INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: A LOW TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

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ABSTRACT

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Intelligence requirements to support military operations other than war (MOOTW) differ in type and scope from the requirements that are most important in conventional war. Examination of five case study examples (Vietnam, Lebanon, Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia) demonstrates that MOOTW intelligence requirements are not easily satisfied with high-technology approaches. These requirements are often satisfied from a detailed knowledge of, and through interaction with, target cultures and nations. They are knowledge, analysis and human collection intensive. The Army of today and the Army After Next must maintain a capability to satisfy MOOTW intelligence requirements because the Army will continue to be involved in these operations into the foreseeable future.
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MOOTW INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - LOW TECH BUSINESS

In creating the Army After Next, the Army must maintain a capability to satisfy intelligence requirements to support military operations other than war (MOOTW). Much of the writing on the AAN emphasizes capitalizing on technology and the "revolution in military affairs." Rapid, precision attack from remote locations and platforms along with "information dominance" (highly computer-based) are hallmarks of the future force.

These capabilities are certainly important and must be a part of our future force. Most of our military operations have not involved operating against a large, technologically advanced enemy force. Most of the Army’s recent operations have been at the low end of the conflict spectrum and operations we doctrinally refer to as "military operations other than war" (MOOTW). Current Army doctrine and the projected geopolitical environment both dictate that the Army participate in MOOTW operations into the foreseeable future.

Intelligence requirements to support MOOTW differ in type and scope from the requirements that are most important in the conventional war "decide, detect, deliver" approach to winning battles. In conventional high-intensity war, the emphasis was on high technology sensors designed to find massed enemy forces. In Cold War conventional situations, we knew enough about enemy organization, equipment, doctrine and tactics to predict from
that sensor-provided "picture" enemy courses of action. In MOOTW, killing "the enemy" is not usually the focus. Major intelligence issues are often determining if there is an enemy, who he is, and how he operates.

Further examination of MOOTW intelligence requirements reveals they are not easily satisfied with high-technology approaches. These requirements are often satisfied from a detailed knowledge of, and through interaction with, target cultures and nations. They are knowledge, analysis and human collection intensive. These requirements are outlined in detail in Appendix 1. The Army After Next must plan for developing and retaining the capability to satisfy MOOTW intelligence requirements.

MOOTW AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE FUTURE

The Army defines MOOTW as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."\(^1\) FM 100-5, Operations lists thirteen different activities and categories of activities that constitute MOOTW, ranging from support to domestic civil authorities and humanitarian assistance, to attacks and raids.\(^2\)

The Army has participated in MOOTW throughout its history, but their "pace, frequency, and variety...have quickened in the last three decades."\(^3\) Illustrative of the increased frequency of
these type operations is the fact that in the last seven years, the Army participated in 25 deployments, nearly all of them in support of MOOTW, compared with ten deployments of all types in the 40 years between 1950 and 1989.\(^4\)

This trend in military operations is not surprising, given the character of the world political environment. An average of eight wars is going on in the world at any given time, most of them internal wars or insurgencies, and many involved major U.S. interests.\(^5\) Add to these “small wars” the additional MOOTW missions of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian relief that are consequences of such conflicts, and it is apparent why MOOTW will be a growth industry.

Most prognosticators about the future global security environment see continued instability, violence and unpredictability in the years ahead. Steven Metz, a professor of military studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute who has written extensively on the future of warfare, postulates that a blend of up to five different security environments might exist in the year 2030 and beyond. Each of these five security environments has different implications for the types of armed forces the nation would need and the types of missions those armed forces would be most likely to perform. Four of them would require the military to perform MOOTW missions.\(^6\) In two, MOOTW missions would probably dominate other military missions.
The Army recognizes that it will conduct MOOTW operations well into the future. Army Vision 2010 assesses that most future operations will occur in the lower or middle portions of the spectrum of conflict; the arena for MOOTW. It recognizes seven general mission categories especially suited for ground forces, five of which contain doctrinal MOOTW missions.\(^7\)

Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan, in writing about future warfare, saw a world in which traditional military combat power would not be the most appropriate means to achieve the nation's political objectives:

"Contemporary strategists confront representatives of feudal lords, religious groups, ethnic groups, drug cartels, crime syndicates and even transnational corporations using force or the threats of force to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, nations now use operations other than war - such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, supervising cease-fires, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing rights of passage and enforcement of sanctions - to compel adversaries to do their will."\(^4\)

**PAST AS PROLOGUE - FIVE CASE STUDIES**

If the Army After Next is going to conduct MOOTW, it must maintain a capability to satisfy intelligence requirements associated with MOOTW missions. These requirements are often different from the requirements that support operations against large organized forces involved in high intensity conflict. This paper will examine five MOOTW missions U.S. forces have supported
and from these derive the types of intelligence requirements typical to such operations. It will also describe the most effective approaches in satisfying MOOTW intelligence requirements. The missions in my examples do not encompass the gamut of MOOTW missions as outlined in FM 100-5, but they are representative of those missions where U.S. forces would most likely be deployed in harm's way, in significant numbers, and for extended periods of time.

**Vietnam and Counterinsurgency**

Our experience in Vietnam provides a case study of appraising a rural-based communist insurgency. Intelligence requirements to support counterinsurgency doctrine are described in the now out of print 1970 field manual FM 30-31, *Stability Operations*. Scholarly studies have more recently articulated these requirements.

