COALITION TACTICS ON THE NAPOLEONIC BATTLEFIELD AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON UNITY OF EFFORT

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

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The mechanism for the operation of our military forces beyond the shores of the United States is the modern coalition—from the grand alliance of NATO to simple bilateral relationships. Understanding the dynamics of coalition warfare is important for a United States Military that often finds itself operating as the dominant member of any coalition it joins. One of the major considerations listed in the portion of joint doctrine which addresses multi-national coalitions is the concept of unity of effort. Current U.S. Army doctrine has long recognized the importance of unity of command. However, the latest drafts of the new Army keystone doctrine publication, FM 100-5, have upgraded the principle of unity of command to unity of effort. The efficacy of this change recognizes the realities of operations in a world of coalitions, transgovernmental agencies, and private organizations—all which find themselves often in league with our military as we strive to reach common (not always strictly military) objectives.

This monograph will examine two historical case studies from the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) in order to explore the relationship between tactical and doctrinal differences between different members of the same coalition. Specifically the effect of these differences on the unity of effort, both military and political, will be addressed. The first case study examines the coalition army of Marshal Suvorov at the battles of the Trebbia and Novi in 1799. The second example will move forward in time to the Russo-Prussian army of the spring of 1813 and its performance at the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen.

Although history does not provide us with exact recipes for implementing complex solutions in a complex world, it does provide a means to understand the dynamics of human behavior on a vast scale. The Napoleonic period represents a veritable laboratory of coalition warfare and provides a means of applying the lessons of a historical period to understanding the dynamics of coalitions. This period also coincided with perhaps the last truly profound Revolution in Military Affairs and as such its relevance to our current debates and doctrinal developments remains appropriate despite the vast technological changes we have seen. This is, perhaps, because the complex behavior of men is the one true constant in history.
Commander John Trost Kuehn

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I. INTRODUCTION

Understanding the dynamics of modern coalition warfare is important. United States joint military doctrine and the Army’s capstone operational doctrine are in agreement regarding coalition warfare’s significance, now and for the future. Both doctrines attest to the undeniable fact that United States military forces normally operate as part of a multinational coalition when deployed beyond the shores of the continental United States.¹ Coalitions are the mechanisms within which we have routinely operated in the past and expect to operate in the future.

The Napoleonic Era (1792-1799) represents a veritable laboratory of coalition warfare and provides a means to investigate, through the prism of history, the levels of warfare pertaining to coalitions. The period produced no less than seven anti-French coalitions. Within this context the era provides numerous instances of multinational leadership of integrated coalition units on the battlefield. Did differences in tactics and doctrine cause problems for the unity of effort of anti-French coalitions during the Napoleonic era? If the answer to this question is yes, then what were the effects of these problems—how did they influence the stability of these coalitions?

Joint Pub 3-0 lists six “considerations for multinational operations:” national goals, unity of effort, doctrine/training/equipment (hereafter called doctrine), cultural differences, management of resources, and national communications. This monograph will use the relationship between two of these considerations, unity of effort and doctrine, to investigate the thesis question raised in the previous paragraph.

Unity of effort simply refers to the commitment of coalition members to common objective(s). Doctrine refers to minimizing differences between different military organizations through common training and equipment while at the same time “matching missions with capabilities.”²

The critical importance of unity of effort as a consideration has been further supported and acknowledged by the recent change in the principles of war (now called principles of operations) outlined in the draft version of FM 100-5.³ Unity of effort has superseded unity of command in acknowledgment of the difficulty of achieving unity of command for operations that may encompass the civilian and military authorities of many nations. Indeed, the author’s examination of this principle across the spectrum of
Napoleonic conflict concluded that improved unity of effort among Napoleon's opponent's contributed substantially to a more effective and, ultimately, victorious coalition in 1813. Therefore, coalition warfare during the Napoleonic Era offers the opportunity to study the impact and dynamics of unity of effort at all levels of warfare—including the tactical level.

The doctrinal consideration also finds historic precedents during the Napoleonic period. The relationship between the unity of effort of a coalition of states and doctrinal differences over the tactical employment of combat troops may initially seem tenuous. However, when contemplating the revolutionary changes in tactics during the period, combined with the absolute necessity for unity that the erstwhile allies discovered they must have to oppose Napoleon in the field, the chance for problems arising over tactical or doctrinal differences seems likely.

A coalition's unity of effort might be considered within the exclusive domain of the operational and strategic levels of war and discounted at the tactical level by virtue of the size and control of the units contributed by various coalition members. Nations want their combat forces commanded, at the tactical level, by their own commanders, thus achieving tactical unity of effort via tactical unity of command. However, recent experience has shown that this sort of unity at the tactical level is not always possible, as in the tactical command of British and French divisions by the U.S. at the corps level during DESERT STORM.

Given the level of U.S. commitments, and the shrinking size of military resources, U.S. contributions to multinational coalitions will include smaller tactical units. One current example was the battalion task force provided for the Macedonian peace mission associated with the larger Bosnian operation. Examples such as this support a trend toward coalition structures composed of smaller tactical units. The day will come when, not enjoying the preponderance of force, it will prove politically expedient, or even mandatory, to place our forces under the command of another nation's military officer. Current policy, as listed in Presidential Decision Directive 25, already provides for this situation via the mechanism of operational control, with some significant limitations.

During the Napoleonic Wars this practice was routine. For example, Marshal Suvorov, a Russian, commanded a largely Austrian combat force at the beginning of the Second Coalition's Italian campaign in
1799. Suvorov’s chief of staff was Austrian and Austrian officers performed his operational and logistic staff functions.

The example of Suvorov’s campaign in northern Italy provides a methodology to examine the mix of multinational leadership and tactics on the Napoleonic coalition battlefield. Two case studies examining historical instances where significant (corps sized) units of one nation were under the leadership of the general of another nation with different doctrine, and by implication different tactics, will be examined.

Each case study will examine a different historic anti-French coalition. The first case study, not surprisingly, will examine two battles from Marshal Suvorov’s Northern Italian campaign of 1799—the Trebbia and Novi—both coalition victories. Suvorov’s campaign was fought as part of the War of the Second Coalition against Revolutionary France. It provides the example of two coalition partners with significant differences in tactics—Russia and Austria. Added to this dichotomy in doctrine between states is the fact that Suvorov himself differed from his own military establishment in his methods of war.

Moreover, he published his views in the *Art of Victory*, a short pamphlet that explained his methods of war and training. Suvorov, as will be shown, was a serious student of military history and put considerable study and intellectual thought into his methods.

Suvorov’s campaign also provides an effective case of an army, the majority of which were Austrian, commanded by the general of another state. Finally, the example provides a means of looking at how tactical success might be just as problematical to a coalition’s unity of effort as tactical failure.

The second case study will examine the leadership and tactical employment of the Russo-Prussian army during the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen during the spring campaign of 1813. This example again offers the example of a Russian officer (Wittgenstein) nominally in charge of substantial numbers of soldiers of another nationality (Prussians). However, the command structure was more complex than in the Suvorov case, at least on the battlefields. The tactics involved also differed, particularly for the rejuvenated Prussian forces involved. Lutzen and Bautzen also provide the case of tactical failure and its effects on unity of effort.

In review, both historic cases offer the opportunity to analyze how tactical employment under another nation’s general effected the unity of effort of the respective coalition. The Northern Italian case
provides an opportunity to analyze the effects of successful coalition tactics and leadership and the German battles in the spring of 1813 provide a counterpoint with two failed battles.

A common approach to each case study will be followed. First, the tactical, doctrinal, and organizational make-up of the armies of the coalition states will be summarized. Secondly, a brief summary of the background of the war and campaign, the context of the battles, will be reviewed. The battles themselves will then be examined with an eye toward what tactics were actually used and the effect of the battle's decision (if any) on the unity of effort of the coalition.

Two battles were chosen vice one for the following reasons. First, multiple engagements provide a broader look at the evidence, which tends to lessen the chance of drawing a conclusion from what might be a non-typical battle. Additionally, this approach provides the investigator a cumulative result over time of effects of the tactics and consequences of the battles on the integrity of the coalitions.

Do the Napoleonic lessons have applicability or relevance today? Investigation of the dynamics of coalition warfare assumes more urgency if we consider that many historians and military scholars believe that we are currently in, or at the beginning of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). History again provides one method to analyze and understand current developments through the lens of past experience. The last truly profound revolution in military affairs with respect to how armies are fundamentally organized to fight was the watershed period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from 1792-1815. The division-corps-army, combined arms structure, and general staffs that evolved from that time period are with us still in hardly altered form. This revolution coincided with the emergence of the modern nation state as the predominant political entity of Europe during a period characterized by near-continuous coalition war.

If it does nothing else, Napoleonic history provides a glimpse of how coalition dynamics "played out" during actual conflict. However, if the United States is indeed to routinely operate as a coalition partner while at the same time experiencing or anticipating a revolution in military affairs, then it is incumbent to look for lessons from a time period characterized by both coalition warfare and an RMA. The Napoleonic era provides precisely that prescription.
II. The Coalition, Tactics, and Success in 1799

The end of the eventful summer of 1799 saw the Second Coalition poised to achieve the strategic success denied the previous coalition. Indeed, the initial campaigns resulted in both tactical and (by modern standards) operational victory. British sea power had cut off and stalemated France’s most brilliant general in Egypt. The Archduke Charles defeated the French, under Jourdan and Massena, in southern Germany and Switzerland. Finally, the great Russian Field Marshal Suvorov had reconquered Italy at the head of a combined Austro-Russian army.

Suvorov’s campaign was in many ways as dazzling, brilliant, and certainly shorter, than Napoleon’s more celebrated Italian campaign concluded less than a year and a half earlier. He effectively destroyed one French army (Macdonald’s) and crippled another (Joubert’s, who was killed). Suvorov “liberated” almost the whole of Italy, placing France territorially farther back than the starting point of Napoleon’s 1796 campaign. Before the year’s end the entire situation reversed. The Second Coalition collapsed as the Russians withdrew in disgust that soon turned into hostile neutrality. The final victory that seemed a certainty in September was doubtful by December. What caused this dramatic and rapid turnabout?

The answer lies in a strategic shift to the north that took place during late August and early September 1799. The Archduke Charles, commanding the Imperial Habsburg forces in Switzerland moved north to the middle Rhine as Suvorov prepared to move north to Switzerland. Here Suvorov would link up with the remaining Austro-Russian forces under Korsakov. By this mechanism the French under Massena gained a temporary numerical advantage over their opponents in Switzerland during the period between Charles’ departure and Suvorov’s arrival. Massena used this opportunity to strike and defeat the isolated Russians at Zurich and seize the key southern alpine passes into Italy from their Austrian allies.

Suvorov fought his way through the passes into Switzerland only to find himself isolated by the victorious French. The alpine snow line descended with the onset of winter making the mountains in Suvorov’s rear virtually impassable. Nevertheless, he conducted an epic fighting retreat over the impassable peaks—but his army was ruined in the process and lost half its effective number.
Why did the Second Coalition tamper with its armies’ positions so disastrously? Why not consolidate and go into winter quarters and resume the campaign the next year in the best eighteenth century fashion? This was certainly Austria’s desire. However, both Russia and England wanted an invasion of France from Switzerland in 1799 and they felt a Russian army under Suvorov the surest way to guarantee success.

Archduke Charles opposed this plan for many of the very reasons it later failed. Nevertheless, the Austrian government, under the leadership of the Chancellor Baron Thugut, ordered Charles to comply. If the Austrian government and its best general were against this strategy, why did they adopt and support it? Two arguments prevail: one is that Austria was guided solely by its interests and pursued territory in Italy and along the Rhine to the detriment of the Alliance. The second argument maintains that Austria supported this plan to please her Allies while at the same time keeping an eye out for territorial advantages that might be obtained given Austria’s great sacrifices. One factor common to both arguments was the desire, by all parties, to remove Suvorov from Italy. All accounts agree that Suvorov’s attempted restoration (at the Tsar’s behest) of the King of Sardinia to his former dominions in the new Italian conquests threatened the unity of the coalition. The following quote from Thugut’s correspondence reveals the prevailing Austrian attitude toward Suvorov at this juncture:

The innumerable inconveniences caused in Italy by the conduct of this general (italics mine), acting according to foreign [Russian] orders and obviously opposed to the interest of His Majesty, are of such a grave nature that His Majesty could easily do without his commanding an army [in Italy] if having him sent to Switzerland is happily followed.

