In post-Cold War Germany, the future of German security policy revolves largely around its attitude to deployment of its forces abroad. The relevant question is will Germany return to "normality," using its military as a tool in an interventionist manner, as France, the UK, and US do? Or, will Germany continue its path of reticence – unwilling to see a place for military force in foreign policy?

These two possibilities are supported by divergent international relations theory paradigms. Neo-realism supports the "return to normality" camp, while Liberalism supports continued "culture of reticence" view. This study analyses the effects of wide variety of domestic security institutions. Institutions, by definition, limit the choices available in the exercise of security policy. Through study of the effects of these institutions, we can clearly see which paradigm German security policy has taken.

The thesis concludes Germany’s actions since Reunification follow the liberal and not the neo-realist paradigm. For the near future, Germany will continue to avoid the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Germany will only use force as necessary to maintain good relations with other democracies as required under concepts such as "burden-sharing."
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Germany’s Chosen Path:  
Domestic Security Institutions in the  
Berlin Republic 1990-97  

Courtney W. Paul

Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree  
Master of Arts  
In the Department of Western European Studies,  
Indiana University  
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Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Carl Ipsen, Ph.D.,
Chairman

Roy J. Gardner, Ph.D.

Robert Rohrschneider, Ph.D.
for Alexander

In the hopes that he will also know there is true joy in learning.
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I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my thesis committee, Professors Carl Ipsen, Roy Gardner, and Robert Rohrschneider. The quality of this work is much improved due to their insight and guidance. I am also thankful to Margit Besseney Williams. Without the benefit of numerous discussions with her, the linkage between academic theory and “rubber meets the road” practice would not have been possible.

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easy for an American officer, whose career began during the height of the Reagan Era, to take for granted — the absolute importance of the society’s support of the military. We in the American military enjoy a luxury, that goes beyond dollar amounts in defense budgets — that luxury is the ability to focus on the practice of the military art, and not on justifying every minute action to a suspicious public. In that respect, their task is harder than that of my colleagues and myself.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Antje, and my son, Alexander for their love and support. Antje, who was a source of inspiration even while enduring the frustrated moods of a husband suffering “writer’s block.” She also contributed directly to this work through her objective critique and editing of the translations. For Alexander, to whom this work is dedicated, I hope he will eventually understand why his father had retreat to his “sanctuary,” instead of attending to the more important aspects of life in the eyes of two-year-old.
Chapter One lays out the thesis, supporting theories and methodology. In post-Cold War Germany, if the military is to be used as a tool of foreign policy, then the measure of its effectiveness comes from the ability to project force outside of the country’s boundaries. The relevant question is will Germany return to “normality,” using its military as a tool in an interventionist manner, as France, the UK, and US do? Or, will Germany continue its path of reticence – unwilling to see a place for military force in foreign policy?

This question is congruent to an academic debate over international relations theory paradigms. The “return to normality” camp is supported by the neo-realist paradigm, here represented by Kenneth Waltz. The Liberal paradigm supports continued “culture of reticence” view, here represented by Thomas Risse-Kappen.

This study analyses the effects of domestic security institutions. Institutions, by definition, limit the choices available in the exercise of security policy. Through study of the effects of these institutions, we can see more clearly which paradigm German security policy has followed since Reunification. This method is preferable to an analysis of public opinion, due to the general public’s ambiguity on many security issues.
Chapter Two deals with three domestic security institutions that restrict the exercise of military power, and remain unchanged from their Cold War form. These unchanged institutions are the Basic Law, *Innere Führung*, and Germany's policy towards weapons of mass destruction.

The Basic Law contains the set of constitutional provisions which govern security policy. This institution also includes the 1995 Constitutional Court decision concerning the legality of the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* abroad. Often referred to as a step allowing greater freedom to use German forces abroad, this judgement actually made no concessions but reinforced standing restrictions.

*Innere Führung* applies the principles of the Basic Law within the military by restricting its capabilities and providing for parliamentary oversight. It has existed since the *Bundeswehr*'s inception, and safeguards against use of the military beyond what the *Bundestag* expressively allows. The German government offers *Innere Führung* to Central and East European countries as a model for redesigning their own society/military relationships.

Germany continues to refuse to possess any weapons of mass destruction and remains a strong advocate of disarmament. This position directly contradicts an early neo-realist position that Unified Germany would seek to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

Chapter Three addresses three institutions which have been notably altered. Reflecting the near universal re-examination of the mission of the military since the end of the Cold War, these changes are conscription training, and organizational capability.
The government has revalidated conscription since reunification, but has reduced the term of military service from 18 to 10 months. This reduction has implications which reach beyond a simple reduction in available manpower. The shorter term of service has reduced the training cycle of units to the point that certain aspects of collective and leader training have been compromised.

Military training has changed due to changes in conscription. In addition to curtailing collective and leader training, training outside of confined training areas has dropped to almost nil. This resource shortfall has further curtailed collective and leader training in the middle echelons (company, battalion, and brigade), resulting in an experience deficit among mid-grade officers. A prioritization of training on main defense missions leaves military leaders further unprepared for non-traditional “out-of-area” missions.

Organizational capability has changed somewhat through the creation of crisis reaction forces but continues to reflect the main defense priority. The Bundeswehr is dependent upon allied strategic lift and logistical assets to deploy a sizeable force or one that requires a robust combat capability. The defense budget limits procurement of assets which would rectify this problem.

Chapter Four deals with the bargaining and consensus building within international institutions that influences two domestic institutions. In the first instance the other fifteen NATO members (including nine WEU) were able to influence German domestic policy through the decision to develop immediate and rapid reaction forces. Germany created these forces in line
with NATO/WEU guidelines, but then added numerous restrictions that made their deployment more difficult and less effective. In the other instance Germany, from its strong economic bargaining position is able to influence the national policies of other countries on the terms of monetary union. These monetary convergence criteria have led to reduced defense spending not only in Germany but in other EMU candidates as well.

Chapter Five concludes that the analysis of institutions indicates that Germany’s actions since Reunification follow the liberal and not the neo-realist paradigm. To change its current path to the path called for under neo-realism, Germany would have to alter or abolish all of the institutions described in this work. For the near future, Germany will continue to follow the liberal path, avoiding the use of the military as an instrument of foreign policy. Germany will allow some military action abroad, but only as much as necessary to maintain good relations with other democracies as required under concepts such as “burden-sharing.”
Zusammenfassung


Diese Arbeit analysiert die Wirkungen von nationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen. Institutionen, durch Definition, beschränken vorhandenen Optionen in der Ausübung der Sicherheitspolitik. Durch die Analyse der Wirkungen auf diese Institutionen, können wir feststellen, welchem Modell die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik seit der Wiedervereinigung gefolgt ist. Diese Methode ist einer Analyse der öffentlicher Meinung vorzuziehen, aufgrund der
Vieldeutigkeit der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit bezüglich vieler Sicherheitsangelegenheiten.


Deutschland lehnt kontinuierlich ab, irgendwelche ABC-Waffen zu besitzen und bleibt ein starker Befürworter von Abrüstung. Dieser Standpunkt widerspricht einer früheren Stellungnahme der Realisten, daß das wiedervereinigte Deutschland versuchen würde, sich Nuklearwaffen zu beschaffen.

Kapitel Drei addressiert drei Institutionen, die besonders verändert worden sind, und spiegeln die fast universale Wiederprüfung vom Auftrag des Militärs


Die Militärausbildung hat sich verändert wegen Veränderungen in der Wehrpflicht. Äußer der Verkürzung von Gemeinschafts- und Führungsausbildung, ist auch die Ausbildung im offenen Gelände fast auf Null gesunken. Dieser Mangel an Übung hat wiederum die Gemeinschafts- und Führungsausbildung in Einheiten (Kompanie, Bataillon, und Brigade) verkürzt, was zu einem Erfahrungsdefizit unter Offizieren der mittleren Ränge führt. Eine Prioritätsetzung der Ausbildung auf Hauptverteidigungsmissionen läßt militärische Führer unvorbereitet für nicht-traditionelle Auslandseinsätze.

Organisatorische Fähigkeiten haben sich ein wenig durch die Kreation von Krisenreaktionskräften verändert, spiegeln aber beständig die Hauptverteidigungs-priorität wider. Die Auslandseinsatzfähigkeit der Bundeswehr ist abhängig von verbundetem strategischen Lufttransport und logistischen Elementen, um einen Großverband oder einen, der eine robuste Kampffähigkeit erfordert, einzusetzen. Der Verteidigungshaushalt beschränkt die Beschaffung von Mitteln, die dieses Problem korrigieren würden.

Kapitel Fünf kommt anhand der Analyse von Institutionen zu dem Schluß, daß deutsche Aktionen seit der Wiedervereinigung dem liberalen und nicht dem neorealistischen Paradigma folgen. Um diesen aktuellen Weg in Richtung Realismus zu ändern, muß Deutschland bestimmte Institutionen verändern oder abschaffen. In der nahen Zukunft wird Deutschland fortfahren, den liberalen Weg zu folgen, d.h. die Verwendung von Militär als Instrument in der Außenpolitik vermeiden. Deutschland wird die Bundeswehr für begrenzte Auslandseinsätze zulassen, aber nur in sofern es notwendig ist, um gute Beziehungen mit verbündeten Demokratien zu bewahren, unter Konzeptionen wie "burden-sharing" [Lastverteilung].
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Chapter 1

Thesis, Competing Theories, and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

The year 1989 was a remarkable year. Some writers remarked that it was a terrible year for prophets.\(^1\) Others remarked that it was nothing less than an *annus mirabilus,\(^2\)* destined to be one of those benchmark dates in history which mark the social progress of civilization. "Nineteen eighty-nine", has become shorthand for a chain of sweeping events that continued until 1991 before a perceptible pause appeared. One of the more notable events was the reunification of East and West Germany – resulting in the emergence of a fully sovereign and even more powerful *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*.

The new Germany was different, and through an academic need to make a distinction, the old FRG became the “Bonn Republic” and the new became the “Berlin Republic.” All of the old concerns about post-Nazi Germany found a new lease on life, and the “German Question” gained renewed relevance. The failed prophets of 1989 wished to make good and set out to do nothing less than answer the “German Question.”

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\(^1\) Schoenbaum and Pond, 1996, p. 16.

\(^2\) “a year of wonders” See Garton Ash, 1995, p. 15.
These early analyses produced disparate results. Some alarmist writers warned of a "Fourth Reich."\(^3\) The opposite extreme held that NATO (internationally) as well as the Bundeswehr (domestically) had lost their raison d'être and were ready to be abolished.\(^4\) Now, nearly a decade after the events of 1989, the dust has settled, the extremist positions have retreated, and two major schools of thought remain.

With the end of the Cold War, the standards for the use of military force to support security policy goals have changed. In the post-Cold War era, the measure of its effectiveness for use of the military as a tool of foreign policy has shifted. For the industrialized democracies, effective security policy now no longer comes from the capability to defend itself as much as it does from the ability to project force outside of the country’s boundaries. Both NATO and the WEU recognized and adopted strategies calling for “out-of-area” deployments – that is, deployments outside of the sovereign territory of the member nations. These deployments were to fall into three categories: humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.\(^5\)

The relevant question is whether or not Germany will return to "normal," using its military in an interventionist manner, as France, the United Kingdom, and United States do. Alternatively, will the Berlin

\(^4\) This was a popular position among the members of the PDS and certain factions of the Green Party.
\(^5\) In this thesis, “Peacekeeping” and “Peace Enforcement” are special terms and use U.S. Government definitions. For more information, see these terms and “Peace Operations” in Appendix A.
Republic continue Bonn's path of reticence – unwilling to see a place for military force in the execution of foreign policy?

Supporting the debate surrounding this "German Question" is its congruence to an academic debate over international relations theory paradigms. The "normality" camp is supported by the tenets of realist thought, in particular the branch of neo-realism advocated by Kenneth Waltz. Liberal thought supports the view of a continued "culture of reticence." The branch of liberal thought used in our discussion traces its origins back to Emanuel Kant, with recent expansions by Thomas Risse-Kappen.

Thus, the central question of this thesis is, "What is the future of German security policy?" -- particularly concerning the use of military force as a tool of foreign policy. The answer to this question, applied to security policy, further gives insight to the "German Question" itself – Whither Germany? Liberal and realist paradigms clearly indicate two separate paths. The security policy decisions and institutions created, altered, or revalidated in the eight years since Reunification offer ample evidence of the path that German security policy has taken. An analysis and a necessary clarification of these complex institutions will show whether Germany has chosen to take the liberal path of the "culture of reticence" or that of the realist "normality." Finally, by applying our understanding of these institutions to these paradigms, we can predict the alternatives available in the realm of security policy and evaluate their likelihood.

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1.2 The Neo-Realist Paradigm

Neo-realism, tracing its roots back to Thucydides and later the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, finds an important modern source in Kenneth Waltz. His 1979 work, *Theory of International Politics*, lays out a systemic theory in which individual nation-states are the primary actors. The world is anarchic, meaning that these individual states are not subject to a higher authority. Given these conditions, survival is the most important interest of the state and military power the most effective means of ensuring that survival. States must guarantee their own survival through self-help and view all other states as potential threats.

The result of these assumptions is that all states will seek to improve their relative standing in terms of power. While economic, diplomatic, and strategic factors contribute to a state’s relative power, military strength is the ultimate guarantor of survival. In addition, states will seek to reduce the relative power of other states in order to prevent their dominance. This competitive environment establishes which powers dominate and which do not. Disparities in strength drive states to form alliances, creating distinct arrangements of power. These arrangements of power fall into two categories – either bipolar or multipolar systems.

Bipolar systems feature two dominant powers and an attempt to create a

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balance between them. Weaker powers ally with one superpower or the other to ensure their own preservation, while the two powers compete to gain the allegiance of lesser powers in order to improve their relative power status.

A multipolar system involves three or more dominant powers. This system is less stable than the bipolar one due to its dynamic nature and the multiple variations of power arrangement. Weaker states tend to act as free agents, rather than allying themselves in stable relationships, while major powers are under the continuous threat from alliances of the other powers.\(^8\)

The Cold War balance of power in Europe remains the archetype of a bipolar system. The Iron Curtain delineated those countries, both major and minor, which aligned themselves with superpower USA from those who aligned themselves with superpower USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically altered this power arrangement. A multipolar system took its place with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany as major powers with Soviet-successor Russia demoted from superpower to a more equal status. The United States, in response to a lessened threat, reduced its presence in Europe but not completely. Europe became a five-power multipolar system.

John Mearsheimer presents the most controversial view of realist thought regarding the European power arrangement. In "Back to the Future" he asserts that the best guarantee for peace in Europe is a return to Cold War bipolar confrontation, but acknowledges that this eventuality is unlikely. He instead predicts a Europe with a greater potential for instability and war. Nationalism,

or its negative form of "hyper-nationalism", would fuel security competition among the states of Europe. Only German possession of nuclear weapons could offset this multipolar competition for strength. Mearsheimer argues that Germany would feel threatened by the conventional capability of the Soviet Union (Russia) and the potential "nuclear blackmail" from the other nuclear powers. To assuage these fears, Germany would seek to acquire nuclear weapons to augment its large conventional capability.⁹

Robert Art, while not endorsing Mearsheimer's prediction of a German bid for nuclear weapons, shares his concerns about increased security competition in a multipolar Europe. He argues that the U.S. must act as the "balancer of last resort" who soothes the fears of weaker nations and lessens the need for competition among the major powers.¹⁰ Art argues that surges in European integration coincide with peaks in French fear of increasing German power. France, in 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community and the EEC and again in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty and WEU/Eurocorps defense initiatives, sought to ensnare Germany in a net of institutional commitments to limit its national power.¹¹

The Neo-realist position is that Germany, now a sovereign unitary actor, and concerned with protecting its own self-interests, will value self-help over alliance guarantees. Germany will eventually seek to increase its power (meaning

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¹⁰ Art, 1996, p. 5-6.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 7-8.
military capability) relative to other European powers. Even if Germany has not yet begun to do this, its European neighbors already perceive it as a potential threat.