FM 30-31 divides intelligence requirements into two broad categories: geopolitical intelligence requirements and insurgent movement intelligence requirements. Geopolitical intelligence requirements included political, economic, sociological, geographical, and military intelligence categories. National-level collection and analysis, traditional "country studies" and open source publications satisfy these "strategic intelligence" categories.
Insurgent movement intelligence requirements are subdivided into general requirements and "insurgency force" requirements. The former category includes; identification of the movement (name and history of the movement), its location (by level of government), its causes, support of the movement (did communists or non-communist organizations support it and did the population support it?), membership of the movement, activities of the movement and strengths and vulnerabilities of the movement. These requirements straddle the levels of intelligence, but are more operational and tactical than strategic in nature.

Recent scholarly studies of insurgencies also suggest the types of information required to understand and then counter an insurgency. O'Neill details three major characteristics of an insurgency and six strategic variables (or criterion) that must be evaluated in order to understand the insurgency and to determine its strengths and weaknesses. The three major characteristics of the insurgency are: the type of insurgency, the forms of warfare the insurgency will engage in, and the strategy of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{12} Knowing these characteristics, the analyst knows the goals of the insurgency and also has a baseline against which to evaluate the insurgency when examining the six variables. The six variables are the environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and the government response.\textsuperscript{13}
Experiences of those who gathered intelligence to support counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam show that some requirements were more critical than others in understanding the situation and taking appropriate military action. Principal among these was an extensive knowledge of the cultural and psychological aspects of the situation. One Vietnam province advisor explained this to a newly arrived Phoenix program intelligence officer. "Naturally, we need to know the answers to such questions as 'How many Vietcong are there in a given village, and who are they?' But it is equally important to know why they are out there, and what goes through their minds as they hide in their bunkers."¹⁴ The cultural barrier (coupled with the language barrier) was a major impediment to successful operations against the Vietcong and explains why "many Americans were flying blind the entire time they served in Vietnam. These barriers were one of the major reasons why there was too little understanding of both the enemy and the friendly situations..."¹⁵ Understanding the motivation of insurgents would allow the development of programs to undermine their movement.

A great deal of specific knowledge in a given district, village and hamlet area was equally essential. According to one U.S. intelligence officer in the Phoenix program, it was important to determine the "ingredients of the stew" before you could see an accurate picture in a given area. These specifics included a knowledge of the families and family structure in the
villages. Family experience and history had a great influence on which young people were recruited by which side (government or communist). Knowing the family history and the family structure could assist in determining who was a member of the Viet Cong and their level of commitment.

It was also important to know the "real" leadership structure in the village and district. An official government leadership structure existed, but appointed officials might not be the ones who wielded real power. The principal way to find out who these individuals were was to get someone to tell you. Knowing who the real decisionmakers and influential people were in the village allowed you to determine who the Viet Cong would attempt to control. By interrogating or winning over these individuals, you might be able to identify and neutralize the Vietcong shadow organization or infrastructure in a village.

Other critical information included; the level of collaboration of the local government (who is creating grievances and who is helping the insurgents or reaching accommodation with them?), the location of families of known insurgents, the location of insurgent sanctuaries, and the infiltration routes in and out of the villages / hamlets. This information aids in the identification of insurgent bases and patterns of operations. If this information is known, military operations to interdict and isolate these base areas can be planned.
The characteristics of the types of information required are similar, whether we examine FM 30-31, the experiences of those involved in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, or O'Neill’s framework. There is a great deal of background environmental and cultural information and knowledge that is required and then there are the details of the insurgent movement itself (its organization, its leaders, its planned activities, its support infrastructure, the locations of its sanctuaries, etc.), that must be known to implement an effective counterinsurgency program. Much of the "strategic" and "operational" information is gleaned from open sources such as country and scholarly studies, but the detailed information concerning the insurgency's tactical operations must, and in the case of Vietnam did, come from human and technical intelligence collection activities.

**Lebanon and Peacekeeping**

The Marine experience in Lebanon is instructive of what happens when the threat environment is not well understood. When U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon in September 1982, Lebanon was a fractured state with numerous hostile actors all vying for influence. The heavily armed groups included: the Muslim Druze (4,000); Maronite Christians (10,000); the Christian South Lebanese Army (3,500); Amal Shiite Muslims (2,000); Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad groups (1,000); Syrian Army forces; Israeli Army forces; and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).¹⁹
Despite this, the environment the Marines stepped into in late September 1982 was viewed by most, if not as a non-threatening environment, at least one where the warring parties were exhausted and tired of fighting. A signal that this was not the case occurred in November when a car bomb blew up near Marine supply parties at work. The bomb injured no one and the Marines were unable to determine who set it. Marine intelligence officers classified the bombing as "clumsy" and "amateurish." It does not appear that the Marines viewed this first direct attack against them as a bellwether of change in the environment, but they did recognize the need for more information. They began jeep patrols into the Christian stronghold areas, not only to gather valuable intelligence and a "feel" for the area outside their perimeter, but also to demonstrate to Muslim factions their impartiality.

Over the succeeding months, the environment continued to deteriorate around the Marines, but leaders from the national level through those on the ground failed to fully comprehend the nature of the changes: the Marines compromised their neutrality in the eyes of the Muslim factions when they were directed to train the Lebanese Army; Muslim radicals bombed the American Embassy compound; Syria rejected a withdrawal agreement with Israel negotiated with the aid of the U.S., emboldening the Druze militia; and the Druze sporadically attacked the Marines with rockets. To make matters even worse, the Marines sent their
organic intelligence-gathering capability home in August 1983 and reduced patrol routes to the immediate vicinity of USMC positions. This effectively blinded the Marines and took away their primary ability to "sense" their surroundings and make judgments about the threat. They were completely reliant on national-level intelligence support, which although good, was not capable of providing detailed and accurate information on the situation.