The general mistrust of Austrian motives by Great Britain and Russia devolved into an outright conflict between Suvorov, the commander in the field, and his nominal command authority in Vienna, the Hofkriegsrat (Court War Council) over the disposition of Piedmont. The Hofkriegsrat was a mixed “military civilian body” composed of statesmen and military officers whose purpose was not really that of a supreme command, but more administrative and logistical in nature. In reality its impact on the direction operations was often a function of the personalities of its members. During the French Revolutionary Wars the Hofkriegsrat was dominated by Baron Thugut and essentially provided the overall strategic direction for the war. Thugut issued orders countermanding Suvorov’s political moves in Piedmont. Suvorov wrote to
the Tsar offering to resign, but this was politically impossible and Suworov remained in command. However, the conflict remained unresolved and further poisoned the relationship between Suworov and the Austrian officers under his command and on his staff who received contradictory orders from their both commander and Vienna.\textsuperscript{17}

The disagreements at the higher echelons upset the fragile mood of cooperation that existed in the name of unity among the officers of Suworov’s multi-national force. As Suworov “...thundered...against ‘yes-men’ and ‘breadsavers’ in the Austrian high command...” the Austrians in turn “...complained about Suworov’s ‘eccentric plans and undertakings’ and his utter ignorance of logistics and supply.”\textsuperscript{18}

As these events show, the seeds of failure for the collapse of the Second Coalition were laid before the engagements that led to the swift disaster occurred. My examination of some of these seeds on a larger scale concluded that unity of effort was merely agreement to fight a common foe, but not for common objectives.\textsuperscript{19} The issue of objectives and the breakdown of Austro-Russian relationship come into sharp focus when one more piece of evidence is considered. During the Allied debate over strategy the British ambassador in Vienna observed that Austria’s “main immediate concern...was to preserve its army(emphasis mine).”\textsuperscript{20} Did Suworov’s Austrian troop losses in his Italian campaign contribute to Austria’s concern for the integrity of her armies and thus further weaken the unity of the coalition?

To understand the answer to this question Austrian and Russian (more specifically Suworov’s) doctrine and tactics in 1799 must be understood to define what was different between them. I will examine the Russian system first and then the Austrian. With this baseline established I will examine the differences between the two systems. Finally, the influence of tactics on and off the battlefield will be examined in two ways. First how Suworov’s tactics were received and executed by his Austrian subordinates. Secondly, how the losses incurred by these tactics affected the unity of the coalition as a whole.

We must first clarify that there were definite differences between the strategy, tactics, and doctrine of Suworov and the official tactics and doctrine of the remainder of the Russian army. The Russian army of the new Czar Paul I could not openly endorse Suworov’s methods. Paul, intolerant of dissent and intensely paranoid, disgraced and exiled Suworov to his estates for his criticism of his the new military reforms.\textsuperscript{21} The essence of Paul’s reforms was a return to the rigid tactics of Frederick the Great and the
Seven Year’s War. Many of Catherine the Great’s most practical reforms and innovations were undone by her son, including the dissolution of the General Staff and a return to the obsolescent uniforms of a bygone age. The Russian Army now became an institution where the emphasis was on minutiae over substance—parade ground performance was paramount. Against this background of reactionary change, much of it resented by the lower ranks, Suvorov was recalled from virtual arrest to lead the armies of the Second Coalition in Italy.

Before addressing Suvorov’s art of war, we must understand the raw material of his armies—the Russian soldier—and the basic tactics of the Russian army. Understanding the Russian soldier of this period is the key to understanding the corresponding tactics...and the tactics that Suvorov developed on his own initiative. Wilson, the British liaison officer who served so much in Russia, observed that the Russian soldier “is fearless, disdains the protection of ground, is not intimidated by casualties (italics mine).” How this trait translated into action on the battlefield is best described by Marbot during a skirmish prior to the battle of Eylau:

The Russian Generals...had forbidden all speaking, and in the case of our attacking the wounded were to drop without uttering any sound. This order, which only Russian troops could carry out (italics mine), was so punctually obeyed that when...Colonel Albert...ordered his 25 Chasseurs to fire a volley, not a cry, not a word was heard, and no one replied to us.

This human advantage was often offset by the inconsistent quality of the officer corps. This corps consisted of two distinct elements: the native Russians and foreign officers. Russia, more than any other European power, employed substantial numbers of foreign officers. These officers, because of their generally better education, often occupied staff positions. They also commanded major armies and fleets. Some of these officers were excellent: Barclay de Tolly, Clausewitz, and John Paul Jones to name a few—but many were simply the rejects of other European armies. Hostility and resentment were bound to occur on the part of the native Russian officers, thus further dividing and diminishing the effectiveness of the officer corps. This hostility continued throughout these wars and caused problems when substantial number of Austrian officers were integrated into Suvorov’s staff and command structure in Italy.

Nevertheless, the native Russian officers were not as badly educated as some would have us believe. Throughout the eighteenth century a Russian system of state and private military professional
education developed in the creation of "Cadet Corps" academies. These included both line and technical
service (artillery and engineer) training, often from a very young age. After graduation the prospective
officer was required to serve as a non-commissioned officer in one of the Guard regiments. In this manner
vast numbers of the gentry and middle class obtained noble status; for by law an officer was an aristocrat.
This matter of Russian officership and professionalism is important because it was this system that
produced Suworov as well as the backbone of leadership for an army that was never defeated by Frederick
the Great.28 ""The Russians have always beaten the Prussians. Why imitate them now?"", responded
Suworov to Paul's "Prussification" of the Russian army.29

The tactics of this army, however, left much to be desired. Archduke Charles thought the "officers
and men were poorly trained in tactics and deployments." Although Russian light infantry (jaeger)
formations did exist, skirmishing and independent action by them were only in the regulations and rarely
practiced.30 Against European armies the Russians employed the eighteenth century line and against the
wilder Turks and Poles they employed columns and squares.31

As for artillery, the best that can be said for the Russians was that they competently served their
cannon. Quality, however, was offset with quantity: "No other army moves with so many guns," observed
a British officer.32 Of the three arms the cavalry was probably the least effective on the battlefield. This
deficiency, too, had its mitigating factor—the Cossacks. The line cavalry of European nations frequently
chased these irregular horsemen from the Ukraine from the main battlefields of Europe. Their true value
lay in their skill in the light cavalry roles of reconnaissance and pursuit and moral effect due to their
ferocious reputation. The natural hardiness of both the Cossack and his horse allowed them to pursue and
raid farther and longer than any other cavalry in Europe.33 Their natural talent for theft and kidnapping
invariably resulted in prisoners and captured dispatches that provided generally excellent intelligence for
the officer willing to sift through it all.34

This then was the Russian army in 1799: stolid, imperturbable infantry, numerous artillery
indifferently served, and clouds of Cossacks. Combined arms action between them was virtually non-
existent.35 Count Langeron captures this essence best: "All their principles of war come down to their
bayonets and their Cossacks...and all their enterprises have been crowned with success."36
Enter Suvorov. A recommendation to conduct a reconnaissance by his Austrian chief of staff shortly after he arrived in Italy elicited the following response:

Reconnaissance (sic)! I am for none of them; they are of no use but to the timid, and to inform the enemy that you are approaching. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it. Form column—charge bayonets...these are my reconnaisances (emphasis mine)!37

Of course much of this was bombast in order to fire up his Austrian Allies. Suvorov’s idiosyncrasies and lunacies have been widely documented: his aversion to mirrors, jumping on tables, mourning dead fowl and the like. The real Suvorov was far more subtle. 38

The key to understanding Suvorov is to understand how completely revolutionary his methods regarding training and the common soldier were for his times. Suvorov literally practiced his motto of “train hard fight easy.” He took the basic tactics already discussed and mercilessly practiced them with the troops under his command. His men routinely conducted marches of greater than 30 miles a day. Infantry charged infantry with bayonets leveled, cavalry charged full tilt against infantry who only passed them in prearranged corridors at the last possible second. He conducted mock attacks on monasteries to simulate the stone fortresses of Europe. Throughout he discharged cannon to simulate the rage and chaos of battle. By these methods he enhanced the courage of his peasant soldiers and the experience of his officers with a foretaste of the combat environment.39

Suvorov was truly a soldier’s general. Hard on his officers he was paternal with his men, caring for their well-being, eating their fare, and sleeping on hay or the ground just like them. He shared their hardships and they idolized him in return. One historian goes so far as to say that only Suvorov, of all the Russian generals before and since, really understood the “potential for tactical innovation that the Russian peasant soldier afforded” his leaders.40

Finally, Suvorov was a true military intellectual. He came by this through his education and family. His father spoke fluent French and translated Vauban into Russian, which his son eagerly devoured. Living in the house of a scholar resulted in Suvorov literally giving himself a classical education...especially with regard to the military classics. As his biographer Anthing relates: “The small portion of his leisure which he enjoys is devoted to reading...military science has long been, and continues
to be the sole object of his regard, those authors of every nation who investigate, illustrate, or improve it, engross his literary attentions."

Suvorov not only practiced and trained for war, he published as well. His Suzdal regulations in his earlier days as Colonel of that regiment were fully expanded into a coherent philosophy of war in the Art of Victory. Philip Longworth’s book of the same title captures the essence of this philosophy which combined the aspects of training and troop care already discussed with tactical and even operational and strategic maxims. His almost supernatural belief in the power of the bayonet has often overshadowed his devotion to the concepts of mass and rapid movement in warfare. To accomplish these he often used columns, as did the French, to minimize the transition from column to line and maintain the momentum of his attack.42

Before proceeding to an examination of Suvorov’s Allies, the Austrians, let us return to his bombastic denunciation of “reconnaissance.” An examination of the operations plan for his famed assault on Prague (suburb of Warsaw) in 1794 reveals a far different mind than that encountered above (see Appendix A). Reconnaissance, as one example, was organic to the plan and his instructions for the phases of the battle have the sophistication and clarity we attempt to teach as “phasing” in modern staff colleges.43 One important point to remember, however, is that the army he was to lead in 1799 had not been personally trained by him, he had been in exile and the Russian troops he inherited had been languishing under other commanders and the Tsar’s new regulations. The majority of his army was not even Russian, and to this subject, the Austrian army, we must now turn our attention.

The Austrian army, like the Russian, “remained essentially a typical eighteenth century dynastic organization.” The key word is “dynastic.” The Habsburg Empire was not a nation state and its army was, therefore, not a national army in the way France’s was. The officers were composed solely of aristocrats, loyal only to the crown. The troops were basically mercenaries, signed on for life long service. They were either forcibly conscripted or “volunteers.”44

In addition to these “regular” forces the Austrian army included extra-national formations from the various frontiers of the Empire called Grenzer regiments. These regiments usually served along the frontiers from which they were recruited. However, they could be used, as Maria Theresa proved, as light
troops or even line formations in times of emergency beyond their normal border garrisons and fortresses. The same holds true for another category of troops, the Ban of Croatia and the Insurrectio, which were feudal levies whose call-up was also only in times of Imperial emergency. The military value of these levies was that of untrained militia, minus the enthusiasm of the “godless, flighty, madcap French” of the levee en masse.45

Nevertheless, the line infantry of this army was “renowned for its solid bravery” and the cavalry “was still considered among the best in the world.” 46 The artillery, of the three combat arms, was the only professionally educated branch. All of the “officers and senior non-commissioned officers” were trained at special schools. Because only literate Austrian subjects were recruited for the artillery, this arm also had the added benefit of being truly homogenous. The artillery, in contrast to the Russians, was well integrated with the infantry to provide combat support. No less an authority as Marshal Massena attested to its effectiveness in his memoirs.47

The tactics and strategy of this organization were governed by and large by a manual called the Generals-Reglement of 1769. This document combined both doctrine, standard operating procedures, and administrative guidance. It was essentially the “Bible” of Austrian doctrine, with “minor modifications,” until 1807. Not surprisingly, it emphasized all of those attributes of tactics and strategy that have come to be identified with the eighteenth century: linear formations, drill, and “cautious strategy based on magazines and secure communications.”48

After its numerous defeats during the War of the First Coalition the Austrian army underwent attempted to implement reform. This effort was placed in the hands of the Archduke Charles, who counseled only minor reforms because of the imminent outbreak of another war with France. Charles wrote, “…before such changes have been completed for some time, the army will be in disarray and there will be disaster.” Charles was deposed and a military commission appointed.49 In the end the only “reforms” affected were a new musket, new uniforms, and a superficial reorganization of the army to account for the loss of territory to the French.
Nevertheless, the Austrians, in response to the new French ways of war, had developed skirmishing tactics. However, their field regulations did not officially sanction these methods. A good feel for the battlefield level of tactical doctrine is captured in the following excerpt:

Regular, trained, and solid infantry, if it advances in closed ranks with rapid steps, courageously, supported by its artillery, cannot be held up by scattered skirmishers. It should therefore refuse to lose time either by skirmishing or by the fire of small groups...It should close with the enemy as rapidly and orderly as possible, so as to drive him back and decide the action quickly. This is the method that saves lives; firing and skirmishing costs casualties and decides nothing (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{50}

The instructions of General Zach in 1800 echo the above almost exactly, indicating that nothing really changed from 1796 to 1799.\textsuperscript{51} Noteworthy in the above instructions is the emphasis on low casualties and the integral support of the artillery.