1.3 The Liberal Paradigm

Liberalism, as it applies to international relations, originated in the theories of Immanuel Kant in his 1795 work, *Perpetual Peace*.\(^{12}\) Liberal approaches to international relations (hereafter liberalism), using the definition supplied by Thomas Risse-Kappen, offer the counter paradigm to Neo-realism\(^{13}\). According to Risse-Kappen, Liberal approaches agree that:

(1) “The fundamental agents in international politics are not states but individuals acting in a social context – whether government, domestic society, or international relations [context].

(2) The interests and preferences of governments have to be analyzed as a result of domestic structures and coalition-building processes responding to social demands as well as to external factors such as the material and social structure of the international system.

(3) International institutions, ... form the social structure of international politics presenting constraints and opportunities to state actors in a similar way as the international distribution of power.” \(^{14}\)

Liberal theory traces state interests back to domestic sources, whereas neo-realism holds that the conditions of anarchy in a self-help system determine state

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\(^{12}\) Original Title: *Zur Ewigen Frieden: ein Philosophischer Entwurf*, Kant, 1795.

\(^{13}\) Neo-liberal institutionalism (e.g. Greico, Keohane, Oye) is often used as the contrasting theory to neo-realism. Risse-Kappen offers an important discussion of why neo-liberal institutionalism is not the most appropriate counter to neo-realism. I have chosen to use his definition of “liberal approaches to international relations” because of a clearer distinction of the relationship between societal-domestic, transnational, and international institutional actors. *Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p.24-7 and footnotes 35-40.*

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 25-6.
interests. Where realism holds that states view all other states as potential threats, liberalism contends there are different types of states and relations. Specifically, liberalism holds that democratic states, due to shared values between their constituencies, are less likely to go to war with each other. Accordingly, these shared values significantly decrease their distrust of each other and increase their likelihood to cooperate.

Liberalism places emphasis on the process by which states formulate their interests, whereas with neo-realism, process is unimportant. In liberal thought, state preferences originate with actions of individuals and undergo transformation because of bargaining. Bargaining means that actors must alter their preferences in order to build a consensus. Interests can spread to other states at this level through transnational actors (non-governmental entities that operate across national boundaries) initiating a new preference within the domestic context of another allied state. Ultimately, these domestic interests transform into state interests which national representatives negotiate within the constraints of international institutions.

At the international level, further transformation can occur as states attempt to build consensus. Democratic states are likely to form alliances in democratic international institutions. This style of organization relies upon consensus among equals rather a relative-strength hierarchy to reach decisions. Generally, all members are able to influence decisions and can veto the decision if their concerns are not met. Because members offer input to all decisions and possess the safeguard of a veto, they are less likely to seek out new alliances. Therefore,
liberal international institutions generally have more stable and permanent memberships than the power-balancing alliances under neo-realism.

Long-standing liberal democracies in the West and nascent and fragile democracies in the East characterize Europe after the Cold War. The elimination of an authoritarian block of states and its military threat allows for an unprecedented degree of liberal cooperation among the nations of Europe. The European Union and NATO – and to a lesser extent the OSCE, the WEU and the Council of Europe – form the alliances in which Germany and the other West Europeans can pool their resources while assisting Central and Eastern European nations to make the transition into a Kantian “pacific federation.”

To understand the ability of these “pacific federations” to affect policies of European nations we need only retrace the path of individual preferences and their transformation in that process. Concerning security policy, Germany’s peace movement is the best example of the Liberal process at work. The student protests of 1968 vowed to change a situation viewed unacceptable, even irrational, to many individuals. The Generation of ’68 vowed to “march through institutions”\(^\text{15}\) and become the agents of change in German society.

Thirty years later, some of these former students have not only influenced German policy but are also the individual actors carrying it out. Politically, the “68ers” are predominantly represented by the Green Alliance and the Social Democrat Parties (SPD). These two parties (along with the PDS) form the opposition to “the militarization of foreign policy”. The Christian

\(^{15}\) Heilbrunn, 1996, p. 82.
Democrats/Socialists (CDU/CSU) and their junior coalition partner, the Free Democrats (FDP) are sufficiently respectfully of the anti-war sentiment. One could characterize their opposing position on the use of the military as not that of "hawks" but of "pragmatic doves."

Transnational actors have had an important effect in this regard as well. Aside from the student movement, which made its presence known from Berlin to Berkeley, non-governmental actors continue to shape German preferences. Notable among these are the numerous institutes (Stiftungen) such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and their foreign counterparts such as the Peace Research Institutes in Stockholm and Oslo.16

Numerous domestic non-governmental actors have contributed to shaping the national preference toward security policy. The broadcast and printed media, with the exception of a few "less-left" newspapers, has pursued an anti-military agenda that takes relish in presenting the Bundeswehr and NATO allies in a critical light.

Education has been a long-standing stronghold of anti-military sentiment in Germany as well. Teachers in secondary schools were so pervasive in presenting the anti-military dogma that the Bundeswehr felt compelled to have junior officers (Jugendoffiziere) visit high schools regularly to give classes on security policy. Part of this instruction included the legitimization of the Bundeswehr's existence as well as German participation in collective security organizations.17

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17 Author's own observation while attending the Jugendoffizier Lehrgang (lit. Youth Officer course) in Strausberg, GE, Nov. 1995. See also AIK, 1994, p. 168-9.
Clearly, history has had a profound effect on German public opinion over
the military in comparison to that of the United States, France or the United
Kingdom. In my discussions with German military officers over restrictions
unique to the German military, the reasons of history inevitably preceded any
current rationale. "Wegen unserer Geschichte"\(^1\) was standard shorthand for
acknowledging 12 years of history under National Socialism, and was a
prerequisite to any discussion of why the Bundeswehr did things differently.

The examples of German reluctance to use force are numerous and all
share the same governmental, societal, and transnational actors. The German
decisions not to possess nuclear weapons and to sign the non-proliferation treaty
trace roots back to the anti-nuclear movements in the 60’s and 70’s. A similar
liberal process, albeit with a slightly different cast of actors, resulted in the
reaffirmation of conscription in 1996, despite the opposite trend among NATO
allies. The decisions on Bundeswehr training priorities and budgetary allocations
are products of interests shaped by the liberal process, not the realist assumption
that self-preservation is paramount to all other interests.

Collectively, these "individual actors in a social context" have had a
profound effect on the formulation of German national interests and the
preferences it furthers at the bargaining table of international institutions. The
bargaining process, particularly in the EU or NATO, can result in a universal
implementation of that policy or its transformation during the give and take of
negotiation. The transformation does not guarantee Germany gets what it
originally wanted; only what it is willing to accept. An example is Germany’s

\(^{18}\) "Because of our history..."
strong preference for continued *Sonderrolle*¹⁹ (i.e. no military deployment) concerning NATO’s support to the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of bargaining at NATO, Germany had to settle for restricting NATO’s “out-of-area” deployments to those mandated by the UN while acquiescing the deployment of a squadron of *Luftwaffe Tornado* fighters to support the NATO effort.

In sum, the liberal position is that Germany can best ensure its security by fostering democracy in Central and Eastern Europe -- acting in concert with allied democracies in international institutions. Germany will diminish its military capabilities in response to the lessened threat from neighboring democracies instead of authoritarian states. Moreover, Germany will continue to impose domestic restrictions on the use of the military that are in concert with liberal democratic values.

1.4 Methodology – *Institutions versus Public Opinion*

These two paradigms offer a theoretical framework for both options. However alone, these models alone cannot predict changes in German security policy. The thesis question requires a methodology that analyses the available evidence and its support of the two paradigms. The evidence used in this thesis consists of institutions that govern security policy, rather putting emphasis on surveys of public opinion. In dealing with change in security policy, public opinion is important, as it gives us insight into preferences and interests related to change. Except in extreme cases, however, it is inadequate evidence for

¹⁹ "special role."
determining if change will actually occur. The clearest evidence follows the proverb of "actions speaking louder than words" – that of altering or maintaining domestic security institutions.

Institutions – as I will use them in this thesis – are defined broadly as rules and norms that limit choice. Domestic security institutions, through their integral limitations and restrictions, define the options available to Germany for the resolution of its security issues. Using the broad definition, institutions appear in such diverse forms as Germany's Basic Law, physical military capabilities, and the defense budget. These institutions work in concert to limit how Germany can respond to a specific security issue.

This analysis proceeds from the premise that Unified Germany is a fully sovereign nation-state with authority over its domestic institutions. It assumes that German actions are the result of rational decisions to achieve the perceived best national interest. The basis of this national interest can find its sources in both liberal shared values like democracy and free markets or realist concerns for relative gains and survival. Thus, the Berlin Republic's decisions toward its security institutions reflect the perceived value of said change according to national preference.

This preference is the result of competition of different ideals in within a democratic process. While public opinion can remain divided into polemic positions, the "give and take" of bargaining in the democratic process orients

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21 To avoid detraction, a sovereign right that Germany has voluntarily abdicated - such as giving the European Union regulatory ability over a national affair – does not affect this definition of sovereignty.
toward compromise and agreement. Public opinion must not take into account resource constraints, while governmental decisions must establish resource priorities in line with national interest. Agreements reached in this process reflect the national interest more accurately than polls. By analyzing these decisions and their effect on institutions, which by definition limit future choices, it is possible to see the path that Germany has chosen.

There are additional reasons why public opinion, despite its importance, is not necessarily determinant in the question of this thesis. Realism does not even recognize public interests in its paradigm, instead referring to an abstract state that fears for its survival. Realism assumes that ensuring survival of the state and focusing on relative power gains ultimately serves the interests of the public and elites.

Liberal thought accounts for public opinion, but only as the initial source of national interests. While individual opinions alone do not cause an actions, they do create interests and motivate actors. However, only organized actors with a sufficient base of power can see the realization of their interests into actuality. Particularly in Germany, the official position of political parties and other societal organizations (e.g., unions, lobbies, activist groups) is more significant than public opinion. Party platforms – not necessarily an allegiance to a segment of the public based on a geographic constituency – are the driving
force in political decisions. The German voting system reinforces the dominance of political parties and bars general referendums.

Much of the debate about security policy does not take place in a public forum. All of the institutional issues – European Monetary Union, NATO “out-of-area” deployments, etc. – are either controversial and technically complex or lack relevance to the general public. Discussion of security and foreign policy issues takes place within organizational bureaucracies and only alienates the electorate.

Because of this alienation, public opinion can unwittingly violate existing treaties – though it is unclear if intentional in the following instance. In a RAND survey conducted in 1994, only 41% of the public supported the Bundeswehr’s use in defending Turkey from an attack by Iraq. The majority of the respondents opposed the action, despite an international treaty (the North Atlantic Treaty) that required military assistance under those circumstances. Whether or not the other 49% respondents were aware of the treaty obligation or were willing to breach the treaty anyway is inconclusive – demonstrating a problem in adapting polls to deeper questioning.

Public opinion, particularly when expressed in terms of poll results, is not necessarily consistent. Whereas the public may accept a general principle, this does not guarantee that a specific application of that principle will have public

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22 Germany uses a two-vote system, where the first vote is for a named district representative and the second is for a political party. Under this system, the majority of parliament members are beholden to their party and not a geographical constituency. For example, in 1994 voters elected 328 district representatives, while an additional 344 were selected from party lists. Hancock, 1996, p. 291.


support. An example illustrates this point; according to the RAND survey, 79% of the German public supported the use of the *Bundeswehr* to prevent genocide. Yet, only 39% of the same respondents supported the hypothetical use of the *Bundeswehr* to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing against Albanians in Kosovo.\(^{25}\)

In sum, public opinion alone cannot decide the question of which path German security policy will take. Domestic security institutions give a clearer view of preferences and priorities, particularly when resources are limited. If the allocation of resources towards security priorities is consistent, then it serves as a more reliable predictor of future trends. By analyzing these institutions, we can see how Germany has chosen to limit its security options. From these self-imposed limitations, we can predict the paradigm Germany is most likely to follow.

Chapter 2

Enduring Institutions

2.1 Enduring Domestic Institutions

From the end of World War II to Reunification, a "semi-sovereign state"\textsuperscript{26} is an apt description for Germany's status in the world. German security policy from that era was as much a product of policies of the Allied powers as it was an expression of German national interests. The very creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955 came in response to Western fears of Soviet military might, and was definitely not something willed by the German people. Even today one can still hear remarks that the Bundeswehr was "the army the Allies made us have".\textsuperscript{27}

Germany's "semi-sovereign" status ended with the signing of the 2+4 Agreement in September 1990. This treaty ended the residual occupation rights of the four Allied powers over Berlin and the rest of Germany. The Berlin Republic was then master of its own affairs, domestic or international.

Since that time Germany has been free to adopt, change, or retain any of the institutions that previously restricted the exercise of military power. This chapter deals with three institutions that remain largely unchanged from their Cold War form. Rather than change these institutions

\textsuperscript{26} Katzenberg, 1987, Title.
\textsuperscript{27} Paul, 1995, Jugendoffizierslehrgang, ZIF and BMVg.
to something less restrictive, the German government has reaffirmed them since reunification.

The institutions I will discuss restrict the exercise of military power, but at different levels. The first is the set of constitutional provisions that govern security policy found in the Basic Law. The discussion of this institution also includes the 1995 Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decision concerning the legality of the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad. Often referred to as a step allowing greater freedom to use German forces abroad, a closer inspection will show this judgement actually made no concessions but reinforced standing restrictions.

The second institution, called Innere Führung, applies the principles of the Basic Law within the military by restricting its capabilities and providing for parliamentary oversight. Innere Führung has existed since the Bundeswehr’s inception. The Post-unification German government has not only kept it intact but also offers it to Central and East European countries as a model for redesigning their own society/military relationships.

Lastly, I will briefly mention Germany’s continued opposition to weapons of mass destruction. This simple fact runs counter to realist claims about a German attempt for a relative power gain in this sense.

2.2 The Basic Law and Security Policy

The German basic law contains numerous provisions that regulate the military and the conduct of security policy. Appendix B contains the full text of all articles governing defense. German reunification and the related
amendments did not affect any of those provisions. The Basic Law is the first and most important of the unchanged institutions.

The German states ratified the Basic Law in 1949 and made numerous amendments to articles related to security in 1956 and 1968. Both the Allied occupier's fears and a strong domestic peace movement were influential in forming the provisions and amendments that emasculate the exercise of German military force. Determining to what degree external versus domestic factors influenced the formation of these institutions during the Cold War is not necessary in light of German Reunification. Since Germany has attained full sovereignty it has not broken any of the restraints imposed by allies, but rather has reaffirmed its commitment to these principles.

