FORTY YEARS OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY
AN INTERVIEW WITH LTG (R) EDWARD HONOR

BY

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19980427 171
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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An Interview with LTG (R) Edward Honor

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Forty Years of Strategic Mobility -- An Interview with LTG (R) Edward Honor

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 2 March 1998      PAGES: 36      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper is an extract of the interview conducted by the author with LTG (R) Edward Honor in November and December 1997. The interview was conducted under the purview of the Senior Officer Oral History Program (SOOHP) administered by the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The focus of the interviews and, therefore, this project, was the first hand observation of events that have impacted on the development of Strategic Mobility policy and procedures. The career of this distinguished transportation officer spanned 35 years of active duty, culminating with his assignment as the Joint Staff J4. During his career the U.S. Army evolved from a forward-deployed force oriented on our Cold War enemies to a Power Projection Army with worldwide focus. His view of how this occurred is the essence of this project.
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THE BEGINNINGS

The art of strategic mobility has been practiced since the beginning of recorded history. Examples abound throughout history of Armies preparing unit equipment and personnel for an excursion well beyond the confines of their home nation-state. Certainly, Thutmose III demonstrated a well-developed grasp of the art as he deployed his Egyptian forces from the inside the Wall of Princes all the way to Northern Palestine to eject a coalition of Canaanite-Syrians from their occupation of the strategically important citadel at Megiddo. Although by today's standards the distance, about 250 miles, would only be considered an operational level maneuver, in 1479 B.C. it was an extremely long reach. What makes this movement notable is the fact that it is the first time in history that sufficient details of an operation have been recorded to demonstrate a state's use of military power as an instrument of a clearly articulated national defense policy.¹

The exploits of subsequent conquerors are rife with examples of deployment to foreign theaters to apply military force. Alexander used both land and sea modes to deploy and sustain his forces around the Mediterranean basin and the Persian Gulf
region. The armies of Richard the Lion Heart and other Crusaders before him deployed across an entire continent to conduct military operations in the Holy Land.

Our own American history is replete with deployments of U.S. forces abroad to achieve national objectives as part of a larger national defense strategy. Perhaps the earliest example is the deployment of the Fifth Corps across Daiquiri Beach, Cuba in late spring, 1898. Our expeditionary exploits of the 20th Century from the belated entry into World War I through the global deployments of World War II to the "logistical marvel" of Desert Shield/Desert Storm are well documented. Volumes of first hand accounts and official records have been published of strategic deployments from our history, however, it is a rare individual who has experienced, from key observation points, what is arguably the most evolutionary period in the development of our strategic mobility capability.

From the late 1950s to the present, LTG Ed Honor has been in a position to observe and participate in key events that have shaped our doctrine, policy, and execution of the projection of military power abroad. As we evolved from an Army with a cloudy deployment mission through the trials and excesses of the Vietnam period to the current role of Power Projection Army of the
world’s remaining superpower, General Honor was there, right in the middle of those history making and future shaping events. My interview with General Honor as part of the U.S. Army Military History Institute’s Senior Officer Oral History Program has been an extraordinary opportunity to extract observations and anecdotes of the events of the time from this superb officer and transporter. What follows is a chronological summary of his recounting of those events to me.

**EARLY CAREER**

Ed Honor experienced Army Transportation long before he entered active service. As a child growing up in Sunset, Louisiana, he recalls how a cousin who was in the Army assigned to Fort Polk, Louisiana near the end of World War II would be allowed to sign out a 2 1/2 ton truck to take on liberty. The cousin and other accompanying soldiers would "...come down to our home and park the truck in the yard and they’d go out and raise hell until Sunday evening and then go back to camp. Well, I was really the big boy in the neighborhood. I had a damn real Army truck in my yard that everybody could play over."

The fact that Gen Honor would be commissioned a Transportation Officer was partly determined by his selection of a university. Long before graduating from high school, he had decided to attend
Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Southern University's ROTC program, like a handful of other universities at the time, had an affiliation program with the Transportation Corps which meant a commission in the Transportation Corps for the graduates of the program. And like all other Regular Army officers of the period, he would serve a combat arms, in his case, Armor, detail prior to ever working in the Transportation Corps. Even as a young Armor officer, he would be exposed to strategic mobility planning at the unit level.