Command and control of this force served only to increase its “cumbersome” nature, especially during operations. There were still no higher tactical formations than the regiment. Higher command levels of the armies were organized along strictly eighteenth century lines and strategic direction was provided by the Hofkriegsrat. During the War of the Second Coalition this civil-military body was dominated by Thugut. The Hofkriegsrat often caused more disunity in the direction of military affairs than its intended purpose of unification of strategy. Orders sent from Vienna were often irrelevant by the time they reached the commander in the field.\textsuperscript{52}

This rather large (for this time period) army was extremely expensive to maintain—45 percent of all the Imperial revenue went to its upkeep and maintenance.\textsuperscript{53} Austria’s expensive army was essential to her existence as a dynastic state, and therefore was a more intrinsically valuable army from the standpoint of its rulers. This was one of two fundamental differences between the Russian and Austrian armies. High casualties were anathema to Thugut and the Emperor. Russia’s army, on the other hand, was regarded with paranoia by the Tsar whose father had been removed by a conspiracy of guards officers led by his mother, Catherine. It was a tool to expand Russia’s influence in Europe and Paul’s personal legacy of glory.\textsuperscript{54}

Since the Austrian army was a major component in the glue that held the Habsburg dynastic state together, its well-being and conservation were, for all intents and purposes, a key component and objective of Habsburg policy. This policy was a major factor in bringing Russia into the coalition “...to insure that...the Russians assumed a full share of the effort.” \textsuperscript{55}
The second fundamental difference synergizes with that of the first. This was the difference in the basic raw material of both these armies—the common infantry soldier. Russian tactics took advantage of the ability of its soldiers to endure circumstances that the soldiers of other armies couldn’t. As Marbot and numerous others attest—the Russian soldier could execute orders that no other troops of Europe would. Suvorov understood this moral advantage and took advantage of it by further training his troops to be even more impervious to the horrors of combat and casualties. The result were tactics that essentially minimized the consideration of casualties and maximized the importance of the objective. Russian units could endure terrific casualties and still remain cohesive and so their tactics tended to minimize the effect of large casualties on the army in battle. This is not to denigrate Suvorov as a butcher; he obviously cared for his soldiers, but implicit in his methods was a preference for a swift bloody decision vice a longer conflict which might cause more casualties and accomplish less.

On the battlefields of northern Italy Suvorov’s tactics resulted in the use of both lines and columns. Did these columns, when faced with the skirmishers and accurate artillery of the French, suffer what modern military science might call prohibitive casualties? Finally, the fact that differences existed provides an environment for discord by virtue of human nature. Did the Austrians “take offense” at having to use some else’s doctrine—no matter how successful it might have been—or did Suvorov allow them a greater or lesser degree of tactical independence when under his command?

The first thing to remember is that the Austrians requested that Suvorov assume the overall command in Italy, even though the Austrians had the preponderance of force. Modern doctrine would have given an Austrian the command. The first choice was in fact Frederick of Orange, a Dutch prince in the Habsburg service in whom Thugut had great hopes. However this young man inopportune died shortly after obtaining the command. Archduke Charles, the best senior commander the Habsburgs had, was needed in Germany because of his intimate knowledge of that theater. The other Habsburg princes were eliminated by Thugut because of their inexperience. The political reasons for Suvorov’s appointment are perhaps the most compelling: the Russians were allies and Suvorov was the commander of their Italian contingent. He was chosen by default due to his stellar reputation from the Turkish and Polish wars. Thugut wrote of him: “We have to admit that our army will make progress with astonishing rapidity under
Suvorov, who will bring about extraordinary results whether good or bad; we just have to make sure they are not the latter (emphasis mine).”

Meanwhile, the campaign had already started in March of 1799. The strategic situation in theater consisted of approximately 130,000 French against some 60,000 Austrians. The French were divided into numerous garrisons (due to simmering and outright rebellion throughout the peninsula) and two field armies, the Army of Italy under Scherer in the north and the army of Naples under Macdonald in the south. These forces were spread across the length of Italy from the Alps to Naples resulting in a local superiority for the Austrians along the line of the Adige river.

Victory smiled on the Austrians before Suvorov even arrived. Under the leadership of the Hungarian-born General Kray the main Austrian Army defeated Scherer at the battle of Magnano on April 5. Kray, an expert in light infantry tactics used a favorite Suvorov tactic in his counterattack that decided the battle, an all out attack on Scherer’s right “with fixed bayonets.” The French were forced back to the Adda river, the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera placed under siege, and Scherer was replaced by the Directory (France’s government) with the more competent General Moreau. The Austrians had good reason to be pleased with themselves and their victories, unassisted by the Russians and Suvorov, had given them a well-deserved pride in their own methods and abilities.

On April 17 Suvorov assumed command of the Austrian force, arriving ahead of his own hard marching troops, who were at this point marching up to thirty miles a day. Unfortunately, Suvorov had already done two things that had alienated his Austrian partners. His first act had been to refuse to discuss with the members of Hofkriegsrat, particularly Thugut, his plans for the upcoming campaign as he passed through Vienna. Suvorov remained uncommunicative on his way to the front as he shared a carriage with his Austrian chief of staff, General Chasteler who also attempted to discuss operations with him.

Suvorov’s second act was to issue a series of tactical instructions to the Austrian officers delineating how everyone was to operate tactically. One of Suvorov’s directives detailed that the infantry was to form into “two lines” from column at one thousand yards from the enemy and then advance slowly to “300 yards, this being the maximum range of the excellent French musketry. Then, when the order to advance was given, the troops should proceed at the usual rate, but after a hundred paces they must double
their speed, and a hundred yards short of the French line they must rush at it...with bayonets leveled. The second line was to follow through while the first, having delivered their charge, halted and reformed (emphasis mine). Suvorov also announced to his army that, "We have come to beat the godless, windbag Frenchies. They fight in columns and we will beat them in columns!"

There is an apparent contradiction here between the use of columns or lines that is easily explained. Suvorov used both. His purpose was to maintain the impetus of his attack on a broad front while maintaining the advantage in movement and cohesion provided by the column. What he did was construct a sort of temporal mixed order, moving rapidly up to the enemy in columns and transitioning to lines just out of musket range, then moving to the attack. As we shall see this tactic was to work quite well with the Austrians, in fact they may have executed it better than their Russian comrades who often did not form line but remained in column for the duration.

Suvorov then conducted training courses to ensure the Austrians digested his instructions properly. This action could not help but have some negative consequences. The future Field Marshal Radetzky, a junior officer in Suvorov's force wrote of these instructions: "the order...was dictated to a victorious and confident army... . The army felt itself humiliated, offended. ...The consequence was an extraordinary division between the allied forces—a division which extended all the way up to headquarters."

Not all of the Austrian officers were so alienated. Chasteler, in particular, made strenuous efforts to work with his allies. He and the Cossack leader Denisov in established a "joint" intelligence cell that combined Austrians, Cossacks, and Italians together to interpret maps the illiterate Cossacks made to describe their reconnaissance's. By these heroic efforts the unity of effort of the Austro-Russian army remained surprisingly good despite Suvorov's initial tactlessness.

These affronts by Suvorov, probably unintentional, were also mitigated by his victorious advance across Italy. Moreau was defeated at Cassano and the line of the Adda river forced. As mentioned earlier, the Austrians seem to have executed these tactics faithfully. At St. Juliano we find a joint Austro-Russian division under the Austrian General Lusignan executing the double line tactic in a counterattack that defeated an advance by Moreau. The capital of Lombardy, Milan, fell on April 29 and Suvorov
essentially forced Moreau into defensive positions in the mountains around Genoa. All of northern Italy now lay uncovered and Suvorov and the Austrians now settled down to a consolidation of their gains by placing all of the major fortresses that they had masked in their victorious advance under siege.

Meanwhile, the Directory had finally recalled General Macdonald and his Army of Naples from southern Italy to attempt to unite it with Moreau's for a retrieval of the situation. Suvorov had to a degree anticipated this move and his requests for reinforcements brought 11,000 more Russians detached from Korsakov's corps on its way to Switzerland and another 10,000 Austrians under Bellegarde from Charles' army already in Switzerland. Suvorov also suspended the siege of Mantua and detached Kray, the victor of Magnano, to the south to delay and develop Macdonald's force as it advanced rapidly through Tuscany.

Macdonald and Moreau almost succeeded in uniting. They were in constant communication and Macdonald's unexpectedly rapid advance to the Trebbia river took even Suvorov by surprise. Suvorov was not used to his enemies advancing as rapidly as himself! Moreau's job was to bring his now reinforced army into a position on Suvorov's right flank where he could either threaten Suvorov or unite with Macdonald, or both. This plan nearly worked.

While Suvorov rushed with all available troops toward Tuscany (marching almost as far and certainly as fast as the French), Macdonald resumed his advance with an army of some 33,000 men. On the June 11 Macdonald collided with the advanced units of Austrians at Modena. The Austrians again used Suvorov's tactics to good effect, this time bayonets against cavalry, and repulsed the French. As one reads these accounts of Russian tactics and bayonet charges of great courage one almost forgets that the troops doing the executing were Austrian.

Macdonald advanced on June 12 with more success and forced the Austrians in the center to retire on Mantua. Macdonald now turned to the northwest and Moreau. All that stood between them were 6,000 Austrians under Ott—but Suvorov, now down to only 22,000 troops, was rushing to Ott's aid. Macdonald had already passed the Trebbia and halted between that river and the Tidone river.

The battle of the Trebbia began June 17 as essentially as a skirmish by one of Macdonald's divisions (Rusca's) as it pushed across the Tidone. Ott's Austrian's were slowly withdrawing under this pressure when Suvorov and his advance guard, mostly Cossacks, arrived and counterattacked. The French,
who had not expected a battle, were thrown back in disorder to the Trebbia but some units remained on the western side. Macdonald claims he had specifically ordered an avoidance of a battle until Moreau was in communication. The battle of the Trebbia is unique in that what began as a meeting engagement during a pursuit turned into a three day battle of wills between Suvorov and Macdonald. Neither army had completely arrived and units of both were still “marching to the guns” from the north and the south.

Macdonald resolved to remain on the defensive to await the arrival of the rest of his forces. Suvorov, on the other hand, formed his army up for the attack during the night as his tired troops marched up to the battlefield. Suvorov was not able to organize his army and bring it up until the next afternoon. In so doing he achieved a certain amount of surprise against the French on the left bank of the river, as Macdonald attests in his memoirs. These troops, under Salm were hurriedly withdrawn with loss to the right bank. The battle then raged into the night, the cannon only ceasing their racket at about eleven o’clock. Macdonald described the Austro-Russian attack as a “vigorous onslaught...their strength was great, and their cries and howls would have sufficed to terrify any troops except French ones.”

Suvorov’s tactics had been to bring his forces up in five large columns which he again directed to “form line immediately in an orderly fashion...without pedantry or...excessive...exactitude (emphasis mine).” Macdonald’s counterattacks, unbeknownst to him, nearly succeeded. The Russian soldiers’ failure to break after these punishing blows sustained Suvorov’s position on the west bank of the Trebbia as night and exhaustion brought the second day’s battle to a close. Suvorov’s decision to attack with his outnumbered and exhausted army had paid off—for the moment.