Articles 12 and 12a provide for conscription into the armed forces. Rather than simply a cost effective source of manpower for the military, the draft is a key element of Germany's structural mechanism for limiting the exercise of power. The rationale is that a draft army is less likely to separate from mainstream society. As society must contribute its sons to the military, it should more closely supervise the actions of the military. Chapter Three covers conscription in greater detail, since the administration of conscription has changed considerably. Despite these changes, Article 12 has not been seriously threatened with change.

Article 24 provides for entry into collective security systems as well as the transfer of sovereign powers to international institutions. Any transfer of sovereign power must also pass the approval of the Bundestag. Though
this provision sounds innocuous enough, it is been the source of a great
deal of debate. At what point exactly does the transfer of sovereign power
occur? This article (along with Article 87a) was the subject of a celebrated
Constitutional Court case in 1995. Section 2.3 deals specifically with these
articles and court decision. For now, it is important to remember that only
two things can nullify any of these provisions: an amendment in accordance
with the constitution or a transfer of sovereign powers to a collective
security organization.

Article 26 expressly forbids any war of aggression and makes preparation
for such a punishable offense. The authors of this straightforward provision
clearly wanted to prevent the past from reoccurring. If this provision had existed
in the Weimar Constitution, Hitler would no doubt have removed it long before
attacking Poland in September 1939. The current Basic Law would prevent Hitler
from legally doing the same, even under "emergency" conditions.

Somewhat troubling is the lack of definition or judicial clarification of the
terms, "war of aggression" and "preparation." Was the UN sanctioned attack
into Iraq a "war of aggression"? Germany's non-participation in the Gulf War
allowed the Bundestag and the Constitutional Court to delay resolving this
question. Theoretically, the transfer of sovereign powers would allow
participation in a UN sanctioned attack. However, Germany would require a UN
resolution merely to prepare to for such an action. Is the expectation of a timely
resolution realistic? The answer is problematic. Arguably, the Bundeswehr's
version of a General Staff\textsuperscript{28} would be able to develop plans for such an action in sufficient time. It is questionable, though, if such a resolution would be timely enough to train troops on unique tasks or procure special equipment required for a war of aggression. This restriction would not affect the deployment of troops for peacekeeping operations, which by nature are non-aggressive. Peace enforcement operations, which require the aggressive projection of force, remain unclear from a legal standpoint. Nonetheless, it is a legal point that must be resolved if normalization is to occur.

Article 45a and b govern parliamentary control over the military. The Bundestag\textsuperscript{29} has budget committees and defense committees that exert their influence over the military in a similar fashion to the United States Congress or British Parliament. The notable difference contained in these articles is in the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Wehrbeauftragter). Article 45b of the Basic Law gives this official the mandate of safeguarding basic rights and assisting the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control. The Wehrbeauftragter is to take action whenever he\textsuperscript{30} suspects the violation of the basic rights of service members or the principles of Innere Führung. The commissioner can receive directions from the Bundestag, specifically the Defense Committee, respond to petitions from individual soldiers, or conduct unannounced visits on his

\textsuperscript{28} An oft-cited assertion that Germany has no General Staff needs exploding here. The Führungscentrum der Bundeswehr fulfills the same national planning and control of deployed forces that its predecessor, the renowned German General Staff that existed from 1807-1945, performed.

\textsuperscript{29} The lower house of the German parliament

\textsuperscript{30} The pronouns "he", "his", or "him" as well as the masculine -er ending in Wehrbeauftragter refer to both genders in this paper. It is worthy of note that the current Wehrbeauftragte, Claire Marienfeld, is female.
own initiative. Investigations directed by the parliament are comparable to U.S. Congressional hearings, while the response to petitions from individual soldiers is somewhat similar to the role of the U. S. Congressional Liaison Office. The *Wehrbeauftragter* is the sole parliamentary representative for all members of the armed forces. Unlike in the U.S. where a soldier would complain to the Representative from his district or his state Senator, all petitions concerning the armed forces go to the *Wehrbeauftragter*. Once the office receives a complaint and deems it legitimate, representatives from the commissioner's office go directly to the place best suited to resolving the problem - usually the battalion level.\(^3\)\(^1\) This is in sharp contrast to an inquiry through the U.S. Congressional Liaison Office that solely uses the existing chain of command to find answers to pointed questions. By going directly to a battalion level agency the *Wehrbeauftragter* effectively circumvents five echelons of senior commanders and their staffs.

The commissioner, in theory, only has a right to information and then can make a recommendation in order to resolve the problem. In severe cases, the *Wehrbeauftragter* can file with the proper legal authorities and initiate criminal or civil proceedings. The effect of the *Wehrbeauftragter*, in reality however, appears much more dramatic. As one German lieutenant colonel described from his own experience, "Having the *Wehrbeauftragter* take a position against a commander, was worse than receiving a disciplinary action - it would be the end of an officer's career."\(^3\)\(^2\) The

\(^3\)\(^1\) Gleumes, 1995, p. 13.
\(^3\)\(^2\) Strickmann, Zentrum Innere Führung, 23 May 1996.
distinction here is that the *Wehrbeauftragter* enter into the military structure anywhere it chooses, not just from the top. While this structure seems to want to avoid having intervening echelons distort or cover up problems; it also seems to have no requirement to inform higher level commanders of what is happening in their subordinate organizations. The U.S. approach differs in that responsibility for and authority to fix the problem lies solely in a well-defined chain of command.

The *Wehrbeauftragter* is similarly not inclined to report to higher level commanders on his unannounced visits, but rather is his own agent acting on his own discretion. This is unlike the Inspector General Corps (IG) in the U.S. armed forces (or its equivalent in the other countries), which receives its mandate from its parent headquarters. In the German military, this constitutionally given right to bypass the chain of command reflects distrust in a conventional chain of command’s ability to handle information or act. This right of information (*de facto* right of inspection) gives the parliament a power, which it can and does use to control the activities of the German military with great effectiveness. Under this system, a single telephone call from a single soldier can alert the parliament to a suspected digression at any level of the military.

Article 115a-I governs the state of defense (*Verteidigungsfall*). Though this state of emergency grants special powers to the executive, it has numerous built-in safeguards. Its prohibitive provisions read like a laundry list of Adolf Hitler’s actions that brought about the end of Weimar Republic. The combined effect of the restrictions ensures that the
chancellor or his cabinet cannot sidestep the democratically elected voice of the people, the Bundestag, in the name of an “emergency”. Additionally, the executive may not dissolve the Bundestag or amend the Basic Law during a period of defense.

2.3. The “AWACS” Decision and Articles 24 and 87a

The Persian Gulf War caught Germany off guard and raised many questions about what the newly sovereign nation could and could not do. Despite its vested interest along with other Europeans in the security of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Germany was not up to the task of assuming an interventionist role so quickly. Thus while France, Britain, and the United States send troops to the Gulf, Germany sent a check instead – citing constitutional reasons prohibiting deployment of troops.

This argument raised many eyebrows, especially in light of the fact that unified Germany was a signatory to two treaties that required the foreign deployment of troops. Article V of both the NATO and WEU treaties required Germany to deploy forces abroad. Additionally, Article 43 of the UN Charter required members to contribute armed forces, though the vague wording of “and other assistance” prevented Germany from being taken to task for not supporting the UN’s use-of-force resolution (UN Res. 678).

The basis of this controversy was Article 87a, which says that the federation (Bund) created armed forces for defense, and that they may only be used as expressly allowed by the Basic Law. Article 26 added the “no wars of aggression” clause to the debate. Conventional wisdom in the
Bundestag was that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to allow the Bundeswehr to participate in armed deployments abroad. The ensuing debate pitted the SDP, who favored limiting deployments to UN peacekeeping missions only, against CDU/CSU/FDP. The Government coalition favored also allowing deployments in support of NATO and WEU "out-of-area" missions. The Greens and PDS were against foreign deployments and pushed for further reductions in the Bundeswehr.

According to a comprehensive RAND study, public opinion supported the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad in principle, but not in practice. Humanitarian missions caused little contention with 83% approval rating. Over three-quarters of the populace supported defending threatened allies. When asked about specific countries, however, it was clear that the circle of allies was smaller than the current NATO circle. Figure 2.1 shows how the principle faired when applied to specific nations.

![Figure 2.1: Public Support of Bundeswehr Deployments to Defend Allies](source: RAND, Nov. 1994, as quoted in Asmus, 1995, pg.44-45.)
After the Gulf War, Germany began using its military more in international humanitarian roles. Though often misstated, foreign deployments of the *Bundeswehr* for disaster relief and humanitarian missions were never a point of contention. From mid-1991 through mid-1994, Germany conducted numerous unarmed deployments to Somalia, Cambodia, Georgia, and Iraq/Bahrain under the auspices of the UN.

Beginning in mid-1992, NATO Operations SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT proved to be affairs of a different sort. Here armed German warships participated in the weapons and trade embargo against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. DENY FLIGHT enforced a no-flight zone over former Yugoslavia. Six NATO countries supplied Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft to assist in the enforcement of the no flight zone. German Air Force personnel along with their NATO counterparts served in the AWACS. These missions were not humanitarian in nature, but fell into the category of "bewaffnete militärische Einsätze" (armed military deployments).

The SDP held that the executive had overstepped its powers with deployments to Somalia and the Balkans and challenged the executive before the Constitutional Court. The SDP charged the Defense Minister has conducted unconstitutional armed military deployments (contra 87a) and failed to secure the approval of the *Bundestag* for a transfer of sovereign powers (contra 59 paragraph 2). In a bid to acquire a negative ruling, the junior coalition party, the FDP, also challenged the deployments before the Constitutional Court.
In July 1994, the court ruled that the use of German troops for SHARP GUARD and DENY FLIGHT did not breach Article 87a. Because they were operating under a UN or NATO mandate to which Germany was a signatory, Article 26 allowed for the transfer of sovereign power to these organizations, thereby negating 87a’s prohibition. Additionally, the court ruled that German troop participation in Somalia was of an exclusively humanitarian nature, and therefore not prohibited. However, the court ruled against the executive for failing to acquire Bundestag approval prior to the deployment of German troops for the two embargo actions.\(^3\)

A “what if” scenario can illustrate the effect of this decision. Applying retroactively the 1994 clarification, German forces could have participated in the UN sanctioned attack into Iraq in 1991 with the approval of the Bundestag. The legal basis for the attack would have been the limitation of sovereign power under Article 24 and Germany’s obligation to the UN under Article 43 of the UN Charter. Article 24 would have been sufficient to nullify the defense only clause of Article 87a, but the action would have been subject to Bundestag approval.

Had the UN Security Council not passed Resolution 678 (as very nearly happened when China threatened a veto but then abstained), this constitutional prohibition of 87a would have applied even if the Bundestag had voted in favor of the action.

While this ruling allows for the participation of German troops abroad, the decision reinforced one aspect that makes it distinct from France, the United Kingdom, and The United States. In these countries, the command of military

\(^3\)BverfGE 286 (381-90).
forces and their employment is the responsibility of the executive. France is the most extreme case, but both Britain and the United States as well allow the executive more free reign than does Germany. In comparison, the U. S. War Powers Act of 1973 was a tremendous shift of powers away from the president to Congress (and questionable as to its constitutionality if ever challenged before the Supreme Court). Yet, the provisions of the War Powers Act are lax in comparison to the AWACS decision. Under War Powers, the American President can deploy U. S. forces at a moment's notice for a period of up to 180 days (90 before requiring Congressional consent plus 90 more if consent is not given). In contrast, the Chancellor may not deploy German troops abroad for a single day without the prior consent of the Bundestag in addition to de facto approval from the UN Security Council in the form of a UN resolution.

2.4 Innere Führung

_Innere Führung_ is a term that describes a system of controls that ensures that the military operates in accordance with the principles of the Basic Law. The translation of this phrase is "inner leadership," although "inner guidance" or "internal command" are possible as well. In any case, the translation only hints at the meaning of the concept and its implications. As such, I will follow the example of the German Ministry of Defense, and not translate this term but instead define it as a concept with a its own specific meaning.\(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\) See also Abendheim, 1988, p 33.
The Central Service Regulation 10/1\textsuperscript{35}, the authoritative regulation concerning \textit{Innere Führung}, describes it as:

"A concept which binds the armed forces' conduct of its mission to the values of the Basic Law. The concept has the purpose of easing and helping to make bearable the tensions produced from the combination of the individual rights of the free citizen on one side with military duties on the other."\textsuperscript{36}

Karl Gleumes offers an additional definition of this concept. \textit{Innere Führung} is a concept of leadership and civic education which seeks to combine the demands of the military mission of the armed forces with the dignity and rights of service personnel as citizens of a democratic state.\textsuperscript{37}

This definition reveals little that makes Germany's control over its military any different from that of any other western democracy. The essential difference lies in the application of this concept. The distinction becomes clear when we examine the four cornerstone principles of \textit{Innere Führung} and the institutions that implement them. \textit{Innere Führung} rests upon four cornerstone principles. The \textit{Bundeswehr} (including all of its soldiers):

- Is subordinate to the control of a legitimate, democratically elected government.
- Is bound to the same laws as any other private citizen.

\textsuperscript{35} Translation of \textit{Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv)}10/1: \textit{Innere Führung}. This is the equivalent of a U.S. Department of Defense Regulation, applicable to all services.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ZDv} 10/1, 1993, paragraph 201.
\textsuperscript{37} Gleumes, [1995], p. 7.
- Renounces any military legal jurisdiction in criminal prosecution.
- Limits the command authority of its officers.\[^{38}\]

We have already touched on the most direct subordination of the military to the government in the section concerning the Article 45 GG and the office of the *Wehrbeauftragter*. The Soldier’s Participation Act (*Soldatenbeteiligungsgesetz*) provides another control measure. Per this act, all military units must have an elected representative (usually at company\[^{39}\] level) who becomes the spokesperson for all the other soldiers. This measure also includes officers; for example, the lieutenants in a brigade\[^{40}\] would elect a representative just as the enlisted soldiers in a company would do. Once the unit has elected this individual, the commander of that unit consults the representative for all planning which would affect its soldiers. For example, if the company were to take part in a training maneuver over a weekend, this spokesperson would express the wishes of the group for when compensation time could best occur. The commander can also use the spokesperson in the reverse fashion, allowing a two-way flow of information in addition to the chain of command.

The goal is for supervisors and subordinates to reach a consensus on how they are to conduct their missions. This mandated cooperation is a check on the power of officers to give orders to their soldiers and differs

\[^{38}\] *Zentrum für Innere Führung*, 1995, slide H 3/18
\[^{39}\] Small unit (ca. 100 soldiers) usually commanded by a Captain (in BW, *Hauptmann*).
\[^{40}\] Medium sized unit (ca. 2500 soldiers) usually commanded by a Colonel or Brigadier General (In BW, *Brigadegeneral*).
from the "blind obedience" stereotype of the Nazi regime. In addition, regulations empower the spokesperson to act as a "Mini-Wehrbeauftragter", pointing out violations of the principles of Innere Führung and basic rights of soldiers.

Another notable feature of Innere Führung is the absence of a military justice system from the German military. The only police function the German Feldjäger⁴¹ have is traffic enforcement. A military criminal investigation agency, military lawyers, or courts martial are non-existent. There is no military prison or code of justice. The same civilian code applies for civilians and the military.

Innere Führung limits the legal authority of commanders as well. German commanders, like their allied counterparts, can take pay or reduce a soldier in rank, as well as assign extra duty or corrective training - but here their authority ends. A German officer cannot arrest a soldier, unless that soldier is in the process of committing an act that could bring harm to personnel or property. In any other circumstance, military personnel can only make an arrest with an arrest warrant signed by a German civilian judge. From this point, the civilian system tries the case and dispenses out any punishment.

