Central Eurasia

Military Affairs
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CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Criticism of Main Military Procuracy
92UM0735A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
No 29, 13 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Colonel of Justice Vladimir Sergeyev: "The Leopard Cannot Change His Spots"]

[Text] I know this "firm" inside out, since I worked in the Main Military Procuracy. If its present leadership is not replaced and functions changed radically, this leopard will never change his spots.

I shall begin with a high point in developed socialism, a time of extensive oversight of strict observance of the law, the prerogative of the USSR Procurator General. His power extended into the Army. The Procurator General's interests were represented in the Army by the GVP [Main Military Procuracy]. The head of the latter—at the same time a deputy to the Procurator General—differed from his civilian chief in that he carried the rank of General.

It should not come as a surprise to anyone that the USSR Procuracy constituted a pillar of the system for more than 70 years, serving totalitarianism faithfully. The same may be said about the GVP.

However, strange as it may seem, the Military Procuracy apparatus grew larger and stronger than ever before in the last few years, in spite of massive attacks waged on totalitarianism by democratic forces. Showing up in the GVP were two new directorates, several new departments, and a bunch of new posts for colonels and generals. Whereas in previous times no more than two general officer ranks were awarded in a year, things got to the point where the rank was handed out by the dozen. Maneuvers ostensibly made to reduce the average age of service personnel amounted to nothing less than bringing in pliant, complacent youths.

The GVP was moved from the old building to another one, an old single-standing edifice that was much larger than the previous apartments. The Procuracy was then assigned an additional building; this one was located on Kropotkinskaya Street. This also was the time when Procuracy officials were gifted new residential apartments, even though they were not entitled to receive improving living quarters.

The USSR Procuracy—as well as the GVP—was the recipient of emissaries in the form of officials from the CPSU Central Committee and the Main Political Directorate. This included V. Smirnov and A. Lavrentyev, who had become generals of justice; this was the same Lavrentyev who had never worked a day in the procuratory organs. All of a sudden, he showed up to take over a highly responsible post, that of Cadres chief in the GVP.

An earlier arrival was another former Central Committee member: V. Frolov. He had openly supported the August takeover attempt. Included in the party favorites was A. Muranov, who assumed the rank of Lieutenant-General as soon as he joined the Military Tribunals Directorate.

Sessions of the GVP Collegium—mounted much the same as theatrical productions—would be mandatorily attended by overseers from the CPSU Central Committee, who, with their put-on knowledgeability and look of great dignity, were there to impose themselves upon the procurators. They sat there in the pre-putsch months, alongside Yazov, Lizichev, and Kochetov, instructing GVP workers in how they were to proceed in the struggle against the "Yeltsin-Popov Mafia."

The demagoguery diminished with every passing day, as the people's eyes were opened to the truth. The GVP itself had known the truth for some time. The average military procurator was aware of the abuse of privileges, such as those enjoyed by the generals. He was also aware of the economic sufferings of rank-and-file Soviet Army officers.

Premier V. Pavlov demanded that he be granted extraordinary authority, while the GVP leadership insisted that the USSR Procuracy and the USSR Armed Forces Procuracy grant it greater punitive functions within the Army.

The present Criminal Code includes 31 articles listing military crimes carrying a penalty of imprisonment. A number of articles consist of two and even three parts. In a word, there is much there to instill fear of punishment for commission of a military crime.

The Ministry of Defense and the GVP stood guard over the interests of the military-industrial complex, the needs of which were filled by expenditures amounting to billions of rubles. When it came to improving the welfare of the Army sector, the spending was pitifully inadequate. If anyone were to raise his voice in protest in this sector, the military procurator (who after all existed for this very purpose) would bring the troublemaker in line in short order. This, even though many Army persons of common sense had known for some time that the basic problem had to do with the lack of rights and poverty which drove the man in uniform to violate regulations.

I was dismayed as I read a letter written by Pacific Fleet Captain Pochtariev, who had been found guilty, of all things, of raising his voice in his own defense. How many appeals he filed! Not one procurator came to his aid. Many months were to pass for Pochtariev, his parents, and attorney, before the USSR Supreme Court finally issued the verdict of "not guilty." But just look at how procurators vied with each other at that time! As Pochtariev was suffering unjustified punishment, many procurators rose in rank and post. That was when Pacific Fleet Procurator V. Kaunin became a General and won a transfer to Moscow to assume a high post in the GVP.
Senior Lieutenant Puzakov (also of the Pacific Fleet), for his having dared to disagree with his commanding officer, was also unmercifully trampled on: He was first reduced in grade, then transferred from Vladivostok to the "boondocks." When he complained of these illegal acts, they got to him even in the "boondocks." He was tried and found to be materially responsible, levied with a fine of 6,000 rubles, then thrown out of the Navy. It took years for justice to triumph: His good name was restored and money returned. V. Kaunin was familiar with all the details of the unjust treatment of the lieutenant but did nothing to discharge his procurator function. S. Puzakov presently lives in Astrakhan, where after civilianizing he became a deputy. He winces when he recalls his Navy service.

The case of Puzakov is not the only instance of this kind. Dozens of other cases bear witness to the fact that among military procurators there are many honorable and intelligent persons who are dismayed with their position and role as protectors of interests of the military elite and such a monster as the GVP. They were the first to raise their voices against the corrupt military higher-ups; they were the first to have something to say about abuse of dachas by generals and other illegal privileges.

Colonel of Justice A. Varfolomeyev, a comrade-in-arms of V. Kaunin and Chief of the General Supervision Department, was heard to make the following remark: "As soon as my boys take up a more or less serious investigation, higher-ups start to apply pressure, saying to them something like, 'Do not go any further; that is not something in which you should become involved.'" Incidentally, A. Katushev, former GVP chief, forbade this department's officers to show up in the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense without first obtaining permission directly from him. Really. The leadership of that time was highly displeased when, after my transfer from the GVP to the USSR KNK [Committee of People's Control], I took a highly serious interest in looking into dacha abuses on the part of generals and began to attend military procuracy collegium sessions. After all, I could leak a negative story, the kind that the GVP tried to keep under control, the same as the Diamond Fund's keeping of diamonds. It wound up where Katushev issued an order prohibiting me from visiting the GVP.

I am well aware that it is mainly rank-and-file service personnel that are serving time in penal colonies, camps, and disciplinary battalions. Persons of higher rank are almost always "pulled out of the fire." They are either sent to another duty station or transferred to Moscow for a safe assignment.

At the end of 1988, I, along with Main Military Procuracy officers, became involved in an investigation into the matter of an illegal sale of a service dacha for an low price (1,400 rubles) located in a resort area of the Moscow suburbs, in the village of Arkhangel'skoye. The house was purchased by G. Molchanov, a Colonel in the Ministry of Defense Main Cadres Directorate. The matter involved a two-story dacha with underground garage and swimming pool built for the Colonel by military construction organizations at no cost to him. The deal included involvement by a large number of highly-placed officials of the Ministry of Defense, including Lieutenant-General N. Gryaznov, who was instrumental in promoting the illegal agreement. As I expected, the matter ended without any positive action taken. Gryaznov was promoted to Colonel-General and assigned to a higher post. Molchanov was discharged into the reserves, carrying with him honors and a substantial bonus.

I recall how Major-General V. Vasil'ev spoke before Ministry of Defense officers, referring to newspaper accounts of dacha privilege abuse by Yazov and his team as slander directed against the Soviet Army. In an encounter with me, he told me that if I did not stop "digging around," that "we would deal with you." The "we" meant the Main Military Procuracy, the firm which is engaged not in a struggle for observance of the law in the Army, but in protecting the system and the upper echelon of Army commanders.

However, deceit and force can go only so far. Changes have taken place in the country. The shape of the country has merged into the past, as have Yazov and Lizichev of the Ministry of Defense and many others so idolized by the GVP. Also a thing of the past is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the inspiration and organizer of "victories." The military procuracy however has been spared change. It continues to ignore honorable officers, encourages infringement upon the rights of the man in uniform, and fosters abuse and corruption.

A military procurator of a Pechora garrison, Major of Justice V. Vlasov, made an exhaustive inquiry into the condition of military builders. He wrote to Major-General V. Zakimovat in Moscow to tell him of the deficiencies he had uncovered. The procurator's report presented a graphic picture of the awful condition of lower-scale service persons. Vlasov invited Moscow to think some more about those persons and extend a hand of charity. He argued that improvements would result in less criminality. Nonetheless, this "washing of dirty linen in public" (we are discussing a district commanded by A. Makashev, who was known for his reactionary views) was prohibited by the GVP. Vlasov's superiors were made to understand that their subordinate was to be delivered a severe reprimand, so as to teach him not to "misuse his rights" in Moscow. It was much more important for Makashev to maintain his personal peace of mind than deal with the rights of servicemen. After the winds of change blew over Pechora, Gorsovet Deputy V. Vlasov once more moved to center stage, this time to propose that military justice be reformed. Once again he was openly attacked.

In the fall of last year, the Soldiers' Mothers of Russia group came out with a severe criticism directed at the GVP, demanding the retirement of generals L. Zaika and V. Frolov and of other persons who supported the
August putsch. Vlasov, the uncoverer of wrongdoings, once again became the target of massed attacks. No sooner had he descended from the speaker’s platform after addressing the meeting of the soldiers’ mothers when an assault party was dispatched from the district Procuracy to the Procuracy of the Pechora garrison, the purpose being to gather information that would discredit the colleague who had gone too far. This previously was referred to as a “search for enemies of the people”; it has become “rendering of practical work assistance,” “control.” Were it not for the intervention of USSR People’s Deputy V. Lopatin, Vlasov would have been “eaten alive.” He may be “eaten” yet, incidentally. I doubt that the Main Military Procuracy can forget this insult. It has an excellent memory and long arms. Its leadership has not changed; the higher-ups have kept their posts. No good can be expected from this kind of people. The procommunist clan has its own set of rules and well-developed ways to twist arms.

Also not to be let off easily by their “own people” were Colonels of Justice Yu. Ostrikov and V. Nagibin, deputy military procurators of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Garrison. They also “insulted” Zaika and people of that ilk, openly pointing a finger at the wrongs prevalent in the military procuracy. They also were vilified, intimidated, and threatened with petty investigation. While they are alive. But Zaika’s team is also alive. This, in the continued absence of an investigation into the GVP leadership’s activity at the time of the putsch, in spite of persistent requests by many officers serving in the procurator proper to mount one.

It is said that the GVP is now subordinate to the Russian Procuracy. Rest assured that it is subordinate to no one. I have nothing against the military procuracy as such. However, if this institution retains its former overly punitive functions, and if the former leadership remains at the helm, the institution will never arrive at the point where it can assume protecting the rights of the man in uniform.

Lack of Resources Effect on Military Training

92UM0721A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 21 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major O. Vachayev under rubric “Pertinent”]: “And All The Same It Revolves: On Problems of Organizing Combat Training With a Resource and Personnel Shortage”; first paragraph is box insert]

[Text]

- How much does a company tactical exercise cost?
- How the commander was set straight
- Not everything old is bad

I remember that on the division staff where I served there was one oddity—an officer from the operations section. He would rush about offices of commanders and chiefs with a pile of calculations, and he fought for economy of POL and vehicle resources inasmuch as, in contrast to the majority of his colleagues, he took this slogan appeal as a guide to action. Once he even suggested holding company and battalion tactical exercises not at the district training center a good hundred kilometers away, but in our own situated right behind the military post. At that time they made fun of him and additionally accused him of oversimplification. It is understandable why. At one time it was not the custom to elevate expenditures to the absolute if no major support problems arose.

Would that we had his calculations now! Probably those who now think day and night how to save something and not purchase something superfluous would not have to rack their brains over this cursed question. But they have to think. I saw a detailed diagrammatic chart of the organization of combat training for this training year in the office of Guards Colonel V. Smolnyakov, deputy commander of a guards tank division. And Vladimir Mikhailovich sighed as he showed that, considering the present state of affairs, the very intensive program will not be fulfilled. Even platoon field firing and the company tactical exercises which begin soon are threatened with disruption. And the artillerymen’s training courses had to be conducted on their own range...

The situation is as follows. Gasoline reserves have come to an end on the current allowance. Those crumbs obtained by hook or crook barely support the formation’s vital needs. Remaining vehicles which are not laid up are fueled to support the delivery leg (15-20 liters) by the division commander’s personal memo. The duty UAZ’s [jeep-type vehicles]—and then not all of them—receive gasoline in jugs, as one chief somberly joked. It comes down to curiosities. A month ago a senior officer of the Kiev Military District Combat Training Directorate, who was inspecting the division training center, got stuck right there—the vehicle ran out of gas.

Things are more reassuring with diesel fuel and the ammunition with which tracked equipment is supplied. Things are tight with respect to lumber, plywood, nails, and electric light bulbs.

Officers wearing papakhas have turned for a time into expediers making the rounds of industrial enterprises. The mechanics of mutually advantageous cooperation are simple: elementary barter, where, for example, a box of canned stewed meat goes for a cubic meter of plywood. But where are the canned stewed meat and other deficit food products to be gotten without pilfering them from one’s own people? The division is even ready to offer a tank for operational necessities, but no one needs it.

Now everything is being sold for coupons. Money can be transferred with the permission of city authorities, but things are tight.

The personnel also are in a fever. It is not enough that this year the district training centers provided the most wretchedly trained junior specialists ever and that their
unorganized and organized outflow to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States from which they were called up continues. Crew specialists, especially driver-mechanics, are leaving. For example, in the tank company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant O. Shcherbina nine persons made off for their native areas one and one half weeks after arriving from the training center. The situation is no better in other companies. And so the regiment had to disband one battalion, using its people to replenish subunits which have been stripped bare.

What is left for the division staff, the regiments and the separate units to do? They...are working. And every day and night the environs of the military post are shaken by the rumble of engines and the rap of bursts—music so dear to the heart of any commander. But this music does not come simply, if only for the fact that for the time being life and service somehow have not forced taking nonstandard steps.

Division Commander Guards Major-General N. Lavreshin told me about one such nonstandard step, though hypothetically for now. Inasmuch as the scenario of field exercises essentially is identical, Nikolay Grigoryevich proposes a certain symbiosis of command and staff exercises, company tactical exercises and battalion tactical exercises. Schematically this appears as follows: the appropriate staff (of the regiment) works on the terrain with the involvement of those subunits activated for the exercise. One can figure what effect this has if only approximately by referring to data of KRASNAYA ZVEZDAN. Well, a company exercise cost R15,500 and a battalion exercise with a motorized rifle battalion and tank company (with field firing) cost R134,300 in 1991 prices. But here everything is together.

Of course, the concept is prospective and requires thorough checks. Strictly speaking, this is what division staff operators headed by Guards Lieutenant-Colonel A. Grinin are doing. But life forces gyrations in solving current problems.

For example, take march training of young drivers. Its finale is a 500-km march. As Kiev Military District Commander Lieutenant-General V. Boriskin said in a recent interview with NARODNAYA ARMIYA, “the unit cannot do this. There is no gasoline.” But in the division they could. All young drivers were transferred to diesel vehicles. But an acute question arose about providing control and command. The fact is, according to calculations, organizing communications requires 20-30 pieces of vehicular communications equipment with gasoline, of which there is none. But they found a solution: a route of tracked command and staff vehicles with communications relays was run parallel to the future march route. Now, for example, the regimental commander with a low-power radio in the cab of an Ural vehicle has gained the opportunity of maintaining communications along the entire route. Life forced a return to old procedures. I can no longer recall how many conversations and appeals there were to achieve interchangeability in tank crews. There was “socialist” competition. Now there are different motivations—it is not a question of rights and certificates, but about elementary company, battalion and regiment survivability, if this word is applicable to Army conditions.

On arriving at the tank gunnery range where Guards Senior Lieutenant Shcherbina’s company was finishing a practice firing exercise, we found tank gunners and commanders at the training station at the controls of a combat vehicle.

Oleg Vladimirovich explained the situation: “This is nothing surprising; we are training backup driver-mechanics. We do not have enough of them. Those who came from the training center... We have Guards Private Iman Shamurzayev. Except for two digits learned by heart he knows nothing more. At first he got into the wrong hatch. It is better that I entrust his place to Aleksandr Garkusha and Andrey Grabko instead of that apology for a driver-mechanic. At least I will be calm with them.”

Yes, it resembled something from what had been undeservedly forgotten. There already are training stations in the motor pools—tanks with broken tracks—and alternate crews are trained in them without leaving the confines of the post. The time also has come to recall about tank gunnery practices and practicing the norms by the numbers—in short, everything that in past years was shoved into the background under the fashionable motto of maximum intensification of training...

The question arises: As soon as the training process is simplified for objective reasons, insofar as this is possible, will this not lead to a reduction in proficiency of privates and NCO’s, a reduction in the level of officers’ methods training, and to the use of the formation’s rather good physical facility? Yes, such a trend has been observed, attested to in particular by results of an inspection by the Kiev Military District Combat Training Directorate? But there are things more important than figures and percentages of coverage.

I asked the following “provocative” question of Guards Major-General Lavreshin: If the problem of providing the formation with everything necessary is not resolved in the near term, then what?

“We will train,” answered the division commander without delay... “If we do not get an opportunity to go into the field, we will train on the parade ground, in the sports facility and in the barracks. The absence of combat training is like death to the enlisted man and officer. The question here is not just of accrued time working on particular skills. Everything is tied up with training—discipline, service, and order in the units. Only a short-witted person may not understand this.”

Probably every officer of the formation, which by the way traditionally gives the district the best specialists—
winners of field combat proficiency contests—from year to year, probably will put his signature beneath these words.

And one more thing. The national economy of Ukraine, which has assumed a very difficult task of providing for its own Armed Forces, now is in a difficult situation. But the state has many industrial giants, including where the formation is stationed. Why not give the Army an opportunity, on a mutually advantageous basis of course, to use their considerable productive capital? For example, specify mutual and reasonable requirements for that same lumber and those same nails and electric light bulbs at the beginning of the year. By the way, Guards Colonel Smolnyakov, the author of this suggestion, is ready to share his calculations.

But who will undertake to settle and coordinate everything? Have shortages really not taught us to confront economic work? We have become more accustomed to wait for a train to arrive according to an encoded message from above. But it turns out that the train still is not running...

“All the same it revolves.” As the legend asserts, those were the words uttered by an ancient scholar and philosopher following forced renunciation of his views after passing through the tortures of the Inquisition. So too the problems which now trouble the formation can be solved by their own efforts, albeit with strenuous attempts. Only not everything is in their power...

**Odessa Unit Handles Returning Deserters**

92UM0790B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 6 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Ovsyanikov: “Collecting Point for...”]

[Text] How do we refer to these lads, idling their time away at this collecting point in one of the units of the Odessa Garrison? Some of them are in dress uniforms, others are in fatigues. There are all possible combinations of one and the other, and then there are the ones in civilian clothes. Here they are referred to as fugitives. All of them willfully left their military units and voluntarily appeared before organs of the military directorate of the Odessa Garrison requesting to be stationed closer to home.

To be honest, this situation is typical of not just the Odessa Garrison alone. Thousands of first-term privates and sergeants are on the run in all states of the former Union.

It all began back when the flaws of the army became the legacy of glasnost. At that time the “dedovshchina” concept supplanted all of the army’s other problems in the minds of the people, and became the main trump card in the hands of nascent public movements and currents. Rather than joining forces to fight this phenomenon, everyone hastened to rescue youngsters from it. The opinion gradually formed that soldiers who had fled their units due to “dedovshchina” were victims, and worthy of indulgence. They fled and appealed to all kinds of committees and commissions, and even to Marshal Yazov, who was then the minister of defense. And wherever they went, they received forgiveness and support.

The first successes made spirits soar. But then those who simply didn’t want to serve took to running. Private Dmitriy Tishchenko arrived in his home town of Zaporozhye. He went to the procurator and described in graphic detail how he was beaten in the unit. In his words he had always wanted to serve in the army of his native Ukraine. But on being assigned to a certain unit of the Zaporozhye Garrison, in short time he accused several AWOL’s. In the end he committed assault and battery against some acquaintances of his. When they began investigating this case they revealed incidentally that Tishchenko had been convicted of robbery before. He was saved from prison by enlistment in the army. It’s hard to believe that this thugs was the victim of unlawful acts.

Or consider Private Vitaliy Barbula, who returned for patriotic motives: He began his service in his homeland with AWOL’s and thievery.

The collapse of the former Union elicited a natural reaction in youngsters to return to their states. However, not all of them absorbed the sober reasoning of state organs that appealed to their citizens serving in other republics to resolve all issues on a legal basis. Some conscientiously waited for resolution of their issues by legal means, while others decided to spur events on.

And they were followed, as always, by mobs of youngsters who had no desire to serve in any army at all. Even close to home. And they turned to organs of the military directorate with one goal: to be officially released from service. Many declare outright that they have no intention of serving.

In the meantime others are once again becoming habituated to the loud phrases and the old slogans. Some are victims of “dedovshchina,” like before, while others cite patriotic motives. Like Private Vitaliy Parshikov, who fled to Odessa from Dnepropetrovsk. He stubbornly insists that his desire to serve in the Ukrainian army was the cause of his flight. In response to all arguments that the army is also in Dnepropetrovsk, he stubbornly holds his ground, knowing quite well that the argument he offers—that he wants to serve near home—isn’t very important.

Private Oleg Medvedev, who fled to Kherson from Odessa, offers the same motives for his act. His patriotic feelings apparently grow stronger as he comes closer to home.

In the meantime commanders are literally groaning in the units—this flight, you see, has become a real scourge for them. Some are returning to the Ukraine, while others are
fleeing it. And combat training suffers, because it’s a little hard to get by without young specialists.

There is one other facet to this issue: It is very hard to create a new army with firm discipline out of people who doubt the need for it. In all ages and in all nations, desertion has always been treated as one of the gravest military crimes. But today it is legal in an informal sort of way. This is why there is an acute need to make some legal decisions regarding this issue.

**Number of Female Officers Noted**
92UM08054 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by Natalya Gorodetskaya under the rubric “The Army”: “General Stolyarov Gives Assurances That The Ladies Will Not Be Donning Canvas-Top Boots—There is a List of Positions That May Be Occupied by Women in the Army”]

[Text] An attitude toward women as “reliable rear support, a wife ready to share the burdens and deprivations of military life, thereby affecting the officer’s fulfillment of his duty” has predominated up to now in the army. The press conference of Nikolay Stolyarov, chairman of the CIS Armed Forces Committee for Personnel Work, was thus devoted by and large to the difficulties of the families of servicemen.

The number of divorces in the families of servicemen has decreased by 20-30 percent over the last two years, and the hope of a shining future has evidently appeared. This shining future, in Stolyarov’s opinion, is a professional army that would help solve a host of problems—from hazing and desertions to everyday issues. Here is just where the role of women in the army increases, because there are a multitude of purely female professions in it, “especially in connection with scientific and technical progress.” Women are still working primarily at “medical and staff institutions,” and their numbers in the CIS armed forces are one colonel—Valentina Tereshkova (there are six brigadier generals and one rear admiral in the United States), 16 lieutenant colonels, 92 majors, 330 captains, 180 senior lieutenants and 38 lieutenants—a total of 657 officers (34,777 in the United States). There are 25,396 warrant and petty officers in the CIS Combined Armed Forces (224,000 in the United States).

It was elaborated, in answer to a question from an NG correspondent on what positions a woman could hold in a professional army, that a whole list of positions that women have the right to hold exists. But if we were to follow the principle of a democratic society—“all that is not prohibited is permitted”—there should be, on the contrary, a list of the positions that are forbidden to women owing to their physiological features. Women do not yet have the right to learn at military educational institutions. Women were permitted to enter the command-personnel course at the Military Medical Academy imeni Kirov or transfer there after completing the fourth course of study at a conventional medical institution only this year, by order of the commander-in-chief.

Overall, no one has yet seriously conceived of the possibility of seeing a woman not only as “reliable rear support,” but also as a full-fledged comrade-in-arms or, God forbid, a commander. How a woman will serve in combat subunits, for example in the Air Forces, Navy or tank troops, as in the United States, is not known. What will they wear? True, N. Stolyarov did give assurances that they would not have to wear out their putties in canvas-top boots, but as far as a possible uniform he said only that the Americans have a very comfortable one.

**Reserve Officers’ Group Elects New Leader**
92PS01044 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 2

[Col (Res) I. Semenov report: “Change of Leadership in the Russian Union of Reserve Officers”]

[Text] A session of the Collegium of the Main Staff of the Russian Union of Reserve Officers was recently held. An organizational question, among other things, was considered. Maj Gen (Res) Fedor Nikolayevich Khalturin, who had headed the union and done much to establish it, asked to be released from the post he occupied on account of the state of his health. Maj Gen (Res) Viktor Stepanovitch Andreyev, 56 years old, was elected unanimously the new chairman of the collegium and chief of the main staff of the Russian Union of Reserve Officers.

**CIS: POLICY**

**Cadres Chief Rodionov on Changes in Officer Training**
92UM07584 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 92 First Edition p 2


[Text] CIS Armed Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Cadres Colonel-General Yuriy Nikolayevich Rodionov answers some questions for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Correspondent] Comrade Colonel-General! Events in the former USSR have developed so energetically that it is difficult to foresee how these or those problems will be solved any longer. But they must be solved nonetheless. A streamlined system of training for military cadres existed at one time. Tell me, what is the picture with that at the current time?
[Rodionov] I would like to stress first and foremost that we are living in an exceptionally complicated, contradictory and difficult time. Our conversation is taking place against an acute social backdrop. There are so many problems in the army! First of all, the creation of armed forces is underway in the independent states of the CIS, and that alone is giving rise to the most complex issues, including cadre ones. Cutbacks are occurring in their numbers, including in the central apparatus. And there are so many problems connected with the withdrawal of troops and questions of social protections for servicemen and the members of their families! Whatever way the situation shapes up, however, questions of training military cadres must be resolved.

The already difficult situation with this question is being further complicated by the fact that 33 percent of the military educational institutions that are located in the Ukraine are considered their property. These decisions were made in unilateral fashion, and the fate of the officers and cadets is thus uncertain. Some other states of the Commonwealth are assuming their ownership of military educational institutions too. All of this cannot help but worry the people who are responsible to this or that extent for the training of military cadres.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Nikolayevich! The system for training military cadres should also undergo some changes, proceeding from the situation that has taken shape and for understandable reasons? Are there any projects, plans or forecasts here?

[Rodionov] I would like to dwell in our conversation on the question of improving the supervision of training for military cadres. I am convinced that the upkeep and effectiveness of military education as a system depends to no small extent on that.

The supervision of training for military cadres is currently organized according to the functional-department principle, and is implemented in three basic areas. The first is the direct subordination of the higher educational institutions to the commanding generals of the branches and arms of the service for which they are preparing the military cadres. The commanders directly supervise the military academies and schools through their deputies for higher educational institutions or those apparatuses that are part of the cadre bodies or the bodies for the combat training of the troops.

The second is the centralized scientific-methodological supervision of military education and the pursuit of a uniform statewide policy in this area, which is provided by the Main Directorate for Military Educational Institutions. General questions of training and the use of officer cadres, staffing of the higher educational institutions with temporary and permanent personnel and a number of others are also resolved in centralized fashion (through the Main Directorate for Cadres [GUK] and the GOMU of the General Staff).

Finally, the higher educational institutions are guided on issues of combat and mobilization readiness, garrison duty and construction and infrastructure development by the orders of the commanding generals of the military districts (or fleets). Those administrative bodies are able to handle the tasks entrusted to them in general. At the same time, as I was saying, the force composition and structure of the armed forces are being radically altered, and a redistribution of the higher educational institutions among the states of the Commonwealth is underway. All of this requires a critical reconsideration of the extant system of supervision of military education.

That analytical work has been done—a host of proposals have been gathered and analyzed, and world and domestic experience has been studied.

[Correspondent] The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are interested in knowing what the basic substance of those proposals is like. The spectrum of opinions on this issue is obviously quite broad, isn’t it?

[Rodionov] You are right. There are many proposals, and simply opinions, on this issue. I would like to talk briefly about the two extremes, and then some unacceptable viewpoints on this problem.

The first is to concentrate the supervision of military education in the same hands, to subordinate all the higher educational institutions—regardless of their fields of training and affiliation—to a branch of the service and a unified supervisory body. That route has been chosen, for example, by the Ministry of Defense in Ukraine. Such a rigid centralization contradicts not only the practices of the supervision of higher education in the country, but also world practices overall. The more so as it is unacceptable in the face of the existing scope of training of the military cadres for the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The second point of view, the opposite of the first, is to decentralize the supervision completely, dissolve the Main Directorate for Higher Educational Institutions or any other central body that could be created on the basis of it, and transfer everything to the branches of the armed forces and the arms of the troops. Accepting that proposal would mean rejecting the pursuit of an overall policy in the realm of military education and unified scientific-methodological supervision of higher military schooling. That would mean returning to the "feudal" fragmentation of the higher educational institutions whose harmful consequences were rectified by the Ministry of Defense in 1968.

Historical experience in military organizational development, including the experience of the Russian Army, testifies to the necessity of the strong, centralized and, at the same time, sufficiently flexible supervision of the system of military education. I will dwell in more detail on the proposals that meet the initial requirements to this or that extent.

One of them is eliminating the higher-education institutional apparatus at all levels and in all bodies of troop combat training. The Soviet Army already has such
experience. The administration of the higher educational institutions of the Ground Troops was part of the Main Directorate of Combat Training for a brief time in the middle of the forties and the fifties. The functions of inspecting the military-teaching institutions were entrusted to combat training at the end of the thirties.

The unilateral approach of the combat-training bodies toward the problems of military education has forced the rejection of such unification every time, and starting in 1961 supervision of the higher educational institutions in the branches of the armed forces has been implemented by independent directorates for the higher educational institutions.

What positive things could such a combination provide? It is assumed in theory that there would be a closer integration of the teaching with the training of the troops, and that an opportunity would be manifested to make more widespread use of the material teaching base of the troops for the practical training of the graduates. But the branches of the armed forces and arms of the troops, as experience has shown, have been accomplishing that task successfully without the structural unification of the supervisory bodies—provided there is good organization.

[Correspondent] And what are the drawbacks of such a combination?

[Rodionov] First of all, it contradicts the basic principle of the independence of policy, in the realm of military education, from any departmental interests whatsoever. The military educational institutions are obliged to give their graduates more than sound field, aerial or naval proficiency, teach them to shoot all types of weapons and drive military vehicles. The chief task of the higher educational institutions is to lay the groundwork for military education that the graduate will need for the whole period of his service as an officer. They are obliged to give him a general scientific and humanities education that corresponds to world standards.

Higher military schooling and troop training are two independent areas of military organizational development with all of their own particular tasks. Clear-cut interaction and objective mutual exactingness are needed between them. Experience has shown that the subordination of one to the other leads to attempts to transform the schools into regimental schools, or the academies into ordinary courses of study.

That is why I feel the merger of these bodies is not optimal or desirable.

[Correspondent] But there are also opinions that it would be best to change nothing at all. Leave everything as it is, just bring the administrative bodies of the higher educational institutions into conformity with the changing structure and size of the armed forces.

[Rodionov] That is an understandable desire. Quite skilled collectives have taken shape in the apparatuses supervising the higher educational institutions. Interaction is all set up, and solid ties have been established with the troops, scientific institutions and the higher schools of the country. Many years of experience testify in favor of that variation, which has proved itself in practice.

Under the existing system of supervision, however, there is no uniform line of supervision at all its levels. The Main Directorate for Higher Educational Institutions and the Main Directorate for Cadres operate under the unified command of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Cadres on the scale of the Glavkomat of the Armed Forces of the CIS. The apparatuses for the higher educational institutions in the branches of the armed forces are directly subordinate to their own commanders. The work of the higher educational institutions among the arms of the troops and the services, however, is supervised by small groups, and even individual officers, who are part of either the cadre organizations or the combat-training bodies.

The cutbacks in the central apparatus connected with the re-organization of the armed forces have moreover also affected the administrative bodies for the higher educational institutions. Many of them are becoming too small to preserve their independence and provide for a high professional level of supervision under these conditions.

[Correspondent] What is your version for solving the problem?

[Rodionov] Taking into account that the bodies for the higher educational institutions and cadres are occupied in practice with the general cause of bringing to life the cadre policy of the military and political leadership of the CIS and the training and placement of military cadres, I feel that we must do the following. We should not radically break up the existing system of supervision of military education. The military educational institutions should be left directly subordinate to the branches and arms of the troops and the chiefs of the services for which they are preparing officer cadres.

The cadre bodies for the higher educational institutions must be combined under a general and unified supervision at all levels.

The Main Directorate for Higher Educational Institutions could be transformed into a special subdivision of the military-teaching institutions as part of the GUCh, taking into account the cutbacks in the central apparatus.

The position of deputy commander should be preserved in the branches of the armed forces, but for the cadres and higher educational institutions, making the corresponding higher-educational and cadre apparatus subordinate to it.

The small apparatuses for higher educational institutions in the arms of the troops and services should be unified and consolidated. I assume that this should be done in the ground forces, the General Staff and the Rear
Services. The small higher-educational groups or individual liaison officers should be included in the corresponding cadre bodies in places where their combination is inefficient.

In order to raise the level of supervision and professional competence of the administrative bodies, they must be staffed with officers who have scientific-pedagogical qualifications and experience in working at higher educational institutions. The leadership of the independent states must be approached with a request for additional pay for academic degrees and knowledge for this purpose. It would be bolder, in the face of cutbacks in the size of those bodies, to replace the officers with servicemen, which would make it possible to retain experienced workers.

Improvements in the system of supervision of the training of military cadres are just a stage in a broad program of reform of military-cadre policy. Other components of that program could be the topic of my next conversation with the readers.

**Maj-Gen Malakhov Comments on Proposals on Officer Reduction**

92UM0800A Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Letter to the editors by Guards Captain O. Yegorenkov, Chita Oblast, with commentary by CIS OVS Main Directorate of Cadres' Department Chief Major-General I. Malakhov: “Carry Out the Cutbacks Painlessly”]

[Text] If this letter is published in the newspaper, then I think it will also without fail be read at the Main Command of the Combined Armed Forces [OVS] of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. What is bothering me?

The political transformations that have been occurring in the country are having a direct influence on the mood of the officer corps in the army and navy. Everything connected with the impending new cutbacks in the armed forces is especially troubling to us. People are concerned about whether they will get the right to continue their service through the terms stipulated by law. Will they be receiving the housing they are in line for? Will they be able to serve out the year or two they have until they obtain a pension? These are not simple questions.