Continued fighting characterized the time leading up to the bombing of the Marine barracks. The Marines inflicted dozens of casualties on Muslim militiamen and even leveraged fire support from attack helicopters and naval gunfire. In October, amidst a widely publicized sniper duel between the Marines and Muslim militia, Marines noticed "some hard-looking characters in Soviet-pattern camouflage fatigues, sporting red headbands." These individuals were members of the Hezbollah, a fanatical Shiite splinter group supported by Iran. The significance went unnoticed. On 19 October, there was an attempt on the Marine commander's life and on 23 October, a five-ton truck packed with explosives rammed into and detonated in the Marine barracks.

What were the critical intelligence requirements in the Lebanon situation? Certainly, Lebanon validates the need for a comprehensive understanding of the general cultural environment, in its current and historical aspects. The tremendous complexity of most peacekeeping situations also reinforces the need for very
detailed and current information on each potentially dangerous faction. In the case of Lebanon, there were at least nine players, some national entities, some military, some paramilitary and some terrorist. One of the first things that must be determined in any peacekeeping operation is the extent of commitment of each party to the truce, cease-fire or peace agreement. This provides a first indicator of who the potential troublemakers are. The attitudes of the belligerents toward U.S. forces and when those attitudes are becoming hostile are also important to know. For example, what actions by U.S. forces might make one or more of the factions directly hostile? Answering this requirement would have alerted the Marines to the loss of their neutral image and perhaps allowed them to make adjustments in their activities (or recommend adjustments in their activities to higher headquarters).

In a peacekeeping operation, the peacekeeping force is generally restrained from using military force. Military action is mainly allowed for self defense, thus activities like meetings with belligerent leaders and presence patrolling are the major ways influence and order are obtained. When methods like these are used, it is critical to know who the real faction leaders are (those with real power, who can influence their groups), and how they might be influenced.

The Lebanon experience also demonstrates how high-level political actions influence the tactical level. The U.S.-backed
agreement between Lebanon and Israel, and the rejection of it by Syria, ultimately had direct and adverse impact on the Marines. For this reason, the tactical force on the ground in a MOOTW operation must understand the overall political situation, monitor and track it, and even war-game likely reactions or outcomes of high-level diplomatic and political actions.

Implications for collection are similar to the counterinsurgency problem. In a situation like Lebanon, the best sources were probably HUMINT. Although some degree of information was certainly available from national level intelligence agencies, it was not detailed enough to support situation development across the problem set the Marines should have been interested in. The Marines harmed themselves when they sent home their own tactical collectors, and compounded their problem when they reduced patrolling. If nothing else, patrolling provides eyes and ears into the surrounding areas that over time can determine what "normal" looks like and possibly detect "abnormal" when it occurs.

**Bosnia and Peace Enforcement**

The mission of NATO forces on entering Bosnia in December 1995 was to separate the former warring factions (FWF) and accomplish other military-related provisions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Factions separated and military units and their heavy weapons withdrew to cantonment sites and barracks within the first 120 days. After this, NATO
forces focused on monitoring FWF compliance with the military provisions of Dayton and providing a secure and stable environment within which the civil provisions could be implemented.\textsuperscript{25}

Key to any commander's success in Bosnia was first and foremost an appreciation for the culture and history of this complex region. After this, detailed and specific knowledge of the area of operations was required. This included the military leaders and organizations in the area, the civilian leadership, the police structure, leadership and practices, the political party structure and its leadership (especially the three dominant parties of the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims), refugee organizations and their leadership, and the paramilitary situation. It was also important to know the current economic and displaced person and refugee (DPRE) situations. All of these factors and actors interacted in complex ways that could breach the peace over a wide variety of issues, and all of these became intelligence requirements.

The threat environment in Bosnia is an extremely complex one. Besides the "conventional" armed forces of each side, there were numerous paramilitary organizations. In 1994, a UN report identified 83 paramilitary groups fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, of which 56 were Serb, thirteen Croat and 14 Bosnian Muslim (Bosniac).\textsuperscript{26} Many of these units, though not at the time active as military units, still existed as loose organizations in 1996.
These units often had criminal connections and were more like criminal gangs than military organizations. Because they were more like Mafiosi than military, obtaining reliable and detailed information on these organizations and their members was extremely difficult. It was more akin to police detective work than classic intelligence collection. Task Force Eagle (TFE)\textsuperscript{27} relied mainly on overt indicators observed through routine aggressive patrolling and tactical CI / HUMINT teams, and we were never very good at obtaining predictive or actionable intelligence.

Two other issues that threatened Bosnian peace will illustrate the complexity of the intelligence problem, the types of intelligence that was required, and how it was obtained and used. One of these issues is the issue of Brcko. The Serbs ethnically cleansed Brcko and took it over during the war. Its post-war status was so contentious that it could not be resolved at the Dayton negotiations. The issue was relegated to arbitration and the arbitration decision was announced in February 1997.\textsuperscript{28} The decision by the arbitrator was secret until its announcement, not even known to NATO security forces until hours ahead of time, yet TFE had to ensure that a stable environment would be maintained whatever the decision. Both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniacs considered Brcko a key area, so potential reactions to the decision by both sides had to be
determined and war-gamed so plans for preventing violence could be implemented.

Key players on the Bosniac side included the large population of former Brcko residents that resided in small towns just south of Brcko in the Bosniac-Croat Federation. Pronouncements by Bosniac political leaders, both local and at the national level, as well as activities by a group representing former residents of Brcko called "Brcko Bracima" (loosely translated meaning "Brcko for Brckans"), were critical to understanding planned Bosniac reactions. The Bosniac military was clandestinely involved in provocative resettlement activities before, so it was important to monitor them. Previous experience with the way in which the Bosniacs conducted a DPRE return also gave TFE a baseline against which to measure activity.