This fundamental difference reflects two things. First, the military can not police and prosecute its own - clearly a reversal of the abuses of this ability during the Third Reich. Secondly, it shows the fundamental difference in the conception of the two armies. The primary reason in the U.S. for a separate military code is to deal with crimes during deployments,

⁴¹ The nearest equivalent to U.S. Military Police
at sea, or in times of war where there were no guarantees of the presence of civilian authorities. The Bundeswehr, on the other hand, was an army formed to fight on German soil. In recent deployments, the German military has had to return accused soldiers back to Germany for investigation and prosecution of crimes committed in theater.

The final “cornerstone” deals with limitations of command authority. One such a limitation is that an officer may not give an order that violates the international agreement on the Law of Land Warfare. This policy is common among all of the signatories and prevents atrocities such as the shooting of prisoners, the needless destruction of cultural objects, and the protected status of non-combatants and medical personnel. Similarly, it fixes blame on the doer of the atrocity as well as the order-giver. This removes any pretense of protection from the infamous excuse of the Nuremberg Trials - “I was only following orders.”

Innere Führung includes this limitation to command authority but adds a dimension not found in other allied military regulations. The concept adds the distinction between orders given for duty and non-duty purposes. A German soldier is to obey any legal order given for duty reasons, but can ignore an order given for non-duty reasons. This is not to say that allied forces do not adhere to a convention of giving orders only for duty purposes. The difference is who determines whether or not the order is proper and the recourse in case of

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42 Despite the theoretical requirements of the NATO treaty for defense anywhere from Alaska to Turkey, the assumed scenario was the defense of Germany from an attack from the Warsaw Pact.

43 Burkhardt, Zentrum Innere Führung, 23 Jan 1996.
disagreement. Under *Innere Führung*, the soldier may choose to ignore the order without undue recourse, whereupon the supervisor must retract the order or clarify why it is for official purposes. This aspect of *Innere Führung* creates an "institutionalized insubordination" designed to further limit the powers of leaders. This check also serves to destroy any perception of blind obedience from soldiers fearing recourse from their supervisors.

*Innere Führung* has remained an integral part of the *Bundeswehr*, and today fifteen former Communist countries send delegation after delegation to the *Zentrum Innere Führung* in Koblenz, Germany for instruction on how the concept works. These countries have looked at all the models for recreating their militaries, including the United States, and there has been a great deal of interest in *Innere Führung*. This stems in a large part from the fact that the post-Communism countries have a lot in common with post-Nazi Germany. They have replaced authoritarian regimes where the military played a major role in implementing oppression with fledgling democracies. What they want to avoid is clear – and *Innere Führung* is tailor-made for that purpose.

We have seen how the office of the *Wehrbeauftragter* magnifies parliamentary control over the military. The legal basis for the armed forces prohibits offensive wars and other laws require a consensus-building atmosphere at the very lowest levels. The *Bundeswehr* is incapable of meting out criminal punishment, and relies on independent civilian judges to enforce laws. Lastly, the command authority of leaders is limited to the point a sort of "controlled insubordination" exists. These effects of *Innere Führung* combine to ensure that no officers can undermine the will of the people.
as expressed by the Bundestag. In comparison to similar institutions in the United States, United Kingdom or France, Germany shows a much greater degree of control over the activities of the armed forces. A consciousness of the military's potential to become an instrument of aggression clearly shapes these principles.

Any position arguing that aggression could stem from Germany's inherent military power would have to demonstrate how a proposed perpetrator would overcome the numerous safeguards found in Innere Führung. Innere Führung remains true to its design as an effective means of preventing the use of military as a tool of a single person or group of elites.

2.5 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Germany has never been a nuclear power in the sense of owning nuclear weapons. The closest Germany ever came (if we can call it that) was by allowing the stationing of American tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. These Pershing missiles sparked one of the most contentious public debates in the Bonn Republic's history during the 1980s. The debate, which pitted the moral irresponsibility of using nuclear weapons against the necessity to counter the Soviet threat, demonstrated that German aversion to nuclear weapons has deep popular roots.

While the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was not one of the wonders of the annus mirabilis of 1989, it certainly was a precursor. Now even those American owned missiles are gone from Germany. The Berlin Republic has continued Bonn's traditions of non-
nuclearism. Quite the opposite of the realist warnings of a Germany seeking nuclear weapons in the post-bipolar world, the Berlin republic has not attempted to change any of the institutions of the Bonn Republic. It continues its commitment to all treaties regarding weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament. Unified Germany advocated the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and became a signatory in September 1996. Germany has also renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Germany’s renunciation of force is not just limited to weapons of mass destruction, but applies to conventional forces as well. Reunification was not even a month old when Germany signed the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty (CFE). In addition to its own forces, unified Germany had to deal with disposal of the material legacy of the NVA under the auspices of the treaty. In a few years it destroyed, sold or rendered useless an overwhelming amount of materiel.\textsuperscript{44} In recent times, it has also advocated the ban of anti-personnel mines and unilaterally moved to destroy its stockpiles. In sum, Germany has not shown the inclination to increase military power in the realist sense, but rather reduce it.

\textsuperscript{44} This included 2,300 main battle tanks, 9,000 other armored vehicles, 700 aircraft, 192 warships and nearly 300,000 tons of ammunition, BMVg, 1994a.
3.1 Altered Domestic Institutions

In the previous chapter, I discussed the domestic institutions which have not changed since reunification. Those institutions, whether unchallenged or revalidated, continue to impose limitations on the use of force as a part of policy. This chapter deals with domestic institutions that have undergone significant change. The institutions in the previous chapter were political – if not legalistic – in nature, whereas the institutions of this chapter tend to be of a military character.

These sweeping changes have occurred not only in the Bundeswehr but all in NATO militaries. The end of the Cold War affected all of the members of the Atlantic Alliance as international and national institutions scrambled to reassess the rapidly changing European security environment and how to deal with it. The resultant tumult brought terms such as "drawdown", "peace dividend" and "hollow force" into everyday usage. While change occurred in all military institutions, German changes were unique. As defense resources shrank, Germany continued to divert resources to different priorities.
There are three specific changes I will address in this chapter. Conscription, revalidated since reunification, has changed in length and added a "voluntary longer-serving conscript"\textsuperscript{45} status. The rapid reduction in the term of military service – from 18 to 10 months – has implications which reach beyond a simple reduction in available manpower. The most significant implication is the resultant effect on collective and leader training.

Military training is the second area which has changed and is directly linked to the changes in conscription. In addition to curtailing collective and leader training, training outside of confined training areas has dropped to almost nil. This has further curtailed collective and leader training in the middle echelons (company, battalion, and brigade). Further, a prioritization of training based on main defense leaves military leaders unprepared for non-traditional "out-of-area" missions.

Lastly, organizational capability has changed somewhat through the creation of the KRK, but continues to reflect the main defense priority. The projection capability of the Bundeswehr is dependent upon allied strategic lift and logistical assets for a sizeable force or one that requires a robust combat capability. The defense budget limits procurement of assets which would rectify this problem.

One point needs to be made regarding the discussion in this chapter as it focuses on the German Army as opposed to the entire Bundeswehr.

\textsuperscript{45} "Freiwillige langerdienende Wehrpflichter" - refers to conscripts who volunteer to serve 12-23 months instead of 10.
This orientation is not a parochial interest in army matters over those of the air force and navy, but rather intentional for three reasons. First, the Heer is the dominant service accounting for 60% of the Bundeswehr. The Luftwaffe (air force) and Marine (navy) make up 30% and 10%, respectively. Second, issues like conscription affect the army far more than the air force or navy. Due to higher requirements for specialized skills, the air force and navy employ only 17% of the conscripts. The remaining 83% go to the army. Lastly, there is not as great a structural impediment to the deployment of the navy or air force. With the army, the force responsible for the bulk of conducting a potential “out-of-area” mission, the story is quite different.

3.2 Conscription

Conscription is second only to nuclear weapons as an indicator of the divergent path of the German military versus that of United Kingdom and United States, and soon France. While the United Kingdom and United States have a long-standing tradition of professional armies, and France opted for this route in 1995, the German government and elite have steadfastly held to the principle of conscription. In response to the security requirements of Post-1989 Europe, the three nations have moved towards smaller, professional forces which focus on force projection and crisis intervention - Germany has notably resisted this course.

46 Based on conscription figures for 1997. Source BMVg, 1997c.
Conscription alone does not necessarily inhibit the conduct of a projection and intervention policy. Nor is it necessarily the result of an economic decision process. Both statements oversimplify the problematic nature of designing force structure to meet the goals of security policy that is based on security threat. A conscript army can be a force of intervention within the constraints of defense spending as can a professional force. The actually ability varies as a result of particulars of a national policy. Thus, this section does not focus on the concept of conscription in general, but rather how Germany has chosen to implement this institution.

The end of the Cold War created a paradigm shift in Germany's security environment. The security threat of the Cold War was a large, clearly defined enemy capable of attacking across its Eastern border. After 1989 this changed to numerous smaller and vaguer threats in the form of fledgling democracies, ethnic rivalries, re-emergent nationalism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, all geographically spread from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf. The Bonn Republic's plans to mobilize 1.3 million active and reserve troops during a several-month-long period of tension and then defend pre-designated positions close to their places of mobilization were no longer appropriate to meet the security concerns of the Berlin Republic.

In order to meet the manpower requirements of the NATO main defense, the Bonn Republic instituted an 18-month term of military service in 1968. The Basic Law required only males to serve and provided for substitute civil service as well as conscientious objection or
Kriegsdienstverweigerung (KDV). Since its inception, dissatisfaction with conscription has grown steadily among young males. Figure 3.1 vividly demonstrates this tendency. In 1994, more than 20% of the 1973 cohort, then age 19 - requested KDV status. Some estimates put the total for that year group between 25-30% before it reaches its final muster year.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Males Applying for Conscientious Objector Status (KDV) by Cohort

Birth year reflects the total for all years of muster (ages 18-25). Small drop following the 1957 cohort represents change in application procedures for conscientious objectors. Prior to the change, applicants had to only mail in a postcard requesting KDV status. Source: Bundesamt für Zivildienst, 1994, p. 4-5.

Despite the unpopularity of military service, the major parties have stubbornly defended the need for conscription, citing foremost the need to bind the society and the military together. In light of post-Cold War forces structure changes throughout Europe, the government coalition and the Social Democrats upheld of the necessity of maintaining conscription. These parties reconfirmed their positions with renewed vigor when France

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47 Bundesamt für Zivildienst, 1994, p.4.
surprised both the Foreign and Defense Ministries by announcing it would end conscription in 1996. Defense Minister Volker Rühe responded by stating that “for us, national and alliance defense remains in the forefront of our conception of security policy. Thus, reduction in conscription is non-negotiable.” In agreement with the government and dismissing what was seen as a French ploy to improve its reaction forces, the SPD Bundestag member Walter Kolbow remarked that “with us, it’s the same as before, the main mission is that of territorial and alliance defense.” This main defense first attitude by the majority of political elites would have not only important implications on conscription but also on training, as we will later see.

While the major parties have remained staunch supporters of conscription, they have attempted to ease the burden of military service by curtailing its length. From 1989-95 the Bundestag voted to reduce the term of service from 18 to 15 months then further to 12 and then again to 10 months. Despite this measure and a multi-million dollar campaign to increase the attractiveness of conscription, 1996 saw the number of KDV applicants reach an all time high.

The Greens and the PDS predictably oppose conscription and have pressed for its elimination coupled with a drastic reduction of the Bundeswehr. Green Bundestag member Winfried Nachtwei called conscription “the most massive intrusion into the basic rights of young men

50 Ibid.
...[where the state] coerces them to kill others or to be killed for others. ... Such a compulsion, especially today, is no longer justifiable."\(^{51}\)

Public opinion on conscription varies with the source of the information. In 1996, the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, General Hartmut Bagger, stated that the 62% of the population favored retaining conscription and 76% of the citizens held conscription as an important fulfillment of civic duty.\(^{52}\) This contrasted sharply with a survey in *der Spiegel* that same year, which found 56% for and 29% against an all-professional force.\(^{53}\)

Military elites also tend to support the status quo of conscription. I interviewed numerous Bundeswehr officers on the subject, and senior officers (ranks Lieutenant Colonel up to Brigadier General) were of one voice. All saw conscription as necessary, but felt that ten months was too short – as we will see later in this chapter. Their preferred option was a return to an 18-month term of service. Junior officers (Lieutenant through Captain) tend to be much more open to the idea of a volunteer force – though on the whole remained ambivalent about which was the best course.\(^{54}\)

An interesting, if somewhat strained, argument for conscription was made by the Defense Ministry's Center for *Innere Führung* in Koblenz.

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\(^{51}\) Nachtwei, speech before *Bundestag*, 7 November 1996.

\(^{52}\) Bagger, speech before *Mission d'information commune sur le service national* on general conscription, Paris, 15 May 1996.


\(^{54}\) Paul, based on interviews conducted Nov 1995 – June 1996.
Figure 3.3 lists the reasons for and against as seen by this organization. While I do not necessarily agree with the accuracy of some of the arguments presented — especially if these arguments are also the reverse arguments for and against a volunteer army — they demonstrate the points that the military wants to emphasize. It is interesting to note the length and the routes taken to justify conscription.

The most poignant example is the last item in the “for” column. According to this entry, an argument for conscription is that it ensures that there will be enough people to fill an organization that was created for the purpose of employing people who objected to conscription! This seemingly ridiculous statement belies the fact, however, that Zivildienst has become an important institution on its own by providing low cost labor to predominately social programs. Because they are inseparably linked, an argument against conscription is also an argument against substitute civil service. This fact carries considerable political weight.

So how does conscription prevent Germany from exercising military power for purposes other than national defense? First, the elected Bundestag would be less likely to approve of the deployment of conscripts abroad than the deployment of an all-professional force. Conscripts are fulfilling a constitutional obligation to defend the country — but only that. Thus, the public and its elected representatives will more closely scrutinize “out-of-area” operations and peacekeeping missions, before committing
### Figure 3.2 Reasons For and Against Conscription

<table>
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<tr>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
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<td>- Democratically compatible.</td>
<td>- Due to the coercive character antithesis of individual self-determination; collision between personal interests and exercised activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Expression of the common responsibility for defense.</td>
<td>- High fluctuation of personnel.</td>
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<td>- High level of political and societal attention.</td>
<td>- Limited technical ability with &quot;high tech&quot; systems, leading to &quot;hobbyist solutions&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Recruiting basis for professional soldiers.</td>
<td>- High material cost through greater training intensity.</td>
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<td>- Forces a separation of security and societal policies.</td>
<td>- Additional effort required for military registration (Wehrerfassung).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Flexibility through resizing the personnel volume.</td>
<td>- Problem of fairness of service; one-sided burden on male population</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Personnel replacement numbers are predictable, reliable, and independent of the economic cycle.</td>
<td>- Resistance against training exercises. (affected individuals, family, employers).</td>
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<td>- Guaranty of regional balance in filling positions.</td>
<td>- High opportunity cost (lost economic productivity, lost income for conscript).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Representation of different social and education-specific classes.</td>
<td>- Minimal social recognition; shrinking social prestige.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Distribution of costs to several parties (affected individual, communes, employers, and insurers), thus realizing a savings effect in defense budget.</td>
<td>- Danger of political controversy if deployed. (main defense through conscripts, international deployments with volunteers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Expression or compulsion to societal solidarity.</td>
<td>- Strong consideration for motivational structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conscientious Objectors ensure filling of personnel requirements of the substitute Civil Service.</td>
<td>- Job attractiveness has minimal meaning (cutting edge technology, infrastructure, leadership climate).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

draftees who are not necessarily obligated to perform them. Thus, conscription acts as a brake, which prohibits or slows the government from use of military force as foreign policy tool more so than a professional army.

