by a law of the Azerbaijan SSR.

Article 121*. Along with the President of the Azerbaijan SSR the Presidential Council functions and has as its mission the elaboration of measures to carry out the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy of the Azerbaijan SSR and to ensure the republic's security.

Members of the Presidential Council are appointed by the President of the Azerbaijan SSR; the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers is a member of the Presidential Council of the Azerbaijan SSR by virtue of his position.

The Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet has the right to participate in sessions of the Azerbaijan SSR Presidential Council.

Article 121*. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR on the basis of and in the interests of carrying out the Azerbaijan SSR constitution and the laws of the Azerbaijan SSR issues decrees which are compulsory over the entire territory of the Azerbaijan SSR.
Article 121. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR has the right of immunity and can be removed from his post only by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet in case of a violation by him of the constitution and laws of the Azerbaijan SSR. Such a decision is approved by no less than two-thirds of the total number of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies at the initiative of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet taking into account the findings of the Azerbaijan SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

Article 121. The President of the Azerbaijan SSR can transfer the discharge of his duties, stipulated in points 12 and 13 of article 121 to the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, and can transfer the duties stipulated in points 14 and 15 of article 121 to the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 121. If the President of the Azerbaijan SSR for one reason or another is unable to further discharge his duties, his authority is transferred to the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet until the election of a new President of the Azerbaijan SSR, and if this is not possible, to the Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers. Elections for a new President of the Azerbaijan SSR must be held within three months.

6. Articles 164, 165 and 167 of Chapter 21 should read as follows:

"Article 164. All courts of the Azerbaijan SSR are formed on the basis of the election of judges and people's assessors.

People's judges of rayon (city) people's courts and the judges of city courts are elected by the corresponding higher soviets of people's deputies.

Judges of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Court and the oblast court of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast are elected accordingly by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court, the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Court and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

People's assessors of rayon (city) people's courts are elected at meetings of citizens at their place of residence or work by an open vote, and people's assessors of the higher courts are elected by corresponding soviets of people's deputies.

Judges of all courts are elected to a term of ten years. People's assessors of all courts are elected to a term of five years.

Judges and people's assessors are responsible to the organs of voters which elected them, are accountable to them and can be recalled by them through procedures established by law.

Article 165. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ of the Azerbaijan SSR and supervises the judicial operations of the courts of the Azerbaijan SSR within the limits established by law.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court consists of a chairman, his deputies, members and people's assessors. The membership of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court includes the Chairman of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Oblast Court of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The organization and operational procedures of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court are defined by the law on the Azerbaijan SSR judicial system.

"Article 167. Judges and people's assessors are independent and are subordinate only to the law. Judges and people's assessors are assured conditions for an unhindered and effective implementation of their rights and duties. Any kind of interference in the activities of judges and people's assessors and their execution of justice is inadmissible and is punishable by law.

The immunity of judges and people's assessors, as well as other guarantees of their independence are established by the law on the status of judges in the USSR and other legislative acts of the USSR and Azerbaijan SSR."

II. In regard to the new edition of Chapters 10 and 13 of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution, the changes and additions resulting from them are to be included in the following articles of the Azerbaijan SSR constitution:

1. Article 100 will read as follows:

"Article 100. A deputy exercises his authority, as a rule, without interrupting his industrial or professional activities.

During the sessions of the soviet, as well as for exercising the authority of a deputy in other situations stipulated by law, the deputy is excused from fulfilling his industrial or professional duties with reimbursement from the corresponding state or local budget for expenses associated with his activities as a deputy."

2. Article 124 reads as follows:

Article 124. The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers is responsible and accountable to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The newly formed Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers submits the program of forthcoming activities for its term of office to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers is accountable for its work to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and regularly informs the President of the Azerbaijan SSR about its activities.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet can, at its own initiative or at the suggestions of the President of the
Azerbaijan SSR, express its lack of confidence in the government of the Azerbaijan SSR which results in its resignation. A resolution on this issue is approved by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies."

3. In article 125:

The first part will read as follows:

"The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers is competent to decide all issues of state rule delegated to the authority of the Azerbaijan SSR, since, according to the Azerbaijan SSR constitution, they do not enter into the competence of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the President of the Azerbaijan SSR;""

Points 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the second part will read as follows:

"3. Implement measures to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of the interests of the republic, the defense of property and public order;
4. Undertakes measures to ensure the sovereignty of the republic and state security;
5. Implements general measures in the area of relations with the union republics and foreign states, foreign trade, economic, scientific-technical and cultural collaboration of the Azerbaijan SSR with other republics and foreign countries; undertakes measures to ensure the implementation of Azerbaijan SSR interrepublic and international treaties ratified by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet; ratifies and repudiates intergovernmental, interrepublic and international treaties;
6. When necessary, forms committees, chief directorates and other agencies attached to the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers."

4. Article 127 reads as follows:

"Article 127. On the basis of and in executing the laws of the USSR and other decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of the President of the USSR, laws of the Azerbaijan SSR and other decisions of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of the President of the Azerbaijan SSR, resolutions and instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Minister; organize and monitor their execution."

6. Articles 131, 132 and 133 read as follows:

"Article 131. The highest organ of state power in the Nakhichevan ASSR is the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet.

The Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet has the right to resolve all issues delegated to the authority of the Nakhichevan ASSR by the constitution of the USSR, the constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR and the constitution of the Nakhichevan ASSR.

The constitution of the Nakhichevan ASSR and the laws of the Nakhichevan ASSR are approved by the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 132. The powers, structure and operational procedures of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet are defined by the constitution of the Nakhichevan ASSR and the laws of the Nakhichevan ASSR.

Organization of the work of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet is carried out by the Presidium of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet headed by the Chairman of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 133. The Nakhichevan ASSR Council of Ministers is the highest executive and administrative organ of state power in the Nakhichevan ASSR and is formed by the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet.

The Nakhichevan ASSR Council of Ministers is responsible and accountable to the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet."

7. The first and second parts of Article 140 read as follows:

"Sessions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, rayon, city (except cities of rayon subordination), city rayon soviets of people's deputies are called by their presidiums no less than four times per year.

Sessions of city (cities of rayon subordination), village and rural soviets of people's deputies are called by their chairmen no less than four times per year."

8. Article 145 is to be included in Chapter 17 and reads as follows:

"Article 145. Work of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, city, city rayon soviets of people's deputies is organized by their presidiums headed by the chairmen of the soviets, and the work in city (cities of rayon subordination), village and rural soviets is organized by the chairmen of these soviets."
9. Articles 146 and 150 read as follows:

"Article 146. The executive and administrative organs of local soviets of people's deputies are their executive committees.

The executive committees submit reports not less than once per year to the corresponding soviets as well as at meeting of labor collectives and at the place of residence of citizens."

"Article 150. The executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies are directly accountable both to the corresponding soviet and to the higher executive and administrative organs."

10. Article 182 reads as follows:

"Article 182. The state hymn of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic is ratified by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet."

11. Article 185 reads as follows:

"Article 185. A change in the constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR is made by a decision of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and approved by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies."

III. This law goes into effect as soon as it is ratified.

Baku, 18 May 1990

Memorandum on Belorussian SSR Sovereignty
90UN2302A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

[Report by Belorussian SSR People's Deputy N.I. Dementey: "Memorandum to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the Republic's State Sovereignty"]

[Text] Yesterday, 19 June, the memorandum of Belorussian SSR People's Deputy N.I. Dementey on the republic's state sovereignty was disseminated to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet as an official document. In publishing the text with the author's permission, the editors invite the newspaper's readers to discuss the proposals it contains, and await important responses to the given publication.

The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is a sovereign state in the body of the Union of SSRs, which is fixed in the USSR Constitution and in the Belorussian SSR Constitution. This responds to the will of the Belorussian people, the role and significance of Belorussia in the international community.

However, the deformations in the area of national policy that took place in the country during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation have substantially limited the sovereignty and independence of the Belorussian SSR, as well as those of other republics, in the resolution of the most important political, economic, and other issues of internal and external life.

In the area of state construction, a negative practice has been formed in the country of defining the concrete authorities of the union republics not by the expression of the will of their people, but by acts of higher organs of state power and administration of the Union of SSRs.

The restoration of genuine sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR will allow it to be spared the excessive centralization that has formed in the country, to overcome the dictatorship of all-union departments, and to create conditions for full political, economic, social, and cultural development of the people of Belorussia.

The issue of national-state structure of the USSR was discussed at the session of the USSR the Federation Council that was held in the Kremlin on 12 June of this year under the chairmanship of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

It was proposed by me and by other members of the Federation Council that there be an immediate move toward the development and conclusion of a new union pact that would guarantee the republic's genuine political and economic sovereignty.

The creation of a working group of authorized representatives of all republics was acknowledged as necessary to develop the draft of the new union pact. The group must begin to work out proposals on the union pact on 20 July of the current year.

Therefore, I feel that even at the first session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, after detailed analysis, it would be possible to define the basic principles of the republic's genuine political and economic sovereignty. This would mean the restoration of the factual independence of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in the resolution of issues of political, economic, and social-cultural life. At the same time, the corresponding guarantees for ensuring Belorussian SSR sovereignty should be fortified.

The conception of Belorussian SSR sovereignty must be based upon the principles of:

—full power of the people and integrity of the territory of the republic, which not only cannot be altered, but cannot be used in one form or another without the consent of its people;

—the right to make independently the decisions that determine the fate of the people, the methods, trends, and means of political, socioeconomic, and cultural development in accordance with its traditions, requirements, and wishes;

—the empowerment of the republic itself to establish the political and economic structure.

In my view, the genuine state sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR must be expressed in the following:

—all the state power within the territory of the Belorussian SSR belongs only to its organs, formed and functioning on the basis of the Belorussian SSR Constitution and other laws of the republic, reflecting the
specifies of its state structure, the development of the socioeconomic structure, and national features:

—all natural resources located within the territory of the republic are the property of its people;

—all facilities of the national economic complex functioning within the territory of the Belorussian SSR, with the exception of the facilities belonging to foreign states and citizens, are the property of its people;

—respect for the political, economic, and other types of independence of other republics comprising the renewed union of sovereign socialist states, and equal and mutually advantageous cooperation with them on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements that will be concluded among the republics as a result of the development of the all-union market;

—the principles of the legal basis of the relations of the Belorussian SSR with the union organs and other union republics in the body of the USSR, which must become the new union pact among all the subjects of the federation. The Belorussian SSR voluntarily transfers to the general federal organs individual authoritative powers associated with ensuring the country’s defense capability, and the resolution of certain other problems. Their list, however, must be exhaustive. It is advisable to establish in the new pact the concept of the federal territory, necessary for situating and operating the organs of the USSR. It is also necessary to determine the status of the common federal organs which must not embody the Union of SSRs in general as some sort of independent formation, standing over the republics, but as representatives of united republics that express their interests and are accountable to them. The new union pact must also proceed from the idea of the rejection of the so-called joint competence of the Union of SSRs and the union republics, which in practice is leading toward a groundless expansion of the rights of organs of the Union of SSRs to the detriment of the sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR and that of other union republics;

—the right of the republic’s highest organs of state power to suspend the action of the acts of union organs in the event that they violate the rights and lawful interests of the Belorussian SSR should be specified in the new conception of Belorussian SSR sovereignty;

—the republic’s state sovereignty under conditions of an authentically democratic society signifies the granting of all necessary legal guarantees to each of its citizens for harmonious development and inviolability of the individual, the provision of full and equal freedoms, the creation of worthy living and working conditions. The republic organs of power must promote the satisfaction of the cultural and linguistic requirements of the Belorussians living beyond the borders of the Belorussian SSR;

—by constitutional procedure, the right to establish mutual relations with foreign states, to conclude treaties with them, to participate in all foreign economic relations, to have activity in international organizations, and to open authorized representations of the Belorussian SSR in other union republics and foreign countries are reserved to the republic.

I consider it advisable to entrust the development of the Declaration of Belorussian SSR state sovereignty to a special commission of the republican Supreme Soviet, in the composition of which should be included the chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, his deputies, the deputies of the permanent commissions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and a group of Belorussian SSR people’s deputies. If necessary, it would also be possible to involve in the work specialists who are not deputies.

To include in the agenda for the first session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th Convocation the issue of the Declaration of the state sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

To consider this issue as one of the first order, as soon as it is readied.

This memorandum is introduced for the consideration of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

N. Dementey, Minsk, 13 June 1990

Delegates to Moscow Talks Selected
90UN2302B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

[Report by A. Kryzhanovskiy, BELTA parliamentary correspondent: "We Are Going Toward Sovereignty. By What Means?"]

[Text] The 5th week of the parliament’s work began with debates not specified in the agenda. Chairman N. Dementey reported on the telegram from USSR President M. Gorbatchev, which states, in particular, that in connection with the start of the work on the draft of the union treaty on the national-state structure, it is necessary to send to Moscow three authorized representatives of the republic Supreme Soviet for the session of the USSR Federation Council in order to discuss the conception of the treaty.

N. Dementey introduced a proposal to send a delegation consisting of V. Sholodonov, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, V. Zablotskiy, department chairman, Scientific Research Institute of Computers, and V. Danilenko, permanent representative of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers under the USSR Council of Ministers. The proposal was adopted. The group received the status of authorized representatives majority vote.

The need to adopt the declaration of the Belorussian SSR state sovereignty no longer causes any doubt among that same majority. Could it be that the interests of their voters have changed so radically over the last 4 weeks, or perhaps the recidivists of the old disease are making themselves known—not a step to the side without a sign from the top?

...Two chairmen of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions were elected at the 19 June morning session. The position of chairman of the Commission on consumer goods, trade, and consumer services was
taken by Chairman of the Mogilev city soviet of people's deputies, D. Sivitskiy, who won out over two other claimants, a department manager of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, I. Gerasyuk, and V. Konovalov, secretary of the Mogilev Oblast party committee of the Belarusian Communist Party. S. Kotov, the chief physician of the 2nd Grodno territorial medical association became chairman of the Commission on health care, physical culture, and social services. Competing with him for this position was Ye. Novikov, physician of the Minsk clinical hospital, and Chief Physician of the Rechitsa central rayon hospital V. Lazarevich, who withdrew his candidacy.

The session continued its work at the evening session.

Belorussian CP Membership Analyzed
90UN1939A Minsk KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII in Russian No 5, May 90 pp 27-29

[Unattributed Article: "The KPB in the Statistical Mirror"]

[Text] Many questions are coming in to the editorial offices about the main trends that characterize changes in the composition of the Republic Party Organization on the eve of the 31st Belorussian CP Congress. Data prepared by the Belorussian CP Central Committee Party Organization and Personnel Department and published at the request of our readers clarifies the situation in many ways. P.P. Dubin and S.G. Moskaliev, deputy chief and an instructor of this department, respectively, comment on them.

During the period after the 27th CPSU Congress, the strength of the Belorussian Communist Party increased by 29,600 people. The average annual growth of Party ranks totaled 1.1 percent. In 1989, for the first time during the postwar period, Belorussian Communist Party strength decreased by 1,500 people.

More than 95 percent of the Belorussian Communist Party's current personnel are individuals who entered the Party during the postwar period. By the beginning of this year, there were nearly 4,500 communists with more than 50 years of Party service in its ranks.

The ratio of communists with higher, incomplete higher, and completed middle educations currently totals 83.7 percent. The Belorussian Communist Party has 425,868 communists (61 percent of total strength) who are experts in various branches of knowledge. More than 7,700 Party members have the academic degree of candidate and 976 have a doctor of science degree.

Belorussian CP Numerical Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPSU Members</th>
<th>Candidates for CPSU Membership</th>
<th>Total Communists</th>
<th>Including Women</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of January 1, 1981</td>
<td>572,313</td>
<td>22,998</td>
<td>595,311</td>
<td>155,098</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of January 1, 1986</td>
<td>645,754</td>
<td>22,226</td>
<td>667,980</td>
<td>193,303</td>
<td>28.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>As of January 1, 1989</td>
<td>682,816</td>
<td>16,343</td>
<td>699,159</td>
<td>211,370</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of January 1, 1990</td>
<td>685,270</td>
<td>12,338</td>
<td>697,608</td>
<td>211,698</td>
<td>30.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Composition of CPSU Members and Candidates for Membership By Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981 Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>1986 Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>1990 Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total CPSU Members and Candidates for Membership</td>
<td>595,311</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>667,980</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>697,608</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>191,013</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>218,634</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>212,850</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants (Collective farmers)</td>
<td>75,928</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>80,424</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>82,311</td>
<td>11.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>268,034</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>292,660</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>300,644</td>
<td>43.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>4,731</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Working</td>
<td>35,605</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>72,604</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>98,402</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that the ratio of communists-workers in the Belorussian Communist Party has been somewhat reduced during recent years, its rates of growth in the composition of the Republic Party Organization exceeds the increase of the numerical composition of workers among the working population by a factor of more than two. A reduction of the ratio of collective farmers in the Belorussian Communist Party in recent years is explained by a reduction of the total number of collective farmers caused by a reduction of the rural population. The total number of communists-collective farmers in the Belorussian Communist Party and also as a whole throughout the CPSU increases from year to year.
Acceptance of CPSU Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Accepted as Candidates for CPSU Membership</th>
<th>Accepted as CPSU Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20,660</td>
<td>20,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>20,592</td>
<td>21,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>19,202</td>
<td>20,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>14,192</td>
<td>18,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10,279</td>
<td>13,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Composition of Accepted Candidates for CPSU Membership According to Occupation (In Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Between the 29th and 30th Belorussian CP Congresses</th>
<th>During 1986-1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Accepted as Candidates for Party Membership</td>
<td>104,147</td>
<td>64,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of Them:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the present time, the Belorussian Communist Party unites within its ranks representatives of 86 nations and peoples. Belorussians account for 71.2 percent of its membership.

The data presented show what a complex and complicated year Republic Party organizations have lived through not only from the point of view of the socio-political and economic situation but also on the fundamental issue of party structural development and what acceptance into the Party is. The trends noted in previous years toward reduction of acceptance have also been confirmed during the past year. In 1987, it was reduced by 6.8 percent, in 1988—by 26.1 percent, and last year by 27.6 percent.

Many people explain their reluctance to join the Party by the fact that, they say, its prestige has fallen and that, judging by the press, there are only careerists and bureaucrats in the Party. Other people are biding their time: Let us see, they say, how perestroyka turns out.

We think that we do not need to excessively dramatize here. This is the way it always is at critical turning points in the development of society.

And if in this situation if applications come forth, even though considerably fewer, but they nevertheless come forth with a request for acceptance into CPSU ranks—believe me, these people are not only brave (there is not even a shade of doubt here) but they are also soberly looking at the processes that are occurring and fervently believing in the ideals of socialism. Unfortunately, adapters and careerists have not been transferred.... They are here but they do not determine the "weather."

We must not lose sight of the fact that we will not resolve the tasks of perestroyka without a vigorous working nucleus within the Party. And there are unjustifiably few workers in the Republic Communist Party—30.5 percent and there are fewer of them with each passing year.

The Vitebsk Oblast Party Organization has been working under experimental conditions since November 1989 when the leading Party organization's decision on acceptance of a candidate for CPSU membership is final and not subject to approval by the raykom or gorkom. It is still early to judge the total result. But despair has already been heard—they say the experiment has not provided any results. And here a certain haste and a wave of indiscriminate criticism is being manifested. But really the fact that the leading Party organization itself resolves the fundamental issue of its existence under all other equal conditions awakens initiative in it, develops initiative, and imparts confidence and strength.

The Party is intensifying its self-purge of individuals who compromise the rank of communist. Just last year, 9,276 people were expelled and driven out of the CPSU. This is a natural process. However, serious concern is caused by the fact that many Party organizations have lowered their exactingness toward prospective members and accept anyone who submits an application as a result of the reduction of the number of people joining the Party. During this same 1989, 1,600 of its candidates have been expelled and driven from the Party. Figuratively speaking, today we accept them and tomorrow we will expel them.

And now briefly about another phenomenon in our lives. The trend toward voluntary departure from Party ranks is acquiring an increasingly stable nature. These are the statistics: 1986—44 people surrendered their Party documents, 1987—56, 1988-259, and 1989—3,283.
There are various causes of this phenomenon. We can divide such individuals into the following groups. Those who have become confused and frightened by the processes occurring in the country and have despained after learning about negative phenomena, repressions, and various deformations that have occurred in the Party and the State belong to the first group. Having made a difficult choice for themselves, they thereby express their nonconciherence with reality and protest the biter and severe truth.

There are also quite a few of them who justify their act through dissatisfaction with the pace of perestroyka, by passivity of both the center and leading Party organizations, and by the gap between word and deed of certain leaders. We need to work with these people while patiently explaining to them everything that has occurred and that is occurring. We do not have to expend either strength or time to do this.

The second group are opportunists who needed the Party only as a guarantee of their well-being. For such people, not satisfying their demands or the smallest personal insult are the culmination for which the extreme immediately follows—surrender of the Party membership card. V.I. Lenin once said about such people: “Good riddance. This reduction of the number of Party members is an enormous increase of its strength and weight.”

CPSU Party members with long Party service belong to the third group. As a rule, they are people of advanced age who are often ill and alone. Their days of political activity are already past. And we frequently rebuke them about their irregular attendance at meetings and sometimes late payment of membership dues etc. instead of paying attention to them or even understanding their situation.

Obviously, we also need to look at the massive “transfer” of communists-pioneers to Party organizations according to their place of residence from a different point of view. How many emotional offenses and injuries are being inflicted! ZhES [Railroad Electric Power Plant] and building management office Party organizations are losing their functional ability for the same reason. Yes and we also cannot forget that each of us will be pensioners some day! A respectful attitude toward old age and, finally, kindness—these human qualities have been highly valued at all times and they must be not be ephemeral even today and all the more so among communists.

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Estonian Supreme Soviet Decree on Supreme Soviet Activity in Transition Period

90UN2053B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 May 90 p 2

[Decree of the Estonian Republic’s Supreme Soviet: “On the Program of Activity for the Estonian Republic During the Transition Period Until the Restoration of the Estonian Republic’s Independence and On Provisional Procedures”]

[Text] Proceeding on the basis of the Estonian people’s unbreakable will, the Estonian Republic’s Supreme Soviet considers its principal task to be the restoration of the Estonian Republic’s independence. The principal means for attaining this goal are as follows:

—legislative activity with regard to changing Estonia’s political, social, and economic structure, as well as the appropriate relations;

—negotiations;

—cooperation with Estonia’s Congress, to be based on dialogue.

The period until the restoration of the Estonian Republic’s genuine independence and the formation of the Estonian Republic’s constitutional organs of authority shall be regarded as a transition period.
The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet, which was formed on the basis of the present-day Constitution of the Estonian SSR, hereby declares that the level of its legality or legitimacy rose significantly due to the mandate given to it by the people at the time of the democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet, elections which were held for the first time during the period of occupation. The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet shall cease its own activity at such time as the Estonian Republic's constitutional organs of authority become operational.

In order to restore independence, the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet considers it necessary to concentrate its attention on the following lines of activity:

I. Contacts with the USSR

In its relations with the USSR, the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet shall proceed on the basis of the Tartu Peace Treaty, which was concluded between the Estonian Republic and the RSFSR on 2 February 1920.

The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet considers it necessary to regulate or regularize relations between Estonia and the USSR by means of negotiations. The goal of preliminary talks shall be to determine and specify the topics to be discussed at the official negotiations. The Estonian Republic shall set forth as topics of the negotiations the cessation of the occupation and the de facto restoration of the Estonian Republic's independence. Specific ways and conditions for restoring independence must become a subject for the negotiations. The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet does not consider it possible to participate in negotiations about any forms of further remaining within the body of the USSR. The goal of these negotiations shall be to conclude an agreement or treaty providing for the ending of the occupation, the granting of guarantees of independence, and other good-neighborly relations between the Estonian Republic and the USSR.

During the course of negotiations with the authorities from the USSR, we must also regulate such problems related to the restoration of the Estonian Republic's independence as the following: economic and cultural relations between the Estonian Republic and the USSR, legal guarantees for citizens of the USSR who are residing in the Estonian Republic, consular relations, the problem of property ownership by the USSR within the Estonian Republic, as well as that of property ownership by the Estonian Republic within the USSR, reciprocal indebtedness, the problem of state borders, of transforming the Estonian Republic into a neutral, non-aligned state, the status of that contingent of the USSR's Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the Estonian Republic prior to their complete withdrawal during the time period provided by the agreement to be concluded, as well as other issues of mutual interest.

The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet shall strive to examine the problems of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within the framework of the integrated or unified Baltic question in multilateral, international negotiations.

II. Foreign Relations

In foreign policy the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet during the transition period shall be guided by the fact that the restoration of independence to the Baltic republics is an international problem. In its relations with other states, the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet and Government shall prepare for the diplomatic recognition of the restored Estonian Republic. The republic shall strive to obtain from other states political support for the Estonian people's liberation movement, as well as economic and humanitarian aid. Particular importance shall be accorded to including the Baltic Question on the agenda of the Helsinki-2 Conference and the participation of the Baltic republics in discussing it. Estonia's participation in international organizations, including the status of observer at the UN, shall be set as a goal.

III. Division of Competence Between Estonia and the USSR

During the transition period Estonia's organs of state power and state administration, as well as the organs of the court and the procuracy, shall cease relations with the corresponding organs which are subordinate to the USSR. Those institutions and organizations which continue to exercise the power of the USSR on Estonia's territory shall be considered as unlawful institutions of an occupying power, whose activities are possible solely by their reliance on force.

IV. Integrity of Estonian Society

During the transition period guarantees for protecting the human rights of all the inhabitants of Estonia, regardless of their nationality or citizenship, shall be worked out and applied.

V. Legislative Activity

During the transition period the Supreme Soviet shall begin to form the political, economic, and social structure of the independent Estonian Republic.

The Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet shall set as its goal the building of an open society and the formation of a state based on the rule of law, where all human rights shall be guaranteed, where social protection shall be ensured, regardless of nationality and citizenship, and where people's education, know-how, and initiative shall be valued.

The basic political structure shall be a parliamentary democracy and a division of powers.

The economy shall be based on a multiplicity of forms of property ownership, on privatization, and on converting to a market-type economy.
The Estonian Republic shall not harmonize or coordinate its own constitutional structure and legislation with that of the Fundamental Law (Constitution) and legislation of the USSR.

The legal system to be created for the Estonian Republic shall derive solely from the will of Estonia's people and the commonly accepted norms of international law.

It shall be deemed necessary to begin, in conjunction with the Estonian Committee, working out a draft law on elections to the State Council of the Estonian Republic, as well as the draft of a new Fundamental Law (Constitution) for the Estonian Republic.

VI. Relations Between the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet and the Estonia Congress

During the transition period both the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet and the Estonia Congress shall operate or function as independent representative assemblies. On fundamental issues connected with Estonia's statehood (i.e., state sovereignty, state status, interstate relations, Constitution, and citizenship) the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet shall deem it necessary, in the name of restoring the Estonian Republic de facto to engage in coordinated actions with the Estonian Congress and the Estonian Committee formed by it. The forms of cooperation and issues subject to coordination shall be established and specified by agreements to be concluded between them.

A. RUUTEL, chairman,
Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic.
Tallinn, 16 May 1990

Law Governing Strikes in Estonia Detailed

90UN2053C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 23 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Strikes and the Law: Information from the Estonian Republic's State Chancellory"]


The above-mentioned Law regulates the procedure for resolving collective labor disputes (conflicts) regarding questions of applying the existing labor legislation, the conclusions and performing the conditions of collective agreements, as well as agreements for establishing new or changing existing socioeconomic conditions of work and everyday life between labor collectives (the collectives of subdivisions) and the administrations of enterprises, institutions, organizations, or the branch-type (interbranch) administrative organs.

Regulated here is the presentation of a labor collective's demands, their examination and consideration, as well as the procedure for the creation and activity of conciliatory commissions and labor arbitration units. This Law obligates the parties and conciliatory organs concerned to utilize all the possibilities available for eliminating the causes and circumstances which have entailed the collective labor dispute (conflict). If the conciliatory commission and the labor arbitration unit have not been able to regulate or settle the differing views of the parties concerned, the reasons for this shall be submitted in written form for the information of the labor collective. In that case, the labor collective is entitled to utilize, in order to satisfy its own demands, all other means provided for by law, including a complete or partial stoppage of work at the enterprise, institution, organization, or subdivision (i.e., a strike).

A strike is an extreme measure for resolving a collective labor dispute (conflict). A decision regarding a strike is taken at a meeting (conference) of the labor collective or collective of a subdivision involved by a secret ballot and shall be considered as adopted if it is voted for by at least ¾ of the members of the collective involved (or conference delegates). A strike is led by a trade-union committee, labor-collective council, strike committee, or other organ empowered by the labor collective concerned.

An administration or management must be advised (i.e., warned) at least five days ahead of time regarding the beginning of a strike and its possible continuation. Concerning the possibility of an imminent strike, the administration involved shall warn suppliers and customers, transport organizations, as well as other interested enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Nobody can be compelled to participate or to refrain from participating in a strike. The organ which is leading the strike shall operate within the limits of the rights provided for by the legislation and the above-mentioned Law; it shall represent the labor collective's interests during the course of the strike; it shall inform the population via the mass media concerning the progress being made in resolving the collective labor dispute (conflict) which has arisen. The above-cited powers shall cease if the parties concerned sign an agreement to settle the collective labor dispute (conflict) which has arisen, or in case the strike is deemed illegal.

When exercising its powers, the organ which is leading the strike does not have the right to adopt a decision relating to the administrative competence of an enterprise, organs of state power and administration, nor that of public organizations.

In accordance with the above-mentioned Law, the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet can postpone the conduct of a strike or stop it for a period of up to two months.

As a means of resolving a collective labor dispute (conflict), a work stoppage is not permitted if it creates a threat to people's life and health, as well as at enterprises...
and at organizations of railroad and municipal public transport, civil aviation, communications, electric-power engineering, defense sectors (in subdivisions directly engaged in producing defense-type items), in state organs, at enterprises and organizations charged with the tasks of ensuring a defense capability, law and order, safety and security for the country, as well as in continually operating production lines the stoppage of which would be connected with serious and dangerous consequences.

Labor collectives of the above-mentioned enterprises and organization, after observing the conciliatory procedure provided for by the Law cited above, have the right to appeal for the protection of their legitimate rights and interests to the Supreme Soviet of the union republic involved, and, in case of union-level subordination—to the USSR Supreme Soviet, which must examine and consider their demands and provide an answer within a month's time.

 Strikes are deemed to be unlawful and are not permitted for motives connected with setting forth demands for the violent overthrow or alteration of the Soviet state or public order, or demands which entail violations of national, ethnic, or racial; equal rights: strikes the proclaiming of which have not obsered the procedure established by the above-mentioned Law for submitting demands by the labor collective or the procedure for examining and considering them in conciliatory commissions, either beginning or continuing violations of those articles of the Law dated 9 October 1989 which regulate the activity of labor arbitration units: the adoption of decisions concerning the beginning of a strike, postponing (or stopping) a strike, or prohibiting a strike in certain spheres.

A decision concerning the illegality of a strike obligates the labor collectives to do the following: to stop it and proceed back to work no later than the day following the receipt by the organ leading the strike of a copy of the decision involved.

In accordance with the above-mentioned Law, employees taking part in a strike shall retain their overall and continuous period of labor service (i.e., seniority), the right to be provided with state-sponsored social insurance, whereas employees participating in a strike which is not prohibited by the Law shall also preserve their jobs (positions).

During a strike the employees participating in it do not retain (i.e., continue to earn) their wages.

For employees who have not participated in a strike but who, in connection with it, have not had the opportunity to perform their work the enterprise, institution, or organization involved are obligated to keep on paying wages in amounts at least as high as those established by Article 106 of the Estonian SSR Labor Code, since it is simply not the employees' fault.

Organizing a strike which has been deemed illegal by a court or participating in it is regarded as a violation of labor discipline and can entail the application of disciplinary measures and material responsibility, as provided by the labor legislation.

Supervisors, managers, and other officials who are at fault for allowing collective labor disputes (conflicts) to arise or for holding back the execution of decisions taken by a conciliatory commission or an arbitration unit shall be subject to disciplinary action to the extent of being relieved of their duties, while, in case their actions have caused material damage—to financial responsibility in an amount of as much as three months' salary.

Damage caused as a result of a strike to other enterprises, institutions, organizations, or citizens, shall be reimbursed in accordance with the existing legislation.

Based on what has been stated above, the councils of labor collectives and administrations (i.e., management) must carefully weigh their decisions as to whether or not to join in a strike.

**Opinion Poll on Political Future of Estonia**

90UN2052A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA

in Russian 26 May 90 p 3

[Editorial report: "Mini-Referendum on Future of Estonia"]

[Text] The words "referendum," "federation," and "confederation" have become the most popular in our political lexicon. What is more, these concepts are the motor of many political measures: strikes, the Congress of People's Deputies of Estonia meeting today in Yykhvi.

The press information center conducted a telephone survey of residents of five cities in Estonia (Tallinn, Tartu, Pyarnu, Kokhtla-Yarve, and Narva) on the question of the future of Estonia. The survey was conducted on 15-16 May of this year, with 1,314 persons polled. In the table we also cite data from a similar survey in March. Here are the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you wish to see as the political future of Estonia? (in percentage of number of respondents)</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Neo-Estonians</th>
<th>Neo-Estonians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing needs to be changed</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3 (99)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic independence as part of the Union (i.e., a federation)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24 (28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What do you wish to see as the political future of Estonia? (in percentage of number of respondents) (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and economic independence as part of the Union</th>
<th>March 1990</th>
<th>May 1990</th>
<th>March 1990</th>
<th>May 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Estonians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An independent state with orientation on cooperation with the USSR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7 (13)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An independent state with orientation on the West</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9 (6)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent, neutral state</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>77 (71)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14 (10.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures given in parentheses pertain to Narva and Kokhtla-Yarve.

As can be seen, the majority of those polled favor an independent and neutral Estonia. Among non-Estonians, two variants were virtually equally acceptable: a union confederation (32) and an independent Estonia (13+3+14)=30 percent. The “federation” variant did not find dominating support already in March (23).

We will note that the overall results of the telephone survey are close to the results of a survey conducted by means of a personal questionnaire. Opinions in the northeast of the republic did not differ strongly from the general opinion.