Quite a few proposals on this score have been sounded in recent speeches by military leaders and spokesmen for the Main Command of the CIS OVS. But that is, as they say, the voice "from above." The officers completing service in the ranks also have their own opinions. Such as?

I feel it is essential to discharge all officers who do not wish to serve (who have not reached the maximum age for being on active military service). Second, servicemen who have reached the maximum age for being on active military service should be submitted for discharge, with the exception of those individuals who for various reasons do not have 20 years of time served in the best case. Third, discharge all officers who do not correspond to the positions they occupy, first carrying out their certification. And, finally, propose on a voluntary basis the discharge of those who have 20 years of service time or more and have not reached the maximum age, that is, have the right to a pension from the CIS OVS Main Command.

Possible complications in the realization of this plan (as we will call them) depend only on whether the officers are allotted living space. The merit is in the fact that it will be possible to create full-blooded units of the armed forces with well thought-out staffing sizes, able to perform the tasks entrusted to them to protect the state rather than housekeeping chores.

**Commentary by CIS OVS Main Directorate of Cadres' Department Chief Major-General I. Malakhov**

Quite a few proposals analogous to the one expressed by Guards Captain O. Yegorenkov come in to the CIS Combined Armed Forces Main Cadres Directorate. They are all studied meticulously and are utilized in practical work, especially those that pertain to the activity of cadre bodies during the period of cutbacks in the armed forces. That is why the opinion of an officer on this score is worthy of attention. But I would like to include these accents.

I feel that we cannot leave without elaboration the proposal to discharge all those officers who do not wish to continue their service but have not reached the maximum age for being on active military service. Taking that path would signify bleeding the army and navy white. According to the logic of Guards Captain Yegorenkov, after all, the commanders should sign the requests of all lieutenants and senior lieutenants who have expressed the desire to find employment in the national economy through their own efforts and knowledge. And they unfortunately number in the thousands for political, moral and morale reasons. Put their requests into play all at once, and the armed forces will be left without officers assigned to the primary positions. Such a situation cannot be permitted. What is the way out?

The way out, I think, is in skilled organizational and educational work and in an individual approach toward each officer who has decided to leave for the reserves. All of the circumstances of the appearance of an officer's request for discharge should be studied carefully and discussed at an Officers' Assembly. The collective should know, to put it bluntly, whether their comrade-in-arms is conniving or whether he really has substantive reasons. If an assembly moreover intercedes on the discharge of a comrade, the commander and the cadre bodies should not create any obstacles. They should moreover help to determine under which article he should be discharged.
Guards Captain Yegorenkov sees the necessity of discharging all officers who do not correspond to the positions they occupy, with the preliminary performance of certification. It should be recalled herein that a certification of the entire officer corps was carried out two years ago. The further service designations of each were indicated in the certification conclusions at that time. Individuals who were a discredit to the high rank of officer and the greater portion of those with poor professional qualities were discharged over that time. This was moreover done in a climate of broad glasnost and democratism. The question of such cadres today is even more concrete today—they are discharged immediately by petition of the Officers' Assemblies and in accordance with the decisions of the standing certification commissions. And if Guards Captain Yegorenkov, himself the chief of a cadres division and in line service, had attentively studied USSR Minister of Defense Directive D-53 of 2 Sep 91, “Specific Features of Contemporary Work With Cadres,” then he should know that. That same directive, by the way, proposes the certification, before 20 Nov 92, of the officer corps being freed up in connection with the elimination of the military-political organs and the depatrialization of the army and navy, with the aim of determining the further role of each officer.

The question of officers, generals and admirals who have reached the maximum age for active duty and have served enough years to receive the right to a pension is also unequivocal. The service prospects for each of them are considered individually; the overwhelming majority of them are submitted for discharge (retirement).

Individuals in the officer corps who have reached the maximum ages for being on active military service but do not have the right to a pension for time served are given the opportunity to continue their military service until they obtain that right.

There is complete clarity as regards the theory of the letter's author that those who have 20 years or more of service but have not reached the maximum age should also be offered discharge. Such people are offered discharge with a regard for the availability of housing and the impossibility of finding them a position. The forced displacement of individuals in that category from the armed forces, however, cannot be permitted. That must be taken into account.

I would like to see commanders, senior officers and cadre bodies take this commentary into account and make use of it as a methodological reference for working with military cadres during the period of cutbacks in the armed forces.

Prediction of Future Problems in Unifying Army

92UM0737A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 3, Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences V. Petrovsky under the rubric “Problems and Solutions”: “The CIS and the Army—The Prediction of a Military Expert”]

[Text] The country that once personified itself as the “great and mighty” Soviet Union is gasping in the throes of crisis today. And its armed forces are experiencing the crisis phenomena along with it. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet, which created a major spiral in tensions in the relations between Russia and the Ukraine, is clearly not the only one in a series of military problems that the majority of the leaders of the independent states will still have to encounter. Similar collisions will arise constantly, making the leaders nervous, disturbing the population of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and varying only the addresses of the conflicts and the topics of dispute.

Judging by everything, the division of the former All-union Army and Navy—except, of course, the strategic nuclear forces, at least initially—has pre-ordained that constructive discussion of the creation of a unified armed forces within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States can take place only in the event that the republics possess real national armed forces. For that to occur, it is essential to divide not only the army and navy fairly right down to the last piece of armament and to the last soldier and sailor into the rolls, causing the sweeping migration of servicemen and members of their families from certain republics to others, but also the stockpiles of materiel supporting the everyday activity of the troop organizations and, where necessary, their combat functioning thereby.

Each of the sovereign republics has claims toward the stores, arsenals and bases of the army and navy today. And that is wealth that it would be fitting either to use themselves or to sell at a profit, for example, for hard currency.

Time and the actual military-political situation were ordered in such a way that defense groupings in the former USSR were created proceeding from concrete operational-strategic conditions, rather than from republic borders. That is why these groupings in the European part of the former Union, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia are located close to the state borders of the former USSR, by and large outside the territory of Russia. The overwhelming majority of stockpiles of materiel, as a rule, are among the troops and naval manpower whose vital activity and combat operations they are intended to support—once again, outside of Russian territory. It may thus be assumed that the issue of army and navy stockpiles of materiel for the armed forces will soon become one of the most serious stumbling blocks in the mutual relations of Russia with its counterparts in the CIS.

New difficulties, in short, are at the door in the sphere of the military-political sphere of the functioning of the Commonwealth. One specific feature of them, however, consists of the fact that the focus of the application of force today is being shifted from the realm of political declarations into a realm saturated with concrete material assets of a defensive nature. This signifies, in practice, seizures on the spur of the moment—or, putting it
mildly, the "forcible" privatization of the military-technical and other matériel of the armed forces located on the territory of the Baltics, the southwestern portion of the former Union, the Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

Can these difficulties be avoided, or at least lessoned? Yes, of course, if the idea of creating a unified armed forces for the CIS is preserved, at least for a transitional period. Its duration, by the way, could be set—depending on the decisions of the heads of the independent states that are members of the Commonwealth—at from 2-3 to 5-7 years. Its initial intent should be to support the transformation of the system of defense of the former USSR without undermining the combat capabilities of the army and navy, as well as the complete or partial (when time is insufficient) fulfillment of the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms to eliminate armaments and convert military hardware. The faithfulness of some of the sovereign states in the Commonwealth to the international obligations of the former Union could otherwise come under doubt, since they do not have at their disposal a sufficient disarmament productive base for this.

The nations of the CIS could conclude an Agreement on Defense Issues among themselves for the transitional period. It could reflect the prospects for the conclusion of multilateral and bilateral protocols on issues of the disbanding of the existing armed forces and their transformation into the armed forces of the CIS and the national armed forces of the independent states. The preservation of unified monitoring of nuclear weapons and the "nuclear umbrella" over the states of the Commonwealth is a key clause herein as before, and a guarantee of the security of the existence of this treaty formation.

A treaty on joint defense could be concluded among the independent states of the Commonwealth upon the expiration of the transitional period and the full realization of the agreement. Its substance will clearly and naturally be corrected in accordance with the new realities that will exist in the Commonwealth, Europe and the world at the moment of conclusion of such a treaty.

The chief body of the CIS empowered to resolve military-political and defense issues in the transitional period and later will clearly be the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth. The Council will be headed by one of the presidents, elected by the members for a certain period, say for five years. The replacement of the chairmen will be by rotation or any other principle that will ensure the democratic nature of the work of the Council of the Heads of State.

This council would be authorized to designate—in all likelihood, on the basis of consensus—the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the CIS. The General Staff and the Strategic Forces of the CIS could be directly subordinate to him. The leading command staff of these bodies, including the CinC himself, could occupy their positions for, say, 2-5 years and be replaced periodically, including on a rotating basis, by representatives of the national armed forces of the independent states.

What are the Strategic Forces of the CIS? They include the large formations, units, institutions and military-training establishments of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Forces, the Navy, the Air Defense Forces, the Directorate of the Chief of Space Hardware, the VDV [Airborne Troops], strategic and operational reconnaissance and the nuclear-technical units, as well as the manpower, equipment and facilities intended for the command, control and support of the strategic forces. The specific list of the formations and facilities of the strategic forces located on the territory of the independent states is stipulated by a separate protocol for each of the member nations of the Commonwealth.

The Council of Heads of State of the CIS carries out its activity on the basis of recommendations, proposals and considerations devised by the Council of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth. That Council in turn directs and coordinates the work of the Council of Defense Ministers of the independent states, who are at the same time deputy CinCs of the CIS armed forces. The national armed forces of the independent states and the General Purpose Forces of the CIS are under the authority of the Council of Defense Ministers. The group commanders of the General Purpose Forces on the territory of the independent states are simultaneously deputy ministers of defense of those states.

What are the General Purpose Forces of the CIS? These are deployed and combat-ready troops stationed in the most important sectors of the border regions of the Commonwealth, as well as constituting a powerful mobile reserve located on the territory of the CIS in such a way that in the event of necessity, it could provide for the augmentation of defensive efforts in any strategic sectors. The chief mission of such forces is seen as ensuring the sound defense of the territory of the CIS in peacetime and successfully repelling possible aggression, from wherever it may come, in wartime. Their composition and command and control procedures should probably be determined with a regard for the interests both of the Commonwealth overall and the independent states making it up.

The fate of servicemen and determination of the ownership of armaments, hardware and stockpiles of matériel and their disposition are all envisaged to be determined in a civilized manner, that is via negotiations, when realizing the idea of creating a unified armed forces for the CIS. In the fairest possible manner and in the shortest possible time. Such an approach could satisfy the aspirations of the most impatient and mistrustful participants in the Commonwealth—that is, meet their interests to the fullest extent. We unfortunately have something else in practice, however. Take, by way of example, the activity of the political and military leadership of a number of the member nations of the CIS aimed at the rapid creation of
their own armed forces. The Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan. And we will look at this through the prism of some of the international obligations of the former USSR for the withdrawal of troops and the cutback and elimination of arms.

The countries of the Commonwealth are permitted, in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, to have no more than 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,175 artillery systems, 5,150 combat aircraft and 1,500 attack helicopters on the territory of the European portion of the former USSR and in the Transcaucasus. There are other restrictions as well. On the northern and southern flanks in particular, including the Leningrad, Odessa, North Caucasus and Transcaucasus military districts, we can have no more than 1,850 tanks, 1,800 armored vehicles and 2,775 artillery systems among the regular troops, as well as no more than 1,000 tanks, 800 armored vehicles and 900 artillery systems in storage in the Leningrad and Odessa military districts.

If we balance the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe with the scope of the armed forces that, say, the Ukraine plans to have, it turns out that up to 48 percent of the tanks, 38 percent of the armored vehicles, 66 percent of the artillery systems and 38 percent of the combat aircraft of the overall levels of the corresponding arms stipulated for all of the countries of the CIS with territory in the European portion of the former USSR and the Transcaucasus could be located in Ukrainian territory.

Is such a step by the Ukraine valid without coordination of the national arms “ceilings” with the other nations of the Commonwealth? Most likely not, since the proportionate share of the tanks, armored vehicles and combat aircraft falling under Ukrainian jurisdiction, with a regard for the troops from the Western and Southern groups being withdrawn from Ukrainian territory, could exceed 50 percent of the norms that the independent states are permitted to have on the territory of the European portion of the former Union and the Transcaucasus. This means that a lesser share of them will fall to, for example, Russia, Belarus or Moldova.

Insofar as the leadership of the Ukraine has demonstrated more than once its reluctance to participate in the creation of a unified armed forces for the CIS, the unified system of defense that used to exist within the framework of the former USSR proves to be shattered by the efforts of the Ukraine. This state of affairs puts the other countries of the Commonwealth—Russia, for example, which has virtually no deployed and combat-ready troops in the strategic sector from the borders of Belarus to the Sea of Azov—into a tense situation, an escape from which with minimal losses and in a short time is exceedingly problematical.

It is reasonable to note, pertaining to the fulfillment of the provisions of the other treaty—the one on strategic offensive weapons—that the elimination of nuclear weapons within the framework of it is planned to be implemented over seven years. Economic, technical and ecological factors, organizational and other capabilities for the destruction of a large quantity of nuclear weapons and the necessity of maintaining strategic parity in the realm of offensive weapons were all taken into consideration when substantiating this time period. The stance of the Ukraine, which envisages the destruction of the 176 ICBM launchers and their 1,240 nuclear charges that are located on Ukrainian territory over a short time (three years) is thus outwardly appealing and attractive. The fulfillment of that task under conditions of an absence of political, economic and social stability in the CIS countries without overstressing the corresponding capacity and without enormous additional expenses, however, is quite doubtful. The strategic nuclear arms located on the territory of the Ukraine moreover constitute a portion of the “nuclear umbrella” for the whole Commonwealth and, in the aggregate with the nuclear arms located in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, ensure the security of all the member states of the CIS. This issue should be resolved in coordination with them. And, clearly, within the framework of the parity that has taken shape today in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons. Otherwise it is a road to nowhere.

KGB Officer on Border Guard Role in Estonia
92UM0774Z Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 25 Feb 92 p 10

[Article by Mert Kubu: “Life Without Future in Estonia”]

[Text]

Russian Colonel Regrets Not Being Welcome in New State

Colonel Rinat Gimadashev, 48, chief of staff for the former Soviet border troops in Estonia, is a congenial man. Only once during the interview did he get angry. That was when DAGENS NYHETER asked: “When are you and your troops going home?”

“Get out, get out. Go home. That’s all we ever hear. The Estonians only want to kick us out, their professional border guards. But they have no border guards of their own to replace us.”

Colonel Gimadashev has difficulties in controlling his anger. The former Soviet border guards are everywhere along the Estonian coastline, bordering the Gulf of Finland in the north, Sweden in the west. They can be seen in the port of Tallinn, on all the islands, and their munitions are top-notch.

The newly formed Estonian border guards (Piirkaitset) lack almost everything. They attempt, using their inferior equipment, to watch their eastern border, facing Russia. And Colonel Gimadashev knows that.
Portait of Lenin

He welcomes us, on Saturday morning, in the staff building in Rahumae 4, at the outskirts of Tallinn. An enlisted man meets us at the garrison gate. A giant portrait of Lenin still hangs from the wall of one building, and is surrounded by banners with all the old slogans.

We passed a newly painted bust; a well-known face, painted in gold. "Dzerzhinskiy," the soldier told us.

Feliks Dzerzhinskiy was the founder of the Cheka, also known as the KGB. The Soviet border guards answered to the KGB until the failed coup, last August. Colonel Gimadseh is a Tatar, born in the capital Kazan. He attended military academy in Alma-Ata and served in Kazakhstan. Thereafter he attended the graduate military school in Moscow. He spent two years on Osel. There his daughter was born. Then he was sent to Lithuania, Latvia, and back to Estonia.

Retirement in Two Years

The whole family lives here. His son is the captain on a fishing boat. He himself is a grandfather and has only two years left before retirement. In the old days he could have stayed on until he turned 55. "In the old days Tallinn was a dream city for any officer in the Soviet army. I wish I could stay here after retirement and grow tulips," sighed the colonel.

"Now they want to get rid of me. But I'm a soldier. A soldier obeys orders. If they tell me to pack my belongings and leave, so be it," he continued.

Did he and his troops, during the years of communist rule, shoot at defectors trying to escape across the Gulf of Finland?

"We had instructions from the Party not to let anyone escape. We arrested even the ones trying to swim their way out of the country," answered the colonel.

"But shoot at them? No, that we did not do. We did not have to do that. We intercepted them by helicopter before they reached the twelve-mile line. We were only authorized to fire if they threatened us with guns," he continued.

Colonel Gimadseh waved a green booklet, the old Soviet instruction book for border guards. These instructions still apply today.

10 Escape Attempts

On an average, ten people a year tried to escape. Most of them were caught.

"Two Jewish refugees from Moscow, who had been able to get to northern Estonia, were, however, able to escape in 1988. They left in a fragile aluminum rowboat, in high seas. The boat was painted white, for which reason our floodlights did not catch it.

To this day it is difficult for the colonel to understand how they could evade his men. "Unbelievable," he said.

But then he is quick to add: "These are of course unpleasant memories, which will haunt me for the rest of my life...."

Today the horrific, gigantic floodlights, which, as late as a year ago, used to light up the bay of Tallinn, are turned off.

"They are still there but not turned on. Every now and then we check that they still are in working order," the colonel told us.

He laughed and said: "But nobody escapes today. Why risk your life, when you can have a window table in the restaurant and cross the Gulf in comfort on the ferry to Helsinki."

We asked if he had experienced any disciplinary problems with his soldiers. "No, not here within our ranks. The soldier serves, sleeps, serves, sleeps. And besides, we are quite selective in choosing the border guards," he answered.

Russian Social Protection Decree

92UM0694A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Feb 92 p 3

[Russian Federation Presidential Decree No. 154, Signed by B. Yeltsin, Moscow, the Kremlin, February 10, 1992: "Russian Federation Presidential Decree On Measures to Increase the Social Protection of Servicemen and Individuals Released from Military Service"]

[Text] For the purpose of increasing the social protection of servicemen and individuals who have been released from service and to insure appropriate conditions for the fulfillment of military service obligations, I resolve:

1. to prescribe, as of February 1, 1992, minimum salaries in the amount of 1,800 rubles per month for leading officer positions in the Armed Forces (for platoon commanders and positions commensurate with them);

—to approve the amounts of salaries for officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel according to the primary types of positions, while proceeding from the minimum salaries prescribed by this Decree.

The indexing of monetary allowances for servicemen will be conducted in the prescribed manner as a result of retail price and rate increases.

2. to pay compulsory service personnel a one-time allowance of R500 upon release from military service and R2,000 to indicated individuals who are orphaned children or children who are left without the care of parents;

3. the Government of the Russian Federation, the governments of the republics within the Russian Federation,
the organs of executive power of krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg will, in the first half of 1992, eliminate indebtedness in allocating housing to servicemen, including cost-sharing in housing construction;

4. to transfer free of charge apartments occupied in state or departmental housing to officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who have served 20 or more calendar years of military service and to individuals released from military service due to age, illness, personnel reductions, or due to health restrictions and who have 20 or more calendar years of service, participants of the war, internationalist soldiers, and also family members of servicemen who were killed or died as a result of wounds, contusions, injuries, or illness associated with the fulfillment of their military service obligations;

5. to increase monetary compensation to sublease (lease) temporary living quarters to R300 for officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who have not been provided housing for permanent residence, and up to R350 per month (depending upon residence in various populated areas) for personnel who have families of more than three persons;

6. to prescribe that officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who are on active duty and also those released from military service due to age, illness, personnel reductions, or due to health restrictions and who have 20 or more calendar years of service are paid an amount that is 50 percent of the cost of the apartments and utilities in state or departmental housing that they occupy with members of their families;

7. to render free financial aid at the duty location in the amount of 50 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or bank credit received for the construction of individual housing for servicemen who have been performing flawless uninterrupted military service for 15 or more calendar years and who have not been provided housing or who need improved housing conditions, who have joined housing construction (housing) cooperatives, or who are carrying out construction of individual houses;

8. to grant free plots of land for construction of individual houses and gardens with an area of 0.10 hectares—in urban villages and 0.25 hectares in rural areas—to servicemen and individuals released from military service due to age, illness, personnel reductions, or due to health restrictions, who have 15 or more calendar years of service, and also to participants of war, internationalist soldiers, and also family members of servicemen who were killed or died as a result of wounds, contusions, injuries, or illness associated with the fulfillment of their military service obligations;

— to release servicemen, who have been granted plots of land for construction of individual housing in accordance with this Decree, from payment of the portion of the land tax that is part of the Russian Federation government budget;

9. to release all categories of servicemen from payment of income tax on monetary allowances, monetary awards, and other payments received by them as a result of fulfilling their military service obligations;

10. Within a month, the Russian Federation Government will:

— determine the amount of monetary awards for special service conditions and skill qualifications, and also additional types of monetary allowances of an incentive nature;

— determine the procedures for granting free financial aid to servicemen for the acquisition of housing and also the procedures for monitoring the purposeful utilization of the resources allocated;

Proposals will be submitted:

— on the procedures for granting tax benefits associated with the privatization of housing to servicemen and to individuals who have been released from military service;

— on increasing hourly wages and salaries of workers and employees of military units, enterprises, organizations, and institutions, and military educational institutions in 1992; and,

— on changes and additions to existing law that proceed from this Decree.

11. This Decree enters into force the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
February 19, 1992
No. 154

Proposed Features of Contract Service
92UM0759A Moscow KRAZAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General Boris Yevgenyevich Pyankov, head of group for working out conditions for contract military service, Commonwealth of Independent States Joint Armed Forces Glavkomat [Main Command], by KRAZAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel I. Sergeyev, occasion, date and place not specified: "What Kind of Contract Service is Seen?"]

[Text] On learning that a group for working out conditions for contract military service had been established in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] Joint Armed Forces Glavkomat, we turned to its head, Colonel-General B. Pyankov, with this question. It turned out that the document already had been prepared.

Well, just how does the Glavkomat see this service? You will learn this on becoming familiar with the draft conditions and commentary thereto.
Conditions for Performing Contract Military Duty in Positions of Privates, Seamen, Sergeants and Petty Officers

1. The following are accepted for contract military service in positions of privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers:
   — Young men who have reached draft age;
   — First-term privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers who have served at least six months on first-term active duty;
   — Reservists not older than 40;
   — Unmarried, childless women and servicemen's wives except those having children of preschool age, in ages from 19 to 40 inclusive.

2. Persons accepted for contract military service must meet medical and psychological requirements of service for specific specialties in appropriate branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms or naval forces.

3. Candidates accepted for contract military service are selected as follows:
   — Among servicemen, by the command element of military units or ships;
   — Among draftees, reservists and women, by military commissariats based on requisitions of military unit commanders and directions of military district staffs.

   Military Commissariats also are assigned the task of determining such citizens’ fitness for military service in their chosen specialty, making out necessary documents and sending candidates to military units for assignment to military service.

4. The contract is concluded between the unit or ship commander and the person being accepted for military service.

   The contract is signed as follows: for 2-3 years with servicemen who have been on military service at least six months; and for three years with draftees having a specialty necessary for service in the Armed Forces, as well as with servicemen who have served terms of service established by law, and with reservists and women.

   Subsequently a contract can be extended for a period of 3, 5 or 10 years.

5. After conclusion of the contract, persons who do not have the necessary level of training for their chosen specialty are sent by decision of the unit or ship commander to training centers (units or subunits), from which they return to the unit at the end of training to continue service.

6. In concluding a contract, citizens accepted for service are paid a one-time monetary allowance in the amount of one month's pay for the position for which they are being accepted (from R1,370 to R1,920).

During training in a training unit, persons accepted for military service under contract and sent for training are paid 30 percent of the rate of pay established for the chosen position.

7. Servicemen accepted for contract military service are paid the following rates of pay:

   a. For rank:
      — Junior Sergeant (Petty Officer 2nd Class) R50;
      — Sergeant (Petty Officer 1st Class) R70;
      — Senior Sergeant (Chief Petty Officer) R90;
      — First Sergeant (Master Chief Petty Officer) R 110;

   b. For position held, depending on chosen specialty and combat arm:
      — Privates from R1,370 to R1,570;
      — Sergeants (Petty Officers) from R1,470 to R1,780;
      — Sergeants (Petty Officers) appointed to positions of platoon commander, company first sergeant, senior instructor, senior technician and the equivalent to be filled by warrant officers, from R1,710 to R1,920.

   Position pay for all categories of servicemen under contract is determined by the statute on monetary allowance.

   Depending on special conditions of service and service in remote areas and in areas with severe climatic conditions, the overall level of monthly pay with acceptance on active military service under contract (initial pay) can be as follows:
   — In the Ground Troops from R1,370 to R4,085;
   — In the Air Forces (for flight personnel) from R1,780 to R5,240;
   — In the Navy (for personnel on sea duty) from R1,920 to R6,580.

8. Based on results of work for the past year, servicemen are paid a one-time monetary reward in January of each year for maintaining high troop combat readiness, for conscientious performance of official duties and for faultless discipline in an amount of up to two month’s pay for rank and position; and during the calendar year material assistance is given in the amount of one month's pay.

9. Each time a contract is extended for three years, an additional one month’s pay is paid for position held and for rank:
   — For five years, two months’ pay;
   — For ten years, five months’ pay.

10. In addition, pay increments are established as follows:
    — For years served from 2 to 5—5 percent (of position and rank pay), from 5 to 10 years—10 percent, from 10 to 15—15 percent, from 15 to 20—20 percent, from 20 to 25—25 percent and so on;
    — For service in remote areas and areas with severe climatic conditions depending on the area of performance of service—15, 50 or 100 percent (of position pay):
—For class rating: 2nd class—3 percent, 1st class—5 percent and master—7 percent (of position pay).

—For special conditions of service, other supplementary forms of pay as well established by law for warrant officers.

11. Servicemen performing contract service are provided with free meals according to norms established for branches of the Armed Forces.

When accommodated outside the unit disposition area or when on leave, they can receive a food ration or monetary compensation in its place according to existing prices (as of February 1992 the cost of a combined-arms ration was R960 per month).

12. Clothing property is provided free to servicemen performing contract service according to norms for extended-term servicemen (according to prices as of February 1992 the cost of one set of clothing for a year was R14,500).

13. Servicemen’s transportation to and from leave is free, and members of their families as well as household goods also are transported free in proceeding to a new duty station under terms presently in force for extended-term servicemen, with payment of a posting allowance, including for family members, under the established procedure.

14. Annual regular leave is granted for a period of 30 days to servicemen who have served up to 10 calendar years, 35 days for 10 to 20 calendar years, 40 days for 20 to 25 calendar years, and 45 days for 25 calendar years or more (less the time needed for travel on leave and back to the duty station).

15. Servicemen (bachelors) who have signed a contract live in a separate room in the barracks. They are given a place in a dormitory if there is an opportunity in the unit. They can live in private apartments, for which they are paid monetary compensation amounting to up to R300 per month.

Servicemen with families as well as servicewomen are given a place in a dormitory or official living space if possible or are given monetary compensation for renting private living space in the amount of up to R300-350 per month.

After five years of continuous service, servicemen with families and who have extended their contract are placed in line and given housing on a universal basis.

16. The procedure for performance of service by persons who have entered contract military service is regulated by the “Statute on Performance of Contract Military Service in Positions of Privates (Seamen) and Sergeants (Petty Officers),” as well as by the Combined-arms Regulations and laws in force.

[Sergeyev] Judging from the document, Boris Yergeyevich, the idea of contract service, about which there were so many conversations, is beginning to be implemented?

[Pyankov] There really were many conversations on contract service at all levels. But then a month ago Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov set the task for us: it is time to shift from words to action. And after studying the experience and conditions of contract service in the United States, FRG and other countries, a group of officers which I headed up worked out and is presenting our draft for broad discussion.

[Sergeyev] Tell me, in addition to all else, was this step not dictated also by the complicated political situation in republics of the former Union?

[Pyankov] You are quite right. Under today’s political conditions, draft service is becoming essentially impossible, inasmuch as the majority of states and their parliaments have passed laws prohibiting draftees from serving outside their republics. You realize that this seriously complicates the organization of duty in strategic forces as well as in general purpose forces above all on the territory of Russia. Russia alone is incapable of fully providing personnel even to these forces, but under contract people will be able to come here to serve from any regions of the CIS. The statute on contract service provides for this if, of course, new laws do not appear prohibiting citizens from serving outside their republics.

[Sergeyev] Did I understand you correctly? Any person, say, from Ukraine, who desires to do so will be able to go serve in Russia?

[Pyankov] The agreement already signed on the CIS Joint Armed Forces states that governments of the sovereign states will not prevent their citizens from serving in the army of any CIS state. It turns out they can. Well, we will see how it will be in practice.

[Sergeyev] You mentioned a statute. Evidently you are talking about the “Statute on Performance of Contract Military Service in Positions of Privates (Seamen) and Sergeants (Petty Officers).” When will those who will wish to go serve under contract be able to familiarize themselves with it?

[Pyankov] This document has been worked out and now is in the coordination stage. I think it will soon be ready.

[Sergeyev] Boris Yevgenyevich, are you not afraid that basically officers’ wives, and above all the wives of local officers in charge, will enter the Army under contract?

[Pyankov] There is that danger. Moreover, as often happens with us, “contractors” can fill positions of clerks, storekeepers, bathhouse attendants and so on. But we need the tank or IFV commander, operator, gunner, and gun commander, i.e., those people who will hold positions which determine troop combat readiness.
[Sergeyev] Fine, let us assume that those the Army needs and who strengthen combat formations have arrived. They are guaranteed a rate of pay, but they still may not end up being the desired professionals, as has occurred and is occurring with many warrant officers or extended-term servicemen. Do you assume this?

[Pyankov] There must be appreciable motivations for improving professionalism to see that this does not happen. A "bracketed" rate of pay was put into our draft document for this purpose, and the difference between the upper and lower limits is rather significant. In addition, category I, II and III positions are envisaged for privates and category IV, V and VI for sergeants, and all of them differ substantially in level of pay. Increments for class rating also are provided. All this should seriously stimulate the growth of proficiency and professionalism of future volunteers in the Armed Forces.

[Sergeyev] Yes, by the way, about class ratings. Do you not find that the difference of 4 percent between 2nd class and master is not very large, and the 7 percent for a master in a professional Army...

[Pyankov] Of course, it would be well to have a difference in pay between classes of about R(3)00 [Translator's note: parentheses around a digit or digits indicate only partial legibility]. This is an appreciable stimulus. By the way, we initially made it so that pay for 2nd class was 5 percent, 1st class 10 percent and master 20 percent of position pay. But you yourself understand that the financial question now is the most complicated for us. I think that subsequently this point will be able to be adjusted even within the limits of those amounts which will be released to us for implementing the idea of contract service.

[Sergeyev] It must be assumed that inflationary fluctuations also will be reflected in the adjustment of servicemen's pay. Or if you sign up for two years is the pay unchanged until the end of the contract?

[Pyankov] Of course not. Inflationary processes will be taken into account and pay rates will change depending on them, such as, for example, price indexing now affects the cost of the food ration for officers.

[Sergeyev] In your view, when might these draft conditions become law? To put it more simply, when might our first volunteer appear?

[Pyankov] Before legislatively approving the conditions and the Statute on Contract Service, we have to know whether or not there will be many who wish to go into the Army under these conditions. We have to study the opinions and wishes of those potential volunteers of ours whom we await in Army formation. Today this draft already has been sent to the troops and to military commissariats, and after we receive objective data on the number of persons who desire it and about their quality we will make the decision. If it turns out that there are rather many who desire it and specifically those whom we need, I think that it already will be possible to recruit contract volunteers beginning with the spring call-up.

[Sergeyev] This means you assume that people may not go into the Army under these conditions?

[Pyankov] It is impossible to exclude that variant. Today the proposed conditions of material-financial support to the contractor frankly speaking are difficult for the Russian budget, but in our view they are good for a person who has decided to accept them. But even these conditions may not create the necessary influx of takers. Unfortunately, however, we cannot offer other conditions as of the given moment because of our, pardon me for saying so, poverty.

[Sergeyev] And then... Implementation of the idea is put off until better financial and economic times?

[Pyankov] I do not think so. We will study the problem and achieve optimum conditions suit both interested parties. But I would like to believe that persons who desire to serve under contract will be found even under these conditions.

**Russian Resolution on Servicemen's Compensation**

92UM0827A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 92 p 2


1. To confirm:

   Armed Forces pay scales for officer personnel according to primary duty position (Appendix No. 1);

   —and Armed Forces pay scales for army and navy warrant officers and conscript servicemen according to primary duty position (Appendix No. 2).

2. To task the Main Command of the Combined Armed Forces with determining pay scales according to servicemen's specific duty positions [and] in accordance with the rates of pay established by this resolution for primary duty positions.

3. To pay servicemen (other than conscript servicemen) of the Armed Forces wages according to rank [and] in conformity with pay scales for special military ranks as stipulated for corresponding categories of command personnel in the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs.
To pay supplemental allowances and allotments to servicemen who have extended [and] at levels calculated in conformity with [those of] army and navy warrant officers.

4. To pay incremental service bonuses proportionate to those established for officer personnel to army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended.

To consider incremental service bonuses as a part of the pay from which pensions are calculated for army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended. To furthermore include wages based on rank in the calculation of pensions for servicemen who have extended.

To grant the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces the authority to determine procedures for calculating service time for army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended [to be used to determine the size] of incremental service bonuses.

5. To recognize [previous] service time of servicemen and enlisted and command personnel from internal affairs agencies of the applicable ministries and departments when they are transferred to the Armed Forces. (This includes those transferred prior to the adoption of this resolution.) To similarly take into account years of service for payment of incremental service bonuses.

6. To abolish limitations on maximum amounts of monetary compensation owing to special service conditions for personnel on combat alert [as well as] to abolish limitations on maximum amounts of naval monetary allowances for servicemen on warships (and auxiliary and service craft) that are on operational cruises.

7. To establish compensatory payments to servicemen [based on] skills qualifications at levels up to ten percent of established position pay and dependent on their grades, proficiency ratings and military occupational specialty classifications.

8. To double the current levels of supplemental incentive pay that is paid to servicemen in rubles, to include one-time payments for airborne, scuba and combat alert duty as well as bonuses for special service conditions.