There was a significant Serb refugee population in Brcko, transplanted from Sarajevo when the Bosniacs took over sections of that city, that could be mobilized against the Bosniacs. TFE also considered Bosnian Serb police, military and paramilitary reactions because the Serbs had openly proclaimed that retention of Brcko was a "go to war" issue. Potential scenarios for reaction by all of these groups were developed and indicators of sides adopting these possible courses of action were monitored in the months leading up to the decision.

Understanding the "systems" of response to the arbitrator's decision for both sides (the Bosniac DPRE return process and the
Serb response process) allowed TFE to focus information gathering efforts in the right places to obtain an accurate picture of what was occurring and what would probably occur. Most of the useful information in this situation was obtained from human sources. TFE was able to develop a plan that pre-empted a planned Bosniac march on Brcko and kept the Serbs from over reacting in response to a Bosniac gathering south of Brcko.

Additionally, early on, TFE detected a Bosnian Serb military mobilization and was able to bring pressure to bear through higher headquarters on the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership to stop it. The military mobilization manifested itself in increased presence of military age males in and around Brcko, the sighting by patrols of paramilitary-associated clothing, and increased requests for training from a numerous Bosnian Serb military units. Signals and imagery intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT) played very little in this scenario.

Another major threat to a stable and secure environment in Bosnia was the return of DPRE to their former homes, something guaranteed under the Dayton Accords. All factions resisted the return of other ethnic groups, but in the TFE sector, the Bosnian Serbs were the most blatant. Besides the pervasive hatred the Serbs have for the Bosniacs, the Serbs fear that the return of large numbers of Bosniacs to a town or region could tip political control of that area. To further complicate the picture, TFE
confirmed in November 1996 that some DPRE return activity on the part of the Bosniacs was intentionally provocative. 29

As a result of analysis performed by TFE, the Bosniac DPRE return system and the Bosnian Serb response system became well understood. TFE analysts determined areas of potential conflict and briefed leaders in detail on the situation. This ultimately led to a good knowledge of "hot spot" areas that could be monitored and to a modification of the DPRE return policy being advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), specifically the rate of return being advocated and the adoption of a more measured approach to the repatriation issue. 30

Most of the information obtained on the Bosniac DPRE return system and the typical Bosnian Serb response came from a wide variety of human sources, direct experience, and close study of the demographics and the history of fighting in the area. Generally, information was not specific or timely enough to allow preemption of all hostile acts (the Serbs blowing up particular houses, for instance), but more than once, TFE pre-empted violence based on specific HUMINT and a general understanding of the "systems" and the situation. 31

TFE had a clear enough picture of the situation so that commanders knew what the actual threats and problems were, could take appropriate actions, and communicate that picture to higher level decisionmakers. The bulk of the information that
contributed to this ability was human source information. In addition to patrols and tactical CI / HUMINT teams, TFE gathered and fed into the assessment process information from anyone who had regular contact with the population, the factions or their leaders. This allowed TFE to keep the "pulse" of the environment and have a very good current situation picture. More importantly, it provided a barometer of when the environment was changing and allowed TFE to take actions to ensure the peace was maintained and soldiers remained protected. Several times, it allowed TFE to pre-empt problems before they occurred.

**Haiti and Nation Assistance**

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, which restored President Aristide to power, was a nation assistance operation. The ground forces deterred trouble, violence, looting and assassination attempts, backed-up Haitian law enforcement efforts, and patrolled Port-au-Prince where there was no Haitian police presence. The task force commander considered force protection to be another key element of the mission and his number one priority. The Haiti mission was similar to the other OOTW missions we have examined; provide a secure and stable environment and protect soldiers on the ground.

Initially, the task was to know the military threat, which was minimal. The Haitians had a small military of little conventional consequence, possessing a few heavy machine-guns and
a few motorized armored personnel carriers. They had no air
force. It was also critical to have a basic understanding of the
country and culture. It was a society rampant with poverty and
corruption, where Catholicism and voodoo existed side-by-side and
intertwined, and where political, military, police and criminal
organizations and interests overlapped.  

Locating and disarming Haitian paramilitary organizations
(“attaches”) who posed a direct threat to President Aristide was
of more concern than understanding the military, and became the
focus of the operation for the first month. Analysts knew some
of the paramilitary leaders, but much information on these
organizations was developed once on the ground. This was a
complex problem because these organizations had both formal and
informal power structures. Some political leaders were “window
dressing” with the real leader a criminal with linkages to the
police and the army. Analysts developed extensive data bases and
conducted extensive analysis to unravel the organizations and
identify the real leaders. Once identified, these leaders were
monitored or arrested if they posed a threat to security. The
best sources of this information were the tactical CI / HUMINT
teams. Special forces elements operating in the countryside
provided a “feel” for what was going on outside the city, and
whether a major insurgent threat existed.  

Concurrently with the neutralization of the paramilitary
organizations, intelligence began supporting general anti-crime
efforts by the military police. Since restoring and maintaining order in the society were key measures in the success of the mission, intelligence was required to help determine who the criminal troublemakers were.³⁸

The installation of a reliable and professional Haitian police force was a major objective because it helped set the conditions for departure. Intelligence was required to support the vetting process; determining who was trustworthy and capable of serving in the police force and even identifying possible future leadership that would act in a responsible way. The same problems that permeated reliability judging of HUMINT sources led to difficulty in this process as well. The Haitian culture is complex with a blend of voodoo, Catholicism, abject poverty and corruption. Judging truthfulness and motives was always a problem. On-the-ground experience was required for any real understanding.³⁹