The unprejudiced reader will draw his own conclusions. We would like only to propose to the political leaders to take public opinion into account. We plan to publish survey data on the most timely problems regularly (monthly).

In our troubled times, we would like to reproduce again the words of the great manager Carnegie: “Let’s calm down and begin living!”

Estonian ‘Home Defense,’ Workers’ Patrols Described

90UN2052B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 May 90 p 2

[Article by S. Chernov, government press secretary: “A Few Clarifications”]

[Excerpts] It is apparent from the telephone calls and letters being received at the state office of the government that some or other problems of our life are not quite clear to citizens and require a more detailed explanation. From all appearances, the reason is that these questions are the result of insufficient information on the most recent, and that means the most vital events of our life.

The beginning of registration of volunteers in the organization “Eesti kodukaytse” [Home Defense] was announced this past week. At the same time, quite a few unclear points exist regarding the activities of the so-called “workers’ patrols” at enterprises with a predominant number of workers of non-native nationalities. We will try, if only in general terms, to understand what is going on.

Prior to official registration of the “Eesti kodukaytse,” it is difficult to talk about its numerical strength and legal status. It is known that it will be a part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and will be directly subordinate to it. Its primary tasks will be to assist the militia in every way in maintaining law and order in our republic.

Membership in this organization is strictly voluntary. And like any voluntary association of citizens, it must be registered and have its charter with a clearly defined range of rights and responsibilities. These are not militarized formations, although, naturally, each person who signs up must go through the appropriate training before performing his duties. According to available preliminary data, several thousand young people have already signed up, both native Estonians and non-Estonians.

Things are more complex with the “workers’ patrols.” The first problem involves their subordination. Everyone knows about their existence, but no one knows what their status is or to whom they are accountable. An announcement posted at the “Metallist” Plant (there you can sign up with V. Timofeyev in shop No 3) stated that “everyone to whom Soviet Estonia is dear and who has the strength to protect it, join the Militia Assistance Workers’ Detachments (ROSM).” At the republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, they know nothing about such a desire to “assist” the militia. What is more, it is the “workers’ patrols” or ROSM (?) who played a rather well-known role in the events of 15 May, when these formations opposed namely the militia.

Further, in speaking at a machine building plant on 11 May, M. Lysenko, chairman of the strike committee, reproached those present: “...all our enterprises have basically already organized workers’ patrols, but our enterprise has not.” As one can see, work has been going on for a long time and fairly secretly. One can only guess what goals the organizers of these detachments are
pursuing by conducting work by such a semi-underground method. [passage omitted]

Estonian Defense Groups' Roles Clarified
90UN2052C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Report by Committee of Estonia Press Service: "Who Will Protect Estonia?"]

[Text] On 22 May, the board of the Committee of Estonia discussed the mutual relations between the organizations "Kodukaytse" and "Kaytseliyt." One of the leaders of the "Kodukaytse" organization, A. Eevel, talked about its creation and activities. Representatives of the Committee of Estonia were most interested in why "Kodukaytse" was subordinate to the minister of internal affairs instead of combining this organization with the already functioning "Kaytseliyt." It turned out that the reason involved disagreements between the two security services. "Kaytseliyt" proceeds on the succession of the Estonian Republic formed in 1918 and therefore has agreed to participate in public actions, except for guarding buildings of the current government and Supreme Soviet.

It is planned to form from "Kaytseliyt" a service for protecting the independent Estonian Republic. The appeal to protect the government of the transitional period served as the reason for creating "Kodukaytse."

From all appearances, the negotiations which began on 22 May between the two organizations will become the basis for creating an effective service for maintaining law and order in Estonia.

In the extreme situation, both organizations expressed a readiness to act together.

Nazarbayev on Party Unity, Membership Losses, 'Kazakh Nationalism'
90US0742A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with N. Nazarbayev by G. Dildyayev: "On Party Solidarity: Thoughts of Kazakh CP First Secretary N. Nazarbayev"]

[Text] [Dildyayev] Nursultan Abishevich, on my way over here I grabbed letters from some former Communists. Reading them is a bitter but, in my opinion, highly instructive activity. Dictated out of a desire for self-explanation or to slam the door, akin to a confession, sermon, or rebuke, they really make you think, and sometimes force you to look at a lot of things in a new way.

[Dildyayev] I have no regrets about the people who slam the door, throw away their Party card, and then start hollering about the Party's schism or ruin. Or rather, I regret that kind of renegade wasn't tossed out of the CPSU before his noisy "exit."

Another matter is the people who lost faith or heart and didn't get any support. After all, when we join the Party we promise ourselves we'll be comrades in struggle. Lenin conceived of the Party as a union of spiritually close people with the greatest mutual understanding. Remember how benevolent and attentive Vladimir Ilich was to his comrades. And demanding, truly exacting, intolerant of amorphous positions as well. Party ethics were permeated with these human qualities of his. Unfortunately, we have long since eliminated that from our legacy.

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[Dildyayev] "For twenty years I paid dues, went to meetings, worked as hard as I could in those Party organizations I belonged to," writes Grishin from Dzhambulskaya Oblast. "I won't rehash the entire past, I won't talk about my own fruitless efforts. I did do something, I wasn't the worst Communist. But the sense of our estrangement has always depressed me and has compelled me to leave the Party. Seemingly, so much unites us that we should literally be prepared to fight for one another. But, now that we're in this mess, I now feel the utter lack of Party solidarity. I found that no one needed me. 'The detachment did not notice the loss of the warrior.'"

There's one of those letters. One might say that Grishin was unlucky. And leave it at that. Won't you agree, Nursultan Abishevich, though, that losses like this are by no means isolated or accidental. Why are our relations with one another so often almost intentionally harsh and official? Is it the fault of a general decline of culture? Or is it because the apparatus and the Communists live in different dimensions?

[Nazarbayev] Party solidarity is a topic that becomes more and more real every day. It seems to me that at the heart of the democratization of intra-Party life is the strengthening of precisely this feeling of Party solidarity. All the changes that have come about in the Party, its organizational structure, and its regulations must be aimed at bringing back this feeling, imbuing it with real consolidating power. Without it we will never manage the tasks of perestroyka.

[Dildyayev] Testimony to that is the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In no way, though, do we wish to call it conclusive. All that went on there was only a start... You didn't speak at the plenum, but I know that you had planned to. Why? Wasn't your "homework" good enough?

[Nazarbayev] I didn't speak, although I realized my desire partially in my work on the editorial board drafting the CPSU Central Committee platform. I was pleased that much of what I had already thought about coincided with the mood and conclusions of the plenum, which forced people to think, to try to make up their minds... The people who spoke from the tribune with their "homework" frequently demonstrated political deafness.
Once we recognized the reality, that is, the presence in our Party milieu not only of diverse views but also of coalescing movements and new political forces, we arrived at the necessity of fighting for our program, our values, within the framework of the democratic process. Seeking rather than seizing the leading role, to prove by deeds the validity of our claims—that is our point of departure, our new point of departure. And now, as we delimit our functions and define ourselves, we must understand that what unites us is not regulations but a restored sense of Party solidarity. The CPSU Central Committee’s platform for the 28th Congress, the draft of which the entire public is now studying, does, in my opinion, give such hope.

“The CPSU has lost its monopoly on power”—everyone endows this now endlessly repeated phrase with something of his own: malice, panic, regret, triumph. But believe me, I have also experienced a feeling of relief. Maybe this will offend someone’s ears, or even insult them, but it’s so: relief, precisely. And not only because a monopoly is a heavy burden, multiplied a hundredfold by a growing awareness of its lack of a future, its dead end. Freed of it, we Communists gain more than we lose. We acquire the opportunity to vanquish our opponents in the political struggle. After all, we’ve rather forgotten the taste of genuine victories. What we’ve had instead is the atrophy of our fighting qualities.

[Nazarbayev] I never tire of repeating: as we reorganize our ranks, we need to debureaucratize our relations. In point of fact, why should we Party members always knit our brows, have all our buttons buttoned?

[Dildyayev] So tightly buttoned that you can’t even see your soul?

[Nazarbayev] Here is what I’m now convinced of: the long years of emphasizing prescribed discipline and strictly regulated unanimity little by little trampled our sense of community, each person’s sense of being a part of a genuinely great cause. Each person’s! With all his peculiarities, social temperament, his point of view, his own reasoning.... Party ethics have been transformed into a selection of schematic commandments that nourish indifference and alienation. Here are all our losses.

But since you’ve started from a concrete example, I’ll talk about a concrete instance. Let’s look back in time a little. Kazakhs are quite familiar with the names of writer Saken Sayfullin and academicians Kanysh Satpayev and Yevney Buketov. These people, our national pride, were slighted for many years by the republic’s former leadership. Today we are giving back to the people, with love and a sense of permanent guilt, the names of repressed, slandered Communists. I think that this is true Party solidarity. Yes, it’s much too late, it should have come earlier, but as the saying goes, better late than never.

You don’t have to go far for examples, though. A few years ago R. Cherdabayev was relieved of his position as first secretary of the Gurievskiy Gorkom on, shall we say, trumped up grounds. Whatever, he dropped out of the nomenklatura and worked as a petroleum engineer. Last summer, when after the well-known events a need arose to revive the leadership of the Novouzenskiy Gorkom, the Communists remembered him. To become first secretary for a second time in the present day is an unusual fact. Apart from everything else, I see in it Communists’ strengthened solidarity.

[Dildyayev] The times we live in are often and justly called critical. But to thwart peoples’ destinies using the nature of the times as an excuse!... But there are some Party guardians who are reanimating the principle of “direct benefit,” the morality that says you can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.”

[Nazarbayev] There’s that as well.... Necessary cruelty spilling over into inadmissible cruelty.... We absolutely cannot allow that to happen again.

Recently, for example, we completed a Party investigation of a situation, or rather, incident—the clash in the Merkhenskiy Rayon of Dzhambulskaya Oblast. I’ll remind you of what happened there. The obkom bureau fired the raykom’s first secretary for serious shortcomings. A just decision. However, it did not feel it was necessary to explain it openly, to justify its viewpoint. At the raykom’s plenum a majority of its members did not support that decision. And what broke out after that! Instead of a comradely conversation, efforts to understand the Communists, they were accused of forming a clique, repressions rained down on them; 28 were disciplined, 8 of them kicked out of the Party. In short, they carried out a “We’ll show them!” campaign. And this in times of perestroyka!

[Dildyayev] In your recent public speeches evaluating the situation in the Party, you have talked about the necessity of restoring self-respect, and you have made appeals to put an end to self-abasement.

[Nazarbayev] Yes, I think we need to break the chain of censoring everything and everyone in the Party, a chain that has turned into a guiding thread, leading to a dead end. Be assured, I’m no “political Tolstoyan,” no absolver, but I also do not share the careless, almost voluptuous obstinacy over totally negative judgments of the people who worked before us and who are now trying to carry on. Rather, I cannot exult over such judgments. Universal nihilism, the desire to tear down everything “to its foundation”—this has simply become an end in itself for some leaders, both of the formal and informal persuasion. But we have already been through that.
three times: purification, renovation, is a powerful consolidating force. But can people, including us Communists, really be united by permanent animosity, unending exploitation of discontent provoked by old and new mistakes?

I want to be correctly understood. For example, I decided to criticize Politburo member D. Kunayev openly at our Party congress. I will say honestly: I did this after some difficult thinking, out of conviction, remembering who he was, and believing that time would render him the truest evaluations in any event. Yes, I criticized him constructively, on the issues. But really and truly, the eagerness to start whooping in the wake of those who are in a hurry to take advantage of a situation, to win points in a new situation, always grates. This relates to our issue of ethics.

[Dildyayev] History seems to be repeating itself. The first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party's Central Committee has left his post after working in the republic for two and a half years and right on his heels I start hearing wholesale abuse from one person or another.

[Nazarbayev] That, of course, is not comradely. I disdain people like that. I know, and Gennady Vasilevich himself is not entirely pleased about what went on under him, but in my opinion he worked hard and honestly.

[Dildyayev] What do you mean when you talk about the next steps in the democratization of the Party? Proposals to reexamine the CPSU's statutes, its program?

[Nazarbayev] In my opinion, perestroyka in the Party is being hindered by paternalism, which leaves only centralism from democratic centralism. More concretely? The curator institution, for example, and what I would call its oversight functions. Kindly tell me why we still have to lead a candidate for the tiniest post in one of the republic's rayons through the corridors of Moscow? What, are his merits more apparent there?

Yes, this is formalism, but it reeks of arrogant disregard for our own opinion and of something that looks very little like true comradely relations. In general, I believe, the loss of these kinds of relations is what is most inadmissible of all.

As I've already said, the participants in that December plenum of the Kazakh Communist Party's Central Committee were highly disciplined, they asked no questions, and it all ended in the voiceless raising of hands in favor of the sole nominated candidate, chosen by the apparatus and offered for election in the worst traditions of stagnation. And so the youth of Alma-Ata started asking questions.

The demonstration, which later spilled over into the well-known December events, had at its conception a strictly peaceful nature. It was not directed against the other peoples of Kazakhstan, especially against the Russians, with whom Kazakhs are linked by centuries-old traditions of genuine friendship and brotherhood. So here, the people on the square then asked: why didn't a resident of Kazakhstan become the republic's first leader? Russian as well as Kazakh names were cited. I want to stress that especially. And then the inability to listen and to act in a complicated situation, on the one hand, and the lack of democratic customs, on the other, passions heated up, and they were off and running.

Naturally, there is no excuse for disorderliness. There were many more reasons for the outburst. But I repeat, it really is the fault of the old approach.

In early 1987, a CPSU Central Committee resolution was promulgated “On the work of the Kazakh republic party organization in the international and patriotic education of the workers.” This was the first Party document in many years to make an attempt at critical analysis in such a complex sphere. Understandably, the context of the time has to be considered; it is from the vantage of our present-day ideas about national and interethnic problematicsthat we can see how hasty and overburdened this resolution is with old ideas. The platform of the CPSU Central Committee on the nationalities question is an incomparably more profound document.

[Dildyayev] The resolution contains expressions like “Kazakh nationalism.”

[Nazarbayev] The people of the republic, the Communists of multi-ethnic Kazakhstan, requested that the CPSU Central Committee reexamine these positions, which do not encourage comradely feelings.

Possibly someone will say: it's hard enough for the Party, and here Nazarbayev is making more claims. But it's life itself that's making the claims. I'm convinced our troubles will only increase if we don't break with everything that has been outlived, that is putting the brakes on the Party's development.

The republic's Communist Party cannot be restrained by the puppet strings of indefinite tutelage. Why are we still so deathly afraid of the natural question of whether the Communist Party has national interests? Yes, of course it does! But who said that they necessarily contradict general Party and human interests? These interests can and should be harmonized—that's the crux of the situation. Imparting new content to the Soviet federation will necessarily revitalize the Party structure as well. Excessive centralization, regulating every step in politics as well as economics, has to be done away with. As was rightly envisaged by the platform passed at the plenum.

[Dildyayev] Doesn't the rise in independence among the Communist parties provoke separatists sentiments? Aren't these processes parallel?

[Nazarbayev] These are phantom fears. Real life consists of such a diversity of political, economic, historical, and
human ties, that only a madman could decide to cut them. What can be truly dangerous is separatism of an ideological persuasion. But I see no reasons for that; after all, there is no alternative to the ideology of perestroika. For all the pluralism of opinion, this is the generally recognized point of departure for all our thoughts and actions.

And finally. We began our conversation with a discussion of people who are quitting the Party and about their reasons for doing so. To this I would add that in the last year approximately 2,500 people have left the party, and 21,000 have joined! And these are reliable people, because they came to the Party when times were hard.
Sociologist Surveys Armenian Voters' Attitudes
90US0969A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
19 Apr 90 pp 1-2

[Article by G. Pogosyan, head of the Department of Sociology at the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law under the rubric “In the Mirror of Public Opinion”: “The Person or the Platform?”]

[Text] We have already published a summary of results tabulated in the polling of three rayons in Yerevan—Mashtotskiy, Spandaryanskiy, and Shaumanskiy rayons—by the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. Here, in somewhat more detail, we will focus on the results obtained in polling the voters of Shaumanskiy Rayon, comprising about 1,500 people. The poll of this rayon was carried out quite recently, in February 1990, and the analysis was completed in March. Of those polled, 49.7 percent were male and 50.3 percent were female. Sixteen percent were between the ages of 18 and 25; 13.2 percent between 26 and 29; 45.9 percent between 30 and 44; 16.8 percent between 45 and 60; and 8.1 percent were in their 60’s. Respondents included 24.7 with general secondary-school educations, 23 percent with specialized secondary-school educations, and 52.3 percent who had either completed or attended educational programs without completing them at a higher level. These results attest to the rather high educational level among those polled. The predominant majority of persons polled—70.9 percent—were not CPSU members; 18.3 percent were party members, and 10.7 percent were members of the Komso- mol. Seventy-eight percent of those polled had lived in Yerevan for more than 25 years or since birth.

The results of the poll indicate that 43.5 percent of eligible voters did not participate in the elections of 26 March last year, and that from 16 to 20 percent do not intend to take part in the upcoming election campaign. Moreover, 25 percent of them are undecided whether they will vote or not. The situation in the republic, it is apparent, resembles that of the country as a whole. In last year’s elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian republics, sociologists predicted a significant fall-off in voter activity. The fact is that the elections were carried out amid a certain apathy and indifference on the part of voters to the events that were taking place. In the RSFSR, for example, an average of 67 percent of eligible voters took part in the elections; in Moscow, less than that—only 64 percent; and in a number of voting districts elections were not even held, owing to the fact that less than half the voters turned out at the precincts.

The reasons for such a drop in activity are entirely understandable. Chief among them is a certain disillusionment associated with disappointed hopes in the election of the USSR People’s Deputies. The hopes aroused in the deputies, which proved to be unjustified, and the activities of the new parliament have led to a situation in which people now regard the republic elections without particular enthusiasm, supposing that even less is to be expected of them. It should be recognized at once that such an attitude is mistaken and extremely dangerous. Today more than ever our republic is in need of a strong, unified, and decisive parliament that will prove itself capable of leading us out of the present crisis, and that will effectively thwart any attempts to violate the sovereign rights of the republic. Most important, the republic’s new parliament, reflecting the genuine interests of the people, should be capable of working out a far-sighted policy designed to bring about a national development program in Armenia.

What kind of people do voters envision as deputies in the new republic? The poll enables us to clarify the political preferences of the voters even before the candidates are nominated. In response to the question “Who has more chances of winning election to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet?” the following answers were given: the party leadership, 19.6 percent; the leadership of the AOD, 49.7 percent; members of the informal or non-official association Nakhabkorurderen, 3.5 percent; supporters of the Ayriyan, 6 percent; and other “informals,” 1.7 percent. About 20 percent of persons polled had difficulty responding to this question.

These results are substantially different from those obtained in Mashtotskiy and Spandaryanskiy rayons, where from 22 to 28 percent of the voters thought that the party leadership had the best chance of winning, from 14 to 16 percent picked informals to win, and 39 percent were of the opinion that winning was simply a matter of who exercised most personal authority in the region. Given the data, however, there can be no further disagreement since representatives of the AOD and other informal as well as formal organizations are to be included among the people exercising personal authority among the population. On the whole, it may be presumed that on the order of from 20 to 25 percent of the voters are predisposed to vote for persons representing the party or soviets; that another 20 to 25 percent will vote for representatives of informal organizations, principally the AOD; and the great mass remaining either have not yet defined their political preferences and will vote on a purely individual basis, apart from the deputy’s political affiliation. That is, they will vote for the person, not the party.

This situation, it must be said, is typical also for the country as a whole; for we have only just begun to form alternative political parties us, we still lack experience in political activities, and we have yet to work out clear-cut programs and platforms of our own. In many respects, but especially with respect to style of operation, the new parties are emulating and adopting what has been undergoing development for decades within the party apparatus and right now is being subjected to sharp criticism. That is why the voters are more inclined to vote on the basis of purely personal preference rather than for political platforms, which are still not well known to everybody.
Thus 66.5 percent of all the voters believe that party affiliation makes no difference to them. A majority of party members—62.2 percent—are of the same opinion. This attitude of voters who are party members to the party affiliation of the deputy reflects a disconcerting shift in social awareness with respect to the idea of multiple parties. Judge for yourselves: 13.9 percent of voters who are party members think that a deputy should be without party affiliation; 10.3 percent think that he should be a member of an informal organization; and only 13 percent think that he should be required to be a communist. A majority of the voters preferred a candidate for deputy to be of middle age, between 35 and 50, of Armenian nationality, and for the most part with higher educations and with a family, as well as being a resident of the rayon in which he was running for office.

Voter opinions varied as follows with respect to a deputy’s professional background: 53.7 percent were of the opinion that the future deputy should be a worker; 16.2 percent thought that he should be a white-collar worker; 49.5 percent that he should be a representative of the intelligentsia; 35.7 percent that he should be an industrial or farm manager; 1.5 percent that he should be a representative of the administrative system; 0.9 percent that he should not be otherwise employed; and 23 percent were of the opinion that it made no difference.

Clearly, the desires and expectations of the voter bear no resemblance to the composition of candidates for deputy whose nominations have only just been completed. A cursory review is sufficient to see that the overwhelming majority of candidates—from 60 to 65 percent—are made up of representatives of the party apparat or managers of various kinds. Representatives of the intelligentsia total no more than 20 percent. The impression left is of a board of directors being assembled rather than the Supreme Soviet. Is not this turn of events disillusioning to our voters? And will not the ballot boxes be half empty in May?

The poll also made it possible to reveal the political priorities of the voters. What follows, in fact, is a collection of demands they are voicing with respect to the political platforms and the election campaigns of the candidates. Here are the answers received in response to the question: “What kind of program will you vote for in the coming elections?”

- That which advocates strengthening nationality-oriented schools and preserving the purity of the mother tongue—9.3 percent;
- That which urges a maximum effort to create a free economic zone in Armenia—9 percent;
- That which considers the main task to be the restoration of the earthquake zone—8.8 percent;
- That which regards resolving the everyday problems and needs of the people as the priority tasks—7.1 percent;
- That which offers a program of ecological renewal—5.2 percent;
- That which is outspokenly opposed to the secession of Armenia from the USSR—4.3 percent;
- That which proposes the establishment of an independent Armenian Republic—3.2 percent;
- That which concentrates entirely on refugee problems—4 percent;
- That which promises to pursue the Gorbachev program of democratization—1 percent.

It may be seen that there is a rather wide diversity of opinion. Obviously, the issue of seeking a just resolution to the problem of Artsakh ranks in first place.

Many voters believe that if we uproot the negative tendencies of our society, it will become possible to resolve expeditiously an array of problems facing the republic. It is no accident that the problem of creating a multi-party system by eliminating the dominant role of the Communist Party ranks third in order of importance; for this order reflects an obvious dissatisfaction in the minds of the voters with the positions and platforms of the party apparat in combating bribery and corruption in the republic. They want to see more determined steps being taken to eliminate these poisons from the years of stagnation which even today hamper the process of democratization and domestic renewal in the republic. The voters are therefore ready to cast their ballots for those deputy candidates who call for decisive measures and an effective program to deal with our many problems—in particular, those the importance of which has been noted by the voters themselves. These problems include the effort to restore the earthquake zone, the refugee problem, the ecology and environmental protection, and the establishment of an economic free zone, as well as many others.

The chances of becoming a deputy are not very great for those candidates who champion the cause of a free and independent Armenia and an exodus from the ranks of the Communist Party. Their chances are even somewhat slimmer than are those of candidates who speak out against secession from the USSR. As we anticipated, this issue, which was rather hotly debated at meetings and even at sessions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet,
proved in fact to be of vital interest for the present to only a narrow circle of people and did not affect the broad mass of the people. The people understand very well that for the present there are other tasks of extreme importance confronting the republic. Insofar as the succession issue is of legitimate concern, it requires a comprehensive and thorough analysis, and it cannot and must not be decided in the heat of the moment. The voters have in this respect displayed an admirable unanimity. Men and women, young and old, named the same political priorities—with only minor differences. Women, for example, put the issue of preserving the mother tongue fourth in order of importance; whereas men put in fourth place eliminating the dominant role of the Communist Party with the introduction of a multi-party system.

Persons with higher educations tended to designate such an issue as the introduction of a multi-party system third in order of priority; while those with secondary general or specialized educations tended to designate a constitutional solution to the problem of Artsakh.

It is noteworthy that of those who gave a priority to eliminating the dominant role of the Communist Party and introducing a multi-party system, 19.1 percent were party members themselves. Moreover, 36 voters who were party members indicated that they would vote for a deputy who stood in favor of proclaiming the independence of Armenia, while 58 voting members indicated they would vote for persons opposed to secession from the USSR.

In conclusion, it should be noted that voters as a rule registered their concern not with any single problem but with several problems facing the country today. We have singled them out in order of importance and priority given them by the voters, but this is not to suggest that they can be dealt with separately. Since virtually all these problems are functionally interrelated, they must be dealt with in their entirety. It is the hope of the voters is that all these problems may be resolved by the new Armenian parliament. But in order for this to happen, it must become a parliament of national concord—uniting the various political forces in the republic—rather than an arena of unending discord and disputes arising from clashing personal ambitions of the deputies.

Armenian Sees Azerbaijan in Defiance of Soviet Authority

90US0981A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
1 May 90 p 1

[Article by Amayak Oganesyan, political expert: “The Republic’s Alarmgning Spring”]

[Text] May Day is celebrated throughout the world as a holiday of the unity and brotherhood of all people, irrespective of race, skin color, or religious affiliation. Everyone who is having a difficult time, who is languishing in captivity, who is suffering under the heel of tyranny, or is subjected to discrimination and bloody oppression must sense on that day the strength of universal human solidarity and support in their just struggle for their civic rights and national dignity.

Today it is impossible to find a spot on the world’s map where as much pain and suffering, as many tortures and insults, have accumulated as they have in Armenia. The history that dealt cruelly with our nation at the beginning of the century had apparently completely exhausted the ill-starred Pandora’s box and we could rest assured that the past would remain only in our memories. The bloody events of February 1988 in Sumgait opened our eyes and showed us the ephemeral nature of our seven decades of complacency. Dozens of people killed, hundreds crippled, tens of thousands of refugees—women, old men, and children. The false catch phrases about “international” Azerbaijan were crowned by the monstrous crime of genocide—as the twentieth century came to an end, before the eyes of all of civilized mankind...

However, that was only the beginning. The impunity of the organizers of the vile deeds led to their repetition in Khodzhalu, Kirovabad, and Shamkhorskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan in the autumn of 1988. The coiled-up spring of national hatred was released with violent force. The dam restraining it—the dam of legal responsibility for the crimes committed—was broken, and nothing could stop the blood bath that ensued. Not even the tragedy of a nation that had lost as a result of a devastating earthquake tens of thousands of its sons and daughters. Not even the humanitarian upsurge of people from all around the world, people speaking various languages, who came to give their aid, to save and to warm the victims of the natural calamity.

Since the autumn of 1989 there has been a permanent blockade of Armenia, a blockade that has brought the republic’s economy to the brink of catastrophe. The restoration operations in the earthquake zone have been disrupted. Construction sites are completely empty. The blockade of Armenia, a blockade that has brought the victims of the natural calamity.

The events of January 1990 in Baku showed once again that the blockade, like the antigovernmental actions on the Iranian border and the genocide of the Armenian and Russian-speaking population in Azerbaijan, were aimed at discrediting the policy of perestroyka. The organizers of those vile deeds—which were skillfully aimed and orchestrated—would have liked to have them identified as the results of perestroyka, and to depict perestroyka itself as a synonym for complete permissiveness and anarchy.

From the point of view of the inspirers of the criminal January 1990, in Azerbaijan, it is possible in a lawgoverned state to shut off the railroad arteries and to destroy the state border. In his statement at a meeting of the party and economic aktiv on 8 January 1990, G. Gasanov, the current chairman of the Azerbaijan
Council of Ministers, said, "Isn't it a crisis of evaluation when we call the tearing down of the reinforced cinder-block wall between socialist Berlin and capitalist Berlin a new way of thinking, but we call the taking down in Nakhlachevan of barbed wire running a half-kilometer from the border an aspiration of extremists." Thus, in the opinion of the highly placed Azerbaijani figure, if we have also proclaimed perestroika to be a new way of thinking, then we should not name the participants in the crimes. Nor should we defend the USSR State Border against encroachments: it would seem that in a law-governed state it is possible to destroy the border freely and to cross over onto the territory of other states. But one cannot move freely over the territory of the Soviet state and develop mutually advantageous economic ties between NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and Armenia.

"We are proceeding toward a law-governed state," Gasanov continued in his statement at the aktiv meeting, "and we authorize the journalist to call the thousands of people, including old men, women, and children, who participated in the tearing down of the barbed wire a group of extremists, and to determine by direct observation that they are narcotics addicts." Hence the conclusion: no steps should be taken to stop the riots on the state border. It is possible to establish smooth contacts of "kinship" with the citizens of another state, but it is impossible to establish them among the citizens of a single country, the Soviet Union—the Armenians in Karabakh and in Armenian SSR. The barbed wire on the border between Iran and the USSR is inadmissible, but the siege of a Soviet autonomous oblast by Soviet Azerbaijan is completely admissible.

Moreover, five days before the pogroms in Baku, Gasanov self-critically proclaimed at a meeting of the party aktiv, "Our tactics are well thought-out to be peace-making and to have a calming effect," thus calling for more decisive and aggressive actions. We are well aware of what the refusal to use these tactics that were "well thought-out to be peace-making and to have a calming effect" led to. Once again, dozens of people killed and tens of thousands of refugees from Azerbaijan.

All of this could only heat up the already complicated sociopolitical situation in Armenia. Something that evoked special indignation was the deportation of the Armenian population from the settlements of Azat and Kam, in Khailarskiy Rayon, Azerbaijan, that are adjacent to NKAO, in late February of this year. That illegal action was carried several days later, after a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet where the January events in Baku were evaluated. Public opinion in Armenia unambiguously evaluated that action as a manifestation of the center's inability to curb the illegal actions being carried out by the Azerbaijani side, or to react adequately to the NFA's [Azerbaijan National Front] tactics of blackmail and armed riot.

On this ground there arose a dangerous tendency to view violence as the sole method in a key that was favorable to oneself to have an effect on the course of events. Under the impression of connivance by the center and its lack of desire to prevent the deportation of the Armenian population of Azat and Kamo, mass awareness started to move toward the point of view according to which the center was ignoring the civilized, peaceful method of posing the problems and was recognizing only the factor of pressure by the use of crude force. Another opinion that received broad acceptance was that the center, intimidated by the Azerbaijani riots, was ready to make any concessions at the expense of the Armenians. Hence there arose the temptation to think that it was only by resorting to violent actions such as those that had occurred in the course of the January events in Baku that one could force the center to observe parity in the approach to both republics and to take the Armenians' rights and interests into consideration.

The consequences of these moods manifested themselves in the criminal actions that well deserve censure: the seizure of the building housing the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, and the attack directed against the building housing the ArSSR KGB. As a result, the new party leader had to face a situation qualitatively different from the previous one: the sharp intensification of the anti-center and separatist manifestations, and the domination in the mass awareness of nihilism with regard to the possibilities of the lawful settlement of the problems arising in the trans-Caucasus.

Under these conditions the republic's leadership found the only true solution. The posing of the task of achieving national consent and of neutralizing the populist tendencies by consolidating the best representatives of the intelligentsia, the working class, and the peasantry promised to return the lost trust in democratic, constitutional discussion of the vitally important problems—primarily the problems pertaining to NKAO. Of course, in order to do that, it will be necessary to travel a difficult path. However, the beginning of that path has been laid: in a statement made by V. M. Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, at a meeting of the republic's party aktiv, the concept of creating a National Consent Council received thorough substantiation. The council's basic goals and the immediate prospects for its activities were formulated. The proposed program found a response both among the broad social segments and among the intelligentsia. A large group of scientists and public figures make public statements supporting it.

However, the shifts that were just beginning to be noticed in normalizing the sociopolitical situation in the republic were disrupted by the adoption on 21 April by the Presidium of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet of an illegal decision concerning changes in the administrative-territorial division of NKAO. That action, which was frankly aimed at changing the demographic situation in Nagornyy Karabakh, caused a shock condition in Armenia. No one, even in his wildest dreams, could have assumed that the laws guaranteeing the rights of the autonomous formations and the agencies of local self-government could be trampled on in such a frank,
cynical form. Because as recently as 9 April the USSR Supreme Soviet had enacted the Law entitled “General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Economy in the USSR,” Article 23, Section IV, of which guarantees the supporting of the complete powers of the agencies of local self-government in developing the territory. That article requires “the mandatory coordination with the appropriate soviet of people’s deputies of any measures that can lead to economic, demographic, or other consequences that affect the interests of the territory’s population.”

Just indignation is evoked by the latest attempt to use for political purposes the refugees from Armenia—the victims of those same insidious forces in Azerbaijan that at first immolated the peaceful Armenian population of Sumgait, and then, having sown the seeds of fear among the Azerbaijani population of Armenia, urged that population to abandon the places where they had lived all their lifetime. In January those refugees were used in order to justify the genocide of the Armenians in the city of Baku. At that time it was asserted in Azerbaijan that the eviction of the Armenians was the only possibility of resolving the housing problem created by the persons who had resettled from Armenia. But now, when not a single Armenian remains in Baku, and the amount of housing made available as a result of the genocide of Armenians and Russians is more than twice the amount necessary to provide for the persons who have resettled from Armenia, the attempt is being made to prove that those resettled persons must settle down in blockaded Karabakh, where 80 percent of the population is made up of Armenians.

The intentions of the originators of this far-ranging plan are obvious. They involve the forced changing of the demographic situation in NKAO, following the example of Nakhichevan ASSR. This goal is confirmed by the refusal of the Azerbaijani side to recognize the results of the population census in NKAO.

Throughout the country, in all the republics, USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] carried out a census, but Azerbaijan objected to conducting that nationwide measure in NKAO. It is as though the sovereignty of the USSR over the country’s entire territory does not exist. It is as though Azerbaijan’s sovereignty is higher than the Union’s sovereignty.

But what can one do if the center today is actually refusing to exercise its own rights? If it refuses to make such an obvious decision, a decision that is capable of relieving the tension in the situation and of guaranteeing tranquility in the region—the introduction of presidential government in NKAO...