9. To extend the applicability of this resolution to officers, army and navy warrant officers and servicemen who have extended [and are serving] in the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, the Russian Federation President's Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information, the Committee for Protection of State Borders, railway troops, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, internal troops of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Main Administration of Special Construction as well as those who are performing military service in other Russian Federation ministries, departments, organizations and institutions.

10. To put this resolution into force as of 1 February 1992.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin

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**CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES**

**Skrunda Radar Considered ‘Monster’**

*92UN1047A Riga ATMODA in Latvian 30 Jul 91 pp 8-9*

[Article by G. Barkovskis: “Skrunda’s Monster”]

[Text] In the beginning, there was not a monster at all, but only a supersecret Soviet military unit whose current number is 18951. Its origins could be found in 1964, when the three-year-long construction of the Dnieper radar station (RS) began. At that time, the LaSSR [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers evicted local residents without objections and provided 819.3 hectares for this undertaking. After that, only a few people knew what was happening on this land. The Dnieper was operating within the joint USSR defense system and its military purpose was and is (since the station currently continues its operations) to detect and to provide warnings of strategic ballistic missile launches. The rest of the time it tracks the Earth satellites and their debris whose numbers continue to grow. The station resembles two interconnected barns which look like a pair of hothouses. The first one became operational in 1967, the second in 1971 (we were not allowed to photograph them, or the building which houses the transmitter's antenna of the new and still unfinished Daryal system). Each of the four blocks simultaneously serves as both the transmitter and the receiver antenna, and they are arranged to cover the horizon at a 180 degree angle. The closest Dnieper to the north is located near Murmansk, and to the south - in Mukachevo (Western Ukraine). In principle, they are located all around the Soviet Union, which is “surrounded by imperialists”, and the RS is located in Skrunda for the military strategic purposes of the neighboring country, too.

The station is not fireproof, and large amounts of water are required to extinguish [possible] fires. This fact increases the suspicion that a nuclear reactor is present. However, all the military authorities and designers swore that this is untrue.

Two high-voltage power lines enter the military unit’s site (a third line is being built). Electric power consumption of the garrison is equal to that of the whole Kuldiga rayon. At the present time, the garrison consists of more than 4000 men and several military units, including the construction battalion, or stroybat No 03535, which is building the new Daryal-UM RS. The USSR either already has, or still is building another four such facilities, so each of them is relatively unique.

Skrunda's monster became scandalously notorious since its construction started. The Daryal under construction is analogous to the world renowned Krasnovyarsk space studies center, whose conversion from a military site into a civilian one, as it is known, was not a voluntary action, but rather the result of the pressure by the West. The reason for it (based on unconfirmed information)
was the fact that the international treaties prohibit placement of such facilities, which could be used for offensive purposes, deep inside the territory of a country. [as published]

The history of Daryal started on 13 November 84, when the Deputy Chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, Kazimirs Spogis, signed a document allowing the placement of the new RS next to the already existing Dnieper. Therefore, people in Kuldiga suddenly learned that next year they are to lose another 156 hectares for the benefit of the Army. Nobody pays to the rayon for the land usage. The inflicted wrongs, lack of information, and misgivings have alarmed the residents of Kuldiga rayon even more. Misgivings grew with the growth of the new station's building, which could not be hidden anymore because it began to rise above the tops of the forest trees. Presently, it is an 18-story and 84-meter-high structure later to be filled up with computers that can be seen from a distance of tens of kilometers. (The height of the hotel Latvija is 87 meters.) The difference with Dnieper is that the transmitter and receiver antennas are separated and the individual buildings are located at a distance of a couple of hundreds meters from one another. Both of them resemble perpendicular right-angled triangular trapeziums whose sloped planes are directed toward the north-west. This facility also belongs to the military unit No 18951, whose commanding officer is Colonel Viktor Khukhlin. He is under the direct command of the General staff of the Air Defense Forces [PVO] located near Moscow, and the obtained information reaches Gorbachev's desk on a regular basis. One military person in a private conversation said approximately the following: if Moscow ever begins to withdraw its troops from Latvia, this will be the last unit to go through Zilupe. PVO Colonel-General Volter Kraskovskiy had asserted that the computer center serving the RS is the largest in the republic and that the new one will be even larger.

All told, the above is only an introduction, only the flowers. The berries ripened on the 16 October 1990, when the local people's deputies attended the session of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom and, based on the studies carried out by Dr. Abelitis concerning the negative effects of the RS on people, adopted a historical resolution. It stated that the construction of the new station had to stop before 20 November. Otherwise, the bread supplies to the garrison would be stopped, food coupons would not be issued, and the railroad stations in Skrunda and near it would prohibit the unloading of arriving cargoes. A panic started in the Army's ranks, because in the recent past the construction of Daryal was temporarily stopped in Mukachevo, where the Ukrainians have shown not only their hot tempers, but also demonstrated their knowledge of the really inexhaustible depths of Russian verbal folklore.

After all, the military are only people, and they also have families and children who are living too close to the RS and are receiving increased dosages of electromagnetic radiation (EMR). A common language has been found, and on 23 November 1990 the USSR Council of Ministers with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the republic of Latvia decided to form a 63-men commission to perform an all-round ecological study of the Skrunda facility. In his comments, the chairman of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom, Aleksandrs Lange, said that the only way to deal with the Army is to apply a methodical and active pressure.

Ilmars Bisers was the formal head of the group representing our side in the commission and he was seen at its sessions only twice. Other representatives of the Council of Ministers assigned to the commission followed his example. Thanks to this "activity", the final document does not mention that the commission was an international one. This means that any word, or item that the USSR Prime Minister Pavlov does not like, will be easily removed and the work of a half-a-year (even of a full year) will go down the tubes. Even when it still could be corrected, Deputy Minister Valdis Zeikats, who justified his regular absence by being very busy and relying on the high professionalism of the Latvian scientists, found it appropriate to leave the room. This time no comments. The Deputy chairman of the USSR Environment Protection Committee, Yevgeniy Minayev, who left an impression of a far from intelligent person, was the head of the joint commission. It should be noted that Moscow was also interested in the work of the ecological study - to prove the RS harmless and to calm other people living in the vicinity of Daryal. Therefore, it is no surprise that Izvestiya and Krasnaya Zvezda on 12 July hurried to publish the results desirable to them. For residents of Mukachevo it was a bad service. We should note that such a commission was formed in the Soviet union for the first time and the work it performed is unique in the world's practice. That the commission was unique is attested to by the fact that the USSR was represented by high-ranking officials of the Defense Ministry, famous medical workers and scientists, the designer general of the USSR missile attack warning system, Aleksey Kuzmin, and the Chief Designer of the Institute of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry, Vladimir Ordanovich. This Institute is also involved in the production of Daryal.

The commission's work may be conditionally divided into three subgroups: physical, biological, and medical. The first group measured magnitude and volume of the electromagnetic radiation (EMR) emitted by the station and their conformity with the norms approved by the USSR Ministry of Health. The second group studied the effects of this radiation on nature, and the third group—on people's health. Everybody worked hard, but results were difficult and long in coming, which caused the delays in the commission's work until 5 July (instead of the scheduled 25 March). This could be explained by the large volume of work, its uniqueness and mutual frictions, and even by serious differences in opinions during
the work on the final document, because each side tried to achieve the results it desired. However, unfortunately (or thank God) the observed deviations were within the approved norms. For example, the maximum radiation flux was 7.6 mW/sq. cm while the norm existing in the USSR is 10 mW/sq. cm. The chief specialist on EMR at the Latvian Environment protection Committee, Peteris Jansons, commented as follows: “In the Soviet system an object and its needs are always primary, but the health of the service personnel is secondary. Thus, all studies and the approved norms are subordinated to these needs.”

EMR effects on people are generally little studied and according to the chief internist of the republic, Professor Anatolij Danilans, the results of such studies would deserve a Nobel Prize. Not likely. Of course, because they are connected with the work of closed institutes studying psychic and other effects. By the way, Dnieper and TV operate on close electromagnetic waves frequencies, and therefore, for example, in the Rudzorzhi township only, 62 homes experience interference with their radio, TV, and tape recorders. The main attention was directed toward the medical studies. Two zones (base and control) were selected in the Kulda rayon. Population of the first zone was 2500 people, that of the second zone—2765 people. According to a methodology developed in Latvia, 202 and 328 people, respectively, were selected by the Kulda rayon residents themselves for medical testing. Doctors have found that residents of the base zone have more headaches, worse sleep, get tired more easily, and have pain in the joints and spine more often. Other deviations in the work of the internal organs were also found, for example, heart arrhythmia. However, except for several cases, it was also within the limits of the physiological norms. To prove the connection between these deviations and the EMR emitted by Dnieper and that they are caused only by it is almost impossible. And that is exactly why the Army’s representatives are satisfied with the commission’s work. The growth biologists determined that since the mid-70’s wood in the local forests was drastically falling. This phenomenon has not been explained yet, and it was decided to continue studies.

No substantial deviations from the physiological norm were found during inspections of the cattle farms, especially because the feeding of cattle at the farms is abnormal, not to say more. The environment is also polluted by the garrison’s boiler room, by freon escaping from refrigerators and destroying the planet’s ozone layer, and also by chlorine being used.

The region is seismically inactive.

In addition, 22 proposals and conclusions were written, including the following:

- to study and to define more precisely influence of the very high frequency (VHF) signals on human health, if pulse repetition frequency is 20-24 Hz, and frequency of irregular radio pulse emission is within the 150-200 MHz band;
- to study the effects of the RS signals interference on the quality of radioelectronic equipment functioning and to develop measures to protect radio and TV receivers from noise generated by Dnieper and Daryal transmitters;
- to study in 1991-1994 the epidemiology of effects on population in locations of analogous facilities. To compare the results with those which were already obtained and to prepare proposals for improving the health of residents;
- to continue to observe the health conditions of people living in Kulda rayon;
- to ask the USSR Defense Ministry and Health Ministry to find together with the Kulda rayon authorities the technical and material means to maximally satisfy the interests of the local population;
- to recommend that the Latvian Academy of Sciences together with the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR Ministry of Radio Industry, and the USSR Defense Ministry develop options to use the RS for scientific purposes, for example, to study the interaction between the space, Sun, and Earth, and other similar research. The USSR Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Radio Industry together with the authorities of the Republic of Latvia shall develop and approve within two-months a plan, which would serve as the basis for the realization of the proposals and recommendations.

AFTERWORD

The commission has completed its work which costed 170,000 rubles. The RS remains. The construction of the new complex will continue for at least three years until a victorious end. Then it will be 10-fold larger. A whole generation has already grown under abnormal and psychologically stressful conditions. One more similar facility in Vidzeme and such a notion as the genetic fund of the Latvian nation will not exist.

What to do? In principle, there are two options, namely, to leave, or to tear down the RS. The second option is simpler, because to tear down is always easier than to build. To blow up such a facility will definitely cost a million-fold less than its construction. The more sophisticated the equipment, the easier it is to damage. How real is the second option? The deputy chief designer of the Daryal, Sergey Korshunkov, answered this question: “The historical experience shows that some types of weapons die out, and new others emerge. In the nearest future, nobody will give up such stations. They are part of the star wars concept.”
Thus, for the time being, nothing indicates that the Skrunda monster could die soon. What do the residents of the Kuldiga rayon and the chairman of the Kuldiga rayon ispolkom intend to do?

"The commission has competed its task and we are practically at the same place as in the beginning. Well... we will follow up that the measures written in the final document are actually implemented, especially those in the field of ecology. If is determined that residents of areas around other similar facilities have health deviations, then, it seems, we will need the world's pressure to close the Skrunda RS."

What does the actual boss of the facility, Colonel Viktor Khukhlin, think about its future?

"Whether Skrunda will become a civilian space research center does not depend on us, but rather on Moscow, the negotiations between the USSR and the USA, and the political situation in the world. I personally would benefit from the military base status. Then I would not have to think about food and other supplies to the military units, because the other party to the agreement would take care of them. In addition, we all would get a double salary for the work abroad, while my current salary is very small - 700 rubles. However, all this can be resolved only through negotiations between Latvia and the USSR, or through a Union treaty. In addition, I want to say that we are not interested in a conflict with the local population."

Finally, the words of a man who is far from being a good-natured person, namely, PVO Colonel-General Volter Kraskovs, come to mind: "Give my regards to the great Latvian people!". He is not, of course, guilty that these words may be perceived in very different ways. And these words hurt.

The building of the new complex Daryal receiver's antenna. The unique photo was taken from the military unit's territory. Photo by Ints Kainins.
Daryal-UM transmitter's antenna. Antenna's array is formed by 648 (36 x 18) oscillators. The power of a pulse emitted by one oscillator is 200 kW, frequency band - 150 MHz, duration of a pulse - 2 ms - \( \lambda \) (lambda) - 2 m

One of the Dnieper pairs existing at Skrunda. The power of a pulse emitted by each transmitter is 1.25 MW, frequency band - 154-164 MHz, duration of a pulse - 0.8 ms

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

1991 Variant of AK74
92UM0778A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 1, Jan 1992 (Signed to press 31 Jan 92) p 32

[Article under the rubric “The Arsenal”: “The 5.45-mm AK74M Assault Rifle”]

[Text] The Kalashnikov Design Bureau has demonstrated excellence again, designing an updated model of the well-known AK74 assault rifle. Regular production was begun in 1991 at the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant Production Association.

The weapon retains all the advantages of the AK class but has acquired a number of new features which improve its combat and operating features. Changes have also been made to reflect experience in the assault rifle’s use in combat.

The main new feature is a folding plastic stock. When the lock catch is pressed, the stock folds to the right. The assault rifle’s overall length conforms to the dimensions of the AKS74. The forestock and handguard are also made of plastic. The heat transfer coefficient of the new material is no higher than that of wood, and this rules out the possibility of burns to the hands during prolonged firing. It is more resistant to wear and to impacts, and the danger of chipping and splintering has been eliminated. The stock can still be used in hand-to-hand combat.

The AK74M has a standard attachment (leaf) for the optical and night sights.

The design of the muzzle compensator has been altered somewhat. It has open chambers which can be cleaned without detaching them from the barrel. “Oscillation” of the muzzle brake has been eliminated by enlarging its seating area. The receiver cover has been reinforced, which reduces the likelihood of damage from blows, particularly in hand-to-hand combat. A more reliable clamp makes it possible to fire the under-barrel grenade launcher without additional reinforcement of the cover and ramrod, which was necessary for the previous model.

In general one can say that the AK74M is an obvious advance in the development of small arms. Coupled with the new cartridge, it has no equal in the world in many respects. I believe that the combat and operating features of the Kalashnikov assault rifle are not advertised abroad purely because of competition in the arms market. The latest designs of Western companies, weapons of the Bullpup design which use caseless ammunition, receive attention for their original technical features, of course. It is still a fact, however, that with respect to its reliability, simplicity of operation, quality of manufacture, automatic fire power and maneuvering ease, the AK74M is unsurpassed. The fact that the price
of the assault rifle is somewhat lower than that of weapons of the same class produced by Western manufacturers, particularly when purchased in large quantities, will also obviously be important for buyers.

DATA:
cartridge, 5.45X39 mm;
weight, 3.4 kg (with loaded magazine);
length, 1,089 mm (with bayonet), 940 mm (without bayonet), 700 mm (with folded stock);
barrel length, 415 mm;
rifling grooves, 4; groove spacing, 200 mm;
initial bullet velocity, 900 m/s;
bullet force, 1,377 joules;
firing mode, single or sustained;
cyclic rate of fire, 600 rounds/minute;
sustained rate of fire, 40-100 rounds/minute;
sighting range, 1,000 m;
direct firing range for standing figure, 625 m;
magazine capacity, 30 or 45 rounds.

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CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Novgorod Long-Range Bomber Base: Typical Problems
92UM0761A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by N. Belan: “Take Off Against the Wind: Today Is the 50th Anniversary of Long-Range Aviation”]

[Text] It is not for nothing that these places in Novgorod Oblast are called the Berendevey Kingdom. Forests stretch from horizon to horizon. A military post of a Long-Range Aviation regiment became lost amidst this wooded spaciousness.

But it was not about local charms that my companions were speaking.

“It is time to determine what we are for, who needs us and what will happen to us,” said Lieutenant-Colonel A. Chaykovskiy, Major V. Molchanov and Captain R. Mustakov, crew members of a supersonic missile-armed aircraft.

In another time it would be strange to hear such things from people who are considered aces. Such pilots as they would have made up the most valuable possessions of any country’s army. Their proficiency was tested by Afghanistan—three years ago together with countrymen they covered the withdrawal of our units from there. That means they saved the lives of many officers and men. Today it seems the question is about how to save not only the crews of these professionals, but also Long-Range Aviation as a whole.

The aviators said this to me, having given up on their everyday and social difficulties as hopeless. And I had the thought that it was not by chance that at all times in Russia the professional military were called state people. The interests of the state came first for them, but woe to the country if this most important thing is removed from their souls.

Two of my companions, Major Molchanov and Captain Mustakov, come from working families. Lieutenant-Colonel Chaykovskiy is a hereditary military man. Colonel V. Meshcherakov, senior pilot and inspector of Long-Range Aviation’s Combat Training Directorate who was flying with us, livened up on hearing his name: “Isn’t that the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Yevgeniy Grigor’evich Chaykovskiy, who taught me to fly at one time?” It turned out it was; today Aleksandr has “caught up” with his father both in military rank and in position—he commands a squadron.

“There is one more pilot in our family, and he also serves in Long-Range Aviation,” Aleksandr Yevgenyevich said, adding to our acquaintance. “My brother Yevgeny; he is a Major and an aircraft commander.”

Long-Range Aviation is held up by such people and their comrades in arms. Who will come to replace them and will there be persons willing to experience the difficulties of military routine? I dropped in on Regimental Commander Colonel V. Yekimenko. Diagrams hang in his office. No, not the growth of pilots’ combat proficiency, but the post’s water and heating lines.

“In the almost three years that I have commanded the regiment I have learned all these lines by heart,” says Vladimir Alekseyevich. “But what can you do? the pipes are old; they were laid very long ago and they break first here, then there.”

How do people become regimental commanders? First-Class Pilot Colonel Yekimenko became such after acquiring enormous experience and knowledge and completing a military academy. But is all this really necessary in order to deal with water, sewer and heating lines? I understand this is a controversial question and I fully share Vladimir Alekseyevich’s position: pilots live on the ground and without concern for them and their families the aircraft will not fly. I am not reproaching Yekimenko, God preserve us, but it is about something else: Who should show this concern so this same Yekimenko would have more time to deal with combat readiness.

I was told that this regiment is one of the fortunate ones in provision of housing and in the solution of other social problems. Here “only” 41 persons do not have apartments. Those are the statistics. True, their language and the realities of life at times are two enormously different things.

For example, in the hotel I became acquainted with Lieutenant Andrey Matkin and Lieutenant Andrey Matkin. Both completed the same school and both are navigator-operators and are married, but for now they are living without their families.

“No apartments?”
“By no means, we just moved in,” responded the lads. “But you should see these apartments.”

What “creations” of military builders have we not had occasion to encounter. But that which the lieutenants showed me exceeds all fantasies. There are thin chipboard partitions instead of walls in the apartments and a pile of boards instead of floors...

I saw a display in the Uzin Division warning about what is contraindicated for pilots before flights. “Becoming agitated”—the following picture is drawn on the board: a son hands his father a report card with D’s. “Not have enough sleep or not rest fully”... But I recalled the dormitories and hotels: families in cramped rooms with children exhausted from discomfort crying at night. I do not know about their fathers, but at times I was unable to fall asleep until morning. There are now a total of 7,500 homeless in Long-Range Aviation, of which on the order of 600 are pilots.

The disintegration of the USSR intensified the already painful social and everyday problems. The intention of some independent states to give up strategic nuclear forces after some time introduced uncertainty in officers and warrant officers about tomorrow. We spoke about this in Baranovichi, for example, with Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Makhalov.

“Far from all people plan to leave,” he said. “At the same time, after being discharged, how to find a job? How are their children, who are not fluent in Belarussian, to continue studies after school?”

On the 50th anniversary of Long-Range Aviation I would like to speak about tradition and its very enormous contribution to our Victory. But who would have thought that together with this, today it also will be necessary to sound the alarm? The break of economic ties is turning out to be irreparable.

“Engines are needed,” said Colonel Yekimenko. “They lie around at all echelons, but our requisitions for 200 descriptions of spare parts are not being filled.”

“There is a catastrophic shortage of fuel and we are sitting on starvation rations,” said Guards Lieutenant Colonel Makhalov, supplementing the, alas, joyless picture. “The pilots’ minimum of flying hours is not being fulfilled.”

But perhaps the officers are dramatizing and exaggerating the situation? I addressed this question to Colonel-General of Aviation I. Kalugin, commander of Long-Range Aviation.

“Unfortunately, not,” answered Igor Mikhailovich. “While previously the mission was to support high combat readiness of Long-Range Aviation at the level of demands placed on it, now it is to preserve it. Do you sense the difference? It is terrible when they try to pull equipment asunder, but even more terrible when they pull people asunder. The instance in Uzin is a clear example. Swearing of the oath of allegiance to Ukraine there did not correspond to the spirit and letter of agreements on strategic forces.”

...Colonel M. Ovcharov, who fussed about the posts with me, related a great deal about the history of their units. Yes, this is Long-Range Aviation, but the people's concern for it should not become a far-off tradition...

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Adm Kasatonov Profile
92UM0764A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian No 7, Feb 92 pp 4-5

[Article by SYN OTECHESTVA special correspondent Yevgeniy Vodopyanov, Sevastopol, February: “The Winter of an Admiral”]

[Text] Every day he receives letters and telegrams in which he is invoked, by the blood of Russian sailors, not to lower the flag of the power and to recall the heroism and glory of the Russian fleet. Every day he receives telegrams and letters in which he is called a provocateur and protect of the imperial center. The president of the Ukraine has demanded that he be removed from his post, while the women of Sevastopol have awarded him the Flag of St. Andrew, sacred to the church. All of his conscious life he has been learning to make decisions and to have the courage to bear responsibility for them. But after he had achieved a great deal, with difficulty—he received a fleet that had at one time been commanded by his father—it turned out that the chief decision belonged not to him, the admiral, but rather to others who had no relation whatsoever to the fleet.

I met with Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov upon his return from Nikolayev and Ochakov. Despite the fact that the fleet commander had been delayed due to the weather conditions, which pinched the admiral's already pressed day, he was in a good mood.

It was always raised for Igor Vladimirovich when he saw that people were supporting him. The workers of the two largest yards had not only come out on the side of Kasatonov, who was fighting to preserve the fleet within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. He was still obliged to repair ships and vessels under the conditions of today's galloping prices. Even though the fleet, due to the miserly deductions for its upkeep, already owed the yards a x amount of money with a lot of zeroes.

Recalling a conversation with the director of one of the yards—Yuriy Ivanovich Makarov—who had asked, “You, Igor Vladimirovich, do not lower the flag, and we will hold out somehow,” the admiral smiled. And to see that smile on the face of a man who was at the very epicenter of a storm of political passions was unexpected. The admiral, by the way, had another reason for his good mood.
Kasatonov associates special memories with Ochakov. During his rise as a commander, graduate Captain 2nd Rank Igor Kasatonov of the Naval Academy had taken command of the large ASW ship Ochakov that was under construction. So the people received him not only as an admiral who was defending the integrity of the fleet, but also as the first commander of the ship that bears the name of their native city.

It was not so sweet for the first one then. You cannot convey in a couple of words what a newly built ship is like. In brief, it is a cluster of metal, electronics and weapons, but dead. The same way that the intellect and hands of man brought it into being, only those intellect and hands can breathe life into it: teach it to float, to "see," to be able to wage battle. And for that a crew has to be created that does not even exist on paper.

Captain 2nd Rank Kasatonov was then able to prove to the fleet headquarters that he himself should be chosen to command it. But it is one thing to find specialists, and another to "stick together" a unified crew, able to understand their commander quickly on the uptake, from each individual person with his own "I," varying service experience and levels of training. That sometimes takes years. Kasatonov was able to do the impossible, it seems—to put his team together over a few months.

One of the former Ochakov crewmen, today a deputy chief of the Operations Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, recalled how Kasatonov patiently educated him along with the other twenty-four young lieutenants who had come to the ship. He demanded thorough knowledge of people and being in charge, but he also found the opportunity to be occupied with each of the young officers personally. And after having completed the school of Kasatonov, they were easily able to master their higher levels of command on other ships...

I had occasion to hear a great deal about the school of Igor Vladimirovich. All of my interlocutors noted, aside from the toughness, scrupulousness and pedantry, something else that was an invaluable, in their opinion, quality of Kasatonov the commander—the ability to find an approach to the person, not only to demand, but to outline the course to the intended goal in two or three sentences. And another thing—to help them look at the service with different eyes, to get away from stereotypical thinking. It is no accident that many of the former lieutenants from the Ochakov, as well as those who served under the command of Kasatonov when he was chief of staff and then commander of a division of surface vessels, occupy leading positions in the fleet today. When Igor Vladimirovich came to Sevastopol to the position of commanding admiral, on seeing acquaintances from his prior service at the headquarters he joked that "Oh-oh, now they'll be accusing me of protectionism." It was a prophetic joke, as it turned out.

My interlocutors also pointed out one trait of Kasatonov's character as commander—putting his mind to everything, not letting a single detail slip by.

When the Ochakov large ASW ship was in the yard, the ship's commander crawled all over it literally from stem to stern. He delved into every nuance of it, consulted with the workers on how to improve the positions so that people could perform their difficult duties a little more easily. The training of the commanders proceeded simultaneously with the finishing off of the ship. And when the Ochakov joined the brigade, its crew was permitted out to practice course missions without any of the organizational period that is usually provided to convert the ship from yard organization to planned everyday activity. Overall, a unique case for the fleet. The ship took part in exercises after just a month and a half, after which it made a call on Bulgaria under the flag of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

That was in February of seventy-five.

February was an altogether special month for Kasatonov. His mother, Tamara Kirillovna, was born on February 28. On February 28, at the age of twenty three, she married her first and last love, Vladimir Afanasevich Kasatonov—the future father of an admiral. Igor Vladimirovich himself was born in February. In February his father, Vladimir Afanasevich, completed the Naval Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, became a commander of the RKKF [Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy] and was sent to the naval forces of the Baltic Fleet. Thirty one years later, in February of sixty-two, already having been commander of the Black Sea Fleet for more than six years, he was assigned to another—the Northern Fleet.

The youngest fleet proved to be at the crest of events at that time. The crews of nuclear submarines were reaching the highest latitudes of the harshest of oceans: they were running "under the ice," assimilating Arctic cruise routes and new navigational gear and instruments.

In July of sixty-two the nuclear-powered torpedo submarine Leninist Komsomol under the command of Captain 2nd Rank L. Zhiltsov was the first in the world to pass twice under the North Pole. A year later he was overtaken by another nuclear submarine under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Sysoyev. Northern Fleet Commander Fleet Admiral V. Kasatonov supervised that cruise. Two nuclear powered craft—first under the command of Captain 2nd Rank I. Dubyaga, and then Captain 1st Rank A. Mikhaylovskiy—completed crossings to the Pacific Ocean and back under the ice in that same year. A year later, in April of sixty-four, North Sea sailors using a nuclear-powered underwater cruiser under the command of Captain 1st Rank I. Gulyayev and the supervision of Vice Admiral G. Khloostyakov circumnavigated the globe without surfacing a single time.

There was no little labor and thought by Admiral V. Kasatonov in these heroic deeds—which cannot be called anything else (even in the face of today's allergy to
high-flew phrases)—by the sailors. Himself an experienced submariner, Vladimir Afanasyevich had begun service as watch officer and navigator of the submarine Bolshevik, called the Rys before the revolution, and he had invested much effort in the development of the nuclear-powered fleet. So while February was a special month for Kasatonov largely for the confluence of circumstances, Vladimir Afanasyevich was not assigned to the North by the will of Lady Luck. It was all inexorable—the admiral went where he was most needed.

Twenty years later this same route—from the Black Sea Fleet to the Northern—was followed by Igor Vladimirovich.

The courses of the father and son Kasatonov were repeated and intersected more than once. Which is not surprising, in the opinion of the author, and testifies just to the fact that our blue planet is far from too big, as it could seem, and we must live harmoniously on it. It is something else that is noteworthy. Both the father and the son went to the hottest spot in the fleet at the time.

A new flotilla was being created in the North in those years. A formation that was not known to history before, consisting of diverse manpower and equipment: ships for protecting the maritime regions and submarines, missile craft and coastal missile and artillery batteries... Igor Vladimirovich was designated to command this miniature fleet, which was called upon to operate in an operational zone that was almost no smaller than that of the Black Sea.

And once again, as at one time on the Ochakov, Kasatonov had to start almost from zero, only with the difference that he had to combine and unite into a unified organism whole units and formations rather than individual people. Under the leadership of Kasatonov his staff developed operational documents, ran through questions of interaction and created rear support. Combat training could not be let slip either.

Not everything went smoothly.

At one exercise a missile launched from a missile craft headed for another craft instead of the target. Happily, people were not hurt, but the incident was the cause for an investigation by the highest authorities. Kasatonov was rebuked by order of the Minister of Defense.

Igor Vladimirovich took the reprimand as his due; as the commander of the formation, he answered for all shortcomings in the training of his subordinates. It was not in his blood to seek out justifications for his deeds.

The first deputy commander-in-chief of the navy, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Afanasyevich Kasatonov, in recalling his forebears, the peasants of the Kursk province, wrote: “Communion with the land and independence gave rise to the characteristic traits that have been transmitted by inheritance—independence, courage, the love of freedom and doggedness in the achievement of what is conceived.”

It was namely courage and loyalty to duty that threw the holder of the St. George’s Cross, a Wachtmeister of the Leibgarde of the Uhlans Regiment imeni Empress Alexandra Fedorovna (the Elder), Afanasy Kasatonov—the grandfather of Igor Vladimirovich—under the German bullets, inciting him to be the first, as a volunteer, to go on reconnaissance and make a prisoner snatch.

It was namely a reluctance to forgo one’s conscience and courage that forced the Pacific Ocean sailor Vladimir Kasatonov to repudiate all accusations of betrayal of the Motherland in the 1930s that were made against his commander and old friend G. Kholostyakov. And, in the fifties, to defend his opinion before Minister of Defense G. Zhukov on the necessity of merging the two Baltic Fleets into one. Knowing therein that the minister always had his own point of view and, moreover, that in the event that such a merger did occur it would not be he, commanding the 8th Naval Fleet, that would command the Baltic but rather the more experienced A. Golovko. But he knew that it would be easier for one master to command, and thus strove for his own.

It was namely independence and courage that did not permit flotilla commander Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov to appeal to the Minister of Defense on the score of his reprimand by making reference to the fact that the exercises were being supervised by a higher officer during the time of the ill-fated firing. And when President Leonid Kravchuk, even before the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements, declared himself to be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Ukraine and transferred the three districts and the Black Sea Fleet under his own subordination, to express his disagreement with that decision to his face. And then to defend his point of view. While categorically forbidding the members of the fleet military council and all of his advocates to interfere in political debates. Justly reasoning that in the event anything happened, it would be better for one head to roll than several at once. And he surrendered his own, commander’s, head as the sacrifice.

This February in Sevastopol happened to be a rare snowy one. It looks like the weather has decided to join the confusion that the former “Union indissoluble” has wrapped itself in. The old-timers here cannot remember when so much snow has fallen in Sevastopol. It covered the streets and sidewalks, the piers and the ships. The “dull peace of timelessness,” as a journalist from OGONEK wrote, however, was not blowing from it.

The fleet continues to live despite all the efforts of the politicians. It goes to sea to practice the missions of the ships. Such trips have become less frequent, it is true, due to the shortages of fuel. Greater attention is being devoted, on the other hand, to basic training and the use of simulators and training hardware. There is no little credit due in this to the fleet commander and his staff.

“Politics are politics,” the admiral said to me, “we should not decline in combat readiness.”
But what real means does the commander possess for this? Russia has allocated 250 million for the upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet for January. The Ukraine has given another 350 million, but that is for the quarter. How miserly that is for the fleet can be understood using just one example. Something on the order of 70,000 rubles went for one day’s cruise at sea for just the Moskva ASW cruiser alone. And that is in the old prices. No one has computed how much in the new ones.

And the ships were created for that, to plough the oceans and seas, and not to rust successfully while standing at anchor or a buoy.

It would be simplest of all, of course, to cut the old ships up for the metal and sell them for hard currency along with the new ones. Seeing that there are plenty enough buyers for the one and the other. But what do you do with the people—throw them on the scrap heap? Can we get rid of potential enemies with a single stroke of the pen too? The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf showed—and the Americans have learned this well—that a strong power needs a strong navy. And only the Commonwealth, as the example of the Moskva PKR testifies, is able to maintain it. If it does not want to depart this life, of course.

Many of our politicians unhappily cannot (or will not) understand at all that it is easier to break up than to build anew everywhere. We have already destroyed everything down to the foundations in one day. Can history really have taught us nothing? Or is our Slavic nature such that only by committing follies and beating up the big shots, ourselves and others, often close, we begin to look around in horror and scratch our heads—what have we wrought?

What can the fleet commander really do today for his subordinates if he has no funds, and he will soon have left for reserves, as he jokes humorlessly, just his nerves? There are more than three thousand servicemen without apartments in Sevastopol alone. And each one has a family. Construction is underway, of course. But in the words of Kasatonov, the fleet can only erect one house, and that with great pains, where three were being built before. That means that they will have to wait not 10-11 years for an apartment, as before, but three times longer.

Considered and well thought-out decisions on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet and real assistance are needed. Emissaries keep coming to the fleet instead. More and more from the Ukraine, fewer and fewer from Russia. I have been able to talk with two of them.

Stepan Andreyevich Kuzmuk and Ivan Lukyanovich Stepanyuk from Rovno Oblast, together with several soldiers’ mothers, came to visit their sons serving in the fleet and meet with the commanders.

I looked at their heavily worked hands, accustomed to the land, faces weather-beaten from the fields, and bitterness overflowed my soul. Not because both insistently defended the right of the Ukraine to possess the Black Sea Fleet. It was shameful for the politicians to drag simple folk into their games. Here they are torn from their places in search of a truth lying on the surface. While, in the words of Kasatonov, 55,000 tractors are standing idle without spare parts in Nikolayev Oblast alone. And the harvest is at hand.

So what then, will we go all over with hat in hand again or will we blame the fleet and the army, supposedly impoverishing the people?