Later in the Haiti support operation, intelligence was required to support elections. Much as in the case of Bosnia, "political intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)" had to be accomplished. This included the names of primary candidates, headquarters of the major parties, electoral headquarters, and demographics. The attitudes of voters and workers in various regions was also important. The objective was to identify potential trouble spots so they could be monitored or efforts could be undertaken to pre-empt problems.⁴⁰
Somalia and Humanitarian Assistance

Somalia was a complex operation, mixing elements of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In fact, the U.S. and multi-national forces in Somalia had to create a stable enough environment in which to conduct the humanitarian portion of the mission, so initial intelligence requirements were oriented to discerning the major threats to carrying out relief operations and threats to U.S. forces (force protection). Again, commanders needed a good knowledge and understanding of the culture and general situation. This was, however, lacking. Much of the general information available in open source was outdated. The first U.S. units went into Somalia knowing very little about the faction forces, their relationships with each other, capabilities and limitations of those forces, or their attitudes toward foreign forces on Somali soil.⁴¹ This basic understanding of cultural attitudes did not improve sufficiently enough over the next ten months to prevent miscalculations in estimating the situation. A review of the Somali reaction to the Ranger operations in October 1993 shows we did not have a good understanding of the Somali warrior ethos.⁴²

Developing detailed situation awareness was one of the biggest challenges facing U.S. forces in Somalia. Initial intelligence requirements focused on determining the capabilities of the factions / clans, their organization and leadership, and level of training. Understanding the clan structure was
especially critical in Mogadishu and Kismayo because violent inter-clan warfare occurred in those areas, and they were also key operating areas for U.S. forces. Other priorities for collection included information on "rogue gangs", arms caches, arms markets and the location of "unauthorized" weapons. Additionally, the procurement of "targetable intelligence" (the location of specific arms caches, for instance) was extremely difficult.43

The Somalia operation vacillated between its "stabilization" and "humanitarian" phases throughout. In the humanitarian portions of the operation, information concerning the location of wells sites, schools, markets, hospitals, churches / mosques, and police stations became important as forces attempted to help restore infrastructure to facilitate the relief operation.44 During these phases, road status and medical intelligence concerning the status of the population was also important. The importance of threat data - prospects of clan-on-clan violence or terrorist acts - never diminished because it was needed for both successful humanitarian and force protection operations. As we have seen in the Bosnia and Haiti cases with regard to force protection, performing intelligence to support this function was more akin to doing good police detective work than classic intelligence work. The J2 had to track crimes and "bad guys" that were potential threats to U.S. forces.45
HUMINT proved to be the most valuable source of information in satisfying intelligence requirements. The Marines established low-level source operations using tactical CI / HUMINT teams shortly after arrival in country and these formed the backbone of their HUMINT effort. These teams "saturated the areas at the grass-roots level." Foot, motorized and mechanized patrols, debriefs of pilots, debriefs of drivers / commanders in truck convoys and meetings with members of non-governmental organizations augmented tactical CI/ HUMINT team operations. National capabilities did not provide very detailed or accurate HUMINT of relevance to the tactical commander, perhaps because of focus, access, or both. The orchestration of the HUMINT effort was a continuous challenge, and no automated means to facilitate it existed.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing cases demonstrate several conclusions regarding intelligence requirements, collection and analysis in MOOTW. First, the commander on the ground must have a good understanding of the culture he is operating in as well as broad and regional situation awareness. This includes (in addition to the more traditional areas such as knowledge of the weather, enemy and terrain) an understanding of the history of the area, demographics, customs, mores, and the political and criminal as well as military situation. More importantly, he must understand
how these interact to produce effects. In regions like Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and the Middle East, this can be extremely complex. Our own difficulty in relating to and understanding non-Western culture only makes this process more challenging.49

Much of this regional information can come from open source. The UN, World Bank and other international agencies will generally have up-to-date economic information, for instance.50 The U.S. or other nations’ foreign services may have experts on the region of interest. Additionally, academia should not be ignored; many universities, colleges, and “think tanks” have scholars who have spent years studying some region, country or area. They can usually provide insights that only come from long study or experience.

Second, the commander must develop a detailed knowledge of the situation in his particular area of responsibility. This will include detailed knowledge of the factions, tribes, clans, families, political organizations, military and paramilitary organizations, criminal organizations, government structure and their leaders, as appropriate. Understanding the manner in which all of these organizations or individuals interact is more critical to situation awareness than understanding a “who’s who” laundry list. Ultimately, the commander needs an understanding of the intentions of these groups, how they will react to each other and how they will react to friendly forces and actions.
In MOOTW, collection of the relevant information is dependent mainly on HUMINT. Highly technical approaches are not as useful, both because the level of sophistication of the target usually does not lend itself to these means, and because technological advances and their widespread availability (commercially available encryption, for example) render some disciplines like SIGINT less lucrative.

Low-level source operations are the bread and butter of MOOTW. Elicitation, debriefs, screening operations and threat analysis of the results were premier in each of the cases examined in this paper. HUMINT reporting via interpreters, official contacts, tactical CI / HUMINT teams and first-hand observation proved to be the best consistent sources of intelligence.