Are we really to believe that the center is not troubled by the fact that in Azerbaijan—where quite recently, in January, the mass movement for that republic’s secession from the USSR made itself menacingly known, and where a decision concerning that was even adopted at the level of the supreme agency of authority, and the supreme agency of Nakhichevan ASSR deemed it possible to send the United Nations a declaration concerning secession from the Union, after the enactment by USSR Supreme Soviet on 3 April 1990 of the Law entitled “Procedure for Resolving Questions Linked With the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR”—feverish efforts with the purpose of Azerbaijanizing the NKAO began to be undertaken? Are we really to believe that people in the center are not being asked the question: why is this being done?

Political farsightedness requires seeing the link between the January events in Azerbaijan and the current attempts to achieve demographic parity or even a preponderance of Azerbaijanis over Armenians in NKAO, on the one hand, and Article 3 of the USSR Law entitled “Procedure for Resolving Questions Linked With the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR,” on the other.

The Armenian nation has never been indifferent to the fate of the borders of the Russian state. Defending those borders, it has brought to the sacrificial altar of devotion to the Russian orientation of life two million of its sons and daughters. And today also, when our souls are seething in confusion and many people, by the will of circumstances and under the impression of the cruel insults and disappointments of the past two years, are makes an agonizing reappraisal of their values, one wants to hope that the alarms will pass and the mighty tree of our thousand-year-old community will yield fruit again.

Starovoytova Interviewed on Armenian Refugee Problems
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[Text] “...We need a wise fundamental concept for resolving the fate of the refugees. We need a policy that is ahead of things. But we are still in the pose of an ostrich that has hidden his head in the sand...”

Who is unaware of the fact that in Moscow and many other cities today thousands of people are wandering about in poverty? “Oh, the refugees—it’s terrible...” But what
are we doing for the refugees? What should the government do? What can society do?

We had a conversation with People's Deputy Galina Starovoytova late one evening at the Moskva Hotel. She had just returned in a disturbed frame of mind from the Armenian permanent representation, where she had heard many reproaches from refugees who had been spending the night on the floor for two months: "No one needs us... The deputies argue about the presidential election, but they can't be bothered about our fate."

[L. Grafova] Galina Vasilyevna, to the best of my knowledge, at a recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that dealt with the national question, it was you who demanded the enactment of a law governing the status of the refugees. Am I correct?

[G. Starovoytova] It was not just me. There was also deputy Chechshev from Zaporozhzhia. And several others also touched upon it in passing. A very strong statement was made by a deputy who is an actor by profession—Sos Sarkisyan. He emphasized that he was no politician and was speaking in simple everyday language about the atrocities in Baku, about the raping of old women... It sounded terrible. But our proposal was not adopted. I had proposed that the Committee on Questions of Legislation immediately develop, within a two-week period, the draft of a Law governing the status of the refugees in the USSR with a consideration of international legal standards.

[L. Grafova] Don't the deputies really have such a draft?

[G. Starovoytova] That's where the problem lies. There isn't any draft yet. I happened to get by chance a study made by a deputy who is an actor by profession—Sos Sarkisyan. He emphasized that he was no politician and was speaking in simple everyday language about the atrocities in Baku, about the raping of old women... It sounded terrible. But our proposal was not adopted. I had proposed that the Committee on Questions of Legislation immediately develop, within a two-week period, the draft of a Law governing the status of the refugees in the USSR with a consideration of international legal standards.

[L. Grafova] That is, every third person needs housing?

[G. Starovoytova] No other republic has a similar situation. Add to that the blockade, the freeze on construction, the departure of construction workers, including those from other countries, who had begun to help after the earthquake. All these things demoralized the Armenian people so much that the age-old friendship with Russia (300 years of efforts by that same tsarist government) is being put under doubt. In a certain Armenian village I was asked by a simple peasant: don't the Russians remember that we Armenians fought alongside of you against the Turks? I thought a bit and then had to admit bitterly: no, they do not remember. It is difficult for them to understand. The entire mentality of the Armenians is saturated with history.

As for the Russian refugees, the Goskomtrud study recommends "encouraging" them to return to Baku. This very division of the fates of the victims on the basis of nationality evokes a protest. It turns out that the government seemingly is taking the position of the persecutors and is silently agreeing with them. It is as though they are saying, "You don't like the Armenians, and you have driven absolutely all of them out, but that's okay." But without the Russians (of whom there are still many in Baku), industry would come to a stop... Also, it is strategically important for the government to have Russians living in Azerbaijan. Therefore the Russians should be encouraged to return.

I am incapable of understanding this "conception." It seems to me to be just as immoral as it is unrealistic. I made a deputy's query to Shcherbakov, chairman of Goskomtrud: "Vladimir Ivanovich, on what are these principles in the draft based?.. Haven't you forgotten that Armenia was destroyed by the earthquake?..." I did not get any answer.

[L. Grafova] Nevertheless, Galina Vasilyevna, the optimal resolution of the refugee question is, of course, return. However well we find housing and jobs for them, to the end of his life any resident of Baku, I think, will be homesick for his city as though it were a paradise lost. And we must not proceed from the assumption that Azerbaijanis will perpetually slaughter Armenians... True, all you have to do during a conversation with refugees is just to hint at their returning, and you will hear, "Never! Not for anything in the world!" People are completely terrified, but they are happy to be alive. And they seemingly do not need anything else. It seems that they do not complain about anything. But then they suddenly remember what they have lived through...

[G. Starovoytova] You have to look truth straight in the eyes. It is cruel: they do not have anywhere to return to. Neither the Armenians, nor the Russians. Their apartments were occupied long ago.
[L. Grafova] To be completely just, we might state more precisely that many apartments in Baku have apparently been occupied by those unfortunate Yer-Azes (Yerevan Azerbaijanis) who had been forced to leave their homes in Armenia and to roam around for a long time without a roof over their heads...

[G. Starovoytova] In general, I feel that we cannot discuss today the optimal resolution of the problem. It might be better for those persons if they gave up their illusions immediately.

[L. Grafova] At one of the conferences at Goskomtrud, the deputy chairman of the Baku City Soviet spoke. He had come to meet with the Russian refugees and to ask them whether they wanted to return to Azerbaijan. He was asked whether he would guarantee the safety of those persons. He answered vaguely. He recalled that once Vezirov had already given the Armenians that kind of guarantee and many believed him then and returned...

[G. Starovoytova] The deputies from Azerbaijan demanded at the session that the troops be withdrawn from Baku. In my statement I said that I agreed with my Azerbaijani comrades: couldn’t the Soviet authority stand firm by force of weapons? That should be a matter of free choice for the nation itself. The troops should be withdrawn, but with the proviso that none of the people remaining in Baku should suffer any more. For that purpose it is necessary within a month’s time or some other definite period of time to grant to everyone who does not feel that he is safe there the right to leave the republic calmly. Irrespective of nationality. After all, there are many Azerbaijanis who are married to Armenian wives. Or those democrats who parted from the policy of the people’s front. But so much blood has already been spilled that the government does not have the right to put people at any more risk.

[L. Grafova] But today the fear of pogroms has seemingly become a component part of the atmosphere in many parts of the country. We are living as though on a field that has been mined, and no one knows where a mine might explode at any moment. Should the recommendation really be given to all “foreign speakers” ahead of time that they leave the republics? But where should they go? Or should they just hide?

[G. Starovoytova] Approximately 60 million people are living today on territory that is not their own republic. As the author of a monograph concerning ethnic minorities, I am well aware of the fathomless complexity of this problem. But I definitely feel that we need a wise fundamental concept for resolving the fate of the refugees. We need a policy that is ahead of things. But we are still in the pose of an ostrich that has hidden his head in the sand. We do not make any serious conclusions from our own tragic experience. But it is sometimes advantageous for certain people to make conclusions that are opposite to common sense. For example, in justification of the late sending of troops into Baku, the reason given is... “the Tbilisi syndrome.” The center, it was said, was experiencing doubts like Hamlet. But people were being burned and butchered at that time! The center didn’t receive any truthful information from the republic? Well, I can assume that.

I talked a lot with the deputies from the commission on the Tbilisi events. They ascertained that there exist five information sources on the basis of which decisions such as this are made. Five sources, and all of them, essentially speaking, are unmonitored. First of all there is information along party channels. It is of two kinds: written enciphered messages (there are comparatively few of them) and high-frequency telephone conversations. Every day someone at the Central Committee who is responsible for a particular republic receives a local telephone summary. Only in those instances when it is necessary to have official confirmation to enable the person taking action to remove the responsibility from himself does he ask to have a cipher message sent. But high-frequency telephone communication is absolutely incapable of being intercepted or restored. The third source is MVD information. Then there is independent army intelligence, which, incidentally, is the most reliable. And, finally, a KGB summary. It would seem that the KGB always knows everything exactly.

[L. Grafova] At the present time people hopefully think about the KGB that they’re the ones who can prevent the possibility of pogroms in other places. During Andropov’s time, the opinion was firmly established in the public’s awareness that the most competent people were working there, and that corruption had not completely eroded that structure...

[G. Starovoytova] Well, then... I happened to become acquainted with a KGB summary for December-January. I am well aware of the state of affairs in Armenia, which elected me as deputy, so I was able to make comparisons. I discovered a huge number of inaccuracies! We are talking, you might recall, about the events that had prompted the Baku events. The KGB summary mentions, for example, an anti-Armenian rally in Stepanakert. Ten thousand people had allegedly gathered there... Who were they? Where had they come from? Because there is no Azerbaijani population in Stepanakert. Are we really supposed to believe that no one knew that “detail”? It was also stated in that summary that Ashot Manucharyan had spoken on 1 December, and it was allegedly after that that “everything began”... But Manucharyan had not been making any statements at all at that time! But Vezirov’s fateful statement over Baku television on 13 January is not mentioned at all in the summary. If even the KGB is that confused, how can one rely on the competency of the other sources? Ought one to be surprised after this that, when the next social catastrophe occurs, society will not be able to answer the question, “Who’s to blame?”

Gorbachev said at that session that, in his opinion, there was no need to create a parliamentary commission to consider the Baku events. Actually, there really are too many of them, the KPD [efficiency] of their activities...
(other than the commission to consider the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) is too low. The commissions are deprived of the opportunity to restore by means of documentation the course of events. At the governmental level, we do not have the same kind of "black box" that is opened up after an aircraft accident. But we have a vital need for it! Those secret conversations on high-frequency telephone, the most frightening weapon to enforce the power of the party apparatus (and the weapon for its self-preservation!), must definitely be recorded, for example, on tape. That tape could be kept in a special safe and should be kept absolutely secret for a certain length of time, but, in principle, it must exist for historical purposes.

[L. Grafova] Certainly not just for historical purposes...

[G. Starovoytova] Of course, this is necessary first of all for developing the legal mechanism for decision-making in those acute situations.

[L. Grafova] I have become rather closely involved with the refugee problem and I have seen not only the despair of those people who feel that they are people without a future, but also the confused mental state, bordering on desperation, of officials. Approximately 90 ministries, both union and RSFSR, participate in finding accommodations for the refugees in boarding homes and rest homes. They have knocked themselves out finding accommodations for them. But only for a very few of them. About 6000 or 7000. And yet there are approximately a half-million refugees in RSFSR, most of whom are "unorganized," and have found accommodations for themselves wherever they could. Meanwhile, the three-month period that the "organized" individuals have for free housing is coming to an end. What are they going to do then? No one knows. At that same Goskomtrud it was reported that the draft of the law governing the forced migrants "is in the stage of having the contradictions removed." That is, it is roaming around from office to office. It turns out that Gosplan in general is against this kind of law. It feels that there are enough governmental decrees. The MVD also objects. And Minyust [Ministry of Justice] insists...

P. S. Rudev, chief of USSR Goskomtrud's Citizens Migration and Resettlement Service, told me that many highly placed officials begin to help the refugees enthusiastically, but then give up, finding themselves down a blind alley. For example, L. A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, undertook the job heatedly, "leaned" on the ministries, as Rudev expressed it, "with all the power accessible to him," but a month later threw up his hands, saying, "No, these people do not need our help." The refugees themselves are allegedly taking a hostile attitude and refusing the kinds of jobs being offered to them.

[G. Starovoytova] Of course working with refugees is a terrifying job. It involves profoundly traumatized people, each of whom certainly needs help from a psychologist or priest. It is a pity that for the most part they are nonbelievers. But the officials do not want to get into the position of these people, nor can they do so. And the people themselves, unfortunately, naively hope that the government will resolve everything for them. These illusions also, this infantilism demonstrated by the people, are also the fault of the government and of education. I remember that after the earthquake in Spitak I asked a doctor from an Italian hospital what he thought the psychological peculiarities of our patients were. He said: astonishing passivity, up to the point where a person would wait for the doctor to move his wounded leg from one place to another. "Your people keep waiting for something from without, and they rely very little upon themselves."

In that same permanent representation, in the hotels, young and strong men live for months at a time alongside of the sick and old people. What are those young men doing? They're simply waiting! I put myself in their shoes. I don't think I would wait for two days for "manna from heaven." I would tell myself that I had emigrated, I was now in a foreign country, I would go wash dishes in a restaurant, or I would get a job at a cooperative where I would not need a registration card. We revile the American system with its fierce competition, but actually that is a healthier approach than creating in people the illusion that they are being socially protected, and then throwing them to the will of fate.

[L. Grafova] Recently a courier from a group of Baku pilots came to our editorial office. They are still living in a boarding house in the Moscow suburbs. They are highly skilled specialists whose profession is needed everywhere, but they have driven around, visiting many cities, and no housing has been offered to them anywhere. Not even a promise of it. People have been pushed to the limit. They say, "We'll seize offices in the Ministry of Aviation and begin living there with our families." I realize that this question is not in your area of responsibility, but what are people like this supposed to do?

[G. Starovoytova] People like this have also appealed to me. True, they were not pilots. They were passengers on the IL-86 that arrived at Vnukovo from Baku and then stayed on runway No. 27 for three days with the people still on board. They didn't have any documents, or any warm clothing, and no one wanted to help them get resettled. One of the refugees telephoned me, asking whether they should maintain the defense any more. They decided not to leave until they received some kind of guarantees. Aeroflot fed them, but you can imagine the situation in the toilets and in general. I telephoned the chief of the cargo service. He was completely distraught and was indignant at these "obstinate people." I would think so. After all, the plane had proven to be grounded for three days. Finally, they were all put into a hotel anyway.

And there was yet another rather symbolic scene. During the second deputy congress, a group of refugees who had been refused acceptance anywhere broke through a
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militia cordon and seized the vestibule of the Moskva Hotel where our deputies were staying. They spread their meager belongings out on the floor. Children were crying. But the imperturbable deputies kept walking past them, discussing rather abstract questions, such as the best place in the law to place a comma. But the question of the refugees’ status was not even put, I repeat, on the agenda.

[L. Grafova] Probably because no one knows how to begin to resolve it. It’s all a matter of our poverty...

[G. Starovoytova] No, it’s the priority of values. Having proclaimed the primacy of universal human values, we continue to put people’s needs in the last place. Are there no funds for people whom the government could not protect against pogroms? If so, then why launch ships into space? Why maintain the world’s largest tank corps? Why not sell those tanks to Libya, as has already been done? Every tank costs $800,000...

[L. Grafova] The refugees themselves suggest alternative: selling their manpower abroad. A method that is extremely popular throughout the world is the hiring of people in accordance with temporary contracts. These people are “Gastarbeiter”—“guest workers.” That way, the refugees say, we ourselves could earn currency for the construction of housing for our own families, and, in addition to currency, could bring back to our country the practical skills needed in highly industrialized labor, as occurred, for example, in Algeria... They still cannot understand why we are wandering around with jobs, at a time when our government is hiring a large number of Vietnamese citizens who, in the same city of Moscow, occupy entire dormitories and who are working without any particular enthusiasm, as has been reported several times in the press. Finally... In those same VDNKh [Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy] hotels where, as you put it, the refugees are awaiting “manna from heaven,” specially recruited workers from the distant corners of our country are also living. Do you say that these are remarkable specialists? But after working for a month and getting a large amount of money, many of them get blind-drunk. Calls for the militia, for an ambulance... The refugees raise the question of why their efforts are not being used for those operations, pending the final resolution of the refugees’ problem.

[G. Starovoytova] I am especially upset at the fact that the immorality of the policy with respect to the refugees causes the local population to be vicious and hateful toward them. These people, whom the government could not defend against pogroms, have the right, now at least, to count on the government’s special concern. But, I emphasize, not at the expense of other needy citizens. For example, I am wary about the statements to the effect that the material compensation for property that was stolen, apartments that were lost, moving expenses, etc. must be paid to the refugees by the republic as a whole. Is it just to impose material punishment (to fine!) an entire nation? Whereas, for example, lies the blame of the Azerbaijanis who, at the risk of their own lives, are saving their Armenian neighbors? There were many such Azerbaijanis. So, in general, resolving the refugees’ problems by depleting the already meager social funds can only increase the tension in society.

[L. Grafova] Do you think that we will be able to return morality to policy?

[G. Starovoytova] To the degree to which morality returns to society. We might recall that Sakharov always put morality in first place. He violated the rules of all the games, and that was where his political might lay. Alone, he replaced an entire parliamentary faction and forced the entire world to listen to him, because he acted from positions of morality and law.

Until we admit that the bloody tragedies that we shamefully call the “interethnic conflicts” are actually genocide, until there is repentance on the highest level, the refugee problem will not get out of its blind alley. The word “genocide” was pronounced many times at the most recent session, but officially that phenomenon has not been recognized. You might recall that as long ago as July 1988, when the old Supreme Soviet was discussing the Karabakh problem, writer Vardges Petrosyan was the first person to mention genocide. Gorbachev at that time objected to him, telling him that he was a writer and he should learn how to use the word properly. One could talk about genocide, he said, if it was a purposeful governmental policy... And with that statement the matter ended.

I carefully studied the United Nations Convention on genocide, which the USSR signed. In Article 4 it contains the special stipulation: not only the actions carried out by the authorities are considered to be genocide, but also any persecution carried out by private individuals.

[L. Grafova] I had a pleasant meeting yesterday: one of the former (long-suffering!) lodgers at the Armenian permanent in-patient sanitorium of the Tsentrosvar Plant. Incidentally, that woman, Elmira, is half-Armenian and half-Azerbaijani. She has two children and is also taking care of two old people. She was crying as she told me, “They accepted us as though we were relatives...” So I know that the goodness in our people has not been exhausted, and if the job is organized normally... Once again I am pleased that, in his first presidential speech, Gorbachev included the refugee problem as one the first-priority ones. Galina Vasilyevna, do you have any hope that this stalemated problem will be resolved in a humanitarian way?

[G. Starovoytova] To live is to hope.

Past Two Years of Azerbaijani Political Crisis Reviewed

[Article by A. Mursaliyev: “The Baku Tragedy: It Began Two Years Ago and May Again Be Repeated”]

[Text] Azerbaijan has gone through two tragic spirals since February 1988. Both of them ended with the death
of innocent people, of my countrymen, with refugees, curfews, and deep public shock. There is now relative calm within the republic. For how long? How will events develop further? Will they follow the course of the peaceful process of social transformation or will we again find ourselves at the beginning of the next, a third spiral?

Azerbaijan is today the only republic in which the Law on Elections has not been passed and the schedule for these has not been set. It is still unclear how they will proceed. As in Lithuania, or as in Tajikistan? Judging from everything, things will follow the latter variant: elections under a state of emergency.

In order to understand completely what is going on, we must call things by their real name: For the second year already we have in the Transcaucasus—civil resistance. Almost a war. And this is being launched for the sake of one principle goal—power. And it is precisely through the prism of the question of power that everything that is going on in this region should be examined.

For the past ten to fifteen years the villages have been regularly supplying the cities with excess hands and mouths. These have swiftly accumulated in the belts of self- and newly-built structures in which the grapes of wrath, have already ripened and grown succulent with their bitter juice. This mass dissatisfaction has hung threateningly above a mafiosi of all possible calibers, both overt and underground.

In February 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh exploded. Avalanches were set in motion and ... clashed against one other. The grapes of wrath gushed forth their bitter juice.

The first avalanches only barely affected the bastions of official and unofficial power and, at the same time, the mass social explosion that had developed was successfully shifted into the channel of ethnic conflict. The game began and, in it, the Karabakh card became trump. It is a surprising natural process that just as soon as a real threat to authority arose, the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug (NKAO) was exacerbated. And representatives of the center rushed to both Baku and Yerevan.

The first wave of meetings emboldened the old leadership in both republics. New people came. I well remember the first speeches of Abdulrakhman Vezirov, who was "elected" first secretary of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee in the summer of 1988.

In August of the same year, A. Vezirov delivered the program report to the plenum. And many recalled another plenum that had taken place exactly 19 years earlier, in August 1969. At it, the "throne speech" had been delivered by the young leader of the party organization, Geyder Aliyev, as whose political opponent A. Vezirov had belatedly come to the republic. The new leader, having proclaimed a struggle against clannishness, conducted an energetic struggle against the clan of G. Aliyev. One after another the Nakhechevan people—the relatives and landsmen of Aliyev—departed, leaving behind their official chairs and a mass of unresolved problems. The Karabakh people arrived—the landsmen of A. Vezirov, the Shirvan and Baku people, dispassionately exposing stagnation within the republic, promising to clear away the old rubbish from of years from the path of the people. But even new brooms, no matter how well they swept, nevertheless, alas, remained brooms. But, by this point, only earth graders were capable of clearing away the trash.

Time passed, the credit of trust ran low. And a new explosion rang out.

On 17 November 1988, a many-day marathon of meetings began in Baku and spread over practically the whole republic. A state of emergency and a curfew were introduced in Baku and many rayons of Azerbaijan. Streams of refugees flowed toward one another. The majority of the refugees from Armenia congregated in Baku. Opinions differed within the republic's leadership: Part proposed to resettle the refugees, primarily emigres from the countryside, in the rural rayons of Azerbaijan. However, another point of view prevailed: The refugees were left in Baku. Without places to live, without work, with every growing anger.

In the winter and spring of 1989 a deceptive calm was established, ensured by the orders of military commandants and Armenian patrols. And it was under these conditions that the elections of USSR people's deputies took place. I don't think it is necessary to explain what elections are like under curfew conditions. This means that all gatherings and meetings are with the permission of the commandant; that there is a possibility of not registering unwelcome candidates.

As a result, what was seen in Azerbaijan was the same usual burst of "political activeness" on the part of the voters that derives from those sadly remembered years when, according to the flowery expression of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, "Azerbaijan took broad strides..." According to official data, 98 percent of the voters in the republic took part in the elections, more than anywhere else in the country.

The results of the elections became evident even at the first Congress of People's Deputies. I suspect that a part of the delegates from Azerbaijan did not understand at all what was being said, simply because they had a poor mastery of the Russian language. At the previous year's meetings, deputies from the republic who held, as the speakers said, positions "to the right of the right wing," were in a strong position. But, as they say, the train left.
In the summer of 1989 the next spiral of events began. A new force—the People’s Front of Azerbaijan (PFA)—appeared on the scene. Its founding conference took place in July. Slowly, step by step, the PFA won positions from the authorities. Under pressure from the Front, the republic’s leadership made promises, signed protocols of agreement, and then annulled them. The next, stronger round of meeting and strike pressures followed—and the authorities again retreated. The democratic wing of the Front lost arguments, the radicals found them.

The question of power arose full grown. At meetings, more and more insistent demands were heard that a session be called, that the Law on Elections be approved, that the time from for these be set. But while promising in words to fulfill these demands, the leadership of the republic in fact put off the session, delaying the start of elections.

In the beginning of August, the Front, in the words of its leaders, figured on taking one-fourth of the deputy mandates in the upcoming elections to the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet. In October, after the session of the republican Supreme Soviet that approved the Law on Sovereignty (which, incidentally, took place not as a result of unexpected leap in the national-self consciousness of local parliamentarians, but under pressure from and with the participation of the PFA), the Front already had pretensions to 90 percent of the seats. In December, it became clear: The future parliament of Azerbaijan would be one-hundred percent informal. And the majority of seats would have been occupied, I am confident, by democrats and not radicals. And they would form their own cabinet of ministers. And the power would once and for all depart the weakened hands of the old nomenklatura.

The absence of changes, greater and greater exasperation, brought the people out onto more and more public squares. The most out-of-the-way, “god-forsaken” places awakened. The spearhead of the attack was pointed against the authorities. In September, as a result of meetings and strikes, the first secretaries of the Khachmasskiy and Lankoranskiy rayon party committees were removed. Already in November, a similar thing happened when a number of the most odious party leaders on the rayon and city levels were driven from their official chairs. But earlier the people would drive some out and then others would be designated from Baku. Now, the situation had changed somewhat. The people were not restricted to simply driving out a secretary, but were demanding to participate in the election of a new one. In November 1989, after meetings lasting many days, the building of the rayon party committee in Agdzhabedi was taken by storm. Several days later, with those in the square participating, election of a new first secretary took place. Selected as first secretary was one of the leaders of the local section of the People’s Front. Analogous events occurred in many of the republic’s rayons.

The reaction to these events was varied: The democratic wing of the Front, welcoming the political activeness of the people, spoke out for noninterference in the internal affairs of the party, calling for a struggle for soviets that would function really and independently. The radicals, while considering the post of first secretary to be the real power, not the rayon executive committee, pushed for their “own” people to come to power. The leadership of the republic’s party organization gave an ex post facto endorsement to the newly appointed and waited to see what would result from this.

In the big picture, this process was not an encroachment on the holy of holies—the structure of power itself. One person within this structure had simply been replaced by another. In general, this process did not produce special objections either from the party leadership or from radicals of a nationalist bent. The leadership did react with great apprehension and mistrust toward the democratic wing and exercised pressure toward the radical one. The reason is simple: Nationalism in principle does not attack the structure of power; it fights only for the ethnic purity of this structure. The democrats however attack its very foundations.

Is it not therefore that V. Polyanichko, a former advisor to Nadzhibulla and presently second secretary of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee, having only come to the republic from Afghanistan in the summer of 1989, insistently recommended to the PFA leadership that it paint its own program in a blue-green color, that is that it introduce Turkish and Islamic motifs into it? In December 1989 and January 1990, the “frenzied” Nemat Panakhov and his supporters, whether sometimes having heeded the advice of the second secretary or sometimes having thought for themselves, began to “intensify” Islamic and Turkish motifs...

Within the course of a month or two, the secretaries were changed three times within the Dzhallalabadkiy Rayon party committee until, after a clash with the militia, the storm and seizure of the building resulted. And following this incident, there occurred the incidents in Lenkoran. Here, for the first time, they did not change secretaries, but simple abolished the city party committee and all government institutions. Life within the rayon, where Article 6 of the Constitution had been abrogated on the spur of the moment, contrary to expectation, did not come to a halt. Children went to school, public transpiration functioned, stores were open. And the former authorities sat in the teahouses awaiting the time when somebody would come and return power to them. They waited... The army came—and returned the habits of the teahouses to their offices.

Meanwhile, Lenkoran was swiftly advancing on Baku. More and more rayon party committees were turning out to be within the ring of the fronts. Power structures were collapsing. They were not in a position to defend themselves on their own. It was either necessary to put out the white flag or somehow to draw the fire away from themselves. However, the leadership did not put out white flags. “Who said that we are getting ready to surrender power?”—angrily asked A. Vezirov in December at one of the gatherings.
And here appeared the ill-received decision of the Armenian Supreme Soviet about including the NKAO national economic plan within the budget of Armenia. Episodic clashes developed into military confrontations. The authorities began forcibly to whip up the thesis of “unity in the struggle against a common enemy.” A. Vezirov made a 180-degree turn in the thesis he originally presented—that “Nagorno-Karabakh is preventing us from solving social and economic problems”; “Social and economic problems, meetings and strikes are preventing us from solving the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, calls for unity with the leadership did not have success. Every day, enormous groups gathered before the party Central Committee building, to the threatening cry “Istafa” (“sack them”). Persistent rumors spread through the city and republic: “On Saturday, 18 January, the Central Committee will be taken.” But, on Saturday, the Armenian pogroms began. The dynamite set a year earlier—the refugees from Armenia—exploded.

The pogroms went on for three days in the city. Armenians hid and saved their friends, neighbors and PFA activists. The militia, with few exceptions, did practically nothing. The army sat in its barracks, which were then still not blockaded.

The blockading of military units and roads began on 16 January, following publication of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase declaring a state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of other rayons in Azerbaijan. People were worried about point seven of the Ukase, in which it was recommended that a state of emergency be introduced in Baku. What for? By this time, the pogrom had practically come to an end. On 16 January, the last abandoned Armenian apartments in Baku were seized. Three days remained before the introduction of troops. During these days, they abandoned the buildings of the party rayon committees and, finally, on 19 January, the building of the Central Committee was also blockaded. Authority fell to pieces, literally before one’s eyes... They brought in the troops. The apparatus returned to its offices. But the ranks of the party had grown thin and authority was severely shaken...

Azerbaijanis say: If it is impossible not to quarrel with your neighbor then it is necessary to quarrel in such that a possibility remains for reconciliation. On 19 January, this possibility was almost cancelled out. If, before January 1990, there had not been very many proponents of Azerbaijan’s secession, then, after the 19th, in Baku alone, 60 percent were in favor of leaving the USSR (against only 10 percent). Yes, of course, both a burst of emotion and the freshness of the wounds had an effect here. But time passed, passions cooled, and the attitudes remained. More than this, the attitudes are turning into conviction.

And so, what do we have today? Frankly speaking, I have not noted the anti-Russian attitudes about which there has been so much talk. However, anti-Moscow, more precisely anti-center attitudes are strong. The Azerbaijan CP is no longer the sole political force in the republic. Society is swiftly becoming politicized and a multiplicity of new political parties and organizations are appearing. Probably many of these will sink into oblivion in the near future. However, others even today possess great authority among the people and are on the rise. I am not talking here about the PFA, which a large part of the people follow.

In such a situation, attempts to hold onto power with the help of force are fraught with new shocks. It is possible to avoid them only having rejected a monopoly of power, of the mass information media, and, finally, of the truth. Today, there is still a possibility of sitting all the political forces in the republic down at a roundtable, of finding and working out a peaceful, bloodless way out of the crisis. And this is possible only through honest, democratic elections. Tomorrow, when a new spiral begins, it will be too late.

Estonians Polled on Interethnic Relations

[Commentary by A. Kuznetsov, minister for interethnic relations: “What Is Behind the Figures?”]

[Text] Lying on my desk are the combined data on the results of the poll which was conducted a few days ago by sociologists from the Journalistic Information Center. Its goal was to shed light on certain aspects of interethnic relations in Estonia. This poll was conducted at the request of the government. I should tell you that we intend to conduct such polls and analyses every month in the future in order to have the opportunity to constantly analyze the situation.

I wish it to be noted that this was a telephone-type poll. A sum-total of 1,314 persons were polled in the following five cities of the republic: Tallinn, Tartu, Parnawa, Narva, and Kokhtla-Yarve. That is, the poll encompassed persons who have already been living in this republic for some time now. Most of all, those polled included persons who have already lived in Estonia for ten years. Some 54 percent of such persons were non-Estonians. As to the Estonians included in the poll, they have lived in Estonia all their lives.

And so, just what did the poll show? I think that its results are important for understanding many processes which are taking place in our republic, as well as people’s attitudes and motives.

For example, one of the questions was the following: how greatly have you recently had to change your point of view, your opinion regarding the history of the Soviet Union or our republic’s recent past? It turns out that, under the influence of everything which has become known recently, many persons have changed their views and, furthermore, quite fundamentally.
One of the questions dealt with the attitude toward the restoration of Estonian statehood. As is known, it is precisely with this issue that the basic complex of contradictions now existing in this republic is connected. The answers given by the Estonians really require no comment: 98.5 percent of those polled are convinced that the aspirations of the Estonian population for independence are justified and legitimate. Among non-Estonians, this indicator is, of course, lower. But it is still quite high—57.4 percent. In Tartu it is higher—73 percent, while in the other four cities it is close to the average. The discrepancy is small in practical terms. Although, of course, among non-Estonians, there are quite a few such persons who do not approve of this striving for independence. In Tallinn they comprise one-fourth of those polled, and in Narva—approximately the same amount. And many persons find it difficult to answer this question.

In my opinion, it was very important to elucidate how people themselves evaluate the status of interethnic relations in this republic. And such a question was posed to everyone. Most of those persons participating in the poll—Estonians and non-Estonians—consider that these relations have become worse, i.e., they have quite a gloomy view of the presently existing situation. But, on this plane, it is important to compare the present poll with one which was conducted in November of last year. On the whole, at that time, approximately half of those persons polled considered that nationality or ethnic relations were becoming worse. Nowadays, as the more recent poll has shown, there are fewer and fewer such pessimists. Only slightly fewer, but even this is important. Although, of course, there are quite a few such persons who feel uncomfortable in Estonia these days. And this pertains to the Russian milieu as well as the Estonian one. This is a very big problem, one on which we need to think and work. Nevertheless, we cannot help saying that the conclusion drawn by certain of our politicians to the effect that the status of interethnic relations is becoming worse with each passing day is UTTERLY UNJUSTIFIED. And this must be borne in mind.

An interesting question, it seems to me, was put concerning the attitude toward socialism as follows: Do you consider that only socialism can guarantee your rights, human rights, and civil rights? Most Estonians answer this question in the negative. Among non-Estonians, a scattering of opinions is to be observed. Nevertheless, 36 percent of them consider that socialism does not guarantee their rights or their life. About 25 percent dispute this point of view.

There is nothing unexpected in the fact that people became disillusioned with socialism. But, of course, what we are talking about here is not socialism in general, but about that particular system which has existed up to now and still does exist in the country, about that situation which does not provide for a sufficient standard of living.

How do people—Estonians and non-Estonians—picture Estonia's future? The overwhelming majority of Estonians—77 percent—think of an independent, neutral state. It is interesting to note that the next variant to this one—Estonia as an independent state, oriented toward the West—garnered only 9 percent of the votes, and oriented toward the Soviet Union—7 percent. Preference is accorded specifically to an independent, neutral state.

Among non-Estonians, 32 percent consider that what is needed is political and economic independence for Estonia within the body of the Soviet Union, although there are also other variants (24 percent are just for economic independence). In other words, many persons have already agreed with the concept of a confederation, although just recently this idea would have seemed absurd and unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of non-Estonians.