The second way that conscription inhibits the force projection capability is a result of the ten-month conscription. This short term of service has implications which reach beyond this simple braking effect, particularly when we examine the effect it has on training.

3.3 Military Training

The changes in military training were perhaps the quickest to occur after the events of 1989. Training meets our broad definition of "institution" as it limits choices available in the execution of security policy. Regardless of resolve towards a particular policy option at the political level, this same option is unavailable if the military has not previously committed resources to achieving it. Training is but one aspect of that commitment toward implementing political decisions. Simply put, the lack of military training to perform a certain task (e.g. deploy a unit by air) is an institution just as restricting as a legal provision prohibiting the same action.

The above example does not imply that the Bundeswehr does not train to deploy by air. Rather, a complex interaction of factors affecting training creates this institution. Before I address those factors, a short explanation of the relevant aspects of military training is necessary.
Training, as it applies to this discussion, falls into four general categories. Individual basic training comprises the general skills common to all members of the armed forces – basic marksmanship and wearing of chemical protection equipment for example. Advanced individual training augments those basic skills and prepares a soldier to perform his specific occupation within the military. A tank crewman would learn the skills specific to operation and maintenance of a tank, for example.

Collective training is the training of multiple individuals while performing as a unit and varies by echelon. A unit must reach a certain level of competency at one level before competency can improve at the next level. For example, three tank crewmen and a tank commander form the crew or smallest echelon. These individuals must learn to work together and operate as a crew before two tank crews (a section) can train to operate together. This process continues through the echelons of platoon, then company, then battalion, then brigade, etc. These last three echelons are arguably the most difficult to train, because they are the most resource intensive in terms of vehicles, terrain, personnel, and cost. In this regard, collective training for units above the brigade level is easier to perform, as computer simulation is effective for modeling the actions of lower echelon units.

The last type of training is leader training and refers to those tasks individuals in key positions must perform as a part of unit action. Unlike basic and advanced individual training, leaders can only hone these skills in a collective training environment.
Both conscript and professional armies train in a cycle, beginning with basic individual skills and progressing through collective tasks from smallest to largest unit. The length of this cycle depends on the level of proficiency desired. As a basis of comparison the U.S. Army standard is 18 months for a training cycle that culminates in evaluated field exercise at a combat training center (CTC).\textsuperscript{55}

Conscript and professional armies differ however in their readiness based on training. A conscript unit generally receives all new conscripts at one time and begins with the very basics. As a unit it progresses through the training cycle to the point that it reaches maximum proficiency just before the conscripts are released from their term of service. This is typical for a Bundeswehr unit. The former French conscription modified this model by centralizing basic individual training at the regimental level and then sending the conscripts on to other companies to continue training. Thus, the French line companies would never be completely untrained. Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates the fluctuation in training readiness. Both conscript armies compensate for the drop in training readiness by staggering the training cycles of companies.

Figure 3.3 also shows the effect the shortened period of conscription has on readiness. The 10-month conscription term coupled with the German policy of conducting not centralizing basic individual training, results in a training peak lower than that of the subjective minimum training readiness. German main defense forces are not mission ready until three

This figure shows nominal readiness, based solely on training standards, of a single line* company in each countries’ active armed forces. The amount of training and at what collective echelon is the basis of the proficiency rating. The minimum readiness level required for combat or deployment is more subjective. The author has linked this to collective training level. A company is not combat ready unless it has trained its critical collective tasks as a company and has functioned as part of a battalion for command, control and logistics functions. Units must have trained all tasks in a tactical environment with some method of evaluation.

* - ‘Line’ refers to a unit with a combat or combat support mission. Units that conduct training exclusively, cadre units, headquarters units or other administrative units are not in this category.

Using a tank company as an example, this figure illustrates the 10-month training cycle of a main defense force unit. On the tenth month all conscripts are released, but subject to recall for the next two months. The unit repeats this cycle annually.
months after mobilization partially in order to make up for this training shortfall. Because of this shortfall, Germany developed its “voluntary conscript” policy for its crisis reaction forces (KRK), which I will discuss later.

Figure 3.4 shows a typical training cycle for a tank company. This table illustrates in detail the problems with collective training in such a short cycle. It also hints at a hidden but potentially more devastating problem – the shortfall in leader training. German main defense forces, representing over 75% of the force, repeat this 10-month cycle every year, and spend the remaining two months without any soldiers. The leaders of these units therefore function almost exclusively as facilitators for the training of individual skills and lower echelon collective tasks. There is little opportunity for an officer, in the rank of captain through colonel, to practice his necessary tactical skills outside of a lecture hall environment.

The odds are that during the course of a 3-year command, the captain in charge of a company may never actually command his unit in a field environment. Even if the officer has this opportunity, it is extremely unlikely that he will command his unit in coordination with adjacent units and higher headquarters. As bleak as this outlook is for a captain, prospects are worse still for a lieutenant colonel. During his three years in command of a battalion, it is certain he will never take his battalion to the field, and rare that he will have a chance to command a task-organized battalion in a tactical environment. By way of comparison, every U.S. Army battalion commander can expect his 18-month training cycle to end
with an evaluated 15-day field exercise at a CTC. During this maneuver, his battalion must perform all of its combat tasks in non-stop combat conditions. In the *Bundeswehr*, only three ⁵⁶ of 45 active combat battalions come close to this standard per year. These three battalions will conduct seven days of training, under structured conditions that include no night combat, no chemical weapons defense, a non-tactical administrative maintenance day during the exercise, a limited range of missions (hasty attack or delay ⁵⁷), etc.

The problem becomes more acute when one realizes that this short training cycle and its resultant loss in leader training has been in effect since the 1989. The company commander who never commanded his company in the field is now a major and possibly the operations officer in a KRK battalion. The major from 1989, who never conducted a tactical battalion operation, is now a lieutenant colonel and possibly commands a KRK battalion. How much longer will this process continue? In a word, shortening conscription has robbed the professional soldiers of the practical experience necessary to perform their duties.

Compounding the training cycle problem is the shortage of training resources. The two relevant training resources are funds and real estate. The next chapter will address how Germany compares to other allies in terms of defense spending. For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that

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⁵⁶ This number represents the three “Bluefor” units at CMTC Hohenfels, three more battalions facilitated this training, (i.e. “Goldfor”) but were not themselves evaluated.

⁵⁷ These are the U.S. doctrinal terms, German doctrinal terms are *Verzögerung* and *Angriff*.
defense spending is low. So low, in fact, that it was the subject of the Wehrbeauftragter's annual report in 1994. Alfred Bielefeld found that serious shortages existed in training ammunition and repair parts. These shortcomings compromised operational readiness rates of the armed forces and prevented the conduct of essential training exercises.\(^{58}\)

An anecdotal indication in the seriousness of the problem deals with the issue of spare parts. The three battalion training exercises conducted by the Bundeswehr in 1995 accounted for one third of the Leopard 2 main battle tank repair parts used for that year.\(^{59}\) This is only astounding when put in perspective — each rotation involved 70 tanks for seven training days. This means just 210 Leopard 2s operating for a week used a third of the repair parts used by 2,231 Leopard 2s operating for a year.\(^{60}\) Given the relationship between repair parts usage and operations tempo, one quickly sees that the rest of the Bundeswehr does not train to nearly the same extent as these six battalions.

In addition to shortage of funds, the Bundeswehr does not have nearly the same quantity of training acreage as other countries, esp. the United States. To make up for the shortage of training areas, the German government, in conjunction with NATO Allies, previously designated large areas of land (both government and privately owned) as a maneuver rights area (MRA). While always unpopular with environmentalists and locals,

\(^{59}\) A lieutenant colonel in the Bundeswehr and senior maintenance officer related this anecdote to me. Unfortunately, written documentation was not available.
\(^{60}\) Leopard 2 figures from Sadlowski (ed.) 1995, p. 341-2.
after 1989 more people began to view practice as unnecessary. After reunification the use of MRAs, particularly for tracked vehicles, all but stopped.

For an example, one needs only to compare the conduct of the REFORGER\(^6\) training exercise in 1988 with that 1990. In 1988, “the largest REFORGER ever,” thousands of armored vehicles maneuvered on the open countryside attempting to replicate a corps on corps battle. By the winter of 1990 the same battles were fought with a single wheeled vehicle representing a company of tanks. Some brigades participated only on computer terminals and related computer generated battle data to the field. While the reduction of REFORGER exercise was no doubt warranted by the drastic changes in the European security situation, it also heralded a change in the way training would be conducted in the future.

The drawback to this method is that units can no longer train on certain, necessary tasks. Using typical German tank company as an example, the only members to ever participate in the exercise would be the company commander and his wheeled vehicle driver. All of the tanks and their crews would remain in garrison, and this company commander would lose the opportunity to maneuver his entire company in the field. All of the collective tasks — logistics, tactical formations, communications, etc. — would go untrained. The company commander is in fact not even receiving

\(^6\) Acronym for REturn of FORces to GERmany. Usually conducted biannually, this was the largest training exercise conducted by NATO.
training himself. Rather, he becomes a training aid for commanders and staffs at the brigade level and above.

This predicament affects all armies, not just the Bundeswehr. If units cannot do field training exercises in MRAs, then that training must occur elsewhere or the combat competency of the unit and all of its personnel suffers. In addition to stopping the use of MRAs, the Germans have seen fit to get rid of the majority of the bases inherited from the NVA. Figure 3.5 shows the substantial changes undergone between Unification and now. It is interesting to note that while troop numbers dropped a third (from 521,000 including the NVA to 345,000) between 1990 and 1997, the number of ranges and acreage of training areas dropped by roughly two-thirds.

As if this loss of training resources was not enough, much of the training real estate in the former East Germany was unusable due to unexploded ordnance that covered many maneuver portions of the reservations. Cleaning up these areas proved to be a laborious and expensive process. One training area near Magdeburg, which will eventually become the German CTC, will not be completely free of duds until 2002.\(^{62}\)

Environmental advocates also took on the military with renewed vigor after the end of the Cold War and demanded that the environment take precedence over security. Between dud-laden areas in former Soviet bases

\(^{62}\) Wermuth, personal interview, June 1996.
and lawsuits and political pressures caused by environmental groups, only 18.8% of the Bundeswehr’s training acreage is available for that purpose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 3.5: Change in German Training Areas</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number†</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany (49,400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Germany (25,935)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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† Number of training areas does not include those owned by NATO allies.
* Total acreage of military reservations, number in ( ) shows actual training acreage.
Source: BMVg, Üben für mehr Sicherheit, Truppenübungsplätze in Deutschland, 1997a.

In contrast, the United States’ two largest training areas, Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels, cover 96,632 acres. The primary users of these training areas are the four U.S. combat brigades and one U.S. armored cavalry regiment. The German training resources have to meet the needs of 14 active and eight partially active combat brigades of the Bundeswehr.

The United States does provide for joint use of its training areas, particularly after the drawdown of United States Forces in Germany. The Bundeswehr is the second most frequent NATO user of the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and the firing ranges at Grafenwöhr. However, what is a helpful relief to Germany’s training real estate problems also offers a prime example of the third component of the institution of military training.
CMTC is a combat training center, one of three crown jewels among the U.S. Army’s training resources. Many NATO members take advantage of this facility either during a national rotation or as a part of the NATO multi-national division. A post-Cold War adaptation of this center is training on a concept called “complex battlefield”. In addition to CTC standards of dedicated personnel that act as the “enemy” and as observers and evaluators, “complex battlefield” adds personnel trained to act as refugees, media, and local officials in addition to the indigenous populace. The curriculum is designed to reflect the realities of the “out-of-area” missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Germany, as second largest user of this facility, does not take advantage of “complex battlefield”, instead training on scenarios remarkably similar to Cold War general defense plans. The units train on two missions (hasty attack and delay). Both of these pit mechanized forces against mechanized forces on a “high intensity” battlefield. There are two reasons for this dichotomy.

First, the Bundeswehr attempts to maximize the number of units it can train during its allotted time. By dispensing with the dedicated “enemy” force and using its own unit, the Bundeswehr lowers the training quality but doubles the number of units that receive a battalion field training exercise. Doctrine dictates that with two equal sized forces, only two missions are realistic – hasty attack and delay.

The second reason is that the strategic priority of the Bundeswehr is defense of Germany and its allies or “main defense.” This is not a casual
statement. It is widely interpreted within the armed forces as first train defense tasks then, if possible, train “out-of-area” tasks. For this reason, Germany continues to train as it did during the Cold War.

German performance at CMTC has borne out the results of the leader experience deficit. The senior German observer controller at CMTC remarked that in eight rotations there was not a single training day that either battalion fulfilled its mission to standard. The reason that this officer gave for the failure of 100+ missions went back to insufficient leader experience and the lack of a structured method to apply lessons learned to other units.63

German soldiers who deployed to Croatia for the IFOR mission did not undergo the practical, tailored scenarios of CMTC. Instead, as with the leader training mentioned before, their preparation tended to be of the Hörsaal (lecture hall) variety. The focus on general guidelines instead of practical application also indicates a problem mentioned earlier – the lack of experience among instructors. By continuing to focus on main defense, the Bundeswehr uses its precious resources on preparing for the priority, but yet the least likely scenario.

The absence of German experience and hesitancy to gain it regarding out-of-area missions is also notable at Eurocorps. On the corps staff, the operations section is divided between main defense and “out-of-area” type missions. Despite the fact that all sections have personnel authorizations

63 Koglin, personal interview, May 1996.
that give equal representation to the member countries, all of the German field grade officers have migrated from the "out-of-area" section to the main defense section. This now-German-heavy section focuses almost exclusively on planning and execution of PEGASUS, a main defense scenario set at the army\textsuperscript{64} level. The French wind up running the "out-of-area" planning, with input from the Belgians and Spaniards. The German officers again lose a chance to repair their knowledge deficit.

In theory, the German plan for training works. Shorten conscription except for crisis reaction (KRK) units. Give KRK units priority on training resources. Have KRK units prepare to conduct out-of-area missions, while the rest of the armed forces focus on main defense. Unfortunately, it fails to work as planned because of the common thread of lack of leader experience.

Leaders acquire their experience deficit by serving in units that only train on individual and lower level tasks that continuously repeat in an annual cycle. These units never reach the higher collective training that these leaders require in order to improve. While KRK leaders get more higher-level collective training, the odds are that an officer will spend the majority of his career in main defense forces. Limitations on training resources compound this issue by depriving units of exactly the type of training they need the most – tactical collective training at the company and battalion level. Finally, once a unit, KRK or not, gets a chance to conduct such training, either shortcomings in leader abilities or a priority to prepare

\textsuperscript{64} "army" here refers to the echelon between corps and army group.
for the least likely mission will prevent the unit from training on deployment tasks. This leaves the Bundeswehr with severe restrictions on how it can conduct “normal” missions such as “out-of-area” operations.