An additional duty of lieutenants in CONUS units was that of loading officer. The rough equivalent to the modern day unit movement officer, the duties entailed development and maintenance of unit level plans for the movement of unit equipment to a designated water port. Units were required to be adept at reducing unit equipment for shipment as well as maintaining detailed rail load plans, convoy requests, and individual vehicle load cards. For those lucky enough to get it, installation level instruction was offered. For others, like most additional duties, the young officer learned by "self study." Validation of unit readiness for deployment came in the form of no notice "exercises" from U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM), the predecessor of U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM). "In those
days it was called CINCSTRIKE because he was the guy who had the deployment packages for the 82d, XVIII Airborne Corps and all the support units that went with it. If you were one of those support units, they would swoop down on you and do an inspection." Like other readiness inspections of the time, commanders were relieved due to poor showings on deployment readiness inspections.

CINCSTRIKE played a key role in the next major deployment that the U.S. Army would execute in the mid 1960s. The 11th Air Assault Division (AASLT) was formed at Fort Benning, Georgia in the early 1960s as the first Army Division built on the concept of mobility via helicopter. The Continental Army Command (CONARC), under the watchful eye of CINCSTRIKE, oversaw the formation and train-up of the 11th AASLT, which included a number of exercises designed to validate the air assault concept. Then Captain Honor was assigned to Headquarters United States Third Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia as a combat service support training officer and participated in Exercise AIR ASSAULT II at Fort Jackson, South Carolina in late 1964. It was also while he was assigned to this position that the 11th AASLT became the first major combat organization to be alerted for deployment to South Vietnam in 1965. The Division would be redesignated the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) prior to deployment. As a means of assisting the Division to deploy, Third Army sent a number of field grade officers to Fort Benning to assist the organization prepare unit equipment for the deployment. Honor was among the officers tapped for the duty.

The unusual aspect of this deployment was the choice of ship for transport of most of the Division's equipment. During this period, the majority of ships available to the military for deployment purposes were breakbulk vessels in the private sector the W.W.II vintage Victory and Liberty ships that were maintained as a reserve fleet. While helicopters certainly could have been deployed aboard those ships, a lot of disassembly would have been required and available space within the holds of the ships are somewhat restrictive. It was determined that aircraft carriers would be used for deployment of the Division's huge fleet of helicopters. The four "baby" aircraft carriers as they were referred to by the troops, were the USNS BOXER, KULA GULF, CROATON, and CARD. The BOXER had been converted to an Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH) in 1958. Most of the helicopters were loaded below deck, however, many were lashed to the flight deck and cocooned to prevent corrosion. Upon arrival in Vietnam, the helicopters were flown from the carriers. The significance of
this deployment was that it was the first time Army helicopters had been deployed via sealift, proving the viability of the concept. It was not until Exercise REFORGER 76 when the 101st AASLT Division was deployed to Europe that helicopters were moved on roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels on a large scale.¹

Deployment aboard RO/RO ships meant a much greater ease of handling which reduced exposure to damage and facilitated faster loading and discharge.

THE FIELD GRADE YEARS - VIETNAM

It was not long after that that Major Honor found himself headed for Vietnam. In the fall of 1965, he was reassigned to the 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) at Fort Eustis as the Group was preparing to deploy to Vietnam. "Went to Fort Eustis, joined the 507th and I have never seen so many TC majors and lieutenant colonels in all my life....So we developed some CPXs [command post exercises] and what not and put teams together to do some training before we deployed. Then the unit was deployed in small pieces because they were watching the numbers of people that could deploy to Vietnam during that time."¹⁰ Honor eventually deployed as part of the advance party aboard a C130 from Langley AFB, Virginia, on a flight that required five days of Pacific Island hopping to get to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. His
early duties involved the establishment of the 2nd Movement Region in Nha Trang.

