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USING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT BATTALIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE FUTURE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM L. WIMBISH III
United States Army

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Using Army National Guard Combat Battalions for Peace Operations: A Viable Alternative for the Future

by

William L Wimbish III
LTC USA

Colonel Paul Cunningham

Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
Since the end of the Cold War, defense spending has declined as well as active Army force structure, requiring more reliance on the Total Force: the Army Reserve and the National Guard (ARNG), to accomplish ever growing multinational peace time engagement missions.

Additionally, National Military Strategy requires a much smaller Active Component (AC) to prepare for and be capable of fighting two near simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). Although the Army has relied on its Reserve Components (RC) to fill critical shortages in Combat Service Support (CSS) and Combat Support (CS) for peace operations, since DESERT STORM, the Army has only deployed two RC combat units to such operations.

With a decreasing AC combat force and new and increasing challenges, the Army National Guard divisions' combat battalions provide a tremendous untapped resource to help relieve AC operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and free AC combat forces conducting peacekeeping missions, enabling them to train and prepare for their wartime missions. In order to realize the efficiencies of this option, Department of Defense and Army planners must properly, program, train and adequately fund these battalions to assume selected peacekeeping missions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only a soldier can do it."

Former UN Secretary General, Dag Hammerskold

As the United States enters into the 21st century, it will face new and difficult challenges that will be more complex than those encountered during the Cold War. Instability and internal conflict among developing countries and failed nation states will continue as it has in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia, threatening peace and stability around the world. These situations and other natural and man-made disasters will continue to promulgate great human suffering, civil unrest, refugees and even genocide, requiring the United States Military to respond globally to conduct range of complex peace operations in order to aid those in need and restore and maintain peace and regional stability.

Over the past six years, the United States has been committed to an increasing number of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), particularly peace operations, with multinational and coalition partners. However, since the demise of the Soviet Union, America's interests have turned to domestic concerns. The US Congress and the American people, in the absence of a perceived external threat to national security, have agreed to balance the national budget and reduce the debt. In order to facilitate these actions, the Congress has continued to decrease
Department of Defense spending to provide resources for other federal programs. As a result, defense spending has been cut by 39% since 1985, requiring significant downsizing and shifting of additional force structure into the reserve components. For example, the Army has reduced its active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) forces over 30%, decreasing from approximately 1,546,000 soldiers in 1989 to 1,080,000 in 1998.

Despite current military reductions, the National Security and Military Strategies still require the US Military to prepare for and respond to two near simultaneous major theater wars (MTW) while shaping the global environment through responsive forces engaged in an increasing number of peace and stability operations. To accomplish this, each year, the Army has continued to increase the role of the Total Force: Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 1997, Army National Guard soldiers have contributed approximately 1.5 million man-days on 337 missions worldwide. Over the past four years, the Army National Guard has committed soldiers and units in support of the Army for United Nations peace operations in Haiti for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the Multinational Force and Observers Mission (MFO) on the Sinai Peninsula, RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD in Bosnia and most recently, Task Force ABLE SENTRY (TFAS) in Macedonia.
No matter how technologically advanced the future force becomes, as the US Army moves into the new century, peace operations will continue to be an extensive human endeavor and manpower intensive, requiring combat soldiers and "muddy boots" on the ground. These forces, as in the past, will be required to conduct a broad menu of peace operations and multiple tasks, from providing disaster relief, and security for humanitarian missions to enforcing treaties, verifying, cease fire agreements, and separating warring factions.

As a result of America's new role as world leader and only remaining superpower, the United States has progressively moved toward a policy of "multilateralism." As US global interests have continue to expand, it has required the United States to unilaterally or with multinational partners exert all appropriate instruments of national power to foster resolution of conflicts, strengthen democracies and address world issues in support of the Nation's Security Strategy of "Engagement." The reluctant but growing acceptance by the US Congress and the American public and the implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," has set a precedence and is freeing the way for more military involvement in the future.

As peace operations increase in frequency, size and duration, demanding extensive use of smaller Active Component combat forces and over 54% the Army's combat power residing in the National
Guard, using Army National Guard (ARNG) combat battalions to replace and augment AC combat forces in traditional peace operations is a viable alternative. In the future, ARNG combat battalions could be effectively used to help reduce AC operational tempo and assist in freeing AC combat units to train for assigned warfighting missions.

Just as the Army routinely relies on and requests the use of critically needed RC Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) soldiers and units for peace operations, ARNG combat units could also be routinely used for extended peacekeeping operations like the MFO mission in the Sinai or the United Nations peace mission, TFAS, in Macedonia.

Although the Army and the National Guard Bureau have considered using more ARNG divisional combat battalions for peace operations, since Operation DESERT STORM, the Army has mobilized and deployed only two RC combat units to support peacekeeping operations: one composite infantry (AC/RC Mix) battalion and one infantry company.

Can the nation and the Army afford to continue not using ARNG divisional combat forces in peace operations?
PURPOSE

The purpose of this discussion is to examine the viability of using the ARNG divisions' combat battalions in "follow-on" traditional peacekeeping operations by addressing the following questions:

First, is there a need to use ARNG combat forces in future US traditional peace operations to reduce the negative impact on AC forces?

