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THE CASE FOR REMOVAL OF U.S. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES FROM EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

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A number of circumstances have emerged since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 that tend to diminish the "value added" of U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces based in Europe. This paper examines these factors and concludes that U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces are no longer required for the security of Western Europe, provide a significant impediment to Russian-American cooperative engagement efforts and, as such, should be withdrawn.
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THE NEW EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult.

— Winston Churchill

The decade of the 1990's will be remembered as a time of tremendous change, highlighted by the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and of unparalleled opportunity for the leadership of the United States to advance American interests free of Cold War related impediments. For the first time in U.S. history, our nation has had the luxury of planning and executing a foreign policy free of the many complications presented by a peer competitor. The Cold War victory, however, has not been without some significant baggage. Many time-tested national defense related paradigms no longer apply. A number of old military-industrial relationships and concepts have been left by the wayside as the United States grapples with adapting its national security structures and strategy to the new geopolitical environment. Those Cold War relationships and concepts that appear to have some sort of value to the "new world order" remain as the Administration attempts to accommodate them within a new National Security Strategy.
One of the most perplexing issues facing United States foreign policy as it struggles to meet the challenges of a multipolar world concerns the long-standing U.S. commitment of non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNFs) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When founded in 1949, NATO was a "nuclear alliance", designed to counter the Soviet threat to member nations and relying upon U.S. nuclear weapons as a "...basis for collective defense and common security...." When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the only credible, large-scale military threat to the Alliance vanished with it. As a result, NATO's "collective defense" strategy, which relied heavily upon a credible Alliance nuclear policy, seems to have evolved into a de facto strategy of "selective engagement" in which member states may opt into or out of operations based upon their own national interests. The current NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly represent this trend.

A number of other factors have emerged since 1991 that tend to diminish the "value added" of NATO NSNFs:

- Global public opinion and a revitalized anti-nuclear movement have made justification of NATO's nuclear weapons progressively more difficult.

- Poor economic conditions have resulted in degraded Russian NSNF safety and security. In many ways, Russian tactical nuclear weapons are more dangerous than their strategic "cousins" because of the risk of early and/or unauthorized use and vulnerability to theft. Therefore, a reduction in the magnitude of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile is in the best interests of both NATO and the United States. Any attempt to reduce the size of these
Russian forces, however, must somehow be tied to a corresponding reduction in NATO's own NSNFs.

- Plans for enlarging NATO by granting membership to three former Warsaw Pact nations have raised the specter of NATO NSNFs being based five hundred miles closer to Russian territory. This, in turn, has served to increase Russian distrust of and opposition to NATO expansion.

- Budget cuts and force restructuring in virtually every Allied nation raise the question whether a continuing nuclear role is feasible for nations with nuclear certified squadrons, particularly Belgium, Italy and Greece.²

Given these substantial changes to the Global and European geopolitical landscapes and in the character of NATO itself, it is no longer good enough to justify the deployment of nuclear weapons based solely upon a Cold War-related strategy or in support of a Cold War-based alliance. Each critical decision, strategy, or commitment that shapes today's U.S. nuclear force structure and deployment posture must be carefully reexamined to ensure that the additional security it provides clearly outweighs the associated security risks. In the NATO context, the security benefits provided to members of the Alliance by U.S. NSNFs must clearly outweigh the security risks associated with their continued deployment to Europe. Further, these benefits should not be obtainable by any other means.

This paper attempts to support the hypothesis that U.S. NSNFs are no longer required for the security of Western Europe,
provide a significant impediment to Russian-American cooperative engagement efforts and, as such, should be withdrawn.

**U.S. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND NATO**

Non-strategic nuclear forces have played an integral role in support of the U.S. National Security Strategy since the early 1950's. During the last two decades of the Cold War, they were an important element of the NATO's "flexible response" strategy that called for the use of NSNFs as a means to help offset the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional forces, particularly in Europe.

As relations between the superpowers began to thaw in the late 1980's, significant efforts were made to reduce the inventory of U.S. NSNFs in Europe NATO in exchange for Soviet concessions. The first such agreement, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty of 8 December 1987, eliminated a whole class of NSNFs - intermediate range ballistic missiles (1000 - 5000km range). As a result of this treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union destroyed over 2500 missiles (U.S. - 859, USSR - 1752) during a three year period. More importantly, the Treaty also called for on-site inspections to ensure the compliance of both sides.