After a few months, he was assigned to the Group’s Sealift Center in Saigon where he received his initial terminal operations experience and observed first hand the vagaries and inefficiencies of a “push” sustainment system. The Sealift Center was charged with calling ships forward to Vietnamese ports from forward locations in the Philippines and Okinawa. The ships’ loads had been determined weeks earlier by a teleconference between the 1st Logistics Command in theater and the Pacific Area Movements Priority Agency (PAMPA), a joint agency located at Oakland Army Base, California.

Once the ships were loaded, the vessel manifests were transmitted via autodin to the theater. It was the duty of the personnel in the Sealift Center to manually review the individual manifests to determine which ships had the most needed cargo and would therefore be called forward and discharged in sequence. Due to last minute changes in priority, it was not unusual for some ships to be only partially discharged before having to be moved back out “on the hook” to get to higher priority cargo on other ships, particularly ammunition. It was almost at the end of his tour in Vietnam that he learned one of the reasons for the shifting of priorities. At a conference at Hill AFB, Utah, he
learned that the 7th Air Force in Vietnam had been receiving specific directions from Headquarters, Air Force on what munitions to drop on specific days. "Well hell, they were telling them out of Washington what to drop on what days. That is why we had musical chairs on ships. You know, open them up, close them up -- horrendous challenge."

Honor returned to CONUS in November 1966 to attend Command and General Staff College with a follow on assignment to the Army Staff. As an action officer and later Chief, Personnel Movements Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), he experienced strategic mobility from a different perspective. The principal focus of the office was personnel movements to Vietnam. Working closely with USREDCOM, his office would represent the Army at regular conferences designed to develop and refine unit deployment lists. At these conferences, participants would verify unit equipment lists and assign strategic lift to the movement. "We'd finish that probably in a day's time manually, but we'd assign ships, tail numbers from military airplanes, the whole works. Then we'd turn it over to the guy that has to go back and key punch this stuff. They'd work all night getting that stuff ready for us. We'd go back in the next morning and just verify that yes, this is what we want
to do. So we finished that process in like a day and a half." This process would eventually become the current Time Phased Deployment Data (TPFDD) conference.

In May 1969 Honor returned to Vietnam where he commanded two truck battalions (36th and 24th) based at Cam Ranh Bay and was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Security, Plans, and Operations (ACofS, SPO) for the 500th Support Group. Upon completion of his combat tour, he was assigned to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) for the first of many assignments to what would become the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). It was in this assignment that he came in contact with an organization in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), J4 called the Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility (SASM). The SASM was a group of colonels and captains that worked strategic mobility issues for the Joint Staff. "[These] guys were real comers. They went off, they got command, they made flag...you had guys in that group like Delmar." The SASM would come to the forefront in the area of strategic mobility later in the 1970s. Even though Operations Plans (OPLANs) for the defense of Europe and the Korean Peninsula were on the shelf and regularly reviewed and refined, in 1970, the focus at MTMTS, as it was at the Army Staff and the Joint Staff, was on Vietnam.
MTMC AND WASHINGTON

Honor would spend the next five years in various positions before he would reenter the world of strategic mobility. While still in command of the 37th Transportation Group in Germany, the Transportation Terminal Group, Europe (TTGE) was realigned under MTMC. The MTMC commander, MG Delmar, requested that COL Honor assume command of the newest MTMC Area Command, so after only fourteen months in command of the 37th, Honor changed command and relocated to Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Two major events occurred during Honor’s tenure that would shape specific concepts of strategic deployment. In the fall of 1976, the theater hosted the largest REFORGER exercise to be conducted before or since. REFORGER 76 was the first time that a major deployment of helicopters had occurred aboard RO/RO vessels when the majority of the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) deployed into Central Europe through the port of Vlissingen. This period also saw the realignment of all the Mediterranean ports plus the Azores under the TTGE umbrella. This organization would remain intact for the remainder of the Cold War and would be the key to the successful deployment of the VII Corps for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

After giving up command of TTGE, COL Honor was reassigned to the U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) as the Director for Plans, Doctrine, and Systems. It was during
this assignment that the DOD wide command post exercise, NIFTY NUGGET was conducted. Designed to test mobilization plans, systems, and procedures of military and civilian federal agencies, the exercise was the first government-wide mobilization effort since W.W.II. Of particular note, NIFTY NUGGET evaluated cooperation between the DOD and other federal agencies during mobilization and deployment.  