Second, Has past performance proven that the ARNG divisions' combat forces can effectively mobilize, and train for peace operations and are they suitable and capable of accomplishing the mission?

Third, what are the National Guard's future combat capabilities and how should they be employed for peace operations?

Fourth, what are the associated challenges in training, preparing and using the ARNG divisions' combat battalions for peace operations and what is the impact on units, soldiers and employers?16
DISCUSSION

The Paradigm. Increased use of ARNG combat units for peace operations will require new thinking and a paradigm shift from holding ARNG combat forces as a "strategic reserve and hedge" against uncertainty or in the event of a Major Theater War (MTW). Historically, the United States has called upon its RC combat forces only in times of crisis. The changing strategic environment is moving away from the probability of a MTW to an unpredictable and increasing number of MOOTW scenarios that will necessitate more flexible and responsive ARNG combat forces that can be called upon in peace time, not just in time of crisis.

Army National Guard Divisions in Transition. The mission of the National Guard has and is continuing to undergo exponential change and expansion to meet the diverse needs of the nation. Since the Bottom Up Review (BUR) in 1993, ARNG force structure, roles and missions have been under critical review.

Based on declining resources and need for a large Strategic Reserve, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommended additional ARNG division combat force reductions and endorsed the ARNG division redesign effort to convert over 43,700 positions; equivalent of 12 National Guard combat brigades, into CSS and CS to fill critical shortages identified by the 1993 BUR.
The QDR also noted that:

"existing war plans do not call for the ARNG divisions to participate in MTWs instead are or suppose to be assigned missions which include easing Army PERSTEMPO and providing rotational units for peace operations and extended contingencies."\(^{20}\)

In December 1997, the Congressional chartered National Defense Panel (NDP) considering the changing strategic landscape, noted that:

"...not only will RC forces augment AC forces overseas worldwide in missions ranging from combat, and peacekeeping to regional security but will be increasingly involved in containing threats here at home."

They recommended following key additions:

- The Strategic Reserve must have clear peace time missions such as partnership for peace in Europe and possibly assumption of the US Army South mission.

- The National Guard should provide forces to train civil agencies and immediate reinforcement for consequence management (terrorist attack/use of Weapons of Mass Destruction) and natural disasters.\(^{21}\)

As highlighted above, the QDR and NDP recommend, that to remain relevant and responsive in the near term, the Strategic Reserve, which consists of CS, CSS and combat forces of the eight ARNG divisions, must be more involved in the increasing number of MOOTW and peace and stability operations.

In a vote of confidence and recognition of the National Guard’s capabilities, General Charles Wilhelm, CINC, SOUTHCOM has already recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Army, SOUTH mission be given to the Army National Guard with
headquarters in Puerto Rico. Additionally, on the domestic front, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre approved the creation of ten full-time ARNG teams to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These recommendations, proactive responses and new initiatives by DOD emphasize the need to properly mission Army National Guard divisions and will have a significant impact on their training and readiness as the Army National Guard begins its transition into the 21st Century.

Is there a need to use ARNG combat forces in future US traditional peace operations to reduce the negative impacts on AC forces?

Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). Peace operations and other MOOTW have been steadily taking their toll on the Active Army. Since October 1991, unit deployments have increased 69% concurrent with a 29% decrease in total end strength. During the Cold War from 1945-1989, there were only 13 peace operations. After the breakup of the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 1995, approximately 26 new and separate operations were authorized and sanctioned by the United Nations (UN). The US Army has participated in 16 of these operations, providing over 60,000 troops from both the active and reserve components. Since this period, the United States Army has continued to contribute substantial AC combat forces from Europe and the Continental United States (CONUS) and is providing the leadership for the UN
mandated NATO peace enforcement mission, Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD in Bosnia. This extended mission and other MOOTW commitments, have significantly affected training plans, availability and readiness of the Army's first line contingency forces.  

Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO). PERSTEMPO has steadily increased during fiscal year 1997, averaging approximately 139 deployment days a year across the operating force, with a significant number of combat, CS and CSS units exceeding 180 days. The Army Chief of Staff, concerned with the adverse effects on quality of life, has directed that all commanders attempt to reduce the average days deployed below 120 days, reduce training by 10% and cut National Training Center rotations form twelve to ten per year.  

Increasing number of deployments may be adversely effecting recruiting and reenlistment rates as well. In FY 1997, the Army recruited just 70% of its goal.  Reenlistment rates for first term soldiers have dropped nearly 10%, from 49.5% to 39.6% and for careerists over 8%, from 80% to 71.9%.  

Training. On a recent Army War College Survey, the majority of participants that had served with or commanded combat units in peace operations said that battalion staffs had lost operational proficiency and battlefield synchronization skills.  In Germany, Combat units recently returning from Bosnia had similar
difficulties during training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). \(^3\)

A GAO study concluded that brigade and battalion combat units returning from extended peace operations could require six months to regain combat proficiency. \(^3^2\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a study in 1995 that concluded in part, that MFO Sinai unique training, deployment and post deployment combat requalification for a single battalion effectively reduces the Army's combat ready force structure by a brigade (i.e., three battalions preparing, deploying, recovering and retraining). Specifically, it has collectively degraded the readiness of the Army's first line contingency forces from the 101st Air Assault, 82nd Airborne and the 10th Mountain Divisions that have supported the MFO mission for over the last 16 years. \(^3^3\)

Since 1994, 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions have also collectively degraded the combat readiness of a brigade equivalent in support of TFAS in Macedonia.