I parted with the “parliamentarians” without being convinced that it would be any easier. And I met them completely by accident the same evening. And I was struck at how the tone of the envoys had changed.

I do not know what words and reasoning the fleet commander had found, but both Kuzmuk and Stepanyuk asked me in one voice, “You write in your newspaper there, let the fleet be a common one. But let a few ships be allotted to the Ukraine.”

But the fact that the Ukraine, as an independent state, has the right to its own fleet had been declared long ago, after all. The Main Staff of the Navy and Kasatonov and his staff are moreover prepared to help them with it. But clearly those who say that the appetite passes when it is time to eat are right.

The political debates and hue and cry surrounding the problem of the Black Sea Fleet raised by our brother journalist, along with the lack of amenities and hopelessness of life, have led to the fact that the mood of the officers and warrant officers is vacillating today.

Most of those with whom I had occasion to meet take the position that the fleet should be a common one and, having once taken an oath, they will not take any more. But there are also those who are inclined toward the idea that in the event of the collapse of the CIS they will have to swear loyalty to the Ukraine. They would not want to do it, but they have to think about their families too.

Several officers moreover told me that they see in Kasatonov only somebody’s favorite. It is easy to talk about the honor of an admiral, they say, for whom someplace to serve will always be found if anything happens. What will they do—tear themselves from where they have settled and head off into oblivion?!

Does the fleet commander know about these sentiments among the officers? He does and he does not blame them, since he sees in this the tragedy of the “man with a gun,” without rights and hapless, who has proved once again to be a hostage to ill-considered political decisions and personal ambitions. And the admiral realizes with particular bitterness that the army and navy will always prove to be on the outside.

During the August putsch the Black Sea Fleet was accused of violating the oath and not coming out on the side of now ex-president M. Gorbachev. Even though no one had ever sworn loyalty to the first or the later president.
Today the Black Sea Fleet sailors and Kasatonov (who was, by the way, with the Northern Fleet during the putsch) are rebuked for the fact that they remained faithful to the oath. Although, they say, there is no sign of either the state or the people they swore to defend. The question of the oath is thus in fact not worth a plugged nickel. It is another matter for the officers and soldiers of the imperial army—the sovereign and the commander in chief were violently overthrown, and under those conditions the oath took on a special significance: it was a spiritual obligation before the Lord God and one's own conscience.

If it were only a matter of gastronomical delicacies, to which eggs are equated today, one could perhaps not argue with the author of OGONEK anyway. But it is, after all, a discussion of honor, on which the officer Kutasyev expressed himself voluminously in the film “Red Square.” Standing under the rifle muzzles of the infuriated soldiers demanding that the officer surrender his honor, he said, “Honor is all, if you surrender it, how can you live?”

I doubt that the majority of officers in the tsarist army and navy chose armed fighting only out of loyalty to the Emperor. Remember the call to battle of the Russian officers raising the soldiers to attack: “For faith, tsar and the Fatherland!” Namely for the Fatherland, whose ruin the officers saw with the coming of the new power, and they stood up against it with weapons in hand. There are, by the way, no few examples of that—it was not only monarchists fighting in the ranks of the White Army, but advocates of democracy as well. Can Kasatonov, who has become a witness to a real rather than mythical ruin of the Motherland, be blamed today for the fact that he will not accept it? That upon coming home after the famous meeting with the president of the Ukraine, he said to Yuliya Aleksandrovnna, his wife, “That’s it, Yuliya, I’m retiring…”

I will possibly be violating journalistic ethics by making that last instance known, which Igor Vladimirovich asked me not to mention. But when hearing the opinions of the officers on Kasatonov as a favorite, I understood that they see in the commander only a commander. A place in fact probably would be found for Kasatonov in one of the three fleets in the event anything does happen. But there is also Kasatonov the person. With his experiences, plans and, finally, as we see, momentary weaknesses.

Kasatonov the father, as many officers, is troubled about what will happen to his daughter Tamara, who is studying in the second year at Simferopol State University. If she transfers, then where—not all of the fleets are based alongside higher educational institutions. His heart aches for his twin sons Sasha and Kirill, who intended to enter the naval academy this year. What would it mean to transfer them to a new school on the eve of finals? There is, finally, Kasatonov the husband, for whom taking his wife from her place of habitation and bringing her to a new one is a knife in the heart. The more so as Yuliya Aleksandrovnna has already managed to kick around the naval garrisons a little with her officer father and then the admiral.

So it turns out that the hysteria surrounding the Black Sea Fleet, the submissiveness of some of the officers to fate, placed in essence at the mercy of the waves raised by the politicians, is the pain and tragedy of Kasatonov himself as well. The tragedy is also in the fact that he has always valued people not for their national affiliation, but for their attitude toward the cause. (His first ship commanders, by the way, were A. Timoshenko and A. Dobnya—Ukrainians.) Today they are pushing him simply to divide everything into “ours” and “theirs.” But that goes against the very soul of the sailor. Insofar as the admiral reveres Peter the Great, whose portrait hangs over the fleet commander in his office. Not Peter the Emperor and Autocrat, but Peter the founder of the Russian Navy. Note—not a Russian, Moldavian or Ukrainian, but the Russian. The Peter in whose Naval Charter was written, “Officers and others who serve in His Majesty’s fleet love each other faithfully, as a Christian should, without differences, of whatever faith or people they be.”

...A submarine was moving along the smooth surface of the water in the Sevastopol bay, heavy and gray in winter, reminiscent of hardened tin, on one of the days before my departure. In gusts of wind throwing handfuls of wet snow into my face, over the dark conning tower, a flag with a field of white decorated with two blue stripes crosswise sagged and snapped out straight again.

Will this sacred object—the Banner of St. Andrew—returning to us from ancient history be the embodiment of a strong navy standing on guard for the interests of a Commonwealth of States, rather than the personal ambitions of individuals? Without which, as Kasatonov is convinced, the fleet cannot exist. Or is this a cross for the fate of the fifty-three-year-old admiral and tens of thousands of Black Sea sailors?

What are you hearing them, February?

**DEDOVSHCHINA IN BLACK SEA FLEET**

**92UM0729A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 18 Feb 92 p 2**

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major G. Klyuchkov: “Suffering of Soldiers’ Mothers: Dedovshchina in the Black Sea Fleet”; first two paragraphs are NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] Virtually every newspaper prints something about the Black Sea Fleet, about its past heroic traditions and current problems. The Black Sea Fleet has attracted a great deal of attention relative to the taking of the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine.

However, in the minds of the Ukraine Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, the Black Sea Fleet conjures up a different kind of picture. They think of it more along the
lines of various forms of hazing, a deep inaccessibility to the eyes of the public, as attempts to maintain at any cost the infamous “honor of the uniform.”

None of the committee members were surprised when informed that Black Sea authorities in Sevastopol rejected out of hand a request for a visit by Ukraine people’s deputies. The soldiers’ mothers have direct knowledge of the rights exercised by Sevastopol military units. On more than one occasion a seaman standing watch would block the way for committee members as soon as he realized who the people in front of him were. Officers were somewhat more courteous, but they insisted that shipboard discipline is strict and there is no evidence of hazing whatsoever. They tried to convince the mothers not to confuse mockery with regulations; that it was too bad they raised milksops instead of real men.

One could only wish that in the fleet, the same as in the song, the “crew is a family.” Perhaps the preconceived notions the soldiers’ mothers have of what is going on in the Black Sea Fleet can be traced to the negative phenomena they have often been encountering in their public activities. That cannot be denied. In any event, one cannot fail to take note of the seamen who turn to the committee for help. A person has but to look at what happened to some lads to learn something about occurrences so prevalent in units and in the entire fleet.

Viktor (I do not list his surname, since this seaman’s future is uncertain.) was inducted in May of 1990. The medical board took a dim view of the list of chronic illnesses noted in his health record, but the youth exhibited a burning desire to be inducted into the service.

Viktor completed his tour in a training detachment and was assigned to a shore unit stationed in Sevastopol. It was not long before he had an encounter with nongovernmental treatment. Seamen who had been in service for some time forced recruits to scrub the assembly area with soap and water, humiliated them in various ways, and did not hesitate to manhandle the newcomers.

A milksop is something Viktor is not; he is a strong lad, one who played sports. Nevertheless, after serving eight months in the unit, he felt compelled to request a transfer to another military collective. Upon learning of the request, the “dedy” came after him to threaten him openly.

His request was approved; the seaman was transferred to an auxiliary. However, things were even worse there. The longer-service men forced Viktor, who had by then served 18 months, to have his head shaved in the evening. The reason given was that the novice refused to join in “educating” the recruits.

That was when Viktor decided to jump ship. He phoned his parents residing in Kiev after arriving in the city to tell them of the unbearable conditions he encountered in the service. That same day he was taken into custody by a patrol and delivered a savage beating in the komendantura. His parents arrived to find him in a hospital. Nonetheless, the division commanding officer responded to the parents’ complaint by stating that the son could not have received a beating in the komendantura. And that he does not believe that mockery of young seamen is going on.

Nonetheless, the parents were successful in having Viktor transferred to a large amphibious warfare ship. Since there was no application for Viktor’s specialty aboard the ship, the commanding officer told him that his primary assignment would be to report to the galley every other day for detail duty. Then there was an amazingly similar repetition of events. On that day the “dedy” beat up the recruit, supposedly because he had eaten their canned fruit. Viktor then noticed that his bunk was occupied and his underwear was missing. He decided to say nothing about it. His past experience told him that things would be better that way.

However, things did not improve. The “dedy” demanded that Viktor bring them tea, sugar, and other food items from the galley. Then they beat him up because the tea was not sweet enough.

One evening Viktor witnessed a particular occurrence. Three recruits had Cologne water poured on them, after which they were set on fire. One of the recruits suffered serious injuries after the “bicycle exercise.” The ship’s authorities were able to cover up the unpleasant incident.

Serving aboard the ship was quite a number of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. They expected to be sent home to continue their service, but they were informed that the Black Sea Fleet is a part of the strategic forces, which meant that no one could be discharged into the reserves. The situation rapidly deteriorated. Seamen of Caucasian origin started to terrorize their fellow servicemen, venting their anger on the weaker. That was a major factor in exacerbating the crew situation.

The officers did nothing to counter the hazing; as a matter of fact, they looked upon it as a way to maintain strict shipboard discipline. Their response to a request for help in protecting the men’s dignity met with a cold, “You will have a hard time in our collective with your personality.”

On 24 January, the commanding officer and 16 men aboard the accompanying ship took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. On the next day, the commanding officer was arrested. The others were told that they soon would be next.

Viktor had a comrade from Vinnitsa serving aboard the ship. They decided to make a break for home, since they could see no other way out. The two youths in their sweaters and low-quarter shoes managed to elude roadblocks for four days, making their way home nights.
The parents listened to their son's story and decided that they should appeal to the rayon military commissariat without delay. Viktor did not agree, however. Valeriy Bitikhovskiy, his comrade, also escaped from hazing; he too appealed to the military commissariat, which sent him back to the same unit. There he was beaten severely, suffering a broken collarbone. But there was no mention made of an investigation of this crime.

That is why Viktor's parents paid a visit to the Ukraine Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

After hearing this story, of course a person may say that Viktor is simply unsociable: No matter how many times he changed his station, he would always find something that was not to his liking. On the other hand, it is possible to draw another conclusion: hazing is quite widespread in the fleet; it has deep roots.

I realize that this does not come as a surprise. Little progress is being made to combat this evil in many military units. In the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers one can see fugitives from military units located throughout our state. That is quite true. But the secrecy factor, the absolute refusal to accept any criticism, especially from public organizations, does nothing to improve the terrible phenomenon of hazing.

In this atmosphere of nonregulation treatment, young servicemen are left with one option: To clench their teeth and persevere a certain amount of time, until they too can join those who practice the severe "traditions."

Is it possible to put an end to this vicious circle? The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers sees no grounds for optimism at the present time. The fleet authorities' concern with the "honor of the uniform," which is taken to extremes, prompts officers to cover up incidents of mockery of recruits and protect their collectives not from the acts of barracks hooligans but from the eyes of public organizations. In this sense, Sevastopol continues to be a "closed" area.

Disposal of Obsolete Black Sea Fleet Equipment
92UM0732A Moscow KRASNAAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 92 First Edition p 1

[Article by Vice Admiral I. Vasilyev, deputy commander/chief of rear, Black Sea Fleet, under rubric "Clarifications Required": "How the Black Sea Fleet is Being 'Sold Off""]

[Text] One writer—if my memory does not fail me, it was Aleksandr Kuprin—noted that the printed word is believed without a second thought in Russia more than in any other country. I too, sinner like many others, suffer from this, but this is until the question concerns yourself personally. Recently I read in IZVESTIYA an answer given to journalists in a press conference by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk.

It follows from Leonid Makarov's statements that Black Sea Fleet admirals declaim only in words for unity and indivisibility of the Black Sea Fleet. As a matter of fact, as Fleet Chief of Rear Services, I am selling combatant ships, submarines and auxiliary vessels right and left on the sly through the Nevikon-zyuyd Joint Stock Company. Figures were even given: 15 submarines, the cruiser Zhdanov and so on.

Of course, in our troubled times some have made it a rule to juggle political cards, but this is impermissible to such an extent. Like living people, ships have their own lifetime. Each year, probably from the times of Peter the Great, they have been written off, decommissioned and sold. No one in the Black Sea Fleet wrote off or sold 15 submarines, as the Ukrainian president was informed by his assistants. Only three submarines were written off, one of which was sold to the domestic firm of Krym-kontinental.

I can state the following with respect to the other ships and vessels which actually have been sold. Leonid Makarovshifted the dates of the sale somewhat at his press conference. This is of substantial significance. It was not the Black Sea Fleet and not Vice-Admiral Vasilyev, but the former Soviet Union and its Ministry of Defense that was selling obsolete, decommissioned ships. The contracts were concluded long before Ukraine started an argument over the Black Sea Fleet.

I will cite the facts. In accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Instruction No 712 of 15 April 1988, the Navy began preparing ships that had been decommissioned for sale. The procedure for selling the written-off ships was specified by CinC Order No 312 of 1990. Planned goals for 1991 were specified for the Black Sea Fleet by CinC Navy Directive No DF-3 of 17 January 1991. In accordance with it, ships were sold for export in 1991 under CinC Black Sea Fleet Directive No DK-9 of 28 February 1991. Nine ships with a cumulative weight of 18,500 tons were sold for export last year.

The obsolete, broken-down cruiser Zhdanov was sold not to India, as stated at the press conference, but to the British firm of Trimax Marketing under a contract of 21 May 1991 for $2,142,000.

Four old patrol ships were sold to the Turkish firm of Ogyu and two submarines of wartime design and the guided missile ship Neuvolimmy were sold to the Italian firm of Conmar. One submarine, I repeat, was purchased by the domestic firm of Krym-kontinental. That is all that was sold last year.

I emphasize that all contracts were concluded long before the August events, before the argument arose over the Black Sea Fleet. The contracts were concluded on behalf of the USSR. A subtle hint was heard at the press conference that Black Sea Fleet admirals got something from the "sell-off" of the Fleet. I report to the readers that we got nothing but trouble.
Money from the sale of the ships was transferred to [one word illegible] No 208 of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Of course, as emphasized in the account of the press conference, this side of the admirals' activity was unknown both to Leonid Kravchuk and to Boris Yeltsin. This is nothing surprising. The fact is, they became presidents not long ago and obviously did not become privy to all their predecessors' affairs without exception. In such a case it was necessary to refer to M. S. Gorbachev or to MATROSKAYA TISHINA for information. There one also can learn where the money received went.

For some reason, the following fact also was not heard at the Ukrainian President's press conference. This year the Black Sea Fleet sold 24 written-off vessels exclusively to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. The majority of them were sold to Ukraine and acquired anchorages in Kherson, Odessa, Sevastopol and Kiev. I am not speaking at all about the fact that for many long years the Fleet has been selling Ukraine written-off equipment—motor vehicles, prime movers and so on—for miserly prices. The Black Sea Fleet turned over 10 vessels to the Sevastopol Ship Parting Facility of Vtorchermet [Secondary Ferrous Metals Procurement, Processing and Sales Industrial Association] and Ukraine received 4,400 tons of ferrous and nonferrous metals.

Yes, the Black Sea Fleet again must write off obsolete ships and auxiliary vessels in 1992. This is a fact of life. One cannot get away from it. In my view, let the CIS Council decide how they will be sold; the Fleet is common [to all]. One thing is clear: domestic ship parting facilities will not be able to cope with dismantling all equipment. The important thing is that in the desire to leave everything for ourselves at home, we do not become like the person about whom Ukrainians made up the saying: "If I can't do it, I won't let anyone else do it either."

Ukraine's Claim on Black Sea Naval Infantry
92UM07704 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Navy Coastal Troops Chief Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov: "Nationalize and... Disband? What Will Be the Fate of the Coastal Troops of the Black Sea Fleet?"

[Text] The naval infantry of the Black Sea Fleet fought to the death around Odessa and Sevastopol, Kerch and Feodosiya, Yevpatoriya and Nikolayev during the last war. The beachheads they won and held in the Crimea and the Ukraine, at the price of irrecoverable losses, later were more than once the decisive sectors of battles to liberate the territories seized by the enemy.

Today the Coastal Troops of the Black Sea Fleet, which include naval infantry, coastal missile and artillery troops and the coastal-defense troops, are once again on a "beachhead," but this time a political one.

The aspirations of Ukraine for the unilateral "privatization" of the Black Sea Fleet also extend to an indispensable part of it—the Coastal Troops. The chief of the Navy Coastal Troops, Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov, comments on the situation.

I have repeatedly gone out to the Black Sea Fleet over the last three months, occupied with preparing the Coastal Troops for the new training year, issues of their planned refitting and the readiness of the units for inspections in light of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. And I have observed, over all that time, how waves of agitation for the coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet to take the oath of loyalty to the Ukraine have been crashing down on them from Kiev. The appearance of agitators among the troops during troubled times is a long-standing practice here, and unique methods of psychological pressure on the "man with the gun" have been devised. Nationalist motives and promises of a new and happy life, sometimes as well as badly concealed threats, are in circulation. All of this was put into play by various visitors from the republic as well. They tried to intimidate the officers in the Black Sea Fleet coastal-defense division commanded by Major-General Yu. Tikhonov, for example, with the disbanding of the formation in the event that it remained part of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] OVS [Combined Armed Forces].

I have also had contacts with official representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and especially Colonel V. Lazorkin and Captain 3rd Rank I. Tenyukh, who had visited our units to elaborate on the policies of the republic. In a discussion that lasted several hours, they tried to convince me that the Ukraine was striving legitimately for the right to "possess" the Black Sea Fleet coastal troops. My attempts to hold a professional conversation on the purpose and concepts of the utilization and development of the coastal troops, on the fundamental strategic military interests for the Commonwealth overall on the southern flank, they tried to direct toward conclusions of one sort—that everything that is on my territory is mine.

The Naval Infantry, Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and Coastal-Defense Troops, by virtue of the specific nature of their training, the combat hardware they have and the necessity of interacting with virtually all types of troops in the other branches of the armed forces, are in the aggregate a unique branch of the service, able to perform important missions. The naval infantry of the Black Sea Fleet, in naval assault landing operations, are the assault ships, including the Zubr air-cushion type, fire-support ships, minesweeping craft, and ship-based combat and assault-transport helicopters. The shore-based Missile and Artillery Troops of the Black Sea Fleet consist of several tactical and operational-tactical detached missile regiments (battalions) and units of coastal artillery, and they are able to cover the whole Black Sea coast of the Ukraine and Russia against strikes from the sea, as well as to cover targets on the territory of
other member states of the CIS against launches of sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers.

None of the representatives of the republic with whom I have had occasion to speak on this issue was able to explain to me in a reasoned manner why Ukraine needs such a large contingent of troops with such a specific purpose. Not indeed to land assault forces in Novorossiysk or Poti!

One also cannot fail to take a whole series of circumstances into account. The missiles and all the basic armaments of the coastal missile and artillery troops, and the amphibious armored vehicles and artillery of the naval infantry, are produced at plants in Russia. The need to replace the existing missile systems with more modern ones, the more so the coastal artillery systems, has become acute. Their development and production is always more expensive than existing ones. Can one republic afford the upkeep, training, outfitting and refitting of the coastal troops? I think that would require inordinate efforts on the part of an economy in disarray that would not favor the welfare of the Ukrainian people. It is then asked, why continue this “military” tug-of-war? So as to nationalize the coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet in the name of today’s ambitions, and then to inevitably disband them to the detriment of the CIS.

We already experienced that, as they say, when in the 1950s the naval infantry was disbanded entirely, while the coastal artillery was almost entirely cut loose. More than 15 years were required to restore the naval infantry, and the coastal artillery never righted itself after such a willful blow.

Even today the majority of the officers, warrant officers and conscript soldiers favor the status of a branch of the CIS Navy for the Coastal Troops. More than 70 percent of the younger generation took an oath to the Commonwealth not too long ago. It remains a matter for the politicians, and for their common sense. The troops are tired of toying with the military map according to nationalist “stripes,” of attempts to set them against each other. They want to be, and should be, occupied with combat training and maintaining combat readiness in the interests of the whole Commonwealth.

1976 SSBN Deployment Along U.S. Coast Recalled

92UM0763A Moscow ZHIZN in Russian No 8, Feb 92 pp 12-13

[Interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 1st Rank Valentin Yevgenyevich Sokolov by Oleg Karmaza, occasion, date and place not specified: “Seventy Days Shrouded in Secrecy”]

[Text] It was not when Bush and Gorbachev shook each other’s hand in view of the whole world that the cold war passed into nonexistence. The end of combat patrol duty of strategic missiles and nuclear powered submarines in the world ocean is what finally finished this senseless confrontation.

Now is the very time to recall how it all began.

It was 1976... Years later this unique deployment by Soviet nuclear powered submarines was studied carefully in the West, but at that time they did not know nor could they learn about this deployment. Covertness and secrecy were its main conditions.

Today we publish an interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 1st Rank Valentin Yevgenyevich Sokolov, a participant of the voyage.

[Sokolov] I realize you probably are interested above all in why this deployment was so secret and covert. Everything is explained rather simply. First of all, by this voyage of ours we were to lay a completely new route for combat patrol duty by nuclear powered submarines along the U.S. East and West coasts; secondly, it was necessary to check the possibility of covertly approaching various targets of our new technology, particularly of the nuclear powered missile submarine, or SSBN (here and further, the designation of submarines is given in the American classification — O.K.), and the nuclear powered attack submarine, or SSN. In addition to all else, it was also necessary to clarify how effective American submarine detection equipment was at that time. Design bureaus developing submarines in the Union wanted to know precisely to what assemblies it was necessary to pay special attention in the future and what parameters and characteristics to put into them.

Based on all this, our group of two submarines was assigned a very specific mission: to cover 22,000 nautical miles [nm] without once—I repeat, without once—coming to the surface. We accomplished this mission: the submarines moved under water in total radio silence and in absolute quiet for all 70 days of the deployment.

[Karmaza] You were the senior officer of the voyage and were in command of the group of submarines. But you will agree that it was not someone with a high rank from the Navy Staff, as usually is the case, but you, a Captain 1st Rank, who was appointed senior officer for such a very important deployment.

[Sokolov] Of course, this really appeared somewhat unusual from the side, especially when you consider the fact that among other participants of the voyage there were both rear admirals and many other highly placed persons of the Northern Fleet Staff and Navy Staff aboard the second submarine, the SSBN.

But evidently what played a role here was my experience in lengthy deployments, the cohesion of our crew and the circumstance that in principle we already had been preparing long ago for an around-the-world voyage; true, not under such conditions or by such a method, but nevertheless, ...
I learned of my appointment as senior officer of the voyage from CinC Navy Admiral S. G. Gorkhov, to whom I was summoned by an urgent radio message in early March 1975. There with Gorkhov I was told that I could choose the submarines, the crews and the time of voyage: in short, everything that concerned the upcoming deployment in one way or another.

On returning to base, the first thing I did was to decide to draw up tests for the crews in order to select crew members not by eye, but by a system I had already worked out. In general, four crews, two primary and two backup, were prepared by the beginning of the voyage. The primary crews went directly on the submarines and the alternate crews aboard a special destroyer whose heading was known only in Moscow on the Navy Staff.

I basically took my own crew from previous submarines into the crew which went with me aboard the submarine, plus about 15 outside persons from those whom I knew excellently and on whom I could rely at any moment.

[Karmaza] You mentioned the tests. Was this your personal "invention" or the advice of psychological specialists?

[Sokolov] No, strictly speaking, psychologists had nothing to do with this. It was simply that in sailing rather often on lengthy deployments I realized that the important thing in a crew is compatibility. If there is compatibility, the crew runs like clockwork; if not, extraordinary incidents torment you.

[Karmaza] Judging from the official account, you submerged in the Barents Sea off Kuvshin Island on 5 January 1976, and...

[Sokolov] ...some time later we discovered a stowaway aboard. I realize this sounds improbable, but nevertheless a stowaway who had hidden in the bilge turned up on our submarine.

He was discovered, and quite by chance, for no one could imagine such a thing, even the KGB associate involved in the voyage. Of course the stowaway immediately was brought to me. I asked: "How did you get here?" He was silent. It turned out that the last few hours before departure the submarine had been guarded by soldiers who were his compatriots. He asked them to let him through "for a second," there was allegedly something aboard the submarine that he needed. Then he hid, and that was it. It was absurd, of course, but that is how it was: on the one hand, the strictest, most absolute secrecy and on the other hand...

[Karmaza] And how did this extraordinary incident end?

[Sokolov] How could it end? We already had left shore and had submerged, and already were on course. Where were we to put him? Not surface because of him, upon my word...

In general we sat and talked. It turned out that he had long wanted to be on a deployment of many months, and although he did not know where we were going or for what purpose, he guessed from the preparations that it was a serious, lengthy matter. I asked: "What are you able to do?" "I am a cook." We had our own cooks. "I will bake you cakes and pastries..." Honestly speaking, I was surprised—such a thing had not been the practice aboard any submarine as yet.

Finally we assigned him to the galley, and what do you think? Literally a week later when the entire crew was celebrating someone's birthday, a magnificent cake suddenly appeared on the table in the wardroom. Everyone was taken aback.

In general we had these cakes, pastries and other delights for the entire deployment. He proved to be simply an irreplaceable person.

[Karmaza] A surprising incident, no matter what one says... But still, how did the deployment begin?

[Sokolov] Initially we submerged to 60 m and then proceeded all the while at a depth of more than 200 m. The fact is that American reconnaissance satellites can "view" the water area to a depth of 100 m. This means we had to be below this reference mark and have a "margin of error."

We submerged separately from each other and even put to sea from different bases. At that time it was impossible to preclude an information leak from the Northern Fleet Staff.

A week later we rendezvoused with the SSBN in a given area of the North Atlantic at a depth of 150 m for us and 200 for the SSBN. And we rendezvoused at the precisely designated time: no one waited for anyone else. At that time this was a very complicated maneuver. After rendezvousing we identified each other, then proceeded next to each other, side by side. The SSBN was under our unique protection during the entire deployment. By the way, this was the first instance of security for a nuclear powered missile submarine not in a surface, but in a submerged, condition.

The route was as follows: we crossed the Norwegian Sea, the Atlantic, went along the U.S. East Coast, rounded South America, passed Drake passage, crossed the Pacific Ocean and finally surfaced not far from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, just 2.5 nm from the cruiser that already was awaiting us.

[Karmaza] Judging from everything, the route lay in rather "hot" spots. How did you avoid encounters with other countries' ASW ships, of which—it is clear even to me, an amateur in our area—there is more than just a single dozen?

[Sokolov] Well, honestly speaking, this would take a long time to explain. From a purely technical aspect there are numerous different procedures, particularly a regime of maximum silence in compartments and so on.
But these, I repeat, are technical procedures. The fact is, there also were forecasts specially compiled by our intelligence: we knew where we might run across NATO ships, at what points and in what strength. In this sense the most difficult thing was the North Atlantic leg, where NATO has a multitude of ASW equipment. But it was all right, the danger passed.

Generally when we were readying for the voyage we calibrated literally every underwater mile: what could be expected in such-and-such a specific location, how a situation might shape up. For example, in addition to purely technical information, I also had information on almost all commanders of American nuclear powered submarines, right down to copies of U.S. Navy Staff personal efficiency reports.

Moreover, we studied all literature that might have contained any information regarding meteorological and hydrologic conditions in those areas through which we were to proceed. By the way, during the voyage we incidentally discovered an underwater current in the South Pacific whose existence no one had anticipated.

[Karmaza] And how did you maintain communications with each other? Radio communications evidently were ill suited for these purposes. They fully could be DF'ed...

[Sokolov] We specifically used those same radio communications, only the signals were transmitted directionally, in a narrow sector, from submarine to submarine. Special modified transmitters permitted doing this at that time; I am not even speaking about modern systems.

And matters stood as follows with respect to communications in general: information, encoded of course, was constantly transmitted to us from Moscow; for our part, during the entire voyage we did not transmit a single signal from the submarines. The understanding with Moscow was as follows—we were proceeding in total radio silence and if we gave a signal, any signal, that meant SOS! That meant the voyage had been aborted. By the way, signals generally were dangerous to transmit in the situation we were in. Before us, for example, there was the following incident. In completing his own voyage of some kind and proceeding through the Strait of Gibraltar, the commander of the nuclear powered submarine Skate transmitted only one phrase over the air after a lengthy radio silence: “Have slight damage. Proceeding authorized course.” And that was it. No one saw this submarine again.

Later, using their SOSUS system—it includes very sensitive sonar sensors placed on the bottom of the Atlantic—the Americans decoded all recordings of noises fixed by this system at the moment this submarine was lost. It turned out that the explosion was not of internal origin; in other words, not in the submarine herself. From all appearances someone had gotten a “fix” on her...

[Karmaza] There is one rather sad statistic: in 99 cases out of 100, fires aboard submarines and other extraordinary incidents happen in the final days of a deployment. Did you have specifically that one case out of 100 or...

[Sokolov] Unfortunately it was “or”... A week before the end of the voyage, when we still were in neutral waters, the submarine lost power and we literally began to sink...

It is a terrible feeling. Everything is happening not in minutes—nothing of the sort—in seconds. They only managed to report to me from the 5th compartment that they had a turbogenerator fire when the light went out everywhere instantaneously, instruments froze and the submarine began to quietly sink...

Now I no longer can say how, but then, in those seconds we were given, by some miracle we still managed to put out the fire. This was a supernatural stroke of luck, because according to all laws, the submarine should have sunk—her situation was critical.

Gathering in the wardroom later, we analyzed for a very long time what had happened, and then one of the young officers said: “We were saved because there is a person aboard our submarine who is destined to remain alive.” I do not know, but in my opinion this is the most precise explanation of why in the final account we remained alive. I see no other reason.

By the way, there was one point during this fire on which I would like to dwell in more detail. The fact is that when the submarine lost power, the system controlling the two nuclear reactors also was shut off. At this moment the reactors should have stopped and shut down automatically with all consequences stemming therefrom—surfacing, SOS, being towed to base...

But the reactors did not stop. At the critical moment the nuclear specialists took over control of them. Can you imagine what this means, what professionalism is required here to collect your thoughts in seconds and begin to manually control the reactors? I will say honestly that after this instance I became set in the opinion forever that the submarine fleet must only be a professional fleet, and that only professional submariners must serve in it. Seamen recruited from the fall-spring callups have nothing do to there. This is fact.

[Karmaza] With respect to the reactors... In the time of your voyage or, more precisely, afterwards, did any of the crew members have any kind of complications connected in one way or another with radiation?

[Sokolov] Insofar as I know, no. Our reactors and those of the SSBN were thoroughly protected. Therefore an increased radiation background in the compartments was precluded.

[Karmaza] The Americans once figured that the most optimum period for a lengthy voyage in a submarine is 57 days, on condition—and this is especially stipulated—of a quality rest for crew members in breaks between combat patrols. Your voyage exceeded optimum periods by almost two weeks. Did this make any kind of adjustments to the internal life of the crews?
[Sokolov] Well of course. Before the deployment we surveyed all crew members on a mandatory basis about what they would like to take with them on the deployment: what films, books, newspapers, journals. Everything mentioned in the questionnaires was then included in a list of basic necessities. By the way, during the voyage for some reason the film “White Desert Sun” enjoyed great success with us just as it did with the cosmonauts. They played it about 50 times during the voyage. There is something in it so soothing...

[Karmaza] You called at the roadstead in Avachinskaya Bay seventy days after the beginning of the voyage. Flowers, congratulations...

[Sokolov] Not without this, of course...

True, there was a special case—after ascending to the bridge and inhaling the fresh air, I rested my elbows on the railing and, honestly speaking, fell asleep. I was shaken out of my slumber by the seaman. “It’s awkward, Comrade Commander,” they said, “the CinC is coming to congratulate us and you are snoring...”

After all the celebrations we transferred the submarines to the Kamchatka Flotilla and departed for our place, for the base where, a day later, received by the CinC Northern Fleet, we received the proposal: “And how do you look on passing under the ice after leave?” In principle, we looked on it positively.

Cruiser ‘Minsk’ Called ‘Dying Ship’
92UM0833B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Lysenkov, under the rubric “No Limits?”; “This Is How Ships Are Dying in the Union’s Ruins”]

[Text] Pacific Fleet—The aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk has given the Navy a lot of service during its life. And it is not the ship’s fault that its machinery has grown old, using up its service life long ago. For 12 years a place was not found for the ship near the quay at its “registration” point. And so the cruiser rolled in the roadstead, “running” the equipment not to maintain the fleet’s combat readiness but to stay afloat. Now the ship needed repairs and modernization, and it eagerly awaited a move to the Black Sea, to the ship-repair docks.

The breakup of the Union, however, and the collapse of the economic links which formerly passed through the presently unacceptable center deprived the ship of its crew, formed in accordance with the officers’ desire to serve the homeland in the Black Sea Fleet and their hope for survival.

The families of the Minsk crew members took their household goods and departed for warmer parts when the order came to halt preparations for the move. After spending a long time at a repair yard, where just enough life was breathed into the cruiser to complete the move, the Minsk went to a “cherished” mooring to live out the rest of its life, dooming the crew to an existence beyond the bounds of common sense.

I went onto the cold deck of the Minsk a few days after a sailor had been killed with two blows to the chest. That sort of thing also happens, unfortunately. An old-timer directed a novice to “bring food.” The latter refused and received a blow to the chest. He caught his breath. Another blow came, reflexive heart failure.... Artificial respiration did not help.