In September 1991, President George Bush, in recognition of the diminished threat posed by Soviet conventional
forces, ordered the unilateral withdrawal of all ship-based and overseas-deployed NSNFs.\textsuperscript{4} The only U.S. NSNFs excluded from this presidential order were 480 U.S. Air Force B-61 nuclear bombs, deployed in Europe and assigned to NATO, and their associated dual-capable aircraft (DCA) delivery systems.\textsuperscript{5} In a parallel announcement, President Mikhail Gorbachev took similar steps and ordered the redeployment of all remaining Soviet tactical nuclear systems to Russian bases. Unlike the 1987 INF Treaty, however, the 1991 NSNF reductions were voluntary and, as such, are not binding and are subject to change.

The remaining number of European-deployed U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons is believed to be relatively small. Today, it is estimated that the United States retains about 200 B-61 free-fall nuclear bombs on bases in Greece, Turkey, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom for delivery by NATO dual capable aircraft.\textsuperscript{6} Russia, for its part, is estimated to have about 1,100 air delivered tactical nuclear weapons deployed to Russian bases in Europe, with between 6,000 and 13,000 warheads in storage.\textsuperscript{7} Unfortunately, because the 1991 NSNF reductions were voluntary in nature, no verification or transparency regimes were developed to verify stockpile size and disposition. Furthermore, while approximate NATO NSNF levels are available to the public, official Russian figures remain
classified. A recent statement by Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe illustrates the magnitude of the problem:

...the United States and the Alliance on the one hand and the Russians on the other, have rather different ideas about what the counts are for the Russian force. That produces a discrepancy. The Russians say, no, your numbers are much too high. We have no way of knowing, but we are reasonably confident that the numbers were accurate. If, in fact, there has been substantial dismantlement that we don’t know about, that is a logical possibility. There may be issues of how weapons which are not currently deployed in an operational configuration are counted and how far back in the cycle you go. I will say that even if you make the most generous allowances, there is probably a substantial Russian advantage.⁹

A NEW NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR POST-COLD WAR EUROPE

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO quickly recognized that, while the fundamental purpose and basic principles of the Alliance remained unchanged, developments in Eastern Europe would “have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its [NATO’s] aims would be met in the future.”¹⁰ Accordingly, the Alliance undertook a comprehensive review of its strategy and announced its conclusions in a new Strategic Concept published in November 1991. On the subject of NSNFs, NATO said the following:

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option... A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war
prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{11}

The post-Cold War policy of the United States with respect to NSNFs and the Alliance is entirely consistent with that of NATO. The 1995 National Security Strategy committed the United States to the “current structure and deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces”\textsuperscript{12}, while Secretary of Defense William Perry, in his 1995 annual report to the President and the Congress, stated that:

...maintaining US. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation.\textsuperscript{13}

In an article for NATO Review Magazine, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe reiterated NATO’s earlier Strategic Concept, while adding:

The presence of ...U.S. nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. This will remain true after enlargement.\textsuperscript{14}

In essence, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and its associated security threat, NATO’s “new Strategic Concept” looks very similar to the Cold War version, at least with respect to
NSNFs. With this in mind, it is interesting to examine Allied NSNF strategy in an attempt to ascertain what security benefits these weapons bring to Alliance members that cannot be obtained by other means.

THE BENEFITS OF U.S. NSNFs IN EUROPE

Underneath all of the rhetoric associated with NATO and U.S. statements on the future of American NSNFs in Europe, there exists a recurring theme – NATO nuclear weapons have both a military and political purpose.

DETERRENCE AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

From a strictly military point of view, both the United States and NATO address NSNFs within the context of deterrence and of prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The importance of NSNFs to NATO’s success in either mission is questionable.

According to General Eugene B. Habiger, CINC USSSTRATCOM, deterrence rest on the following perceptions:

- First – that aggression poses unacceptable risks …
- Next – that no potential adversary will have the opportunity to inflict a disarming strike…
Finally - that any potential adversary will face an assured, significant and credible retaliatory capability.\textsuperscript{15}

Credibility seems to be the litmus test for NATO's NSNFs. Given today's heightened global sensitivity to nuclear weapons, it is difficult to envision an act of aggression short of a nuclear detonation which would provoke a NATO nuclear response. For the vast majority of WMD threats, therefore, new generations of precision, non-nuclear technologies provide the Alliance with a more credible basis for deterrence against regional threats than do nuclear weapons. For those situations in which a NATO nuclear response may be politically acceptable, use of offshore assets - U.S., United Kingdom or French submarine launched ballistic missiles - may be a reasonable alternative to land-based NSNFs. The United Kingdom already has decided to dismantle its own NSNF delivery capability in favor of deploying a sub-strategic TRIDENT missile system - a decision based upon both the longer range and enhanced precision of the submarine-launched ballistic missile system.\textsuperscript{16}