Deploying ARNG combat battalions on a rotational basis to replace AC combat units conducting peacekeeping missions such as those in the Sinai and Macedonia, would help reduce AC OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO and free AC forces to train and prepare and maintain proficiency for wartime critical combat missions.
Has past performance proven that the ARNG divisions' combat forces can effectively mobilize and train for peace operations and are they suitable and capable of accomplishing the mission?

Since the Gulf War, the Army has mobilized and deployed only two RC combat units for peacekeeping missions: One composite AC/RC light infantry battalion and one light infantry company. Both units have performed in an outstanding manner.

MFO Sinai. In 1993, concerned about the increasing demands for AC participation in multinational peace operations, Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, directed a study to test the feasibility of recruiting, forming a battalion of predominately volunteer RC soldiers and deploying them on a six month rotation to replace AC units conducting the MFO peacekeeping mission on the Sinai peninsula. The 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) was commanded by an AC officer and consisted of 72% National Guard, 8% Reserves and 20% AC soldiers. All noncommissioned officer positions were divided equally. 34

The three month pre-deployment training solidified a cohesive battalion task force that successfully accomplished the six month mission. The Army Research Institute (ARI) study on MFO Sinai showed that the RC soldiers were competent, well trained and performed as well as their AC counterparts. 35 Ms. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, lauded the operation. The US Ambassador to Egypt was impressed with the maturity and
resourcefulness of the RC soldiers. Skeptical at first about the use of RC soldiers, the AC Battalion Commander observed that; "They are mature, highly educated and are well suited for stable peacekeeping operations like the Sinai."36

The ARI study concluded that if properly missioned, resourced and notified in sufficient time, the use of RC combat soldiers can be a successful strategy for meeting US overseas military peacekeeping commitments. Moreover, it was also found that these types of operations enhance home unit morale and have positive effect on unit and individual combat readiness as well.37

Another associated ARI follow-up study comparing selected AC 10th Mountain Division soldiers with RC soldiers of the 4-505th (PIR) showed that the RC soldiers had more positive constabulary attitudes than the AC soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, in terms of support for peacekeeping, impartiality and minimal use of force as well as believing more strongly that peacekeeping was career enhancing and appropriate for like combat units.38

Although all conclusions were based on the MFO Sinai mission, ARI believes they will be applicable for other similar missions of the same stability, complexity and level of threat. ARI and other DOD officials caution that these same findings may not apply equally for operations of great intensity, complexity and instability such as those that have taken place in Somalia or Bosnia.39
"I see as a mission that could be totally handed to the Guard and Reserves in the future. That’s how well they did. And if we did, we would reduce the operational tempo on the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.... I am hopeful that the mission will stand as a model, and that one success will breed another success. And that confidence in the reserves will increase."

Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Bosnia. In June 1997, C Company, 3-116th Infantry, Virginia ARNG was mobilized for a mission in Bosnia. The mission was to provide security for the Sava River bridge and the US support base at Slovonski-Brod, Croatia. C Company conducted approximately 51 days of individual and collective training at home station, the Infantry Leaders Course (ILC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Company C assumed the mission from B Company 2-14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division in November 1997. Since that time, they have performed extremely well. Colonel Ingram, the Commander of Task Force PERSHING, recently stated: "C Company is a well trained and lead unit. They have completed the transition and are doing an all-around great job with the bridge mission." Lieutenant General Joe Kinzer, Commander, 5th Continental United States Army (CONUSA), on a recent visit was extremely pleased with the company’s performance as well.41

Although since The Gulf War, there have been only two RC combat units deployed to peacekeeping operations, numerous ARNG
CSS and CS units and thousands of individual soldiers have and
still are effectively providing critical skills and capabilities
to the nation and the Army in support of domestic emergencies and
contingencies world wide.

In FY 96 and FY 97, a cumulative total of 4,475 ARNG soldiers
supported Operation Joint ENDEAVOR/GUARD in Bosnia and Task Force
ABLE CENTURY in Macedonia while units in the United States
responded to 308 domestic and local support missions.\textsuperscript{42}

What are the Future Army National Guard’s combat capabilities and
how should they be employed for peace operations?

Combat Capabilities. The National Guard provides a
tremendous untapped resource of combat power. Future force
structure will contain approximately 52\% of the Army’s total
combat power.