At approximately the same time three lieutenants, last year’s graduates, announced a preliminary hunger strike. The lieutenants wanted to serve Ukraine and demanded to be released from the armed forces. Ahead of the lieutenants, however, Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Nazarov, commander of the Minsk, had submitted his request for release into the reserve. He had a service apartment in Ukraine. The chief of the yard to which the Minsk was to be taken announced that if he did not make it to Ukraine by spring, he would not see the three room apartment.

“If I take you to see the ship,” Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Baranov said with a smile in response to my request, “next week they will find me frozen to death on some dead-end street.”

Aleksandr Sergeyevich is a candidate for promotion in the formation. He was sent here to help out. But what can one person do when the entire system is broken and in agony? And I could see for myself that “rigor mortis” had set in on the ship.

I was taken down gangways from the superstructure to the lower decks by Captain 3rd Rank S. Sherukhayev, who first picked up a flashlight from his cabin. At midnight the previous night, during his ship’s duty, the cruiser had become submerged in darkness. The turbine had “gone sour,” as the people here say. They checked things out and started up the diesel, and it was 03:00 before the turbine was “wound up” again. Then, until 07:00, the sailors transferred onto the ship food supplies delivered the previous evening.

I followed Sherukhayev along the cold, wet gangway. Only the weak beam of the flashlight outlined the contours of the dangerous underground world in the darkness. I do not know what one could compare with the lifeless bowels of a monstrous cruiser without electric lights, where rotted electric wires protrude everywhere and the ventilation in these “catacombs” has no odor, but the muggy, putrid air assaults one.

Somewhere in the depths of the ship’s belly we came upon a broken iron door. The stench took one’s breath away, and rats scampered away from the flashlight beam through a pile of trash, food scraps and other unthinkable objects. It was an ordinary dump in the recesses of the ship.

“What was here before?” I asked.
“A cabin.”

The fifth deck, crew quarters No. 40 for the fire-control division... It was warm in the “oasis” behind the rusty door with peeling paint. The beam of light captured some sort of wretched-looking table with food scraps, then the startled face of a sailor appeared out of the pitch black. I looked around. There were no pillow-cases or sheets on the double-tiered bunks. The crew quarters were half-empty, and the metal frames of bunks stood next to mattresses and blankets.

We could not get into the next crew quarters. We tried to break through a door like the first with the paint peeling off in some sort of dressing-room with puddles of stagnant water. We were unable to open it, and no one opened it for us. Later I wandered around a deserted hanger the size of a football field. Deck-based aircraft were once parked there, but now there was only the same neglect as elsewhere.

In the warrant officers’ wardroom, where the outlines of objects less than 3 meters away were obscured by wisps of moist air, Captain 2nd Rank Igor Nikitin, senior executive officer on the cruiser, was scrutinizing the faces of young sailors with the help of a flashlight. Two of them attributed their bumps and bruises to a fall from a ladder, and only one of them admitted that he had been “roughed up” with a towel. It is not surprising that nonregulation relations flourish under the inhumane conditions, where even in the warrant officers’ wardroom the temperature is only a couple of degrees higher than outside the ship.

If I had had a handful of medals, I would have awarded them to the entire crew—for surviving. The heads—pardon the expression—are blocked off. The officers heat water in kettles for washing up in the mornings, keeping the water in whatever receptacles they can find. They receive water very rarely. And they can even go without a hot breakfast or supper due to another malfunction or accident.

“The ship is dying.” I heard that statement from everyone with whom I spoke. Viktor Yuryevich Udovichenko, senior engineer at the ship repair yard, who received the order for the final repairs on the Minsk before it was to leave for the Black Sea Fleet, told me the following:

“The ship is in critical condition. Only an overhaul will save it.”

The Minsk left the yard ready to make the trip. And it would have departed the Pacific Fleet if not for a fire in the forward electric power plant. But would it have had a better fate in the Black Sea, where now-sovereign repair yards are not accepting fleet orders?

“Every five years the Americans send their aircraft-carriers to a repair yard for modernization,” Udovichenko said. “They replace the electronic equipment and weapons, and spend millions on repairs. These ships have operated for them since the war, while the Minsk expired after 12 years. Mothballing it makes no sense. How could the pipes be preserved, when they are full of holes? Breaking it up for scrap metal would also cost more than an overhaul. And then the ship should be saved for the fleet.

The senior engineer told me in parting that since everyone had “abandoned” the Minsk, the ship’s fate is in the hands of the crew. They too have long since thrown up their hands, however, and they only have enough vigor left to submit another request for release into the reserve. To their credit, however, not all of them have taken this final step. Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Makarov, for example, and S. Sherukhayev, my escort in the intricate innards of the ship, still hope things will improve. These smoldering embers of optimism will hardly breath new life into the Minsk, though. This is how ships of the Navy are dying in the Union’s ruins. And this is how the fleet will die, if its troubles are not detected behind the politics of the moment and the competition.

Foreign Submarine Said to Violate Territorial Waters
92UM0833A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 8

[Report under the rubric “News”: “Not as Easily as Though at Home”]

[Text] “The foreign submarine detected by Northern Fleet ships on 25 March at the entrance to Kola Bay was in Russia’s territorial waters, 12 nautical miles from its outer border,” Rear-Admiral Valeriy Alekseev, chief navigator of the Navy of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], announced. “Bearings taken pinpointed it in an area 11 miles south of where the American submarine Baton Rouge collided with our submarine on 11 February of this year. I cannot say officially at this point whose submarine it was, but this will become clear in time. Right now the incident is being studied at various levels, including listening to recordings of sonar noises,” the admiral said. It can be considered an established fact, however, according to Alekseev, that it was a nuclear-powered submarine.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Col-Gen Petrov on Future of Chemical Troops
92UM0779A Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 92 (signed to press 31 Jan 92) pp 12-16

[Article by Colonel-General Stanislav Veniaminovich Petrov: “The Chemical Troops Have a Future”]

[Text] He is 52 years old. He was born in the city of Gorkiy. When the time came to determine his position in
life, he went to the Saratov Chemical School without a doubt. That is what his father, who died in the Great Patriotic War in the fighting to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine, had wanted.

He served as a platoon commander and assistant chief of staff. He successfully completed the Chemical Defense Academy and the General Staff Academy. He then served in the troops in various positions: as deputy chief of a division chemical service to Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Europe. In 1986 he was First Deputy and three years later Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Armed Forces. He participated in the clean-up operations after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

He values independence, detail, and unselfishness in people. He is married. Both of his sons have continued the family tradition: the eldest is a company commander, and the youngest is an officer candidate at a military school.

Despite the full load of official duties, he finds time for woodcarving and taxidermy. Overall, Stanislav Veniaminovich Petrov is a nature lover. He believes, not without reason, that many of society's troubles are due precisely to man's isolation from his natural environment, from the earth.

Colonel-General S. Petrov does not take advantage of his "general's" privileges. Like other lucky persons, he has a legal six-hundredths of a hectare, on which he is completing, with his own hands, construction of a small garden cottage with a veranda.

He enjoys reading V. Pikul, J. London, A. Chekhov, and V. Ladinsky. He likes to listen to the works of M. Musorgsky, A. Borodin, D. Shostakovich, and D. Verdi. He is indifferent to modern music.

He assesses the present social and political situation in the country optimistically. You see, there have been such critical periods in the history of the great Russian state more than once, but the people survived them. He believes that we will overcome them now, too.

The profound changes in all spheres of society that have taken place during perestroyka, particularly after the well-known events of last August, have not bypassed its armed forces. Above all, they are the result of military reform, a key element of which is the implementation of the tenets of the modern doctrine of preventing war and new approaches to defense organizational development in the new conditions taking shape in the country and in the world community.

As we know, its content is supported by the ideas of new political thinking. Our diplomatic practice of recent years was founded on the total rejection of war as an extreme means of settling the claims of one state on another, and also on the dissolution of opposing blocs and, thereby, the decrease in the total military potential to the level of necessary sufficiency. In light of implementation of these measures, the withdrawal of our troops from the territory of Eastern Europe is proceeding in a planned manner. Not so long ago, in the summer, the last Soviet soldier left Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Back in 1985, the Soviet Union put forward a program of eliminating weapons of mass destruction of all types by the end of the century and is fighting consistently for its implementation. At the Soviet Union's initiative, Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles were eliminated. In June 1990, the USSR and U.S. presidents concluded the Agreement on the Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons. Negotiations on drawing up the text of a multilateral convention on a global ban on chemical weapons are now in the final stages.

Finally, the leaders of the two superpowers have demonstrated interest in searching for new uncompromising solutions in the area of mutual security, exchanging declarations on voluntary nuclear disarmament at the suggestion of the American side. This process is scheduled to begin with curtailing operational-tactical (above all, artillery) land- and sea-based systems.

All these steps will certainly have a positive effect on international relations. At the same time, the erroneous opinion that there is now a total absence of a military threat for the Soviet people is becoming widespread in public circles. In connection with the agreements that have been reached, the thesis has appeared that the Chemical Troops supposedly are losing their purpose and will be cut completely.

I will say frankly that such an approach is abstractly pretentious. An objective analysis of the situation taking shape in the world and the country today indicates otherwise. Therefore, I am convinced that the Chemical Troops, of course, have a future. To back up my statement, I will cite a few facts as confirmation.

One must frankly admit that the world disarmament process is in the initial phase and affects relatively small portions of the military potentials of only two nations. It can no longer be limited to a simple balance between the former USSR and the United States. After all, there are many more countries now that have ballistic missiles and have also acquired their own nuclear capabilities.

What is more, despite the latest peacemaking mission, the Pentagon has no intention of halting nuclear testing in the foreseeable future. The view of American command authorities towards strategic offensive forces, which are considered a basic guarantee of national security, also has not changed. Priority is being given to their development today.

In particular, work is being conducted to create nuclear warheads to destroy superhardened installations. As calculations show, their use will nearly double the size of zones of heavy, hazardous, and extremely hazardous radioactive contamination. And this is with the planned 30-percent reduction in the number of platforms.
One also must not ignore the strategic potentials of the NATO partners of the United States—France and Great Britain. According to predictions, in the next decade they will increase 1.5- to 2-fold. In addition, there are plans to equip all aircraft platforms of NATO's tactical aviation with nuclear-cruise missiles with a range of up to 600 km by the mid-1990's. It is also hard to disregard the American nuclear aviation bombs stored in considerable numbers at depots in Europe. In other words, the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in critical situations has decreased only slightly for the time being. That is the first point.

Secondly, the Agreement on the Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons will enter into force after it has been ratified by the parliaments of the two countries and is not a one-time act, but will be implemented over a specific period of time. It is appropriate to note one important detail here, which journalists and politicians sometimes prefer not to mention when commenting on this truly historical document. Namely.

This is not a matter of totally rejecting but only reducing one of the varieties of weapons of mass destruction. By the year 2002, the stocks of these weapons on both sides will be reduced by 80 percent and be 5,000 tons on each side in terms of the weight of chemical agents. So, for this period of time and in the future as well, there will still be a danger of chemical weapons being used. That is because about 20 nations already have their own chemical arsenals or may become potential possessors of them.

That is why the tasks of chemical defense remain relevant until full implementation of the convention mentioned above. Such activities are not prohibited by international law. Furthermore, similar aspects are also typical for areas associated with nuclear and biological weapons. Incidentally, with respect to the latter, such a convention entered into force in 1975.

Thirdly, at this stage of development of the world infrastructure, even a conventional armed conflict will take on the nature of a war using weapons of mass destruction in the event nuclear and chemical industrial facilities are destroyed. For example, if a nuclear reactor of an nuclear power plant is damaged (that is roughly what happened at Chernobyl), a cloud made up of a mixture of the most varied radionuclides could spread over considerable distances.

It not only releases a powerful stream of ionizing radiation, but also contains a finely dispersed radioactive aerosol with a total equivalent dosage of several thousand roentgen equivalents. Areas of extended terrain contamination are formed in the near track—up to 100 km, and there are spots of radioactive fallout in the distant track—up to 1000 km or more. Besides nuclear power plants, a similar situation also may be observed if there are accidents at nuclear thermoelectric plants, other enterprises of the nuclear-fuel cycle, and at radioactive waste storage facilities.

Damage to equipment at facilities of the chemical industry producing chlorine, ammonia, and organochlorine products and refining oil is also quite dangerous. Discharge of the highly toxic substances used and produced there will cause respiratory lesions on people up to 20 km from the accident within three to four hours or maybe up to two days.

You can imagine the likelihood and scale of such situations if you consider that there will already be about 600 nuclear reactors in the world by the end of the century, compared to the 480 now in existence, 51 of them in our country. The number of enterprises of the chemical industry will increase considerably (by 40-70 percent), including in our country. Thus, the massive losses due to factors which it is customary to call secondary, with reference to weapons of mass destruction, are also real in a conventional war.

I think it is now clear what level of protection we need to have for the armed forces and the civilian population in order to repel any aggression successfully. And here I am certain that the Chemical Troops, as before, will carry the main burden: detect chemical and biological agents and highly toxic substances; effectively assess the radiation and chemical situation; eliminate the after-effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction and damage to hazardous industrial and military installations; and others.

Fourthly, in the early 1980's, many foreign armies began developing high-precision weapon systems at an accelerated pace within the framework of the "shoot-destroy" program. In the opinion of U.S. and NATO leadership, only linking reliable intelligence information in time and space with the fire capabilities of modern conventional weapons will make it possible to increase substantially the effectiveness of hitting enemy installations.

So, in order to protect against enemy reconnaissance and strike systems, it is necessary to ensure equally reliable camouflage of our units and subunits, primarily their armored equipment. Military chemical troops also will play an important part in performing this complex task, with smoke-generating equipment accomplishing aerosol countermeasures against intelligence-collecting equipment and weapon-guidance systems operating in various wavebands. This direction in the activities of the Chemical Troops will be even more typical in the coming 21st century.

Analyzing foreign press, it is easy to note that in the near future, totally new weapons based on nontraditional physical principles will appear in some of the leading countries. Above all, I would single out varieties of them—so-called directed-effect weapons based on laser and microwave emissions, use of kinetic energy, and also means of actively influencing geophysical natural processes.

So who, if not our specialists, is in a position to discover the fact, inspect the area, establish the scale and consequences of the use of beam weapons, monitor the change
in the environment, and reduce their casualty effects?
There is no doubt that already now some subunits of the
Chemical Troops are ready to perform such tasks par
tially. And their capabilities will increase sharply if they
are supplied with modern instruments.

One must also state that chemical warfare troops are also
engaged in combat work during peacetime. This is pri-
marily the result of the high level of development of the
industrial infrastructure, on the one hand, and the aging
of equipment and technologies, on the other. Strange as
it may seem, it is such a paradox that has become the
reason for the sharp increase in production and transpor-
tation accidents, including at facilities with radiation
and chemical hazards. What is more, anomalies may also
occur due to the atmospheric shifting of highly radioac-
tive substances from the territories of neighboring states.
The tragedy at Chernobyl and at the Azot Production
Association in Ionava, the disasters in Bashkiria and
Azramas, and a number of others, where personnel of
chemical defense units and subunits selflessly and
making their lives cleaned up the after-effects of some-
one's slipshod work and professional incompetence.

The problem of emergencies in the technology sphere is
directly linked to the formation of numerous ecological
disaster zones in our country. Everything is so serious
that we simply cannot handle it on the spur of the
moment without knowledge of the situation. That is why
we need a concept of ensuring ecological safety now.
First and foremost, we need to create within its frame-
work a far-flung state network for monitoring the natural
ecosystem, which assumes observing and monitoring the
environment and predicting and assessing possible
changes in it.

I believe that, from the standpoint of economy of the
necessary resources and assets for this, the Chemical
Troops can make an invaluable contribution here. This
can be done, for example, through adaptive (through
conversion) use of our packages of applied programs,
telemcommunications lines, and the present unified
system of identifying and assessing the scale of the
radiation and chemical situation, capable of functioning
equally effectively during the use of weapons of mass
destruction and in the event of major accidents
involving radiation and chemical danger.

As far as participation in improving the environment is
concerned, taking into account the opportunities that
have opened up recently before units and institutions of
the Ministry of Defense in financial and economic
activities, we would not reject on a contractual basis
mutual cooperation to continue research and develop-
ment and the participation of our scientific cadres in
other joint work.

We are ready to transfer on a mutually beneficial basis or
sell to interested persons series-produced individual and
collective protection gear and radiation and chemical
monitoring instruments, mobile and stationary versions.
Chemical defense units and subunits are in a position,
without detriment to combat training of course, on those
same terms to provide assistance to local authorities and
organizations on many specific issues. For example,
transporting toxic liquids, using smoke to protect agri-
cultural plantings against frost, and so forth. I am sure
there will be more than enough such requests.

On the whole, in their daily practice the Chemical
Troops must be ready to discover radiation and chemical
accidents in a timely manner, monitor the situation in
areas of those installations and also in the direction the
contaminated cloud spreads, participate in cleaning up
after such accidents, disasters, and other hazardous
geophysical phenomena, as well as in destroying chemi-
ical weapons, and implement measures of radiation and
chemical safety in the armed forces.

It is not surprising that these tasks are largely identical to
those which personnel of the Chemical Troops will have
to carry out in a combat situation when performing their
defense function. In essence, they have become general-
purpose, since they are just as necessary in peacetime as
in wartime. In connection with this and also for a
number of other reasons (for example, our chemical
troops have never once used chemical weapons during
their entire history), it is advisable to rename them. In
my opinion, the term "Radiation, Chemical, and Bio-
lological Defense Troops" would reflect our activities more
accurately.

Of course, in-depth reforms require more than just
changing signs. Purely from an economic and military
standpoint, within the framework of the military defense
treaty coming into being between the sovereign republic it
is necessary to preserve the overall radiation, chemical,
and biological defense system. But from positions of
reasonable sufficiency, obviously, we cannot avoid serious
changes in the organization and establishment of units and
subunits. Nevertheless, despite the cuts in the amount of
money being allocated to us, priority will continue to be
given to creating the latest models of armaments for the
Chemical Troops and protective gear, the kind that can be
used equally effectively both for chemical support of
combat (operations) and for cleaning up after industrial
accidents and natural cataclysms.

Specifically, advanced materials are being used to
develop multipurpose clothing for continuous wear by
personnel of the armed forces. It successfully combines
excellent ergonomic qualities with reliable combined
protection against radioactive, chemical agents, highly
toxic agents, laser radiation, and also thermal radiation
from a nuclear explosion.

Or let us take decontamination. The point is not that they
use various types of kits and instruments, several special
solutions, and, most importantly, much manual labor.
Soon there will be new standardized onboard equipment as
well as a single polydecontaminating compound. In the
future, scientists promise to put into practice non-
compounding methods of decontamination.
But people are our most important concern. I am firmly convinced that without their participation, any reform will reach an impasse. Now, during the transition to a professional army, we need comprehensively trained officers, warrant officers, and compulsory-service specialists more than ever before. Therefore, one of the priority directions is to improve the system of training personnel for the Chemical Troops.

Fundamentally new qualification characteristics for chemical defense academies and schools have already been developed for all specialties up to the year 2000. Whereas before they specified what a graduate was supposed to know and be able to do within the framework of each subject taken separately, now it will depend on what job duties are to be performed.

The curriculums to which the military educational institutions switched at the beginning of the new training year have also changed. There are three mandatory phases of training: common training for everyone; specialty-based training; and purposeful training, patterned for the specific job. By optimizing the structure and content of instruction, we have tried to eliminate duplication completely in the school-academy level.

Professorial and instructor collectives are more and more extensively introducing progressive forms of instruction into the training process. The so-called modular method is becoming firmly established. Its essence involves grouping disciplines by interrelated topics. We also approved their desire to reduce the mandatory auditorium classes to 30 hours a week, thereby giving the students more opportunities to study according to individual plans. We are now considering supplementing the engineering department of a 6-year academy with specially talented students who have completed the first or second year at schools.

In conclusion, I want to dwell on another question that is being asked most often recently and involves the creation of national formations in the sovereign states. Who will train the personnel for them and how? This problem is of special importance to us. You see, the three schools and one academy that exist now for chemical defense are geographically located on the territory of Russia.

We understand perfectly well what the material costs will be to form such military educational institutions in the localities. It is not likely that it will be possible right away to create a sound, science-intensive material and technical base and select professors and instructors with the highest qualifications. Therefore, the doors to our military educational institutions will always be open to applicants from any republic. For the service of radiation, chemical, and biological defense, which runs through the entire army structure—from battalion to military district—is inconceivable without highly trained professional specialists.

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One truly cannot be reconciled to them. But, on the other hand, during a meeting of the chairman of the State Committee for Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Lieutenant-General S. Nurmagambetov, with representatives of the public and the elders of the Tyuratam station, these issues were discussed without passion and in an interested manner. And the people were even ready to help the command somehow to eliminate the drawbacks. Those who committed, say, the burning of a medical station or a barracks, considered one of the best in domestic amenities, could scarcely have been concerned with this. It somehow cannot be believed that these actions were dedicated to good intentions.

There are, unfortunately, more than enough reasons for expressing dissatisfaction. And that is not only in Leninsk, and not only in this or that military-construction detachment. Lieutenant-General S. Nurmagambetov was also telling me about this when I asked him to give an assessment of what had happened here, at Baykonur. Many problems, emphasized Sagadat Kozhakhmetovich, had long ago become acute. That was evident. But the state system that had existed before had put the missile, figuratively speaking, in first place, and everything that was intended for people—the construction of housing and social and cultural facilities, both for soldiers and military-construction workers and for the officers’ families and the families of warrant officers—was last in line, with little funding. Many social and cultural issues were resolved at far from the level that supports the realization of fantastic space projects.

So then I repeat that there were plenty of reasons for the military-construction workers of Baykonur to express their dissatisfaction. But take the late payments of monetary sustenance. Who would take it into their heads not to pay the military-construction workers if the money had been in the account of the Glavspetsvosenstroy (Special Military Construction Chief Directorate)? The customer—in the person of the Space Hardware Agency of the CIS OVS—had not paid up, either for December of last year or for the first two months of this one. The debt, in the words of the chief of the engineering directorate of that agency, Major-General B. Kalinichev, has now reached 612 million rubles. And how can they pay up, when the financing of space programs has effectively been halted? The chief economist of the Construction Chief Directorate, Colonel A. Blinchenko, added to this that a bank loan in the amount of 20 million rubles has been put into motion in order to continue operations that have already begun at Baykonur facilities.

Quite a few seem to be saying that all the republics of the former Union need the cosmodrome. It would seem to be clearer than clear that modern communications are supported using space apparatus, that tasks in cartography, geology and meteorology are accomplished with the aid of it. But issues of financing are not being resolved. At Baykonur they are very much awaiting concrete assurances from the heads of state of the CIS, who are gathering on March 20 for the next meeting in Kiev. So far only Kazakhstan has allocated 50 million rubles. They are directed toward the upkeep of the social and cultural facilities of the city of Leninsk. But there are just enough funds for January and February, and what they will live on after that is not known.

The same Major-General Kalinichev, clearly not laying it on too thick, said that if the question of financing the space programs is not resolved, Baykonur is expecting a genuine catastrophe. A billion rubles are needed, in his opinion.

Recent events in the military-construction units of Baykonur have given many leaders the idea that once the customer is not able to pay for the construction work being performed at facilities, the number of military-construction detachments should be cut back.

But that decision suits far from everyone. Major-General Kalinichev feels that this should not be done. And it is not a question of the erection of new facilities—there will be none even to maintain what there is in working condition.

The military-construction workers are also “tied up” with other regional problems as well. They have erected schools, clubs and other social and cultural facilities on neighboring and remote sovkhozes and kolhozes. They have drilled and prepared for operation seven of the 22 water wells that were projected for start-up in the populated areas near Baykonur. They intended to take part in the realization of programs in the infrastructure development of the Aral Sea zone, the construction of canned-goods plants and a shop for the processing of agricultural output. What is planned will scarcely be accomplished if the military construction workers leave. It may be assumed that all who intend to live and work in Leninsk in the name of developing the progressive directions of space science are counting on improving their living conditions.

It would be good, of course, if all these problems were solved without the military construction workers. But that is just wishful thinking today. That being so, it is time to become occupied in earnest with providing them with quality conditions for living and working. But one must also not forget about the missile workers of the cosmodrome, who have no fewer problems. And there are quite a few among them who have given their whole lives to the cosmodrome. Don’t those people really deserve better treatment for themselves?

Press Conference on Civil Defense Reorganization
92UM0757A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Mar 92 p 6

[Article by Vitaliy Tseplyayev under the rubric “Security”: Civil Defense in Russia Will Be Reorganized—1,100 People Lost Their Lives in Catastrophes Last Year”]

[Text] Sergey Shoygu, the thirty-six-year-old chairman of the State Committee for Civil-Defense Affairs, States of
Emergency and Clean-Up of the Consequences of Natural Disasters that was formed three months ago under the President of the RF [Russian Federation], invited in journalists in order to share his plans for restructuring his agency.

As reported, a conference of the chiefs of CD [civil-defense] staffs and chairmen of the commissions for states of emergency of the autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, as well as the deputy commanding generals of the military districts for Civil Defense, was held on February 25-26 in the capital. The necessity of such an imposing gathering, in the words of S. Shoygu, arose as a consequence of the formation of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and the reorganization of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under which civil defense used to be. The question of financing and material support for the CD subunits was hanging in the air with the disappearance of the all-union ministry. Agreement was reached—not without difficulty—with the leadership of the armed forces on the preservation of former supply volumes for a certain time. Only the Russian treasury alone will have to pay exclusively for them.

The activity of the committee will be defined by two basic tasks. The first is traditionally oriented toward the so-called "special period," that is, in the event of a possible nuclear war. But the other task will have the priority significance today—clean-up of the consequences of natural disasters and all types of accidents and catastrophes. There have been more than 600 such incidents in Russia over the past year and two months, in which 1,100 people have lost their lives, about 16,000 have been injured and material damages have totaled roughly one billion rubles. The necessity of creating a special service for reacting in operative fashion has become acute. It is being proposed that the CD troops be cut back significantly, but the number of skilled specialists—engineers, construction workers, chemists—be increased at the same time. A conversion to the contract principle of manpower acquisition for the CD personnel is also planned as early as this fall. The "orange berets" will be structurally reconstituted into nine regional centers.

The question of technical refitting is also on the agenda. The CD troops do not have enough powerful lifting hardware and specialized equipment for working in earthquake zones. This was demonstrated as early as 1988 by the Spitak tragedy. Heavy aircraft and helicopters are needed for the rapid redeployment of manpower to areas of catastrophe.

All of the CD subunits must also be removed from the composition of the military districts. Finally, a draft law for the Russian Federation on civil defense must also be prepared as quickly as possible.

Sergey Shoygu, in answer to a question from the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent on whether the activity of civil-defense manpower will be covered by a screen of impenetrable secrecy as before, answered that "Secrets will undoubtedly remain. The degree of secrecy will be optimal—that is, it will be sufficient to maintain the effectiveness of our work."

Pay Raises for Civilian Defense Workers
92UM0757B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Mar 92 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Vadim Valentinovich Artamonov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin: "A New Pay Increase—For Manual and Office Workers of the Combined Armed Forces"]

[Text] That is the topic of our discussion with a department chief of the Directorate for Labor and Wages for Manual and Office Workers of the OVS [Combined Armed Forces], Colonel V. Artamonov.

[Altunin] Vadim Valentinovich, it is now well known that the President of Russia has signed an order to raise the wages of the workers at enterprises, institutions and organizations financed from the budget of the Russian Federation [RF]. Have the interests of the manual and office workers in the army and navy been taken into account in it?

[Artamonov] Yes, undoubtedly. The proposals of the high command of the Combined Armed Forces on the pay for workers in the army and navy have been considered and, by and large, taken into account by the governmental bodies of the Russian Federation. The pay increase pertains to all workers (non-servicemen) of military units, institutions, military training establishments, enterprises and organizations of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS that are financed under budgetary-estimate procedures.

[Altunin] How will this be implemented?

[Artamonov] Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS Marshal Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, in the context of the Presidential Order of 3 Mar 92, has signed Order No. 85, which provides for an increase in the wage and salary scales in effect in the following amounts:
—60 percent for the professorial and instructional staff of the military teaching establishments as of 1 Jan 92; and
—50 percent, starting at the same time, for the teachers and other pedagogical workers of schools, boarding schools, military or regular training establishments, children's preschool and extra-scholastic institutions. The heads of the indicated institutions, including the heads of the higher military teaching establishments, will receive the same increase.

The wages and salaries for the leading professions of the military medical institutions and subunits that are paid in accordance with USSR Minister of Defense Order No. 250, as well as the workers of units and subunits of the Hydrometeorological and Meteorological Services of the
navy, will be increased by 45 percent as of 1 Feb 92. The prevailing rate scales and salaries for the remaining workers of military units, institutions, military teaching establishments, budget enterprises and organizations of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS and military administrative bodies will be increased as of 1 Mar 92.

The television program of the OVS Commander-in-Chief has provided the appropriate instructions for commanders and senior officers in order to ensure the prompt payment of the increased wages and salaries, as well as to recompute retroactively those for pedagogical, medical and other workers for whom they were raised as of 1 Jan and 1 Feb 92.

[Altunin] The professorial and instructional staff of the higher educational establishments in the Russian Federation, as is well known, received an increase of three times in their pay as of 1 Dec 91, and those for teachers and other pedagogical workers in the educational system were increased 2.8 times. Aren't there any contradictions here in the amounts you have cited?

[Artamnov] I see no contradictions, the more so any infringements on the interests of the pedagogical workers of the army and navy. First of all, the wages and salaries for all categories of manual and office workers of military units, institutions, military teaching establishments, enterprises and organizations of the armed forces that are on budgetary-estimate financing, including pedagogical workers, were increased by 1.9 times as of 1 Jan 92 by special decree of the President of the USSR on 5 Dec 91. Second, the appropriate level for salaries as compared to analogous categories of workers in education has been ensured with a regard for the wage increases made earlier, as well as the payment of percentage supplements for continuous work of up to 25 percent and the increased amount of the funds directed toward bonuses. And, finally, the latest increase starting 1 Jan 92 of 1.6 and 1.5 times respectively, with some not-too-complex arithmetical computations, provides the same increase of 3 and 2.8 times.

[Altunin] Will the workers who have been working at economically accountable enterprises and organizations of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS also be receiving pay increases?

[Artamnov] The question of increasing pay for that category depends on the results of the production activity of the enterprises and organizations and the availability of their own funds for wages. They have the right to stipulate their own time periods and sizes for pay increases, guided by the Enterprise Law that is in force regarding the conclusion of collective contracts between the administration and the labor collectives within the limits of the funds directed toward wages. They may—as opposed to budgetary enterprises, institutions and organizations, but once again at the cost of their own funds—compensate for the cost of food at cafeterias and commuting on urban transport, or take other steps for the social protection of their own workers.

[Altunin] A multitude of letters are coming to the editors on the fact that the wages of manual and office personnel in the army and navy are not indexed to price rises, while that indexing is being carried out for employees in a number of the sovereign republics. How is that issue being resolved in the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS?

[Artamnov] The legislation of the independent states of the Commonwealth on issues of pay in relation to the workers of the army and navy is not employed, owing to the fact that the pay for those workers in the army and navy is currently carried out according to unified wage and salary scales. The maintenance of the purchasing power of the monetary income, along with indexing, could furthermore be replaced by other methods of state regulation of income, and a reconsideration of the pay levels in particular, in accordance with the Law on the Indexing of the Income and Savings of Citizens. Which is being done, by the way, via the regular increases in the wage and salary scales that are in force.

German Firm To Build Military Housing in Moscow, St. Petersburg
92UM0828A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 92 p 3

[Report by Colonel V. Markushin: “INPAR Offers Modular Homes”]

[Text] On a large satellite photo, against the background of a green forest tract, one can fairly clearly see the territory of INPAR, a subsidiary of the Buch company. It is next to this photo that Dr. Hartmut Krone, the head of the company, stopped. See, esteemed guests, he seems to say—we are even visible from space.

Here, in the East German Pinnau, there formerly was a defense enterprise. They repaired radar stations for air defense troops and made Concourse antitank missiles. After German reunification, the Buch family bought it all up and set up a facility to melt down ammunition here.

The owners showed us their pride—a unique jet chamber for burning explosives that resembles a giant size coil. A system of powerful filters inside the coil permit burning the hellish material practically without any damage to the environment. We also saw the work of the assembly line, currently used to disassemble signal flares.

And probably the most interesting part. In one of the shops production of... homes is set up. To be precise, their component sections. These sections are kinds of containers suitable for convenient transportation. Putting them together like children’s building blocks, one can quickly assemble a one-, two-, or three-story house. Of course, on a foundation prepared in advance. The floor plan is made to the client’s order. The finishing is simply great. Walls are about 10 cm thick, but a special heat-insulating padding inside provides warmth and
comfort even at 40 degrees below. Apartment sections come with kitchen and other furniture—modern and comfortable.

In short, exactly what we need most these days. Based on that, in the beginning of the year the INPAR company and our organization, Conversion-Housing, signed a contract on joint construction of 7,500 apartments near Moscow and St. Petersburg for servicemen from the Western Group of Forces. It may be several standard towns, 100 buildings in each, with stores, schools, day care centers, etc.

How realistic is all this for the near future? Dr. H. Krone assured us that in five months these modular homes can start growing on Russian land like mushrooms after the rain. But... but all business related to settling the financial side of the matter needs to be resolved quickly. First, the creditors need proper guarantees from the government of Russia.
INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Servicemen Return From Azerbaijan
92UM0790C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
6 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel (Retired) Vasilii Perminov: “Officers and Warrant Officers Arriving in Kiev From Azerbaijan Pledged Allegiance to the People of the Ukraine”]

[Text] There are representatives of different arms of service among returnees to the Ukraine: motorized riflemen, tank men, airmen, airborne troops, signalmen, seamen. All of them conscientiously performed their duty while serving in Azerbaijan. Alas, together with their families in this “hot spot,” for a long time they felt anxiety and fear for their lives.

And now that the situation there has heated up to the boiling point, they decided firmly to return to the Ukraine and pledge allegiance to its people.