This fact has resource implications for the current Army and the Army After Next. HUMINT operations, inexpensive compared to high technology approaches, are time and personnel intensive. It takes time to make personnel familiar with an area and its people and to develop a rapport. Better automated analytic support tools should be developed to support HUMINT operations. Often, making sense of the situation in MOOTW is more like conducting police work. Detailed personality files and “mug books” should be constructed to cover key leaders and organizations. “Link analysis” software for use by the military should be developed. This software should have the capability to automatically make
and display relationships between persons and organizations based on HUMINT reporting. Currently, our analytic software is good at sorting enormous volumes of highly formatted data, but we have little capability to deal with analyzing human and organizational relationships in an automated way. We must be capable of dealing with "dynamic complexity", which emphasizes patterns and interrelationships versus "detailed complexity", which is more like mixing ingredients for a recipe or taking inventory.\footnote{51}

Finally, a comment on implications that all of this has for the way we organize and train to conduct analysis. Our doctrine advocates "all-source" analysis, yet our intelligence organizations frequently have only small all-source analysis sections.\footnote{52} Most of our intelligence organizations' structures are still largely functionally based (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, collection management, dissemination, targeting, etc.). More resources must be devoted to all-source analysis that discerns and predicts the effects of interactions of complex variables (i.e., dynamic complexity). Additionally, we must get away from producing "systems experts" who monitor the input for automation that will, theoretically, produce an electronic "snapshot" of the battlefield that requires very little intuitive analysis. This may be somewhat useful in conventional war when we had "doctrinal templates" against which to compare the "snapshots." It will not work in a complex MOOTW environment.

Word Count=5,847
APPENDIX 1

Intelligence Requirements to Support Military Operations Other than War

This appendix outlines intelligence requirements critical to support selected MOOTW operations, as determined in this paper from the preceding case studies. First are listed those general requirements for intelligence that serve as a knowledge base that all leaders should have prior to commencing operations. These may be satisfied from a variety of sources, to include country studies, open source intelligence (OSINT) sources (local newspapers, radio broadcasts, television, publications), as well as academia.

The second list comprises more operation-specific intelligence requirements. These requirements are also more area specific. It should be noted, however, that there is some overlap (similarity in requirements) from one operation to the next.

These lists are not all-inclusive. Taken together, however, these lists serve as a general guide for what should be known or what should be collected to support MOOTW operations. Priorities and emphasis will vary from operation to operation.
Section 1 - General (Background) Requirements

Significant history (historical events with significant bearing on current issues and culture)

Political system, organization and leadership of country

Economic issues

Sociological information (general information on health, welfare, education, culture, crime)

Geography

Demographics (especially issues concerning ethnic makeup and location)

Military, paramilitary and police force(s) composition, disposition and capabilities

Section 2 - Operation Specific Intelligence Requirements

Support to Insurgency / Counterinsurgency

Identify the insurgent movement, its location(s), history, structure, membership (to include details on leadership, trainers, logistics personnel, staff and recruiters)

Identify what motivates the movement (its “cause”)

Identify forms of warfare the insurgents will engage in

Identify the strategy of the insurgents

Identify any outside support for the insurgents

Determine the extent of popular support for the insurgents and the extent of collaboration by the local population or government with the insurgents
Determine government responses to the insurgents and their effectiveness

Develop detailed knowledge of the LOCAL situation and culture (insurgent organization structure, family structure, "real" leadership / power structure in towns or villages)

Determine sanctuary locations, infiltration routes in and out of towns, villages, bases of support

Determine sources and amount of support (both material and non-material)

**Peacekeeping**

Determine political organization, composition, disposition, capabilities and leadership of each belligerent group

Determine extent of commitment of each party to truce (who will likely violate the peace, when and why?)

Determine attitudes of belligerents toward peacekeeping forces

Understand overall political situation and track it

Determine potential effect of political actions (both inside and outside country) on belligerent actions

Determine effect of peacekeeping force actions on belligerents

Determine sources and amount of local and outside support for belligerents, (material and non-material)

Determine local populace reaction to peacekeeping force actions
Political and religious beliefs that affect belligerents
Identify "hot spots" (based on contentious issues) where violence may erupt and determine effects

Peace Enforcement

Determine political organization, composition, disposition, capabilities and leadership of each belligerent group (conventional and paramilitary)

Determine extent of commitment of each party to peace agreement (who will likely violate the peace, when and why?)

Determine police structure, leadership and practices

Determine political party leadership, structure, objectives, strength of convictions and activities

Determine refugee activity, organizations and leadership

Determine current economic and DPRE situation

Determine organization and influence of criminal organizations and their activities and influence on local political, military and police organizations

Collect and analyze "election intelligence" (demographics, DPRE status, political party agendas, candidates, how elections can be sabotaged or manipulated and who has interest in doing so, attitudes of voters / workers)

Determine extent of commitment of each party to truce (who will likely violate the peace, when and why?)

Determine attitudes of belligerents toward peacekeeping forces
Understand overall political situation and track it
Determine potential effect of political actions (both inside and outside country) on belligerent actions
Determine effect of peacekeeping force actions on belligerents
Determine sources and amount of local and outside support for belligerents, (material and non-material)
Determine local populace reaction to peacekeeping force actions
Political and religious beliefs that affect belligerents
Identify "hot spots" (based on contentious issues) where violence may erupt and determine effects

**Nation Assistance**

Determine if a military (or other) threat exists
Determine organization and influence of criminal organizations and their activities and influence on local political, military and police organizations
Determine level of popular support for paramilitary or criminal organizations
Determine who might be responsible and reliable future leaders
Collect and analyze "election intelligence" (demographics, DPRE status, political party agendas, candidates, how elections can be sabotaged or manipulated and who has interest in doing so, attitudes of voters / workers)
Identify "hot spots" (based on contentious issues) where violence may erupt and determine effects

**Humanitarian Assistance**

Determine threats to relief operations from military, paramilitary, police or criminal elements

Determine attitudes of populace toward relief efforts / forces / governmental / non-governmental organizations

Determine law enforcement agencies and capabilities

Determine (if appropriate) tribe, clan and sub-clan affiliations, motivations, and leadership

Identify "opinion-makers" and other influential members of the local population

Identify "hot spots" (based on contentious issues) where violence may erupt and determine effects

Identify locations needed to help restore infrastructure such as well sites, schools, markets, hospitals, churches / mosques, and police stations

Obtain medical intelligence (nutritional status and needs of population and medical threats to population and relief forces)
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 13-4 to 13-8.