The National Guard’s core combat power and primary war
fighting capability resides in the 15 enhanced Separate Brigades
(eSBrigades). These reinforced brigades provide over five
divisional equivalents of combat power. The eSBrigades are
resourced at a significantly higher level than the divisions and
are to be trained, equipped and manned to the highest readiness
level and deployable within 90 days\textsuperscript{43}

Of the eight ARNG divisions, three divisions (Two Heavy and
one Light) will remain as conventional divisions with three
brigades each. The remaining five divisions will be converted
into composite organizations which will include a reduced number of combat maneuver brigades and the creation of composite CSS units to fill critical CSS shortages in current AC force structure.\textsuperscript{44}

In the FY 98, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP), all 15 eSBrigades and 69 of the 332 divisional units are resourced and apportioned to the regional combatant commands for their respective contingency plans.\textsuperscript{45} Current plans reflect that the eSBribades will be committed to reinforce or replace AC combat units in the event of a MTW.\textsuperscript{46} Although the eSBigades could be used for peace operations, their critical mission profile and limited training time would possibly degrade their ability to support wartime contingencies.

Currently, most combat maneuver battalions of the eight ARNG divisions are not included in the regional warfighting CINC's contingency plans and could be assigned peace operations missions. However, as mentioned earlier, not all peace operations are appropriate and discretion must be used when selecting ARNG combat forces to conduct these missions.

\textbf{Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement.} When deciding to use ARNG combat forces in peace operations, planners must clearly understand the key differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Army Field Manual (FM) 23-100, "Peace Operations" outlines the following differences and variables:
• **Consent.** In peacekeeping, belligerent parties consent to the presence and operations of peacekeeping forces, while in peace enforcement, consent is not absolute and force may be used to compel or coerce. In peacekeeping, consent is a clear stipulation.

• **Force.** In peacekeeping, force may be used in self defense or defense with a mandate. In peace enforcement, force is used to compel or coerce.

• **Impartiality.** In peacekeeping, impartiality is more easily maintained, while the nature of peace enforcement strains the perception of impartiality of the force because of the coercive, often forceful and directive nature of the operation.\(^{47}\)

Chayes and Raach of the National Strategic Studies Institute conclude that peace enforcement missions which are short notice and entail a high level of danger would generally require the use of predominately AC forces. They suggest that the decision to use RC forces, should be determined on lead-time, length of mission and level of danger. They advocate the use of RC forces through a phased transition plan to replace most AC forces conducting peacekeeping in stable, less hostile relatively benign operational environments such as the multinational peacekeeping missions in the Sinai, Macedonia and even Haiti once the situation had stabilized. Chayes and Raach state that RC combat forces could participate in peace enforcement missions of greater volatility and danger; however, they note considerable cost and time would be incurred to train and equip these forces to assume
peace enforcement missions that are similar in scope and complexity of Somalia and Bosnia.48

**Peacekeeping Employment.** One feasible option is to appropriate the divisional combat battalions to the combatant commands specifically for follow-on peacekeeping operations. After initial rotations by AC forces, pre-aligned ARNG divisions could permanently or on a six to eight month rotational basis with AC combat forces, assume certain low risk peacekeeping missions.49 This provides the opportunity for divisions to become the force providers and trainers and the flexibility to task organize, cross-level personnel and equipment and tailor composite battalions to support specific peacekeeping missions.

Six-eight month rotations could be planned and scheduled up to five years in advance and submitted as part of the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process based on actual or future peacekeeping missions.

This pre-alignment would allow the Joint Staff mobilization planners to program each mission and provide adequate time to develop and staff draft Presidential Selective Reserve Call-ups (PSRC) within DOD and Congress that identify numbers of personnel and specific units and allows time to acquire volunteer personnel if needed. This option would also assist Forces Command (FORSCOM) mobilization planners in developing, adjusting and validating Time Phased Forces Deployment Data (TFPDD) to preclude late notifications and scheduling delays. Most important, it
provides the Continental United States Armies (CONUSA), Army National Guard State Area Commands (STARC) and aligned divisional combat units information to begin coordinating, scheduling and planning peace operations training well in advance and allows soldiers ample time to prepare for deployments.50

In 1995, because of late notifications, The 29th Infantry Division (Light), Virginia ARNG was unable to fill 39% of the requisite number of volunteers needed for the MFO Sinai AC/RC composite battalion test, requiring other National Guard divisions to provide personnel. This could easily be alleviated by early notification.51 The 1995 DOD Task Force on Quality of Life advocated that a minimum advance notice of six months to one year would provide sufficient time to form, train and prepare soldiers, families and employers for a deployment.52

The Army and the National Guard Bureau are currently planning for a possible ARNG battalion 1999 MFO Sinai mission and suggest the following time line for pre/post mobilization training and deployment (in days):

• D-425 Mission Analysis (specific METL: METT-T driven)
• D-365 Home Station Training (specific peacekeeping tasks)
• D-180 Key leaders report and form unit
• D-120 Annual Training (collective training; Plt. and Co.)
• D-60-45 Soldiers and leaders report and prepare
• D-45-15 Battalion train up; final validation and certification
• D+0+180 Deploy and conduct the mission
• D+180+210 Inactivate53
Besides late notification, repetitive activations of RC forces can be deleterious to the component; however, sufficient combat battalions are available within the ARNG divisions to preclude repetitive activations.

For example, after the division redesign, there will be approximately 23 mechanized and light infantry battalions in the future ARNG divisional force structure for planning. If two battalions were activated per year, it would be 10 years before a unit would conduct another rotation. If armored battalions were included as in the TFAS mission in Macedonia, the time between rotations would be further extended.