The findings and recommendations in the aftermath of NIFTY NUGGET were to shape our mobilization and deployment processes than any other single event since the beginning of the Cold War. The exercise exposed major problems in resupplying the European theater in the event of a fast breaking attack by the Warsaw Pact. Honor was instrumental in identifying problems with visibility over and control of theater stocks and visibility of replenishment stocks in the pipeline. "So NIFTY NUGGET caused us to really look at things in a much more connected way, if you will. It brought us to the understanding that we really needed visibility of those items that we had in the field in case there was a requirement to redistribute. We knew what we needed to do, but there simply wasn't the capability to do it." The DARCOM staff had identified the need for total asset visibility (TAV)
but it would be many years before the technology to provide TAV would be viable.

There were two major recommendations from NIFTY NUGGET that are germane to this report: 1) The Transportation Operating Agencies should have a direct reporting chain to the JCS and 2) the JCS should establish a single manager for deployment planning and execution. To address these recommendations, the JCS formed the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) at MacDill AFB, Florida, in 1979. In addition, to remedy the grievous shortcomings in managing the execution of unit deployments that were brought out during the exercise, development of automated systems to assist managers with the deployment process was hastened. The products, the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS) were eventually merged into one system, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Most importantly, NIFTY NUGGET forced us as a community to look critically at ourselves and our capabilities to respond to a national emergency.

GENERAL OFFICER YEARS

After his promotion, Brigadier General Honor moved across town to become the Deputy Director for Planning and Resources, JS J4. In this position, he was able to continue to work some of the
NIFTY NUGGET issues, specifically in the area of medical supplies. A negative aspect of the formation of the (JDA) arose while he was working for the J4: the personnel spaces that were previously used to staff the SASM were transferred to the JDA. The result was an almost immediate loss of strategic mobility expertise within the joint staff. The loss of that brain trust is still being felt on the joint staff.

Another incident that was to occur while Gen Honor was on the Joint Staff was to have far-reaching implications. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran was to focus our attention on the increasing instability of the region and the subsequent failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt made our inadequacies in joint operations painfully obvious.

It was during this period that through the initiative and under supervision of the J4, negotiations began in earnest to preposition materiel in friendly nations in the region. Initially, the U.S. Air Force began the effort with prepositioning of airfield opening packages in the Sultanate of Oman. Later, common use sustainment items would become part of the theater war reserve stocks being prepositioned.

It was also during this period that one of the most critical strategic mobility acquisitions was made by the DOD. The Sealand Corporation had determined that it was no longer economically
feasible to sail the extremely fast SL7 container ships in liner service and offered to sell the eight vessels to the U.S. Navy. Sealand even offered to modify the ships to a RO/RO configuration prior to delivery. The Navy, however, was not interested and the ships would have been condemned had it not been for the persistence of the then Director of Logistics, Vice Admiral Kent Carroll. "So it started up the chain and quite candidly, Kent Carroll, who was the Director of Logistics, is the guy that really pushed it through." The result of his tenacity was the purchase of eight Fast Sealift Ships, the extremely fast RO/RO ships that earned such an incredible reputation during the Gulf War.

Other programs that were initiated during this period were the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU), the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS), and the C-17. In addition, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was formed and given Southwest Asia (SWA) as an area of responsibility (AOR). All of these initiatives can be attributed to our renewed interest in the Middle East and recognition of the area’s strategic importance.