3 Ibid., 13-0.


7 Department of the Army, Army Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army), 8. The five mission areas that contain doctrinal MOOTW missions are: Punitive Intrusion, Conflict Containment, Reassurance, Core Security, and Humanitarian. The remaining two non-MOOTW mission areas are Defending or Liberating Territory, and Leverage.


9 Intelligence requirements are defined in FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, as “requirements for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge and understanding of the battlefield or threat forces.” These requirements are further broken down into priority intelligence requirements (PIR), which are requirements associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the command’s mission, and information requirements, which are intelligence requirements of a priority below PIR. The term “intelligence requirement” as used in this paper is intended to encompass the broadest sense of the term. See Department of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, FM 34-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 September 1994), G6-G7 for definitions.

11 According to FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, p. 2-3, there are three "categories" of intelligence: strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic intelligence generally concentrates on the national political, economic and military considerations of states or nations and supports the formulation of strategy, policy and military plans at the national level. Operational intelligence supports the planning and execution of major campaigns and operations. Tactical intelligence supports the execution of battles and engagements and provides the tactical commander with intelligence he needs to employ combat elements against enemy forces. In MOOTW, the distinctions between these categories often becomes blurred, or the same intelligence can have strategic, operational and tactical implications simultaneously. It is seldom a clear-cut or even useful distinction in analysis.

12 O’Neill, 17-50. According to O’Neill, there are seven types of insurgencies (anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist), three types of warfare (terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare), and four strategies (conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military focus, and urban warfare).

13 Ibid., 53, 70, 90, 111, 125. The environment includes the physical dimensions (terrain, climate, infrastructure) and the human dimension (demography, socioeconomic conditions, culture). Popular support relates to how much support the insurgency has from people within the country and whether it is passive or active. Organization and unity relate to how the insurgency is organized and functions and its cohesion. External support means just that; how much and from where the insurgency gets external support. Finally, government response refers to how the government is dealing with the insurgency; what actions it is taking to directly and indirectly counter the insurgency and how effective they are. All of these factors essentially outline requirements for certain knowledge, which if unknown are intelligence requirements. They compare favorably with the outline of intelligence requirements at Appendix 1.


15 Ibid., 193.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Review of the Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon, 32.

Bolger, 180; Roy Gutman, “Battle Over Lebanon”, Foreign Service Journal (June 1984), 32; Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Situation in Lebanon and Grenada: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 8 November 1983, 51-52.


This section of the paper is focused on 1st Infantry Division / Task Force Eagle’s (TFE) operations in northeastern Bosnia and is based on the experience of the author who served as the TFE G2 from September 1996 – June 1997. The issues discussed are similar to those confronted by the other two multi-national divisions in Bosnia.

United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (New York: United Nations, 1992), 20. To give one example of the way these paramilitaries crossed the military, criminal and political lines, take the case of the leader of “Arkan’s Tigers.” Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan was wanted for bank robbery in a number of countries and
was on the payroll of the Yugoslav Secretariat for Internal Affairs (secret police). He put together a paramilitary organization, working under the Serbian Ministry of Interior, that engaged in ethnic cleansing and pillaging of towns in Eastern Slavonia and later in eastern Bosnia at the beginning of the war. After the war, he remained engaged in criminal activity but was also a candidate for political office in Republika Srpska. His campaign posters could be seen everywhere in Brcko, Bjeljina and Zvornik.

Task Force Eagle is a pseudonym for Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) which has responsibility for northeastern Bosnia. MND(N) consists of a U.S.-led force comprised of U.S., Turkish, Russian and Nordic-Polish major subelements.

28 Brcko is strategically important to the Bosnian Serbs because it sits astride the six kilometer wide Posavina Corridor that links the eastern and western portions of Republika Srpska (RS). The loss of Brcko to Bosniac control would, in the Serb’s eyes, cut the RS in half and make the western RS vulnerable to destruction. During the war, the Bosnian Serbs likened the Posavina Corridor to a tube that supplied oxygen to a person in danger of suffocation, to cut it would kill the person. The Bosniacs are equally passionate about Brcko. For them, it is first and foremost an issue of justice. They do not believe Serb ethnic cleansing should be rewarded by allowing them to retain the city. There is also the practical matter of thousands of former Brcko residents who desire to return to the city. Additionally, the Bosniacs claim Brcko is an economic lifeline to Europe through its port facilities on the Sava River. For a good discussion of the issues involved in the Brcko arbitration process see Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Brcko and the Future of Bosnia: Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C., December 10, 1996).

A Bosniac return in November 1996 to former homes in a small area on the Serb side of the zone of separation (ZOS) called Gajevi was supported by armed Bosniac soldiers in civilian clothing. The Bosnian Serb police blocked the return and fired on the Bosniacs. SFOR troops intervened, separated the two groups, and turned the Bosniacs back pending a review of the status of the Bosniac returnees. As a consequence for their illicit participation in this activity, the local Bosnian Bosniac unit’s weapons were confiscated and destroyed by SFOR and the unit was forced to relocate farther away from the ZOS. Serb police, who were only minutes away from being fired on by SFOR
attack helicopters when they backed down, were warned against further hostile reactions.

30 The Bosniacs politicized the return process by seeking to re-establish communities in areas that were the most sensitive to the Serbs. These areas included the suburbs of Brcko, the heights overlooking the Drina River Valley (a strategically important area for the Serbs because the RS could be cut in half in that area), and the Doboj area, which is adjacent to ground the Serbs consider holy. The Serbs reacted by blowing up former Bosniac homes, resettling former Bosniac areas with Serb refugees and displaced persons, bureaucratic stalling and police harassment. These actions by the Serbs naturally made them appear as the major impediment to the implementation of the DPRE provisions of Dayton.