3.4 Military Organization and Capability

Like training, the organization and technical capability of the military serves as an institution that limits the options available in the execution of security policy. The Bundeswehr is predominantly an organization suited for main defense. Even after disposing of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), Germany retained the largest army in Western Europe, which still possesses more main battle tanks than the next three Western European countries combined. With the inherent offensive capability of tank forces it would seem that the German Army has no structural impediment for offensive operations. However, while tank forces are designed for tactical offensive operations, their strategic use as offensive or intervention type forces requires the most robust logistical “tail” of any type force. Because the Bundeswehr lacks this robust logistic structure, the majority of its forces are only suited for defensive operations.

The Bundeswehr has conducted deployments to Cambodia, Somalia, the Persian Gulf (post-Gulf War), and the former Republic of Yugoslavia since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Germany contributed troops for the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans under the auspices of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR – 4,000 soldiers) and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR – 2,000 soldiers). While unprecedented for Germany, these numbers are significantly
smaller than the troop contributions of the United States, and the demographically and militarily smaller European powers, the United Kingdom and France.

In 1994, Germany enacted plans for the creation of a crisis reaction force (Krisenreaktionskräfte or KRK) with a force projection mission. The KRK will develop gradually with completion by the year 2000. Only 53,000 of the Bundeswehr's 345,000 soldiers are assigned to KRK units. This leaves the preponderance of the military designated as main defense forces, unsuitable for out-of-area missions without a politically sensitive mobilization and lengthy period of preparation.

The KRK units' ability to deploy and sustain itself is also questionable. While the KRK, roughly a corps in size, has double the normal authorization of logistical assets, these assets have never had to conduct a large scale support of the KRK abroad. The organization of maintenance, for example, is geographically oriented and dependent upon operation from fixed sites. Medical units on the other hand are arguably the most deployable of all German units, if history is any indication. This is in part due to their size (the field hospital deployed to Cambodia had only 150 personnel) but also the political acceptability of deploying Sanitäter (medics).

The ability of the Bundeswehr to deploy abroad is greatly dependent on the type of mission and the support available from NATO allies. The strategic transportation requirements to support humanitarian actions are the

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65 2 maintenance regiments, 2 medical regiments and 3 signal battalions are approximately two corps' worth of logistical assets.
simplest as they require mostly manpower and relatively few heavy vehicles. The 86 C-160 Transalls and eleven military passenger liners in the German inventory can easily project a light force anywhere within Germany’s sphere of interest.

Peacekeeping operations, such as the IFOR/SFOR mission, have higher force protection requirements and call for armored vehicles. The Fox armored troop transport is deployable by Transall and offers troop protection against small arms. KRK units with these vehicles include motorized infantry battalion in the Franco-German Brigade as well as numerous engineer, chemical and medical variants.

The difficult issue comes with the elevated force protection and combat requirements of peace enforcement operations. Two brigades of the KRK are equipped with vehicles suitable for such operations, namely the Leopard 2 main battle tank and the Badger infantry fighting vehicle. The only national assets available for the strategic movement of these vehicles are the same as in von Moltke’s day – by rail or boat. Only with NATO strategic lift or the cooperation of affected nations for transit rights, can these powerful KRK forces participate in out-of-area operations.

The deployment difficulties are not just limited to combat vehicles either. Much of the German equipment continues to reflect its main defense design. A vivid example comes from the Eurocorps main headquarters. This headquarters, due to political interference on the part of national manufacturers, operates two redundant command information computer systems. The French PC-based system, reflecting lessons learned from the
Gulf War, fits into three Renault 2-ton trucks which are easily transportable by the C-160 Transall. The French system can deploy with necessary personnel and communications equipment in three Transall sorties.

The German UNIX-based system, reflects technological innovation geared towards everything but deployability. Two MAN 7-ton trucks carry the system, which is “hardwired” in two 20-foot containers. Neither the Germans nor the French have an aircraft capable of deploying this system in its current configuration, despite a Eurocorps requirement to do so.

Attempts to modernize Germany’s strategic lift capability have stalled. In 1996 the German and French governments decided to cancel their joint project to build the Future Large Aircraft. This aircraft was cancelled primarily due to pressures to reduce spending in light of the European monetary union (see Chapter 4).

Force modernization has suffered greatly under the tight defense budget. The army has resorted to refitting existing inventories rather than procuring new vehicles, and major proportion of the vehicle fleet will reach its planned obsolescence within the next 10-15 years.66

Much of the force modernization that does occur, seems to do so with security as an afterthought. European integration or domestic unemployment seem to take precedence. The redundant computer systems in Eurocorps, are a product of concerns over special interests and jobs, not of security. Despite the numerous advantages of the French system and that

66 JDW, 9 September 1997
it was already fielded and in use to Bosnia, German special interests managed to require the usage of an older (though not fielded) technology. Had the German units simply adopted the French system, it would have greatly improved their ability to deploy with that headquarters.

Two other force modification projects, the Eurofighter and the Tiger attack helicopter, have both exceeded initial cost estimates at a time when the military has less to spend. Early in 1997, Defense Minister Rühe created a stir by announcing that unless the Bundeswehr received necessary funds for force modernization, the Bundeswehr would not place an order for the Eurofighter. Later that year in October, he acquiesced and the government endorsed the $13.1 billion project to acquire 180 aircraft prior to the Bundestag's vote on the defense budget. The fighter, a high-visibility, “European” defense product came at the cost of postponing or canceling other procurements such as the Patriot Missile system for the Air Force and two support ships for the Navy. A cut of 1.4 billion D-Marks in the 1996 defense budget resulted in the cancellation or postponement of several major upgrade programs. These programs, themselves a “second best” option to the procurement of new equipment, included programs for the Leopard 2, the Badger infantry-fighting vehicle, the UH-1D helicopter and the night capability of the Tornado fighter aircraft.

This brings us back to the central question of how the institutions of conscription, training, and organization limit German choices for a more

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67 BMVg, 1997b.
active role for the military in foreign policy. Conscription alone is not a barrier if it were not for the shortened training cycle created by a 10-month term of service. This short term of service creates a systematic problem in the conduct of collective and leader training, thus endangering a unit's ability to conduct its mission. Scarce training resources and a directed focus on the least likely of missions make this problem still more acute. The leaders and units produced by this training institution, raise questions about the ability of Germany to conduct out-of-area missions like peace enforcement. This lack of training and experience, compounded the organizational and equipment deficiencies, reduce the capability of the Bundeswehr abroad to a very limited role, even with NATO assistance.

These critiques speak of an inability on the part of the soldiers and their leaders, yet the responsibility for this inability falls squarely upon political elites. The executive's and the Bundestag's allocation or withholding of resources is a concrete manifestation of political will. Political elites, through decisions on changes in these institutions, have demonstrated where their priorities lie. The sensitivity over conscription length took precedence over training requirements. Environmental concerns were more important than training requirements when it came to training areas. The necessity for governmental spending on other programs outweighed the necessity of funding adequate training or procurement of necessary vehicles. Commercial interests overrode security interests. These examples serve to demonstrate that while "normalization" is a path Germany might follow, there is little desire to go in that direction.
Chapter 4

International Influence on Domestic Institutions

4.1. The Dynamics of International Institutionalism

This chapter deals with two cases where bargaining and consensus building within international institutions have influenced German domestic institutions. These international institutions, NATO, the WEU and the EU, all meet our definition of institution, but not on the domestic level. Nonetheless, these international institutions were able to affect changes in two domestic institutions, crisis reaction forces and defense spending. In the first instance the other fifteen NATO members (including nine WEU) were able to influence German domestic policy through the decision to develop immediate and rapid reaction forces. In the other instance Germany, from its strong bargaining position was able to influence the national policies of other countries on the criteria of monetary union.

The discussions that follow do not focus on the debate within the international organization, but rather the domestic effect of accepting a specific decision or policy. Also important – particularly in the NATO/WEU case -- are Germany's modifications made while implementing a more general international policy.
4.2. NATO, WEU, and Crisis-Reaction Forces

Germany's prioritization of main defense and the NATO's General Defense Plan (GDP) were complementary during the Cold War. German forces, with the exception of a battalion-sized contingent to NATO's Allied Mobile Force (AMF), planned exclusively to defend German soil. The NATO treaty called for defense of any member who was attacked. Ostensibly, this meant that Germany should have been as prepared to defend Vancouver as Canada was to defend the Ruhr. In fact, Germany made no concrete efforts towards this capability. If "the balloon ever went up", as said in Cold War parlance, then World War III would be fought in Germany.

With the end of the Cold War, both NATO and re-emergent WEU grappled to redefine their missions. Both organizations turned toward "out-of-area" operations. The "area" refers to the sovereign territory of the member nations of each respective treaty. Article V of both the Washington (NATO) and modified Brussels (WEU) Treaties contain "an attack against one is an attack against all" provisions – the basis of the collective security guarantee. Conducting missions such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance outside of this area meant that the nature of operations would change from defense to force projection.

With the Rome Declaration in 1991, NATO reaffirmed the provisions of the Washington Treaty which held the ensuring of stability in Europe as a common goal of the alliance. NATO also provided for the designation of
immediate reaction and rapid reaction forces. Within the bargaining of the 1991 NATO Strategic review, Germany pushed for a strategy that moved away from confrontation and nuclear deterrence and towards greater cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact nations.  

The WEU also followed NATO's lead and called for the establishment of crisis reaction forces. In the 1992 Petersburg Declaration, the WEU declared its readiness to support peace operations, disaster relief or humanitarian missions with a UN or OSCE mandate.

The meaning of "Immediate or Rapid Reaction Forces" is self-evident, but three criteria bear pointing out: First, they must be standing forces immediately available for deployment and not subject to mobilization or long periods of preparatory training. The NATO standard to be "prepared to move" is 72 hours for Immediate Reaction Forces and up to 30 days for Rapid Reaction Forces. Second, the forces cannot be constrained for use solely within the sovereign treaty area. Restrictions on the deployments of conscripts had previously affected both France and Germany. And third, the forces must have the support necessary for transporting and sustaining these forces once deployed. In short, crisis reaction forces meant an armed force capable of strategically deploying to another country with the wherewithal to sustain itself for the duration of the mission.

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69 Kelleher and Fisher, 1994, p.165-6
70 ZIF, 1993, p 30-2. In contrast, the bulk of German forces are in the next category, Main Defense Forces. This category must mobilize within 30 days, but will only be combat ready in 90 days. The upper readiness limit for this category is 9 months.
For Germany, force projection has a discomforting historical precedent. Rapid reaction forces, unlike defensive forces, are the proverbial double-edged sword. While necessary for interventions to conduct peace operations, they are also the necessary element of an aggressive interventionist security policy. The United States, the United Kingdom and France all possess and utilize such forces in support of their own foreign and security policies. This is not so in Germany largely because of the stigma associated with historical abuses of military intervention during World War II.

The debate surrounding the formation of Germany’s crisis reaction forces, or Krisenreaktionskräfte (KRK), shares many of the same arguments as the debates on “out-of-area” deployments and conscription discussed in the preceding chapters. The Government coalition argued for creation of the reaction forces, citing Germany’s commitments as an alliance partner in the security of Europe as their reason. The Social Democrats tied their objections to a crisis reaction force to the constitutionality of any deployment of German forces abroad. Until the Court decision rendered the question irrelevant (See Chapter 2), the SDP stated it would support a constitutional amendment that would allow UN peacekeeping missions only. Predictably, the Greens and PDS vehemently protested the creation of an elite “attack” unit and invoked images of Hitler’s Waffen-SS troops. Somewhat more subtly, Winfried Nachtwie, Greens member of the Bundestag Defense Committee, echoed the fears “that the Bundeswehr, with combat deployments, could contribute to resolution of clearly
intrastate conflicts, is in our interpretation a dangerous and expensive heresy."71

The Federal Constitutional Court also weighed in on the matter, ruling that deployments of German soldiers abroad under the auspices of a collective security arrangement was constitutional. The court took pains however, to point out that the Petersburg Declaration did not amount to a treaty agreement, and that potential deployments could only take place with the constitutionally mandated approval of the Bundestag.72

Finally, public opinion was also divided on the issue. In a series of specific surveys done by the RAND Corporation from 1991-94, the German populace overwhelmingly supported the deployment of the Bundeswehr for humanitarian missions. They were only slightly in favor of peace keeping missions. As for any form of military intervention, the public was clearly opposed – sometimes as much as 4 to 1 against (see Figure 4.1). Perhaps the prevailing mood of the public was best captured by one survey respondent who quipped "War is something we leave to the Americans".73

In the end, the government created the KRK, but with two stipulations. First, the KRK would not be a purely professional force. The government deemed the conscript link between society and the military more important than the additional effectiveness of an all-professional KRK.

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72 BverfGE 90, 286 (370).
73 Asmus, 1994, p. 22.
Secondly, Defense Minister Rühe was quite explicit that there would be no “two-tier Army”. While not officially stated, Rühe’s stance implied that he was not going to tolerate a relationship between the KRK and the rest of the Bundeswehr that even remotely paralleled that of the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht.

Defense Minister Rühe announced the creation of the 53,000 strong KRK in December 1992. The Ministry of Defense has designated a total of six army brigades and two division headquarters, as well as a small amount of airforce and naval units to form these forces. These units match the force contributions under NATO and WEU agreements. One armored brigade (12th Panzer) and the German contingent of the Franco-German Brigade are KRK-designated in support of WEU commitments to Eurocorps. All

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75 The German portion of the Franco-German brigade consists of one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, one armored engineer company, and various logistical elements in the brigade’s support battalion.
other KRK forces are aligned with NATO immediate reaction or rapid reaction forces.

After designation, the second step involved manning of the KRK units. Beginning in 1996, the first "voluntarily longer-serving conscripts" (also known as "W12+" because they are conscripts serving 12 months or more) had the opportunity to volunteer to serve longer and then to volunteer once again to serve overseas. Approximately 18,000 of these "double volunteers" will be necessary to fill the ranks of the KRK. In addition to personnel, these units were also to receive priority for new equipment and training funds. A conservative timetable put out by MOD sets the fully functional date of the KRK at the year 2000.

The priority for the filling the KRK's requirements comes at the expense of Germany's main defense forces, the Hauptverteidigungskräfte (HVK). The "New Army for New Missions" consists of 22 brigades which can increase to 26 brigades in case of crisis. These brigades exist in five different states of readiness and range from six KRK brigades at peak readiness to four inactive "Aufwuchs" (growth) brigades. The latter consists only of a small cadre, possibly less than a tenth of authorized strength. In between are Brigade types B, B1 "Stamm" (root or nucleus), and A. Type B and B1 brigades are active and have most of their authorizations for soldiers and equipment. Type A brigades have four combat battalions, of which two

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76 German, "freiwillig ländersüdende Wehrpflichtige", Bagger, from speech on 15 May 1996.
77 Ibid.
78 "Neue Heer für neue Aufgaben" the title of the organization concept of the Post-reunification army.
are active and two are inactive, while KRK, B, and B1 have three active battalions.

One of the most curious aspects of this new organization is the principle of "Vermaschung" (literally, "a meshing together"). Under this principle, KRK and Type B brigades would exchange one battalion and various support units on a one for one basis. This procedure offers no tactical advantage, but rather a disadvantage in the form of missing working relations between units if the brigade were to deploy. The BMVg gives the rationale that the this principle is decisive for "the acceptance of conscription, the morale of soldiers, the attractiveness of service, and thereby the prerequisite for recruitment of qualified new talent." This seems to indicate that the BMVg fears that morale will fall in those units with no active mission. Such a drop in morale in non-KRK units could endanger the number of conscripts who are willing to make a career of the military after their initial term of service.