A second factor is the implicit assumption that WMD-related acts of aggression are originated by states - states that are rational actors who will choose the status quo before risking national suicide. This assumption probably is not valid when dealing with terrorists or with some regional actors.
Unfortunately, there is little solid data on the precise role of nuclear weapons in deterring chemical and biological weapons or in affecting the strategic calculations of non-Western leaders. Regional states motivated by messianic anti-Western zealots or by regime survival may well act differently, perhaps being more willing to risk annihilation for outcomes the United States would not consider "rational." While it is possible that U.S. nuclear weapons deterred Iraqi President Sadam Hussein from using his WMD against coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm, there is no reason to believe that they would provide an equally effective deterrent against rogue states such as North Korea, Iran or Libya.

Similarly, NATO’s plans to use NSNFs to prevent rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction appear to be faulty. There is no evidence that American nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, have ever slowed the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Quite to the contrary, rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea have gone to great lengths to acquire WMD in the face of U.S. nuclear weapons. According to at least one outside observer, General K. Sundarji of the Indian Army, one of the lessons of the Gulf War was that states planning to engage the U.S. in a regional conflict should first acquire nuclear weapons.
THE POLITICAL FACTOR

In Allied eyes, NATO’s NSNFs are primarily political weapons that strengthen the Alliance, thereby enhancing European security. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, is reported to have said that NATO's three purposes were to: "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." While perhaps not politically correct today, the statement serves to emphasize two very important political roles still played by U.S. NSNFs committed to NATO - (1) they are tangible signs of America's continued commitment to the Alliance and (2) they obviate the need for non-nuclear members of the Alliance to obtain nuclear weapons of their own. A final political rationale for deploying U.S. NSNFs to Europe is the notion that they increase Alliance cohesion through risk sharing and cooperation in nuclear weapons planning and command and control functions.

It is difficult to argue with success. The principles of commitment, counter-proliferation, and cohesion through risk sharing and integration have served NATO well for over 40 years. While these principles are arguably even more important today given the lack of a clear enemy against which to focus Alliance efforts, it is unclear that these unifying functions of NATO NSNFs cannot be accomplished via other means.

The argument that U.S. NSNFs strengthen the commitment of the United States to the defense of Western Europe probably is
flawed and, in any case, irrelevant. The supreme demonstration of U.S. commitment to NATO is the continued presence of 100,000 American service men and women throughout Western Europe.

Counter-proliferation is a very important political role associated with NATO NSNFs. The theory is that so long as Germany, the largest and richest nation in Europe, has a hand in the basing, political oversight and potential delivery of U.S. [NATO] NSNFs, it will not develop nuclear weapons of its own. According to one British speaker, "NATO is crucial to prevent nuclear proliferation, especially in Germany... It's the American [nuclear] guarantee that removes the need for Germany ... to have their own nuclear weapons."\(^{20}\)

The notion that NATO NSNFs are required to prevent Germany, or any other non-nuclear NATO nation, for that matter, from acquiring an indigenous nuclear weapons capability is short-sighted and naïve. All members of NATO have signed the indefinitely extended Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Under the terms of this treaty, signatories agree not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and, more importantly, submit themselves to transparency measures under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, even should U.S. NSNFs be removed from Europe, the umbrella of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would still cover Alliance members. Observers familiar with NATO nuclear planning
indicate that such a withdrawal could be combined with a restructuring of the NATO consultation process that would link European security more clearly with U.S. strategic forces. Intensified nuclear planning with nuclear and non-nuclear Allies could be part of this process.\textsuperscript{21}

The notion of "risk sharing" is Cold War related and may be of limited applicability today given NATO's current drift away from collective defense toward a de facto strategy of selective engagement. Implicit in the concept of risk sharing was the idea that all NATO nations would come to the aid of any member state subjected to a Soviet attack, including use of NATO NSNFs if required. Even non-nuclear nations could identify themselves with a nuclear response by providing transport, security or other logistic aid to the operation. By demonstrating a willingness to participate, each Alliance member theoretically shared a certain risk of Soviet preemptive or retaliatory attack. Today, given global anti-nuclear public sentiment and the lack of a clearly identified threat, it is unlikely all NATO nations would support a nuclear response to any type of aggression short of general war. Thus, the idea of Alliance risk sharing has probably outlived its usefulness, at least in the nuclear sense, barring the emergence of major regional threat to Europe.