Here is what Poltava native Major of Medical Service A. Bilka, who served in the Caspian Flotilla, had to say:

“Azerbaijan is forming its own national army. It is completely obvious that it may be drawn into a bloody war with Armenia. This is why officers of other nationalities were confronted with a choice here: either pledge allegiance to Azerbaijan, or leave their place of service. Let me note that attitudes toward servicemen of other than Azerbaijani origins, who may be said to be lacking social protection, changed dramatically in recent times. In a word, the situation is extremely tense. It is for this reason that the wives and children of officers are sitting on their suitcases, impatiently awaiting departure for home. First-term privates and sergeants have almost all left Azerbaijan in organized fashion. But the officers must anxiously wait...”

One could understand Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, and sympathize with him. As well as with his many compatriots who are fated to suffer such injustice. For example Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service A. Vodiyev was acting chief of a branch military hospital. One morning he came to work as usual to find a new chief in his place, appointed by the Azerbaijan defense minister. There was nothing Anatoliy Vladimirovich could do. His appeals to all levels of authority were futile.

Many difficulties were also faced byrovno native Lieutenant Vitaliy Bugay. The same goes for Captain Lieutenant V. Provolovskiy from Kiev Oblast, Poltava native Senior Lieutenant N. Linets, Dnepropetrovsk native Warrant Officer G. Fursenko, and all of their comrades-in-arms who decided to join the armed forces of their native Ukraine, and to pledge allegiance to its people.

We must give proper credit to Colonel A. Slyusarev, department chief at the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School, who heads the regional Ukrainian servicemen’s union in Azerbaijan, for returning to his homeland. He responded vigorously to the needs of people finding themselves in distress, and provided assistance to them, so that the solemn oath-taking ritual would proceed as it is supposed to.

It occurred on Independence Square in the presence of numerous citizens of Kiev. The words of all who gave their military pledge beside the blue-and-yellow flag rang out in triumph. Each was given flowers, and all attending the ceremony chanted “Glory to Ukraine!” This was truly an emotional event.

After the oath Colonel A. Slyusarev noted that the Ukrainian Defense Ministry was doing everything necessary to secure the future of all of the oath-takers in their specialties, and to satisfy their needs.

Well, the first step has been taken. We will hope that the problems of moving Ukrainians home from Azerbaijan will be solved. Time permits no delay.

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Decree Recalls Troops from Transcaucasus, Moldova
92UM0829A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
26 Mar 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Presidential Decree signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, March 24, 1992: “Ukrainian Presidential Decree on the Return of Servicemen Who Are Ukrainian Citizens to Ukraine to Perform Service from Military Units Deployed on Territory of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova”]

[Text] In execution of the Law of Ukraine “On the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” I RESOLVE:

1. For the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers:

a) to ensure the return of servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens to Ukraine from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova, while considering their desire to serve on the territory of their own state:


b) to send delegations to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova with the participation of representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Committee on Issues of the Social Protection of Servicemen and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers for conducting negotiations with government leaders and the commanders of the Armed Forces of these states on issues of the return of servicemen to Ukraine.
2. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense will provide servicemen with transportation to Ukraine from the deployment locations of their units in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova, including the use of military transport aviation.

3. This decree enters into force from the date it is signed.

[Signed] L. KRAVCHUK, President of Ukraine
Kiev, 24 March 1992

Starokonstantinov Aviation Garrison Appeals to Kravchuk

92UM0729B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
18 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: “Starokonstantinov Garrison Appeal to Ukrainian President and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense”]

[Text] On 13 February 1992, during the conduct of flight exercises by the bomber regiment, six combat aircraft were removed without authorization and landed on the Shatalovo airfield in Smolensk Oblast. In addition, the unit colors were appropriated by Regimental Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel A. I. Krishtop.

We, the personnel of the Starokonstantinov Garrison, are deeply disturbed by the extraordinary occurrence. We, considering this incident to be of a decidedly negative political nature, hereby declare that the illegal acts of the perpetrators stand in direct opposition to the sentiments prevailing in this collective.

Therefore, we appeal to the Ukraine Supreme Council, the President, and the Ukraine Minister of Defense to rename our regiment as the “1st Bomber Aviation Regiment,” with unit colors bearing the symbol of the Ukraine.

We are adamant in our demand that legal action be taken against Regimental Chief of Staff Lieutenant-Colonel A. I. Krishtop, who bears primary responsibility for traditional keeping of the unit colors.

We also request that no action be taken to dissolve our regiment, which in its 25 years of tradition includes highly qualified combat pilots in its ranks. We further request that no criminal or administrative charges be brought against Regimental Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Filippovich Yevdokimov, since he had no association whatsoever with the incident and enjoys a position of high respect in the unit.

[Signed] Yu. Kasyanov, Chairman, Personnel Assembly
Feb 92

FROM THE EDITORS. As this edition was being prepared for press, word came to us from a press conference called by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense that Ukrainian President L. M. Kravchuk had expressed his gratitude to the personnel of the regiment for their principled stand relative to the illegal acts committed by the persons who removed the aircraft without authorization. Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. P. Morozov proclaimed his confidence that the bomber regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel V. F. Yevdokimov will reliably serve the defense cause of an independent Ukraine.

Chairman of Committee on ‘Social Defense’ of Servicemen Interviewed

92UM0726A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
21 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Col V. Martirosyan, chairman of the Committee for the Social Defense of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, by Maj S. Kobyshev, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric “First Interview in the New Position”: “Honor and Dignity Will Be Raised to a New Height”]

[Text] Col F. Martirosyan, chairman of the Committee for the Social Defense of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and I agreed to meet in his hotel room in the morning, before the workday began. The conditions and the time permitted me to hope for a long and substantive discussion. And I prepared for one. It turned out, however, that Martirosyan’s room was also his own unique residence, with all the attendant peculiarities, so to speak: beginning with the fact that I was far from his first visitor even at that early hour and ending with the incessant ringing of the telephone throughout the discussion. The first question of Col Martirosyan therefore came to mind of itself.

[Kobyshev] Vilen Arutyunovich, I do not even know whether to congratulate you on your appointment to the position of chairman of the Committee for the Social Defense of Servicemen or to feel sorry for you.

[Martirosyan] You are right. In this case sympathy is more appropriate. I must admit I did not fully imagine the avalanche of appeals, requests and suggestions which would hit me after I assumed the position. Even before, however, when I headed the Ukrainian Officers’ Union, I received my share of attention. Hundreds and thousands of officers saw our public organization as the final authority, where we would hear them out and try to understand and help. This committee is a state structure, and I am therefore confident that the efficacy of its work will be more diverse and productive.

[Kobyshev] Before we discuss the committee’s missions and the prospects for its work, I would like to touch upon the following. Col Martirosyan has become well known in the armed forces. First, as a people’s deputy of the USSR, then as chairman of the Officers’ Union of Ukraine. Probably few people know Martirosyan the person, however, know who he is, where he is from and who he was before he became known throughout the Union.
[Martirosyan] You know, there is nothing particularly unusual about my biography. I had an ordinary officer's career. I was born in the city of Kirovabad in Azerbaijan in 1940. I am Armenian. I grew up and was drafted into the army there. I entered the Kiev Higher Military Engineering Signal School. After graduating I commanded a platoon and a company. I then attended the Signal Academy, after which I served in the Transbaykal Military District. I spent 13 years inside its "wild walls, as the song goes. I commanded a battalion in the division commanded by former Minister of Defense Yazov. Slightly later I served as a deputy regimental commander, brigade chief of staff and commander of a separate signal regiment. I served in that position in the city of Rivne in Ukraine from 1985.

[Kobyshhev] It was there, of course, where you became a people's deputy of the former Union. Why, if it is not a secret, did a regimental commander suddenly decide to go into politics. You have plenty of concerns in your position without that.

[Martirosyan] I have to admit the initiative did not come from me at first, but from my comrades. The preconditions for everything which occurred were there previously, however. After all, we could all see what was taking place around us. We understood the need for change and the impossibility of continuing in the old way. All of these issues were discussed, opinions were expressed and positions took shape. The awakened awareness of the people and the scope of public activism made us certain of the inevitability of rapid change.

Nor have the servicemen avoided these processes. Therefore, when the election campaign for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR began in the Rivne area, the comrades summoned me back from leave by telegram. Even today I can be proud of the results of that election, since I, an Armenian, won out of five candidates, some of whom, incidentally, were Ukrainians. I won because of my realistic program and the faith the electors had in me. And so I became a deputy of the USSR.

[Kobyshhev] Answering a question about the rapid withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe in an interview for the magazine LIDER in May 1991, you said that it was essential to give attention to the man in the uniform and to help him without fail. Particularly those who will be discharged. Our situation is perhaps even more dramatic today. New reductions and additional discharges lie ahead. Nor does the breakup of the Union leave room for optimism. Thousands, even tens of thousands of officers and warrant officers suddenly found themselves abroad. The question of the future became a very acute one for many of them. And I believe it would not be wrong for me to expect that the bulk of these questions will fall to the committee you head.

[Martirosyan] They already have.

[Kobyshhev] And what do you propose to do?

For now let us discuss the committee's general, strategic, so to speak, missions. They are the following. The Ukraine has proclaimed the formation of its own armed forces. And I believe that precisely our committee is obligated to help with their establishment. In some things we may even disagree with established views and with the position of the Ministry of Defense, to be sure. We consider it to be our primary mission in this area to halt the discharge of officers in Ukraine. Halt them until we figure out just what kind of armed forces it needs. In general, we feel that we must work out strict criteria for the release of officers and warrant officers. This fully applies also to the former political workers.

Another thing: I feel—and I believe that the other members of our committee will support me in this—that it should be the rule in the Ukrainian army not to discharge an officer into the reserve until he has a pension and is provided with an apartment. There will be exceptions, of course. This should be the general line, however. And then, who, if not we, would know what is involved in 10 or 15 years of service as an officer, after which a person can find himself cast into the street, in the direct sense of the word, with neither house nor home. We need, need very much to increase the prestige of the officer's service. We know, after all, that for a long time, and particularly in recent years, our profession has not only lost its popularity but also has the least social protection. And this is in addition to the enormous load born by the officers in a situation of an almost constantly unsettled life and a meager family budget.

Speaking of working out the criteria for discharge, we have another purpose as well. Ukraine's army clearly will not need an officer corps of the size which presently exists. Can you imagine, however, the army of unemployed which could be cast out by our military department alone within a short time? Can you imagine the kind of social tensions it could create in the society? We cannot fail to think about this and look ahead. Right now, today, we must therefore think about how to employ the discharged personnel (highly trained ones at that), think about schools and courses for the retraining of the officers. This too must be one of our committee's missions.

[Kobyshhev] Vilen Arutyunovich, you just mentioned a rule under which an officer may not be discharged without a pension and housing. As a state organization, however, you must operate always in strict conformity with the law. But take the recently ratified Law on Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen and Their Families. Just such a requirement, as you will recall, was set forth in the draft. It was not retained in the law itself, however. So what will you do?

[Martirosyan] You are right. This amendment was made. Furthermore, it was made without the agreement of the military and, I dare to assume, without their participation. We have also pointed this out, and in the near future we shall attempt to submit our own statute to supplement and amend this article of the law.
STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

[Kobyshchv] Now, about the actual machinery for your committee's functioning. How, in what way, do you propose to respond to this or that situation? People may not always come directly to you, after all. They may simply be afraid to do so.

[Martirosyan] We do not plan to base our work on appeals made directly to the committee alone. Its staff is made up of 35 people, 20 of whom are servicemen. We shall therefore place the stress in our work on visits to the forces and getting to know the situation at the sites. I am confident that within a certain time the movement for normal, civilized living and service conditions will become a large-scale one. We are assigning a significant role in this matter to the still-functioning Ukrainian Officers' Union, whose cells will soon appear in all the Ukraine's oblast centers. Our main attention will be devoted to seeing that the military collectives are headed by competent, sympathetic and decent people with the moral right to direct others. The officers' assemblies will have a special role in this. In general, I feel that a normal situation will be one in which all service assignments will be made only after recommendations are made and consultations are conducted with both the Officers' Union and our committee. I personally do not rule out the possibility that some of the appointments made through our efforts will be reconsidered. The appointment machinery and the selection criteria must be worked out in detail and strictly implemented so as to eliminate even the possibility of protectionism or the assumption of positions of command by just anyone. At the same time, I can say most definitely that principled and demanding commanders who know their job will be defended by us no less vigorously than other members of the military collectives. In short, we view the armed forces of Ukraine as formations of people based on new and different, morally and ethically wholesome principles. And we shall do everything possible to bolster these and get them established. In this regard, I can say with due modesty that the regiment which I commanded could serve as an example, as the prototype of future relations in the military collective.

[Kobyshchv] Incidentally, who took over command of the regiment from you?

[Martirosyan] An officers' assembly was held and Lt Col Berkasov, former chief of staff, was elected by secret ballot. His position was taken over by Lt Col Pantyukhov, chief of the [signal] center. So you can see that the officers themselves decided whom to entrust to command them.

[Kobyshchv] Thank you for the interview. It is apparently time for us to end it.

[Martirosyan] Yes, it is. Unfortunately, there is not enough time even for the press. Before we part, however, I would like to address the commanders at all levels and of all ranks. We barely touched upon social protection for first-term servicemen in our interview, although we had it in mind. I therefore call upon all commanders to demonstrate paternal concern for their subordinates in these complicated and difficult times. Look upon them as your children. Those who are incapable of this should do the right thing, submit separation requests and give up their high positions. For our part, we shall help them find work in their field. Let it be known by everyone that arbitrary or disrespectful treatment of the man in the Ukrainian armed forces is unacceptable.

The officer's honor and dignity must be raised to where it belongs, so that Ukraine's people are proud of their sons. We shall achieve a situation in which the slogan "The people and the army are united!" reflects the reality. I wish all the soldiers, warrant officers, officers and generals success. I hope to meet them more than once yet.

Ukrainian Psychological Chief on Problems of Forming New Armed Forces

92UM0739A Moscow SYN OTECHESTVA in Russian No 7, Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Social-Psychological Training Directorate Chief Colonel Vladimir Savel'yevich Mulyava by SYN OTECHESTVA Correspondent Aleksandr Prasol: "There Should not be any Offended People in Ukraine"]

[Text] The formation of our own armed forces in Ukraine has caused far from a simple reaction among the population of the former Union.

Our correspondent visited the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense where he talked with Social-Psychological Training Directorate Chief Colonel V. Mulyava.

A bit about Vladimir Savel'yevich. He graduated from the legal-economic department of Kiev State University. During the time of his studies in this department, he also managed to complete three and a half years of the mechanical-mathematics department and four and a half years of the philosophy department. He is a doctor of sciences. The topic of his doctoral dissertation was: "Man in the Individual. The Personality as the Realization of the Human Nature of the Individual."

[Prasol] Vladimir Savel'yevich, you were one of the active participants of the scientific-practical conference on the problems of creating the Ukrainian armed forces. This occurred long before the time when this possibility was actually granted to the republic. In brief, what does the concept proposed by you consist of?

[Mulyava] The main thing is to insure a peaceful and as painless as possible path for forming our own armed forces. Having proclaimed the sovereignty of Ukraine, we immediately made known to society our intention to create an army. In so doing, we proceeded from the universally accepted world practice. We simultaneously announced the state's nuclear-free status.
We are not building the Ukrainian Armed Forces on level ground but we are using the Troop Groupings of the military districts that are deployed on its territory to do this. And in so doing we took into account that people of various nationalities serve here. That is why we are also conducting the process of forming the army gradually, through negotiations and agreements, while striving to transform the already existing military structures to the maximum extent possible. In so doing, the main thing is to insure civil peace and good neighbor relations with all sovereign states.

[Prasol] However, reports on the deportation to Russia of those servicemen who have refused to swear loyalty to Ukraine have caused an entire storm of protests.

[Mulyava] Let this remain on the conscience of the writing fraternity. I must say that we, from the very beginning, understood that among the servicemen would be those who would immediately accept Ukrainian citizenship and would swear to it. There would also be those who would not be able to take the oath but who also do not want to leave its territory for a whole series of reasons. They would not be able to serve in the army and we must offer them the opportunity to retrain and to receive a new specialty and job placement. The state guarantees in this case that the salary of these servicemen will not be lower than the salary that they received in the troops.

And finally, we also realize that there would also be those people who consider themselves to be citizens of a foreign state and would want to serve in the army of their own republic. We relate and will relate to them with complete understanding. People are not at fault because at the moment of the disintegration of the Union they found themselves in the armed forces on the territory of another sovereign state. They need our assistance and support, both political and material.

I must point out that this approach of the Ukrainian leadership found understanding both in the military environment and in society as a whole. This was also demonstrated on December 1 when the majority of the population voted for Ukrainian independence. Among them were not only Ukrainians but also Russians, Poles, Jews, and representatives of other nationalities. We sense this even now while administering the military oath.

If we speak about the approaches of the sovereign republics toward the issues of social protection of servicemen and their family members, in contrast to the other republics, they have been resolved in Ukraine. At the end of last year, the republic Supreme Soviet adopted an entire package of laws. And while they are only talking about this in the other republics, the law is actively operating in our state.

[Prasol] Vladimir Savulyevich, the press has reported that there is a large formation of troops right now on the territory of your state. According to the data of American military experts, there are 20 divisions and 850 aircraft.

At the same time, it has been announced that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will total 300,000-350,000 men. Obviously, Ukraine intends to strictly follow the principle of defensive sufficiency?

[Mulyava] I must say that our military doctrine has a purely defensive nature. In the future, Ukraine will have an army totaling 200,000-250,000 men. This tasks us with imparting high combat characteristics to the armed forces. We recognize that a high level of technical equipment must be reinforced by our highly skilled cadres.

The Ukrainian Army will be structured on a professional basis and a significant portion of personnel will serve on contract. If this is so, the demands are increasing for training soldiers and officers and for their spirituality.

[Prasol] And this will be the basis of the tasks for the directorate you head?

[Mulyava] On the whole, I have been tasked with forming the social-psychological service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. And this will not be the political structure into which the leadership of the former USSR Ministry of Defense attempted to transform the political organs.

Unfortunately, the previous society was politicized through and through. It was based on the positions of the class struggle. And this ideological concept turned out to be lethal.

The essence of our concept is to build a new type of mutual relations, interpersonal relations, and intercourse in the army. We must teach people non-repressive, nonviolent intercourse and make it so that one individual does not pressure another. A well worked out role training system exists to do this. We want to teach this to specialists, to as many as possible. And we will reinforce modern knowledge with historical traditions. Ukraine has a very rich experience in this regard. Not only Cossack to Cossack but also other citizens have greeted each other: "Pan-comrade." This signifies that I do not make myself out to be a Pan but that I consider the other person to be that. Military comradeship has been structured on this. Even when they elected the Ataman, they poured ashes on his head so that he would not get a swollen head and would always remember whom he had been prior to this. In the Pereyaslavl Agreement of 1654, they stipulated the freedoms of the Ukrainian people and gave high guarantees. And all of this was replaced by serfdom. Therefore, when today they tell us about the commonwealth of equals and in so doing attempt to exert pressure and to dictate a foreign will, we perceive this as attempts to restore the single and indivisible Russian Empire. We no longer want to be a colony. To be friends and to have equivalent exchange with all sovereign republics—please. So it would be stupid to accuse Ukraine of striving to destroy these centuries-old ties. We simply want to build a free society and be masters with full power on our own soil.

[Prasol] Returning to the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, I want to say that I have seen many
military personnel in this building who would want to closely cooperate with the Ministry of Defense and directly with your Directorate. What are the criteria for selecting people?

[Mulyava] The only one for everyone—is high professionalism and competence. By way of illustration, our directorate sorely needs sociologists and psychologists. We have already selected quite a few. And the majority of them are not Ukrainian. We do not see any impediments in having representatives of other peoples serve in our army. But the ideological bases which these people adhere to do concern us. Of course, those people who are familiar with the history of Ukraine and its armed forces have an advantage. Because we, just like any other people, have our own history. And it is the history of not just the Ukrainians alone, but also of each people who live on its territory.

[Prasal] Thank you for the interview. Maybe you have some sort of wish?

[Mulyava] I have one wish—that all of the processes which are occurring in our country are objectively covered in the press and become the common property of the people.

Ukraine Guarantees Benefits to Relatives of Those Killed on Duty
92UM0748A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Major G. Klyuchkov and Ukrainian Committee of Soldiers' Mothers Coordinating Council Member T. Shkurym, under the rubric: "A View on the Problem": "They Did Not Return from Service... On Benefits for Mothers Who Have Lost Sons in the Army"]

[Text] The mothers of servicemen nevertheless asked us to begin this generally bitter and disgraceful story with warm words of gratitude to those who were able to understand them and to respond to someone else's grief. A provision that provides benefits to all mothers of deceased servicemen, regardless of the causes and circumstances of their deaths, appeared in the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members" largely thanks to Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman I. Ploshch, to his Deputy V. Durdinit, to Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and State Security Issues Members V. Lenish, A. Tarasenko, P. Misluk, and A. Korzh, to Department Head V. Makarenko, and to others.

An enormous thanks to them from the Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine!

Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov has sent out three telegrams to military commissariats in execution of these laws which direct attention to the fact that parents of servicemen who have died during the period of military service can also take advantage of benefits and rights to an old-age pension with the submission of the appropriate certificate.

However, this order has been treated differently locally. First of all, they have sent out invitations to the mothers with the suggestion to come to the voyenkomat [military commissariat]. And when the mothers arrive, they have heard disturbing exclamations:

"So your son died and was not killed. And we do not issue certificates to such parents."

That is how they responded at Darnitskiy, Shevchenkovo, Dnepr, and Vatutino rayvoyenkomats [rayon military commissariats].

There were also other excuses: They have not received any such telegram, write a complaint to the procurator, let the obvobjenkom [oblstial military commissariat] resolve this. And so on and so forth.

My God, how worm-eaten do our hearts become while working with real people that we taunt mothers who have lost their children in this way!

Yes, the mothers should have obtained these certificates on the death of a soldier from the units along with the zinc coffins. Deliver it and say:

"Mother, you raised a warrior and a soldier but we, unfortunately did not protect his life. Here is your certificate. The State will care for you and will not leave you in misery."

How to care for mothers is already a matter for the parliament and President. And the matter for the military is to issue the document.

But it turns out that in our country it is easier to pass a law than to attain its execution. Military commissariats, while unwaveringly following the "good" old traditions, continue to drive mothers from one bureau to another and continue to separate soldiers into those who were killed [pogib] and those who died [umer]. Are the mothers really to blame that their children did not manage to end up in Afghanistan or Karabakh, but died at military units during peacetime under various circumstances?

Already a year ago, a special commission on verification of the causes of death and trauma of servicemen in peacetime ascertained that a total of 18.5 percent of the total number of servicemen killed in the army die as a result of suicide. And these are healthy, strong lads. At the same time, the percentage of suicides among the civilian population is significantly lower—1.3 percent. Although this figure also includes suicides of psychologically unbalanced people, alcoholics, drug addicts, and elderly people who have decided to take their own lives.

Where does this difference come from? It would seem that a much higher percentage of the deceased must be due to the violation of safety regulations or because of
motor vehicle traffic accidents due to the specific conditions of service in the army. However, that figure is nearly equal to the percentage of civilians killed due to those causes.

The entire matter is due to falsification. It is frequently advantageous for the command authorities to reduce everything to suicide rather than to "hang" a crime on a military unit.

Aleksey Solenyx served for a year and a half in the PVO [Air Defense] Troops at Vyborg. His death notice states: "Gun shot wound of the right half of the chest. Suicide."

His mother, who doubted that her son had decided to commit suicide just prior to his release into the reserve, conducted her own investigation. It turned out that four soldiers in the unit "shot themselves" on that day and at that hour. And they had written "suicide" on the death notices for all of them and had sent the coffins to different regions of the country. And a trial of those who were guilty of the deaths occurred only three years later. But Aleksey's mother did not live until that day. We will return to her fate later.

We can cite an endless multitude of such examples. The merciless statistic attests: an average of 6,600 servicemen have died annually in the Soviet Army and, of them, every fifth has been from Ukraine.

And they have divided all of them into those who were killed while fulfilling their military service obligations and those who died while performing military service. If the parents of the former enjoy benefits granted by the state, then the latter do not have anything except shame. It is the same with the disabled.

This play on words, that was thought up by someone at one time in the corridors of power, is at times reduced to the absurd. By way of illustration, a soldier has broken a leg during physical training exercises. The leg knitted improperly and became several centimeters shorter. They administer the fitness test for military service to the soldier and write to the VTEK [medical commission for determination of disability] that he is disabled as a result of trauma received while performing his military service obligations. This soldier will have all benefits. And this is correct.

But if a soldier catches a cold while performing guard duty and comes down with tuberculosis, they will administer the fitness test for military service to him with the wording: "illness received during the period of performance of military service." And although he will be a Group II Disabled Person and the disease is much more dangerous than in the first instance, this soldier will not receive any benefits whatsoever. Just a minimal disability pension.

Just where is the justice here? It is already long since time to be done with this casuistry and to at least stop separating the graves of the deceased. Ukrainian Committee of Soldiers' Mothers representatives have knocked on every door with this demand. But they always cite one and the same objection: but what if a soldier was absent without leave, got drunk and drowned?

We will not argue that this case is also possible. One of many thousands. Therefore, it is necessary that a painstaking investigation or a medical or judicial-medical board of review be conducted of all circumstances of servicemen's deaths in the troops.

However, it is inhumane and inadvisable to reexamine each case over and over again for those mothers whose children have already been in the grave for a long time.

This is how it turns out in our country: in order not to be mistaken in a single case, we are depriving everyone of the misery benefits. But the mothers of deceased soldiers will never agree that their sons died while not fulfilling their military service obligations! If something happens to a worker while he is at work, that is a work-related injury. Even if it occurred due to an error of the worker himself. Why is everything just the opposite in the army?

We understand very well that it will be difficult for our state to find even very insignificant resources for payment of additional benefits under current economic conditions. But the state and the army, who have taken a son from his mother and not returned him, are obliged, if not to pay for their guilt (nothing is capable of replacing a mother's son!), then albeit to materially support her and to shield her from moral trauma.

Here we once again return to the fate of the mother of the murdered Aleksey Solenyx. Alla Ivanovna was divorced. She had raised her son by herself. After Alesha's death, she continued to work at the plant. She had graduated from Moscow Chemical-Technological Institute and had a good job. However, she was unlucky—she was subject to reduction. An attempt to appeal to the conscience of the enterprise management was unsuccessful. In response, one thing was heard: her son had not been killed but had died.

The job placement bureau could not suggest anything to her other than a job as a maid. Alla Ivanovna lived on a 50-ruble unemployment benefit for three months. Nearly all of the money was spent on transportation to her son's grave and for flowers. In December, having nothing but the entire tragedy of the death notice left, Alla Ivanovna died.

Darnitskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, motivated by the fact that her son killed himself, is not issuing the document for payment of the insurance sum to Olga Gritsenko. Although in accordance with the law, the insurance sum is not paid only in the event the deceased has committed a crime or if he was intoxicated when he died.

Unfortunately, these are not isolated cases. That is why the Ukrainian Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has once
again requested that Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov help to carry out the resolution of the two congresses of soldiers' mothers.

At the beginning of February, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Directive No. 140, dated February 4, 1992, was distributed to oblast military commissariats. It clearly indicated: "If a serviceman's death occurred while he was performing compulsory active duty service in the period from 1945 until the present time, regardless of the cause and circumstances of death, consider the death to be associated with the fulfillment of military service obligations with the exception of those cases when the military commissariat has documents on the commission of a criminally punishable act by the deceased serviceman. Issue the parents of the deceased servicemen certificates for benefits of the prescribed type."

When this Issue Was Being Prepared for Press

The Ukrainian Minister of Defense's latest telegram also did not achieve the desired effect. Now the military commissariats have advanced a new excuse—there are no blank certificates. This is already true: He who wishes to, acts; and he who does not want to act, looks for excuses. Considering that the ill-fated blanks are being printed at the Gosznak factory, the solution to the problem may be dragged out for many long months and even for years.

The certificates are required if mothers are now to obtain benefits that are already due to them in accordance with the law, that is, the sense is to issue them temporary certificates certified by the military commissariat stamp. It is already time to stop forcing the mothers of deceased servicemen to walk along the closed circle of humiliation and grief.

Work of Special 'Berkut' MVD Unit Viewed

92UM0745A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Feb 92 p 3

[Interview with Major-General Militia V. M. Nedrigaylo, Ukrainian deputy minister of internal affairs, by M. Berezovskyi: "The 'Berkut' Go Out on Operations"]

[Text] As is known, several years ago Ukraine established special purpose militia detachments. In mid January this year, they were reorganized as rapid response militia subunits under the name "Berkut." What caused this? With this question our correspondent began his conversation with the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Maj Gen Militia V.M. Nedrigaylo.

Valentin Mikhaylovich [Nedrigaylo] has worked in the internal affairs bodies for more than 30 years. He began his service in the Borispolskiy ROVD [rayon internal affairs department] in Kiev Oblast. Later he worked as the deputy chief of the UVD [internal affairs directorate] in Kiev Oblast, as well as the chief of the UVD in Poltava and Donetsk Oblasts in Kiev. He has completed the USSR MVD Academy.

He has held his present position since April of last year.

[Nedrigaylo] The special purpose militia detachments were organized upon the orders of the Union MVD in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Lvov and Odessa. Great attention was given to the organizing of them in the internal affairs ministry and in the directorates on the spot.

The measures taken ensured subsequently the clear work of the subunits. They were to be employed in emergency situations, in eliminating the consequences of accidents and natural disasters as well as halting group violations of public order.

The high level of combat and physical training, teamwork, mobility and a constant readiness for action have attracted to these subunits workers from criminal investigation, from the service combating organized crime and the protection of the economy from criminal encroachment.

Thus, their functions were broadened and moved away from the initial ones, and now they need reorganizing and an adjusting of the mission considering the present.

[Berezovskyi] Please give us several vivid examples of the effective work done by the OMON [Special Purpose Miltia Detachment] troops.

[Nedrigaylo] There are many examples of this. In November of last year, a group of workers from the Kiev OMON under the leadership of the company commander, Maj V. Konovod was given the task of apprehending two deserters armed with automatic weapons. The deserters had changed into civilian clothes and were operating in the Pushcha-Voditsa Forest. Detected in combing the forest, they opened fire on the militia workers. Showing high professional skill and personal courage, the squad commander MSgt M. Makarenko, with the aid of the other soldiers, disarmed and apprehended the criminals.

Last year a round-up group from the OMON of the Odessa Oblast UVD headed by the subunit commander, Maj Militia A. Martynenko, in cooperation with other detachments, apprehended two bandits who the day before at the Sarata Railroad Station had made a daring attack on a military detail and had captured four Kalashnikov rifles and 280 cartridges. By the skillful action of the men in the detachment the bandits were captured and the stolen weapons and ammunition recovered.

For disarming a group of armed, fiercely resisting racketeers in the settlement of Ginovaruv in Pustomitovskiy Rayon of Lvov Oblast, the deputy subunit commander O. Puriy was awarded the Order For Personal Courage and the squad commander I. Mikhasevich was given the Order of the Red Star.

[Berezovskyi] Why have these subunits been established only in five cities?
This has been caused exclusively by the limited number of personnel. However, the high effectiveness of the subunits in combating bold crimes has suggested the necessity of establishing them in all the oblast centers. They have also been organized in the structures of the subunits in the patrol and post service by drawing on their personnel. While maintaining the same amount of work in maintaining public order, they have been given the same tasks as the OMON.

Why then, Valentin Mikhaylovich, have the well known OMON now been reorganized as the “Berkut” rapid response subunits?

This is how we started the conversation. But I could add several other arguments. At present, the very name of the detachments does not correspond to the tasks which are entrusted to them. Their functions to a certain degree have been narrowed and basically reduced to ensuring public order in carrying out mass measures. Each year on the streets of Ukraine, more than 30,000 crimes are committed. Last year, over 20,000 pieces of firearms were confiscated from the public.

There has been an increase in the number of group hooligan actions, accidents at enterprises, disasters and other extraordinary situations. In addition, the growing arming and technical equipping of the criminal groups demand that they be countered by militia subunits which are properly provided with everything necessary and organized from professionals of the highest qualifications. However, the insignificant number of these subunits and their small number of personnel do not make it possible to effectively influence the various negative processes.

In addition, in a number of cities in the former Union, such detachments have not always shown their better side, in sometimes exceeding their powers and this has greatly undermined their authority among the public.

Under these conditions, there was a need to organize a new type of militia subunit which would be highly mobile, professionally trained for actions in extreme circumstances and equipped with technical and special facilities as well as transport.

What will be the basic tasks and functions assigned to the “Berkut” rapid response militia subunits?

These tasks differ a little from those which were entrusted to the OMON. First of all, there will be the protecting of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens against criminal offenses and other antisocial actions, ensuring public order in areas with a difficult operational situation, with the occurrence of natural disasters, epidemics, accidents at enterprises and so forth. The detachments will be the first to participate in apprehending armed criminals and freeing hostages, preventing terrorist acts and halting armed attacks on banks, institutions, organizations and citizens. They will also be used in standing patrol and post service on the streets and squares of our population points.

We see this name as a symbol of the mobility, of constant combat readiness and of the inevitability of attack actions against the criminals. In nature everything is logical. The predatorialness of the golden eagles is the embodiment of necessity and not unconscious aggressiveness.

At the same time it is not a question of names. For instance, in Austria there also are the rapid response subunits with even the more frightening name of Cobra. But these police workers are respected and well known by the entire adult public. Visiting Vienna several years ago, a delegation from the Kiev Militia saw on the spot that the authority of these subunits was very high among the people. Over the last 20 years in the Austrian capital there has not been a single case of an attack on the police. It must be stressed that such subunits are found in many nations of the world, they have different names but they perform the same functions. In taking advantage of this occasion, I would like to urge through the paper that our people show respect and good feelings for not only the men in the rapid response militia subunits but also the other defenders of law and order.

Valentin Mikhaylovich, what will be the size of the subunits and with what special equipment will they be armed?

In terms of numbers, there will be almost 3,000 men. There will be a regiment in Kiev, battalions in Donetsk, Lvov, Odessa, Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk, with companies in the remaining oblast centers.

As in the Western countries, our detachments will have special weapons, individual protective and active defense gear for disarming armed criminals and for operating in crisis situations, when a real threat arises to public safety, or to the life and health of many people.

The equipment is divided into individual protective gear, active defense equipment and special equipment. These questions have been clearly set out in the Ukrainian Law on the Militia as well as according to the rules approved by the Cabinet of Ministers for the employment of special equipment in maintaining public order.