The next day both commanders decided to attack. Macdonald now had the advantage in numbers and concentrated 12,000 of his troops for a fatal flank attack against the Russians under Bagration on Suvorov’s extreme right and supported by another turning movement on the left. These troops included the Polish Legion under Dombrowski which fought so furiously against Suvorov the previous day. They were practically annihilated by a Russian counterattack, but this in turn opened a gap around Suvorov’s central column under Shveikovski that resulted in an opportune counterstroke by Victor and Rusca that almost broke the back of the Russian position.
The crisis of that day's battle had arrived. Both Bagration and Rosenberg requested to withdraw. At this point Suvorov became personally involved in animating his troops to stand fast. Macdonald heard that Suvorov went so far as to threaten to kill himself if his troops retreated another step. Melas the senior Austrian general present exacerbated the crisis by only bringing part of the reserve into the bloody melee in the center. In the end the Russians held and the third day's battle died down with both sides still separated by the river. Macdonald, and especially his subordinates (those still alive), had had enough. They withdrew after a council of war that night while leaving their campfires burning.73

When the Cossacks advanced early the next morning they found the French gone and Suvorov ordered an immediate pursuit. What little pursuit he was able to mount--Moreau was now advancing in his rear--managed to capture the bulk of Macdonald's rear guard. Macdonald acknowledged that he had received "disastrous...losses" and rated the Allied casualties as equally "enormous." The actual butcher's bill was sobering, Macdonald had lost half his army, some 16,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Allied losses, for the size of their army were nearly as bad, some 6000 killed and wounded--most of these losses had been Russian. Meanwhile, Moreau's advance near Marengo had cost the Austro-Russians another 2,000 casualties during an abortive counterattack by Bellegarde.74

Rather than improve the unity of effort of the coalition, the conduct and results of this bloody battle now synergized with other negative trends in undermining the unity of effort. In May, prior to the Trebbia battle, some of the Austrian generals "under him complained about Suvorov's crude tactics and unnecessary losses and risks (emphasis mine)." Up to this point Thugut had generally backed Suvorov against these complaints, despite the fact that Suvorov's high casualties, particularly Austrians, ran counter to the "first priority" of the Habsburg dynast--namely the preservation of its army in defense of the dynasty and its domains.75

Suvorov had already alarmed Thugut by calling on the Piedmontese to rise up and support their exiled King, which was counter to current Austrian policy. Immediately after the battle Suvorov received the welcome news that Turin the (capital of Piedmont) had surrendered. Suvorov, following the Tsar's orders, used this event as an opportunity to summon the King from Sardinia to resume his thrown. Thugut immediately disavowed Suvorov's actions and subordinated him to his personal control.
With Thugut alienated the Austrian general officers now began to openly speak out against Suvorov. Thugut no longer discouraged their bypassing Suvorov to communicate directly with him. Suvorov was now required to report to Vienna prior to engaging in battle. Additionally, the simmering debate over Italian strategy, sieges versus field engagements, now terminated in the Austrian's favor. Prior to his departure for Italy Suvorov wrote the Tsar a confidential note stating his intention not to "waste time in sieges." The Austrians strategy involved a reduction of the remaining fortresses in Italy before resuming field operations against Moreau. The losses, however, during the Trebbia fight had gutted Suvorov's Russian contingent and he was now very dependent on the Austrians for replacements. In this manner, not out of deference to Thugut but because his control of resources was limited to his Russians, Suvorov had to now submit or resign. Paul rejected any notion of Suvorov's resignation and these conflicts, as already discussed, became a major factor in everyone's desire to remove Suvorov to another theater.  

A final note on the battle of the Trebbia with respect to the actions of Melas. The Austrians had already been in contact with the French and were, to a certain extent, fatigued. But the Russians were no less fatigued after their forced marches. Nevertheless, one historian has noted that it was "curious" how slowly and ineffectively Melas was in supporting Suvorov on both 18 and 19 June. All accounts of the battle agree that Melas responded slowly. Even Macdonald admits that had he been harder pressed on the second day (June 18) he did not know what he should have done. Was Melas in fact one of the officers that had been complaining about casualty rates and did he rectify the situation locally during the battle by dragging his feet? No solid proof exists...but the "curious" nature of his actions argues that he may have done just that.  

The course of the campaign now assumed a slower pace as Suvorov bowed to the will of the Hofkriegsrat, masking Moreau in Genoa while the Austrians conducted sieges of Mantua, Tortona, and Alessandria. The French had other plans. They now sent General Joubert, one of the stars of Napoleon's Italian campaign, to take command from Moreau. Joubert's mission was a subset of an overall French offensive running from southern Germany to Italy. Joubert was reinforced to approximately 40,000 troops, which gave him a field force of approximately 35,000 troops with which to renew the offensive. His goal
was the relief of the beleaguered French garrison of Mantua. Joubert, who was good friends with Moreau, retained that general as an adviser for the upcoming thrust.

Mantua, however, had surrendered. Joubert was unaware of this fact as he advanced in four columns on August 11 toward the Po river valley from his bastions in the Maritime Alps. Suvorov, who had received 10,000 more Russians (again diverted from Korsakov), now rushed to engage Joubert. He also issued orders for his screen troops not to impede the French advance so that he could "lure the French down from the mountains to the plain and crush them." 79

On 14 August Joubert's columns united at Novi on the edge of the plain and halted. Suvorov's army, with the exception of Melas, had also arrived before Novi. Joubert, awed by the size of Suvorov's force, which was a large as his own, now contemplated retreat. He was counseled by Moreau and his other generals to do just that. Joubert hesitated and Suvorov, true to form, attacked him in his defensive position. This position had its left flank firmly anchored in the Maritime Alps at Pasturana with strong defensive positions in the center around Novi. Joubert's right was weak and "in the air," but it was safe as far as he could see because Melas was still marching up.

Suvorov's tactical conduct of the battle was simple. He intended to fix the French with heavy attacks on their left, then their center, and then deliver a flanking blow as Melas came up to the French right. Finally, he would use two wide flanking movements to maneuver on the French rear composed of one cavalry force and a Russian contingent under Rosenberg. Suvorov's most reliable Austrian general Kray "begged" the honor of opening the attack on the French left with his Austrians. At 5 AM this attack began, the first of ten attacks by Kray that day. 80

The attack caught Joubert off guard and he was killed as he reconnoitered forward of Pasturana with his skirmishers soon after the battle had started. Moreau, fortunately, took charge and another contest of wills began as Suvorov attempted to pry Moreau out of his defensive positions. All depended on Melas, who had been so "curious" and slow at the Trebbia. He did not disappoint his Russian commander on this day. The battle was already 9 hours old when Melas arrived and opened his attack on the French right, which Moreau had weakened to support the vicious attacks on the left and in the center. Melas' actions, along with the deep penetration near the French rear of the other two columns, convinced Moreau that his
position was fatally compromised and he attempted to withdraw in good order. Unfortunately for Moreau his artillery became entangled and bogged down on the narrow village streets and mountain roads and many of his troops were taken prisoner.

The price for paid for this success were severe losses incurred by Kray’s Austrians and Bagration’s Russians. The final result was nearly 12,000 French casualties as opposed to almost 8,000 for the allies—the greater percentage of them Austrian. One historian asserted that “Even at the Trebbia the fighting had not been so inhumanly bitter and obstinate as it was here.” The last French field force in Italy had now been irrevocably defeated and would soon be confined within Genoa for an epic siege. It was ironic that the battle of Novi, where tactical cooperation between Russians and Austrians on the field of battle was never exceeded again in that generation, stood in stark contrast to the squabbling, distrust, and outright enmity that existed between the governments represented by Suvorov’s army. The cost, however, in Austrian lives was enormous by eighteenth century standards. A more modern day analogy for the losses at Novi and the Trebbia might be those incurred in our own Civil War at Shiloh or Antietam.

The fragile unity of effort that still existed in the field collapsed at the higher levels under the strain of three factors: the overall strategic direction, i.e. the strategic shift of Suvorov to the north, the theater dispute over the strategy of sieges versus an annihilating pursuit and expulsion of the French from Italy, and the cumulative heavy losses to the Austrian army in all theaters, but especially Italy. On August 16, the day after Novi, Suvorov finally received word of his transfer, with his Russian troops, to Switzerland. He was opposed to this move because “with the loss of Italy, one cannot win Switzerland.” However, Suvorov’s in-theater dispute with the Hofkriegsrat, which had ordered him to cease his pursuit of Moreau, finally convinced him “I cannot continue to serve here.”

In addition to Suvorov’s problems from above, those from below, or rather laterally, had now boiled over again with his Austrian partners. Melas resumed his hostile attitude and refused to obey Suvorov’s orders if they did not correspond with the orders he now received routinely and directly from Vienna. The outright break was no accident. Although Suvorov had won a battle, the decisive battle of the Italian campaign, the Austrians no longer felt the need for his services. The Austrian generals were no longer answerable to Suvorov, unless, like Kray and Chasteler, they risked their standing with Vienna by
cooperating with him. This should have been no surprise to the old field marshal. Under Austrian officers the casualties would certainly now be less...although the results less decisive.\textsuperscript{83}

In conclusion, Suvorov saw the fine instrument that he had in the basic Austrian infantry soldier and used it to maximum advantage...the Austrians performed, in many respects as good or better than their Russian infantry comrades, whose very nature had dictated the tactics that Suvorov employed. In the process he damaged this instrument with excessive casualties. More importantly, it was never "his instrument" to begin with, it was only on loan from another sovereign power. He may have better served his cause, and country, to have understood the constraints for its use before decimating it in two bloody battles. Graham's poignant comment at the end of his narrative of this campaign sums it up: "he was the best possible General for the Russians (emphasis mine)."\textsuperscript{84}

The wastage of Austrian troops since the war's beginning in March, a scant five months earlier, now numbered more than 100,000. The Habsburg dynasty could ill afford to continue these bloody campaigns and hope to have an army to control their empire, much less fend off the Turks, Prussians, and even Russians, once France was defeated by the strategy of overthrow favored by Paul and Lord Grenville of England.\textsuperscript{85} Their final decision to let the Russians assume the full offensive burden, when interpreted under these constraints and trends was not surprising. In other words, the strategy of the Coalition's majority in general, and the tactics of Suvorov in particular, threatened the continued existence of the Imperial army and therefore the Habsburg dynasty itself. These factors were not conducive to the maintenance of the unity of effort. The bloody butcher's bill of Novi could only have further reinforced Thugut and Francis in the correctness of their final decision to assent to Suvorov's transfer with respect to the long term goal of the Austrian monarchy—survival.
III. Tactics, The Coalition, and Failure in 1813

The Sixth Coalition against Napoleonic France began in earnest on December 30, 1812 outside Taurrogen in East Prussia. It was here that the Prussian leadership of a Russian cavalry contingent signed a convention with General Hans David Yorck which subtracted his Prussian Auxiliary Corps from Napoleon's already decimated Grand Armee. Yorck's defection sparked a revolt in the Prussian provinces of East Prussia and Silesia that was belatedly formalized by King Frederick William III of Prussia two months later when he signed the Treaty of Kalisch.

Frederick William now joined Tsar Alexander I of Russia in the first coalition to include two major continental powers since 1807. Great Britain, as usual, immediately advanced material and financial support to the Prussians. Austria officially proclaimed her neutrality and began to secretly rearm as well as secretly provide Prussia limited military assistance.

Against this backdrop Napoleon's step-son Prince Eugene fought a delaying action in Germany that allowed his formidable step-father the time to literally create a new Grande Armee. In the spring of that fateful year, as the Allies confidently advanced west of the Elbe toward the Rhine, the Sixth Coalition's hopes for the quick liberation of Germany received a rude shock. The Grande Armee under Napoleon's personal command regained the initiative at the bloody Battle of Lutzen (May 2, 1813). Barely three weeks later Napoleon administered another tactical defeat on the combined Russo-Prussian army at Bautzen during two more days of punishing combat--nearly annihilating the Allies but for Marshal Ney's blundering.

These two failures on the battlefield resulted in a strategic crisis for the latest coalition against Napoleon. Would the Sixth Coalition fracture in recrimination and hostility—as did the Second—or would it weather the storm? The problem for the Allied high command was the position of Austria. Secret agreements with Austria had committed the Russians and Prussians to operations in the geographical area of Germany contiguous to Austria in order maintain communication with her in anticipation of her joining the coalition. Barclay de Tolly, the Russian general in chief wanted to retreat into Poland to avoid being cut off from Russia in Silesia. The Prussians wanted the entire combined army to fall back into a fortified position around the fortress of Schweidnitz in Silesia and incorporate the considerable manpower of the
Silesian Landwehr in the process. Schweidnitz, however, was "a ruin" and the Silesian Landwehr inadequately armed. Barclay soon discovered these facts and a division of the main army into its Russian and Prussian contingents retreating on separate axes, with Napoleon on interior lines in between, seemed imminent.\textsuperscript{93}

Fortunately for the coalition Napoleon was in just as dire straits and offered them an armistice that gave the coalition a much needed operational pause. Napoleon's army had suffered more casualties than the Allies.\textsuperscript{94} The hostile position of Austria and his lack of cavalry convinced him to seek an armistice to both reconstitute his army and woo Austria and his Emperor father-in-law into at least remaining neutral.\textsuperscript{95}

Was there more to this strategic crisis than failure on the battlefield? That these defeats caused dissension and recrimination within the coalition was no surprise--the Russians and Prussians were bound to blame each other to some extent. This is in fact what occurred, but what was the basis for these disputes and were they related to tactical and doctrinal issues as they were in 1799? In order to better understand and analyze this question we must once again examine the coalition partners' tactics at the time in the same manner as previously. Since the Russians had changed least we will examine them first.