In summary, while NATO's NSNFs still provide some security benefits to member nations, their military and political
contributions to the Alliance are less important than they were during the Cold War. Furthermore, it is clear that there are alternative methods available to strengthen the Alliance, deter aggression and counter the spread of WMD. While no single technique is capable of providing the same political and military security benefits as a shared nuclear commitment, an imaginative combination of other confidence building and deterrence methods may prove more politically acceptable and help ease East-West tensions.

GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

With the end of the Cold War came a radical change in global public opinion with respect to the utility of nuclear weapons. Whereas the Cold War made such weapons of mass destruction justifiable to many in the interests of national self-preservation, the demise of the Soviet threat has made nuclear weapons a much harder sell. Many individuals and nations not previously associated with efforts to “ban the bomb” have added a fresh, more reputable voice and a more compelling argument to the global anti-nuclear movement. One such group, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, appointed by the Government of Australia, found that:

Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to all humanity and its habitat, yet tens of thousands remain in arsenals built up at an extraordinary time of deep antagonism. That time has passed, yet assertions of their utility continue.²²
The commission went on to call upon the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China to take the lead and commit themselves to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Both General Lee Butler, USAF (ret), a former Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, and General Andrew Goodpaster, USA (ret), former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, added their distinguished voices to the anti-nuclear movement in late 1996 with a joint statement:

... We believe the nations that possess these weapons should take the necessary steps to align their nuclear weapons policies and programs to match the diminished role and utility of these weapons, and the continuing risks they involve, joining in reducing their nuclear arsenals step by step to the lowest verifiable levels consistent with stable security, as rapidly as world conditions permit...23

The nuclear weapons debate has even spread to the international legal community. On 8 July 1996 the International Court of Justice declared that the nuclear weapons states share "an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." It also found that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was illegal in every conceivable circumstance except, possibly, where the very survival of a state was at stake.24
CONCERNS FOR THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF RUSSIAN NSNFS

Many experts view Russia's increasing reliance on Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces since the end of the Cold War as a very dangerous development. This trend, overshadowed by successful strategic nuclear force reduction efforts, has resulted from Russia's attempt to cope with a growing inferiority in conventional military capability. A recent publication by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, for example, assesses NATO's current conventional superiority as three-to-one. Other Russian sources indicate that the gap in precision-guided munitions is about six-to-one compared to NATO; this gap is another reason often cited in favor of increasing reliance on Russian NSNFS.25 Unable to improve this situation with more military spending, Russia has attempted to compensate for conventional inferiority by abandoning its "no-first-use of nuclear weapons" policy.26 Unfortunately, this policy change tends to exacerbate a number of other factors that affect the safety and security of Russian NSNF forces:

- Physical and technical security
- The doctrine of pre-delegation
- Stockpile consolidation efforts
- Personnel and internal security problems27
PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL SECURITY

In a case publicized on the CBS newsmagazine, 60 Minutes, Former Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed generated public controversy when he alleged that the Russian government is unable to account for a number of small atomic demolition munitions. Despite strong denials by Russian defense officials, Lebed has stood by his statement; a former advisor to President Yeltsin, Aleksey Yablokov, has backed Ledbed's claims in testimony before a U.S. Congressional subcommittee.\(^{28}\) While this incident appears to be an isolated case, it serves to illuminate the concerns of many with respect to Russian NSNF security measures.

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate on 20 March 1996, John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence, indicated that "a knowledgeable Russian has told us that, in his opinion, accounting procedures are so inadequate that an officer with access could remove a warhead, replace it with a readily available training dummy, and authorities might not discover it the switch for as long as six months."\(^{29}\) Complicating the issue, most tactical nuclear weapons are relatively small, making them easy to transport and hide. In addition, unlike their U.S. counterparts, Russian tactical nukes are known to lack Permissive Action Links (PALs) which are designed to render nuclear weapons unusable to those without proper launch authorization.\(^{30}\)
THE DOCTRINE OF PRE-DELEGATION

The Russian doctrine of "pre-delegation" has its roots in the Cold War when, in order to increase the survivability of tactical nuclear systems, launch authorization codes were pre-delegated to local commanders during times of increased tension. This practice of pre-delegation continues today, thereby increasing the risk that a lower echelon commander will accidentally initiate a tactical nuclear weapon release because of a failure in judgement.