What are the associated challenges in training, preparing and using Army National Guard combat battalions for peace operations and what is the impact on units, soldiers and employers?

Peace Operations Training. Unlike CS and CSS units whose tasks and missions are generally the same in peacekeeping and in war, combat units selected for peacekeeping duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime Mission Essential Task List (METL). Time required to train AC combat units for peacekeeping operations varies from approximately four to six weeks depending on the complexity of the mission and the unit type. For ARNG combat battalions, this training could be spread over several years.

19
Most facets of normal military operations and training apply to peacekeeping, particularly personnel discipline. However, individual combat soldiers and units need various skills, specified training and indoctrination to change their focus from wartime tasks to meet the unique demands of peacekeeping before deployment. Peacekeeping will inherently involve small units and individuals exercising impartiality, perseverance and restraint, conducting defensive and reactive operations to help deal with and solve complex civil and delicate military issues among the local population and former belligerents to facilitate the implementation of a mandate or agreement instead of achieving victory over an enemy. Key tasks that should be accomplished in individual and collective training for peacekeeping are:

- The nature of peacekeeping
- Establishing a lodgment
- Conduct Relief in place
- Regional orientation
- Establish a buffer zone
- Supervise a truce or cease fire
- Monitor boundaries and maintain law and order
- Negotiation, mediation, arbitration
- Force protection; Mine and booby trap awareness
- Rebuilding infrastructure and provide humanitarian assistance,
- Checkpoint/patrolling operations
- Investigation and reporting
- Information collection
- Media operations
- Permissive force demilitarization
- Rules of engagement (ROE)

These tasks are not all inclusive and can be tailored to missions like MFO Sinai and Macedonia as they have by AC units since mission inception. US Training and Doctrine Command,
(TRADOC), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, the 18th Airborne Corps and US Army, Europe and 7th Army have assembled archives of training and information on peace operations from experiences in the Sinai, Macedonia, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) have developed, modified and adapted training scenarios, mission training plans (MTP) and support packages for virtually all peace operations conducted by the US military in the last seven years.59

Currently, Forces Command (FORSCOM) and its CONUSAs have not developed peace operations Mission Training Plans (MTP) identifying individual and collective tasks for peacekeeping and has relied solely on TRADOC schools and Major Subordinate Commands' expertise like the US Infantry school, the MFO Sinai Office within the 18th Airborne Corps and other commands like US Army, Europe and 7th Army and its subordinate combat training center (CTC).60

Additionally, detailed mission training support plans identifying scenarios, observer/controllers, Mobile Training Teams (MTT), role players, facilities, training and simulation sites have not been designated for training ARNG divisional combat units.61
The MFO Sinai ARI study also noted that although the MFO training was detailed and generally met the 4-505th PIR’s needs, much was ad hoc and could be improved upon.\textsuperscript{62}

The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) has developed a three year pre-mobilization brigade conventional training model\textsuperscript{63} that could be adapted to a battalion sized organization for peacekeeping training.

Using IDA’s three year training model, during the first year once subordinate battalions have been scheduled for a possible peacekeeping rotation, parent divisions and brigades can introduce individual peacekeeping tasks into classrooms and through distance learning during Inactive Duty Training (IDT). During Annual Training (AT), training would focus on platoon peacekeeping LANE training and certification.

The second year would focus on the peacekeeping collective tasks at the company level. During IDT, companies would conduct LANE and situation training exercises (STX) and company certification during AT.

The third year would follow the National Guard’s suggested model shown earlier, continuing to conduct peacekeeping classes and individual readiness training (IRT) to include IRT validation and certification. Company and battalion staff training would culminate during AT with a simulation exercise using the TRADOC Unit Leadership Training Program (ULTP). The exercise could be supported by Distributed JANUS, Enhanced Mobile Simulation...
Network Training (EM-SIMNET), Simulations in Training for Advanced Readiness (SIMITAR), Battalion/Brigade Simulation (BBS) or other simulation exercise formats tailored for peacekeeping and augmented with sufficient role players. This exercise could be assisted by JRTC and CMTC Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) or CONUSA Training Support Brigades/Battalions and Training Divisions (exercise).

Once mobilized, the battalion would conduct a two week field training exercise (FTX) followed by a one week validation and certification exercise at a local training area or a CTC. This exercise and certification could be supported by AC Units that have conducted peace operations, as was done during the 4-505th PIR MFO Sinai Train-up or by experienced MTTs from the JRTC, CMTC or CONUSA Training Support battalions (TSBns).

Using the above training model, a battalion can be trained and certified even though a peacekeeping deployment is not required at that time. The certified combat battalion can sustain peacekeeping tasks for one year or until the next battalion is validated and then return to a conventional wartime combat METL and subsequent Yearly Training Plan (YTP). This training would have long term value, providing a significant peacekeeping knowledge base and pool that would be distributed throughout the ARNG divisions' combat units.

One of the greatest challenges is providing the sufficient number of trainers from the CONUSA TSBs and TSBns. Although
Congress has allocated 5,000 Army AC trainers to the RC by Public Law, under Title 11, most have been designated to train the 15 eSBrigades and high priority Reserve and ARNG units (Force Support Packages; FSPs: I, II & III).  