There are two reasons not explicitly stated by BMVg, but also likely. First is a desire to spread out the KRK units geographically, dramatically reducing the distance a potential W12+ soldier would have to relocate if he volunteered for a KRK unit. This would recognize the attractiveness that serving near home has on a potential recruit. The second reason is that "Vermaschung" would serve to reduce elitist tendencies in the KRK and the "two-tier" effect in the army that Minister Rühe adamantly wanted to avoid.

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79 BMVg, 1996b.
Neo-Realists can point to the creation of the KRK as the hardest evidence that Germany has taken a step towards a more interventionist security and increasing its military power. The detailed inspection of the actual forces show that Germany has instead taken an international institutional mandate to create these forces and diluted it. In at least two instances – a conscript based deployment force and the principle of "Vermaschung" – Germany chose to add additional limitations on its crisis reaction forces that France, United Kingdom, and United States do not impose on theirs.

4.3. EMU and Defense Spending

The linkage between the European Union’s convergence on a single currency and German security policy may not be direct, but is nonetheless an important one. Unlike negotiations in NATO, in the European Monetary Union bargaining game, Germany plays trump with the Deutschmark – thus allowing Germany to force concessions in line with its own national interests. While the reasons for monetary union are economic, there are important implications for security policy. These come in the form of the convergence criteria, notably the restrictions against a national governmental deficit greater than 3% of GDP and total national debt greater than 60% of GDP. Germany, particularly the coalition government and the Bundesbank, has been the most vocal proponent of strict adherence to these criteria.
European nations have been forced to push though cost-saving budgets in the hope of meeting the convergence criteria. Given the end of the Cold War and the unpopularity of cutting social benefits, defense spending has become a standard place for finding costs to cut.

First France, but then later Germany too had to scramble to find savings as a downturn in the economy and rising unemployment raised expenses and cut revenues. German insistence on the EMU convergence criteria served as a driving force to hasten the post cold war draw down. In 1996, French President Jacques Chirac unveiled a plan to completely renovate the French military by ending conscription and downsizing drastically. Though the need for this smaller professional force was evident after French difficulties in deploying to the Gulf War, the pressures of the Maastricht criteria made the change all the more urgent.

Figure 4.2 shows that the relative willingness to pay for defense remains unchanged before and after Reunification. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all made cuts in defense spending in real terms. Couched in terms of paying as one is able, Germany has seen fit to cut its modest spending to a much lower level than its allies. The question that remains is: What is the right level of defense spending?

In Germany's case the cuts in defense spending seem to have seriously endangered it ability to conduct combat operations. In 1994 the annual report of the Wehrbeauftragter, Albert Bielefeld, cited "that there was a lack of congruence between the mandate and the means of the
"Bundeswehr." The lack of training ammunition and repair parts, as well as the cancellation of essential exercises for the main defense forces had seriously undermined the combat readiness of the armed forces.\(^{80}\)

![Figure 4.2: Defense Spending as % of GDP 1985-97](image)

Note: These figures come from dividing the national defense budget by national Gross Domestic Product. As a result, the numbers for France and Germany considerably from NATO figures, which include paramilitary forces such as the German Federal Border Guards (BGS) or the French Gendarmerie. As the BGS is constitutionally prohibited from a combat role, and the Gendarmerie is primarily a police force, it is the author's view that the above figures best represent actual defense spending. NATO figures also include a greater portion of stationing costs for foreign troops. This is to Germany's advantage in light of "burden-sharing" but does not reflect contributions to national military capability. Using NATO figures the relative rank in spending is the same but the gap in spending closes. Compiled from the following sources: OECD Economic Surveys (Serial), UK Office of National Statistics; US office of Budget Management; BMVg, para. 457; IISS, 86-97 (serial).

Germany not only trails the United States, United Kingdom and France in GDP defense ratios but in dollars invested per active duty soldier per annum as well. In 1995, both the United States and the United

Kingdom spent roughly $150,000 per active duty soldier, while France spent $96,000 and Germany $89,000. Once France completes the reorganization of its military into a smaller professional army, this figure will undoubtedly increase – possibly enough to be on par with the United States and United Kingdom. Germany, on the other hand, has doggedly refused to opt for a smaller professional force. An increase in defense spending – thanks foremost to EMU convergence criteria – is equally unlikely.

Where does the domestic debate stand on this issue? The “friends” of the military, the Kohl government, are the authors of this dilemma. By insisting on conscription as a crucial link between society and the armed forces, they deny the Bundeswehr the ability to restructure as French Army is doing. Kohl’s non-negotiable stance for Germany to adhere to the budgetary discipline standards of monetary union ensures that the chances of any appreciable increases in defense spending are unlikely. The government opposition is not inclined to argue on the behalf of increased military spending either. The Social Democrats essentially agree with the government coalition on the necessity of conscription and rate the allocation of funds for social programs above that of additional defense spending. The Greens support the EMU and call for drastic cuts in the defense budget.

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81 Derived by dividing active duty strength into defense budget. Source of data: IISS, 1996-7.
82 Kohl, Speech before the Bundestag, December 13, 1996.
German public opinion on monetary union is skeptical about giving up the Deutschmark for the Euro. The EU survey, the Eurobarometer, indicated Germans were less supportive of a common currency than the average EU citizen. In a 1996 survey, 49% of Germans were against a common currency, compared to 40% who were in favor.\textsuperscript{84}

Returning to the central question, it is difficult to see how Germany is moving to a more military posture when considering the effect of its national economic interests. Germany is clearly sacrificing military “power” for an economic ideal. Even if the neo-realist paradigm accepted the idea of economic influence as a form of survival-guaranteeing power\textsuperscript{85}, Germany’s actions still do not fit the model. By pushing for monetary union, Germany exchanges exclusive regulatory ability over the dominant D-Mark for shared regulatory ability over the Euro.

4.4 Summary of Institutions

The KRK and defense budget form last two domestic institutions discussed in this analysis. Agreements in an international forum have strongly influenced these domestic institutions. Both agreements forced decisions in domestic security policy, and the German government chose, in both instances, to lessen military capability – either by adding constraints or withdrawing resources.

\textsuperscript{84} EU, 1996, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{85} One should be aware some realist writers accept this idea, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, while others hold that ultimately power can only be derived from military capability, e.g. Kenneth Waltz.
Chapter Two showed how institutions which predate reunification continue to limit Germany policy as much as when Germany was still only "semi-sovereign." The principles laid out in the Basic Law as well as the mechanisms for enforcing them found in Innere Führung have remained unchanged by reunification. Likewise, Germany has not sought nuclear weapons to soothe its fears, but has maintained its policy against WMD and remained one of the strongest proponents of arms reduction.

Chapter Three introduced the institutions which have changed in response to the end of the Cold War. Conscription, now shortened and with the unique provision for "voluntarily longer serving conscripts", has stayed despite the opposite trend among Western Europeans. Shortened training cycles and lack of resources has seriously affected the collective and leader training conducted by the German military. Furthermore, training priority continues to focus on territorial defense of alliance and the military organization reinforces that.

These institutions, though diverse in form, create a mutually supporting system. The common denominator is not a trend to increase military "power" in order to guarantee the survival of the state but rather a careful limitation of that power. A limitation which resists the use of military force in an offensive manner – a "strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit". Clearly, German actions from reunification until the present do show a trend. In the next chapter we will combine what has

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86 "Structural inability to attack"
happened from 1990 until 1997 with the theory of each paradigm and attempt to predict the future path of German security policy and its implications.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 The Liberal Germany

The discussion of domestic security institutions has clearly shown Germany's choice of the liberal path over that of neo-realism. The security policy of the Berlin Republic has continued the traditions of its Bonn predecessor. Those institutions that restricted the use of military power have remained in place and Germany has only shown a willingness to increase its military capability at the behest of its allies.

Only under such external influence, has Germany increased its military capability. Under the rubric of "burden-sharing," Germany's allies – France, the United Kingdom, and the United States – have insisted it do more. These increases in capability – for example, the creation of a crisis reaction force – are compatible with the liberal paradigm. Because Germany values its relations with its democratic allies, it is willing to let international interests (e.g., crisis reaction forces) take precedence over national interests (e.g., Sonderrolle).

The motivational factors are the critical difference between this increase in military power and an increase that might indicate the neo-realist paradigm. Germany chose to create the KRK to maintain its relations
within an international organization, NATO and the WEU, and not out of fear for its own survival. Had Germany refused to create the KRK, it would have possibly touched off accusations of not “sharing the burden” from other members of the collective security organization. Such an action would have been counter to interests formulated in line with the liberal model.

With the understanding that Germany is most likely to follow the liberal paradigm, one can theorize how Germany may react to certain contemporary security issues. Germany, true to the liberal paradigm, supports NATO enlargement. NATO’s invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is not a neo-realist attempt to increase power from fear of another state, but rather an attempt to enlarge a Kantian “pacific federation” by requiring democratic and free market reforms in exchange for security within the invited states. We can expect that Germany will continue to support enlargement beyond the initial three members, given these same conditions for membership.

Another security topic facing Germany is the potential for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Such a position acknowledges Germany’s increased influence in the world, but is by no means a neo-realist increase in relative power. If Germany were to hypothetically use the seat to initiate UN security actions to support its own national agenda, such an action would be subject to veto by any other member. Indeed, Germany’s seat on the Security Council may stymie efforts by other nations to use the Security Council as a “rubber stamp of approval” for ventures
with national purposes. The German veto of a French-sponsored initiative to send Eurocorps to Rwanda in 1995 seems to be a strong precedent.

5.2 A Neo-Realist Germany?

Germany could theoretically change paths anytime in the near future and pursue the neo-realist paradigm. The result of such a change would be Germany's unilateral conduct of military deployments abroad in support of its foreign policy interests. Over the last two decades, France, United Kingdom, and the United States have all conducted such deployments. A neo-realist Germany would certainly adjust its military capability to the point that it surpassed the demographically and economically weaker nations of France and Great Britain. However, for Germany to choose the neo-realist path, it must abolish or significantly alter all of the domestic security institutions discussed in this thesis.

Germany's Basic Law prevents any overt unilateral action and *Innere Führung* safeguards against any covert action (e.g. a subversive attempt by political or military elites to use the military without parliamentary authorization). The abdication of sovereign powers to an international collective would allow German participation, but this condition, that of having its actions subject to approval by other nations, does not fit the model of a state guaranteeing its own survival in the anarchic world of neo-realism. Instead, Germany would have to remove the provisions contained in Articles 24 and 87a of the Basic Law.

Likewise, nuclear weapons would be a must for neo-realist Germany since not only do France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have nuclear weapons, but so might potential near-term adversaries. Russia and China possess
nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction will no doubt eventually proliferate among hostile states and terrorist organizations. This acquisition of nuclear weapons may be within Germany’s technological grasp, but it would require violation of the non-proliferation treaty, to which Germany is already a signatory.

Germany's military must undergo transformation as well. A prioritization of resources that only supports territorial defense is inadequate to surpass the relative capabilities of other states. While a defense orientation can guarantee domestic survival, it cannot influence or make alliances with relatively weaker states. If Germany is to increase its relative power, it must be able to project that power to smaller nations seeking security guarantees. To remain oriented on defense is to lose relative power, as these smaller nations will seek alliances with states able to project power.

To increase its military power, Germany must simply allocate more resources to that end. While the institutions in Chapter 3 dealt with a variety of limitations within the military, the cause of these limitations is an unwillingness to give priority to the resources necessary for the development and maintenance of military power. Leader experience, equipment shortfalls, insufficient training time and real estate, etc. are all problems which can be overcome, but only if sufficient resources are available.

Germany need not replace conscription with professional forces to meet the neo-realist paradigm. However, policies such as a 10-month term of service and voluntary participation in foreign deployments detract from military effectiveness and thus reduce military power.
The large size of the German military alone is not an expression of military power, because of its structurally defensive nature. Due to the limitations on offensive-type deployments, Germany's relative military power could be increased by switching to a smaller military without these restrictions. With little change in resources used, a professional KRK, properly equipped and free from its current restrictions, and an inactive conscription and mobilization-dependent main defense force would enhance Germany's military projection capability.

Germany's participation in the EMU, while not a security institution per se, has effect of limiting monetary resources in the defense budget and is therefore a limitation of relative power. The abdication of certain sovereign rights under EMU - such as governmental borrowing - inhibits all members of the union relative to non-members. This collective limitation of power runs counter to the neo-realist paradigm.

5.3 Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, we have seen how domestic security institutions have been retained or altered during the early years of the Berlin Republic. We have also seen how these institutions limit the options available in the conduct of security policy. In each of these institutions, Germany has chosen to inhibit its military rather than maximize military power. The result of this analysis clearly favors the liberal paradigm over that of neo-realism.

Germany, for the foreseeable future, will continue to be reluctant to use military force as a foreign policy tool. The only national purpose that Germany will employ its forces for is the geographic defense of its borders. German usage
of force outside of defense will only be considered in a collective setting such as the UN or NATO. Any deployment under these auspices must meet the approval of the German Bundestag, in addition to that of United Nations Security Council. Even if both political bodies express the will to employ German forces, further physical restrictions within the military may relegate the Bundeswehr to a lessor role, (e.g. a support role in a deployment theater rather than a combat role). In short, Germany will not "become normal" and use its military as France, United Kingdom, or United States might.

The identification and analysis of domestic security institutions serve three purposes. First, analysis demonstrates how Germany has chosen to restrict itself and its interests in doing so. Second, knowing the structural nature of these institutions allows us to theorize about how Germany might respond to future situations. Lastly, if Germany elects to alter its chosen path, it must alter or abolish these institutions. In this manner, they serve as gauges which indicate a change in policy. Due to the redundant effects of these institutions, one "warning light" may not be cause for alarm, but rather a number of changes in these institutions are necessary confirm a radical departure from previous policy.

All of these institutions are self-imposed constraints, and Germany is certainly at liberty to remove them. Since Germany can change these policies, then a switch to different type of policy could occur at anytime. Germany could embark tomorrow on a security policy much different than today's. While the conclusion of this thesis does not rule out the possibility of change in the future, each of the institutions has an inherent resistance to change. This factor accounts
for consistent policy in the past and allows institutions to be effective indicators for the future.

The resistance to change of each institution varies. For example, a law can be reversed with a single piece of legislation in a matter of days if it has solid support. A reversal of a ruling of the Constitutional Court or an amendment of the Basic Law takes quite a bit longer. Even more resistant to change are the military institutions, such as training, organization, and equipment. The amount of time it takes to field a completely new equipment system or evaluate and train soldiers, leaders and then units on a new doctrine can be measured in years as opposed to months.

Any hypothetical institutional change presupposes a dramatic change in elite and public preferences. Such a sweeping change would most likely be the result of generational changes in values as opposed to slight shifts in public opinion. If past practice is any indication, Germany has exercised the most consistent foreign policy of any Western power for the last 30 years.\textsuperscript{87} If the dramatic events of 1989 did not change the course of German foreign policy, it is hard to envision the eventuality that would.

\textsuperscript{87} Garton Ash, 1994, p. 71.
Appendix A: Glossary of Abbreviations, Foreign and Special Terms

AWACS – Airborne Warning And Control System. Aircraft capable of monitoring all air traffic within a 200-mile radius.

BMVg, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – The German Ministry of Defense.

Bundesrat – Upper House of the German Parliament representing the Länder.