31 The cases of Gajevi and Doboj are examples. Gajevi was both a success and failure. After the initial trouble in Gajevi (see footnote 43, above), 36 families representing approximately 168 people attempted again to return to their homes in January 1997. A bridge that allowed building material to be brought into the area was destroyed and building materials were also destroyed. Reconstruction was resumed in February under the watch of SFOR troops. On 2 March, however, the Bosnian Serbs mobilized a “civilian” crowd from a nearby town that marched on the Bosniacs, beating them and routing them from their attempts to assemble pre-fabricated housing. Eleven houses were burned. On 11 March 1997, the Serbs burned the remaining two Bosniac houses. TFE was unable to predict or prevent the Serb “civilian crowd” action on 2 March, but was able to avert problems on at least one occasion after 11 March as a result of specific HUMINT. Doboj is a city in the western portion of the RS that guards access to the Ozren region, ground the Bosnian Serbs consider sacred. As part of a comprehensive analysis of the DPRE problem in the TFE area of operations, the Doboj area was identified as one of the most sensitive and problematic areas for DPRE return. As a result of this analysis and comprehensive monitoring of the situation, TFE was able to prevent any major problems from occurring in the area, even as the Bosniacs moved back into several villages that potentially threatened Serb control of the area.

32 Airborne reconnaissance and surveillance provided broad area characterization and helped confirm withdrawal of heavy weapons early in the operation, and UAV platforms such as Predator are still a valuable tool today. The UAV is especially helpful in augmenting the weapons storage site inspection program or in surveilling a potential trouble spot, to provide “eyes on” an area. The most reliable and responsive form of immediate
surveillance, however, was still HUMINT, in the form of “scouts” in AH-64 attack helicopters that could react to a situation quickly, get eyes on it and report back. They had the added benefit of being able to record what they saw - day or night - on gun camera video that could be reviewed on the ground later. Sophisticated sensors such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were of little use after the demilitarization phase of the operation. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) suffered from a number of limitations, including terrain and availability of linguists, however, the factions also employed good COMSEC and OPSEC procedures and after separation the amount of radio traffic decreased dramatically. Often, the military used courier or land line for important communications. Additionally, commercial encryption software (such as PGP) is readily available, making many communications secure. For additional unclassified information on the use of airborne and other sensors in Bosnia see Zachary Lum, “Balkan Eyes: Airborne Recon Over Bosnia,” Journal of Electronic Defense, vol. 18, no. 11 (November 1995), 52-57.

33 This included: TFE leaders who routinely met with FWF military commanders and local civilian and police officials; TFE civil affairs personnel who attended DPRE meetings run by the UNHCR to facilitate the return of DPREs to their former homes; the TFE POLAD who interfaced with a wide variety of local civilian leaders; International Police Task Force (IPTF) elements that worked with the faction police; and even non-governmental and private volunteer organizations (NGOs and PVOs) that dealt with the population in general.


35 LTC(P) Frank B. Bragg, former G2 of 10th Mountain Division and J2 of Task Force 190, interview by author, 29 January 1998.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Denver E. McPherson, “Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti,” Military Intelligence (April-June 1996), 45-46.

A review of the accounts of the raid and the Somali reaction shows that the Somali reaction was unanticipated. This is further confirmed by the experience of the J2 of the Joint Task Force, U.S. Army LTC(P) Charles Sardo: "On 3 October, we realized (the US) that we miscalculated regarding the Somali warrior ethos - this was a warrior society [as] so aptly pointed out by the US ambassador to Kenya in Nov. 92...We missed the boat...when the Rangers got caught in a desperate urban short-knife fight, the Somali response - with one exception - was unanticipated." This assessment comes from LTC(P) Charles Sardo, former G2 of 10th Mountain Division and J2 of JTF in Somalia <sardoc@carlisle-emh2.army.mil>, electronic mail message to author <rappj@carlisle-emh2.army.mil>, 10 February 1998.

Rababy, 41; LTC(P) Charles Sardo, electronic mail message to author, 10 February 1998.

Rababy, 42.

LTC(P) Charles Sardo, electronic mail message to author, 10 February 1998.


Rababy, 41; LTC(P) Charles Sardo, electronic mail message to author, 10 February 1998.

LTC(P) Charles Sardo, electronic mail message to author, 10 February 1998. There was no automated means to ensure that sources were properly registered and not duplicated and no automated means to assist in analysis existed. Additionally, reporting was done without the aid of computer-generated reporting formats which are common today.


Department of Defense, Office of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, White Paper: Intelligence Support to Operations Other

51 Peter M. Senge defines dynamic complexity as "situations where cause and effect are subtle and where the effects over time of interventions are not obvious." (Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 71.) Laura J. Snider, in an excellent assessment of the IPB process with respect to humanitarian operations, concludes that the process is too linear-oriented (detailed complexity) to be adequate for humanitarian operations. (Laura J. Snider, "An Assessment of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance Operations" (MMAS Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., 1995), 42-43.) Her conclusions with regard to the analytic process and humanitarian operations have validity with respect to many MOOTW operations.

52 Department of the Army, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, 2-16 and 2-17. The intelligence cycle consists of "plan and direct", "collect", "process", and "produce." Analysis is a sub-task of "produce," and the manual states that at the tactical level, there may be little difference between processing and producing. This is not the case in MOOTW, but the FM's bias toward high-tech automation and production of products that are the result of little analysis is evident in its description of the intelligence cycle.
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