Certain questions touched upon the political forces operating within this republic. What kind of political party or movement could be of help in resolving interethnic problems within this republic? In replying to this question, 38 percent of Estonians named the republic's Supreme Soviet and Government, while 24 percent gave preference to the NF [People's Front], and 18 percent found it too difficult or hesitated to answer this question.

Among non-Estonians the picture is considerably more gloomy. It turned out that 33 percent of those polled could not name such a force. They simply do not trust anything or anyone. There is a complete perplexity and lack of faith. They place little hopes on Moscow, on the All-Union government, or on M. Gorbachev. These last three were cited by only 3 percent of those persons polled. And this too compels us to think about a great deal. It's obvious that some sort of new force must appear on which these persons could stake their hopes. By the way, such conclusions have also been drawn by the Moscow sociologists. In Russia, as well as in its outlying regions, people have lost faith, as polls show, in the existing forms of power and in the newly emerging, informal associations and formations.

Also interesting are the answers to the question as to what political force in the republic is creating by its actions the greatest number of problems in interethnic relations. On this level, among both Estonians and non-Estonians, the Intermovement [Interdvizheniye] is solidly in the lead—with 52 percent of those people polled. But, on the whole, the attitude of Estonians and non-Estonians toward political movements is different. Among Estonians, 79 percent consider that Interdvizheniye is creating tension, whereas, among non-Estonians, 32 percent consider that what is creating tension is being instigated by the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives]. Among non-Estonians, this idea is supported by only 5 percent. And again an important conclusion: 25 percent of non-Estonians do not know who is creating
proceeds or where the tension is coming from. This attests once again to the perplexity and lack of orientation.

By the way, all the remaining movements and parties garnered very few votes, either positive or negative. And that means that, so far, they have played a relatively small role in this republic's political life. Moreover, as the poll has shown, no great hopes are being placed on the Congress or the Committee of Estonia's Citizens. Only 14 percent of Estonians consider that they can help to solve the problems of interethnic relations.

Of course, this is a cursory, preliminary, superficial analysis of the data obtained. But it too provides food for thought.

There is still, and this is important to note for ourselves, a credit or reserve of trust in the Supreme Soviet and the Government. For the Estonians, of course, it is a higher amount, while for the non-Estonians—it is lower. But it also exists there, although, I repeat, it is small. And this means that the Government must now concentrate its attention specifically on this—on winning over trust and attracting followers and advocates. It's obvious that we need to issue some kinds of guarantees which would calm people down and provide them with hope. And we will have to work on this very seriously.

We cannot fail to note that there is a substantial difference among the cities studied. The calmest with regard to interethnic relations is Tartu. Why is that? Obviously, above all, because it has quite a large number of educated, thinking persons. It is difficult in Tartu for the type of politician who like to hold “meetings.” You cannot get by there with declarations or slogans. There is also another factor at work in Tartu: the ratio between the indigenous and non-indigenous population has not changed so greatly in recent years as it has in other localities, i.e., the population is more permanent, more constant. And this, of course, has left its imprint.

Here, then, are the results. In my opinion, all of us must draw conclusions from them.

Estonian CP Bureau on 1940 Events

90UN2311A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] This year marks 50 years since Estonia became part of the Soviet Union. Estonia’s fate was decided by a division of spheres of influence in 1939 on the basis of secret agreements concluded between Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany.

Leftist Socialists and communists also became involved in the events of 1940 along with Estonia's other political forces. Freed from jail in 1938, the communists began to rally their depleted ranks. They numbered no more than 130 people. At the April Estonian CP Conference in 1940, a course was taken toward establishment of a Democratic People's Republic in Estonia. This course was ended on June 17, 1940 when the installation of the Stalinist Regime was begun in Estonia.

During the dramatization of the socialist revolution and the annexation of Estonia, Stalin and Zhdanov also skillfully utilized the Estonian Communist Party. The majority of Estonian communists, trade union activists, and many workers were not able to foresee the consequences of the events that were taking place. A false picture of the transfer to government by the people was created through disinformation and deception and then even the Party itself became a victim of Stalinist repression and ceased existing as an independent political force.

However, while proceeding from the best motives, many Estonian communists attempted to express and defend the interests of the people although they had to do this under very difficult conditions even during subsequent years.

While giving a critical assessment to its own history, the Estonian Communist Party does not free itself of responsibility for the incorrect policy that resulted in difficult consequences for the Estonian people. As the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress noted, the Estonian Communist Party along with the CPSU and central authorities must assume responsibility for the suffering that became the Estonian people's lot. Each Party member's responsibility is specific and individual.

In today's complex political climate, the Estonian Communist Party considers the reconstruction of a democratic Estonian State through peaceful means to be particularly important. Negotiations and conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements are the basis for this.

Now when the Estonian Communist Party itself has embarked on the path of renewal and is refuting dogma and false concepts, Estonian communists see their task as follows:

— to strive to develop common tactics for all Estonian centrist democratic forces during the transition period;

— to normalize Estonian relations with representatives of other nationalities;

— to promote conclusion of a Treaty on Civil Peace for the purposes of strengthening internal political stability and protection;

— to protect social justice and the material interests of low-income citizens and families under conditions of the transition to a market economy;

— to participate in the development of a law on citizenship and the new Fundamental Law; and,
The Estonian Communist Party appeals to all political forces of Estonia for cooperation for the sake of the establishment of an independent, democratic, free Estonia. Tallinn, June 14, 1990.

Savisaar Visit to Netherlands Described
90UN2311B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 3

[Text] Estonian Republic Prime Minister E. Savisaar's visit to Netherlands continues. His meeting with Queen Beatrix of Netherlands took place on June 15. Her Majesty visited the official meeting of the Hanseatic Commission. Greetings were exchanged during the Queen's short audience with E. Savisaar. As an official guest of the 10th Hanseatic Town Modern Days, E. Savisaar accompanied the Queen during her tour of the Hanseatic Market that was organized in Deventer.

That same day the Estonian delegation had a number of official meetings at The Hague. Prime Minister E. Savisaar talked with the Minister of Agriculture. Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Meri acquainted the leadership of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Estonian concepts in connection with the 2nd Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

On the eve, June 14th, a gala opening of the 10th Modern Days of Hanse took place in Zutphen at which over 100 delegations of cities that were historically part of the Hanseatic League gathered. Prominent political and economic figures honored the holiday with their presence.

That same day the Estonian Prime Minister met with Netherlands Government Leader R. Lubbers. Specific cooperation projects were discussed along with relations between East and West and between Estonia and Netherlands during the conversation with lasted for almost two hours. The parties approved the Zutphen City Council's suggestion on formation of a Netherlands-Estonian Hanseatic Fund.

The Estonian Prime Minister discussed the cooperation project with Tvent [transliterated] University and expressed the hope that such state financing by the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs would in many ways facilitate the development of economic relations between Estonia and Netherlands.

E. Savisaar stated that he is counting on Netherlands' support for the restoration of Estonia's independence and when Estonia applies for membership in international organizations, R. Lubbers pointed out that Netherlands is very carefully following the events occurring in the Baltic countries. The sides promised to promote development of regional relations. The Estonian Prime Minister invited the Prime Minister of Netherlands to attend the 12th Hanseatic Town Modern Days in Tallinn in 1992 as the honored guest. The invitation was accepted.

That same day E. Savisaar and L. Meri held a press conference for the international press in Zutphen. The times are gone forever when Estonian statesmen must explain where their republic is located to the people they talk to. The course of the press conference also confirmed this. Many businesslike questions were posed. Netherlands newspapers have repeatedly published analytical articles about Estonia during the last six months.

That same morning E. Savisaar opened an exhibition of Estonian graphic art in Zutphen.

The Prime Minister and the individuals accompanying him visited a Philips computer plant in Apeldoorn.

The visit is continuing.

More on Savisaar Visit to Netherlands
90UN1123C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Jun 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by unidentified SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent, Moscow, 18 June 1990: "Meetings on Dutch Soil—'Grand Policy'"

[Text] On June 17, Estonian Republic Government Chairman Edgar Savisaar returned from Holland. Having made a short stop in Moscow, he arrived in Tallinn by air that same evening.

The visit to Holland was prepared long ago under the previous government. He primarily pursued two goals: The renewal of historically developed economic and cultural ties that occurred between Holland and Estonia and also participation in Hanseatic Town Days. Hanseatic Town Days began to be observed 10 years ago when they were more symbolic and were a tribute to tradition but today they have acquired a distinctly political complexion and practical significance. In connection with this, they are planning to conduct Hanseatic Town Days in Tallinn in 1992 and we ourselves are also attempting to develop ties with this movement.

As E. Savisaar pointed out, a serious and attentive attitude has been manifested toward the problems of the Baltic Region and Estonia. Several press conferences were conducted. There was a very important and constructive meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers. They discussed the possibility of Estonia's impending participation in the Helsinki Conference and in the European Security Process as a whole and also the prospects for economic cooperation between Estonia and Holland. Incidentally, sufficiently close contacts have already been established between the Ministries of Agriculture, Ministries of Economic Affairs, and a whole series of individual enterprises, that is, economic ties are developing in several directions.
E. Savisaar's speech to the Hanseatic Seminar, where delegates from many countries participated, was also important. The Estonian Premier talked about the problems of the Baltic Region and Estonia in particular and also about the fact that a new political subject—Central Europe—has arisen between East and West. E. Savisaar set forth his point of view for the future of the Baltics which is based on the integration processes in Europe. An interesting meeting took place with Dutch Queen Beatrix who was knowledgeable about all of the processes that are occurring in the Baltic Region. The Queen of Holland wished the Estonian people the fulfillment of all their desires and success on the path to independence.

"Everything that occurred in Holland is and was grand policy," said E. Savisaar, while summing up the results of his visit to Holland where he also met with other prominent political leaders of Europe and with the mayors of many cities.

P.S. While considering that E. Savisaar has planned several meetings in Moscow this week and next, we were interested in whether he had any perspective on relations with the central government and about the central government and the Kremlin's attitude toward economic reform in Estonia. And, in particular, will Moscow accommodate our economic reforms.

E. Savisaar: Right now, Moscow herself is at the crossroads: It must select between future development of democracy and preservation of the empire. And M. Gorbachev and his advisors must make this choice in the very near future. Moscow and the Kremlin's attitude toward the aspirations of the Baltic Region and Estonia in particular depend on this choice.

Estonia's economic plans and aspirations cannot be examined outside the political problems and goals or outside the context of the Baltic process as a whole. Naturally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will in any case be able to accommodate making our plans a reality with regard to economic reform: Both if we are part of the USSR or in the event of our secession from it. Really our powerful neighbor has enormous material resources.

The other question is, will the central government want this in the future or not? Really the "erection of a wall" between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Of course, the young people of the republic, regardless of nationality, if they so desire and meet the level of education and the state of health requirements for border troops, should have the possibility of serving within the frontiers of Georgia.

[Question] Panteleymon Ivanovich, let us at once find our positions. How do you regard the question of the restoration of the Georgian border district?

[Answer] I am for the restoration of the Georgian border district on a more modern level, but as a part of the border troops of the USSR. Of course, the young people of the republic, regardless of nationality, if they so desire and meet the level of education and the state of health requirements for border troops, should have the possibility of serving within the frontiers of Georgia.

[Question] In that case, we will return to the decision of the November (1989) session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet. There, in particular, is the following situation: "There is a significant expansion in the range of questions that are extremely important from the nationality and state point of view and that pertain to the competence only of the supreme organ of power in Georgia and to it only. First of all, we have in mind such questions as the state frontiers of Georgia. . . ." Would you not like to comment on it?

[Answer] I believe that questions of defense and of state security (which is where the protection of the state frontier enters in) are the concern of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In my view, this is the only correct approach. However, in so doing, it is assumed that the arrangement of the state frontier of the republic with the neighbors can be decided only with its complete consent as a sovereign member of this federation.

[Question] Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin, not the most reliable citizen of the Russian Empire, who found himself a few steps away from Turkey, could not control the emotion that swept over him: "I jumped toward the river with an inexplicable feeling. I had never before seen foreign soil." He, naturally, did not have a special pass, but he jumped. The Soviet people are strictly prohibited from visiting the border region, which is under the complete sway of the frontier guards.

[Answer] Why, we must change the law, which was written by us, and we ourselves must improve it. Yes, the frontier regime is regulated by legislation of the USSR. But the union republics have enormous possibilities for introducing corrections in it—in their own interests, but, of course, not to the detriment of the protection of the state border.

[Question] And how are these very possibilities being utilized by the republics, in particular by Georgia? You agree, poorly. That is why people develop grounds not only for dissatisfaction, but also indignation.
[Answer] You are absolutely right. On merely one example I can show the harm of the callous bureaucrat-
ism, the clumsiness, and the criminal negligence, which are exactly what provokes the dissatisfaction with the existence of the border regime within the limits of our republic.

The command of the border district, already at the beginning of restructuring, asked the government of Georgia to create a commission to study the state of the border regime within the frontiers of the republic and to take legal measures to bring it into conformity with the interests of the life and activity of the republic's population, as well as the protection of the State Border of the USSR. In December 1987, the government of Georgia received the Memorandum of the USSR Procurator "On the Unsatisfactory Implementation of the USSR Law "On the State Border of the USSR" and the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures to Secure the Implementation of the USSR Law "On the State Border of the USSR". The indicated memorandum was accompanied by a request of comrade N. Ryzhkov to examine it and to take measures.

In it, in particular, it was pointed out that the processes of democratization taking place in the country require another approach to the solution of the question concerning the establishment of border zones. In some regions of the country, their territories were excessively increased, which in the majority of cases was not called forth by necessity and did not answer the interests of securing order at the border. It happens, when vacation places and health resort localities are included in the border zone, as a result of which the entry, travel, and temporary stay of citizens are restricted in a large territory. This, it is stated in the Memorandum, is the reason for numerous complaints to various authorities, as well as the institution of criminal proceedings against an unjustifiably large number of citizens for violations of the border regime.

I would like to cite still another excerpt from the information that was brought to the attention of the government of Georgia at the beginning of 1988: "The presently established procedure for the entry, residence, and travel in the border zone and region, to an extreme degree, impedes the economic and other activity of the republic's population, and the state of the land and forest tracts along the line of the borders, in view of the lack of care, calls forth alarm."

How did the leadership of the republic react to all these appeals, attempts to persuade, and warnings? The voice of the representatives of the frontier guards was heard. The first deputy chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers, G. Mgeladze, energetically posted his representatives to examine and that measures be taken to eliminate the existing violations of the USSR Law "On the State Border of the USSR".

Further there follows the signature of the then chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, O. Cherkeziya. In his turn, G. Mgeladze instructs the State Agroindustrial Committee [Gosagroprom] to take the necessary measures and, if necessary, to present proposals. But, judging by everything, concrete actions were not observed in Gosagroprom.

In June 1988 there appeared still one other document with two threatening resolutions, but it, too, was unable to make headway in the solution of the—for Georgia important—question.

[Question] People are surprised that our entire country is protected by barbed wire. But it did not exist, did it, either under the democratic Lenin, or under the tyrant Stalin. . . .

[Answer] Barbed wire, of course, is an unpleasant thing. Instead of it, the borders should be equipped with modern means of signalling that facilitate their protection. Incidentally, here and there this barbed wire is really no longer necessary, but it should be removed by organs legally empowered to do so.

[Question] I shall never forget the year 1961. To Batumi came one of the deputy chairmen of the country's Committee for State Security. Having seen that the village of Sarpi on our side is behind seven barbed threads, ordered them removed. They barely prevailed upon him to leave if only one line. He agreed. And where they others had passed through he proposed to build . . . a soccer field. "But if the ball falls on the other side?" they asked him in fear. "A ball is not a bomb," the deputy chairman answered, they'll throw it back. And if they don't give it up, throw them another one: The Turks also play soccer."

[Answer] Yes, I also served in that sector at that time. The proposal of a responsible official called forth a whole range of feelings, mixed in gladness, astonishment, and delight with the unexpectedness of such a solution of the question. In it we perceived, above all, humanity. But I will also not forget that after some time it was precisely from this sector that a criminal escaped abroad. And then already another high official ordered the restoration of the barbed wire fence. Everything that concerns borders requires exceptionally rational and well-considered decisions.

[Question] I am not disputing that, but you agree that at times things reach the point of being absurd. Five minutes would be sufficient for a mother of our Dzhulfia to go over into the Iranian part of the city and embrace her son. But she has to overcome a long path along the itinerary of Baku—Nakhichevan—Moscow—Teheran. Is it right that a Soviet resident of Sarpi is not allowed to share his or her grief or joy with a relative who lives in
Uzbek Language Instruction Program Discussed

90US1069A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 May 90 p 3

[Article by S. Nishanov, professor, Uzbek SSR people’s deputy, dean of the Samarkand State Pedagogical Institute imeni S. Ayni: “A Single Program is Needed”]

[Text] The law on the state language of the Uzbek SSR became the focus of real measures and creative searches of the collective of pedagogues and students of our institute. The student roundtable on the topic “Let us speak frankly,” the results of which were sent to the working commission on the state language, the concrete steps to deepen the study of the state language in our VUZ, the commission formed to implement the fundamental statutes of this law—this is the orbit of the practical realization of this important document by the collectives of the Uzbek language and literature faculty and the linguistic department.

The business correspondence and administrative activity of the deans’ offices and departments, and sociopolitical and educational-indoctrinational work have already gone over completely to the Uzbek language. The study of the Uzbek language in a 240-hour program has already been introduced in the first and second year of Russian and Tajik groups of all faculties, with a 120-hour course for Uzbek groups of non-language faculties. Two circles for language study have been organized for teachers and students.

The initiative of the commission that only recently started working has already been manifested by the fact that the slogans, bulletin boards, announcements, and visual resources in the institute are gradually being translated into the state language. Dictionaries and glossaries of official terms used in the area of the educational-indoctrinational process, scientific-professional work of the faculties and departments are being compiled.

The department of Uzbek linguistics has become the center for the study of the Uzbek language, uniting 50 specialists headed by the teacher of the Uzbek linguistics department Sh. Mandonov. Through their efforts, courses and groups have been organized in the labor collectives of the “Elektrobytmash” trust, the “Uzelektrostroy” trust, the KINAP (Cinematographic Equipment) plant, the “Uzbekbrilyashu” cannery, porcelain factories, bread combines, the PShO imeni 8 March, the “Tourist” and other hotels.

However, along with these enterprises such as Electrobytmash, and Uzelektrostroy that have allocated equipped classrooms, there are others, such as the Hammer and Sickle canneries. Its administrators categorically refused to organize courses to study the Uzbek language.

The administrators of the elevator construction and porcelain factory have shown indifference toward this, apparently forgetting Article 28 of the Law on Language, that states the responsibility of enterprise administrators and institutions for the organization of study of the Uzbek language locally.

The shortage of published Uzbek-Russian and Russian-Uzbek dictionaries and glossaries, and of teaching materials interferes with the cause of learning. Before it is too late, it is time to compile dictionaries in all the various specialties, to introduce documentation, business correspondence, and visual materials, etc.

We have even run into such problems. Samarkand State University, Samarkand State Pedagogical Institute, the “Znanie” society, the institute for teacher improvement are training workers of enterprises and institutions.
in the language. They all have different programs, and different numbers of class hours. But isn’t it already time to have a single program, in order that the start not be dragged out?

Tashkent Russian Cultural Center, Language Issue Discussed

90US0993A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 22, 28 May-3 Jun 90 pp 6-7

[Article by T. Chirkova, cochairperson of the Russian Cultural Center: “But Then We Lived Undivided”]

[Text] “All the nationalities living in the territory of the Uzbek SSR have the right to set up a national-cultural center.” [Article 26 of the Law “On the State Language of the Uzbek SSR”]

“It is essential... to guarantee the entire population free use of the Russian language as the language of international communication of the country’s peoples and complete satisfaction of the language and national-cultural needs of nations and nationalities living in Uzbekistan.” [From the speech by the president of the Uzbek SSR I. A. Karimov at the 1st session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th convocation.]

My father, a military pilot, ended his over 13-year period of service to the Fatherland in Tashkent. It was the start of the 1960s and the “thaw” reached there too. It was only later, after 1964, that teachers who knew Russian poorly began to appear in Russian-language groups of VUZes—nationalization of management and other cadres was underway. But then we lived together—Galina Vdovina, Volodya Simonyan, Sadzhida Yusupova—without looking into each other’s birth certificates and passports, without settling the accounts of history, and not divided into indigenous and nonindigenous residents.

I sincerely loved the kind and hard-working Uzbek people and their customs and deep respect for old people. The ancient culture was revealed to me on Registan Square in Samarkand, in museums and exhibit halls, in the old men’s stories beside the banks of the irrigation pond under the mulberry tree, and over a cup of green tea. But often, looking at the southern flowers, the irrigation pond under the mulberry tree, and over a cup of tea, I remembered the sandy road which children’s bare feet sank into up to the ankles, the plain wildflowers on the shoulder of the road, the little white chapel at the crossroads, and the stream which ran from under it. In my mind I saw images—an old man in a white shirt and on the wall photographs: a group of officers in white uniforms against the background of unfamiliar hills, a rather young Red Army soldier who fought under Budennyy with a baby in his arms, a lop-eared lieutenant. The history of my people looked at me from the old faded red photographs.

And after many years in a far eastern city, my memory returned me again and again to the taste of spring water, to the secrets of a cathedral with taciturn, sad faces of icons on the walls where a stern and majestic old woman, my grandmother, used to take me, to the darkened Tver huts, to the jagged roadways of Mozhaysk, to the street fair in a Siberian city with portly peasant women in gaudy flowered sarafans near enormous samovars and plates of pancakes.

There are about 20 million people in Uzbekistan and among them are Uzbeks—15 million and Russians—1.6 million. For most of them this land is not only their homeland but also the homeland of their ancestors. The Russian intelligentsia has made an enormous contribution to the development of the region’s economic and cultural life: the artists Benkov and Volkov, the writers Borodin and Udakov, the doctor Isayev and his comrades in arms who did the heroic deed of ridding Turkestan of a nationality calamity—malaria and cutaneous leishmaniasis; the Moscow and Petersburg professors who organized the first university in Central Asia in distant 1921; the teachers, biologists, breeders, geologists, and engineers. The cultures of both peoples are intertwined and mutually enrich one another over their entire joint history.

But recently the Russian and Russian-speaking population has begun to experience ever-increasing discomfort. Numerous violations of the Uzbek SSR Law “On the State Language of the Uzbek SSR” which was adopted create bewilderment, to put it mildly. A multitude of examples may be cited. Thus, at the session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet which was held recently one of the deputies did not receive a clear answer to the question of why the session is being broadcast on television without translation, as is guaranteed in Article 5 of the Law on Language.

As for Uzbekistan’s television itself, it has been broadcast in the two languages from the moment of its inception. But recently air time in Russian has been reduced to 5.5 hours a week. Such a picture is also observed on the republic’s radio. In this way the republic’s Russian-speaking population is removed from important economic, political, and cultural information. Certain decrees of the government, in particular on publishing supplements in Russian to the republic’s weekly newspaper which covers issues of literature and art, are not being implemented; and the admission of those very Russian-speaking literary figures to USSR Writers’ Union membership is limited (in 1989 only one person was accepted). Pressure is put on talented doctors, engineers, architects, artists, musicians, and journalists. (A small eloquent example is that not one newspaper other than UCHITEL’YA UZBEKISTANA decided to publish the report by the UzTAG correspondent of 26 March of this year on the modest celebration of maslenitsa [carnival] at the Sergey Yesenin Museum. And one deputy editor in chief answered the question of why he did not make the announcement by saying that the party newspaper cannot propagandize Russian culture.) It is difficult for the main director and artistic manager of the Uzbek SSR State Symphony Orchestra
Imant Kotsinsh, and the architects A. Bogodukhov and A. Akimenko, the artist I. Lipene, and many others have left.

To all this I must add that all levels of Russian and Russian-speaking cadres are being replaced. A person who does not know the Uzbek language is virtually unable to occupy an administrative post (Article 4 of the Law on Language). In other regions of the country and abroad cadres are selected for continued education by nationality. The make-up of the Soviet is practically mononational: 91.2 percent of the deputies are Uzbeks. One can say the same thing about the make-up of the president's council and the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and so on. The number of students accepted for Russian-speaking groups in Vuzes is declining, especially in medical and polytechnical VUZes and the communications institute.

The cadre policy being secretly carried out has led to the fact that the Russian-speaking population does not occupy the appropriate place in terms of percentages among scholars and teachers at VUZes and in health care, the sphere of services and trade, and the administrative-management apparat; while plants and construction sites are for the most part staffed with Russian workers.

Undoubtedly the more languages a person knows, the richer he is. There is no doubt that one should know the language of the land where one lives. But that is a voluntary thing; it cannot be foisted on someone. Even A. Saidov, the methodologist and teacher from the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences House of Scientists, in VECHERNIY TASHKENT on 29 January 1990 marvels that the exam to be certified as an employee in the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services is taken after a four-month course on the Uzbek language.

The policy on the nationalities issue has not been well thought out, and the euphoria of the freedoms received has turned some people's heads. Obviously it is time to remember Marx's words that language arises only from need, from a persistent need to communicate with other people. And that the revolutionary transformations which have cost us so much in our history must not be in first place here in the most delicate sphere of human relations. Everything must be done very correctly and dissatisfaction must not be generated and everyday nationalism must not be created.

In such a situation we who have found ourselves in Uzbekistan by the will of fate sense the rupture of cultural and spiritual ties with Russia to an ever-greater degree. Current actors, writers, artists, and composers do not reach us or come very rarely. Most of our children do not know the customs and traditions of the Russian people and the dances and songs and are losing their national roots completely.

The lack of equal opportunities for the development of our national culture causes justified concern for the republic's Russian population. Therefore, 14 February of this year a group of representatives of the Russian-speaking population of the city of Tashkent appealed to the gorispolkom with a request to register a Russian cultural center. The center's tasks include studying the cultural legacy, history, philosophy, folklore, and traditions, studying the mutual impact of the Russian and Uzbek cultures, and organizing exhibits and meetings with prominent figures of art, historians, and writers. The Tashkent Gorispolkom refused the request.

Obviously it is very advantageous for some people to act on the basis of the old tested principle of divide and conquer. And that is now, when consolidation of healthy forces and a search for paths of national harmony are underway throughout the country. But they have forgotten, it seems, that on the threshold of the end of the 20th century, the many centuries of glorious history which allow us to find solutions to many questions are behind us and resurgent Russia will not leave her children in trouble.

I would like to believe that reason will triumph and the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers will respond positively to our second request.

And in addition I very much hope for kindness in human relations, understanding, and mutual respect. I would like people to invite one another to have pancakes for maslenitsa, "sumalak"—during "navruz," and "chak-chak" during "sabantua"!

A few days ago the gorispolkom studied the issue of the work of national cultural centers; incidentally, there are already nine (Jewish, Bukhara-Jewish, Tatar, Crimean-Tatar, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Uighur, Korean, and Kazakh). The representatives of the Russian cultural center once again were not invited.
Funds Allocated to Upgrade Customs Service
90UN1873A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 May 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with V. Boyarov, USSR Customs Control Administration chief, 16 May 90; place not given; by POISK correspondent G. Alimov: "From Competent Sources: Billion for Customs"]

[Text] Soviet customs will receive major allocations for its development. Chief of the USSR Council of Ministers Main Customs Control Administration V. Boyarov called the decisions accepted by the government "historic and embracing a whole complex of problems, which have not been addressed in years."

[Boyarov] The program to improve customs administration in our country, strengthening of the material and technical basis of the customs system, and development of its social sphere will cost a billion rubles. But we do not lay claim to a single kopeck of the Union budget. Expenditures will be reimbursed out of customs duties. Before the adoption of this decree by them, we did not have the right to use them at our discretion. Now all 100 percent of means will be received into our budget.

[Correspondent] Where is the bulk of investments intended to be directed?

[Boyarov] Nearly 600 million will go to the construction of facilities at the border: reconstruction of old customs crossings, and the building of new customs crossings according to the standards existing in the world. For example, we will build a modern complex in Grodno—the cost of the unit is 15 million rubles; the crossing "Tisa" in Transcarpathia and the Warsaw bridge in Brest are subject to reconstruction. We will set our hands to the construction of facilities at the Soviet-Chinese, Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-Finnish borders. In order to implement this, we are authorized to create building organizations.

To secure normal conditions for activities of customs service—build service offices, equip technological lines of control—it should have been those departments under whose aegis customs crossings are located. These are the transport ministries: Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, and ministries of republic automobile transport. And why? In spite of the fact that the government adopted three decrees on this count, nothing was decided, and we quarreled with them, however we never managed to force them to do something. We are sure that now many things will change. The principle merit of the new decree lies in the fact that it is directed toward the future, and in it the mechanism for a rapid growth rate was laid for everything, with which customs will collide in several years. A completely different situation arises when the market model of the economy really begins, a law for entry and exit comes into effect, a law for a customs code, and many other legal acts...

[Correspondent] As old structures have become outdated, why do you prepare to give up whatever you were striving for?

[Boyarov] First of all we reject the view that customs ought to be at our disposal directly at the border. If everything is left as it is, the border will get bogged down with market relations; it already is bogged down. There is one way out—to draw customs points closer to the participants in foreign economic activities. In principle we aim to move all customs preparation of freight documentation inside our country. This will give the possibility not only to unload the borders, but also will facilitate the rapid advancement of freight, and will make it possible to improve service culture. Creation of an internal infrastructure for customs service will require effort and means. About 4 were planned to be created this year. The number of customs inside the country will increase depending on the growth in the number of participants in foreign economic activities. Incidentally, today there are 15,000.

[Correspondent] New customs—these are the new personnel. Are you allowed to increase the number of personnel?

[Boyarov] Yes. For this year they asked to increase them by 3,000. The request was granted. Further we will add 1,000 annually. In several years we will have 17,000 to 18,000 customs officials. But this too is not a limit.

[Correspondent] And if it is compared with other countries?

[Boyarov] Certainly. For example, in Hungary there are nearly 15,000 customs officials, in America 17,500, and in the FRG 32,000. And here in tsarist Russia, interestingly enough, it was 35,000...

[Correspondent] Will a single automated system on a Union scale be created in your department?

[Boyarov] It should be done at the earliest possible date. We have already sent invitations to serve as a contractor to the most renowned agency of this conversion period: the Ministry of General Machine-Building. According to the contract, this year our contractors will put into operation so-called automated work places. With the help of this system, up to 70 percent of foreign trade volume will be processed. The whole system headed by the main computing center will begin working probably in 1993. Side by side with the computerization we are actively initiating new customs documentation, answering to world standards. We used documents of western economic groups as a model of customs documents.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, we are one of the few countries which does not have customs statistics available.

[Boyarov] Now it will become possible to give the government exact information. Actually, we did not have 72 years of customs statistics. We were unable to
Improvements in Public Prosecutor's Supervision Foreseen

90UN1934A Moscow Pravda in Russian 23 May 90
First Edition p 2

[Interview with V. Andreyev, deputy USSR procurator general, conducted by G. Ovcharenko: “The Law on Procurator's Supervision”; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] One of the basic elements of perestroika is the formation of a new, socialist statehood. State structures hitherto unknown to us are being formed, and the activities of other state agencies are taking on a different content. The procuracy is no exception in this process. How are its future and the main areas of its work envisaged? That was the topic of a PRAVDA correspondent's interview with V. Andreyev, deputy USSR procurator general.

[Ovcharenko] Vladimir Ivanovich, the heated and polemical nature of parliamentary debates over the “Gdlyan and Ivanov case,” at the epicenter of which the USSR Procuracy found itself; the unprecedented rise in crime across the whole spectrum of its manifestations; and the decline in the level of the public's legal protection might involuntary lead one to wonder whether real perestroika has affected the procuracy, and whether it is not the part of the command-bureaucratic system that embodies its archaic nature, its inertia, and its inability to involve itself in the renewal process.

[Andreyev] Undeniably, that way of putting the question forces us to talk about the principal, essential elements in the content and direction of the restructuring of the procuracy’s activities at the present, extremely complex stage in society's development. Therefore, I want to make it clear right away that the main thing for us is the fulfillment of Lenin's behest: to protect and preserve legality as the highest social value and measure of social justice, and to safeguard Soviet citizens' rights and legitimate interests. Therefore, in the procuracy agencies today priority is being given not to investigative work, but to the effectiveness of procurator’s supervision, which is called on to prevent potential violations of law and infringements of citizens' legitimate rights.

[Ovcharenko] Yes, judging from readers' letters, the observance of our rights, interests and liberties is still a sore point.

[Andreyev] Nonetheless, I do not think there are grounds for reproaching us for inaction. Last year alone procurator's intervention made it possible to defend the rights and interests and satisfy the legitimate demands of 126,000 persons. And how many people received qualified consultations on legal matters! Procurators protest about 70,000 unlawful legal acts annually.

[Ovcharenko] Recently the need to expand court, rather than procurator's, protection of human rights in all areas of economic, social and personal life has been widely discussed in legislative bodies and the press.

[Andreyev] I fully agree with that, as do the vast majority of my colleagues, incidentally. However, I believe that the change in legislation here should proceed in conjunction with the real improvement of the courts' work. So far, citizens more often “vote” for the procurator. Thus, last year the country’s courts heard and handed down decisions on about 90,000 civil cases involving disputes stemming from violations of labor laws. And more than 156,000 citizens' complaints concerning violations of labor rights were resolved in procuracy agencies. Only a little more than 10 percent of those who appealed to us for protection were persons whose jobs are listed on the infamous and still-unrepealed “lists.” For all the rest the road to the courts was “not forbidden.”

On the path toward legality and justice, it is necessary to overcome buildups and obstructions stemming from tendentiousness and false pride, spite and self-seeking. And that road to truth often takes not days and months, but years. I recall that at the end of last year, after our employees' official trip to Crimea Oblast, it was reported to me that Ye. Bondarenko's complaint had been satisfied, and she had been reinstated in her job as chief engineer of the Simferopol Indposhin [Industrial Tire] Factory on the basis of a protest by the republic procuracy. But that report did not bring me any particular satisfaction. The problem is that Yekaterina Pavlovna had been unlawfully fired in June 1983! It took a person more than six years to break through the wall of misunderstanding and bureaucrats' obtuseness. And that was despite having the procurator's support.