Units and Soldiers. Until recently, the military saw little value in peace operations; however, as the tasks are better understood, significant positive attributes begin to emerge from the military perspective.

Certainly, not all tasks carried out in peace operations approximates wartime tasks. However, units engaged in routine patrolling, Checkpoint operations, security or area denial tasks do have the opportunity to practice many of the skills required for combat.

For ARNG divisional combat units that are only funded for approximately 39 days of training a year, the benefit of conducting deployment and peacekeeping training reaps extraordinary benefits such as enhanced training, equipment, personnel, family support and employer readiness, as well as unit cohesion, morale and esprit.

The 1996 ARI study of the MFO Sinai mission clearly showed that parent unit and soldier training readiness and morale benefited positively from the 4-505th PIR six month deployment. When the peace keeping mission was complete and the RC volunteers returned to their respective units, 72.7% of the senior RC leaders reported that the volunteers had returned better trained
than when they left. A similar positive impact on unit readiness was found as well. Over 35% of the RC Senior leaders interviewed that provided soldiers for the mission reported a positive impact on unit combat readiness while none reported a negative impact.68

The final important finding was that the peacekeeping mission generated a consistently positive impact on morale, confirmed by substantial percentages of both junior and senior leaders and soldiers who were willing to volunteer for this type of mission again. All senior leaders and over 90% of the junior leaders and soldiers thought that participating in peacekeeping was a good idea and endorsed continued participation in the future69

More recently, other ARNG units that have deployed and served in Bosnia such as the Target Acquisition Battery, Fire Support Elements, and the Area Support Group from the Pennsylvania National Guard have also experienced positive effects on training readiness and morale according to PA STARC Officials.70

Some DOD and Army officials have speculated that increased use of RC combat forces will adversely affect enlistment, retention and morale.71 This theory has had little merit and is anecdotal, especially with FY 1996 being the best year in recent history for recruiting and retention.72 Even with the deployment of 144 National Guard units and 4,589 soldiers to the Balkan theater from December 1995-97, the post deployment
attrition rate averaged only 15.9%. The overall attrition rate for non-deploying units was somewhat higher.

The ARNG Strength Management and Attrition Model (SMAM) final 1997 report concluded that the elevated training pace of high priority units and units that are frequently mobilized did not lead to significantly higher attrition. All data indicates that rates for these units continue to remain well below the ARNG average. Overall, ARNG attrition in FY 97 was approximately 18.6% compared to over 36% for the Active Army. The Army National Guard also has sustained a high continuation rate among “first term” soldiers (84.3%) and for “career” soldiers (87.1%).

A 1997 ARI Soldier Post-Deployment Survey administered to 1,496 RC soldiers returning from Bosnia showed overall, that more soldiers reported positive than negative effects from the deployment on their Army career, future promotions, commitment to the Army and physical health. On the other hand, more soldiers reported some negative effects on civilian jobs/career and family. It should be noted many survey participants deployed for up to 270 days. Spreading deployments over numerous ARNG combat units, limiting operations to six to eight months and improving employer and soldier benefits would possibly improve the latter perception.

Volunteerism Vs PSRC. Generally there are no legal constraints on accessing National Guard divisional combat forces.
DOD has two ways of gaining access to RC forces in peacetime. Under Title 10 U.S.C., section 12304, the President may order up to 200,000 RC personnel to active duty for a period of 270 days (PSRC). The second method is by activating volunteers with the consent of the individual under Title 10 U.S.C., section 12301(d). Current DOD policy supports and requires volunteers be sought first for peace operations and lesser contingencies and has established guidelines for such contingencies where PSRCs will be available for planning.

Questions regarding the accessibility of reserve forces and their willingness to serve have largely been resolved. Since the Gulf War, thousands of reservists have volunteered when requested to assist active forces for peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Sinai and most recently Bosnia. According to service headquarters and major commands, volunteers were qualified for their assignments and performed well.

With the President's willingness to mobilize reservists and their past performance and enthusiastic response coupled with relatively short six to eight month deployments and extended time between deployments, the decision to request and use a PSRC versus the option to solicit volunteers should not be a significant issue.

**Employer Support.** During the Cold War, demands on the RC were considerably lower, predictable and of limited duration. Since then, employers are having to pay for the “peace dividend”
gained by the Cold War's end as demands on the RC are increasing in the frequency and duration and decreasing in predictability which has significantly increased costs in covering reserve employee temporary vacancies. This and the unpredictability of "voluntary" extended duty is a growing concern among employers today. The importance of retaining the support of employers is key to success of RC retention and recruiting in the future.

A recent survey conducted by the Air Force Reserves showed that employers were extremely supportive of those situations that threaten national security. However, the supportive numbers significantly decreased when service involves humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping operations. Despite an increasing number of deployments over the past two years, the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) show employer and reserve complaints are continuing to decline. Scheduling six-eight month rotations five years in advance should alleviate the unpredictability and provide both employer and employee sufficient time to make temporary employment arrangements.