Bundestag – Lower House of the German Parliament giving proportional representation to political parties.

Bundeswehr – The German Federal Armed Forces.

Bundesverfassungsgericht – The Federal Constitutional Court. German equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court.

EMU – European Monetary Union. An effort, agreed to in the Treaty of Maastricht, to combine all European currencies into one. Membership in the European currency is contingent on individual nations meeting strict convergence criteria.
EU, EC, or EEC – The European Union and its predecessors: the European Community and the European Economic Community. The European Union was officially formed under the Treaty of Maastricht in January 1993. Currently consists of 15 members – see Figure A.2 for membership.

*Grundgesetz* – Lit. Basic law. This document, though providing for an eventual replacement by a constitution (*Verfassung*), carries the full weight of and acts as a *de facto* constitution.

*Innere Führung* – Inner leadership. The name of set of controls that ensure military compliance with the Basic Law and protects the rights of soldiers.

Humanitarian Operations – operations which seek to assist a civilian populace beset by adverse conditions. Examples include natural disasters such as earthquakes or typhoons, or those collateral to a military operation such as famine and refugee support. (See also Peace Operations)

KRK – Krisenreaktionskräfte, Germany’s 53,000-man crisis reaction force.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Collective defense organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Consists of 16 members and three invitees, and is parent organization to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). See Figure A.2 for membership of organization and sub-organizations.

Peace building* - Post conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic, that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace Enforcement* - The application of military force or the threat of its use normally pursuant to international authorization to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions, which maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Purpose of Peace Enforcement is the restoration of peace under conditions defined by the international community. The legal basis for Peace Enforcement operations is Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Peacekeeping* - Neutral military or paramilitary operations undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The legal basis for Peacekeeping operations is Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Peacemaking* - a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolve issues that led to conflict.

Peace Operations* - umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities: activities with a predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peace building) and two complementary military activities - peace keeping and peace making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to Diplomacy</th>
<th>Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Peace Enforcement</th>
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<td>Peacemaking</td>
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<td>Peace Building</td>
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Low < -----------------Likelihood of Armed Conflict----------------- > High
More Diplomatic < ------------ Proponency ---------------- > More Military

WEU – Western European Union. A collective security organization with 10 full members formed under the modified Treaty of Brussels in 1954. (See Figure A.2 for membership)
Figure A.2: Comparison of membership in the various organizations

Compiled from: BMVg, 1996a, p. 22; NATO1996a &1996d, OSCE 1996.
Appendix B

Security-Related Excerpts from the Basic Law\textsuperscript{88}


...  

\textit{Article 12} (Right to choose an occupation, prohibition of forced).  
\textit{As amended March 19, 1956.}

1. All Germans have the right freely to choose their trade or profession their place of work and their place of training. The practice of trades and professions may be regulated by law.

2. No one may be compelled to perform a particular work except within the framework of a traditional compulsory public service which applies generally and equally to all. Anyone who refuses on conscientious grounds to render war service involving the use of arms may be required to render an alternative service. The duration of this alternative service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details shall be regulated by a law which shall not prejudice freedom of conscience and shall provide also for the possibility of an alternative service having no connection with any unit of the Armed Forces.

3. Women shall not be required by law to render service in any unit of the Armed Forces. On no account shall they be employed in any service involving the use of arms.

\textsuperscript{88} Author's excerpts from official English translation of the German Basic Law, http:\www.bundesregierung.de .
4. Forced labor may be imposed only in the event that a person is deprived of his freedom by the sentence of a court.

*Article 12a (Liability to military and other service) (added 24 June 1968)*

1. Men who have attained the age of 18 years may be required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a civil defense organization.

2. A person who refuses, on grounds of conscience, to render war service involving the use of arms may be required to render a substitute service. The duration of such substitute service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details shall be regulated by a statute which shall not interfere with freedom to take a decision based on conscience and shall also provide for the possibility of a substitute service not connected with units of the Armed Forces or of the Federal Border Guard.

3. Persons liable to military service who are not required to render service pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may, during a state of defense (*Verteidigungsfall*), be assigned by or pursuant to a statute to an employment involving civilian services for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population; it shall, however, not be permissible to assign persons to an employment subject to public law except for the purpose of discharging police functions or such other functions of public administration as can only be discharged by persons employed under public law. Persons may be assigned to an employment -as referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph- with the Armed forces, including the supplying and servicing of the latter, or with public administrative authorities; assignments to employment connected with supplying and servicing the civilian population shall not be permissible except in order to meet their vital requirements or to guarantee their safety.

4. Where, during a state of defense, civilian service requirements in the civilian health system or in the stationary military hospital organization cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between eighteen and fifty-
five years of age may be assigned to such services by or pursuant to a statute. They may on no account render service involving the use of arms.

5. Prior to the existence of a state of defense, assignments, under paragraph 3 of this Article may only be made where the requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 80a are satisfied. It shall be admissible to require persons by or pursuant to a statute to attend training courses in order to prepare them for the performance of such services in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article as require special knowledge or skills. To this extent, the first sentence of this paragraph shall not apply.

6. Where, during a state of defense, staffing requirements for the purposes referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of this Article cannot be met on a voluntary basis, the right of a German to quit the pursuit of his occupation or quit his place of work may be restricted by or pursuant to a statute in order to meet these requirements. The first sentence of paragraph 5 of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis prior to the existence of a state of defense.

...
2. Laws for defense purposes, including the protection of the civilian population may provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).

Article 24 (Entry into a collective security system)
1. The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.
2. For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.
3. For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation will accede to agreements concerning a general, comprehensive and obligatory system of international arbitration.

Article 25 (Public international law and federal law)
The general rules of public international law form part of the Federal law. They take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the Federal territory.

Article 26 (Ban on preparing a war of aggression)
1. Activities tending and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offense.
2. Weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported or marketed only with the permission of the Federal Government. Details will be regulated by a Federal Law.

...
Article 45a  (Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defense)  
Added March 19, 1956.

1. The Bundestag shall appoint a Committee on Foreign Affairs and a Committee on Defense. (2nd sentence deleted, 23 Aug 1976)  
2. The Committee on Defense shall also have the rights of a committee on investigation. Upon the motion of one fourth of its members it shall have the duty to make a specific matter the subject of investigation.  
3. Article 44 paragraph (1) shall not be applied in matters of defense.

Article 45b  (Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag)  
Inserted 17 July 1975  
A Defense Commissioner of the Bundestag shall be appointed to safeguard the basic rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control. Details shall be regulated by a federal statute.

...  

Article 65a  (Power of command over the Armed Forces)  
Amended 24 June 1968  
Power of command in respect of the Armed Forces shall be vested in the Federal Minister of Defense.

...  

Article 87a.  (Establishment and powers of the Armed Forces)  
(Added March 19, 1956)  
1. The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for Defense purposes. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget.
2. Apart from Defense, the Armed Forces may only be used insofar as explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.

3. While a state of Defense or a state of tension exists, the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and discharge functions of traffic control insofar as this is necessary for the performance of their Defense mission. Moreover, the Armed Forces may, when a state of Defense or a state of tension exists, be entrusted with the protection of civilian property also in support of police measures; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

4. In order to avert any imminent danger to the existence or to the free democratic basic order of the Federation or a Land, the Federal Government may, should conditions as envisaged in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Guard be inadequate, use the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Guard in the protection of civilian property and in combating organized and militantly armed insurgents. Any such use of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued whenever the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.

Article 87b (Administration of the Federal Armed Forces)
(Added March 19, 1956)

1. The administration of the Federal defense Forces shall be conducted as a Federal administration with its own administrative substructure. Its function shall be to administer matters pertaining to personnel and to the immediate supply of the material requirements of the Armed Forces. Tasks connected with benefits to invalids or construction work shall not be assigned to the administration of the Federal Defense Forces except by Federal legislation which shall require the consent of the Bundesrat. Such consent shall also be required for any legislative provisions empowering the administration of the Federal Defense Forces to interfere with rights of third parties: this shall, however, not apply in the case of laws concerning personnel.
2. Moreover, Federal laws concerning defense including recruitment for military service and protection of the civilian population may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, stipulate that they shall be carried out, wholly or in part, either under Federal administration with its own administrative substructure or by the Laender acting as agents of the Federation. If such laws are executed by the Laender acting as agents of the Federation, they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, stipulate that the powers vested by virtue of Article 85 in the Federal Government and appropriate highest Federal authorities shall be transferred wholly or partly to higher Federal authorities in such an event it may be enacted that these authorities shall not require the consent of the Bundesrat in issuing general administrative rules as referred to in Article 85 paragraph (2) first sentence.

Xa. STATE OF DEFENSE

 Entire section Xa inserted by federal statute, June 1968

Article 115a (Concept and determination of a state of Defense)

1. The determination that federal territory is being attacked by armed force or that such an attack is directly imminent (state of Defense) shall be made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall be made at the request of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of the members of the Bundestag.

2. Where the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and where insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely assembly of the Bundestag, or where there is no quorum in the Bundestag, the Joint Committee shall make this determination with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members.

3. The determination shall be promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the Federal President pursuant to Article 82. Where this cannot done in time,
the promulgation shall be effected in another manner; it shall subsequently be printed in the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.

4. Where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force and where the competent bodies of the Federation are not in a position at once to make the determination provided for in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, such determination shall be deemed to have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The Federal President shall announce such time as soon as circumstances permit.

5. Where the determination of the existence of a state of Defense has been promulgated and where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, the Federal President may, with the consent of the Bundestag, issue declarations under international law regarding the existence of such state of Defense. Where the conditions mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Article apply, the Joint Committee shall act in substitution for the Bundestag.

Article 115b (Transfer of command to the Federal Chancellor)
Upon the promulgation of a state of Defense, the power of command over the Armed Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor.

Article 115c (Extension of legislative powers of the Federation)
1. The Federation shall have the right to legislate concurrently in respect of a state of Defense even on matters within the legislative powers of the Laender. Such statutes shall require the consent of the Bundesrat.
2. Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of Defense to the extent required by conditions obtaining while such state of Defense exists may make:
   • 1. preliminary provision for compensation to be made in the event of property being taken, in derogation of the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 14;
• 2. provision for a time-limit other than that referred to in the third sentence of paragraph (2) and the first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 104 in respect of deprivations of liberty, but not exceeding four days at the most, in a case where no judge has been able to act within the time-limit applying in normal times.

3. Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of Defense to the extent required for averting an existing or directly imminent attack may, subject to the consent of the Bundesrat, regulate the administration and the financial system of the Federation and the Laender in derogation of Sections VIII, VIIia and X, provided that the viability of the Laender, communes and associations of communes is safeguarded, particularly in financial matters. (As amended by federal statute of 12 May 1969)

4. Federal statutes enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph 1 of paragraph (2) of this Article may, for the purpose of preparing for their enforcement, be applied even prior to the occurrence of a state of Defense.

Article 115d (Legislative process in the case of urgent bills)

1. While a state of Defense exists, the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article shall apply in respect of federal legislation, in derogation of the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 76, the second sentence of paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) to (4) of Article 77, Article 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82.

2. Bills submitted as urgent by the Federal Government shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall debate such bills together without delay. Insofar as the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary, the majority of its votes shall be required for any such bill to become a statute. Details shall be regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the consent of the Bundesrat.
3. The second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 115a shall apply *mutatis mutandis* in respect of the promulgation of such statutes.

**Article 115e** (Powers of the Joint Committee)

1. Where, in a state of Defense, the Joint Committee determines with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members, that insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely assembly of the *Bundestag* or that there is no quorum in the *Bundestag*, the Joint Committee shall have the status of both the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat* and shall exercise their rights as one body.

2. The Joint Committee may not enact any statute to amend this Basic Law or to deprive it of effect or application either in whole or in part. The Joint Committee shall not be authorized to enact statutes pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article 24 or to Article 29.

**Article 115f** (Powers of the Federal Government)

1. In a state of Defense, the Federal Government may, to the extent necessitated by circumstances: 1. use the Federal Border Guard throughout the federal territory; 2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land governments and, where it deems the matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may delegate this power to members of Land governments to be designated by it.

2. The *Bundestag*, the *Bundesrat* and the Joint Committee shall be informed without delay of the measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article.

**Article 115g** (Status and functions of the Federal Constitutional Court)
The constitutional status and the performance of the constitutional functions of the Federal Constitutional Court and its judges shall not be impaired. The Federal Constitutional Court Act may not be amended by a statute enacted by the Joint Committee except insofar as such amendment is required.
the Federal Constitutional Court, to maintain the capability of the Court to function. Pending the enactment of such a statute, the Federal Constitutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to maintain the capability of the Court to carry out its work. Any decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court in pursuance of the second and third sentences of this Article shall require a two-thirds majority of the judges present.

Article 115h (Functioning capability of constitutional organs)

1. Any legislative terms of the Bundestag or of Land parliaments due to expire while a state of Defense exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of Defense. A term of office of the Federal President due to expire while a state of Defense exists, and the exercise of his functions by the President of the Bundesrat in case of the premature vacancy of the Federal President’s office, shall end nine months after the termination of such state of Defense. The term of office of a member of the Federal Constitutional Court due to expire while a state of Defense exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of Defense.

2. Should the necessity arise for the Joint Committee to elect a Federal Chancellor, the Committee shall do so with the majority of members; the Federal President shall propose a candidate to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee can express its lack of confidence the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with a two-thirds majority of its members.

3. The Bundestag shall not be dissolved while a state of Defense exists.

Article 115i (Powers of the Land governments)

1. Where the competent federal bodies are incapable of taking measures necessary to avert the danger, and where the situation imperatively calls for immediate independent action in individual parts of the federal territory, the Land governments or the authorities or commissioners designated by them shall be authorized to take, within their respective spheres of competence, the measures provided for in paragraph (I) of Article 115f.
2. Any measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of the present Article may be revoked at any time by the Federal Government, or, in relation to Land authorities and subordinate federal authorities, by Land ministers-presidents.

Article 115k (Duration of validity of extraordinary legal provisions)

1. Statutes enacted in accordance with Articles 115c, 115e and 115g as well as ordinances issued by virtue of such statutes, shall, for the duration of their applicability, suspend law which is inconsistent with such statutes or ordinances. This shall not apply to earlier legislation enacted by virtue of Articles 115c, 115e or 115g.

2. Statutes adopted by the Joint Committee, as well as ordinances as by virtue of such statutes, shall cease to have effect not later than months after the termination of a state of Defense.

3. Statutes containing provisions that diverge from Articles 91a, 104a, 106 and 107 shall apply no longer than the end of the second fiscal year following upon the termination of a state of Defense. After such termination they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, be amended by federal legislation so as to return to the provisions made in Sections VIIIa and X. (As amended by federal statute of 12 May 1969)

Article 115l (Repeal of extraordinary statutes and measures, termination of a state of Defense, conclusion of peace)

1. The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time repeal statutes enacted by the Joint Committee. The Bundesrat may demand that the Bundestag make a decision on such matter. Any measures taken by the Joint Committee or the Federal Government to avert a danger shall be revoked where the Bundestag and the Bundesrat so decide.

2. The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time declare a state of Defense terminated by a decision to be promulgated by the Federal President. The Bundesrat may demand that the Bundestag make a
decision on such matter. A state of Defense shall, without delay, be declared terminated where the prerequisites for the determination thereof no longer exist.

3. The conclusion of peace shall be the subject of a federal statute.
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