[Ovcharenko] The editors, Vladimir Ivanovich, also get letters whose authors claim that the procuracy is often powerless, and that its demands to restore citizens' legitimate rights are often simply ignored.

[Andreyev] Unfortunately, those claims are not far from the truth. And therefore, I believe that changes in the USSR Law on the Procuracy that would finally free procurators from the offensive and humiliating (and not, primarily, for us, but for the state that we represent) posture of petitioners and exhorters are justifiable and overdue. Procurators' powers should be backed up by real juridical guarantees and provision for the liability of any person, regardless of official position, for the failure to fulfill the procuracy's demands for the restoration of legality. Only under such conditions will the procuracy's function as a defender of rights be fully developed and manifested. I hope that the USSR Supreme Soviet will share our viewpoint.

[Ovcharenko] A little more than a year ago a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet established a
new structure for the USSR Procuracy. In place of the former general-supervision administration, four new administrations were created: administrations for supervision of the fulfillment of laws in economic activities, for supervision over the implementation of environmental-protection laws, for supervision over the observance of legality and protection of citizens’ rights in the social sphere, and for supervision over the implementation of legislation on violations of administrative laws. I know that analogous subdivisions have also been established in the procuracies of the union and autonomous republics, and oblasts. How effective has this reorganization been?

[Andreyev] It would be wrong the regard the changes that have been made in the structure of procuracy agencies merely as changes in the names of administrations and departments. The new structure is a reflection of a new understanding of the role and place of procurator’s supervision at the present stage of perestroika, and a new assessment of the procuracy’s work from the standpoint of its content, forms and means of affecting the strengthening of legality. Today we cannot limit ourselves merely to the restoration of legality; we must in every case find the initial cause of the situation that has created the need for the procurator’s intervention.

I will cite a fresh example. Recently our employees organized a checkup on the observance of laws on protection of the social rights of the elderly and disabled living in boarding homes. I do not have time to relate its results in detail, but the chief conclusion was that a sizeable contingent of unfortunate people have found themselves, for all intents and purposes, beyond the pale of public attention and genuine state support. Shame and pain—I do not think I was the only one to experience these feelings during the consideration of the checkup’s results at a meeting of the collegium of the USSR Procuracy. We adopted a broad set of measures—from raising issues before legislative bodies and the government, to the initiation of criminal cases against unscrupulous people who prey on the misfortune of the elderly and disabled. Some procuracy employees who considered the observance of legality in boarding houses to be a matter of small importance were also punished. There’s the sort of approach—that is what represents the new elements that we are developing in procurator’s supervision today.

[Ovcharenko] But action by the procuracy alone is hardly capable of solving or substantially relieving many of the social and legal problems that our life is revealing to us in all their acuteness daily and hourly.

[Andreyev] I agree. But in fairness I should add that the generally correct thesis concerning the need to create the necessary material and technical prerequisites for resolving many social issues has become, for certain unscrupulous people, a kind of “indulgence” for their own negligence, low level of professionalism, and irresponsibility. Recently, for example, at our instructions the Kazakh SSR Procuracy brought criminal charges in the case of the death of citizen Mikhakhtchenko. You would literally be horrified by the callousness and indifference of the medical robots before whose very eyes a person died without any sort of help at all. What does the generally miserable state of our health care have to do with this specific case? Here the law should speak, and we accomplished that.

[Ovcharenko] In other words, the procuracy is seeking new and more effective forms of procurator’s supervision, which is directed primarily at the prevention of violations of legality?

[Andreyev] Absolutely right. After all, the arsenal of old methods does not always work under the new economic and political conditions. For example, the transition to market relations in the economy cannot help affecting the forms of the procuracy’s work to strengthen legality in economic activities. We are warning procurators against an oversimplified approach to understanding the essence of the socialist market. It would be a profound mistake to consider market relations to amount to uncontrolled forces. The market, as correctly understood, presupposes much more orderliness than the command economy, and its chief regulator is not orders from above, and not a juridical surrogate in the form of the relations that currently exist between suppliers and buyers of output, but a contract based on law with precisely specified obligations of the parties, agreed-upon sanctions for their violation, and an effective mechanism for monitoring the contract’s fulfillment.

This is a very fundamental point, which determines both the nature and the orientation of the procurator’s intervention. On the one hand, the procurator must take steps to identify and protest unlawful economic contracts. To a great extent, that is what now constitutes our preventive role. On the other hand, he must react to instances of flagrant violations of contractual obligations, without taking the place, in doing so, of economic executives, labor collectives and monitoring agencies. Incidentally, that work has already begun. After all, experience shows that often attempts are made to foist off the old, discredited forms of production management on labor collectives in new verbal packaging.

Thus, in the Belorussian city of Lida the administration of the city food-industry trading organization concluded so-called “leasing contracts” with the collectives of 48 stores. These “contracts” and their appendices provided for a whole system of large fines (up to 400 rubles each) for various violations of a noneconomic nature: the failure to fulfill the orders and instructions of the trade organization and other superior organizations, improper conduct in domestic life and in public places, the failure to present required reports, and so forth. At the same time, contrary to law, the trade organization’s management avoided including in the contracts its own obligations with regard to the improvement of the labor collectives’ social development, including action to solve the housing problem and resolve a number of other
matters of importance for the labor collectives’ production and social activities. On the basis of a representation by the procurator, the illegalities were eliminated, and the contracts were brought into conformity with the legal and economic content of the institution of leasing.

Procurators’ checkups attest to the widespread nature of violations of law in the activities of cooperatives. Of particular concern is a rise in the nonlabor income of cooperative members, speculation, theft, and unlawful actions in the area of foreign trade. These negative phenomena are creating unprecedented social tension in the country and hindering the implementation of state programs in the development of the cooperative movement. Here too, I am certain, the procuracy agencies should also have their say. So the field of activities for procurator’s supervision is a wide one.

[Ovcharenko] And from every indication, it will not narrow in the foreseeable future.

[Andreyev] I don’t think so. In my view, procurator’s supervision should become a more open system, should not lock itself into some sort of rigid framework, and should react more promptly and “sensitively” to the problems and difficulties that concern society. For example, for several dozen years procurators’ reports included a line on supervision over the observance of laws on kolkhoz democracy. Yet can it be that democracy begins and ends on the kolkhoz? We indifferently looked on while many democratic institutions established by law, albeit imperfect institutions, were ignored everywhere. Administrative tyranny became one of the chief obstacles to the realization of Soviet people’s rights and the solution of political, economic and environmental problems. In the Ukraine alone, during the past election campaign agencies of the procuracy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated six criminal cases in connection with identified cases of the falsification of official documents on the nomination of candidates for deputy.

[Ovcharenko] Obviously, the new sociopolitical situation in the country is creating the need for a fundamental revision of the present concept of procurator’s supervision and the appropriate embodiment of that concept in law.

[Andreyev] Of course. And in that connection it should not be forgotten that the concept needs to be developed by practitioners, scholars and legislators working together, relying on the Leninist understanding of procurator’s supervision and taking into account today’s political realities and realities of state and law.

It is necessary, in light of the requirements of the new Law on Constitutional Oversight, to define as fully as possible the limits of procurator’s supervision with regard to the subjects of state authority and administration. It is also necessary to clarify the role of nondepartmental-control and people’s-control agencies under the conditions of the decentralization of economic management and the development of cost-accounting and leasing relations. The question of delimiting the jurisdiction of the USSR and the union republics in the area of ensuring legality and legal order also needs to be treated in depth and incorporated in the constitution. But in any case, there remain fundamental tenets the abandonment of which would mean loss of the procuracy’s constitutional identity as the agency of highest supervision over the universal, precise and uniform administration of the laws. Among such tenets, one must include, first and foremost, Lenin’s requirement that procuracy agencies be strictly centralized, and procurators independent of any sort of local agencies and officials.

Only if these conditions are unconditionally observed will the procuracy be able to fully exercise its functions as protector of legal rights, and to consistently defend the legitimate interests of the state and the individual.

Changes in Penal Policy, Prisoners’ Welfare Expected

90UN1933A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 23 May 90 p 3

[Article by Yu. Golik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet’s Committee on Questions of Law and Order and Combating Crime; Doctor of Legal Sciences A. Mikhlin, honored RSFSR scientist; and Doctor of Legal Sciences I. Shmarov: “And the Convict Has the Right—”]

[Text] The Second Congress of USSR People’s Deputies passed a decree “On Intensifying the Struggle Against Organized Crime” and instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to adopt a whole series of major normative acts, including the Basic Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Administration of Criminal Justice. Are they ready? Let us hear from the specialists.

A doctrinal draft Basic Principles of Legislation on the Administration of Criminal Justice was prepared by a group of scholars with the participation of practitioners from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and USSR Procuracy. Back in 1988 it was published for discussion in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs’ magazine VOSPITANIYE I PRAVOPORYADOK. The drafting group received more than 400 proposals from scholars, practitioners, other citizens, and even convicts. The draft was basically approved and, after additional work, was sent to the Supreme Soviet by the USSR minister of internal affairs and the USSR procurator general. It seems that it might be a basis for discussion. Just what does the new law amount to?

First, its title. The implementation of punishment is presently regulated by legislation called corrective-labor legislation. Many scholars and practitioners believe that such a title is no longer in keeping with its content. The point is that it regulates the implementation only of punishment connected with corrective-labor influence (the deprivation of liberty, suspended sentences to deprivation of liberty with mandatory assignment to work, probational release from places of the deprivation of
liberty with mandatory assignment to work, internal and external exile, and corrective work). The discussion of that issue in the legal press showed that very many scholars and practitioners support that proposal. Although, of course, it is not final.

The law should conform to the international legal commitments that our country has accepted. That pertains, in particular, to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1957 Minimum Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. International conventions require every state to take the universal human principles accepted in the world community into account in the treatment of convicts. In this connection, a special norm has been included in the draft basic principles. The provisions of these and other conventions have also been reflected in the text of the law.

It is important to strengthen the legal basis of the activities of institutions and organizations that implement punishment. At present, such activities are regulated not only by laws but by sublegal acts adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which sometimes have issued decisions exceeding their authority. Since legislation on the implementation of punishment affects the rights of convicts, it should have a minimum of delegated norms, that is, it should be direct legislation.

The draft spells out in detail the principles for the implementation of punishment. Especially important among them is the one that provides for the use of various levels of punitive influence on convicts depending on the seriousness of the crimes they have committed, their past criminal activity, the length of their terms, and so forth. At the initial stage of the deprivation of liberty, provision is made for the criminal to be kept in strict isolation. Subsequently, if the convict embarks on a path of correction, its punitive restrictions may be loosened. In this connection, emphasis is placed on convicts' duty to observe the requirements of the incarceration regime and internal regulations. All this does not exclude human treatment of convicts, which is included in the draft as one of its principles.

Humanism is not only a declared characteristic of the law. It provides for concern for the correction of convicts and the ensuring of their more successful return to an honest life after their release. As research shows, it is by no means the excessive harshness of punishment that promotes the criminal's correction. The rehabilitative and educational orientation of the new law has been strengthened. It relies to a significant extent on established principles of pedagogy.

The goal of maintaining convicts' health and their useful social connections, especially with their families, has not been forgotten, either. Nor have existing norms for living space (two square meters per person, of course, is clearly inadequate). Let us consider that more than 45 percent of criminals have been sentenced to terms of five to 15 years. We sometimes do not even think about how bad matters are in our country with respect to health care in places of the deprivation of liberty. There are colonies that are almost entirely "populated" with people suffering from tuberculosis.

During the time that sentences are being served, about 32 percent of male convicts' families and about 50 percent of women convicts' families break up. On the basis of this, it is proposed that restrictions on correspondence be lifted, that the number of meetings, packages and messages be increased, and that telephone conversations with family members be allowed.

When the draft of the new law was prepared, special attention was given to convicts' legal status. For the first time it was emphasized that they bear the responsibilities and enjoy the rights specified in the USSR Constitution and the union-republic Constitutions, as well as in other legislative acts. The right to use one's native language, to communicate with the administration and provide explanations in that language, and to receive assistance in finding work and housing and other types of social assistance after the completion of one's sentence is regulated in detail. That list will unquestionably be lengthened in the future.

The democratic nature of the draft law is reflected in one important norm: the norm on guarantees of the exercise of the right of freedom of conscience. Convicts may meet with clergy at both their own initiative and the initiative of the clergy, perform religious rites, and utilize religious literature and religious objects. As a rule, they are all supposed to serve their sentences according to their place of residence. At the same time, the draft law quite clearly speaks of the need for convicts to fulfill their civic duties and obey the rules determining the terms of their sentences.

The draft law regulates the implementation of all types of punishment, including capital punishment. It codifies the convict's right to appeal his sentence; to petition for pardon; to meet with relatives, an attorney, or clergy; to dispose of his property, and so forth.

In conclusion, we would like to discuss one of the most complex questions—the relationship between the jurisdiction of the USSR and that of the union republics in the area of the implementation of punishment. It has not yet been resolved on the constitutional level. It seems that the principles and general provisions, as well as the basic questions of regulating the implementation of punishment, should be resolved unequivocally in all the republics. Therefore, they must be reflected in the all-union law. This especially pertains to the legal status of convicts. It would hardly be in keeping with the principle of social justice if persons convicted for crimes identical in severity served their punishment under fundamentally different conditions and enjoyed different amounts of rights.
Prisoners’ Hunger Strikes Viewed

9OUN1313A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by G. Mironova: “Hunger Strike”]

[Text] Khabarovsk—Social Portrait of Event

On January 9, at 11:00 a.m., a military pilot Major Korenev went on a hunger strike. The command of the pursuit aviation regiment was shocked and could hardly believe it. The major-general comforted himself, “Maybe he is simply on a diet”, but on the next day, he had sedative pills in his pocket. They addressed the prosecutor: What is the procedure in a case like that? Is there any appropriate rule? But no law said anything about hunger strikes. Out of desperation, they began to monitor his health. The hunger-strike proved to be true—he was turning pale and losing weight. Several days later, Major Korenev went outside the compound. He stood in the central square of the city with a slogan; people saw him in the airport. “He is defaming the military uniform”, was one opinion; “Why don’t they investigate his case?”, was another.

Korenev’s case was investigated for an entire year. What caused the hunger strike? Before the eyes of numerous witnesses (even his wife saw it, people claimed)—his plane, while he was leading a fighting maneuver, fell down and exploded. At the last moment, the pilot bailed out. The state commission ascertained that the accident was caused by the lack of discipline of O.L. Korenev, who violated the flight assignment and failed to perform the piloting. The Anti-Aircraft Defense Commander-in-Chief’s order put an end to the major’s pilot career and he was supposed to live on the ground as an assistant to a flight instructor. On one hand, he used to be a good pilot who had risen to the rank of a Chief of Staff and a Deputy-Commander of a squadron and was planning to enter a military academy. On the other hand, it was his own fault. Total failure.

Oleg never took up his new duties, he did not take the money allowance on principle, and a year later, after hospitalization, he was pronounced unfit for active service entirely, due to the trauma he experienced during his bail out. This poses a major and quite civilian question: what rate of pay should be used as a basis for granting a pension to the major? He was deprived one dollar salary as a punishment and virtually never received the other one. Korenev insisted on the pension being based on the pilot salary, which was larger. The commanders and officers of the personnel department were studying instructions, trying to find the way out of this complicated situation. But suddenly, the major went on a hunger strike and gradually emotions prevailed over pedantry. The subjective reaction appeared to be stronger, though very different feelings were revealed—hostility and pity, irritation and sympathy. But mostly sympathy; ten years of hard work, after all, evokes human compassion. Officers at their meeting decided to champion the pilot (31 - for, 1 -against, 1 - abstained). Three words from the minutes were very unusual: “out of humanism”.

But what would happen if someone else were to go on hunger strike pursuing his object? Non-sentimental generals had to make their choice, as well as the Moscow Commander-in-Chief. It was the ninth day of the hunger strike.

Hunger strike is nothing but a moral weapon. It is based exclusively on the hope of a residual conscience among the authorities and for public opinion. Though it may now seem strange to us, this prisoners’ right inevitably helped to soften the regime in central prisons, as well as to get various advantages and fulfillment of their demands. In 1914, it took Dzerzhinsky five days of hunger strike to make the administration fulfill all his requests.

In the ‘20s, the attitude towards hunger strikes changed. Though the authorities still accepted written declarations of them, unpleasant rules were developed: a hunger striker should be transferred to a solitary cell and nobody, except for the prison administration itself, knew about his strike - whether at liberty or in prison. As the totalitarian regime was strengthening, another idea developed: Why should we care about hunger strikers? Since the ‘30s, legal declarations from hunger strikers were no longer accepted. In 1933, in the Khabarovsk prison, S.A. Chebotaryov was on a hunger strike for 17 days demanding that his family be informed about his whereabouts. Finally, he was shown a false telegram receipt, because the administration then was still responsible for getting out of a situation, even if by deception. But then a directive came to prisons: from that time on, nobody would be held responsible for any deaths caused by hunger strikes. Sectarian Koloskov died on the 25th day of his hunger strike. Facts like this were given by A. Solzhenitsyn in his book “Gulag Archipelago”.

In this way, an end was put to hunger strikes and this concept was blotted out of memory. You won’t find this word in a single encyclopedia, only Ozhegov’s dictionary explains very briefly: “Hunger strike is a refusal to eat as a manifestation of a protest”. But that sounded strange and unclear, looked stupid or, even worse, like a malicious hooliganism. About fifty years ago, the Soviet people had no idea of hunger strikes. Some people already had interest in medicinal fasting, various diets for losing weight were brought into fashion, but as for a hunger strike as a protest?!

Dr. Hider, a strange man in a knitted hat, in his time, simply amazed us. Thousands of people put their signatures in an organized way to support him, because it was such a campaign then, but still they were puzzled by that hunger strike and took it for something not too serious. And even political observers had to give some explanations to numerous questions.

I was told a surprising fact. A group of ski tourists miscalculated their food reserves and had to live for a
few days with their rations cut. Once in the evening, near
the fire, they recalled Hider and went into a long
discussion on this subject. It turned out that they were
able to understand Hider and reveal something new to
themselves. Their severe conditions, as well as suffering
from hunger, made them take it more personally, with
sincere compassion. As a result, a mountain in Kha-
barovsk Kray was named after the American scientist.

But many people never learned what the stubborn doctor
achieved. The campaign was hastily raced through, and
maybe it was disadvantageous then to announce that
many points of his declaration were accepted. But I think
it was just Hider who discovered for us all over again this
extreme measure of protest. That is why our first Soviet
hunger striker appeared when it became safe that he
wouldn't be drafted into the militia or sent to a mental
institution. It was yet to be comprehended.

In a shabby rayon center, in front of the party raykom, a
man set up a tent. The man was well-known in Troitsky
not for his being a chief of the local rescue station, but
because the prosecutor's office and militia, not accus-
tomed to stepping back, had for a long time been trying
to arrest him. It became not only known, but notorious.
When the case was already in the court and the judge
made a unequivocal hint that a "not guilty" verdict was
quite possible, the dossier mysteriously disappeared. For
over a year Leonov was in Limbo, neither convicted, nor
discharged, having neither passport nor job. His decla-
ration of a hunger strike was accompanied by a whole list
of demands, he had been deprived of all. People looked
at his tent out of windows, from round the corner and
from a safe distance. From time to time, authorities
came up and expressed their disappointment: "Why is he
here and not over the Amur?". By night, Leonov was
afraid that while it was dark they could take him to some
place. There was a little hope for public support. The
people were accustomed to intruding. But nevertheless,
Leonov made the authorities restore his rights.

This fact was meaningful not only for him, although
many people were still puzzled, "Why did his escape
disappear? If he was right, couldn't he prove it in any normal
way?". "Normal way" meant sending complaints every-
where, from the rayon center to Moscow, it meant
fanatical persistence and perpetual patience. People who
had been struggling for justice in that way all too often
became neurotic, though sometimes they were
announced as heroes. As a rule, they achieved nothing.
But there was no other way out. And in principle it
wasn't there.

Hunger strike is a severe action, an act of desperation,
but on the other hand, it is a natural right of anyone. One
needs to make some effort to comprehend it in full. That
is why, maybe, before expressing simple and direct
compassion, we ask ourselves: "Does he/she really go
without food? Are his/her demands legitimate and seri-
ous?". And a question more: "What if hundreds and
thousands of people would use this right tomorrow to
press for something most unfeasible?". The question is
quite familiar and pointless, like the related question:
"Wouldn't everybody leave if the borders were opened?"

But anyhow, a hunger strike is no longer exceptional
news, even for provincial Khabarovsk. Recently, an
inspector of the rayon department of social security went
on a hunger strike to protest against distributing vodka
coupons through the department of social security. The
case was too ordinary and not tragic at all, though since
the beginning of the month, all waiting lines had been
transferred from shops to the rayispolkom. Even a week
would not be enough to give out 16,000 cards, but that
was a resolution of the city council session, so what to
do? All of a sudden, one quiet girl could not endure
anymore. Ira Savel'yeva against all the deputies of Kha-
barovsk? Isn't it funny? "I didn't know what to do, so I
did it in this way", she explained candidly. Can you
understand that? An agonizing and extreme method
seemed the most simple and acceptable. To spend three
days on nothing but water in the chairman's waiting
room seemed easier than to act through profsoyuz,
oficial bodies, least of all through the society of sober-
ness. Well, really, hunger strikes of that sort are a
peculiar feature of ours.

It seems obvious that a hunger strike is an abnormal
phenomenon. But maybe it would be more appropriate
to call it a phenomenon of an abnormal life. Life has
become just a bit more liberal, and one, at least, will not
be punished for a deliberate protest. But how should life
change to eliminate such protests, when a hunger-striker
risks his/her health and even existence itself?

"It is the most realistic method today," explained Sasha
Matveev, a grade 10 student and a member of the
"Trudoden" club. "It is efficient". He participated in a
hunger strike to win a children's aesthetical center from
a profsoyuz school. The decision was altered within a few
hours, though signboards had been already hanging. But
what are the city and kray councils worth? As for me, I
stand for the center, but the victory of a hunger-striking
student does not give me personal satisfaction. At
present, a special deputy commission has finally been
formed to distribute city buildings. There you can argue,
present argumentation, discuss any problems as long as
you like. Maybe then no more hunger-strikers would be
fighting for premises?

Hunger strikes have always been considered an indige-
nous right of prisoners. It was because only in prison
may a person reach that extreme point, when physical
sufferings seem more endurable than moral and psychic
ones. There have always been hunger strikes in prisons,
and out of desperation, many people had naive faith in
the strength of this kind of protest. "There are two going
on now, but before the New Year, there were ten,"
delicately said a man, who looked more like a college
professor than a director of an investigation isolation
ward, "and we treat them as we are supposed to,
according to the rules..." These rules, given in the order
issued by the minister of internal affairs in 1984, are
almost the same as in Stalinist times. The hunger-striker
is transferred to a solitary cell and practically nobody takes care of him. Relatives are not informed, no medical care is provided. As for investigators and judges, they never do anything. If the prisoner's demands are considered to be well-grounded, for instance, if he does not admit the charges, then measures of compulsive feeding would be taken (by the way, the most shameful method is anticipated too, and it causes panic fears). If the hunger strike is not considered well-grounded, e.g. any demand beyond the fixed rules, it is regarded as a malicious violation of discipline and the hunger-striker can simply be put into a punishment cell.

All directors of the Khabarovsk special isolating prison have in turn read a three-volume "History of Czarist Prisons". The people in the military uniform complain that the prison conditions today cannot even be compared with those of the czarist period: "Prisons are overcrowded, some prisoners do not even have a berth, repairs are necessary. But it would be of no use to go on hunger strike in our prison. Although the prison is located in the center of our city, the Soviet authorities have never been here. Both power and time are different here".

When a new phenomenon arises in our life, it often acts as a mirror brought close to one's nose. "Democracy has come!" said many of us. But if free people have to go on hunger strikes and if the punishment in prisons, according to the rules, looks like the above-mentioned... We should shudder again, stunned by our uncivilized society and by the unfranchised status of our people.

Major Korenev stopped the hunger strike immediately after he had been visited at his home by a general who arrived with a large group of comrades. Korenev was promised the simplest thing: his case would be double checked. Was it worth going on a hunger strike for nine days to get that?!

Belorussian SSR MVD Minister on Joint Police, Public Crime Fight

90UN19594 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 29 May 90 p 4

[Interview with Viktor Piskarev, minister of Internal Affairs of the Belorussian SSR, by N. Baranovskiy and V. Roshchin in Minsk: "A Street Without Danger?"]

[Text] Only by joining the forces of the police, the public and workers into a single fist is it possible to overcome crime, believes the minister of internal affairs of the Belorussian SSR Viktor Piskarev.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Viktor Alekseyevich, the crime situation in the country has grown sharply worse. In these new conditions, the police must probably also work differently: more professionally and decisively. Of course, the public and the Soviets must also become more involved in this struggle.

[Piskarev] Of course, though we remain the first defense against crime as before. This has affected our work loads as well, which have exceeded all allowable norms. And how could this be otherwise, when last year's numbers showed crime in the republic up by one-third? Over 10,000 serious crimes were recorded, half again more than the year before. The number of cases characterized by exceptional audacity and cruelty is growing. Crimes committed using firearms have gone up by four times alone. Almost 8,000 cases were recorded of persons refusing to obey the police. There were attempts on the lives of our officers in 540 cases. As a result, they were forced to use their weapons forty times.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] And how are you dealing with the situation? As far as we are aware, the staffing levels of the Belorussian police have not increased recently.

[Piskarev] We're fighting not with numbers but with know-how, as they say. But there is no basis to speak of any reduction in the activity of the internal affairs agencies. Here are a few numbers. There were 54,500 crimes discovered, almost one-fourth more than the year before. Money and valuables worth 5.4 million rubles were confiscated from various sorts of dealers and turned over to the state. To this can be added another 1.5 million rubles collected as fines for crimes for personal gain.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Yet even so the criminal barrier is being overwhelmed. Aren't you painting the struggle against it in overly rosy hues?

[Piskarev] We have no illusions; or secrets either, for that matter. There were 10,000 unsolved crimes last year in the republic. Behind each of them are human lives and pain.

So what should be done? First of all, the entire sequence for investigating a crime must be upgraded: from the moment a call comes to the police until the case is turned over to the court. We are also taking steps to beef up key offices using reserves. After all, are three duty officers of, say, the Frunze ROVD (rayon office of internal affairs) in Minsk in a position to respond to a citizen's call if the rayon's population is over 300,000 and up to 80 emergency calls come in each shift?

Another important condition is to eliminate unproductive work of criminal investigation officers. By this I mean so-called refusal documents. Eighty percent of work time is spent on them. Useless explanations are gathered for trifling reasons, pointless reports are written. An interesting detail: police stations use up to 20 tons of paper each year on refusal cases. And this only for...
At the same time, everyone now realizes that crime cannot be fought by law enforcement agencies alone...

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] There are not the best relations today between the public and the police: there are many mutual charges and insults. Of course, this does little to contribute to an effective fight against crime. How can this be improved, how can the police’s authority be restored in the public’s eyes?

[Piskarev] Two or three years ago that would be a valid question. At that time, the mass media had the police in a crossfire. It was considered improper to say anything good about us. We were attacked for good reason but also, which particularly offended many people, because it was fashionable.

It is only recently that people have begun asking whether the police are guilty of all sins. Further checking revealed that the police need help, and that savings cannot be achieved by cutting its resources.

I often meet with work collectives. I can see that the public’s attitude towards the police has changed. They firmly support measures to establish order; in fact, they are demanding that such measures be strengthened. Of course we are still criticized sometimes, but without such animosity. There is more understanding for our problems, and support for efforts to strengthen the internal affairs agencies. After all, we are decades behind our Western colleagues in our material and technical equipment. And while we were standing in place, the criminals were getting high-speed cars, equipping themselves with firearms, radios, gases, computers...

Inadequate legislation is also hampering the police. This is a serious factor, but one entirely removable. A whole package of new laws is being prepared. But what’s keeping the laws on the books from being enforced adequately?

Take large-scale pilferage of state and public property. Last year 680 persons were convicted of this in the republic, but only 38 of them were sentenced to jail! And only 20 of them for a term of more than three years! And this while the law itself has harsh provisions: from 4 to 15 years. Why aren’t they being used? After all, we’re talking about protecting the people’s property.

Or another example. Only one-third of the 4,400 apartment burglars apprehended were convicted. And those got off with minimum sentences.

Isn’t this the source of the common and, unfortunately, not unfounded belief that crimes can go unpunished?

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] There’s already been a lot of talk about the low social and legal protection of the police, about their scandalous technical equipment. You’ve already touched on this theme. But the situation has not progressed beyond words. Crooks and bandits cannot be overcome without solving these questions. Are there any bright spots in the situation?

[Piskarev] I don’t agree that these questions are not being resolved. It’s another matter that it is not so easy to solve them. After all, it’s only been in the last year or two that the government has seriously looked at the police’s needs. Before that, it was mainly just encouragement. They relied on enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is fine, but it must be seriously supported by material resources, equipment, more manpower.

And it’s just these that... Here are a few figures for comparison. We spend 8 rubles per capita for the police; in the US, 100 dollars. We have one and a half policemen per thousand residents; the USA has 3.5; the FRG one per 400; England one per 225. And the pay scales are not comparable, of course.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Viktor Alekseyevich, it’s no secret that policemen have been receiving meager pay. We’ve heard rumors that there have even been strikes in the republic over this.

[Piskarev] Monetary compensation for our personnel is being increased. But why in stages? First for employees at police stations, then for workers in corrective labor institutions and police officers. Now it’s the turn for dispatchers and investigators. The others will have to wait. It’s true that the work in investigations and BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of State Property] is intensive and high-stress. But other work is no less stressful. And this upsets people, it evokes unhealthy feelings in them. The situation with technical equipment is somewhat better. This year alone the agencies and subdivisions of internal affairs will receive over 600 cars, as many as in the preceding 10 years. And the republic’s Council of Ministers has allocated almost 200 cars more.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Much is being said and written these days about organized crime. Offices dealing with the local mafia have been created in your ministry. How serious do you think this effort is, and has it yielded any results in Belorussia?

[Piskarev] Unfortunately, we encounter it with increasing frequency. Last year alone eight organized extortion groups were broken up in the republic. They involved almost 50 persons. Almost all the money extorted was recovered.

Organized crime feeds on the shadow economy, which is developing vigorously. Shortages also add fuel to the fire: the republic now has a shortage of over a billion rubles worth of goods. There are only 12 kopecks worth of goods for each ruble in the public’s savings.

On the one hand, such a situation creates uncertainty about the future; on the other, the number of “volunteers” to the criminal world grows. For example, in 1985 there were 4.5 million rubles’ worth of missing goods and pilferage uncovered in the republic’s enterprises and firms; in 1988, there were 13.2 million. Last year, 440 enterprise directors and 160 accountants were involved in economic and work-related crimes.
[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Last year workers' brigades appeared in the country, formed to help the police. How do you evaluate this experiment, do you find it useful?

[Piskarev] Absolutely. We now have 60 such brigades with 1,600 persons. Dozens of crimes have been uncovered and stopped with their assistance.

I'd like to mention one other thing. There's a lot of talk these days about the advisability of shifting workers from their basic jobs. It would be better, the argument goes, to reallocate money from enterprises and use it to pay for additional police personnel. I agree. But the public's role in maintaining order must not decline as a result. As they say, we keep order together in the place where we work and live. And this is not just a slogan. For example, in Minsk the charitable fund “Law and Order” has been founded at the initiative of the Frunze ROVD (rayon office of internal affairs). Over 11 million rubles have already been donated to it. Many enterprises donate equipment to the police.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] And the last question. A minister has many concerns, many unresolved problems. But what worries you most of all? What keeps you awake at night?

[Piskarev] The same as any person who loves his homeland, his people. It's hard for them, and it's hard for me; their pain is my pain.

It also bothers me that some people treat democracy and glasnost as anarchy: “I do as I please.” Genuine democracy, like any revolution, must be able to defend itself. And we must all learn how to defend democracy, which means defending its people, its rights.
Journalists on Turkmen Party Congress

90US1063A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 90
Second Edition p 2

[Article by M. Volkov, correspondent of PRAVDA, and M. Durdyev, department chief of the journal ASHKHABAD: “This Sweet Word ‘Stability’”]

[Text] Sufficient time has passed after the congress of the Turkmen communists for impressions to be filtered out and for opinions to be settled. But a strange thing—the discordant feeling does not leave. On the one side, a sort of triumphant notes that were heard in the speeches of the majority of speakers, not without foundation. On the other, this involuntarily compels one to recall the customs of the times not so long ago, when even a small success served for splendid festivities.

“I believe that the Central Committee did not succeed in getting out of the old beaten rut in the organization of the work of its elective organ,” said B. Tagandurdyev, the first secretary of the Chardzhouskiy Party Obkom.

It seemed, there follows an analysis of the circumstances that did not make it possible for the Central Committee Bureau to turn away from the well-worn rut. But no. Having counted up, evidently, that the dose of criticism is sufficient for giving the speech a perestroyka zest, the speaker with relief began to show what “... great work, being conducted by the Central Committee, promoted the stable situation that has developed in the republic as a whole. This is especially noticeable against the background of the other regions of the country.”

“Stability”—this was perhaps the most popular in the reports and speeches at the congress. Precisely with this word the delegates characterized the political, economic, and moral situation in the republic.

In the summary report, an attempt was made to analyze in what way it was possible to avoid a crisis in the communist party, acute economic disorders, social and inter-nationality conflicts. It was noted that the republic organization came to its congress through a complex process of self-purification.

However, serious shortcomings in the development of the republic were noted as well. From the statements of the delegates transpired that they could have been overcome long ago, had it not been for the serious consequences of the stagnation period and the sluggishness of individual leaders. In the report, the passivity of the government was quite definitely given as the chief reason of the socio-economic misfortunes: It tried to preserve the old economic mechanism, dogmatically adhered to the gross output “achievements”, and impeded the dynamic of life and thought. One can agree with this conclusion. But how can one recognize it as exhaustive? No matter how much the speakers sweetened their criticism aimed at the Central Committee of the party, it nevertheless followed that the adherence to the old methods of leadership are inherent in the Central Committee itself. And the analysis of the reasons for the republic’s lagging behind in socio-economic development, which was heard in the report, was only the corroboration of this thesis. Nevertheless, the majority of the speakers adhered to some kind of neutral-assuring scheme. After the declarations of stability (illustrated by pictures of achievements), shortcomings were stated, which were at once recognized as being temporary, since the people believes the party and sees in it the force capable of implementing restructuring and in unity with the people able to overcome all the negative phenomena.