Currently, DOD is examining legislature to provide low interest loans, tax credits and preference on government contracts for employers of Reservist and National Guard similar to those offered employers of minorities. Another initiative that could be beneficial is a federally sponsored program that
assists employers in finding temporary employees to fill the void during a reservist’s deployment.

**Soldier Benefits** In October 1996, the Ready Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Program was instituted based on surveys conducted during and after the Gulf War that indicated over two-thirds of the reservists that were mobilized suffered significant financial loss. This program soon failed because of the limited number of participants. A similar system, possibly federally subsidized initially or bonuses given to soldiers to alleviate effects of possible loss of income for volunteering and deploying with units on regularly scheduled deployments should be considered. Additionally, DOD is pursuing other initiatives to improve commissary, educational, health and dental benefits appropriate in this era of increased RC use.

**Funding Peace Operations and Training** The most significant challenge in using ARNG combat battalions in peace operations is funding. Peace operations have not been funded by Congress in advance. Initial costs pending supplemental congressional appropriations are paid from Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) resources. The trade-offs are reduced training and operations for the Total Force. For example, in FY 92/93, peace operations cost approximately $1.6 billion, in FY 94, $1.7 billion and in 1997, a supplemental allowance of over $2 billion was approved by congress.
Reduced ARNG funding has already affected the operational readiness of the ARNG divisions. Total ARNG OPTEMPO requirements were resourced at 63% in 1996 and only at 49% in 1998. Under the tiered resource management system, the Army must fund high priority ARNG units (Force Support Package units and eSbrigades) at 100% of OPTEMPO funds obligated. Divisional units were resourced at a mere 13% to 17%. The total shortfall for all ARNG divisions was approximately $276 million in FY 98. If decreases continue in 1999, it is expected to adversely affect the operational and training readiness and deployability of all ARNG divisions.88

However, for 1999, the Army is requesting a budget increase totaling $64.3 billion and DOD is requesting that Congress allocate a $3 billion “special allowance” for contingency and peace operations. The Army’s share is approximately $415 million. Most important, the Army’s request includes an additional $100 million for increased National Guard OPTEMPO.89 In FY 95, the cost for training and deployment of the 4-505th PIR was approximately $18 million.90 Today, it would cost nearly $25 million and is almost cost prohibitive under current fiscal constraints unless more priority funding is allocated in future years.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• First, DOD, the regional CINCs and the Army must recognize the tremendous capabilities, efficiencies and possibilities of using ARNG divisional combat units in peacekeeping operations. The Army must begin to identify, request and allocate resources and plan, and train well in advance in order to effectively use ARNG combat battalions for follow-on low risk traditional peacekeeping missions and sustain multi-year training cycles and deployments. Although the Army and the National Guard Bureau are planning for a MFO Sinai National Guard battalion rotation in FY 99, little has been accomplished in assigning ARNG combat battalions these types of missions on a reoccurring rotational basis.

• Second, if ARNG divisional combat battalions are to be used on a continual basis, FORSCOM and the CONUSAs must develop peacekeeping Mission Training Plans (MTP) and mission support plans for pre/post mobilization training and certification. The CONUSAs will also need to train TSBns in peacekeeping operations and shift training resources to assist in ARNG Divisions in training designated ARNG combat units during the final year of training.

• Finally, additional incentives should be considered to compensate both employers and ARNG soldiers for frequent deployments. The Reserve Forces Policy Board and the NCESGR have
continued to pursue certain initiatives and legislative actions within the Congress and the states such as low interest loans and preference on government contracts for employers. They are also examining alternatives for loss of income compensation, bonuses, improved health care and increase educational benefits but much still needs to be considered and some may be cost prohibitive.

CONCLUSION

The United States is gradually adjusting to the realities and challenges of a new strategic environment. Having won the Cold War, there is no major conventional threat to challenge America's national security; therefore, as in the past, DOD can expect a steady decline in defense spending that will eventually drive substantial reduction and changes in the structure and size of the Army as well as the other services. Recognizing this reality, Secretary of Defense Cohen issued a memorandum to the service chiefs calling for a more integrated approach and heavier reliance on the RC forces in order to provide the National Command Authorities a Total Force with the capability for increased military operations across the full spectrum. His memorandum places emphasis on four principles; two are of special note:

• Clear and mutual understanding on the mission of each unit: active, Guard and Reserve in each service.
Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.\textsuperscript{92}

US Military planners are predicting that OPTEMPO will continue to rise and are expecting that US forces will have to respond to numerous small scale contingencies in the future. The Army, who has historically been the heavy lifter in these operations, must look seriously look at increasing the use of ARNG divisions’ combat battalions in selected peacekeeping operations. This decision can be a win-win situation for both active and ARNG forces, providing relief for active forces, allowing them to train for wartime contingencies, while giving the ARNG divisions’ combat units invaluable training and experience not normally afforded. Additionally, this will eventually creating a pool of peacekeeping expertise and experience that will be invaluable on tomorrow’s strategic landscape.

As ARNG combat units capabilities increase, the Army can rely more on these units while continuing to down size and retain force structure at considerable cost savings over time. Moreover, greater reliance on the militia forces instead of a large standing military is consistent with the history and traditions of the nation.\textsuperscript{93} The ARNG divisions’ combat battalions provide a tremendous untapped resource if programmed early, trained and rotated properly and adequately funded.