Suvorov had been a considerable force for reform in the Russian army, as the previous section discussed. However, when Alexander I assumed the throne as Tsar he did not undo many of the Prussian style reforms that his father had implemented within the army in order to maintain its good will. Many of Suvorov's tactical ideas retained their currency with Russian generals like Bagration, Miloradovich, and to a lesser extent, Kutusov. Another group, typified by Bennigsen, executed tactics in the manner of Paul's regulations. This dichotomy between these two sects resulted in "a complete lack of standardization in tactics used."\textsuperscript{96}

Another problem was that Suvorov's more innovative ideas, like his enlightened training methods and his emphasis on swift movement and maneuver, fell by the wayside and were replaced by an almost blind belief in the offensive without the speed of movement that had always given Suvorov his advantages.\textsuperscript{97} The result was a Russian army that slowly plodded across Europe while Napoleon's rapier strokes trapped a considerable Austrian Army at Ulm. Finally, Suvorov's legacy of victory and the record of the Seven Year's War had convinced many, including the new Tsar, of the innate invincibility of Russian
arms. Instead of listening to the experienced Kutusov the Tsar further exacerbated these faults by personally assuming command from Kutusov at Austerlitz and adopting an Austrian plan of attack rather than one of Russian origin.98

The subsequent disaster at Austerlitz dispossessed the Russians of these flawed notions and opened the door for real reform. Their first action was to increase the size of the army and this expansion had barely begun when the Prussians marched off to disaster in 1806. Paul’s reforms had improved the quality of the Russian artillery to a degree, but the misuse of this arm at Austerlitz led to further reforms by the Inspector General of the Artillery Arakcheev. A completely new line of standardized artillery, the System of 1805, was introduced and the Russians achieved technical parity and established their doctrinal basis for the massed fire of artillery in offense and defense (that is still with us today).99 These improvements paid handsome dividends at the Battle of Eylau where a large Russian artillery battery contributed to the annihilation of a French Corps.100

The other action resulting from Austerlitz was the adoption of a French divisional system. These new divisions, unlike French practice, were composed of all arms and actually approximated the size of a small French corps. This considerably improved command and control for the Russians and their respectable performance in 1807 is one proof. But at the battalion level the formations continued to operate in exclusively in columns, rarely in lines outside of the parade field, and never mixed. Cooperation between the three combat arms was also rare.101 Also, the newness of these concepts and their hurried implementation for actual combat lessened their effectiveness in the field.

The most dramatic reorganization of the Russian Army took place in 1810 when the Tsar chose the foreign general Barclay de Tolly as his new minister of war. Barclay had come up through the ranks and he empathized with the troops perhaps more than any other general since Suworov. Both the German Mueffling and the British Wilson had great respect for this somewhat under-rated general. Barclay, like Suworov, understood the importance of training and introduced many of the same tactical procedures that the Prussians also adopted (see below). These he published in a field manual known as the “Yellow Book.” He also trimmed down the size of the Russian divisions and adopted the French Corps system, thus the Russian armies’ command and control was to look very similar to that of the French.102
However, Barclay did not have the persuasive influence of Suvorov and many of his methods only made it to the printing press. His “system was not always well understood or executed.” Tactics essentially remained the same, particularly with respect to the use of large columns (vice the smaller ones Suvorov used), attack with the bayonet, and the lack of a credible skirmishing force capable of effective dispersed action on the battlefield. The army had increased the jaeger battalions so that they comprised one third of the regular infantry, but they were still armed with muskets and fought for the most part in columns or lines.

In 1812 this army, fighting within the vast expanses of Russia, was to do very well against Napoleon. At Borodino, however its ponderous nature and predilection for deep massed formations would result in incredible casualties. The huge echeloned columns of the Russians were always attractive targets for the French artillery and their very size often prevented their being masked by terrain. In conclusion the inertia of the Russian army had resulted in a force organized like the French but essentially fighting “much as their grandfathers had done.”

Unlike the Russians, the Prussians implemented profound reforms in response to the threat posed by Napoleon and France. The course of these reforms was by no means a happy one for Prussia—in the interim Napoleon reduced her to the rank of a minor power with powerful constraints on the size and composition of her army. The Prussians however were to become a true nation in arms in the manner of France and even came up with innovations of their own, perhaps the greatest of which was their general staff system. Of all the opponents of France the Prussians were probably the ones who most completely and competently absorbed the new ways of warfare.

The visceral incorporation of these methods had already begun prior to the Prussian catastrophe of 1806, which was to rapidly accelerate an already-established reform movement within the Prussian Army. Its genesis was, as with the Austrians, the defeats of the early Revolutionary Wars. In 1795 when Prussia withdrew from the First Coalition, a commission was established to “investigate and ameliorate the defects that had appeared” during the recent conflict with France. Aside from an increase in light infantry (termed fusiliers or jaeger by the Prussians) nothing of real importance was accomplished.
Two events then occurred that helped the movement gain momentum: a new King interested in military affairs was crowned in 1797 (Frederick William III), and a Hanoverian officer Gerhard von Scharnhorst was accepted into the Prussian army upon the recommendation of the Duke of Brunswick. Scharnhorst’s addition to the Prussian Army and his assignment to the General Staff provided the intellectual and spiritual fire that were needed within the officer corps itself. “Scharnhorst had made Napoleon’s mode of warfare, and the means of resisting him, the chief object of his study, and endeavored accordingly to prepare young men for the war, then easily to be foreseen, with this dangerous opponent (emphasis mine).”

Nevertheless, the reformists led by Scharnhorst encountered considerable resistance from the older officers of Frederick’s era. Scharnhorst and Colonel von Massenbach, another of the General Staff instructors, had established the nucleus of a General staff, but during the events leading up to the Prussian defeats at Jena and Auerstadt the commanding generals were to ignore most of their advice, particularly Scharhorst’s. Additionally, the army had, at the last minute, reorganized tactically along French lines into all arms divisions. These formations were even more self-contained than the French, and were in essence mini-corps. They combined two brigades of infantry, both light and heavy cavalry, a battalion of light troops (fusiliers), and two batteries of artillery. This was essentially the template for the Prussian “brigades” that we shall see fighting as all arms teams in 1813. Unfortunately, the majority of the Prussian field commanders were unfamiliar with how to tactically employ these new formations. Perhaps more fatal to the Prussian cause in 1806 was the fact that these divisions were first organized as they were marching to war.

The end result of the reforms was much like what happened to the Russians at Austerlitz, only with more disastrous results. The reorganization only served to further confuse the Prussians during 1806 and created a situation where the tactics and formations employed were a mixture of old and new with no unifying system. In this manner 150,000 confused, poorly led Prussians and Saxons blundered into 200,000 “battle-tested Frenchmen” commanded by the “God of War himself.”
It was this total collapse that ironically provided the reformers, now led by General von Scharnhorst, the opportunity to completely revamp the Prussian army. We again turn to Clausewitz, who had a hand in this process, to summarize the gist of Scharnhorst’s reforms:

1. Weapons, equipment, and an organization consonant with the new methods of warfare.
2. To improve the individuals making up the army, and to raise their morale and dedication; consequently the abolition of foreign recruitment, steps toward universal service and the abolition of corporal punishment, and the establishment of good military schools.
3. An appropriate system of promotion to supplement promotion by seniority alone, and the careful selection of the commanders of larger units.
4. New training methods appropriate to modern warfare. (emphasis mine)\(^{115}\)

These recommendations were adopted along with a purge in the officer corps of some 5000 men.\(^{116}\)

Finally, Scharnhorst’s general staff system of pairing battle tested commanders like Yorck and Blücher with professionally trained staffs headed by himself (and after his death Gneisenau) and the cream of the Kriegssakademie—Boyen, Mueffling, and Clausewitz—resulted in a command system second to none in 1813.\(^{117}\)

Scharnhorst’s response to Napoleon’s limitation of the Prussian army to 42,000 men in was an ingenious system of training that created a trained reserve—the Krumpersystem. During every training cycle numbers of men would be released (but kept track of) and new recruits called up to replace them. Gneisenau estimates that after three years as many as 150,000 men had been trained in this way.\(^{118}\)

However, only some 16,000 of these would be young enough for recall in 1813. The beauty of the system was that the ineligible trained men *could serve* in the Landwehr (trained militia) that the reformers planned for call up in a national emergency. Additionally, the 16,000 trained reserves that were called up to service became cadres for the reserve line regiments and thus resulted in an overall increase of around 40,000 additional trained troops to the Prussian army in early 1813.\(^{119}\)

The published doctrine for this army, finalized in the 1812 *Reglement*, earned the praise of Engels as “the best in the world.”\(^{120}\) A multi-authored document developed by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, among others, its final form was due principally to an officer who is often regarded as a reactionary, Hans David Yorck. Yorck had the distinction of winning one of the few Prussian victories of 1806 at the rearguard action of Altenzaun.\(^{121}\) He had used exclusively open order tactics at Altenzaun and was thus
uniquely suited to write the final draft of the 1812 Reglement. The following excerpt from this instruction completely captures the essence of the tactics the Prussians would use in the spring of 1813:

The first stage of maneuvering should be a demonstration; during the initial approach of our firing line, the enemy simply must not know what he is to expect. An extended line of tirailleurs [skirmishers], guarded by troops of horse, keeps the enemy occupied, while our attack columns, covered by the irregularities of the ground, march to the flanks and from there impose the main pressure on the battle... Pursuit of a disorganized enemy... should be pushed as far as possible.

Sometime artillery can be made into the driving force of the engagement; this is possible particularly when the enemy’s intentions have been discovered early on...

Finally, it is self-understood that the fusilier battalions on maneuvers should never forget that in case of need they are also intended to fight in line; in order to achieve real military bearing and develop the quick responses that are so necessary to them, the Jaeger and Schuetzen battalions must also master the basic elements of line duty (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{122}

Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia served as the final element that honed the Prussian army for its contest in 1813. When Napoleon demanded that Prussia provide an auxiliary corps to support his invasion, many of its best officers, including Clausewitz, left the Prussian service for the Russian and thus gained valuable experience in fighting the French. Gneisenau also relates that the efforts to rebuild the Prussian army via the Krumpersystem were in effect “paralysed (sic).” Nevertheless the final verdict of Gneisenau was that the loss of 10,000 trained men in Russia was “outweighed by the military experience gained.”\textsuperscript{123} Another historian of that fateful campaign relates that the Prussian troops, particularly their cavalry, were among the hardest fighting troops in the Grand Armee.\textsuperscript{124}

In summary the Prussian army was now a trained all arms national force, albeit small, but with an excellent command system. Its “brigades” were roughly equivalent to the French divisions in size and excellently trained with an advanced (for Napoleon’s opponents) doctrine. This army, thanks to British supplies would soon be excellently re-equipped in 1813 and was capable of expanding from about 30,000 veterans in January of 1813 to some 80,000 trained troops by the time of the spring campaign.\textsuperscript{125}

The differences between the Russian and Prussian armies are degrees of substance versus appearance. Both were undeniably “national” armies, albeit the Prussian was composed of a more complete cross section of society.\textsuperscript{126} However the other differences are more striking. The Prussians were organized as an all arms combat force and they trained and fought at the lowest tactical level in this manner. The Russians, although organized in this fashion, continued to eschew skirmishing and attacked in large dense columns with the bayonet. The approach toward taking advantage of terrain was also fundamentally
different. To the Russians it meant constructing fieldworks for the great artillery redoubts, but still leaving massed formations deployed on open terrain easily reached by Napoleon’s often more mobile artillery. For the Prussians terrain was to be used to hide and protect the troops until the moment of attack. Essentially the Prussians were to fight in the manner of the Grand Armée at its zenith—1806. The Russians would fight as they always did, trusting to the bayonet, massed guns, and the solid column.

Prussia’s revolt against the Napoleonic system now brought the Russian and Prussian armies together again under far better circumstances than in 1806-1807. However the strategic situation did not allow for complete agreement on just what to do against the now vulnerable French. Kutusov, who had wanted to remain on the defensive now favored building up Russian strength before advancing into Germany. However, the addition of ready for combat forces by the Prussians and the rapid build-up of their army combined with the French occupation of substantial portions of their country politically dictated a continued advance.

The Tsar, against the advice of Kutusov supported this advance for the political reason of supporting his new Allies in accordance with the Treaty of Kalisch. Gneisenau discusses the culmination of the Russian army in his work and that they “must have ended on the Vistula” but for the addition of the Prussians. When the available combat forces not screening fortresses were added up the Allies found they outnumbered Prince Eugene by 70,000 to 50,000—so the advance continued to the upper Elbe.