This apotheosis is sometimes supplied with references to the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local Soviets of the Turkmen SSR that took place in January-February of this year: The Communists constituted 88.6 percent of the republic’s people’s deputies.

True, no one among the delegates analyzed the composition of the republic’s deputy body, but if this were done, a curious picture would emerge. A large part of the republic deputy corps is composed of regular staff members of the party, chairmen of the Soviets, managers of large production enterprises, directors of sovkhozes and chairmen of kolkhozes. The following fact makes one think. In the Sverdlovsk election okrug, in the elections for TuSSR people’s deputy, a kolkhoz brigade leader, the chairman of the Union of Writers, and the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences were not successful. Whom did the voter prefer? The chief of the department of workmen’s services of one of the subdivisions. He was helped by a well-equipped team, which at the time of the meetings with the candidate organized the sale of goods in extremely short supply. Clearly the representative of consumer cooperatives, too, were for some reason lucky. At the same time, not a single writer, artist or composer was elected among the number of people’s deputies.

What is more, can one seriously discuss profound qualitative changes—whether at the initiative of the communist party or as the result of the efforts of the government (which, by the way, was recently reformed), if a decisive turning-point has not begun in the disastrous situation which through inheritance came to us from the period of stagnation. There has been the utmost neglect of the economy, in which the structural imbalance, disproportions and deformations have not been overcome. The weakened social orientation of the economy remains.

The consequences of those stagnation years continue to have an effect. Turkmenia at present has the lowest per capita production of consumer goods in the country: Almost 3.5 times lower than for the country as a whole. Here we find the lowest life expectancy in the country, the highest infant mortality, and the provision of skilled medical care for the population is unsatisfactory. The hospitals and polyclinics are in need of urgent reorganization. And in 64 percent of the maternity hospitals there is not even running water, not to mention sewage systems, hot water, and central heating.
A significant part of the republic’s territory represents an ecological disaster zone, but the measures that are being taken to improve the situation are clearly inadequate.

Yes, there are positive changes in the republic. They talked about them at the congress, and quite a bit. During the period under review, the national income increased by almost 22 percent, exceeding the growth planned for the five-year plan by more than 5 percent. There was a 13.8 percent increase in return on investment, an almost 18 percent increase in the gross output of agriculture. There was a significant increase in capital investment in the social sphere. Many delegates talked literally with rapture about the fact that the food, housing, and other problems in the republic have almost been fully solved. True, in the summary report the assessment of the situation with respect to food was much more restrained.

It was noted, for example, that during the last 4 years the increment of meat per inhabitant of the republic came to only 2 kilograms, milk—to 9 kilograms, and eggs—to 10 units. An increase in growth, but can one close one’s eyes to the fact that even with this increment the consumption of basic food products in Turkmenia are two times lower than the all-union level. What is more, it was not attained through our own production. In the same issue of the republican newspaper, in which the summary report of the Central Committee to the congress was published, one can read the report of the republic’s State Committee for Statistics about the development of the Turkmen SSR in the first quarter of 1990, from which it is evident that, compared to last year, there was a 3 percent decrease in the total number of livestock, a reduction in the milk productivity of cows and the egg-laying qualities of laying-hens, and a decrease in the production of meat and milk for the republic as a whole. To this should be added that the level of today’s per capita meat consumption does not exceed the level of 1975.

But as soon as there is no growth, there remain doubts about the possibilities of achieving the solution of the task set by the congress—a 2-fold increase in grain production, a 1.5-fold increase in vegetable and melon, meat and egg production, and a 2-fold increase in milk production.

The question of the monoculture of cotton, which today agitates public opinion in the republic, was also raised at the congress. On the one hand, it was emphasized that Turkmenia occupies first place among all the cotton-growing republics in terms of per-capita cotton production. The pay for such pre-eminence—land and water, poisoned with pesticides, hepatitis epidemics, a multitude of social problems, the complete dependence of the republic on food imports—from meat and sausage to canned fruit and vegetables and confectionery.

All this is so, and at the same time this question should be decided in adaptation to the interests of the entire Union. In the report of the Central Committee it was firmly declared that it is inadmissible to curtail the production of Turkmen cotton.

The discussion on ideological work that took part at the congress cannot be called constructive. Here, too, the aspiration was manifested to throw on the scales a little more “the token of perestroyka” in order for unpleasant phenomena not to tip the scales. Alas, one cannot avoid them. And faced with them, the ideological commission and the department of the Central Committee proved to be unequal to the task. The delegates of the congress criticized the republic’s social scientists, who were frankly taken aback in the conditions of increasingly frequent speculations on history.

It is impossible not to note the spirit of adherence to the socialist choice and the aspiration to do everything possible to prevent demarcation in the country on the basis of nationality that reigned in the hall and were reflected in the declaration “For the Strengthening of a Reformed Soviet Federation” which was adopted at the congress. It contains an appeal to the fraternal communist parties of the union republics with a call to strengthen the unity of the CPSU, to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the USSR—of a reformed federation of equal republics.

The material on the congress of the Turkmen communists would end on this cheerful note. But the bifurcation and ambiguity remain and compel the addition of a few more words. The party—to talk about this has today become somehow unfashionable—regardless of whatever miscalculations, had and continues to have good traditions. Among them is the agitation, going back to Lenin, the ability not to flatter oneself with what has been achieved, not to celebrate victory in the face of a multitude of problems. This is akin to the psychology of the ploughman: Having thrown the grain into the furrow, having waited for the first shoots, he is more worried than before. And he is not inclined to talk about the species for harvest, but more and more—about sprinkling, additional fertilization, and protection. This is not an empty superstition, but something very practical and serious.
Stalin-Era Repressions of Armenian Writers
Detailed


[Text] Perestroika has given our society a broad opportunity to freely express its point of view on past events and to assess the history of the postwar period in a new way in order to prevent us from again repeating all that occurred during the cruel times of the cult of personality on the path of progress. In the 1930’s, tens of thousands of the sons and daughters of the Armenian people, who were called “enemies of the people” and who died in jail cells, camps, or in exile in the far North, became victims of Stalinism. They also did not find out what they were guilty of since the all-mighty “Troika” itself determined the crime, the degree of guilt, and the punishment. Those who were fortunate to live until the welcome thaw and to return home attempted to tell the truth and to convey the martyrs’ behests to society. But all of this was done in an undertone because the era of stagnation that had come was already trumpeting only about successes, prosperity, and progress. And the blank spots in our history remained. Now the time has come to tell the truth aloud. But, unfortunately, many of the participants of this tragedy and its organizers have departed this life. However, the people’s memory has remained. Archival materials have also been preserved—the written evidence of outrages and arbitrary rule of those harsh days. Work is being conducted to study these archives and everything possible is being done to completely restore justice and peoples’ good names. Several hundred names of repressed people have already been published in the press who have been acquitted by the groundlessness of the grave accusations brought against them and the lack of evidence of a crime. Unfortunately, this has been done posthumously....

Armenian SSR State Security agents have detected a number of archival documents that are shedding new light on the circumstances of the arrest, interrogation, and determination of punishment with regard to three prominent figures of Armenian literature—Aksel Bakunts, Gурген Maari, and Mkrtich Armen.

Armenian Press Correspondent Melikyan asked V.G. Badamyanets, chairman of the [Armenian SSR State] Security Committee, to comment on these documents.

[Badamyanets] First of all, I remember that these three figures were accused of membership in a so-called underground Trotskyite Armenian writers group and of conducting a struggle against the Party and the Soviet regime.

I will begin from the material concerning Aksel Bakunts. This is consolidated information on the archival case file for the accusation drawn up on June 11, 1954 by Main Military Procurator's Office Department Military Procurator Gelyanin. It is clear from the case that Aksel Bakunts was arrested on August 10, 1936 based on the Armenian NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Main Military Directorate information which stated that the writer had joined the underground Trotskyite nationalist group named above in 1932. Incidentally, during an August 5, 1936 interrogation, Bakunts testified that he allegedly was one of the leaders of the Armenian writers group called “Noyember” prior to 1927 and that it continued its activities without a specific name thereafter. Bakunts testified that this group, having permitted a number of nationalist errors in its creativity, thereafter, especially from 1933, went beyond the limits of literary creativity and evolved into a nationalist political group.

As indicated in the consolidated information, Bakunts once again expounded upon the activities of this writers group and characterized it as nationalist at subsequent interrogations. During the trial, he allegedly confessed his guilt and confirmed the data previously confessed during the preliminary investigation about his criminal activities.

On July 7, 1937, a USSR Supreme Court’s military panel of judges sentenced Bakunts to capital punishment—execution by firing squad, which was carried out the next day—July 8.

As we all know, a USSR Supreme Court military panel of judges’s decision dated March 2, 1955 recognized the USSR Supreme Court’s military panel of judges assizes of July 7, 1937 as invalid and Bakunts’ case was dismissed for lack of a corpus delicti. Moreover, the USSR Main Military Procurator’s Office established through additional investigation that Bakunts was groundlessly condemned.

The Armenian CP Central Committee designated a commission in May 1954 to study the works of Charents, Bakunts, and Maari to verify the political orientation and artistic value of Bakunts' literary works and submitted its conclusion. I would like to cite excerpts from these documents about Bakunts. It was noted in them in particular that “there is nothing anti-Soviet in Bakunts' works from a political or ideological point of view. He was a talented Soviet writer and eminent literary master.”

V.V. Kazanchyan, an Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences senior scientific associate; S. Martikyan, former chairman of the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of Armenia and CPSU member since 1904; S. Ioannisyan, former Armenian CP Central Committee secretary; and, Professor Dabagyan, all of whom characterized Bakunts as a talented prose writer who enjoyed great popularity and whose works are imbued with love for the Soviet Homeland, were also questioned as witnesses during the examination. They considered Bakunts to be a principled man for which members of the Russian Union of Proletarian Writers and Beriya supporters Mgdusi, Tsaturev, Akopov, and others also prosecuted him.
Furthermore, these same witnesses testified that Bakunts actively fought Trotskyism and the nationalists, while defending the general line of the Party. Bakunts, said Sergo Martikyan, was as talented in the area of prose as Charents was in the area of poetry and that he knew Bakunts as a patriot who loved Soviet Armenia and the Soviet people.

[Melikyan] How do you explain that Bakunts corroborated the accusations brought against him in his testimony? We all know that investigators beat out such "confessions" using cruel torture or they even fabricated them themselves, that is, they created fictitious documents. We know this through the "Troika's" court sentences with regard to major figures on a country-wide scale which the central press has written about several times recently. Have Bakunts' testimony and the shorthand record of the trial been preserved?

[Badamyanyets] Unfortunately, trial shorthand records were not preserved in archival files. We discovered from records of evidence of interrogations of Bakunts that we do have that Mugdusi and sadly infamous NKVD agents Gevorkov, Nikogosyan and Malkov personally interrogated him...... We do not have any direct evidence of the employment of physical coercion against Bakunts. However, from the contents of the records of evidence of Bakunts' so-called confession and of the individuals who interrogated him who, incidentally, were executed by firing squad in a special manner later on, we can assume that they also employed gross methods of coercion and, as you stated, possibly fabricated a confession while questioning Bakunts.

[Melikyan] What new [evidence] has been established with regard to Gurgen Maari? Maari was one of those "lucky ones" who underwent cruel tests and managed to continue his forcibly interrupted literary activities and to also reflect everything he endured during those nightmarish years in his autobiographical story during the last years of his life. I have in mind his book "Kolyuchaya provoloka v tsvetu" [Barbed Wire in the Prime of Life] that came to light almost two decades after the writer's death and which posthumously bestowed the Armenian SSR State Prize upon him.

[Badamyanyets] I would say that this document adds more to the writer's vivid civic character. This is also a case file for his rehabilitation in which it states that Maari was arrested by order of Internal Affairs Narkom [People's Commissariat] Mugdusi on August 9, 1936. He ended up under investigation because he had participated in a so-called anti-Soviet nationalist terrorist organization that allegedly operated on the territory of Armenia in a bloc with an anti-Soviet right wing Trotskyite organization since 1932. Having joined this anti-Soviet nationalist writers group, Maari conducted subversive activities on the literary front.

A July 20, 1938 USSR Supreme Court military panel of judges closed session that lasted a total of 15 minutes condemned Maari to 10 years imprisonment in a corrective labor camp with deprivation of civil rights for five years and confiscation of all personal property. The remarkable fact is that the sentence states: Calculate Adzhemyan's jail term from August 9, 1937. But really he was arrested on August 9, 1936 hence it follows that Maari was actually condemned not to 10 years as indicated in the sentence but to 11 years. This is a tragic misprint for which the writer paid with an unnecessary year of imprisonment.

As we all know, Maari returned to Armenia in 1947 after serving his sentence. However, he was once again arrested on November 12, 1948 by Armenian Ministry of State Security organs, this time for membership in a right wing Trotskyite organization and, in accordance with the decision of the special conference under the ministry, he was sent to a special exile location on February 23, 1949.

Later, according to a USSR Supreme Court military panel of judges decision dated July 21, 1954, the July 20, 1938 USSR Supreme Court military panel of judges sentence and also the February 23, 1949 resolution of the special conference under the USSR Ministry of State Security with regard to Maari were recognized as invalid and the case was dismissed due to absence of a corpus delicti.

The writer returned home from exile. As it is apparent from materials of the supplementary investigation and the July 7, 1954 record of evidence, while being interrogated as a witness (1936 and 1949), Maari completely denied his participation in the so-called anti-Soviet nationalist Armenian writers group, he noted that he had joined the Writer Charents' creative literary group in 1931 and that this group did not pursue any anti-Soviet goals. Maari also stated that the arrest in 1936 was a surprise for him since he was not guilty of anything.

One more detail from this document. Maari added that he was held in solitary confinement for forty days. During the confinement period, Investigator Nikogosyan summoned him three times and accused him of anti-Soviet activities which the writer categorically denied and he did not admit his guilt.

By using persuasion and various tricks, Nikogosyan attempted to get Maari to confess his "heinous crime" in the records of evidence filled out by the investigators' hands. However, he did not succeed in doing this. We do not know if physical force was used against Maari. But, according to his testimony, the investigator took a pistol out of its holster and laid it on the table at each interrogation.

Subsequently, after his conviction, Maari repeatedly wrote about cases of illegality at various levels of authority, however he did not achieve a positive result.

The case file also contains this April 21, 1954 creative description of Maari written by Armenian Union of
Writers Executive Secretary Gurgen Boryan. In particular, it states: “Maari is an eminent Armenian writer who honestly served native literature during his entire literary career. This is a talented Soviet writer and prose writer whose works are imbued with a spirit of patriotism, internationalism, and invigorating ideals of our Soviet Homeland.”

[Melikyan] Were any other materials about Maari found in the archival documents? I would like to once again remind you about the story “Kolyuchaya provoloka v tsvetu” in which the author also describes his own arrest and the search of his apartment: “They turned all of my drawers upside down,” he wrote, “removed numerous letters, and took my diaries which I had kept since 1922.

“They took a large folder in which they placed (apparently) dubious materials that they seized.” Has any trace been found of these materials that undoubtedly are quite valuable from the point of view of the completeness of the author’s literary legacy and also for assessing events in Armenian literature, social and political life for 14 years (1922-1936), and individuals and phenomena of that time?

[Badamyanets] This question is not being posed to us for the first time. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find any of Maari’s personal materials, diaries, or notes despite the fact that the record of the search dated August 9, 1936 mentions the seizure of a diary, photographs, a Komsomol membership card, four note pads with notes, two notebooks with notes, and a 96 page work manuscript.... In all probability, they were destroyed at that time as documents of an “anti-Soviet and nationalist nature.”

We recently made a photocopy of a photograph of Maari that is maintained in the file and sent it to the writer’s son—Grigor Gurgenvich Adzhemyan.

[Melikyan] What would you say about the archival materials concerning Mkrtich Armen?

[Badamyanets] This is a case file in which the following is recorded: Mkrtich Grigoryevich Arutyunyan (Mkrtich Armen) was arrested by Armenian SSR NKVD organs on November 5, 1937 on the accusation of participating in an allegedly existing anti-Soviet nationalist Armenian writers group. There is also a bill of indictment dated June 10, 1938 which states that the investigation conducted established that Arutyunyan was allegedly recruited by an anti-Soviet nationalist Armenian writers group in 1932 under the direct leadership of Charents that conducted an active struggle with the Soviet regime on the literary front. From 1933, it discredited VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] and measures adopted by the Soviet regime.

Arutyunyan was sentenced to an eight year term in a corrective labor camp by an October 8, 1938 resolution of a special conference under USSR NKVD.

Based on an application by the writer’s mother, Noyemzar Davdivovna Alekyan, to USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Karo Simonovich Alabyan (date not indicated), USSR Deputy Procurator Major General of Justice Vavilov protested Arutyunyan’s case on May 26, 1945. An investigation was conducted as a result of this. In accordance with a review presented by the critics who studied the writer’s works in accordance with a USSR Union of Writer’s board task, Critic Rykachov, and also Critics Yengibaryan and Akopyan studied his creativity in accordance with an Armenian SSR Glavlit [Main Administration for Literature and Publications Affairs] task and established that “Armen’s works are Soviet, politically consistent, and written by the pen of a mature master.”

Mkrtich Armen named Writer Charents as his recruiter during his interrogation. Furthermore, as pointed out in the document, Charents did not admit his own guilt and testified that he headed the Noyemzer Writers Group which Arutyunyan had joined but this group was never nationalist and did not conduct Anti-Soviet work.

The document also added that witnesses’ testimony about Arutyunyan’s participation in the group was not specific. They did not present testimony about practical service. Investigators Ilin and Ruben Arutyunyan, who conducted the investigation of the case, were subsequently arrested for erroneous investigation methods. As a result, the decision set forth by an October 8, 1938 USSR NKVD special session was recognized as invalid by a July 7, 1945 USSR NKVD special session resolution, the case was dismissed, and Mkrtich Armen was released.

We will also add that Academician Alabyan characterized Armen as a talented young Soviet writer.

[Melikyan] From this document, it is clear that Armen was already completely rehabilitated in 1945. And the investigators of his case were arrested. Justice triumphed.... But was Mkrtich Armen unconditionally accepted after his return from exile? I would not say so. This particularly concerns the highest echelons. I was at the writer’s funeral. This was at the end of 1972. Among those few who sent him off on his last journey, there were one or two dozen but there were no representatives of broad society or officials through whose presence it was customary to “determine” the significance of the deceased’s personality. Is this really how we say goodbye to a writer who gave native literature “Rodnik Egnar” [Egnar Spring] and many other works also including “Prosili peredat vam” [They Asked Me To Convey to You]? How can you explain this attitude?

[Badamyanets] I think that this question is not being directed to the proper person. You certainly need to ask the representatives, as you expressed it, of the highest echelons of that time about it. And well my personal opinion is that the year of the writer’s death relates to the so-called era of stagnation when the feeling of fear among people that had been instilled in them during the
era of Stalinism was still being preserved at that time. Hence, all of the consequences resulting from it.

[Melikyan] What are State Security workers doing right now to study archival materials affecting Armenian cultural figures and other leading social and political figures, the forgotten pages of their lives and activities, and the complete revelation of flagrant illegalities permitted in the past?

[Badamyanets] I want to point out that Republic KGB agents have recently completed a great deal of work in this direction. In particular, nearly 3,000 archival criminal cases have been examined through which over 4,000 people who were convicted by nonjudicial organs have been rehabilitated. These lists will soon be published in the Republic press. A great deal of work is being conducted everyday on applications of rehabilitated citizens and their relatives. By the way, the mass media has already reported all of this.

I would only like to specially point out certain political and moral sides of this process. With every passing day, a new generation of Chekists [KGB] is becoming increasingly involved in rehabilitation work and, while coming into direct contact with the tragic pages of our history, the desire and the need for widespread and public publication of these pages is increasingly arising.

I am certain that all of these steps will be one more guarantee of not permitting anything similar in the future.

Pavel Petrovich conducted an extensive search operation. He was able to find documents and eyewitnesses who painted a horrible picture. At the end of 1941 the fascists drove 17,000 Jewish families from Kharkov into unheated construction barracks in the Drobitskiy Ravine. Mass shootings began in January. Prisoners of war and residents of the nearby village of Malaya Rogan were also killed.

With the documents in his hand the historian argues that the attitude towards the graves in the Drobitskiy Ravine must be changed; a monument must be erected, and the area fixed up. He has been joined by local historians and war veterans; the local press has begun to speak up. The organizing committee "Drobitskiy Ravine" has been created at the Kharkov oblast department of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund, and the oblast executive committee has decided to replace the memorial stone and fix up the adjacent grounds.

"The public is playing the main role in work to create a memorial," states the chairman of the organizing committee "Drobitskiy Ravine," veteran S.P. Davydov. "Many people from various regions have responded to our call for material support for the project. Account No. 702402 of the oblast department of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund has already received almost thirty thousand rubles in contributions from organizations and private citizens. For example, the Komsomol members of the Kharkov Tractor Plant donated a Saturday of work to earn money for the "Drobitskiy Ravine" fund. The Ukrainian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments has allocated funds. Many veterans have sent money saved from their modest pensions."

The attitude towards the Drobitskiy Ravine has today become a yardstick of people's conscience, of their relation to those who perished. That is why various organizations willingly support the organizing committee, and needed work is provided free of charge. For example, the Kharkov cooperative "Zemlyane" has conducted the geological prospecting and topographical recordings, and drawn up a map of the area. The competition for the best design for a memorial for the war victims has generated considerable interest among artists and architects.

The curtain of oblivion has fallen from the Drobitskiy Ravine grave. People come here with increasing frequency, both veterans and young people. An asphalt road has replaced the grass-covered path. Along this road are brought flowers which are laid on the nameless graves. A memorial book is being compiled to enable relatives to find out where their loved ones are buried.
National Policies, Economic Stimuli Viewed; Public Activism Urged

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[Article by B.N. Pofryev: “Economic and Organizational-Managerial Problems in Ecological Policy of the USSR”]

[Text] The article describes the current ecological situation in the USSR and emphasizes the negative impact of the rising water and air pollution on the morbidity and mortality of the population. The author, in using the analogy method, provides an economic assessment of the damage caused by environmental pollution and by the irrational use of natural resources.

An attempt has been made to establish the level of the minimally necessary investments into the conservation sphere. A strategy has been proposed for an ecological policy in the USSR under the conditions of perestrojka. The basic tasks and functions have been formulated for the principals involved in the management of the utilization of nature, including the state bodies and industrial enterprises. Particular attention has been given to the role of the public in working out and implementing the ecological strategy.

Over the last 15-20 years, the ecological situation in the Soviet Union has deteriorated sharply. The mass information media, and not to say the scientific publications, have brought out the virtually continuous interference of man into natural processes and the destruction of the ties existing in nature. More and more “sore spots” have appeared on the nation's ecological map.

In comparison with 1975, the discharge of polluted sewage into the interior bodies of water of the nation, according to the official data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] has declined by one-third. However, there has been no compensating for the negative effect of the pollution. As a whole over the last 20 years, the designated indicator has increased by almost 5-fold: from 35 to 152 km² [7, 8, p 78]. By the year 2000, it is assumed that this will increase by 2.5-fold. Up to now, around 40 km³ of sewage (including drainage and collector) are released into the bodies of water completely without treatment or as insufficiently treated, including around 80 percent in the bodies of water of Russia [14].

It is no surprise that the problem of water quality is becoming extremely serious, and primarily on the small rivers of which there are around 150,000. More than one such river has been turned into a drainage ditch and has ceased to exist as a freshwater body suitable for catching fish, bathing and so forth. The need of protecting the large lakes such as Baykal, Ladoga, Sevan, Balkhash, Issyk-Kul and others is acute. At present, each year Lake Ladoga alone, the largest in Europe, receives 7,000 tons of phosphorous, or 3-fold more than 25 years ago; here a constant rise is observed in the concentration of heavy metals and in particular copper and lead [12].

An equally severe situation has arisen on the large rivers. Probably the most critical is the Volga as well as the tributaries which feed it, in particular, the Oka. Each year some 20 km³ of sewage is released into the Volga, that is, almost ¼ of the national amount, including over 1.1 km³ of effluents in the delta region alone and these contain toxic substances which greatly exceed the level of the maximum permissible concentration (MPC). From the rice paddies of Astrakhan Oblast alone, each year approximately 600 tons of just pesticides of some 50 types are washed out. And it is precisely in the Volga Delta, according to the estimates of the specialist ichthyologists, that as of now 90 percent of the world sturgeon stocks are concentrated [13]. As a whole, in approximately 40 percent of the monitored bodies of water, pollution exceeds the standard by 10- and more fold [5, No 13].

The situation is no better in the seas. In the Caspian Sea, the phenol concentration alone exceeds the MPC by several-fold. The content of petroleum products in the Black Sea is 2-fold above the norm. There is also a difficult situation in the Baltic which is considered one of the most polluted basins of the world [4, No 39; 5, No 13].

As for air quality, over the last several years in many cities the rate of its deterioration has declined but in a majority of the major cities, the volume and levels of pollution have dropped, including in the most polluted industrial centers of the nation. However, there are no grounds for complacency. Each year, industry and transportation release into the atmosphere over 100 million tons of harmful substances, and their aggregate volume, according to certain estimates, reaches 140 million [16]. The basic “burden” of the pollution, as in terms of the water resources, occurs in Russia with approximately 70 million tons, or according to the humblest estimates, over ¼ of the national volume [14]. For comparison: in the United States with a gross national product (GNP) which is approximately 4-fold above ours, each year 150-155 million tons of harmful substances are released into the air, in other words, production there is more than 3.5-fold purer.

As a result of air pollution in the USSR in 1989, a bad ecological situation was observed in more than 100 towns and cities and in which 18 percent of the entire nation's population resides with more than 50 million persons. In 68 cities, instances were noted of extremely high concentrations of harmful substances caused by the effluents primarily of enterprises of the lumber, metallurgical and chemical sectors [10, 29 July; 8, p 31]. Particularly “under siege" are the cities of Russia and primarily in the north of the republic and Siberia: Arkhangelsk, Bratsk, Novodvinsk, Norilsk, Ust-Ilimsk and others. According to the data of the Chairman of the RSFSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Protection of the Environment] A. Kovalchuk, of the 273...
Russian cities where they monitor the state of the atmosphere, in 1 out of 7 the living conditions are extremely unfavorable if not to say dangerous and this is over 2/3 of the total number of the ecologically worst cities of the country.

In the air of Gorkiy, Smolensk, Omsk, the nitrous oxides are 20-fold above the standard, sulfur dioxide in Nikel is 33-fold, methyl mercaptan in Ust-Ilimsk is 60-fold, 183-fold in Volzhsk, 289-fold in Arkhangelsk and 478-fold in Novodvinsk, while the benzpyrene content in the air of Novokuznetsk surpasses the MPC by 598-fold [14]. Just in the first half of 1989 in individual cities, there was a surge polluting of the atmosphere with toxic substances. In particular, as a consequence of the leaking of chlorine from the city water treatment facilities in Khabarovsk, people were poisoned. There were also casualties as a result of emergencies at the Batumi Chemical Pharmaceutical Plant, the Alaverdi Mining-Metallurgical Combine [10, 29 July].

At the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.V. Yablokov pointed out: "Twenty percent of our nation's population lives in ecological disaster zones and another 30-40 percent in ecologically bad conditions. As a result, there has been a rapid rise in the sickness rate linked to a deterioration in the quality of the environment. One out of every 3 men in such regions during his life will fall ill with cancer. Each year the number of cancer patients increases...while the average life expectancy is 4-8 years less for us than in the developed nations of the world [10, 10 June]."

Inevitably, questions arise on the reasons for the existing bad ecological situation and most importantly on the ways for mitigating this. Without going into a detailed analysis of all the reasons for the exacerbation of the ecological situation in the nation but rather trying to isolate the main one, we feel that this would be the conservative administrative-command, bureaucratic system of managing society, its productive forces, including the use of nature. This has strengthened the monopolistic position of the resource-exploiting departments and production and the residual principle for allocating financial means for environmental purposes and has undermined the sovereignty of the people's self-management bodies and the Soviets on the spot, having subordinated their activities to narrow pragmatic interests. "The irresponsible attitude of certain ministries and departments of the USSR toward the questions of the use of nature has sharply worsened the state of the environment in individual regions of the nation. In many elements of sectorial management there is a prevalence of departmental and subjective approach to the taking of economic decisions. There continues to be the faulty practice of the "residual" principle for allocating material and financial resources to implement the urgent tasks of conserving nature" [9].

In line with this, it is natural to seek out solutions aimed at mitigating the ecological situation in the nation and primarily in the area of the state management of the nature use sphere. Over the last 2 years, here positive shifts have been noted and these have been caused by the setting up of the USSR Goskompriroda and its republic local divisions although it has far from always justified the hopes placed on it. The restructuring of the nature use management system is a many-sided process encompassing changes in the priorities of financing, the sectorial and territorial production schemes, the procedures for taking economic decisions and, most importantly, new thinking by both the economic and soviet leaders and by the entire population.

Without claiming to treat all the problems each of which merits an independent analysis, let us endeavor to examine certain of what, in our view, are the most essential.

The main goals and tasks of ecological policy are formulated "proceeding from a recognition of the vital need to settle ecological questions not only for the Soviet people but also for all mankind" [see 9]. Such a positing of the question means primarily that rational nature management and environmental conservation along with public health should stand in first place in the series of priorities in the state's social policy. In considering the close linkage of medical (the etiology of illnesses) problems with the quality of the environment, it is clearly valid to speak about the priority of the medical-ecological or ecological policy in relation to other social problems.

This in essence means the ecological imperative of social development as formulated by Academician N.N. Moiseyev and the following of which is essential both on the level of the survival of the nation as well as for realizing the strategy of accelerating scientific and technical progress. Without effectively solving ecological problems, over the long run we will undermine the natural and hence the food, raw material and generally the economic potential of the nation, not to speak of the main treasure, the health of the population.

Clearly, a change in the place of ecological policy in the social strategy of the state means also corresponding changes in the financing priorities. It is essential to overcome the existing significant gap between the real demand for allocations for rational nature management and ecological security and their actual level. What are these demands and respectively the gap which must be overcome?

For answering the question it is essential first of all to possess data on the harm which society bears as a consequence of the inefficient policy in the nature management sphere. Unfortunately, in a majority of instances the data are lacking or are concealed in the bowels of the departments uninterested in publicizing them and without this information corrective calculations are impossible. For this reason, let us turn to estimates using the analogy method.

At the end of the 1960s, around 200 million tons of harmful substances were released into the atmosphere of
the U.S. and the discharge of untreated sewage by industry was around 4 km$^3$ [18]. During this same period, the damage to the environment by pollution was estimated by American economists at 3-5 percent of the GNP. In considering the aggregate harm caused by economic activity to nature and to man, to his health, and including, in addition to the pollution of the biosphere, the irrational use of natural resources and their irrecoverable loss, the figure of 5 percent of the GNP with a large degree of confidence can be considered the minimal assessment of the aggregate ecological damage. In the first half of the 1970s, for mitigating the acuteness of ecological problems, the United States annually has spent 2.1-2.2 percent of the GNP on protecting the environment. Thus, the gap was approximately 2.5-fold and this probably not least of all predetermined the failure to solve a number of ecological problems at present.

At the same time, the significant absolute expenditures for conservation purposes (in the 1970s approximately $30 million a year as an average) combined with a well-conceived but not always consistent policy in the nature management sphere brought tangible results to the United States. The volume of the release of hazardous substances into the atmosphere of cities over the last 20 years has declined by almost ½ (for a number of pollutants substantially more by 60 percent or even 90 percent), and untreated industrial sewage by almost 3-fold [15, 20]. Nevertheless, new ecological problems have arisen or become apparent and these are related to the polluting of the environment with dangerous (carcinogenic and mutagenic) components. As a result, at present many U.S. specialists assess the ecological harm as significant, on a level of the same 5-6 percent of the GNP. For comparison, we would point out that according to the calculations of West German specialists, the given indicator for West Germany is a minimum of 5-6 percent and a maximum of 10 percent of the GNP [17].

Considering these calculations and the previously given data on the volume of the release of toxic substances into the air and the discharge of untreated sewage into the bodies of water of our nation, let us attempt to tentatively assess the ecological damage felt in the USSR. At present, the absolute indicators for the mentioned discharges in the USSR are comparable with data for the United States, but they are substantially higher for the discharge of untreated industrial sewage. Analogous indicators at the end of the 1960s were correspondingly substantially lower and comparable. With all the apparent conditionality of the comparison, it can still be assumed that by analogy with the United States, the amount of damage can be roughly assessed at approximately the same amount, that is, approximately $200 billion as an annual average or (according to the official exchange rate) some 130-140 billion rubles and this is 15-17 percent of the GNP.

The given figure at first glance seems unjustifiably high. However, let us consider that with the current level of technology, the United States and a number of other countries have analogous indicators on a level of at least 5-6 percent of the GNP and domestic technology, as has already been pointed out, is almost 4-fold dirtier than the American. We must also consider the incomplete data on the USSR which is the result, in particular, of poor statistical reporting and this, in turn, is caused by the low technical equipping of the ecological monitoring services. This as yet is unable to cover a series of population points as well as record the low but still health-hazardous doses of harmful substances in the air and water.

Finally, let us consider other assessments by Soviet specialists according to whom just the level from water and wind erosion and the irrational exploitation of mineral wealth (the losses of mineral raw materials in mining and processing virtually are not declining) is at least 25 billion rubles or 3 percent of the GNP. And certainly here we do not include the irrecoverable losses of valuable forest, fish and fur resources and medicinal plants which as a minimum would double this amount. As for the environmental pollution, the damage from it, according to estimates by scientists at the TsEMI AN USSR [Central Mathematical Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences], the VASKhNIL [All-Union Agricultural Sciences Academy imeni Lenin] and others is at least 55-60 billion rubles [see 1], or over 7 percent of the GNP. If we add up these estimates which must, in the opinion of their authors, too, must be considered minimal, then we obtain an amount equal to 13-14 percent of the GNP. As we can see this is very close to the result obtained on the basis of the analogy method.