Word Count = 6865
ENDNOTES

1Department of the Army, Peace Operations, FM 100-23, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 1.


7America has historically drawn down its active forces during peace time, relying on a more affordable citizen force. Over the years, visionaries such as Generals: McCauley Palmer, Marshall, MacAuthur and later Abrams and Sullivan saw the great utility of the citizen forces in building a national Army not only as a repository of great internal strength but as a vital link between the government, its military and the American people (the national will); the Clauswitzian “Remarkable Trinity.” (See Heller, 4-11, 27 and Summers, 6-10). The Army’s “Total Force;” In 1974 General Abrams, CSA, implemented the concept, vowing never to go to war again without the use of RC forces, he created a 16 division AC and integrated and imbedded critical RC CS, CSS and combat capabilities (See Duncan, 144-145).


13Steven Kull, Americans on UN Peacekeeping: A Study of US Public Attitudes (Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, 27 April 1995), 1-4.


16Questions 1, 2 & 4 were derived and modified from Arely J. Ball, ARNG, Peacekeeping: Is it Feasible to Expand the Role of the Reserve Components? (Carlile, PA: USAWC Strategy Research Paper, 7 April 1997), 4, 7, 11.


23Thomas N. Burnette, LTG, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, briefing to the USAWC, Carlisle PA, 23 October 1997.


26Discussions with three G-3 Division Operations Officers revealed that Bosnia has involved a significant number of US 5th Corps and 18th Airborne Corps units. Since 1995, 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division have been heavily involved in deployments to Bosnia. During 1997, the 18th Airborne Corps deployed an armored cavalry regiment, and an attack helicopter regiment. Additionally, the 10th Mountain Division provided an engineer battalion and two reinforced infantry companies while supporting Saudi Arabia, Sinai and Panama security missions with infantry company and battalion sized packages. The 101st Air Assault Division has supported operations in Bosnia with similar requirements as well.

27James L. Hodge, LTC, USA; Force Readiness Division, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, Washington DC, telephone interview, 30 January 1998.


31Author's experience training and evaluating first units returning from Bosnia as Observer/Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center

33 Ibid. and Chayes, 78.


35 Ibid., xvi-xxii, 158-160


37 Phelps, xix-xxii, 431-434.

38 David R. Segal, Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the US Army (Baltimore, MD: Army Research Institute, University of Maryland, 1995), 12-13.


48 Chayes, 17-18, 76-81. Also see Yocum, 15-17.

49 Yocum, 19.


51 Phelps, xxvii.


53 John Slovina, COL, ARNG, Chief, Mobilization and Readiness Division, National Guard Bureau, interview, 21 January 1998 and briefing 4 February 1998, Army War College, Carlisle, PA.


57 Ibid., 86 and Chayes 24-26, 31-35.

58 Ibid., 87.


Ibid.

Phelps, 198, 229-233.


Greg Pickell, "Virtual Reality Warfare," National Guard, December 1997, 23-24. Technology continues to advance and the US Army training base is relying more on virtual training or simulation (Training Aids, Devises Simulation and Simulators; TADSS) to train collective tasks. Most of these simulations are available to the National Guard as well. The esBrigades are currently utilizing JANUS; a battalion and brigade staff training device as well as Brigade/Battalion Simulation (BBS), Simulations in Training for Advanced Readiness (SIMITAR) enhanced mobile Simulation Network Training (EM-SIMNET). The CTC's (JRTC, CMTC) have modified the data bases to improve the resolution and interaction at the small unit level and have augmented with role players to fill the gaps that the simulations can not replicate for peace operations (i.e., media, negotiations, etc.)

Douglas H. Himle, COL, ARNG and Keith S. Wettig, LTC, ARNG, Information Paper: Training Support XXI, Army Readiness Training Division, National Guard Bureau, 15 January 1998 and interview with Major Michael Belew, ARNG, Unit Training Branch, Army Readiness Training Division, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, VA, 21 January 1998. There are 17 CONUSA Training Support Brigades: 11 in 1st Army and 6 in 5th Army. These TSBs and subordinate TSBns are aligned with FSP I, II & III units, especially the 15 esBrigades almost to the exclusion of the divisional combat units. If divisional battalions are to be trained a shift in priorities would be required due to the limited AC/RC training resources.

Chayes, 86.

Ibid., 86-91.

Phelps, 431-433.
Ibid.


Reynolds, John Reynolds, LTC, ARNG, Chief, Officer Personnel Policy Division, National Guard Bureau; telephone interview, 30 January 1998.


Alma G. Steinberg, Chief, Army Trends and Analysis Group, US Army Research Institute, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR; Soldier Post-Deployment Survey: Preliminary Reserve Component Results, briefing to the Deputy Director, ARNG, 16 December 1997.


Ibid., 14.

Ibid., 5-6.


Ibid.


Chayes, 94-95.


Dennis Steele, “Army Requests $64.3 Billion Budget,” Army, March 1998, 6-7.


Yocum, 19-22.

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