Now the strategic argument arose again because, as Gneisenau freely admits, the Prussians had essentially culminated as well and the plans for an advance to the Rhine were recognized as patently impractical. However two schools of thought now emerged about just what to do along the Elbe. One school of thought was that of Kutusov and the other that of Scharnhorst. The Kutusov School wanted to remain on in the defensive along the Elbe and react to Napoleon. Scharnhorst’s view as related by Gneisenau, who estimated that the Allies had 85,000 to Napoleon’s 120,000, maintained that there was no way to hold the French or allow time for a retrograde into Silesia without fighting a battle. Time was of the essence, he argued, because Austria must be allowed the time to rearm. Giving battle to Napoleon on the plain of Lutzen south of Leipzig, essentially a spoiling attack, would allow the Allies to retain the initiative.
The Prussians believed that the Allied superiority in cavalry, surprise, and the “indisputably better... moral value” of their troops would allow them to gain a victory.\textsuperscript{132}

Scharnhorst’s argument carried the day for two reasons: his influence among the high command of the Coalition and Kutusov’s death on April 28, 1813. The first reason offers an interesting glimpse into the command structure of the Allied battle for the upcoming battle and so we will examine it in order to better understand the unity of effort of the Coalition itself. Clausewitz’ states: “Because he enjoyed the confidence of the king [Prussian], Czar Alexander, Blucher, and nearly all the Russian commanders, it was Scharnhorst above all who maintained the harmony and unity of allied operations which might so easily have been lost for lack of a true supreme commander. (emphasis mine)”\textsuperscript{133} All might have been well had Scharnhorst then served as the overall chief of staff of the combined army, but both he and Blucher, in gratitude to the Tsar for his support, then placed themselves “generously...under General Wittgenstein’s command” in a subordinate corps for the upcoming battle.\textsuperscript{134} Another historian summarizes the effect as “no unity at all” and that the “Prussian army was made merely and appanage of the Russian.”\textsuperscript{135} The result was that unity of command was to suffer for the sake of unity of effort—but Scharnhorst seemed to understand which was the more important of the two.

The Allies managed to concentrate 70,000 of their 85,000 available troops on Napoleon’s right flank as the French advanced on Leipzig on May 2, 1813. The Allied plan was to occupy four key villages south of Lutzen, Kaja, Rahna, Gross and Klein Gorschen, to fix the French army and then use the “numerous cavalry...on its Flank and rear...and thus decide the fortune of the day.” Gneisenau’s record freely admits that the key villages south of Lutzen; were not expected to be heavily defended. The Allied attack formation to achieve this result was essentially the Prussian tactical formation on a grand scale: Blucher’s corps would form the first echelon with a heavy line of skirmishers in advance, Wittgenstein’s corps would form the second line, the Russian and Prussian guards formed the reserve separately from the combined cavalry which was intended as the masse de decision.\textsuperscript{136} The Prussians, then, assumed the role as the initial main effort.

The battle started much later than expected, probably due to Wittgenstein’s muddled and complicated orders for the march. Mueffling criticizes Wittgenstein indirectly for not starting the battle a
day earlier and "that General von Miloradovitch was not brought up in time, -- measures which by some mismanagement were neglected (emphasis mine)." Nevertheless, the Allies' surprise of the scattered French III Corps of Ney, who were having lunch, was almost complete. The battle then went increasingly downhill for the Allies as a furious bludgeoning match over the four villages developed. All sources agree that the relatively untrained French conscripts suffered terrible casualties, but even Napoleon's detractors give him his due. Lutzen was a crowning moment for him as a field commander: "Napoleon here displayed generalship equal to any in his career and displayed it under the most difficult conditions." Much like Suworov, Napoleon's will and personal presence animated and sustained his initially outnumbered young conscripts as his forces slowly arrived by stages to overawe the Allies from the field.

The Allies, however, with the aid of a furious cavalry counterattack led by Blucher, were able to retire virtually unmolested from the field. The French casualties, some 16,000-20,000, had been approximately double that of the Allies. Napoleon himself acknowledged their tactical improvement commenting, "These animals have learned something."

However, all commentators are not agreed that the Allies fought as well as they might have, Napoleon's genius aside. The evidence supports the general conclusion that "At Lutzen the military capacity was altogether on the German side of the alliance, but the power to dictate was with the Russians." When we examine the record of Gneisenau we find that there were tactical mismanagements, attributable to the Russian methods discussed, that had exacerbated the Allied course of the battle.

The first example is Gneisenau's reference to the movement of the reserve out of cannon range in response to Napoleon's deployment of a sixty gun battery with devastating effect. The Allies were reacting to a move of Napoleon's that should have been anticipated and one must conclude that the stationing of the reserve was improper to begin with relative to the terrain. Gneisenau then discusses the formation of the Prussian cavalry for its counterattack. Here he explicitly adds that this cavalry had been substantially reduced by a "murderous cannonade of 8 hours duration." Evidently the Russian high command, Wittgenstein and Alexander, had neglected to move them out of range even after their
inadequate position became obvious. These examples bring to mind the battering Kutusov’s stationary masses took at Borodino.

The Allies, who felt they had gained a moral victory at Lutzen, now retreated on the position of Bautzen east of Elbe with their left anchored among the foothills of the Bohemian mountains “where they hoped to offer a second battle to the enemy.” Scharnhorst’s lesser objective of buying time to bring Austria to play seemed to working since it took almost two and a half weeks before the French arrived before this position in numbers.

At this juncture we must turn to Baron Mueffling’s record in more detail, but first we must establish Mueffling’s credibility in the light of what his actual job was at this time. Mueffling was one of Scharnhorst’s protégés and served under Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on the Prussian General staff. This staff was running Blucher’s Corps operationally (which was subordinate to Wittgenstein) and the rest of the Prussian army administratively. At Lutzen Scharnhorst had to step down from this post due to a wound (which would eventually kill him). Gneisenau, who was essentially Scharnhorst’s operations officer, now assumed the chief of staff position and Mueffling filled Gneisenau’s job. This then was Mueffling’s vantage point after Lutzen.

Mueffling’s record now addresses the specific differences between Russian and Prussian methods:

In Bautzen busy preparations were being made... to accept a second battle in that neighborhood; and here the difference of principle between the Russian and Prussian armies first came clearly to light. In contending with Napoleon, the Russians trusted not only in the system of masses, but also in lumping (emphasis Mueffling’s) together the whole of their corps and armies into such masses. At Borodino they had stood ten divisions deep, and they considered the not inglorious issue of the battle as the consequence of this disposition.

On the Prussian side such a disposition was considered faulty under all circumstances, but especially when opposed to Napoleon, who as an artillery officer, with his powerful batteries, knew well how to punish such an error.(emphasis mine unless otherwise noted)

Now Mueffling turns to the fundamental tactical differences discussed throughout this monograph:

The Prussians did not require such means, as all our infantry was well practised in rifle and sharp-shooting; whereas, in the Russian armies only the Jaeger regiments were riflemen [Author’s comment: armed with muskets], and knew nothing of single fighting. ... we Prussians laid great stress on protecting all our positions by some barrier in our front, which the enemy could not pass without breaking line... Rivers, brooks, marshes and valleys are the best impediments of this kind. This the Russians did not understand, as in the battle-fields of Russia—the steppes—few such means are found of strengthening their position. On the other hand the Russians were accustomed to fortify themselves with intrenchments...a practice which was strange to us...as our men have not the physical strength to march all day, and throw up trenches by night... When these matters were discussed, it was deemed
advisable for us Prussians to conform, as far as possible, without giving up any important principle. *We left the Russians to choose the general position,* and made our own preparations for its defense. (emphasis mine)\(^{149}\)

From this discussion we see that the Allies apparently resolved their tactical differences by a cession of tactical control (at the corps level) to the Prussians. Let’s see how this played out at the next battle.

The Battle of Bautzen was a far more deliberate and set piece battle for both sides. Although, Wittgenstein remained the nominal commander in chief, the Tsar assumed the dominant role in the actual conduct of this battle. This was due partially to Wittgenstein’s lack of seniority to some of his Russian subordinate commanders, but also due to the loss of the persuasive and influential Scharnhorst.\(^{150}\)

The Allied plan was simply to offer Napoleon the opportunity to batter himself against their defensive positions, and if overcome continue their retreat to Schweidnitz, fully confident that Napoleon’s lack of cavalry and their superiority in this arm would protect them. This plan conformed to the political objective of their strategy which was to “dispute every inch...to convince the Austrians that they were resolutely determined not to spare their powers...” Gneisenau’s discussion makes it clear that the Allies did not expect to be forced from their strong position, but their previous good intelligence on the French was lacking and they underestimated Napoleon’s strength by some 80,000 men.\(^{151}\)

The Battle of Bautzen began well for the Allies on the evening of May 20 as they repulsed Napoleon’s initial assaults against their lengthy defensive line which stretched roughly southwest to northeast for some ten miles. Unbeknownst to them was the fact that Napoleon, trying to compensate for his lack of cavalry for pursuit, had maneuvered an entire army under Ney upon the Allied right flank and rear in an attempt to completely annihilate them.

Mueffling’s account eloquently chronicles the second day’s battle that brought Napoleon’s rude surprise to light and the extremely slow and maddening council of war between the Tsar and his advisors over the decision to retreat. Mueffling states bluntly that the French should have cut off the retreat of the entire Allied army had it not been for Ney’s “extraordinary civility” in not advancing after he had essentially obliterated the corps of Barclay de Tolly the corps commander on the extreme right.\(^{152}\) Even Gneisenau, who finally convinced the Allied Monarchs and Wittgenstein of the necessity of retreat, acknowledged that Barclay’s loss of ground on the right was the “decisive” element in the battle.\(^{153}\)
Not long after this momentous battle, which almost decided the war in Napoleon’s favor, the differences between the Russians and Prussians resurfaced. David Chandler, the pre-eminent Napoleonic historian, claims that the high command soon fell to “squabbling” after the defeat at Bautzen. The cause of the problem originated with Wittgenstein’s replacement as the Allied commander in chief by Barclay de Tolly. According to Chandler the falling out was due to Barclay’s proposal to retreat into Poland, which upset Blücher and the Prussians who wanted to withdraw to Schweidnitz in Silesia.¹⁵⁴

Mueffling’s discussion of this event more detailed and again brings to light the Prussian frustrations with Russian tactical methods. Mueffling thought Barclay’s appointment:

“a good choice... But for us Prussians this nomination was, at the time, anything but agreeable. Barclay instantly called upon Blücher to adopt, in place of our well-considered and appropriate brigade dispositions, the Russian plan of position, as at Borodino. He was told, in reply, that the King had prescribed our positions, and therefore the alterations could only be ordered by His Majesty. The King was entreated not to consent to this and so the matter ended. Barclay represented to the Emperor that the disorder was so widely spread, that it would be impossible for him to reorganize the army during operations; and the more so, as they were short of everything, even of ammunition for the artillery. He must therefore make it a condition to lead back the Russian army to Poland, and there reorganize it completely. (emphasis mine)”¹⁵⁵

Thus, according to Mueffling, the genesis of the dispute between Blücher and Barclay was a dispute over the tactical disposition of forces, one of the same complaints that Mueffling chronicled earlier in the disputes after Lutzen. Furthermore, Mueffling’s narrative implies that Barclay, rebuffed in his attempt to exert more tactical control, made the retreat of the Russian Army to Poland a condition for his acceptance of the job as commander in chief.

Unfortunately, Mueffling does not specify exactly when this dispute occurred, only that these discussions took place after the battle of Bautzen. Bautzen ended on May 21 and we do not see Barclay officially in command until May 28 (which was the day Wittgenstein resigned). Examination of another account reveals to us that this discussion of tactical differences probably occurred the day after Bautzen on May 22, 1813, the day of the rearguard action at Reichenbach (where Napoleon’s close friend Duroc was killed). According to the British observer Stewart, Barclay was offered Wittgenstein’s command on the 22nd, but “he declined it (emphasis mine).”¹⁵⁶ Since Mueffling talks about “dispositions” in his account of the dispute, Reichenbach is probably the event he is referring to. The later combat at Haynau (26 May) did
not involve Allied infantry and the dispositions around Schweidnitz were definitely made after the tactical discussion occurred.

Mueffling clearly indicates that the King of Prussia backed Blucher in his refusal to make Barclay’s dispositions before the strategic discussion of a retreat took place. The Tsar did not coerce Frederick William III into repudiating his generals on Barclay’s behalf. Barclay then elevated the discussion to the level of the Tsar, making a Russian retreat a condition of his acceptance of the supreme command. Fortunately for the Allies the Tsar realized that a retreat to Poland risked forcing Austria to remain neutral while Napoleon destroyed the Prussians in detail: “...the Emperor could not dissuade his general, who wished to continue his retreat through Breslau [toward Poland], from following out his views. This, fortunately was opposed to the measures that had been concerted with Austria.”