Thus, the gap between the actual expenditures for protecting the environment and the rational utilization of natural resources (9 billion rubles as an average per year in 1980-1986 and 10 billion rubles in 1987-1989) [5, No 13] and the demand for resources for these purposes is an 11-15-fold amount or 4.5-fold above the analogous gap in the United States.

Proceeding from the given estimates and the imperative nature of solving the ecological problems and the capabilities of the economy, it is essential to increase the aggregate expenditures by the state budget and chiefly by the enterprises which are the guilty parties of pollution by 3-4-fold, bringing them up to 30-40 billion rubles annually (in constant crisis). The given amount must clearly be considered as the minimum necessary. We should point out that in discussing the question of the level and scale of financing of measures to protect man and nature against irrational management, it is a matter solely of the volume indicators and does not involve the efficient utilization of the allocated resources. Suffice it to say that in 1988, the fulfillment of the plan to complete sewage treatment facilities in the USSR was 59 percent, for the recirculating water supply system it was 53 percent, and for units to recover and decontaminate harmful substance from released gases it was 66 percent, while in the fuel and energy complex—
probably the chief guilty party of ecological disasters (among the industrial sectors)—these indicators were even lower [5, No 14]. The situation was not much better in the other sectors. Thus, the USSR Minkhimprom [Ministry of Chemical Industry] in 1986-1987 used only 80 percent of the capital investments for conservation measures and this did not prevent the ministry from regularly paying bonuses to the leaders of the main production administrations and enterprises. At the same time, in 1987, instead of a drop in the release of hazardous substances, an increase in them was permitted of some 9,600 tons, and for industrial sewage by 55 million m³ [10, 21 July]. The situation has not improved over the last 1.5-2 years.

The overcoming of the designated gap between the need for allocations and the actually provided funds like an increased return from their use should be commenced immediately, in the current five-year plan. Both foreign and domestic experience are persuasive that prompt investments into conservation activities and rational nature management end up being several-fold less than those expenditures which society bears in compensating for the caused losses (if these can be recovered at all). Capital investments for these purposes in the nation, according to certain estimates, are paid off 1.3-fold faster than as a whole for the national economy [3, No 22]. The repayment time for low-waste technologies in the United States is from a year to 5 years [21]. Thus, these expenditures are not only socially imperative; they are also economically effective.

In emphasizing the priority of ecological policy in a number of other areas of the state's social strategy, we are aware that in addition to the ecological imperative per se, the state and government are confronted with other pressing tasks including those related to human ecology: the production of food, energy, the providing of housing and so forth. This poses the difficult problem of allocating the limited resources in such a manner that all the key problems are resolved efficiently, including the ecological one. The solution is seen in converting the economy and primarily industry to more productive methods which provide high product quality and at the same time conserve raw materials and are ecologically clean. The extensive use of waste-free and resource-saving technologies in all the national economic sectors should become a decisive factor for improving conservation activities in the USSR.

Calculations indicate that resource saving is the cheapest method for developing social production and for simultaneously solving the socioeconomic and ecological tasks. While in 1975 a 1 percent savings in material (essentially natural) resources equaled a rise of 4.9 billion rubles in USSR national income, in 1986, the figure was almost 7 billion rubles [2, No 23].

Investments into waste-free technology are highly effective as is confirmed, in particular, by the following data for the United States. At present, the nation each year forms, according to different estimates, from 260 million to 1 billion tons of wastes and around $70 billion are spent on combating this, including around ½ by the industrial firms. In order to reduce such burdensome expenditures and obtain a profit, the U.S. companies more and more extensively are converting to low-waste and waste-free production methods. Thus, the three well-known 3M Corporation, due to implementing a program under the symbolic name of "Preventing Pollution Pays," since 1975 has saved $420 million over the 13 years or an average of $32 million a year, and repayment was achieved after the start of its implementing. In North Carolina, a survey of 74 firms who have converted to resource-saving technologies which reduce the bulk of waste products by 20-98 percent has shown that investments were repaid within 5 years.

Even the military enterprises which are generously financed by the Pentagon have not remained outside the new and advantageous initiative. Thus, the Air Force Base in Ogden, Utah, in converting from a chemical to a mechanical method for removing old paint from the aircraft and ground equipment, has reduced the bulk of solid wastes by 95 percent, liquid ones by 100, energy expenditures by 50 percent, labor by 90 percent, and the repayment was achieved in just a month [19].

Thus, the low-waste and waste-free technologies the introduction of which is rapidly repaid provide the greatest output of end product per unit of raw material and considering the high level of automation for such production processes also per unit of labor expenditure. The socioecological effectiveness of such technologies is also high. They are ecologically clean, they do not have a dangerous effect on human health and require minimum raw materials and this helps to preserve natural resources and makes it possible to exploit them for other, for example recreational, purposes. We would point out that according to certain estimates, the recreational value of a number of natural resources, for example forests, is several-fold (and sometimes 10-fold) higher than their commercial value as a source of wood. The establishing of realistic prices for the use of natural resources should also conform to a resource-saving policy and this undoubtedly will reduce their irrational consumption.

There is an obvious need for long-term priorities in ecological policy and forms of their realization as well as phases of implementing the policy itself. First of all, there must be a careful scientific analysis of the current situation in the nation. Certain important results of this are reflected in the report on the state of the environment in the USSR and this has been prepared for the first time in our nation. It describes the state of affairs in the area of protecting the air, water, soils, the forest and mineral resources, animals and plants, as well as in the ecologically worse regions of the nation. The report has been published but it is still not available to the entire interested community and has not become a subject of broad discussion by it. The publishing of such reports, in addition to everything else, helps to establish the priorities of the main ecological programs which comprise the core
of the state strategy in the area of nature management, in allocating resources under these programs as well as in the zoning of the territory in terms of the environmental quality criteria.

The Decree “On the Fundamental Restructuring of Environmental Protection in the Nation” as adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers has formulated the basic functions of the USSR Goskompriroda as an Union republic state management body in the area of the protection of nature and the use of natural resources, but these have not been divided between the central personnel and the regional divisions. In our opinion, the regional divisions (which do not essentially have to coincide with the territorial-administrative divisioning of the republic, kray and oblast) should be entrusted with the following functions: analysis of data from environmental monitoring; the working out on this basis of local and/or regional ecological standards which would take into account the specific ecological situation on the spot; the transmission of the mentioned information and standards to the central personnel of the USSR Goskompriroda for working out national standards and an analysis of the situation for the nation as a whole. The results of the given analysis should be reflected in the mentioned report. In addition, the information obtained by the regional divisions and the standards worked out by them should also be transmitted to the local management bodies (soviets) for supervising the ecological situation on the spot. The divisions together with the soviets should participate in supervising the observance of the standards by inspections, checks as well as by regular supervision.

The central national committee, on the basis of the data obtained from the regional divisions as well as from other, including international, sources of information, can perform a number of functions. In the first place, long-range (strategic) planning, including the elaboration of the state ecological strategy with the determining of the long-range tasks and main programs and the allocating of resources for implementing these.

Secondly, legislative regulation, including the elaboration and supervision by the courts and procuracy of the carrying out of conservation legislation, including the national ecological standards for environmental quality. At present, the first important step has been taken in the given area with the preparation of the USSR Law on Environmental Protection for discussion by the public and by the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Thirdly, there is the expert function providing ecological expert evaluation of draft laws for the construction of national economic projects which might be capable of having a significant impact on the environment. For this purpose, it is essential to use the information acquired in the sectorial ministries and it is possible to draw on experts from the academy institutes and VUZes as well as the scientific and technical cooperatives on a basis of cost accounting contracts. The expert evaluation procedures without fail should include an analysis of the ecologically worst of the possible project variations in order to avoid or maximally prevent the arising of an emergency situation such as the disaster similar to the Chernobyl or the Aral.

Thus, according to the proposed scheme for organizing nature management the USSR Goskompriroda concentrates in itself the functions of strategic management in the designated spheres while the regional divisions, like the regional authorities, provide tactical management in this sphere. The functions of operational management rest on the enterprises and local authorities. The enterprises, in being guided by the set local and regional ecological standards, should ensure their fulfillment, in being guided primarily by waste-free and low-waste technologies which conserve raw materials and energy. In converting to such technologies which takes time, it is essential to provide a maximum start-up and introduce various means for treating harmful effluents and sewage and harden control over the procedure for transporting and storing harmful wastes.

In order that the designated activities be carried out in practice by the enterprises, these activities should be encouraged by administrative-legal and chiefly by economic methods. As for the legal aspect of the question, here we should note the affirmative role of the USSR Law on a State Enterprise where one of the articles here we should note the affirmative role of the USSR Law on a State Enterprise where one of the articles obliges the enterprise to fully compensate for a negative impact on the environment, to build and efficiently operate conservation facilities, to carry out all conservation measures as well as pay for the use of natural resources from their own funds or from credit. Otherwise, its operation, as is pointed out in the law, can be halted. We feel that the given point should be strengthened, having pointed out that the enterprises which flagrantly violate the environmental quality standards should be closed down.

Supervision over the carrying out of the ecological standards and the requirements of the mentioned law by the enterprise should be entrusted to the local soviets which would rely on skilled aid from the regional divisions of the USSR Goskompriroda as well as on the labor collective councils and the trade union organizations of the enterprises themselves. Under the conditions of full cost accounting and the sharply stiffened penalties for violating ecological standards the enterprises will be interested in not exposing themselves to the designated sanctions and thereby avoid the stopping of production as this inevitably tells on the profit and, consequently, the earnings of the enterprise personnel. The application of sanctions for the mentioned violations is a prerogative, clearly, of the courts and procuracy.

Among the measures for economic incentives of effective conservation activities by the enterprise, we would point to the following. In addition to credits for installing purification equipment and the introduction of low-waste production methods, it would be advisable
to employ accelerated amortization for the given equipment and production lines, paying, for example, corresponding compensation from the conservation entries in the budgets of the sectorial ministries as well as the local and regional budgets. The volume of designated deductions can be determined as a percentage of the total conservation expenditures by the enterprise for reducing the pollution level and the intensity of exploiting natural resources by a certain amount. The designated percentage must be calculated according to an increasing scale, as the capital intensiveness of conservation measures rises as the ecological situation improves. For example, with a 10 percent reduction in the pollution level, the compensation will be 30 percent of the necessary expenditures and with a 15 percent reduction the compensation will be 1/2; the real amount of compensation is set proceeding from the specific practice of the sectors employing mathematical economics models. Probably only such an approach makes the expenditures on conservation measures advantageous for the enterprise and the measures themselves realistic.

We should particularly point out that in all stages of elaborating and implementing the state ecological strategy and policy, it is essential to have effective involvement of the public, including the conservation organizations which need the greatest possible support of the Soviet and party bodies. These activities, in addition, should be reinforced in the legislation, as has been done, in particular, in the United States in the 1969 National Law on Environmental Protection. The largest public organizations of supporters of environmental protection who in the United States number over 1.5 million do not limit themselves to the discussing of plans, programs or projects. Independently of the corporations and state agencies, they provide ecological expert evaluation of the plans for structures which represent the greatest risk for the public and for nature. The expert evaluations are also provided by economists, lawyers and engineers who are employed in the organizations and are specialists in protecting the environment. The smaller conservation organizations called in specialists from universities.

In the USSR, under the conditions of self-administration, the range of actions of the public should be as broad as possible. This would include: from informing the local authorities of violations of the nature management rules (the alarm function); active discussion of draft laws as well as the plans for the construction of enterprises and structures from the viewpoint of their conformity to the requirements of medical and ecological safety (the expert function) to supervision over the carrying out of voter demands by all levels of deputies (the control function).

Moreover, in using the procedures of the election campaign and elections themselves of the people's deputies, the public conservation organizations can have and, as was shown by the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in June 1989, already do have an effect in promoting to the superior state bodies those candidates who actively come to the defense of nature and the health of the people and are against the imposing of terms by the departments. Conversely, the electoral mechanism has been used as a brake against those candidates whose programs and actions are seen by the public as antieco-

It can be assumed that in the process of the elections to the local soviets, such practices will be further developed. As is shown by the experience, in particular, in the United States, opportunities for this do exist. Thus, during the mid-term elections to the U.S. Congress in 1982, of the 48 candidates supported by the environmentalists, victory was won by 34, or 71 percent. In 1983, under the pressure of public opinion, the administration of R. Reagan was forced to remove the then secretary of the interior who had ignored the questions of utilizing natural resources and the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency the activities of which seriously weakened ecological policy [6]. In 1986, in the elections to the Senate of the 100th Session of the U.S. Congress, victory was won by 6 new democratic senators and in their political platform an important place was held by the problem of combating environmental pollution [18].

We should note the broad support for the activities of the public environmental organizations by the U.S. population. According to polls, over ¾ of the population is sympathetic or actively participates in conservation activities, over ¾ is in favor of having the observance of environmental conservation measures be guaranteed in any event and of them almost ⅔ feels that it is better to close down enterprises and lose jobs than permit deviations from the safety standards and ecological norms [6, pp 101-102]. Indicatively, the results of the polls were recorded at a time when in the United States the strongest postwar economic crisis of 1980-1982 had developed and was accompanied by increased unemployment and a drop in allocations from the state budget for social and environmental needs.

Activating the public in the USSR, its specific actions to shape a competent deputy corps, also on ecological questions, and the full, actual use of all the above-listed managerial functions are, in our view, a crucial condition for a rapid conversion to ecologically steadier development and for the decisive "greening" of the nation's government. In addition to the conservation goals per se, such an approach will contribute to the restructuring of the awareness of people toward greater ecologization.

Footnotes
1. According to the data of the USSR Goskomstat, this indicator is around 29 km² and according to other sources, 30 km² (see [8, pp 11, 78]).
2. Calculated from [3, No 22; 8, pp 140-141].

Bibliography
Lake Baykal is priceless. Its crystal-clear water is worth more than all of the gold mankind has ever mined—this is something we have known since our childhood. The pearl of Siberia is being destroyed, however, and the distressed public has been complaining to government agencies about this for 30 years now. Unfortunately, the public efforts have been largely unproductive. For this reason—let us be frank—the report of a session of the Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, where the efforts to protect the lake during the 3 years since the appropriate decree was passed were to be discussed, did not arouse any particular excitement. Could this make any difference? It was difficult to dismiss this biased view because the people who live near the lake know that any number of decrees might have been passed, but Lake Baykal is not getting any cleaner.

A full working day of heated debates, however, offered convincing proof. The analysis of the state of affairs in the Baykal zone on the governmental level was enough in itself to represent an advance in the resolution of one of the republic's most difficult problems. In addition to members of the government, people's deputies, prominent scientists, and the heads of soviet and party organs, sociopolitical organizations, and environmental protection committees and organizations took part in the discussion. We are publishing our correspondent's comments on this meeting.

The discussion began with distressing reports of procrastination, interruptions, and errors, but first I should say a few words about the history of the issue. It was exactly 3 years ago that decrees were passed by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers and by the RSFSR Council of Ministers "On Measures To Secure the Protection and Intelligent Use of Natural Resources in the Lake Baykal Basin in 1987-1995." The decrees already constituted a major event in the history of Lake Baykal in itself. Although the need to save the lake had already been discussed for a quarter of a century, this was the first time that directive agencies had summarized all of the requirements in this kind of comprehensive document. The decrees listed the main perpetrators in the destruction of the lake and stipulated that they would have to abate their appetites for untouched nature and undertake certain specific measures. Did they do this? Here is an excerpt from the report of the investigating organization—RSFSR Gosplan.

"The situation is depressing," Gosplan First Deputy Chairman A. Kamenev reported. "The lake and the conservation zone are still being polluted with gas from the pulp and paper combine and the sewage of industrial enterprises of the union ministries and public utilities in Ulan-Ude, Irkutsk, Shelekhov, and Angarsk and the Buryat agricultural complex. Last year—just listen to these figures!—around 200 million cubic meters of polluted sewage was dumped in the lake and atmospheric emissions in the region amounted to more than 1.2 million tons of harmful substances, with most of these also falling into Lake Baykal."

It was depressing to listen to the list of aborted measures. It sounded as though we were listening to a list of entries from a highly specialized technical reference work, with the addition of the phrase "not completed" after each item on the list.
"Sewage treatment facilities were not installed in the Petrovsk-Zabaysk Meat Combine (State Agroindustrial Committee), municipal sewage treatment facilities still do not exist in Ulan-Ude (Buryat ASSR Council of Ministers), the fire stations of the forest protection service have not been equipped (USSR Gosplan)...." and so on and so forth. But here is something indicative: It turned out that not all of the items on this gloomy list were equal in terms of the damage they inflict on the lake. There are three main sore spots, and anyone who is concerned about the future of the lake should know what they are. First of all, USSR Minlesprom [Ministry of the Timber Industry] still has not set the guidelines for the re-specialization of the main polluter, the Baykal Pulp and Paper Combine. Second, USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] still has not installed facilities for the removal of sulfur compounds from flue gas and has not hooked up residences in the Baykal coastal zone to the electrical network. Third, through the fault of the Gazprom concern and USSR Mingeo [Ministry of Geology], enterprises in Irkutsk, Shelekhov, Angarsk, Usol'ye-Sibirskoye, and Cheremkhovo have not been hooked up to gaslines. Oil and coal are still being burned in their boiler rooms, and this is inflicting tremendous damage on the environment.

This is the "Bermuda Triangle" where we are losing the battle for Lake Baykal.

"I feel that the efforts to carry out the decree of the Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers and our resolution have been extremely unsatisfactory." Chairman A. Vlasov of the RSFSR Council of Ministers summarized the situation. "All of the parties concerned are greatly in debt to Lake Baykal."

Academician A. Yanshin clarified the situation:

"In essence, the only instructions which were carried out were the easiest, the cheapest, and therefore the least effective in protecting the lake."

The next speaker unexpectedly made a controversial remark:

"The failure is understandable, because the measures stipulated in the decree could never have been carried out!" The declaration by USSR People's Deputy G. Filshin was challenging, and everyone expected arguments. He reminded the gathering of the results of one game. A game? No, its only relationship to juvenile entertainment is terminological; it is actually the organizational game known as collective brain-storming and represents an extremely serious undertaking. In October 1988 it was conducted at the suggestion of the Irkutsk and Buryat party obkoms. In essence, it became a comprehensive socioeconomic appraisal of the situation in the Baykal zone. At that time SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA described the "technology" of the game in detail, saying that it revealed the conflicting opinions of, first, various population strata; second, levels of administration; third, various departments, etc. In this game, as in a model, options were played out to portray a stepped-up version of what unfortunately did occur later in reality, but in the form of irretrievable losses and hopeless situations.

"The main conclusion of this appraisal was that Lake Baykal could not be saved under the conditions of the old system of economic relations," G. Filshin said. "Ecological problems would be insoluble without profound economic reform. The departmental nature of administration only aggravated these problems while pretending to solve them."

Did anyone at the meeting dispute the people's deputy's remarks? Not at all. Representatives of ministries seemed to be expounding on his line of reasoning as they frankly admitted that nothing serious had been done for Lake Baykal, and nothing would be done in the future. When the sums allocated by departments and enterprises for the protection of Lake Baykal in the current year were reported, their indifference became obvious. The Ministry of Railroads was supposed to have allocated 350,000 rubles for air-cleanup facilities in the iron foundries and steel- and copper-smelting shops of the locomotive plant in Ulan-Ude, but actually paid out only...50,000. Was this an isolated example?

There was understandable confusion: Where would the money come from for the next five-year plan? After all, this would require two and a half times as much money! The future of our wondrous lake is being decided in this kind of struggle against the absurdities of departmental interests.

Incidentally, our inefficient and, to coin a phrase, anti-enterprising economy has many absurd features. Academician A. Yanshin reminded the gathering that fresh water is becoming a commodity in our era of ecological disasters, now that most bodies of water are polluted. Furthermore, it is a commodity of great value to the consumer. In northern Sweden, for example, there is already a large enterprise which bottles spring water and sells it at a high profit in Sweden and abroad. The Alpine spring water sold in Nice and Paris costs a franc and a half for a liter bottle.

"The whole world is concerned about the future of Lake Baykal," the scientist went on to say. "Businessmen are already saying openly: 'Your lake is a unique reserve of fresh water for the whole planet. Do not destroy Lake Baykal. Tomorrow its water will be in great demand throughout the world.'"

This has no effect on the departmental economic flywheel, however, which is incapable of considering its own welfare or the public interest.

The discussion did more than arouse indignation, however, because it was also quite informative, even for those who thought they knew everything about the problem.

When scientists and writers first began speaking in defense of the lake 30 years ago, they were viewed...
literally as dissidents in that stifling time: Who had allowed them to have their own opinion? Who dared to question the "party line" after the wise officials in the Council of Ministers and Central Committee had already decided everything for the country and knew the direction it should take, and after everyone else knew that this was the right direction? Yes, this was the situation then.

Eventually, their efforts produced results—the ecologists and public spokesmen who were fighting for Lake Baykal were supported by party and government leaders. In the people's memory, however, this dangerous division was never eliminated: They still think of directive agencies as an impenetrable wall.

If you look through these eyes at the latest meeting of the Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, you make one discovery after another: Where is the wall? It does not exist. On the contrary, it is clear that the issues are being investigated by people with a sincere wish to preserve the unique lake. The government feels obligated to learn everything it can about the situation. Furthermore, it is not superficial knowledge that it wants, but serious scientific analyses.

Three years ago the government asked scientists and experts to draw up a territorial comprehensive conservation plan for the Lake Baykal basin. The work began on a grand scale, with the Giprogor Institute of RSFSR Gosstroy in charge and with more than 70 institutes of different ministries and departments participating in the project. According to members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the result was an important instrument of administration: It was a comprehensive investigation of the entire set of factors influencing the ecology, economy, and social communities in the Baykal zone. Only this kind of overview of the Lake Baykal issue can exclude the possibility of administrative voluntarism, primitive decisions, incompetence, biased plans, and interference in regional affairs in the future. Regrettably, there has been more than enough of all of this in the past.

The first object of investigation was the vast territory taking in 18 administrative regions directly adjacent to the lake, with a population of 1.2 million, reported project leader A. Melik-Pashayev, workshop foreman at the Giprogor Institute. The project was based on all of the positive experience in protecting the Great Lakes and the Tennessee Valley in the United States, the southern lakes in Sweden, and Ehrmscher Park in the Ruhr Valley (FRG). The results were ultimately fed into a computer and analyzed. The Irkutsk Computer Center of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Irkutsk State University used the database to derive 12 (!) scenarios for the development of productive forces in the region with a view to their social and ecological impact. (At this point I just want to mention how unfortunate it is that our industry cannot start dealing with the Lake Baykal problem as comprehensively and carefully as our science! Regrettably, we are only successful when it comes to understanding the problem....)

After reviewing all of the data, the scientists proposed three alternative strategies to the government. In the simplest terms, they could be classified as the cheapest alternative, the medium-priced one, and the most expensive but most radical one. What should the choice be? The situation is all the more dramatic in view of the fact that the three alternative strategies revealed exactly what we had been doing to date. We allocated millions in resources and funds and felt pleased with our efforts to save the lake, but we were actually carrying out the first plan, the "cheapest" one, and only in isolated areas. This "cheap" alternative actually hurt the lake. Therefore, while we were creating the illusion of activity, we were effectively driving the lake to the verge of destruction.

There is no question that the choice will be difficult. Once again, the scientists expressed their opinions.

"Even though the third alternative, the one we call 'goal-oriented,' has an estimated cost of 20.4 billion rubles and is certainly beyond the country's ability unless it is carried out sequentially, we still believe," Melik-Pashayev said, "that only it can stop the transformation of the Lake Baykal region into a disaster zone and secure the continued reproduction of the unique ecosystem and gene pool of Lake Baykal and its basin."

The scientists recommend this as an imperative. And they are not the only ones. Many other people agree with this recommendation—the Siberian public, the local authorities in Buryat, Irkutsk, and Chita, and the experts from the State Committee for the Protection of the Environment.

Someone in the auditorium objected:

"This alternative is certainly appealing and promising, but we have to admit that it is from the realm of science fiction. We have to realize that, judging by the amounts we are spending on conservation today, it will take us 200 (!) five-year plans to scrape up this much money. Are people not likely to call us cranks, to put it mildly?"

Melik-Pashayev replied:

"Yes, it is a huge amount, but we have to consider the recoupment mechanism. We will only spend one-fourth of the 20 billion on purely protective measures. The rest will be used to develop production. In other words, it cannot be called an expenditure in the real sense of the term. It will be used for the intensive incorporation of new, ecologically clean technologies. These, however, will begin producing a profit in the future, and it is expected to be large enough to recoup these production costs and the expenses of environmental protection in 15 years."

A. Vlasov concluded the discussion with this statement:

"We will pass a resolution recommending the approval of the territorial comprehensive conservation plan for the Lake Baykal basin, its re-editing with a view to the comments made here, and its submission to USSR Gosplan and the USSR Council of Ministers for final
ratification. I think we should recommend that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation review the law on Lake Baykal."

Let us assume that the best will happen and that money will be allocated for Lake Baykal. This will not eliminate our worries that, as the Russian proverb puts it, the feed might not reach the horse. Have there been so few times in our history when billions of rubles were lost through mismanagement? Are we not sick and tired of the mountain of phony excuses and justifications we hear from officials when all of the setbacks have already occurred and nothing can be done to rectify the situation? The discussion at the meeting inevitably reached the point of the insistence that someone would have to deal mercilessly with all of the liars and institute the strictest control over the plan. There will be no end of this kind of work.

"Each department has its own 'explanation' for the unsatisfactory state of environmental protection in the facilities under its jurisdiction," said Deputy Chairman V. Kulikov of the USSR People's Control Committee. "We always run into excuses of this type: 'I cannot start building until I have the documents'; or 'There will be no documents until the equipment arrives'; or 'There is no equipment because the machine builders have not delivered it yet' and so forth. Nevertheless, we suspect that the problem does not stem from these causes, but simply from the fact that everyone is comfortable with the system of constant setbacks."

Yes, Lake Baykal could be the victim of the poverty of our economy and also of unscrupulous efforts to satisfy departmental interests. Deception verging on sabotage is practiced so openly that it was apparent even in the misleading, "calm" reports presented here, at the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Minister of the Timber Industry V. Melnikov, for example, discussed the re-specialization of the pulp and paper combine at length in his report: He said that the ministry had drawn up five optional plans for the conversion of the plant. At this point USSR People's Deputy G. Filshin accused the minister of "embellishing" the facts: Three of the five options had been rejected by the ministry itself, and experts already know that the other two are economically and ecologically unsound. Therefore, the impressive figure "five" was cited on the assumption of the participants' lack of information.

"There are, however, the completely realistic proposals of the 'Baykal Fund.'" Filshin went on to say, "on the announcement of an international competition for the re-specialization of the combine. The International Red Cross will even assume responsibility for the foreign currency portion of expenditures if the production of disposable syringes for the region can be organized at the combine. There have been other proposals as well, but Minlesprom has made every effort to prevent their discussion, and it always submits the kind of proposals that are certain to be rejected so that it can say later:

"You see, we have already drawn up so many alternative plans, and not one has been accepted."

Is there an antidote for the exaggeration of estimates, juggling of facts, and outright lies of departments on all levels? After all, this arsenal could easily put an end to any good intention. What is the antidote? Economic reform and the expansion of regional economic autonomy. There must be economic incentives for conservation. The public is already aware that the local soviet is the most reliable defender of nature. Could a lake, forest, or field be injured if the local soviet were to feel completely in control and able to defend it? Conversely, people can only whatever they wish on their territory, to the point of the barbarous destruction of nature, after they have "broken down" the resistance of local authorities. Unfortunately, we have seen many examples of this.

Lake Baykal is no exception. The Baykal problem is a problem of powerful union ministries and departments breaking down the resistance of the Buryat, Irkutsk, and Chita authorities. Sometimes the shrewdest tactics are employed. Chairman Yu. Nozhikov of the Irkutsk oblispolkom said that when the committee was going to prohibit superfelling in the Baykal zone, its requests for lumber for the construction of homes, schools, and hospitals were immediately denied. That would teach it a lesson.

What is needed, in short, is the establishment of "parity" in the relations between local authorities and union ministries. Today this is the main way of protecting Lake Baykal, numerous speakers stressed at the meeting. Incidentally, our parliament has already taken an important step. The recent law passed on local self-government was designed specifically to reinforce the local soviets' own budgets so that they could establish their own material and technical base for ecology, sign contracts for scientific projects, order plans, etc. By the force of inertia, however, local authorities are not making use of the opportunities created by the economic reform. This inaction was criticized by Chairman A. Vlasov.

Does this mean that we have finally found the solution to our ecological problems? Does it mean that tomorrow no one will be able to hurt a river, a forest, or a lake? Unfortunately, it does not take an expert economist to know that the development of regional economic autonomy alone cannot solve environmental problems. This is clear from the experience of the capitalist countries: Although local authorities there have the kind of complete economic autonomy we are still only dreaming about, the equally predatory destruction of lakes, rivers, and forests occurred there. Nature's gifts were bought and sold. Is this really impossible in our country? Is there no possibility that, for example, a contract might be signed on the delivery of lumber from the heavily forested areas of the Buryat ASSR to another of our republics with no forests? Although it would profit both sides greatly, it would injure the Baykal ecosystem.
The obvious conclusion is that no reform can improve the situation in the Baykal zone unless its interests are protected by a government with a strict sense of state and republican priorities. It is on the level of state strategy that the problem of preserving the unique lake can hold its own among other objectives, and life is certain to present us with many more of these.

Personal responsibility is something that can keep the government under control. Priorities are worthless unless they are supported by an Ivanov or a Sidorov. Some people at the meeting had complaints about the Russian Government. In particular, they complained about the loss of control. The interval of 3 years between the issuance of assignments and the verification of their completion is too long a period in view of the importance of the Baykal problem. A decision was made to form a special commission of the RSFSR Council of Ministers to take charge of the Baykal zone.

Is everything settled? Yes, if we remember that there is another element of control over the observance of state priorities by local soviets (and by the government itself)—the defense of these priorities from below, their defense by the public, which gave the mandates of authority to the people it elected. The manner in which these three forces are consolidated will decide the future of our remarkable lake and, by the same token, of all Russian nature.

From the Resolution of the Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers

No later than August 1990, USSR Minlesprom is to draft the technical and economic substantiation for the re-specialization of the Baykal Pulp and Paper Combine in the 13th Five-Year Plan for ecologically safe production with the cessation of cellulose production in 1993 and secure the approval of the substantiation by the State Committee of the RSFSR for the Protection of the Environment and the Irkutsk obispolkom; a water recycling system is to begin operating at the Selenginsk Pulp and Cardboard Combine in 1991.

In the first half of 1990 USSR Minenergo is to draft a program for the conversion of populated points on the Baykal coast to electrical power, beginning with the use of electricity in electric boilers on the south shore of the lake, with the help of USSR Gosplan, in 1990; working in conjunction with the State Committee of the USSR for Prices, it will set preferential rates for the electricity used for this purpose in 1991; in conjunction with the USSR Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, it will step up the installation of effective devices to remove the sulfur content from the flue gases of power engineering enterprises located in the coastal region.

The Gazprom state gas concern will draft plans for the exploitation of the Kovyktinskoye condensed gas deposit in 1991 and 1992 so that the construction of natural gas shipment and refinery facilities can begin in 1993.

Opposition to USSR-PRC Amur River Damming Project Noted

90WN0091B Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 May 90 p 2

[Article by V. Dolgodvorov, I. Krasikov, and Yu. Yudin (Amur Oblast): "The Fate of the 'Black Dragon'; passages in boldface as published]
Then perestroyka began, and people worked, plowed the land, built homes, got married, and expected changes for the better. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, the decision was made to dam the Amur and let the land here become the seabed!

The inhabitants of rural communities in the Amur zone read the terse lines of the TASS report with alarm and distress: “A regular meeting of the Soviet-Chinese commission supervising the drafting of plans for the comprehensive use of water resources in the border sections of the Argun and Amur rivers was held.” The governments of the two countries returned to the joint project of the 1950's known as “Subduing the Black Dragon,” proposing the construction of seven hydrosystems.

The inhabitants of the cis-Amur zone began to complain and to meet at gatherings. They kept asking the same question: “Why is it that we are the ones who live here, but someone in Moscow is still deciding everything for us?”

All seven hydrosystems are to be built in Amur Oblast, but no one felt the need to inform oblast representatives of this fact. Where is the independent ecological appraisal? The waves of protest also reached the pages of oblast newspapers. An appeal to the USSR Council of Ministers, requesting the suspension of the work on the project, was among the first documents A. Belonogov signed when he became the new chairman of the oblispolkom....

Emotions are still running high, however, and the work is still going on. This sounds familiar, doesn’t it? This is what happened when they tried to reverse the course of the northern rivers. This is what happened when arguments were cited to prove that there was no reason to build the Volga-Chogray canal.

The well-known P. Polad-zade, one of the authors and initiators of these plans, became the chairman of the Soviet half of the joint “commission supervising the drafting of plans for the comprehensive use of water resources in the border sections of the Argun and Amur rivers.”

We saw a document signed around a year ago by Chairman Yu. Maslyukov of USSR Gosplan. It says, in black and white, that the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, “in conjunction with interested Soviet organizations, will begin negotiations with the Chinese side on the joint construction of GES’s on the Amur River.”

Remember that, according to official agencies, there are no such interested organizations in the oblast. This Gosplan order was also issued, it turns out, “on the instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers.” Even earlier, in 1986, the USSR and PRC signed an intergovernmental agreement on this matter.

As we watched Father Amur flow swiftly by, we naturally remembered Mother Volga, spanned by dams like blood clots: Huge forests, water meadows, and abandoned lands have been flooded and have turned into salt marshes where the water is not fit to drink and where the fish die.

At a time when there is not enough money to continue the construction of a GES in the same oblast—the 2-million kilowatt GES on the Burey, a tributary of the Amur, where the work has been going on for at least 10 years now, it seems sacrilegious to begin work on a project which will destroy the entire Amur ecosystem.