STOCKPILE CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS

Following President Gorachev's unilateral action in October 1991 to return Soviet NSNFs to bases in Russia proper, the Soviet Union began a long-term program to consolidate and dismantle its large tactical nuclear weapon stockpile. While this program was welcomed in the West, it has resulted in some unforeseen problems. Prior to 1991, the Soviets operated ninety nuclear weapons storage facilities, forty-three of which were within the borders of the Russian Federation; today, only thirty-eight remain. According to knowledgeable experts, these remaining Russian storage sites are operating at 167 percent capacity. The potential for lapses in security and safety measures as a result of this overcrowding clearly is great.31
PERSONNEL AND INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

Russia's painful transition to a market economy has had significant effects on every segment of Russian society. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Russian military. According to Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, the military's chronic lack of funding is "taking the armed forces to the brink of undesirable, and even uncontrollable, developments." \(^{32}\)

Dr. William C. Potter, in a testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, stated that declining military morale coupled with "the widespread disregard in Russia for law, pervasive corruption throughout the government, [and] the increasing reach of organized crime... encourages the plunder and sale of government property", including nuclear weapons. \(^{33}\) .

NATO EXPANSION AND NSNF BASING ISSUES

George Kennan, a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the architect of the U.S. Cold War "containment" strategy, has stated that:

...expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and
to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly
not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might
make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to
secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the START II
agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear
weaponry.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the reservations of Mr. Kennan and number of other
notable experts, NATO has decided to accept three former Warsaw
Pact members - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - as full
members of NATO. These nations, like the remainder of the
Alliance, will be protected by NATO's nuclear umbrella.
According to Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, the
"coverage provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
including its nuclear component, will also apply to new
members."\textsuperscript{35}

Before giving a green light to NATO expansion at the
Helsinki Summit on 21 March 1997, the Russians had focused on a
shifting set of arguments in opposing NATO expansion. One
argument they used persistently and vigorously was that the
proposed eastward expansion of NATO would bring nuclear weapons
too close to Russia's borders. In order to assuage this Russian
fear, the North Atlantic Council stated that:

...enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in
NATO's current nuclear posture, and therefore, NATO
countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear
posture or nuclear policy - and we do not foresee any
future need to do so."\textsuperscript{36}
Similar verbiage was included in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation of 27 May 1997. The Founding Act, however, fails to provide a legally binding guarantee; the new NATO members, like all other nations of the Alliance, are eligible to "join the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies and to participate in nuclear consultation during exercises and crisis." Furthermore, full membership in NATO includes the right to ask for the deployment of nuclear weapons as well as the obligation to accept their presence during wartime. Therefore, it is far from certain that NATO would abide by its statement during times of crisis or change in the European geo-political environment.

From the Russian point of view, the basing of NATO nuclear weapons in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic - 500 miles closer to Russian territory - would be exceptionally provocative. (One only has to imagine the effect on the United States were the Russians to make an analogous move and deploy NSNFs in Cuba.) Almost certainly, it would reinforce Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons and prompt the redeployment of NSNFs to Russian naval vessels as well as to forward bases in Belarus. Russia's former Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, for example, stated that, were NATO to expand, Russia's short-range nuclear weapons would be made operational again and implementation of arms control
treaties would be suspended. The dispersal of Russian NSNFs to forward deployed sites most certainly would complicate efforts to ensure the safety and security of a class of weapons that is vulnerable to unauthorized use or theft.

The ultimate goal of NATO's expansion is clear - an enlarged West that can defend itself, a stable security relationship with Russia, and a regional balance that minimizes the incentives to proactive conduct by any country. The potential for NATO NSNF deployment to Eastern Europe confuses an already complex process. The key for NATO is to find a means of satisfying security guarantees to its new members in a non-provocative fashion. According to the RAND Corporation, improving NATO's power projection capability will accomplish this objective while decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons:

Power projection can meet NATO's security needs at an affordable cost while signaling defensive intent... The outcome can be an enlarged NATO capable of defending itself with conventional forces, thus obviating any need for undue reliance on nuclear weapons.