Brigadier General Honor continued to work acquisition issues that were oriented toward deploying to and operating in SWA after
his assignment to DA DCSLOG as the Director of Resources and Management (DRM). It was the early years of the Reagan Administration and a renewed commitment to defense spending. Funding was becoming available for many of the back shelf programs that had languished for many years. Most notable from the strategic mobility perspective were the additions to the Ready Reserve Force and the continuation of force modernization efforts to improve our Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) capability. The Logistics Support Vessel (LSV), Landing Craft, Utility-2000 class (LCU-2000), and floating causeway systems were all acquisitions that were initiated during this period. In addition, realizing the need for close cooperation, the Army and Navy staffs began to meet regularly at the DCSLOG and OP4 level to hammer out joint deployment issues. Later on, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) were regular participants in these discussions.18

After two years on the DA staff, Honor was to be assigned to MTMC for the third time, now as the Eastern Area Commander, in August of 1983. Although only in command for eleven months, it was an intense period. The focus on SWA was evident in the pace of joint exercises oriented to rapidly deploying to and operating in the AOR. Joint exercises such as BOLD EAGLE and BRIGHT STAR
were designed with specific strategic mobility objectives. We first used an FSS, an auxiliary crane ship, and an OPDS with the vessel, American Osprey during this period and redeployments often ended with a JLOTS discharge. The intensity of the exercises, coupled with the massive force modernization efforts underway throughout the Army, was impacting on the ability of the Eastern Area terminals to support them. "Well, we were really understaffed out at all our terminals, particularly the ones where we were moving a lot of equipment through. We had relied a lot on contractors, but the terminal commanders also needed some people to help them manage the traffic through their terminals."

Honor's solution to preparing the terminals for the future was to improve staffing levels down at the terminals, implement industrial funding at overseas terminals, and effectuate closer coordination with MTMC headquarters for contract development. "So I got with the headquarters and I said, 'Look fellows, you guys do a great job, but us folks on the ground need to give you a little input on things that can be improved on those contracts...So those of us who are working on the ground have something that we can deal with.'" The improvements that were initiated during General Honor's watch at Eastern Area, such as realistic production factors and the occasional use of military
drivers and documentation personnel, would provide a measure of operational flexibility that would prove invaluable when flexibility was most needed -- during the Gulf War deployment seven years later.

Even though strategic mobility was not the most pressing issue in his next assignment as the Director, Transportation, Energy and Troop Support, DA ODSCLG, an event would take place that would shape a segment of our deployment process. In December of 1985, 248 members of the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) died when the chartered Arrow Air DC-8 that was returning them home to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, from their peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, crashed in Gander, Newfoundland.2 In the aftermath, then CSA General John Wickham was agonizing over corrective actions needed to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar disaster. At one point, Wickham stated that the Army would no longer move its people aboard commercial airplanes. "He called [Lieutenant General] Ben Register [DCSLOG] who was my boss at the time and said he wanted me to come up and talk with him. General Wickham has been more family oriented than any chief I've had the opportunity to work with. I said 'I'm sure he does not want to put families on the back of C141s.' The chief is talking quality
of life and man there ain’t no quality on the back of a C141. I just sat in his office and laid it out to him.”

The alternative Honor offered to the Chief was to intensify inspections of the carriers that choose to conduct business with DOD. Honor also arranged for the Military Airlift Command’s (MAC) Director of Operations, Major General William Overacker to brief Wickham and the Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Thurman. Overacker laid out the impact of the additional workload and the legal ramifications of MAC assets taking on a major passenger channel mission. General Wickham accepted the recommendations, “He was satisfied with that answer. We did it. It was just truly a gut wrenching time for the Army.”