The individual protective gear includes light and heavy armored vests, special helmets and transparent shields made from polycarbonate or light alloys.

Among the active defense equipment we would put rubber truncheons and the various modifications of Cheremukha [Bird Cherry] tear gas. Incidentally, the research carried out by scientists confirms that the employed gas dissipates in 1.5-2 hours and does not create life-threatening concentrations in the open air.
The special operations equipment includes devices for the forced halting of motor transport, for opening up rooms seized by the violators of the law, armored vehicles, cartridges with the Volna-r rubber bullets and other.

But we are very hopeful that in Ukraine we have organized preventive work in such a manner that there is such support for the law enforcement bodies and respect for the law so that these will not have to be used.

[Berezovskiy] Who can become a member of a “Berkut” subunit?

[Nedrigaylo] The personnel of the subunits is recruited on a competitive basis from the best professionally trained militia workers who have the required physical qualifications and at least two years experience in the internal affairs bodies. In addition to physical fitness and athletic training, it is essential to have the ability to control one’s emotions, to maintain a moral and psychological equilibrium, to show restraint and not surrender to provocation. The subunit co-workers are trained specially for actions in emergency situations.

In conclusion, I would like to say that at present it is important to support these subunits and to constantly provide them with the required aid, remembering that their work is for our protection, for our tranquility and for a secure life.

National Guard Arranges Ukrainian Language Classes
92UM0788D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 1

[Article under the rubric “Newsbriefs Based on Reports from Ukrinform and the Nezavisimost Information Bureau”: “We Are Learning the Ukrainian Language”]

[Text] Kiev—Groups for the study of the Ukrainian language have been set up in the Main Directorate of the Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard and in the Guard units and subunits for those who do not know or have a poor command of the language. Trained teachers and philologists with whom the units conclude temporary labor agreements will help the Guardsmen master the state language. Classes began on 2 March. Attendance by the servicemen is voluntary.

Harrassment Spurs Deserters to Return to Ukraine
92UM0783A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent Vladimir Yeremenko: “The Deserters Are Joining the Formation”]

[Text] In one unit at the Zaporozhye Garrison Lt Col Sergey Lutsenko’s subunit is called the second induction center. Its official name is the assembly center for servicemen who are AWOL from their duty station.

With the passage of laws on the establishment of the armed forces of Ukraine, a flood of soldiers from Ukraine who had deserted their military units swept into Ukraine. There are more of them every day, and in November of last year the command element of the Odessa Military District was forced to set up the Odessa assembly center.

The deserters spend several days here and, after certain formalities are met, are sent to new stations. They end up here for various reasons. One of the main reasons is hazing by “dedy” [second-year servicemen/draftees]. As a result of reprisals by the “dedy,” several of the servicemen arriving at the assembly center have not been fit to serve and have been discharged. Obviously ill youth are sometimes inducted into the army. More than 10 of these are being readied for discharge for reasons of health at the center right now.

A significant percentage of those who left their duty stations outside Ukraine have expressed a desire to serve only their own independent state. There are also those who came home on short leaves and were unable to return to their units due to international conflicts which paralyzed the transportation system. They too are kept here to serve in the homeland.

Since the flood of deserters is growing, and since they now include officers and warrant officers, assembly centers have been set up also at many other garrisons. The Zaporozhye Garrison is not empty now, however. Every day 15-20 people arrive. A total of 1,150 soldiers have now undergone a “second induction” there.

Their subsequent fate varies. Privates Sergey Chernyiak and Sergey Sorokopudov, for example, performed with excellence during a winter field exercise for district artillery, for which the former was awarded a short leave. Zaporozhians Sergey Luts and Yevgeniy Moskovich, on the other hand, have deserted a third time and are once again sitting at home. Soldiers like them have always been called deserters.

Military Weapons Thefts
92UM0783B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col Viktor Ovsyanikov: “A Sleeping Bench at a Remote Site”]

[Text] News of the theft of weapons from the depot of a military unit in the Crimea instantly swept through all the mass media. It was all linked to mafioso groups, militants from “hot spots,” criminals or members of cooperatives.

Members of the Crimean police rapidly shed light on this “dark” affair. It has now been reported that it was all the “innocent” deeds of schoolboys. Something else is cause for concern: the vigilance of the sentries and the thoroughness with which they perform their guard duty.
It was determined that there had been a whole bunch of infractions. Property of no value was kept in reinforced concrete facilities, while weapons were stored in a shellrock shed. It was no problem for the schoolboys to break through the walls of several rooms.

Following the first visit to the storage facility, workers filled in the holes in the wall somehow or other and left. It was almost noon when this was done. The old guard was relieved, and a new guard took over the guarded facilities. The same thing happened again the following day.

Do you think that a vigilant guard discovered the loss? You are wrong. The warrant officer in charge of the storage depot visited the facility entrusted to him and saw obvious signs that something was wrong: opened cases and paper strewn around. This is when the alarm was sounded. This is when the hole in the wall and then the theft of the weapons were detected. The schoolboys had first hidden them underwater and then buried them.

The happy outcome of this incident gives rise to some gloomy thoughts. How could it happen that a group of schoolboys could steal weapons in broad daylight, why were they stored under these conditions, and where was the sentry at the time? The answers to all these questions were produced with equal ease. This was considered to be a remote site, and inspectors therefore rarely looked into things there. The dumps were long-term storage facilities and were therefore not opened every day. It was a perfect picture of peace and tranquility. And military men do not have to be told how “veteran” soldiers behave in such situations.

Yes, it is absolutely true, a comfortable sleeping bench was discovered next to a wall protected from the wind, in the sunlight, where one could while away the time on duty.

Things would have continued this way if not for the pranks of some kids. The situation there had been calling for stepped-up vigilance for a long time, however. Not long ago, the theft of clothing was discovered there, and legal action was taken. As usual, however, they patched over the holes in one place, and the schoolboys made a hole in another. Will others learn a lesson from this?

Ukraine Military Copes With Housing Shortage
92UM0783C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 10 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Col (Reserve) Vladimir Smirnov: “How Do We Provide the Serviceman With Housing?”]

[Text] The present problem of providing housing for servicemen did not just occur out of nowhere. It was generated primarily by an imperfect legal basis. The Law of Ukraine on Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen and Their Families, for example, does not define the ways in which housing is provided. At the present time an officer may be assigned an apartment based on service position on the military post or an apartment from the departmental pool, that is, a department apartment. In either case the person gets a roof over his head.

In the former case, however, in accordance with today’s (1 underscore: today’s) regulations, the officer and his family have a constant feeling of temporariness and impermanence. In the latter case they have a sense of stability and ownership of their housing, even though it is not quite their own. Unfortunately, we have not had and do not have an unailing rule on the universal provision of officers with housing for their entire period of active duty. Solely because of this we have a situation among the military professionals in which the officer does his utmost to hang onto his apartment, foregoing advancement in the service in the process, since to advance he would have to move and would in most cases find himself without an apartment.

This is obviously an abnormal situation. The new law does little to improve things on the practical level, however. The wording is vague and weak in many places. This begins with the first sentence of the 12th article: “Military personnel are provided with housing space by the state.” What is new here? We are the state. The state is all of its citizens. And state structures are responsible to us. In this case responsibility must be embodied in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. And this should have been put down in writing. This would have made it clear that the military department bears responsibility for providing housing for the military. Since this approach was not specified conceptually, however, the subsequent text of Article 12 contains various “gaps.”

Point 1, for example, states: “Until they receive permanent housing, military personnel indicated in this paragraph (with the exception of first-term personnel—V.S.) are provided with service housing. If such housing is unavailable, the military unit is required to rent housing for the serviceman and his family or, at the serviceman’s request, to reimburse the latter for the subleasing (or renting) of housing under the terms established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Once again, we are dealing with “permanent” and “temporary” housing. And that should not be. Throughout his term of active duty an officer, seagoing or shore-based warrant officer should be provided with an apartment for his position in the service meeting the specifications contained in Article 50 of the Housing Code of Ukraine. These categories of servicemen should receive permanent housing only when they complete their service (when certain terms are met). And once again it is the Ministry of Defense which should see to this.

If this procedure were adhered to, it would finally become entirely clear how much housing must be maintained in the housing pool and how many apartments must be built (or acquired) for servicemen being released into the reserve or retirement under the agreed-upon terms.
Now let us consider the problem from the following angle. The construction of housing and the release of completed housing developments built with funds allocated for the construction of apartments for the families of servicemen being withdrawn from Germany is generally gratifying. This is increasing the amount of available housing.

One such complex has become a reality in the city of Krivoy Rog. The pace of the construction, its quality and the comfort of the homes are impressive. The feelings of the tankmen who have begun moving into this housing development are perfectly understandable. All of the sharp edges of the housing problem stand out even more starkly against the background of the happiness which has descended upon those receiving apartments there, however.

By not drawing strict boundaries for servicemen with respect to their right to permanent or service housing during the period of active duty, we are dooming ourselves to the endless pursuit of an unattainable goal, however, since we shall be in debt forever.

Let us follow this trend using the example of the Krivoy Rog housing development, fashionable according to our beggarly standards. This kind of compact residential area for a large number of servicemen has to be intended for a corresponding future concentration of a large number of troops here for a long period of time. Let us assume that those who selected the site for the development foresaw the strategic plans of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. And so, a modern military infrastructure was created, that is, a place not only for keeping weapons and equipment but also for occupancy by military professionals and their families.

When the development is completed, all or almost all of the servicemen in the tank formation will receive apartments. This is a relative blessing, however. Personnel rotation is a natural part of the army, after all. Many people will want to move into the development, but it is doubtful that anyone will want to leave it. Not even those released from the army. Waiting lists will therefore form again in a Krivoy Rog striving to achieve a good housing situation.

So where does the serviceman have a home? It is easy to ask this question. It is not so easy to come up with an answer, however. Particularly when people are constantly asking today: Can that situation be normal in which many people (a large percentage of them military personnel) do not have a home at all?! Nowhere....

The answer to the question of where a serviceman has a home should probably be the following. It is there where people await the individual and do not just pay lip service to concern for him but actually do something about it. It is not so important how far one serves from his native parts or from Kiev, after all. The main thing is how one lives, whether one has a roof over his head and over his family, and what that roof is like. The serviceman is poor today not just because his pay does not measure up to his physical and mental outlays in the service. He is impoverished by the absence of firm guarantees of housing without the slightest delay, both during his service and after he is released. Experience has shown that people in the military service are twice or three times as confident when they are the masters of their own apartments.

Ukraine has begun forming its own armed forces. I am profoundly convinced that we will not accomplish this grand project with people whose lives are unsettled, who are aggrieved and therefore to a certain degree, deprived. The military reform will not reach the needed pace if we do not build a corresponding moral-material foundation for converting the troops to the quantitatively and qualitatively new status. What needs to be done first?

In my opinion, we must first understand that in addition to patriotism, pragmatism is also not alien to the serviceman. He is first of all a human being, with all the inherent qualities, and therefore defines his attitude toward the service in accordance with the standard of living achieved for his family (and not just for the serviceman, certainly). There is therefore always a strong linkage between plans (faith is always alive, even if only barely) for improving the standard of living, on the one hand, and the level of military discipline, moral and the combat readiness of the subunits (and units), on the other.

The servicemen do have faith in the leadership of the armed forces of Ukraine. They are prepared to tolerate more inconvenience due to a lack of their own housing. We have to tell them honestly, however, what they can hope for, and when. All of them together and each of them individually. And this requires an enormous intellectual effort to work out a program for resolving the military housing problem.

All the phases of this work are important, but I particularly want to single out the final phase. The program cannot be called a plan of action for the future until we forecast the possible development of the situation stemming from the implementation of each measure. A comprehensive expert study therefore absolutely must be performed.

This sort of thing is valuable because it can show us what to expect the next day, in a year or several years after the adoption of this or that decision. That is, it can serve as an effective tool for calculating the consequences.

In conclusion I want to express my firm conviction—which, incidentally, is backed up by experience—that there must be a guaranteed social policy of protecting servicemen without housing. We will not solve the problem otherwise, despite the many decisions already adopted on housing issues.
Tank Regiment Redeployed From Poland Takes Ukrainian Oath
92UM0788C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Mar 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Military Population Has Civilian Status"]

[Text] Cherkassy Oblast—Soldiers of the Orsha Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Aleksandr Nevskiy Tank Regiment, recently redeployed from Poland to Ukraine, have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

This unit was the last of those billeted in Cherkassy Oblast to come under the blue and yellow flag. It is hoped that the tankmen will not regret this. After all, the patriotic feelings of the soldiers, particularly the officers, and their families have solid support. Local authorities are giving the status of a civilian settlement to the military community located in picturesque environs near Cherkassy. This means that they will have their own school, hospital and other social and cultural facilities. Having reliable rear services backing them up and good living conditions for those near and dear also makes it easier to protect independent Ukraine.

Marine Infantry Unit Ready To Take Ukrainian Oath
92UM07904 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
6 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov: "It's Definitely Time To "Turn the Lights Off""

[Text] On 26 February of this year our newspaper printed a pictorial report describing the combat training of a marine infantry brigade under the command of Colonel Anatoly Kocheshkov. As a result of hard and long training, step by step experienced commanders are shaping youngsters into high-class specialists for modern combat, ready to decisively accept all responsibility in the most complex situation, and firmly cross all obstacles to reach their goal.

Obviously, these are precisely the kind of qualities that allowed a separate marine infantry battalion under the command of Major Vitaliy Rozhman to take the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine despite the atmosphere of terror created by the command of the Black Sea Fleet.

This battalion was recognized to be the best in the brigade on the basis of the results of the 1991 training year. High is the authority of its officers in the military collective of marine infantrymen. This is probably why the fleet command decided to rid itself as quickly as possible of this "black sheep" which, as we know, could spoil the entire flock. The fleet command decided to reduce the strength of the battalion (or to put it simply, disband it). Battalion commander Major Rozhman was dismissed from his command, and he was forbidden to even appear on the unit's territory. The officer was led out the gate literally by the hand, barred from even collecting his personal effects from his office.

The battalion is currently disarmed, the unit's colors have been confiscated, and classified documents have been surrendered. The officers are receiving orders to depart for other military units, while the rank and file are being transferred to other subunits.

An appeal to the president and the defense minister of the Ukraine was adopted at a general assembly of the battalion personnel. In it, the marine infantrymen pleaded for protection against the tyranny of the fleet command.

Information on these events was communicated by Captain 3d Rank Aleksandr Plyashechnikov, chairman of the Sevastopol committee of the Ukrainian Officers Union.

It is evident that in Sevastopol, certain military chiefs are concerned not so much with the combat readiness of the military units as with their trustworthiness, their loyalty to Admiral Kasatonov's orders. According to the testimony of Captain 1st Rank Yevgeniy Lupakov, an atmosphere of universal suspicion and absolute intolerance of a point of view differing from that handed down from the Main Naval Staff is being created aboard ships and in shore units.

Servicemen have practically no possibility for reading Ukrainian newspapers. Instead, each day they are deluged with a flood of leaflets bearing appeals from all kinds of coordinating committees, movements and unions. But despite the huge injections of ideology, according to official statistics from 50 to 70 percent of the Black Sea Fleet servicemen are ready to swear allegiance to the Ukraine.

But in such cases the fleet command does not stand on ceremony, having no qualms in disbanding individual military subunits and discharging objectionables into the reserve. Even those who hold important posts. As an example Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Shulge, reconnaissance chief of the fleet's shore-based missile and artillery forces, was dismissed from his post immediately after expressing his support to the policy of the Ukrainian Government.

We can understand the desire of individual commanders to preserve military discipline in the fleet, and to safeguard the subunits entrusted to them from the chaos and boundlessness of the political struggle. We can even justify the actions of certain officers by their inability to understand the complex situation, to extricate themselves from the vice-grip of evolved stereotypes.

But when the command of the Black Sea Fleet starts introducing its point of view, which is incidentally far divergent from the position of the lawfully elected government and the overwhelming majority of the people of
the Ukraine, into the masses by the methods of psychological and ideological terror, it's definitely time to "turn the lights off."

**Officers Accused of Forcing Loyalty Oath on Submarine Crew**

92UM0817A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Pasyakin: "A Mutinous Compartment, Or How One of the Submarines of the Black Sea Fleet Was Forced to Take the Ukrainian Oath"]

[Text] From a letter from the sailors and petty officers to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (30 signatures)

"We want the question of taking the oath to be settled by civilized means and not in an underhanded manner or secretly. This is the desire of not only the Russians, Uzbeks and Bashkirs but also the Ukrainians. The incident which occurred could split the crew along ethnic lines, undermine the trust for all the officer personnel and weaken the combat readiness of the submarine. We do not want dishonest people to involve us in political intrigues and we do not want to be pushed along a path which leads to a civil conflict. We demand that the Fleet Command remove from their posts the Deputy Division Commander Captain 1st Rank Ye. Lupakov and the Assistant Submarine Commander for Personnel Work, Captain-Lieutenant V. Petenko, as we feel that their actions are incompatible with the performing of their duties."

Of course, it is not up to the sailors and petty officers to resolve the question of removing officers from their position. But also their opinion must not be ignored. All the more so in such, let us say this directly, a difficult situation. Just what has happened on this submarine?

On 12 March 1992, the Assistant Submarine Commander for Personnel Work, Captain-Lieutenant V. Petenko, proposed that the sailors and petty officers of Ukrainian nationality come onto the sub for moving things to the base. The officers and warrant officers were also invited for a "serious discussion." The sub's duty officer Lieutenant V. Litvinov, upon orders from Captain 1st Rank Ye. Lupakov, assembled a portion of the officers in the central control compartment and over the ship intercom began reading the text of the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. After this they began collecting signatures from a previously prepared list. In truth, just five officers signed it. Only one sailor in regular service signed.

But events moved on. The executive officer, Captain 3d Rank I. Liukak who had come on board the submarine endeavored to talk with Captain 1st Rank Lupakov and to report to the fleet operations duty officer on what was happening on the boat. However Lupakov did not permit the officer to use the communications equipment and began to force him out of the compartment. The sailors, seeing such a turn of events, locked themselves up in the 4th compartment.

To put it briefly, unbeknownst to the submarine's commander and executive officer who were not on the boat at that moment, Lupakov had organized the taking of the Ukrainian oath. That was how such an alarming situation arose.

The response to what had occurred was an appeal from the submarine division's officer assembly to the Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk and to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General K. Morozov. In particular the appeal stated that individual officers were trying to force events, they were taking measures to administer the oath of loyalty to Ukraine and thereby splitting the submarine crews along ethnic lines. The question of taking the oath of loyalty to Ukraine had been discussed repeatedly at the officer assemblies. It was agreed that this would be resolved by civilized means after the fate of the Black Sea Fleet was clear. But it turns out that the Deputy Division Commander, Captain 1st Rank Ye. Lupakov and the Assistant Submarine Commander for Personnel Work, Captain-Lieutenant V. Petenko, felt differently...

In protesting against this, the officers wrote, the sailors had sealed themselves off in the 4th compartment, they shut off the storage battery fans and reported to the central control compartment that they would sacrifice themselves if the taking of the oath was not stopped.

An alarming and unpredictable situation had arisen. In the first place, it could end with the exploding of the storage battery and the loss of the men and the ship. Secondly, the principles of one-man command were undermined. The sailors called the officers traitors and refused to carry out their orders. Thirdly, a portion of the sailors drafted not from Ukrainian territory (and these are 65 percent) stated that they would leave for home and those who had taken the oath could continue their service. Fourthly, only at a price of great effort was the attempt halted by the other servicemen to employ physical force against the sailors of Ukrainian nationality. Lastly, the very officers who took the oath of loyalty to Ukraine now feel extremely awkward. This cannot help but prevent their carrying out of service duties.

The submarine officers ended their appeal to the Ukrainian President with the following words: "We are profoundly convinced that Ukraine, as a sovereign state, should have its own Armed Forces, but these must be organized on the basis of treaties and laws and not 'underhandedly.' We are certain that you will correctly understand our concern and before the adoption of political decisions you will take measures not to allow the undermining of combat readiness and military discipline."

It remains to be added that Lupakov and Petenko have been removed from their duties.
Maritime Border Unit Takes Ukrainian Oath
92UM0840A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Gennadiy Korzh, MOLODA GVARDIYA correspondent, special for NARODNAYA ARMIYA: “Traits or Patriots?”]

[Text] Border troops are quite remarkable in today’s Crimea. They were the first to take the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine, for which they were immediately branded as traitors. In an attempt to arrive at an understanding of the situation, I had a talk with Maritime Border Brigade Commander Captain 1st Rank Igor Alferyev.

[Korzh] So, are they traitors to the fleet or patriots?

[Alferyev] The point here is that we never had anything to do with the Navy. We were subordinate to the Western Border District, which has been reformed into the Ukraine Border Troops. The fate of the Border Troops was determined at both the political and the military levels; that is why we took the oath of allegiance. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet has not been determined; hence the passions. We were the first in the military in Sevastopol to take the Ukrainian oath of allegiance, with the result that we became the target of passions. There were meetings, picketing, and signs accusing us of treason. People simply failed to understand the significance of the political decisions. That is why people were raising picket signs against us during the recent session of the Sevastopol City Soviet. Deputies had to speak to the people in the street to explain what is going on. And, you should know, they were successful in doing that.

Nevertheless, one now and then does hear the question: Is it possible to take an oath more than once? What is one to do if the state to which a person takes an oath falls apart? An oath to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is nothing but a joke.

[Korzh] You yourself are ethnically Russian. Did you not suffer any qualms about taking the oath?

[Alferyev] It pays to keep in mind that we take the oath to the people of the Ukraine, not to the Ukraine or the President of the Ukraine. It is a fact that the people are made up of many ethnic groups. Someone is afraid that there may be an army of a single ethnic group; this is not to be, since that would be a prerequisite for conflict. An oath of allegiance to the people is a guarantee that the army will not go after the people with automatic rifles or sapper shovels. Officers were also troubled with other doubts. Now everyone’s mind is at ease. We see that everything is coming out right all right. The Ukraine has three laws guaranteeing the status of servicemen. It turns out that the Ukraine is the first CIS state to do something definite to offer servicemen social protection. This means that we can go ahead and serve.

Incidentally, 80 of our seamen are taking their normal leave. Some of the boys are not natives of the Ukraine, but they are enjoying leave granted in accordance with Ukraine law.

[Korzh] Well, is no one requesting a transfer to Russia?

[Alferyev] All 19 men who made such a request have already departed. I believe that most of them took this step under forceful pressure of friends, parents, and the central press. I was sorry to see them go. And not only because we have a shortage of personnel. More because they simply did the wrong thing. They apparently failed to understand the multi-ethnic nature of the people of the Ukraine.

Many people fell victim—to speak—to the prevailing confusion. And this pertains to more than the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine. In our society there are many dissatisfied people.

You cannot change their minds all of a sudden. They basically are people who have not come to terms with the disintegration of the Union. Also to be taken into account is the fact that many Crimeans, particularly Sevastopol people, gave much of themselves in the defense of the country. Many of them are counted among the activists of the Republic Movement of Crimea (RDK). A powerful organization by the way. This can be seen in the way it operates. There presently is no force to counter the RDK in the Crimea.

[Korzh] Is it possible to find something in common with the RDK?

[Alferyev] It is difficult to talk with those people who clamor for the creation of armed detachments. But there are not many of that kind of fanatic. It is necessary, though, to deal with those who maintain realistic viewpoints, those who ask that the people be given the opportunity of expressing their own will in their own time. Incidentally, it often happens that the opinions of individual fanatics is offered up as that representing the entire RDK. That also is done to someone’s advantage. This, while most Crimeans feel that nothing should be broken up. What is interesting is the faction that calls itself the “Democratic Crimea.” It opposes the RDK. The faction stands categorically opposed to the referendum, favoring democratic changes. It feels that the referendum will bring about the destruction of democracy. We all know that these are the people who initiated the struggle in the Crimea against the party apparatus, which they considered to be evil. They are dead set against the referendum, because they consider it to be evil. No, there is no need for separation. The beaches cannot feed the people.

Most of my acquaintances will not sign the referendum. Incidentally, it is not enough to collect 185,000 signatures and carry the referendum through; it is necessary to enjoy a resounding victory. I personally have nothing against the referendum; the people should have their say. But the people are sick and tired of this political mess.
Take Northern Crimea: Its populace knows full well what it means to maintain ties to the Ukraine.

This is a matter of more than economic ties. There is simply no need to have a separation. Who can come forward and cite an example of ethnic bias? On the contrary, everything is being done to improve the welfare of Greeks, Armenians, Germans, and Crimean Tatars. Normal territorial autonomy is in progress. The picture in general is not as dramatic as the one painted by the press. Every journalist was looking for the bare facts. So there you have a mosaic of bare facts.

But what if the Crimea does separate? It will then be necessary to do some hard thinking. The point is that you have there an enormous amount of armed forces that play a significant role in the CIS defense. Units of the Odessa District, the fleet, the Ukraine Border Troop units. What will happen to them? The Crimea as an independent state can hardly be expected to cope with maintaining them.

[Korzh] What awaits the Ukrainian Fleet?

[Alfereyev] It faces a difficult future. How to create such an enormous complex? How to set up ties? Repair of ships (which have seen heavy use), spare parts, fuel—these are the present problems. But there will be a Navy; you can be sure of that.

[Korzh] I sailed aboard ships of your unit many times. That was a time of calm, but even then violators were being caught. What is happening now?

[Alfereyev] Border protection is proceeding in three directions: protection of the economic zone (with an example being our acting last year in concert with Odessa border troops to bring the treasury one million dollars by way of fines levied as loss compensation); protection of the border proper (having to do mostly with criminals awaiting trial here); and actions against smuggling (in which we intercepted contraband worth about one million last week alone, in only the Yalta area of the international channel). As the last example I can cite today's apprehension of a violator in the Odessa area. He—a former serviceman—was attempting to escape by sea. The border situation has not improved.

Nevertheless, all ships are being monitored. The territorial waterway rules are being applied. The Ukraine State Border Law is being observed. We are doing our job, in spite of political passions. Politics is not a matter for the military. It is not a matter requiring the carrying of flags or calling of meetings. We are leaving the resolution of the problems up to knowledgeable people.

BYELARUS

Byelarus Discusses Servicemen's Status
92UM0815A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Kovalev: "Byelarusian Parliament Deputies Assimilating Military Language"]

[Text] Minsk—Military terminology is being heard in the Supreme Soviet of the Byelarus Republic as deputies continue their discussion of a package of military draft legislation. Following adoption in the first reading of the Laws "On the Armed Forces" and "On Defense of the Byelarus Republic," the parliamentarians were presented the draft law "On the Status of Military Servicemen and Their Family Members."

As compared with legislation presently in effect, a number of norms have been placed in the draft law which significantly expand the rights and privileges of servicemen. In particular, the draft law stipulates that, upon discharge from the Armed Forces, pensions are designated for 20 years of service in the amount of 55 percent of monetary allowances.

The pay scale amounts for junior officers assigned to their initial duty positions must be no less than six times the minimum wage for workers in the republic economy. The draft envisages adjustments to official-duty time and relaxation time for servicemen, etc. It also reflects a great many other provisions aimed at consolidating and enhancing the status of military servicemen.

If adopted by the Supreme Soviet in its proposed form, the new law will be quite burdensome for the republic budget. Nonetheless, deputies have thus far made no attempts to "cheapen" it in their discussions of the draft.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Armenian Defense Minister Interviewed
92UM0767A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 2

[Interview with Vaghen Sarkisyan, Armenia's minister of defense, by Gayr Zoryan under the rubric "Interview for RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA: "The Armenian Soldier Must Obey the Private First Class"]

[Text]

[Zoryan] Mister Sarkisyan, the Ministry of Defense has been in existence two months now. What is its stage of development, and what are the primary problems today?

[Sarkisyan] Much has been accomplished organizationally. The structures are known and have been precisely defined, the staff has been formed, and ministry personnel went to work on 23 January. The directorates of
both the ministry and the main staff have been established. The dearth of personnel is a big problem. We need professional cadres.

I would like to note the assistance we have received from the republic government, both in the organizational and financial and in other respects. All possibilities have been made available to us.

The ministry is operating mainly with three focuses today: the establishment and reinforcement of the structures, personnel matters and, of course, the missions dictated by the situation in the region. Our most important areas of work are the development of military policy and the military draft.

[Zoryan] How would you assess relations with military subunits of the former Soviet Army deployed on republic territory? And what will they be like in the future?

[Sarkisyan] We try to maintain normal relations in accordance with the republic's state policy. For now we have succeeded in this. The lack of discipline in the army today, however, and the ambiguity of the defense policy are hampering the development of such relations. One has the impression that normal relations with the army are not beneficial to certain forces. I shall cite two instances. When it became necessary to return deserters to the military subunits, we worked at the job for a week. A total of 500 of them were returned home, however.

Or take the ill-starred case of the helicopters. For an entire week there was talk that it was planned to remove them from the republic, even though the army command always denied that there were such intentions. After all of that we were actually deceived. The helicopters were removed. Patrikeyev, Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, and Meshcheryakov, 7th Army Commander, maintain that they were not informed of what was going on. We were forced to hold them until the helicopters were returned. Such incidents certainly have a negative affect upon our relations. We should exercise greater foresight in the future. And although we have authorized representatives in all the subunits, we shall in all probability make our control more rigid. As the Russians are fond of saying, "Trust, but verify."

[Zoryan] There has been no military draft in Armenia for three years. Today we have the appropriate laws and defense structures. How is the military draft going in the republic in this situation?

[Sarkisyan] The military draft is proceeding, albeit slowly. In this matter as well, however, we are encountering problems in our relations with the army. I repeat, the uncertainty which prevails in the army today is markedly affecting our relations with it. Whatever those relations, however, we have an agreement that 500 recruits will serve in units of the 7th Army. Our own military formations are also being established. It is planned to man and outfit two regiments in May of this year. So 5,000 recruits will serve in the 7th Army; the same number in our own subunits. Furthermore, there will also be a recruitment for the border troops. The total number of slots corresponds to the number of draftees in one recruitment. There is a difficulty, however, in that a considerable number of the youth were not drafted into the military service in previous years. We have to accommodate them as well somehow or another.

Remember that recruits may serve under contract also in other republics.

[Zoryan] What is the ministry doing to prepare professional cadres?

[Sarkisyan] Formerly we did almost nothing in this matter. We have turned to Armenian officers for help. Experience has shown, however, that mid-level officers, younger and more energetic, can accomplish more than the older generation. I believe it would be better to rely on them. They accept today's realities relatively more easily and are more pragmatic and determined.

Steps are being taken to establish military schools. This is one of our most difficult jobs.

[Zoryan] Mister Minister, under the Law on Military Duty students of VUZy [higher educational institutions] are exempted from military service. At the same time the VUZy have closed their military departments, where the students could learn at least the basics of military art. And a considerable part of the youth are actually illiterate in this area today. Is this not a luxury for us?

[Sarkisyan] I agree with you completely. The military departments were closed at Moscow's instructions. Today we intend to reopen them.

With respect to that law, it has significant shortcomings precisely as it applies to students. Today, when we are actually facing an excess of recruits, we can accept this. After a certain time, however, the law will have to be revised.

[Zoryan] Some republics have declared subunits and units of the former Soviet Army deployed on their territories to be their own. And President Mutalibov has announced that Azerbaijan's army is fully formed and capable of defending its borders independently.

[Sarkisyan] Mutalibov's statement is only a declaration. For almost two years now the Azerbaijans have been proclaiming from the rooftops that the 4th Army belongs to them, but this is not the reality. If this army were placed totally at their disposal today, they would still not be able to employ it.

For some reason everyone has the impression that just anyone can direct an army. It would never occur to anyone that he could become a singer or a physicist without an aptitude for this.

The 7th Army belongs to Armenia, of course, its property as well. We have never taken any other approach. Considerable training is needed to be able to direct operations of the entire 7th Army. Suffice it to say that
we are encountering problems today precisely with respect to those 5,000 recruits. Half of them must be taught the basics of military affairs, undergoing at least 6 months of military training. We do not have this capability at the present time, however. These matters can certainly be resolved, but this will take time.

[Zoryan] One of the first announcements by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia had to do with armed formations. An appeal was issued to them to merge into the state structures. Otherwise, they would be declared illegal. Can it be said that there are no illegal militarized groups in the republic today? And what can you say about the “partyizing” of such groups?

[Sarkisyan] We did the right thing. No self-respecting state would tolerate the existence of military formations outside its state structures. In general one can say that we have no illegal formations.

With respect to “partyization,” since our state institutions and structures are more or less strong. Almost all of the former armed formations have joined state structures and are moving jointly ahead toward the establishment of a national army.

[Zoryan] Picture, if you will, the military situation in the border regions of Armenia and Artsakh.

[Sarkisyan] Azerbaijan must understand that it will not break Artsakh. Therein lies Artsakh’s salvation. And all of us—the people, the state, all the parties and every individual—must do everything possible to see to that. We must concentrate our forces and not separate. Defense demands super-centralization.

Prior to the establishment of our ministry Armenia’s borders were controlled by the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Today this job is assigned to military commissariats.

Three border districts have been established in Armenia: Southern, Northern and Southwestern. Deputy Minister Grigoriy Grigoryan has been appointed Chief of the Border Directorate. Corresponding structures are being set up in the northern and southern regions.

[Zoryan] What would you like the Armenian soldier to be?

[Sarkisyan] For a long time we did not have an army, and our newly formed structure must therefore have healthy roots. I would like the Armenian soldier to be irreproachably honest, selfless and state-minded, which, unfortunately, is not the case today. Ideological work is extraordinarily important at this stage in the establishment of a national army. There are people who are capable of performing and want to perform this work, but few of them are coming to us at the present time. We need them, however, and gladly accept their assistance. The phenomenon of lording it over subordinates also poses a great danger, and we need to eliminate it. If the Armenian private does not learn to obey the Armenian private first class, we shall never establish our own army.

OSTS Central Council Chairman Interviewed
92UM0728A Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 9, Mar 92 (signed to press 3 Mar 92) p 6

[Interview with the Republic of Armenia’s OSTS [Defense Sports-technical Union] Central Council Chairman Rafik Mikhaylovich Karaletyan by Vladimir Grevtsev under the rubric “How’s It Going, OSTS?”: “Our Peoples Need Each Other”]


[V. Grevtsev] Rafik Mikhaylovich, recent years have been a time of major changes and difficult experiences for all of the republics of the former USSR. Armenia is no exception, they have gotten it in full measure—from the blows of natural disaster to political rows. One cannot help but worry about how the Defense Society of the republic—a member of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] today—is getting on?