Let’s summarize this confusing chain of events. Barclay was offered Wittgenstein’s job on May 22, the day of a substantial rearguard action at Reichenbach. Mueffling tells us that Blucher and Barclay quarrel over “dispositions” and that the Prussian King vetoes Barclay’s attempt to reassert the tactical control ceded after Lutzen. Barclay then “represents” to the Tsar his concerns and makes the retreat to Poland a condition for his acceptance of the chief command. In this light his declination of the command on the 22nd, and refusal of it for nearly a week until the 28th, makes sense. Barclay, rebuffed first by Frederick over tactical issues went to the Tsar where he was then rebuffed over strategic issues. He turns the command down until, on the 28th with Wittgenstein’s resignation, he can no longer refuse his Tsar.

Did the tactical dispute lead to a strategic one? Mueffling’s account clearly gives this impression. Stewart’s account provides valuable dates and times and the context of a strategic dispute occurring simultaneously with a command dispute in the midst of a tense retreat under the guns of one of the great captains of warfare. Without making too broad of a conclusion we can say that the tactical dispute provided an environment of disagreement which cannot have helped the situation. We can further say that the tactical dispute might have led to the strategic one. In either case, unity of effort was influenced and probably strained.

However, we must give Barclay his due, his recommendation to retreat into Poland was not solely due to petulance over his failure to gain tactical control over the Prussians. Barclay’s concerns about his
army’s condition were consistent with what we have said about him earlier. The Allied forces were greatly reduced in numbers, and the Russian army amounted to no more than 35,000 effective men according to Stewart. Should Napoleon trap the Allies in what Stewart called “a *cul de sac*” in Silesia, the Allied army would be effectively cut off from the reinforcements and supplies pouring into Northern Germany.  

In conclusion, we can say that tactical differences between the Russians and Prussians were essentially resolved after Lutzen by the adoption of a parallel command system that allowed the Prussians tactical *carte blanche* at corps level and below. However, this system was still new when a new Russian general assumed the role as supreme commander. Possibly because of poor relations between Barclay and Blucher, and partly because of the confusion born of a very recent defeat, the issue of tactical control resurfaced when Barclay wanted to change the Prussian “brigade dispositions.” From Mueffling’s discussion it does indeed appear that the *military* unity of effort of the Sixth Coalition then suffered somewhat. However, the tactical discussion was rendered irrelevant by the Prussian King—Barclay could not make the Prussian generals do his will because their political leader forbade it. The strategic dispute over a retreat that followed was resolved by the Tsar’s actions in support of his Prussian ally.  

To say that this conflict between Barclay and the Prussians had no long term influence on the overall unity of effort would also be incorrect. The atmosphere became strained between the two camps and Barclay’s recommendation to retreat to Poland smacks of someone who is tiring of the cooperation and comprise required by coalition warfare. However, the Tsar could not continue to tell his number one general ‘no,’ especially since he had recently fired his predecessor. In the end, the Tsar finally did say ‘yes’ to Barclay, who delivered another ultimatum to his Tsar: accept the truce offered by Napoleon or the Russian army must separate from the Prussian and retreat into Poland. Napoleon’s offer was accepted.  

Whatever Barclay’s motivation, his insistence on investigating the Prussian strategic alternative was correct. It forced the Prussians to acquiesce in the strategic decision to accept an armistice after it became patently apparent to both the Russian and Prussian monarchs and generals that no other viable military course of action was really available. This decision was made out of the absolute necessity to maintain unity of effort—which included a promise to neutral Austria in order to gain her membership in the coalition.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

In section one I posed a number of questions which have been answered here and there throughout the text of sections II and III. It is now appropriate for us to explicitly address these questions in toto and examine any further lessons they may have to offer us with respect joint U.S. military doctrine.

Did differences in tactics and doctrine cause problems for the unity of effort of anti-French coalitions during the Napoleonic era? In both of the case studies the answer to this question is an unqualified “yes.” In the 1799 case Suvorov’s tactics were probably one of several overlapping factors that contributed to the collapse of the Second Coalition. Clausewitz’ stated the general case of an eighteenth century force in his book on war plans: “...a royal commander had to use his army with a minimum of risk. If the army was pulverised, he could not raise another, and behind the army there was nothing (emphasis mine)”\textsuperscript{164} Clausewitz goes on to survey several eighteenth century armies and then closes his historical support of this general thesis with the explicit examples of Prussia and Austria at the time of the French Revolution. We can thus say that Suvorov’s handling of the Austrian Army was the case of an eighteenth century army being used in a new nineteenth century way.

In the second case we do not see the problem as the crippling of an eighteenth century army with nineteenth century, albeit uniquely Russian, tactics. Instead the 1813 case is the initial tactical misuse of a nineteenth century army, the Prussian, by the same Russians under less capable leaders than Suvorov. Simply put, the fundamental problem in both cases involved the inappropriate use of tactics by a multinational commander for the forces of another nation. In the second case, however, we see the two sides working out their problem prior to the second battle by the adoption of a parallel command structure.

The effects of this problem on the stability of the coalitions varied with each coalition because the nature and environment of the problem, generally the same, were in fact very different in their specifics. The true difference in both cases illustrates again the ascendancy of the political over the military in the continuum of human conflict. Suvorov’s tactics were not inappropriate in a military sense, they were inappropriate in the political sense. He achieved a unity of effort at the tactical level at the Trebbia and Novi that was perhaps the best example of such a thing for a coalition army for a generation or more.\textsuperscript{162}
It can be argued that Suvorov's tactics, combined with his indomitable will, were the only way to beat Macdonald and Moreau, who both performed well at these battles. However, the political unity of effort in the Second Coalition was flawed, to the point of the Allies all mistrusting each other almost as much as they mistrusted the French. Thus Suvorov's inappropriate tactics for the Austrian army exacerbated political problems that already existed and contributed to the formation of a strategy of convenience vice one of military pragmatism—a strategy that led to defeat in Switzerland.

In the second case the problem also had some political consequences. The key difference, of course, was that the unity of effort at the top, i.e. the political, level of the Sixth Coalition was better than that of the Second Coalition. After Lutzen, when the problem raises its ugly head the unity at the top seems to have filtered down and the Russians and Prussians actually work around their differences with a pragmatic solution that still provides unity by leaving the Russians nominally in command.

Had the Allies won, or not fought, at Bautzen we may never have seen a strategic crisis develop over the line of retreat. Defeat, however, has its own imperatives and one of them seems to be disunity. A new commander, Barclay de Tolly, perhaps unfamiliar with the tactical compromises of his predecessors, brought what was thought to have been solved into dispute again. But even during this debate we find the political unity of effort in the coalition providing the essential glue that kept the Allies going, even when military unity of effort became fractious. The Tsar, to his credit did not turn the clock back and the system of parallel command was retained.

Aside from the illumination of the relationship between doctrine and tactics and unity of effort are there any other points of relevance in these case studies to current doctrine? In fact there are. Another interesting aspect that these two case studies bring to light from modern doctrine is the concept of parallel command. Joint Pub 3-0 defines parallel command as existing “when nations retain control of their deployed forces.” The doctrine further states that this is “simplest to establish and often the organization of choice” for coalition command and control. Both cases seem to support this doctrine. In the first case the lack of unity of effort eventually resulted in the adoption by the Austrians of a parallel command situation against the wishes of Suvorov, who initially had complete unity of command. The second case
also began with unity of command, but after Lutzen developed into the modified parallel command structure described by Baron Mueffling. This structure differed from the first case in that it was established by mutual agreement and not by subterfuge. In conclusion we can say that parallel command was more supportive of unity of effort than unified command for anti-Napoleonic multi-national coalitions.

Another application to joint doctrine of these case studies is the joint concept of "matching missions with capabilities."\^164 The political must be implicit in this concept. If we broaden this to matching political missions with military capabilities we may find some solutions to the Second Coalition's problems in 1799. This in fact is what evolved, the Russians became the active field force while the Austrians besieged the fortresses. These military roles better reflected the political realities of the military uses to which the Russian and Austrian armies could be put to. In 1813 we find that there was no need to make such political distinctions in their use, because both armies were intended to be used in the same manner.

Finally, this monograph provides some important data points in the debate currently raging over the replacement of unity of command with unity of effort as a principle of operations in the draft version of the new U.S. Army Operations doctrine found in FM 100-5.\^165 We find a paradox in these two cases. In the first case we have unity of command and tactical unity of effort on the plains of Northern Italy in 1799. Here military success, instead of aiding unity of effort, contributes to its breakdown and eventual collapse. In the second case we have unity command that is essentially superseded by consensual parallel command and supported by political unity of effort at the highest levels. Despite military defeat the coalition does not collapse and emerges stronger after an armistice with their enemy. We can only conclude, in this historical era, that maintenance of unity of effort superseded the importance of unity of command in coalition warfare.

Some might argue that unity of effort is a concept pre-eminent in times characterized by non-conventional war and low intensity conflict (which we currently enjoy) and that unity of command is pre-eminent in those times of high intensity warfare. This monograph offers a of modicum of historical proof that unity of effort is pre-eminent in all levels of conflict for multi-national coalitions.
APPENDIX A (SUVOROV’S OPERATIONS ORDER FOR THE ASSUALT ON PRAGUE)\textsuperscript{166}

I. The army shall march from Kobylka against Prague in three columns by three different roads, on the 22d of February at five o’clock in the morning, and shall encamp in a circle round Prague.

II. The right wing shall be commanded by Derfelden, the center by Lieutenant-General Potemkin, and the left wing by Lieutenant-General Baron de Fersen.

III. On the following night, when the army shall have pitched their camp, batteries shall be erected in front of each corps, and play throughout the day on the enemy’s batteries, which shall be annoyed as much as possible. The object of these batteries is to deceive the enemy, by making them believe we mean to commence a regular siege, and to give the generals and commanding officers of columns time again to reconnoitre (emphasis mine), under protection of the cannon, the points of attack.

IV. In the night between the 23d and 24th the army shall be arranged in seven columns. four shall march to the right, two in the middle towards the left, and one in the left wing to the banks of the Vissula.

V. Each column shall be preceded by one hundred and twenty-eight arquebusiers and two hundred and seventy-two pioneers. the former shall be commissioned to carry the enemy’s advanced post without firing, to defend the pioneers, and to draw the enemy on to the ramparts, while the approaches are making. the pioneers shall clear the roads from rubbish, and carry the facines, hurdles and ladders. Besides these pioneers, each battalion shall be accompanied by thirty labourers furnished with implements of intrenchment.

VI. As soon as the first column of the right wing shall have forced the enemy’s intrenchments with the bayonet (emphasis mine) they shall cut off their communication and their retreat over the bridge.

VII. As soon as the second and third column shall have taken the works and batteries, they shall range themselves in order of battle in the great square.

VIII. The fourth column, after surmounting every obstacle, and taking the two cavaliers, shall immediately seize the park of artillery.

IX. The three last columns shall make their attack half an hour later, to give time to the enemy, who are known to be more numerous towards their right, to carry their strength to the other side, and thus to assure the success of the manœuvre.

The seventh Column are particularly ordered to march to the assault, directing their course against the island in the small river, and to send, if possible, a detachment to the left, towards the bank of the Vistula, to assist the first column to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the bridge.

X. As soon as the columns shall have pierced through the enemy and formed, they shall immediately fall upon the enemy with the sabre and bayonet (emphasis mine).

XI. The bodies of reserve of each column, composed of two battalions and two squadrons, together with those who conduct the flying artillery of the columns, shall march at a distance of one hundred and fifty paces behind each column, shall immediately form on the parapet of the first intrenchment, and shall by means of the pioneers clear the road as much as possible for the cavalry.

XII. As soon as all the columns shall have carried the second intrenchment, they shall clear the streets of Prague, and overthrow the enemy with the bayonet (emphasis mine), without stopping for trifles, or entering into the houses, and then the bodies of reserve shall occupy the second intrenchment in the same order, and with the same object as is above pointed out.
XIII. At the same time all the field artillery, consisting of eighty-six pieces of cannon, shall occupy the outermost intrenchment, and shall be supported by one-third of the cavalry; and the remaining two-thirds shall keep on the two wings observing a proper distance.

XIV. The Cossacks shall remain in the place assigned them behind the columns. Those who shall be between the fourth and fifth columns at the beginning of the assault, shall approach the intrenchment crying our Hurra! and those who shall be posted on the banks of the Vistula, shall keep their post, forming a semicircle.

XV. The troops must act with the greatest energy against those who are under arms, but shall spare the inhabitants, unarmed persons, and those who shall ask for quarter.

XVI. As soon as the business shall be terminated, a proper ground shall be sought, for erecting batteries, where the field artillery shall be placed, and the troops shall immediately begin a brisk cannonade on Warsaw.
ENDNOTES

Section I


2 Joint Pub 3-0, VI-3.

3 Draft FM 100-5 1997, 4-4.

4 John T. Kuehn, *Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon in 1813* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), chapter 6 passim.


Section II

7 Paul W. Schroeder, “The Collapse of the Second Coalition,” *Journal of Modern History* 59 (June 1987), 244. The Second Coalition’s major members were Austria, Russia and Great Britain.