THE BIRTH OF A UNIFIED COMMAND

As discussed earlier, the Joint Deployment Agency was charged with integrating the deployment activities of the services. Without any authority over the Transportation Operating Agencies or Unified CINCs, the JDA managed this process until 1987. Although the JDA can be credited with dramatically improving our strategic mobility posture over a period of eight years, a number of independent studies were pointing to the need for more coordination and cooperation among the services and CINCs. The report of the Packard Commission in February 1986 was the event
that got the ball rolling toward a establishing a "unified command to provide global air, land, and sea transportation."\textsuperscript{24} In anticipation of Presidential guidance, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe had established a flag officer steering committee to begin planning the implementation of a Unified Transportation Command.\textsuperscript{25} It was this steering committee that was to recommend implementation of an organizational structure that had been previously developed by a task force of the services' directors of transportation headed by the Joint Staff J4, Lieutenant General Al Hansen. "When I was the DTRETS, I was on the task force that worked the organization for TRANSCOM. Built the organizational structure and sat and argued out what the responsibilities should be."\textsuperscript{26}

In October 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was signed into law, which directed the Secretary of Defense to consider creation of a unified transportation command and removed the legal obstacle to consolidating functions of the military transportation commands.\textsuperscript{27} It was during this period that MG Honor was commanding MTMC. It was a period of rapid development of automated systems to assist transportation managers and warfighters with the deployment of forces. MTMC was developing the Worldwide Port System (WPS) and JOPS and JDS were soon to
become consolidated into one system called JOPES. The move away from centralized main frame computers to more client-server architectures would greatly enhance flexibility and expandability of the systems.

As the MTMC Commander, an Army major command (MACOM), MG Honor was a principal in the implementation of USTRANSCOM. In October 1986, he was preparing for a meeting called by GEN Wickham to discuss the organizational relationship of MTMC to the proposed USTRANSCOM. Up to that point, the flag officer steering committee had determined that CINCTRANS would be an Army billet. The evening before his scheduled meeting with the CSA, Honor received a call at home from the chief who "...asked me to come in early -- we need to talk about location of TRANSCOM. And he said, 'We've had a change in signals.' And that change in signals was the Army's desire to be the Special Operations Command four star as opposed to TRANSCOM. So Wickham and [the] Chief of Staff of the Air Force had done a little horse trading during the night." Gen Honor expressed concerns over the decision, but it was apparent that the issue was closed. At the end of the discussion, Wickham informed Honor that he intended to nominate him for promotion. "On the way out of the tank, General Wickham told me he says, 'I'm going to nominate you for your third star.' That was a down day in my life. Here I am in the
assignment I’ve always wanted -- been there four days, and he tells me he is going to promote me and move me out of there. I had two years to go and I really enjoyed MTMC. It took me by surprise." 28 Wickham was good to his word and Honor commanded MTMC for just nine months before he was promoted to Lieutenant General and became the Director of Logistics (J4) for the Joint Staff in July 1987.

It was in his final active duty assignment that LTG Honor, appropriately, was able to see the culmination of several strategic mobility initiatives. Arguably, the key event of the period was the establishment of the United States Transportation Command. On 10 April 1987, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger approved the proposed Unified Transportation Command (UTC) Implementation Plan. 29 Subsequently, on 18 April 1987, President Reagan directed establishment of the Unified Transportation Command 30 and the U.S. Transportation Command was formally activated on 1 July 1987. Initially, CINCTRANS’ authority over the services’ Transportation Operating Agencies was limited to wartime only. This limitation would offer unique challenges to the new command and make the process of standing up and establishing credibility more difficult. "During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, people really came to their senses. I
really credit old [LTG] Dane Starling with really beating the halls of the Pentagon to get the peace time missions also assigned to TRANSCOM..."³¹ The effort would pay off on 14 February 1992 when Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney approved the USTRANSCOM mission expansion to include transportation operations in peacetime.

Another significant initiative that achieved culmination while Honor was the J4 was the prepositioning program. While the prepositioning program continues to undergo refinements and will continue to as requirements change, the zenith of the program was the late 1980s. "On the good side there was the TRANSCOM stand up, ...increased prepositioning, increased agreements with countries out in the Middle East where we were going to go into harm's way. And actually seeing the materiel and equipment prepositioned out there, particularly when you're with this stuff from the start. In my case, I left the Joint Staff in 1981 when we were starting to do the construction for prepositioning and got back in 1987 to see a lot of these things come into fruition. The construction had been completed, finally. Those were really some high points for me."³²
RETIREMENT - JUST ANOTHER VIEW OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY

LTG Honor retired from active duty on 31 August 1989, but his involvement in strategic mobility continued. Immediately after retirement, Gen Honor took over the helm of the National Defense Transportation Association (NDTA), becoming the association's 25th president. His current battles are focused on fostering and maintaining that critical partnership between the Department of Defense and the private sector of transportation. It is widely accepted that the success of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM deployment is attributable to relationships that were developed as an adjunct to NDTA.