**NATO BUDGET CUTS AND FORCE RESTRUCTURING**

According to NATO estimates, Alliance members will have to spend between $30 billion and $100 billion dollars to improve the militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO standards. When viewed in the context of the significant reduction in NATO member defense budgets since 1990, such a large
expenditure can only result in further Alliance belt-tightening. The budgetary problem may be exacerbated still further in a number of nuclear-capable nations such as Belgium, Italy and Greece which are having a difficult time meeting stringent monetary criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union. Given this situation, it is difficult to believe that many Alliance members will have the wherewithal to tie up scarce budgetary resources in a military capability - tactical nuclear weapons delivery and associated support functions - that is of such limited utility.

CONCLUSIONS

Neither the United States nor NATO can afford the cost of maintaining non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe. The associated political, military, and economic baggage is too great given the lack of a credible threat to the Alliance and, more importantly, the evolving nature of the Alliance itself; the benefits are too few. U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces should be withdrawn from Europe - but not before an effort is made to link their pullout to a reduction or elimination of Russian tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The greatest threat facing Europe today is not attack by a neighboring nation, but rather the potential loss or unauthorized use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. According to Graham
Allison, the Director of the Center for Science and International Studies at Harvard University, the magnitude of this threat will be perfectly clear the day after a catastrophe results from premature Russian nuclear employment or Russian nuclear leakage.\textsuperscript{43} The challenge for NATO and the U.S., then, lies in ensuring such an event never takes place. To this end, every effort should be made to control, and eventually eliminate, tactical nuclear weapons in Russia. As one author points out, the final utility of U.S. NSNFs in Europe "may be their role as a bargaining chip to induce the Russian Federation to eliminate entirely this category of weapons."\textsuperscript{44}
ENDNOTES


4 William C. Potter, "Next Steps in Nuclear Disarmament: The Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," 5 December 1996, available from <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/potterjapan.html>; Internet; accessed 27 September 1997. In September 1991, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev made parallel unilateral declarations that had the effect of (1) eliminating the entire U.S. inventory of ground launched theater nuclear weapons, (2) removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. surface ships and submarines, (3) removing all nuclear bombs from aircraft carriers, (4) dismantling and destroying many of these U.S. warheads, and (5) securing the reminder (submarine launched nuclear cruise missiles and air delivered bombs) in central "hedge" stockpiles in the United States. The Soviet Union took similar steps and redeployed all remaining tactical nuclear systems (air delivered bombs) to Russian bases.


7 "Estimated Russian Stockpile, End of 1996," June 1997, available from <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/nukenotes/mj97nukenote.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 February 1998. NATO estimates the total Russian NSNF active and reserve stockpile to be between 8000 and 16000 devices. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists lists 1,600 active warheads for delivery by 360 land-based aircraft and 600 active warheads for delivery by 240 naval aircraft. Additionally, it lists 1,000 active nuclear devices assigned to naval uses (mines, torpedoes and cruise missiles) which should have been withdrawn in accordance with the 1991 initiatives. In
1996, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced that Russia intended to complete implementation by 2000, but because the withdrawal was unilateral and without any transparency measures, it is impossible to verify.


11 Ibid. 247-248.


14 Walter Slocombe, Is There Still a Role for Nuclear Deterrence?”, December 1997, available from <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/review/articles/9706-07.html>; Internet; accessed 26 January 1998. The “Washington Treaty” to which Under Secretary Slocombe refers is the NATO founding document, “The North Atlantic Treaty”, signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949. Article 5 of this treaty states that “...an attack against one or more of them [Alliance members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...” It also provides for action as deemed necessary to “...restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”


16 Davis, Perry and Winner.

18 Ibid. 23. Although it is impossible to know with confidence why Iraq did not use its CW and BW, revelations late in 1995 by the Iraqi leadership indicate that Iraq’s decision was based upon fear that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of a BW or CW attack. This Iraqi concern stemmed from a direct U.S. warning that Iraq would suffer catastrophic consequences if it used BW or CW against the coalition.

19 Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 33.


25 Sokov.

October 1997. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, Mr. Blair stated that "...Russian security policy continues to shift toward emphasis on nuclear weapons. Russian planners rely more than ever on these weapons, on their widespread dispersal, and on their first use in a crisis." He further stated that one of the most disturbing trends is the "...growing expectation among Russian planners that they could be forced to initiate the use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons during a regional crisis involving NATO or China. This doctrinal shift abandoning their no-first-use pledge of 1982 became evident in Russia's draft military doctrine in May 1992, a shift confirmed by Russia's new doctrine officially promulgated in November 1993."

27 Lambert and Miller.


29 Lambert and Miller.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


35 Slocum.

36 "U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals, 1996-97."

37 Ibid.


41 Ibid.


44 Lambert and Miller.
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