Like all the inhabitants of the Far Eastern zone, we support every effort to strengthen friendly relations with China because we know from our own experience what the tension in our relations once did. Two of us have lived in the Far East for a quarter of a century. If our neighbors need electricity so much, would it not be better to ask them to take part in building the Bureyskaya GES? Furthermore, it would be more acceptable from the ecological standpoint: It would not create a gigantic reservoir but would simply raise the level of the water in the mountain canyons, whereas the Amur flows mainly through level territory. In general, if it is impossible to get along without several GES’s, why could they not be built on the alpine tributaries of the Amur? There are many of these on the Soviet and Chinese sides.

We should listen to some of the specialists’ arguments and different points of view.

When P. Polad-zade was interviewed in the documentary film “Russian Bank, Distant Bank,” he said: “Now we are working in earnest with our Chinese partners on various plans for the joint use of the Amur’s water management resources in the interests of our people. We are considering measures to combat the floods that cause so much economic damage on the Chinese and Soviet sides. This is a matter of the joint resolution of problems connected with the development of fishing, the operation of the river fleet, and opportunities for the use of the tremendous hydraulic power engineering potential of the Amur.”

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences I. Druzhinin, director of the Institute of Water and Ecological Problems of the Far Eastern Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said: “We do not see the establishment of dams and reservoirs on the Amur as a problem. This matter has been settled. Now we have to choose the sites. In line with our contract with Soyuzgiproprovchhoz, our institute only has to study the effects of flow control on local flora and fauna and conduct hydrochemical and hydrobiological analyses of the water after the dams have been built.”

The director made this statement 2 years ago. Even then he had no doubts, and the institute boldly promised to submit the necessary materials in 1990.

Let us listen, however, to the opinion of another scientist, a less eminent and therefore more independent analyst, Candidate of Geographic Sciences A. Makhnov. Here is what he had to say: “The Amur is one of the 10 largest rivers in the world, but even a giant’s healthy can easily be undermined by a problem in just one of the basic elements of this mechanism. A dam, even a single dam, will eventually ruin the river’s health. The old migration routes of animals and fish will be dammed,
and their sources of food will disappear. We must not forget that the fish resources of the Amur are unique and unparalleled. There are 109 different types of fish here, including the largest fresh-water fish—the Kaluga, which can weigh as much as a ton—and many types are now included on national and international lists of endangered species. The flow patterns of rivers are established over centuries. If the flow is slowed down even slightly, irreversible processes will begin. I think that the construction of the GES's on the Amur is tantamount to a crime—what is more, it would be a crime against humanity.

We spoke with dozens of people in Blagoveshchensk—with scientists and workers, with administrators on various levels, and with informal associations. Not one person said anything in favor of the GES's. An ecological council is being set up by the oblast soviet to keep the Amur in what could be called its original state. Why are the people who approved these dubious plans in the solitude of their offices ignoring the opinions of the inhabitants of this territory? After all, the historical roots of these people will be unavoidably obliterated along with the land and the Amur. The lands inhabited by the descendants of the defenders of Albazin are threatened by floods—the lands where the homes of thousands and thousands of the inhabitants of rural communities along the Amur now stand.

We remember what A. Dorokhina said to us when we were leaving: “I would go to Moscow myself to tell everyone there what is happening and to stop the crime, but I just do not have the strength anymore!”

The Amur flows on—the river of time. What will happen to it tomorrow?

Funding, Support for Developing Decontamination Devices Urged

90WN0091A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 May 90 p 2

[Article by M. Yurchenko (Kharkov): “The Strontium ‘Trap’; Why New Decontaminants for Polluted Soil and Water Are Not Being Tested”; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] In 15 years people in Kharkov will not be able to drink tap water. The local newspaper reported this, citing expert sources. The water of the Dnepr and nearby reservoirs will turn into a “cocktail” of radioactive nuclides by 2005!

The population is being reassured with the news that the new Akva joint stock company will build a plant for the production of ecologically clean water to be sold in bottles and cardboard containers—like kefir. Understandably, this beverage will cost more than tap water, but is there no other alternative?...

The item did not send the general reading public into a turmoil, but it did bring a group of researchers from the Biomos Joint Scientific Production Enterprise (SNPP) in Kharkov to the TRUD branch office. It was obvious that they were having difficulty restraining their emotions when they explained politely that they had no intention of sitting back and waiting for the inevitable. They said they had developed substances (the ones which gave the firm its name) capable of effectively decontaminating water and soil.

These substances are “attracted” to several heavy metals and to other so-called complex-forming agents, including the strontium and cesium the Chernobyl volcano had dispersed so profusely. Their molecular structure includes “empty spaces” into which the biomosses “drag” strontium, which is lethal for all forms of life but is a tasty snack for them. They catch hold of their “prey” like mousetraps and then, for extra insurance, envelop the resulting compound in a strong polymeric casing. The compounds in the ground water are anchored, as it were, displaying virtually no dilution, elution, or migration.

Can biomosses prevent radiation? No, they will continue “producing background radiation” in the casing until the strontium “expires.” They will, however, keep radioactive nuclides out of creeks and streams and out of the Dnepr (and, consequently, out of our water supply)....

Biomosses prepared according to another recipe and applied to the soil in a water solution can, according to the inventors, turn the grass on radioactive territory into a pump for the evacuation of radioactive nuclides.

This is not all the biomosses can do. They can act as filters in gutters. They can turn the radioactive silt which is now creating a radioactive background at the bottom of the Dneprovskoye Reservoir into an insoluble and immobile substance. Finally, biomosses can protect living systems from radiation stress....

Anticipating the questions of meticulous ecologists, we should add that biomosses are harmless in themselves and do not contaminate the soil or the organism.

It must be said that concerned groups were informed some time ago of the Kharkov SNPP’s projects. At the beginning of this year the biologists knocked on every door in Kiev and spoke to people in the Southern Department of the USSR Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Kharkov oblispolkom. They asked for assistance in stepping up the production and testing of the soil “medicine,” but their efforts were futile.

Yes, the founders of the SNPP—the Kharkov Pharmaceutical Institute, the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health, the Moscow branch of the Atomic Energy Scientific Research Institute, and the Kurskaya AES—did everything they could: They formed a research team and acquired a work area (even if it is rather shabby). They are incapable, however, of solving the main problems: of organizing the large-scale production of anti-radiation substances to save the contaminated soil and of sponsoring this work. This is a job for the state.
For half a year the biologists have been asking the directors of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Soil Sciences (located in Kharkov) to sell them a small abandoned plant which was once earmarked for fertilizer processing. It would take only half a year to re-equip it and begin operations here, but their requests have been denied.

After I heard the reasons for the denial (the directors plan to give the plant to some enterprising cooperative managers), I left the mammoth institute building and went down into the damp basement of the residential building where the Biomos SNPP is located. All of the people there, including the director, looked very odd: They had all tucked their trousers into their socks. This is how they protect themselves from the...huge swarms of fleas in the basement. The sanitary and epidemiological station knows about the insects, the damp, and the poor lighting in the workplace. It will not allow them to hook up the small boiler, which they went through so much trouble to get, for the preparation of the substance (and it is probably right, because there are people living upstairs). For a variety of "criminological" reasons, the medical personnel decreed that the establishment should be sealed up! Only the intercession of a correspondent stopped this "operation."

The convincing argument for them was the great number of representatives of foreign firms (French, Indian, Syrian, Italian, and others) milling around Biomos. They are submitting official and private proposals, offering all kinds of temptations and promises. Bids are coming in from the foreign trade licensing administration and the non-governmental mediating organizations representing the interests of the same foreign firms. At any time they might be able to prevail upon the intractable biologists and talk them into sharing their production secrets.

"But if we let them have even a single gram," said SNPP Director A. Beskrovnyy, who also headed the project, "they will have a ton of the product in half a year, and then our country will once again, as it has so many times in the past, have to buy it at a ridiculous price (and with foreign currency). This is why we have to hold out as long as we can...."

The interest of the foreign firms is certainly no coincidence: They know about biomosses. Researchers in the SNPP have compared their results with research findings abroad and have concluded that they have come closer than anyone else to the creation of artificial humus with controllable properties.

The compounds were developed by A. Beskrovnyy and his colleagues around 15 years ago. The value of the invention was confirmed soon afterward when they learned that biomosses are common in nature. They activate the defenses of plants, animals, and soils. Immune systems have been stifled to some degree by the ailing ecological environment. The Kharkov biologists propose to compensate for the shortage of immunity with artificial bioregulators closely resembling their natural counterparts.

The word "artificial" should not be identified solely with synthetic materials, herbicides, and pesticides. As the saying goes, there is no chemistry here. The patented technology simulates natural processes and consists, as the specialists explained, in simply cooking vegetative matter in a kettle. In particular, vegetation can be used in the preparation of the biomosses for the soil in Chernobyl.

Research conducted jointly with the Saratov Medical Institute reportedly confirmed that biomosses can cope with cadmium oxide (even in the human organism), and it belongs to the heavy metal category. The fish in reservoirs filled with the waste water of the Kurskaya AES respond to the addition of biomosses to the water by developing and flourishing like calves in a good breeding facility. In some cases the compound saved critical patients with radiation burns. The resolution of sarcomas in animals has been recorded at the Rostov Oncology Institute. Biomosses for veterinary medicine and animal husbandry won a gold medal at the Ukrainian SSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements and have been cleared for industrial production. In short, according to research findings, the compound can do a great deal.

"I should warn you that the article will evoke serious argument or no reaction at all," A. Beskrovnyy warned. "I should remind you that the response to an item about biomosses in TRUD about 7 years ago was the opposite of what we expected. I can already foresee problems...."

I hope people will listen to him today, and not only because his arguments sound extremely convincing to me.

Have you noticed that reports and arguments about the consequences of the Chernobyl accident usually focus on evacuation procedures, the amount of material assistance the evacuees will require, the shutdown of the still "running" reactors, the organization of waste disposal sites...? Has anyone even suggested the leasing of the "zone" for foreign currency to anyone who might want to conduct experiments there, so that we can derive some kind of benefit from the situation? The item in the Kharkov newspaper about the rescue mission of the Akva joint stock company belongs to the same category. But have we heard many reports of real attempts to rescue the priceless lands of the Ukraine and Belorussia and stop the migration of radioactive nuclides?

Some people might argue that the attempts to defy radiation are senseless and futile, but even if suggestions of this kind are not voiced loudly, this does not mean that they do not exist—not everyone has surrendered. When I was almost through with this article, I read some proposals on ways of "trapping" radioactivity and keeping it from spreading in the subsoil. Their author is V. Gakhov, head of the Soil Radiology Sector of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Soil Sciences and Agricultural Chemicals. He was unable to complete his research because the 10,000 rubles he was allocated was not enough to cover the cost of experiments.
Some experts predict that it will take from 180 billion to 250 billion rubles to eliminate the consequences of the accident by the end of the century (new construction, resettlement grants, etc.). The additional 20,000 rubles Gakhov needed and even the 20-40 million required, according to the estimates of Biomas researchers, for the treatment of the contaminated area with their compound, sound like ridiculously small amounts in comparison with those huge sums, and the results might be incomparable!

It is not just a matter of money, although nothing can be done without money. We need another precedent transcending the bounds of current scientific knowledge; we need some incentive for the augmentation of radioactivity rescue procedures.

A unified program for the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident was approved recently. No reports of the inclusion of Biomas projects in the program have reached Kharkov. Meanwhile, the Permanent Representation of the Ukraine to the United Nations has addressed the scientists of the world through the world community to ask them to share their experiences, achievements, and discoveries. Could this really be more appropriate, more reliable, and less expensive?...

**Disagreements Continue in Leningrad Barrier Project Controversy**

90WN0092A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Yezhelev and Kim Smirnov: “The Leningrad Barrier: Shield or Sword?”; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] How many years have the arguments about flood protection for Leningrad been going on? Numerous commissions have stated their conclusions. The two latest scientific appraisals were conducted just recently by the Leningrad Scientific Center and the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and a conference on “The Experience in Independent Appraisals of the Leningrad Barrier” was held in the Polytechnical Museum in the capital. The range of opinions, however, is still extremely broad—from fervent assurances of the absolute ecological safety of the structures to the jokes, transmitted along the “people’s telegraph,” about how the levee in the gulf has provided Leningrad with a cesspool.

In essence, the irreconcilable “pros” and “cons” are the following:

**Con...**

The barrier will turn the bay into a sump filled with a whole bouquet of dirty and hazardous substances. Besides this, it could become a “chemical and biological reactor,” in which mutation processes will cook up a terrible “soup” threatening Leningrad with epidemics of diseases still unknown to medicine. We could have a biological Chernobyl right next to the gigantic metropolis!

The designers and builders of the barrier, scientists, and earlier “city fathers” staked their reputations on its ecological safety, but is the value of all their reputations combined comparable to that of Lenin’s city, a place sacred to all our people?! Officials come and go, but Leningrad is eternal. Does anyone have the right to stake his reputation or his conscience on its future?

The design for the barrier did not have the necessary ecological substantiation. The first studies were not conducted until 3 or 4 years after it had been approved, in 1981-1982. Some essential data are still lacking. In particular, there were no land evaluation studies of the banks. The choice of the barrier site was never substantiated. It was purely arbitrary. The location of the outlets of the northern sewage treatment facilities was an unfortunate choice, and the southern location was the worst possible choice. In general, the outlets should be beyond the barrier instead of near the shore. The run-off should be directed farther away from the shore through pipes.

We still do not have a comprehensive and objective ecological service in Leningrad to provide us with all of the facts. For this reason, no one can guarantee the validity of the ecological safety data the barrier’s supporters are citing. No one can give us any solid guarantees of this safety today. For this reason, would it not be better to halt the construction until the discharge and dumping of enterprise sewage into the Neva and Lake Ladoga have been completely stopped?

The planning and the construction of the barrier were conducted in line with the worst stereotypes of the period of stagnation: Secure financing approval as quickly as possible; begin the work without any thorough scientific—including ecological—investigations; link the work with problems of vital importance to the city. When sizable sums have already been spent on a project, it is virtually impossible to call a halt to it. This is the logic of the expenditure mechanism that was perfected over decades, but sooner or later we must give up these practices.

Why not start with the Leningrad barrier project? Why not dismantle the barrier for souvenirs, like the Berlin Wall? Of course, this would seem inconceivable to the old members of the Leningrad soviet. After all, they were chained, like Prometheus to his mountain, to the levee—or, more precisely, to the authoritarian system which gave birth to it—and each objection to the project tore at their livers as ferociously as the mythical eagle. We have to put our hope in a new Leningrad soviet....

**Pro...**

Anyone who calls the protective structures a barrier or levee is stretching the point and trying to state the issue in unforgivably crude terms. This is a unique and intricate product of the art of engineering, which is unparalleled in the world and which not only has no negative ecological effects but, rather, can regulate the ecology for the better if necessary.
The amount of pollution in the water simply does not depend on the barrier (for the sake of brevity, we will continue to use this word—Authors). This is why its designers and builders and all of the people in Leningrad are in favor of the start-up of sewage treatment facilities as soon as possible, the renovation of the technology in the Ladoga basin, and the recycling of water in Leningrad plants. All of the pollutants reaching the barrier will pass right through it, and nothing will accumulate in the inlet.

Therefore, there is no reason to hold up the construction of the protective structures, and of the shipping locks in particular. After all, the latter are "above suspicion." They will let water out, not keep it in. The suspension of the construction project before "all of the pieces have been put together" (temporary bridges, locks, etc.) could inflict disastrous damages on Leningrad in the very first severe flood. The best solution is to step up the construction work.

The protective structures do not simply represent Leningrad's set of "false teeth." Their construction will solve a whole group of the most pressing current problems of the gigantic city—in areas ranging from demography to transportation. Flood protection is an integral part of the Leningrad General Plan, securing the most economical way of establishing new neighborhoods on the banks of the inlet, connecting the banks by highway, and reducing traffic in the center of the city.

The main thing, however, is the probability of floods, the Damoclean sword hanging over Leningrad. The suspension of the barrier project (i.e., leaving it half-built) or dismantling the protective structures, which could already serve as a shield for Leningrad in the near future, could postpone the decision on new ways of protecting the city for years or decades. During these years, we would have an almost 100-percent guarantee of a devastating flood, which the historical center of the city, with its decrepit foundations, simply could not survive.

The opponents of the barrier are instituting legal proceedings against its supporters—from former Politburo member G. Romanov to the people who actually drew up the plans—and have suggested the closure of the institutions and organizations connected with the protective structures. But who will take the responsibility for the collapse of the Cathedral of St. Isaac, the Winter Palace, the Admiralty, and Smolny Convent? The members of today's informal movements and the "independent" experts? They cannot even be held accountable for anything in the courts!

Alternatives

These are the two points of view summing up the hours, months, and years of fierce arguments in the city on the Neva. Each has been supported by a multitude of facts, figures, and graphs, but although the debates have been going on for several years in the form of an open and unrestricted clash of opinions, neither side has scored the winning point or delivered the knockout blow yet.

We have to say right away that we have no intention of offering our own judgments in place of the opinions of scientists and specialists. They and only they should come up with the final answers to the questions of whether excessive algae is growing in the Marquise's Pond, whether or not flood seasons should be "bath days" for the Neva, whether or not the protective structures affect fish reserves in the inlet, and what must be done now—whether the construction of the barrier should be stepped up or whether it should be "dismantled for souvenirs."

We, however, are interested not only in the scientific and economic arguments over the barrier, but also their social implications. By their "roots" and original causes, they are firmly connected with the recent signs of stagnation in our life. To an equal extent, the present high pitch of these arguments reflects the new developments connected with perestroyka. It is time to learn important lessons from these arguments and to apply them to more than just the local problems of Leningrad.

First Lesson

We must learn technological democracy.

What does this mean? The supporters of the barrier project allege that it was born in an atmosphere of competition between various options, with the extensive involvement of the scientific and technical community, as if those who question it are mere dilettantes. Nevertheless, many facts prevent the description of this birth as a ray of light in a dark and stagnant realm.

In essence, it is only now, and only to the accompaniment of considerable difficulties, that research displaying the features of genuine democratization is making some headway in our country—features such as the refusal to follow the arbitrary orders of head institutes, the first steps toward diverse and even alternative plans, and the creation of a mechanism to carry them from the blueprint stage to completion, a mechanism in which the appeal of "prominent names," "first secretaries," and "solid firms" would lose its strength and in which economic expediency combined with ecological safety would be the primary objective. Is there a single specialist today who can swear on his honor that all of these features were present in the plan to protect Leningrad from floods and that it was not influenced by authoritarian orders?

It is too late to return to the stage of the first blueprints, where countless options can be explored on paper. The structures have already been built or are being built. They are definitely linked with many of what are known today as fateful economic and social problems of the city on the Neva. But after all, this was also the highest principle of the period of stagnation: Poorly planned massive projects were linked with the people's crucial concerns without any feedback from these people.

According to the supporters of the barrier, no hydraulic engineering project before or since underwent a more
thorough ecological analysis. According to its opponents, this was not an analysis, but merely an attempt to tailor research results to fit assigned requirements. There is the same clash of opinions on each detail—general and particular.

Why were there delays in the construction of the waste treatment facilities? Why did the design need adjustments, which then had to be "corrected" in a hurry? Why was no one held personally responsible for this? Why, finally, were the plans for the construction of protective structures and waste treatment facilities kept separate, even on the organizational level, although they would seem to constitute a single ecological engineering project? These questions will remain rhetorical until the appeals to "stay ahead of ecology" take physical form in a tangible and effective system of ecological and social protection, backed up by strictly scientific appraisals and eliminating the possibility of arbitrary authoritarian behavior.

There were no ecological appraisals of the Leningrad barrier project, no matter how many times we are assured that there were. This "state procedure" simply did not exist in our country at that time. In Japan, for example, a resolution of the cabinet of ministers on the procedure of ecological appraisal went into effect in 1986. Some of the nine compulsory stages are the announcement of the conclusions of the board of experts, their discussion by the public, and the comments of local residents on the proposed project. In our country, the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection is still only taking the first steps in this direction. We can still hear the echoes of the departmental, regional, and authoritarian disregard for ecological laws and imperatives.

Consider this: In Japan they found the precise legal balance between the appraisals of specialists (they are the ones who judge the project and the appraisal data) and the opinion of the inhabitants of the regions where projects are to be undertaken. We are still arguing even today about whether the population has any right to make decisions reserved for specialists. This is an upside-down view of the entire issue. If we were to turn it right-side up, we would be asking whether specialists are competent and responsible enough to avoid jeopardizing the future of people with their technical decisions.

Deputy Chairman A. Mishchenko of the academy commission of experts expressed this point of view accurately in his report on "Expert Appraisals in the USSR Academy of Sciences" at the conference mentioned at the beginning of this article: "I remember what Academician B. Raushenbakh said when he was arguing against the opinion that only specialists have the right to make decisions on matters connected with ecology, the administration of the national economy, and other such complex issues. What we need, he said, is for each citizen of the Soviet Union—and, in our case, each inhabitant of Leningrad—to have enough reliable information to make a conscious choice and take a firm stand on, for instance, the barrier project. If science cannot explain one of its conclusions to the average citizen, this is science's problem, and not the citizen's."

Second Lesson
The time for complete ecological glasnost in the country is approaching, and we must be equipped with all of the achievements of the modern art of monitoring and a comprehensive system of ecological observation, with compulsory reports on these matters to the public.

If a referendum were to be held in Leningrad on the barrier project today, most of the citizens would vote against it. This would not tell us anything about the side with the most competence, but it would give us quite definite indications of the current state of public opinion and of public likes and dislikes.

This phenomenon is not confined to Leningrad. Why is it so difficult to soothe public opinion throughout the country and to convince the public with statistics whenever the discussion turns to ecological problems? Why are rallies and demonstrations in defense of the environment so volatile and uncontrollable? Is it simply the fact that "our 'Greens' do not want to hear anyone else's arguments" (as one explanation puts it)?

The roots go much deeper: Now that the people have begun expressing their wishes openly, they do not want to be the submissive guinea pigs of the authors of any "projects of the century" or dams, levees, and chemical complexes. They want to know the truth about everything affecting their living environment.

The resolution of the 19th party conference "On Glasnost" already said that "the unjustified restrictions on the use of statistical information about the socioeconomic and political development of the society and the ecological situation must be lifted, and a system for the collection, processing, and distribution of information, based on modern data processing technology, must be established...." It has been around 2 years since the resolution was passed. The supporters and the opponents of the barrier project have referred to it repeatedly. Both sides are in favor of complete glasnost. Each side believes that complete information would convince the people that its position is the right one. Both are complaining about the absence of complete ecological glasnost.

One of the reasons is that information about the environment always had to be, and still has to be, literally wrested from the depths of the authoritarian system. We often hear frightening warnings about the unpredictable consequences of the provision of the population with the whole truth about the air it breathes, the water it drinks, and the land on which it grows vegetables and fruit.

But after all, there is no other solution. Realistic measures to improve the living environment cannot be undertaken without a knowledge of all the details. The people who kept the truth about ecology hidden were
afraid of more than just the ecological rallies and demonstrations of the "unaware" public. They were afraid they might have to find real solutions to environmental problems today, without having a chance to transfer them to the shoulders of tomorrow's "fathers" of our cities and rural communities. They were afraid they might have to move from "ecological jabbering" to real action—to extremely difficult action.

New people have now taken charge in the majority of soviets in the country, including Leningrad. Many of them received the mandate of trust because they promised to tell everyone the truth about the environment and to do everything within their power to improve it. Soon they will have to keep this promise. In Leningrad they will have to tell the people the whole truth about the barrier, explaining all of the details, and then decide its future.

Today no one can ignore our ecological concerns. Everyone will have to take a stand. It will be a crime to say nothing about the distressing state of the environment. Chernobyl is only one indication of this.

Returning to Leningrad and the need for flood protection, we must say that although much has been done in recent years to inform the population through the press, radio, and television, the city still cannot brag about an all-encompassing and unified information system providing inhabitants with regular and complete reports on the ecological situation in the inlet and on its banks. It is no wonder that rumors are started.

We have heard about the uncontrollable algae in the water, and about the layers of dead smelt on the river bed near the barrier. All of the facts have to be checked. We have to check them together—the supporters and the opponents of the project. It is important to separate not only truth from rumor, but also facts from their interpretations and extrapolations. Finally, we need a single ecological service for the protective structures, the mouth of the Neva, the whole river delta, and any other body of water in Leningrad, even the smallest creek. The service should be headed by the chief ecologist of Leningrad, an incorruptible individual with considerable authority and "veto" power.

Now that we have all decided that we cannot get along without complete ecological glasnost, will we manage to supply the population with complete and reliable information? After all, this will require special equipment and knowledgeable experts. The country is just approaching the threshold of ecological instrument building.

Something else is also important. Ecological information should not be anyone's "private domain." Environmental monitoring should be the responsibility of a single service, and not of separate departments. Within this service, specialists should work with public spokesmen expressing both points of view—or, more precisely, representing all of the interested parties.

Third Lesson

Nothing is preventing the actual improvement of the environment more than the irreconcilable battles between different forces in charge of these matters.

We said that neither side had delivered any "knockout" blows, but let us assume that one side does. What will happen then? Will this immediately create an atmosphere of peace and harmony? Hardly. The momentum of the struggle is too strong today. Both sides have gone too far in creating an "enemy image." Journalistic license has been substituted for objective reporting too often.

At the conference on the barrier, for example, a respected scientist had some serious complaints about the earlier Leningrad leadership and presented them in the following carefully worded phrases: "In the time of Grigoriy Rasputin (laughter in the auditorium)—excuse me, I mean Grigoriy Romanov—the tyrannical member of the Politburo who was so brazen and had such a strong sense of impunity and immunity, all of the members of the Leningrad gorispolkom catered to his every whim. I do not think I will offend anyone by saying this. But after he was gone, other leaders continued his practices...."

"The guilty must be punished. There are guilty parties here, beginning with Grigoriy Rasputin (laughter and applause)—guilty, beginning with Grigoriy Romanov. But he is still wearing the star of a Hero of Socialist Labor. Who should punish him? I think the inhabitants of Leningrad should make this decision. This is their business."

"Lenmorzashchita! I accuse you of beginning to build the barrier before the waste treatment facilities had been built and started up. Your flagrant violations of all the rules caused an ecological crisis. You were gambling with the future of millions of Leningraders! This deserves punishment, not medals and awards. And this should not simply entail the loss of a job, but also prosecution in court (applause)."

What is this? A speech by a public prosecutor? A declaration at a rally with a carefully constructed series of scathing remarks? No, it was the end of a scientific report filled with data, their analysis, and conclusions.

The supporters of the barrier have responded to each and every attack: "Dear Comrades, on the assumption that you are gullible readers, viewers, and listeners with no knowledge of hydraulic engineering, the political adventurers, under the guise of struggle for a clean environment, have tried to stir up mass indignation against the protective structures and those who devoted all of their knowledge, thoughts, energy, and willpower to their construction. People, do not believe them. Their hearts and souls are not troubled by your concerns or your misfortunes and they do not care a bit about the city...."
“I sincerely believe that you, dear Leningraders, will not give in to the provocation and will understand the truth of the matter.”

This is what Lengidroenergospetsstroy General Director Yu. Sevenard wrote in a GIDROSTROITEL article.

After events take this turn, it is not a long way from mutual accusations to acts of sabotage: ecological on one side and political on the other. Would it not be better to return to the source and try to understand that Yu. Sevenard, who is defending the barrier, and S. Tsvetkov, V. Bresler, and V. Znamenskiy, who oppose it, are all Leningraders who love their city and who wish it nothing but the best, although they might disagree on what the best is? Is it possible that the supporters and opponents of the project will still be competing 2 years from now to see which can hurt the other the most with a scathing remark?

This does not take much intelligence. This is just a continuation of the old traditions dating back to the August 1948 session of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and earlier.

If we take a look at the history of the protective structures in Leningrad from today’s vantage point, we will see many famous names from our scientific community and government on both sides, going all the way back to Peter I, who decided to found this city on marshes and human bones, under the constant threat of minor floods. Both sides are demanding a “speedy and fair” trial. This, however, is not happening.

God forbid that someone should decide we are trying to justify the actions of the former Leningrad leadership. No, we simply support a proposal voiced at the conference: The Institute of Government and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences should establish a special commission on the legal aspects of the design and construction of the barrier. All of the arguments about the history of the project and the personal responsibility of its “architects” and “superintendents” are groundless without a solid legal foundation. All of our rash actions in response to public opinion and mob rule will only delay the answer to a question of vital importance to each Leningrader.

Yes, people deserve to be put on trial for much of what was done in the years of stagnation instead of being awarded medals and stars, but they must be tried in accordance with law, on the basis of solid evidence, and with their guaranteed right to defend themselves. Otherwise, we will not have come very far from the 1930’s, when the grounds for serious accusations and death sentences could be the unsubstantiated remark that “everyone knows that....”

Now we will take a look at the future from today’s vantage point. Will the present confrontation bring us any closer to the best solution to a double problem: the need to guarantee the ecological safety of Leningrad and the need to protect it from floods? It will not. This means that it is time to move away from mutual accusations to a legal and scientific basis. All of the “pros” and “cons” of both sides must be cleansed of emotion and we must take an objective look at them together.

Dean A. Mishuyev of the Moscow Construction Engineering Institute, head of the School of Hydrodynamics, has suggested the establishment of a comprehensive scientific research laboratory of quick response, so that differences of opinion can be settled without delay and without waiting for another expert appraisal. There should be a single database on the project. Space and aerial cartography of the mouth of the Neva, the river itself, and Lake Ladoga, meeting all of the requirements of both sides, should be organized. An independent team should be formed to conduct regular surveys of the state of the inlet. A comparative analysis of all of the conflicting data on the barrier project and its ecological substantiation from various sources should be conducted. Other measures can be undertaken in common if the two sides show a willingness to cooperate.

Paradoxically, after all the years of conflicting opinions and views, all of us will eventually become richer—in the volume and quality of information and the accuracy of conclusions. The present problem is that these riches are concentrated in two different places, on the two opposite sides of the Neva. Before we can answer the question of whether the Leningrad barrier should be completed or dismantled, we must build a bridge of trust between the two banks.

Armenian Authorities Urged Not To Take Drastic Action Against Major Polluters

[Article by A. Matnishyan, member of Public Ecology Council of Armenian SSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, doctor of chemical sciences, and professor: “Look Before You...”]

The ecological movement in the republic is a relatively recent development, but in spite of the support of the press, headed by Zoriy Balayan, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and the republic government have not always paid attention to our proposals. In fact, we have frequently been ignored by these institutions. Without any reliable data on pollutants, we looked like dilettantes to the representatives of ministries and government commissions.

In 1988 the Armenian SSR State Committee for Environmental Protection entered the people's unequal struggle for their health. At that same time the Nairit Scientific Production Association (NPO) made an attempt to present its own arguments, but it was already too late and no one trusted anyone else. The procrastination of government agencies and the reluctance of Nairit representatives to make specific decisions on existing ecological problems aggravated the situation dramatically. It reached the point at which the commission organized in 1989 by order of the Armenian SSR...
State Committee for Environmental Protection to investigate the ecological state of the Nairit NPO, one of the members of which was the author of these lines, was unable, despite our insistence, to obtain the necessary data of a qualified analysis and assessment of the actual quantity of effluent from the Nairit NPO. As a result, some members of the commission refused to take part in the inspection. All of these circumstances contributed to the dissolution of the informal ecological council that existed at that time, and many specialists grew disillusioned and ceased to work effectively. This led to a crisis in the movement as a whole and to the development of new extreme views in the movement, which was no longer under any kind of supervision. There was a new group of activists who were not always competent but were sincerely committed to the cause. Rash decisions were made on both sides in line with the idea that the whole world could collapse as long as ecology triumphed.

As a result, we are now on the verge of the total collapse of the republic economy without having solved any of our ecological problems to any appreciable extent. It was under these conditions that the republic Supreme Soviet’s decision on the closure of the Nairit NPO was published on 25 June 1989. Incidentally, the whole thing would have remained on paper if it had not been for the vigorous actions of desperate people.

I believe that the decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet is unjustified because several objectives of vital importance to the republic have not been attained. Their attainment will be impossible without the sequential redirection of Nairit into new channels and without a specific plan for re-specialization, which, as we know, can take years.

How could a decree be passed on the closure of the entire Nairit association, including the production units supplying the republic with dry ice, carbon dioxide, oxygen, caustic soda, and chlorine gas? After all, heat and electric power stations, the food industry, and the purification and disinfecting equipment of the sanitary and epidemiological station cannot work without these components, the work in hospitals will be complicated, etc.

Our people, who have always valued knowledge, are now closing a scientific center employing highly skilled specialists who took part in the development of production in other parts of our country and abroad. How can we throw away our scientific potential so carelessly at a time when the whole world is importing it? Is it possible that some people feel we have become too smart? At a time of such tragedy, how could the decision have been made to close the acetylene production facility in Yerevan and the calcium carbide facility in Kirovakan when these are so necessary in welding operations in the disaster zone? In general, is anyone giving any thought to the people in the disaster zone, where the shortage of crude resources and materials is having a much greater impact than in Yerevan? How can the production of polymers be stopped at the polyvinyl acetate plant and the Nairit NPO when they are the raw material for other enterprises in the republic—the enterprises in light industry, the footwear industry, and the production of cigarette filters which have given Armenia a chance to conduct international operations? At a time as crucial as this, now that the existence of the entire nationality is at stake, how can its industrial potential be destroyed, especially the chemical potential that determines the defensive capabilities of states? We have to wonder who will benefit from this.

I think that the republic Supreme Soviet should take all of this into consideration and take immediate measures. Today attempts are being made to isolate the intelligentsia from our people, to take away their scientific potential, and to put the republic on the verge of total chaos. Under these conditions, it will be easy to stop the process of democratization as well.

I am requesting the republic government to unite all of our people’s scientific potential in commissions and soviets with the right to approve or influence government decisions, and to restore the informal republic ecology council, which should work with the State Committee for Environmental Protection on an equal basis, and not just work with it formally as it does now, and should take part in making decisions in the Council of Ministers. I repeat, it should have voting rights. I think that this is the only way we can enlist the services of skilled experts to solve the republic’s current problems.

The republic’s meager crude resources will not allow the development of electronics or machine building, where chemical processes, according to the data of Japanese specialists, account for 50-70 percent of all expenditures. Today the use of facilities operating on gas, which is still the only organic resource reaching the republic, and the processing of polymer by-products can maintain our industrial potential and the viability of the republic.