NDTA served as a catalyst to the development of the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) in the 1970s and the more recent National Airlift Policy. Within the last two years, NDTA has played a critical role with USTRANSCOM in the development of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), the CRAF-like agreement with the maritime industry to provide sealift capacity during conflict. The Sealift Committee of NDTA provided the mechanism to air out issues that needed to be addressed. "...the partnership there is greater than ever. Even on the truck side and again working through our committees because a lot of the issues that the carriers have, they are able to surface these
issues at these meetings. You have the responsible commanders sitting right there participating in the meeting."³³

In addition to the Airlift and Sealift Committees, there is a standing Surface Committee and Technology Committee. A Commercial Business Practices Committee is being formed and in 1998 NDTA will host the first Transportation Advisory Board. "An advisory board and we'd bring about ten executives in. We would bring in a scheduled airline, a nonscheduled airline, a large shipping company, a small shipping company, and we will sit around the table at that advisory board and try to draw ideas from them in various areas."³⁴

ASSESSMENT

Since the mid 1950s, we have experienced a remarkable evolution in our strategic mobility process. From CINCSTRIKE to CINCTRANS; from unit loading officers with hand drawn load cards to unit movement officers with automated equipment lists and the Global Transportation Network (GTN); from Victory ships to Large Medium Speed RO/RO ships (LMSR); from C-124 Globemaster to C-17 Globemaster; no aspect of deployment has escaped change. General Honor has been able to give us a first person account of this evolution and an insider's view of some of the historical events of the period. What is his assessment of where we are going?
"...what I want to say about the evolving of strategic mobility over the last 40 years. I believe it is on a good track now."

He believes that our partnering with industry, particularly the maritime industry, is on track and we must continually refine and nurture it. He believes the C17 is the right airlifter at the right time. "The C17 is certainly an enhancement to our mobility programs. With the C17 program, I believe that we have an airlifter for the 21st Century here." And finally, he believes that establishment of the United States Transportation Command provides an appropriate focal point for strategic mobility issues. "I believe that with the formation of TRANSCOM which took place in 1987,...we have a spokesperson for mobility and I expect that even in the future we'll continue on a steady track."35

The United States is better prepared to project force to trouble spots around the world today than it ever has been before. The fact that we have a Unified Command with the specific charter to manage strategic deployment is evidence of how seriously we take the force projection mission. There is still plenty of room for improvement in our capability. LTG Honor has been a key player in the right places at the right times to help us shape our deployment capability. Even after
retirement from active duty, he continues to play a key role by relentlessly pursuing improvements in the Defense/Industry partnership. There is, arguably, no other officer who has contributed more to our current ability to rapidly deploy than he.

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ENDNOTES


5 Honor, 37-38.

6 Ibid., 40-41.

7 Benjamin S. Silver, Ride at a Gallop, (Waco, Texas: Davis Brothers Publishing, 1990), 260.

8 Ibid., 271.

9 Honor, 363-365.

10 Ibid., 54.

11 Ibid., 62-64.

12 Ibid., 125.

13 Matthews, 1.

14 Honor, 184.
Matthews, 1.

Ibid., 21-22.

Honor, 195.

Ibid., 209.

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Ibid., 222.


Honor, 334-336.

Matthews, 2.

David Packard, An Interim Report to the President by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, (Washington, D.C., 28 February 1986).


Honor, 244.


Honor, 246.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, "Implementation Plan to Establish the U.S. Transportation Command," memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 10 April 1987.

31 Honor, 261.

32 Honor, 275.

33 Honor, 294-295.

34 Honor, 310.

35 Honor, 372-374.
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Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.