10 Parsons, 308.


12 Schroeder, 271. Roider, 314-316. Schroeder provides a good overview and Roider includes a quote from the British Foreign minister’s correspondence vis-à-vis his suspicions about Thugut and the Austrians. For a full discussion on the reasons for the bad blood between Austria and Britain see chapter two of my thesis listed in endnote 13.

13 Rothenberg, 60.
14 Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 214. Macksey, 304. This argument is the traditional one and has gained the broadest acceptance.

15 Schroeder, 245. Roiter, 316. Rothenberg, 58-60. Rothenberg's approach is probably the most balanced, it portrays Austria as trying to support the Coalition and its own interests at the same time.

16 Roiter, 318-319.


18 Roiter, *op cit.*, 318.


20 Schroeder, 279. Macksey, 224. It is interesting to note that Macksey and Schroeder are agreed on Austria's policy to "husband" her army.

21 Philip Longworth, *The Art of Victory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), 226-227. Duffy, 205. Suvorov criticized classes that were taught to the senior leaders explaining the new regulations as "a case of the blind leading the crippled."

22 Duffy, 202-205.


26 Duffy, chapter six passim. Longworth, 145.


28 Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1991), chapter 8 passim. Duffy, 90. Weigley's chapter elegantly discusses Frederick's problems in fighting the Russians. The best he ever did against them was the battle of Zorndorf (25 August 1758)and both Duffy and Weigley agree that this was not a victory for either side. Duffy calls it an "indecisive slaughter."

29 Longworth, 226.


33 Duffy, chapter seven passim. See also Ibid., 198. Duffy’s chapter deals chiefly with the tactics of the Don Cossacks.


36 Duffy, *op cit.*, 156.

37 Parsons, 305.


41 Anthing, xxxii.

42 Longworth 214, Anthing Vol. II 297-301 (see Appendix 1).

43 Anthing, Vol. II 297-31(see Appendix 1).

44 Rothenberg, *Art of War*, 166.

45 Longworth, *op cit.*, 218.


47 Ibid., 168.

48 Ibid., 167.


50 Cited in Peter Paret, *York and the Prussian Era of Reform* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 73-74. This excerpt is from the 1796 directions for Austrian general officers written by either Charles or Mack.

51 Rothenberg, *Napoleon’s Great Adversaries*, 54.


Duffy, 124, 232. Parsons, 289-331 passim. Paul’s distrust of his mother’s army was so great that he established his own “corps” of officers at Gatchina and installed them in the guards regiments when he became Tsar. Paul may not have been too wrong, he was later assassinated in 1801 by a cabal of officers led by count Pahlen and General (later Count Benningsen) at the Michael Palace.


Duffy, 89. Marbot, 247. These accounts cover a span of time from Zorndorf to Eylau.

Joint Pub 3-0, VI-7.


Roider, op cit., 301.

Thomas Graham, Lord Lyndenoche, Campaigns of 1796-1799 in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Etc. Vol. IV (London: T. Gardener, 1812), iv-26. Figures regarding force levels and casualties from this source unless otherwise noted. This excellent study is a reprint, the original was published circa 1800-1803. Graham’s name is nowhere in the credits, but is listed in the national archives as the probable author. Graham was a liaison officer to the Austrians in 1796-1798, spoke French and German fluently and is known to have visited Paris during the brief peace of Amiens to examine the French records for these campaigns. These facts, along with the undeniable fact that this work was written by an Englishman, support Graham’s authorship.

Ibid., 33.

Roider, 300-301. Duffy 216.

Longworth, 238-240. Duffy 216.

Osipov, 138.


Duffy, op cit., 216, from Regele’s biography of Radetzky. Longworth, 240. Osipov, 139-140.

Duffy, 217.

Longworth, 240. Graham 95. The account of St. Juliano is from Graham and is almost exactly the tactic discussed by Longworth.

Graham, 129.

Macdonald, 248.

Ibid., 252.

Duffy, 218. Macdonald, 253. Longworth, 251-252. Longworth also discusses Suvorov’s column to double line maneuver during this assault.
Section III

The Sixth Coalition had begun in 1812 with the alliance of Great Britain, Sweden, and Russia. For the purposes of this monograph reference to the Sixth Coalition is to the Coalition after Prussia joined it in the winter of 1813 for the War of German Liberation.


Charles Stewart (Vane), Marquess of Londonderry, Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814 (London: Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley, 1830), 1-2. Stewart’s job was to essentially ensure that Britain’s investment was properly employed in the fight against Napoleon. Baron von Mueffling, Memoirs of the Campaign in 1813 & 1814, ed. & trans. P.H. Yorke (London: Richard Bentley, 1853), 49. Mueffling’s work is perhaps the best Prussian record of the campaigning. He discusses some 20,000 Austrian muskets that had been purchased for the Silesian Landwehr of Yorck’s Corps. These had been so hurriedly produced that they did not have touchholes bored in the barrels and so were useless!

Scott Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813 (Chicago: The Emperor’s Press, 1990), passim.

Mueffling, 45. Stewart, 54-56.

Ibid, 47-50. Mueffling, who was unaware of the bad state of things at Schweidnitz, personally escorted Barclay around the fortress and in inspecting the Landwehr and was just as surprised as Barclay was to find the position inadequate. It was Barclay who informed Alexander that he must accept Napoleon’s request for an armistice or else retreat into Poland...Mueffling, in his memoirs, agreed.

Count von Gneisenau, *The Life and Campaigns of Field Marshal Prince Blucher*, trans. J.E. Marston (London: Sherwood, Neely&Jones, 1815), 77-106. Gneisenau was Blucher’s famous chief of staff and one of the reformers and principle architects of the new Prussian army after 1806. His memoir, written to glorify his chief and the cause of the Allies, is still an important primary source if one “reads between the lines” of his patriotic rhetoric. Chandler and Bowden also agree that Napoleon’s battlefield losses exceeded those of the Allies by as much as 50%. Bowden also details the incredible non-battlefield losses the French incurred due to straggling, hunger, and exhaustion.

Bowden, 111.

Mark Melenovsky, “The Influence of the French Revolution and Napoleon on the Imperial Russian Army, 1789-1814,” *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850, Selected Papers, 1994* (Florida State University, 1994), 503-505. Duffy, 184. Kutusov was one of the few Russian generals supportive of skirmishing tactics and also wrote a manual on the employment of field artillery.


This plan had been authored by the Austrian Weyrother, infamously portrayed as a martinet in Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*.

Rothenberg, 210-212. These tactics were codified in Kutusov’s *General Rules for Field Artillery in Field Action*.

Chandler, 542. The corps was Augereau’s.

Rothenberg, 199. Melenovsky, 504-505. Duffy 205. My research of Russian tactics has revealed only one Russian general that both talked of using lines and actually used them after 1796—Suvorov.


Rothenberg, 202.

Riehn, 444. Melenovsky, 504, Rothenberg 200. Rothenberg and Riehn take the viewpoint that the Russians did not use their jaeger effectively or normally in skirmish formation by 1813, Melenovsky implies that they do. As we shall see in Mueffling’s commentary, the Russian poor use of skirmishers will be a major bone of contention in the spring of 1813.

Rothenberg, 202-203 and 199.

Gneisenau, 54.
107 Weigley, 460.

108 Rothenberg, *Art of Warfare*, 165. See also Chandler, 873.

109 Fusiliers carried short muskets called fusils, and the Jaeger were embodied in a regiment of guards called the Jaeger zu Fuss Regiment and carried short rifles. Only the Jaeger Regiment was really trained well as skirmishers and performed well in this role at Altenzaun in a successful rear guard action against the French in the weeks after Jena.


111 Mueffling, 4. Mueffling’s and Clausewitz’ accounts of Scharnhorst are remarkably similar.

112 Clausewitz, 91. Mueffling, 5-18.

113 Rothenberg, *Art of Warfare*, 189.

114 Clausewitz, 91. Chandler also supports this thesis in his chapter 43 of his *Campaigns*.

115 Ibid., 93.


117 Leggiere, 240, passim. Weigley 460. See also Goerlitz.

118 Gneisenau 56.

119 Rothenberg, 192. Peter Hofschroer, *Prussian Reserve, Militia & Irregular Troops 1806-15* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1987), 5-7. Gneisenau, 57-58. These reserve regiments were all upgraded to full fledged line units after the armistice and performed outstandingly throughout both the spring and fall campaigns. The Landwehr is not to be confused with the Landsturm, both of which were called up in 1813. The Landwehr was a “trained” militia and included many of the older Krumper. The Landsturm were basically an armed, untrained levy en masse and Gneisenau calls them by that French term.

120 Rothenberg, 193. op cit.


122 Ibid., *op cit.*, 163.

123 Gneisenau, 59.

124 Riehn, 181-182. These incidents involve the famed Death’s Head Hussars.
125 Clausewitz, 98. Chandler, 871-873. The addition of the Landwehr and additional recruits would eventually result in a huge force of over 250,000 by August of 1813.

126 Rothenberg, 194-195. Melenovsky, 506-508. The middle class was represented by self-equipped volunteer rifle companies which were attached to each line regiment.

127 Müffling, 31.

128 Ibid.

129 Gneisenau, 69 and 72-73.

130 Ibid., 71. Stewart, 13. Stewart discusses the views of some, who he does not identify but probably are the Prussians, who held the Rhine as the “limit of victorious operations.”

131 Stewart, 19.

132 Gneisenau, 79-80.

133 Clausewitz, 98.

134 Ibid.

135 Poultney Bigelow, History of the German Struggle for Liberty, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1896), 139. Bigelow’s book is very Pro-German but its major conclusions about the Alliance agree remarkably with the primary sources: Müffling, Stewart, Wilson, Clausewitz, and even Gneisenau, who obviously took pains to avoid offending the Russians in his 1815 work.

136 Gneisenau, 85-86.

137 Müffling, 32.

138 Chandler, 882.

139 Bigelow, 132.

140 Gneisenau, 93, admits that the “Allies had it not in their power to keep pace with the physical strength of the enemy.”


142 Bigelow, 139.

143 Gneisenau, 90. Bigelow, 135-136, discusses Napoleon’s use of a grand battery of 60 guns around 6 PM.

144 Ibid., 92.

145 Gneisenau, 97. Stewart, 25-26, supports the tone of Gneisenau as to Lutzen being a moral victory.
Clausewitz, 98. Remember that Scharnhorst willingly accepted this less than satisfactory arrangement for the political reason of maintaining “harmony” within the Coalition.

Mueffling, 34-36. Clausewitz, 98. Mueffling also makes the point that Gneisenau “wished to continue the management of all business according to the arrangements Scharnhorst had made; but Scharnhorst had cautiously kept many subjects to himself...”

Ibid., 34.

Ibid, 34-35.


Ibid., 106-125. Gneisenau freely admits his underestimation on page 106.

Mueffling, 35-41. He gives Gneisenau all the credit for finally convincing everyone to retreat or face total defeat. Mueffling estimated Ney’s force as at least 40,000 when it first appeared.

Gneisenau, 123. Stewart, 49, too, admits that the destruction of Barclay’s corps was decisive.

Chandler, 897.

Mueffling, 44-45.

Stewart, 50. There were other indisposed generals on this day, Miloradovitch, who commanded the rear guard, asked to be relieved of his duties, which, considering the moment, was very inopportune. Nevertheless, he was relieved, according to Stewart, by Count Pahlen.

Mueffling, 45.

Stewart, 54-55.

Ibid., 47-53. Mueffling was apparently the liaison officer to Barclay’s headquarters and personally delivered the ultimatum to the Tsar, the King, and their chief political-military advisor General Knesebeck.

Kuehn, chapter 5 passim.

Section IV


Duffy, 220. Duffy believes that one reason Suvorov was so successful was because of this incredible harmony between the Russians and Austrians at Novi. “The thing could be done, if only once in a generation.”

Joint Pub 3-0, VI-6.
164 Ibid., VI-3.

165 John Kuehn. The intensity of this debate—unity of command versus unity of effort in the new FM—was most recently addressed on October 17, 1997 during an AMSP seminar lecture by one of the authors (anonymous due to non-attribution) of the FM 100-5 writing team.

Appendix A

166 This appendix has been quoted in whole from Anthing, Vol. II, 297-301. Anthing was Suvorov’s personal biographer and he accompanied him during his later campaigns (including this one) and had complete access to all of Suvorov’s papers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


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Kuehn, John T. *The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon in 1813.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997.


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**Periodicals and Articles**


Government documents


MEMOIRS


Figure 1. Italy in 1799 (Top)
Battles of Trebbia and Novi (Bottom)
Figure 2. 1813 Theater of War in Saxony
Figure 3. Battles of Lutzen (Top) & Bautzen (Bottom)