[R.M. Karaletyan] Yes, there really have been and are enough troubles and concerns. It seems to me that the times today are posing a twofold task again and again. On the one hand, not to lag behind the course of change and, on the other, not to fall into vanity, not to ruin in haste that which is valuable and good, that which was accumulated over the decades of the life of DOSAAF.

That conclusion is not the fruit of abstract reflection for me, it is adorned with quite powerful personal experiences. Can the grief I saw with my own eyes in the destroyed Spitak and Leninakan really fade from memory!! Or can I really forget how at the beginning of 1990 I stood on a mountain road under the barrel of a pistol while the bandits robbed our convoy with sport weapons?

So I have felt the tragedy and difficulty of the times myself.

But when in the fall of 1990, referring to that difficulty, the USSR Ministry of Defense “took away” from us the plan for the training of specialists for the armed forces, the financing and the supply of equipment for that purpose also ceased—this was a hasty and, ultimately, harmful step.

There are 18 of our schools in Armenia—thirteen for truck drivers, two technical and three for combined technical—and on that basis we trained about 11,000 men for service before October of 1990. Then the threat of losses arose, and the excellent base of the schools and the highly skilled cadres collapsed. To the credit of our workers, they were able to switch over to the teaching of specialists for the national economy of Armenia in operative fashion, and in 1991 those cadres trained about 18,000 people instead of the planned 13,000.
[V. Grevtsev] The system of teaching organizations was fully utilized, in short, bringing benefit to the republic and income to the defense organization...

[R.M. Karaleytan] Just so. And what are we seeing today? As is well known, our President Levon Ter-Petrosyan favors the unity of the armed forces of the CIS, he has complete mutual understanding with the troops stationed on the territory of Armenia. The question has been decided—these troops will be replenished with local youth. In January of this year the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, and through it we, have received the preliminary assignment of training specialists for those units. The command of the Transcaucasus Military District can ultimately conclude a contract with us, but it is waiting for instructions from Moscow, from Shaposhnikov... I am an optimist in any case; I believe that we will soon be returning to training cadres for the armed forces, and our schools are ready for it. We will also be training fellows for the National Guard—which is now being created—by the time of the May call-up.

True, there are intentions to transfer the OSTS to the jurisdiction of the republic Ministry of Defense altogether. I am not sure that this is the best version—a social organization should remain a social one, and not lose its independence and flexibility. I hope that I will be able to prove my viewpoint to the leaders of Armenia.

[V. Grevtsev] But aside from everything else, the problem of economic survival is an acute one today in all the defense organizations of the republic. How is the OSTS of Armenia solving it?

[R.M. Karaleytan] We have 48 city and rayon organizations in the republic. And all of them, starting with the largest—in Yerevan, Kirovakan, Kumayri (formerly Leninakan), Didizhan—and ending with the rural “depths,” have an STK [Sports-Technical Complex] and a Military-Technical Training Club. The majority of the organizations are moreover operating on a profitable basis. First, the steady profits from the economically accountable training of specialists. Second, many of the leaders in the local areas realized in good time that it is essential to develop commercial activity to the utmost.

I would number among the most enterprising the chief of the truck school in the city of Kamo, Levon Kalashyan, and the chairman of the Orzhonikidze Rayon Soviet OSTS, Grigorii Oganesyan, and the Yekhnegazdovskiy Rayon Soviet, Sergey Khachatryan. These people were the first to begin creating truck and agricultural-machinery repair and maintenance and metalworking shops, offer paid services to the public and lease accommodations—in short, to carry out profitable commerce. Others have followed their example, and today practically every rayon or city soviet (and we have long since joined with the STKs) not only “feeds” itself and develops sports on its own account, but also deducts money for the overall needs of the Armenian OSTS. We annually receive at least a few thousand from most of the rayon or city soviets for the operation of the seven republic clubs—aviation, radio, maritime, firearms, trucking, hang-gliding and service dog-breeding—and the five DYuSTSh. And that (along with subsidies from the Central Council) helps us to preserve our sports centers, even though the trade unions have refused to contribute their share of the money for their upkeep.

The activity of the republic production association of the OSTS (director Marat Asatryan) is naturally bringing in no little profit. This year the association (before liberalization) deducted a million rubles for the Central Council. Our production workers (like all industry in Armenia, by the way) have never broken off their established business ties with the other republics of the former Union. The Aboyanskiy Plant, for example, producing maps and “[illegible],” is supplying them in good order according to contracts. The enterprise traditionally received engines from Lithuania, from Shiayaluy—and I am glad to note that they are still receiving them to this day.

Our enterprises were operating even under the conditions of the recent energy crisis, artificially created on the outside. Here the ability to look ahead helped out once again. The DOSAAF production workers at the Armelektromash PO [Production Association] (where the general director is the former first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, K. Demirchyan) obtained mobile electric-power units in good time—and turned them on at the enterprises of the OSTS during the days of the power blockade. Production did not stop!

Finally, we are also seeking sponsors. The Armelektro-vigatel NPO [Scientific Production Association] that is located next to the OSTS Central Committee (the director is the former secretary of the Orzhonikidze Rayon Armenian Communist Party Committee, Karlos Petrosyan) has paid for the performance of a number of republic competitions on the technical aspects of sport.

[V. Grevtsev] As far as I understand it, you are trying to adhere to the principle of money not for the sake of money, but for the sake of the cause?

[R.M. Karaleytan] Undoubtedly. We do not forget for a minute our chief mission—to educate our youth. It must be owned that we have largely fallen behind in recent years, and I think that pertains not only to Armenia, but to the other republics as well. The crime rate, the decline in morality, the lack of culture, the lack of moral and physical health, the absence of any striving for honest labor or the protection of the Motherland—these are a universal scourge. Before we were by and large cultivating general Soviet patriotism, and today we are striving to cultivate a worthy patriot for a free Armenia; the “patriotism” of one's own skin, the double-dyed individualism, the devil-may-care attitude toward all interests aside from one's own, most primitive ones are all, I would say, inimical to both the one and the other. Whence the “erosion” of moral criteria, the boundaries between honest and dishonest wages, between success
earned and the plundering of what is nearby, between a healthy pride and disdain for sacred things—humanism, the Motherland, honor... Such a person with a self-seeking psychology will scarcely be useful to the building of the new—free and democratic—Armenia.

The Defense Society, I feel, can and should educate—as before—patriots, skilled and courageous people, people who are spiritually and bodily healthy, thereby bringing benefit to their republic. Through training to protect the Motherland. Through technical knowledge. Through sport. Through leisure.

Recall, after all, that it was namely DOSAAF of Armenia that cultivated such a brilliant and heroic individual as the sportsman and submariner Shavarsh Karapetyan, who more than once rescued people who had been stricken by disaster—a truly harmonious combination of strength, kindness and high culture...

Can one really forget, by the way, the responsiveness that was displayed by the DOSAAFs of the former USSR in the terrible days of the earthquake in Armenia? The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee allocated us two million rubles at that time, and another 700,000 rubles were collected by the defense organizations of the republic—a lot of money for those times. The Kropotkinsky Plant of DOSAAF in Krasnodar Kray sent 50 prefabricated huts, and this made it possible to build settlements for the workers of the defense organization in Kumayr (Lenna- kan) who had suffered terribly from the earthquake—they are still living in them. Radio enthusiasts across the whole country took part in the rescue operations.

Time has passed, and we have now virtually rebuilt the trucking schools, rayon and city sovets, OSTs and firing ranges in the stricken regions. But that outpouring of human solidarity—it belongs, I think, to the spiritual legacy of the past that we do not have the right to squander today. It is clearly no accident that there have been no serious ethnic frictions whatsoever in the OSTs organizations, where people of many nationalities are working.

Independence, I feel, does not contradict, but rather implies, friendship, collaboration, the coordination of actions and mutual assistance among the republics. I am glad, by the way, that it is namely such relations that link us leaders of the independent republic defense organizations, all of us without exception—we understand each other, we consult with each other, we decide all issues, as it is fashionable to say, by consensus. There is an underlying businesslike cause for this, naturally: it is completely essential for us to preserve and develop ties in the technical, sporting and methodological realms. We simply will not survive apart, in isolation.

For that, it is true—and here we concurred at the last meeting—we hardly need such a cumbersome superstructure body as the Central Committee of the Union of OSTs of the CIS; a council of the chairmen and a small working apparatus for coordination, which we have requested be headed by Yevgeny Ivanovich Krylov, would be sufficient.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, I would also say that the republic defense organizations today must undoubtedly have a common newspaper such as the PATRIOT. The OSTs of Armenia, for its part, will give it all the support it can.

[V. Grevtsev] Thank you for the discussion and for the good attitude toward our newspaper. Success to the Armenian—I will use the customary word—DOSAAFers!

Armenian Commissar on Difficulties of Forming an Army

NC2803124292 Yerevan HAYASTAN in Armenian 26 Feb 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Armenian Republic People's Deputy and Military Commissar Colonel Levon Vladimirovich Stepanyan by Eduard Shahiryan; place, date not given]

[Excerpts]

[Shahiryan] Assuming that our roles are reversed for a moment, what would you, as a reporter, first ask the republic's military commissar?

[Stepanyan] I would ask if the military commissariat was ready to perform its main duty, a general mobilization in case, God forbid, of war.

[Shahiryan] I agree so please let us start with that.

[Stepanyan] I have enormous confidence in our people and I value their morals, sense of freedom, and patriotism. In that sense, in view of our people's centuries-old tradition of uniting in the face of danger, we are ready to fulfill our main duty. It is another question whether or not the Defense Ministry will provide enough arms and military hardware and whether or not such hardware exists. We must gather the reserves and place them under the ministry, in keeping with plans and demands. Talk of the people's readiness should not create the impression that the going is smooth and easy. Unfortunately, we do not always find mutual understanding and perceptive-ness. For example, last month when we tried to organize training in Yerevan's Arabkir district we encountered serious organizational problems in the military commissariat and, more regrettably, difficulties in gathering the reserves. Even after several calls some preferred not to respond and refused to show up. Did you know that the area's influential and prestigious people are apparently also advising others. This is the first incident so I will not publish their names but hope they will reconsider.

The training mobilization also forced me to think seriously about another problem. Some people do not seem serious enough; they cannot comprehend the complexity of the military-political situation, not to mention their impunity. You probably guessed that I am thinking
about the money owners, who, ignoring the people's general interests, are only concerned with luxury and hoarding. This last might have seemed natural had it not been for the first.

There are the same shortcomings in conscription work, where unreasonable attitudes also disrupt our efforts. If you try to recruit a "mommie's boy", they give thousands of arguments against it and finally settle for service in a unit near Yerevan.

All these do not mean there are few positive examples. We have many recruits who enlisted willingly and who perform their duties honorably, always loyal to their military oath. [passage omitted]

[Shahiryan] Recent rallies have discussed the creation of the Defense Ministry being delayed despite the explosive situation. What do you think?

[Stepanyan] I believe the Ministry is being delayed. Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and all those who are working on it do not reject this.

I believe the delay is not the fault of some leaders but is due to the complexities of this work, primarily the financial situation, crisis, shortage of officers, lack of suitable buildings and a material-technical base, and other problems. The military commissariat is currently the only functioning military structure and it is helping to solve certain problems associated with completing the Defense Ministry's structure.

Unfortunately, life is not as smooth as rallies, where often emotions prevail. The practical work is more complex and full of obstacles. [passage omitted] For example, with much difficulty we sent nearly 800 conscripts to be trained as junior officers at Tbilisi's Transcaucasian Military District Academy. Ignorant of any compromise and laws, some people criticized us for sending the conscripts outside Armenia.

The law on military service, which I also helped draft, says: "Interstate agreements regulate the military service and training of Armenian Republic citizens in the army units and academies of other states."

Our conscripts have been sent not to Georgian armed forces units but to the Transcaucasian Military District base, where there are no representatives of the armies stationed in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Besides, we have an agreement giving the cadres free training. No other CIS country has been afforded such a privilege. Can we not take advantage of this, considering that we might not get such an opportunity again and that we might even have to pay for such training in foreign currency?

Just when it looked as if emotions had calmed we were suddenly confronted by nearly 200 prospective junior officers deserting the Army and returning to Armenia, claiming to have "suffered" unpleasant acts, which they themselves instigated. As a result of explanations and to escape the consequences of their own actions, most have now gone back, but the incident left a bitter taste and greatly disturbs us. The necessary political enlightenment goes on and levels of social pressure are being used to prevent such incidents recurring. But we are seriously concerned about 30 young men who did not return.

Under the current military-political situation, when there are unfriendly neighbors and when military exercises are being held on the Araks river's other bank, our servicemen have no moral right to give marginal importance to the fatherland's defenses and might. In the past 70 years this matter has never been so urgent. We must make a wise and sober assessment of the seriousness of the situation.

[Shahiryan] There is a question which is directly linked with your concerns. What is the extent of our Defense Ministry's influence? Put it like this, could Vazgen Sargsyan interfere in the affairs of the CIS' 7th Army?

[Stepanyan] That is a delicate issue and I cannot give you an unequivocal "yes" or "no" reply. Given that that Army is stationed in Armenia and is called on to defend Armenia, his right to information cannot be doubted; after all, he is the primary official responsible for defenses. This is also obvious for the Army's commander. This cooperation could be shown differently during peacetime, but if, God forbid, war develops then everything will assume a more concrete form.

[Shahiryan] As a "fresh eye," are you satisfied with the work and the cadres of the city and rayon military commissariats?

[Stepanyan] The military commissariats face many complex problems because of the changes in conscription programs and in drafting. [passage omitted] Our work is also difficult because many staffers, Armenians included, do not know Armenian and avoid open conversations and meetings with the servicemen. The language factor means mutual understanding is not easy. We are also thinking of ways to improve this situation.

[Shahiryan] With the military forces marking their traditional holiday, I am saddened by unfriendliness shown toward the soldiers. What do you think?

[Stepanyan] We must be aware that the 7th Army is the armed force defending Armenia. There are many foreigners and only 2,000 to 3,000 Armenians serving in it. It is essentially the foreign servicemen who are defending the state's border with Turkey and Iran. It is impossible to fill our Army and border guard positions with Armenians alone so we must respect and pay attention to all those who are now defending our independence, our diminished yet stable borders, and who are sharing our difficulties. It is with these considerations that we must shape our relations with the Army and those officers and servicemen who have left their remote homes to join us in defending our ancient but always youthful motherland.

We must be seriously concerned with their problems and cares, which are not few. Most of their wives are not
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working because they do not know our state language and their children do not go to school because Russian schools have closed down.

Speaking at the Armenian Supreme Soviet session, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan outlined the 7th Army role, noting that even if the CIS’ Army loses its unity the 7th Army will retain a military base in Armenia. The president’s statement once more obliges us to be friendly toward and to respect our military.

The Armenian people, who have produced generations of glorious commanders and fighters, would foil adventurers’ attempts to trifle with the honor and dignity of our armed forces’ representatives.

“Partisan” Activities in Azerbaijan, Armenia Viewed

92UM0753A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Colonel V. Gavrilenko and Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban: “Karabakh: War to a Victorious Finish?”]

[Text] Radical groups have stepped up their activities in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment is no longer in Nagorno-Karabakh. President of Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutalibov, who considered primarily political means of resolving the Karabakh crisis, has retired.

Not surprisingly, self-defense formations attempted several times to seize the regiment’s combat equipment when it was in the forming-up area. The tactics of the Armenian detachments also became clearer, however. The militants tried to operate mainly at night and attempted with surprise moves to surround the security forces, made up of airborne troops, and then make their way to the combat equipment.

They were unsuccessful, however. Not a single combat vehicle fell to the militants. The equipment was either flown out by helicopter or was blown up. The editors have information, however, that some personnel of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment did “surrender” part of the equipment to the “self-defense” forces during the trip from Stepanakert to the forming-up area, including several Shilka self-propelled antiaircraft artillery guns and artillery pieces, and so forth. Why this happened is now being investigated.

In any case it is doubtful that a final “solution” to the Karabakh problem can be achieved by guerilla methods. Not surprisingly, radical forces on both sides of the front have now stepped up their activities. On 9 March, when the Supreme Council of Armenia was holding a closed meeting, opposition forces assembled near the parliament building. The RIA reports that participants in the meeting demanded that a constituent assembly be convened. The opposition believes that the makeup of the current Supreme Council does not reflect the actual breakdown of political forces in the republic. A constituent assembly, according to the plan of those advocating one, would announce the dissolution of the Supreme Council, if it does not dissolve itself, and set early elections.

Although the opposition in Armenia does not significantly influence the situation, observers note that an explosion of radical feelings could occur in the republic as a result of the enlargement of the Karabakh conflict. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported yesterday that on 8 March around 60 armed individuals made an attack on the Artik Garrison near Yerevan. There were casualties among the servicemen, both killed and wounded. The attack was preceded by the taking of officers as hostages.

Major P. Karapetyan, our correspondent, reports that talks with the militants are presently underway. Our correspondent was told by Colonel Vasilii Belchenko, representative of the staff of the Transbaykal Military District, demands which can not be fulfilled are deliberately being advanced. For example, the militants demanded 5,000 shells for the BM-21 Grad and 10 million rounds for assault rifles.

We can see there is a danger that the Armenians will also take the route of exacerbating the conflict, and will attempt to draw the military into it. For the sake of objectivity, after all, one has to say that despite explicit orders from the district command element, some personnel of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment still took part in the Karabakh side in combat operations near Khodzhaly between 20 and 30 February. At least two such cases have been established. And during the evacuation of personnel of the airborne regiment, a selective inspection was conducted of several servicemen. Large sums of money were found on them, including foreign currency.

Also in Azerbaijan, following the retirement of Ayaz Mutalibov, the influence of nationalist groups increased considerably. The editors have information that last week, that is, even before the president’s departure, commanders of Azerbaijani subunits in Agdam openly announced that “following the departure of the Russians” (that is, the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment), there will be an offensive. And if we lose Nagorno-Karabakh, Shaim Tagiyev, one of the commanders, told an Agence France-Presse agent, we shall go to Baku and do away with Mutalibov.

A session of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan scheduled for sometime within the next few days should clarify the situation somewhat.

Yagub Mamedov, new chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament and acting head of the republic, addressed the people Sunday evening. Speaking on relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, he stressed his preparedness to conduct a determined campaign against
those who try to sow discord between the two states and to create an intolerable attitude toward the Russian-speaking population.

The republic continues to keep a concerned eye on events in Nagorno-Karabakh. The public has still not gotten over the shock of the tragedy in Khodzha. Azerinform correspondent F. Sadykov reported that on 10 March there was a telephone conversation between Yagub Mamedov and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, as well as Babken Araktsyan, chairman of the Supreme Council of Armenia. The leaders exchanged opinions on the situation developing in Nagorno-Karabakh and on ways to settle the conflict.

MOLDOVA

People's Front Seizes 14th Army Civil Defense Regiment
92UN0947B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Mar 92 p 3

[Article by Igor Rotar]

[Text] According to information supplied by the Dniester region press center, Moldovan People's Front fighters unexpectedly seized a Civil Defense regiment subordinate to the CIS 14th Army on 2 March in the city of Dubossary. They captured 80 submachine guns. The soldiers did not offer any resistance. The officers made an attempt to fight back, but stopped after they learned that some of their family members had been taken hostage. Fighting continued in the early hours of 3 March between the Dniester Guard and the Moldovan OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] forces. One Dniester Guard was wounded as a result.

On 2 March about 300 OMON fighters crossed the Dniester in the vicinity of the village of Kotiery and about 25 trucks of the Moldovan OMON did the same near the village of Golerkany. According to the Dniester press center, there is a possibility of large-scale military actions between the right and left banks in the area. It has become known that OMON forces totalling about 300 people have been gathering near the city of Bender.

Dniester Region Standoff Assessed
PM3103091192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 92 p 2

[B. Yuryev and A. Miklus “Forecast”: “The Forces Are There—No Need For Intelligence?”]

[Text] Odessa—Despite both sides' peacemaking efforts, there is no decline in tension in the Dniester region. What do the Right and Left Banks of the Dniester have at their disposal today? How will they act if the confrontation continues? Let us try to provide a forecast based on military experts' information.

So, there are now 7,000-10,000 men under arms in Moldova, more than half of whom are combat-trained. This figure includes special-purpose police detachments and Moldovan MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops subunits, as well as the "Tiras-Tigina" formation, the prototype for the future national army. If necessary, several tens of thousands more volunteers can be armed. The deployment of volunteer units has already been tried 18 months ago during the first bloody events in Dubossary.

The Moldovan Government is now speeding up the program to form its own armed forces, the overall strength of which will probably be 25,000-30,000 personnel. The main problem—arms and combat hardware—has already been settled following the transfer to Chisinau's jurisdiction of 14th Army units stationed on the Right Bank. According to some information, it is on the Right Bank that the mothballed motorized rifle division is stationed that was intended to be deployed in the southwest in the event of an attack on the USSR.

What is more, according to reports from competent organs, Moldova is already receiving arms shipments from neighboring Romania: firearms, ammunition, and, of late, something more serious—armored personnel carriers and mortars.

The Dniester Republic started forming its own armed forces (guard) last fall. At first Lieutenant-General G. Yakovlev, former commander of the 14th Army, helped form the National Guard, being instrumental in the guardsmen's receiving roughly 1,500 assault rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, communications systems, and transportation. However, the Dniester region inhabitants subsequently encountered considerable difficulties in the quest for weapons and were forced to try to get them by any possible means, and not always legally. Thus, in fall 1991 they succeeded in partially seizing armored equipment from a USSR MVD battalion being withdrawn from Moldova, and in January 1992 they seized firearms from an internal troops subunit during an attempt to remove these weapons to the Right Bank.

Aside from the guard, which has barely more than 3,000-3,500 men, and the “Dniester” battalion, Cossack formations from Russia are starting to play an increasingly important role in the region. To date they do not number more than 500-700 men. Nevertheless there are reports that the leadership of the Don Cossacks has formulated a plan to send a Cossack expeditionary corps of 10,000 men to the Dniester region if necessary.

Mobilizing some of the male population may provide the Dniester region with another 15,000-20,000 fighters, although it will be difficult to arm them. This problem can only be solved by using the 14th Army arsenals, above all in Tiraspol, although the special stance held by General Yu. Nekachev, the army's new commander, who has ordered all weapons dumps to be mined and combat hardware put out of operation, is well known.
When assessing the current alignment of forces we should not fail to take into consideration the fact that a large proportion of the army is still stationed on Dniester territory. Including the 59th Motorized Rifle Division, several engineering and chemical units, and a missile brigade. These total roughly 15,000 enlisted men and 4,000 officers at least. Most officers clearly sympathize with Tiraspol.

In the prevailing situation some of Moldova’s military superiority may be used to further increase pressure on the Dniester Republic with a view to forcing it to capitulate. This may take the concrete form of trying to break up the Dniester Moldavian Republic by mounting a military attack from the Dubossary area in the direction of the Ukrainian border. The concentration of Moldovan forces near the village of Koshnitsa on the Left Bank is a sign of these intentions. If the operation is successful the northern part of the Dniester region will be cut off from the southern part and swallowed up by Moldova. Cut off from the major cities in the south, the northern parts of the Dniester Moldavian Republic will hardly be able to resist pressure from Chisinau.

Aware of this danger, the Dniester side is doing its utmost to foil these plans. Therefore it cannot be doubted that any attempt by Moldova at a military offensive on the Left Bank will meet with fierce opposition. This means that it will hardly prove possible to keep the military confrontation within an acceptable framework. A rapid escalation of hostilities will follow in which considerable manpower and material resources will rapidly become involved. Given that neither side has a decisive military edge, all this may entail pointless bloodshed on a large scale.

To all appearances politicians on both sides of the Dniester are aware of this. At a 17 March session of the Moldavian parliament Lieutenant General I. Kostash voiced a high opinion of the Dniester armed formations’ level of combat readiness.

In view of all this the most realistic scenario is for a temporary stabilization in the situation. Aside from purely military considerations, the fact that the time for spring field work is drawing near favors this development of events—neither side dares disrupt this work. So, over the next few months Moldova’s military activeness will evidently be reduced to a minimum and confined to small clashes and possibly subversive actions. In turn the Dniester inhabitants will use the breathing space to further strengthen their military potential.

Russia’s position on the Dniester region situation will evidently continue to be ambivalent, stemming from the need to resist separatism in Russia itself (which implies condemnation of separatism in Moldova) and organize aid for the Russian population in the Dniester region at the same time. Ukraine will probably act in the same way.

The coming two- or three-month breathing space in Moldova should, in our view, be used by politicians in Chisinau, Tiraspol, Moscow, and Kiev to find an immediate way to break the deadlock. Maybe history is giving us all a last chance to peacefully resolve the conflict on the banks of the Dniester.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY

KEMPO Unites Kazakh Defense Industries
92UM0734A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Viktor Dmitrievich Milovanov, President of the Kazakh State Corporation of Electrical Equipment and Machine Building Enterprises of the Defense Complex, and Veniamin Vasilievich Matsenko, general director of Ala tau Production Association, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Ladin and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel (Reserve) N. Kozin, occasion, date and place not specified, under the rubric "View of a Problem": "Defense Enterprises: New Reference Points"]

[Text] The situation of defense enterprises following elimination of union ministries for some time resembled the free drift of barges deprived of a tug. Their heads found themselves on-one with a clump of problems. How could people be reassured? What goal should be advanced for them?

In Kazakhstan the process of reorientation or, let us say, transition to Republic jurisdiction, took place in a calm atmosphere for defense enterprises. Last September there was a conference chaired by Kazakhstan Republic Deputy Prime Minister K. Baykenov, attended by leaders of the Republican Ministry of Industry on the one hand and by representatives of union defense ministries being abolished and defense industry directors on the other.

It is said that it was then the idea arose of consolidating defense complex enterprises in state corporations. One of them already is well known in Kazakhstan today. It is the Kazakh State Corporation of Electrical Equipment and Machine Building Enterprises of the Defense Complex, or KEMPO for short.

What changed after this? How will orders for the Armed Forces be filled subsequently? You will agree that these are far from idle questions.

We offered them up for discussion to KEMPO President Viktor Dmitrievich Milovanov and to Veniamin Vasilyevich Matsenko, general director of the Ala tau Production Association—the Alma-Ata Electrical Equipment Plant, an enterprise included in the KEMPO Corporation.

[Milovanov] After incorporating we began looking into who has what. We made interesting discoveries. We realized that very often we were chasing across the entire Union after some kind of set-making parts, while what was needed was already being produced or could be produced without problems nearby in native Kazakhstan. But excessive secrecy and notorious departmental dissociation interfered: one plant, for example, was the private domain of the Ministry of the Radio Industry, and another of the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry. On the whole, the striving to create one's own complete production cycle within the framework of each sectorial department brought no small costs.

Having incorporated, we immediately began purposeful work of developing both internal as well as interbranch cooperation.

[Correspondents] But as we understand it, your corporation's defense enterprises have partners not just within defense sectors...

[Matsenko] Yes, we have many partners. For example, the Alma-Ata Electrical Equipment Plant has more than a thousand. It is not simple to defend the honor of the maker's label under present conditions. Previously we were helped out by funded deliveries. Everyone realized that second-rate raw materials are not suitable for defense products. Now it is necessary to prove this obvious truth. To whom? First of all to those heads of enterprises which retain a monopoly on individual kinds of goods. For example, our plant can purchase rolled aluminum only in Siberia. Our Association's supply department chief disappears for weeks there. It is the same with timber, copper and duralumin sections...

[Milovanov] Previous ties with component manufacturers are not always successfully preserved. Some have inflated prices to an unacceptable level and others demand, for example, refrigerators and refrigerators alone as barter exchange. We already are becoming accustomed to that situation. We seek methods to reliably support production with everything necessary. The KEMPO Corporation established an exchange, a bank and a trading house. Other Kazakhstan organizations and departments also have become their cofounders together with us.

[Correspondents] It follows that it is necessary to have something to trade and exchange?

[Milovanov] Yes, we chose priority directions for Corporation enterprises: manufacture of equipment for the agro-industrial processing industry and public dining and trade enterprises. We manufacture medical equipment as well as consumer goods, including sophisticated household equipment.

[Correspondents] Will it not turn out now that defense orders very soon will be ousted once and for all from KEMPO Corporation enterprises?

[Matsenko] Probably there will not be any outing. Rather, one can say something else: conversion is directed at a fairer attitude toward interests both of military as well as civilian clients, who would like to cooperate with us equally. We will try to supply both with high quality products.

One problem is that not only do we have to place new conversion commodities into production, but also find the consumer on our own. We established a commercial engineering department in our Association. We will also
seek customers in the foreign market. KEMPO Corporation's striving to develop foreign economic activities is supported both by the Kazakhstan Cabinet of Ministers and by the Republic Ministry of Industry.

[Milovanov] I am sure that foreign partners will appear for us. Already in the very near term with their help we propose to adjust production in our enterprises of television sets and rural automatic telephone exchanges equipped with digital communications gear using satellite channels.

It should be emphasized that the time is coming for more dynamic, rapidly reorganizable production. A reform is going on within the Corporation, new forms of economic operation are being actively introduced, and small leased enterprises are being established...

[Correspondent] Thus, as we understand it, conversion is proceeding on a planned basis for you, and the new wave of reduction of the Armed Forces and accordingly of military orders will not catch the Corporation unawares nor does it threaten labor collectives with anything bad?

[Matsenko] It is all more complicated than that. On the whole, I would not call the conversion that is occurring planned for now. How planned is it when it must be decided on an urgent basis what to produce tomorrow and when unfinished military products slow down production?

[Milovanov] This is really so. For what do we have today? We already have passed the middle of the first quarter and not one contract for manufacturing defense products has been let with a single ordering directorate of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] High Command...

[Correspondent] And nothing is being produced for the Army?

[Milovanov] What do you mean? To this day everything that was designated in requisitions of the former Union Ministry of Defense is being made. But there is no client financing for products being manufactured. Work essentially goes on at the expense of profits of enterprises and of credits.

It must be remembered that at one time military-industrial complex representatives persistently raised the question for the USSR Supreme Soviet about adopting a special law on conversion, but it just did not appear. As a result, today we have no precise system of mutual relationships of defense enterprises with the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command. Questions of timely formation of orders and formalization of losses in those cases where products that are already semi manufactured have to be removed from production due to a reduction in the order volume have not been resolved.

There also are no precise legislative measures concerning coverage of losses in conversion reprofiling of production. The fact is, at times it is necessary not only to "slightly adjust" particular sectors and conveyor lines, but also to totally dismantle previous equipment and install new equipment. On whose account is all this to be done?

[Matsenko] Back last December we shipped to Armed Forces addresssee products they unquestionably needed and which we produced for them, but there has been no payment to this day. What situation have we found ourselves in? We paid R40,000 per year last year to supply heat to three kindergartens. Now they demand R600,000 from us. It is necessary to put out an additional R21 million for electricity being consumed by the enterprise, but our entire profit last year was R18 million. [Translator's note: possibly R13 million. And so try to make ends meet.

[Milovanov] So you also have learned about our troubles. In concluding the conversation, I can declare firmly that the Corporation will continue to fight for its authority as a reliable, obliging partner in relationships both with military and civilian clients. But we would very much like stability in relationships with partners. And let it come as quickly as possible.

Antonov General Designer on Future Plans
92UM08104 Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 11, Nov 91 pp 17-18

[Interview with Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex [ANTK] imeni O.K. Antonov General Designer and Hero of Socialist Labor Petr Vasilyevich Balabayev by Anatoliy Krikunenko: "General Designer Balabayev: 'We Will Enter the World Market'"

[Text] The Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex [ANTK] imeni O.K. Antonov is a firm that is famous in our country and abroad. It has risen from the small, light AN-12 to the AN-124 "Ruslan" and AN-225 "Mriya" giants. In so doing, the ANTK has not followed in the footsteps of Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed, the world's largest and best known firms, but has followed its own original and distinctive path.

In letters to the editor, many writers ask: what is ANTK working on today and what will it please us with in the near future? And, naturally, what can sportsmen expect? We requested answers to these and other questions from the firm's General Designer P.V. Balabayev.

[Krikunenko] First of all, Petr Vasilyevich, bring us up to date on new business, what does your firm expect from itself today?

[Balabayev] In brief, our firm is the largest scientific-technical syndicate, with scientists, designers, the highest class specialists, and scientific subunits on many trends of modern technologies. Experimental manufacturing with the newest equipment forms a part of it. In contrast to all other KB's [design bureaus], we have our own wind tunnel, a laboratory complex with a computer-based flight simulator, altitude chamber and cold chamber,
that is, everything that creates the conditions that await an aircraft at altitude—a sort of "torture chamber."

We are applying and using many things for the first time in aviation practice. They say that the AN-124 "Ruslan" is the largest aircraft. But it is not simply an enormous aircraft, it is a new landmark and a new spiral in the development of science and technology. There are many firsts. For example, the use of a super-critical aerodynamic wing configuration. Flights were also conducted for the first time on aft center of gravity positions and dynamic stability is achieved through automation. The originality of "Ruslan's" wing is that it was manufactured from all-extruded panels. This wing eliminates tens of thousands of holes and bolts, the instigators of cracks. And this is quality, dependability and service life.

As a result of the fact that the use of metal in an aircraft is a barrier in the development of aircraft construction, we have been working for a long time on composite materials which the magazine wrote about in issue number 7. And more than five tons of composites have already been used in the AN-72, AN-74, and AN-124 which is just 4-5 percent of the weight of the AN-124 airframe. But the times demand a shift to load-bearing structures—horizontal and vertical stabilizers and the wings—manufactured from composites. We have successfully developed these horizontal and vertical stabilizers in which there is absolutely no metal. We bake these structures, like pies, mechanically in an enormous oven. There are none like this in the world. This is our greatest achievement which we are already using on a new aircraft—it will take off next year. Very soon, assemblies manufactured from non-metallic components will comprise 25-30 percent of the weight of the airframe.

The volume of passenger traffic increases every year. In order to cope with passenger traffic in the years 2000-2005, we need to build 12,500 aircraft. Of them, 5,000-6,000 will replace worn out aircraft and the rest will be for growth.

Krikunenko] Passenger aircraft occupy a special place in the OKB's [experimental design bureau's] work. The demand for them is great...

Krikunenko] And it is difficult to satisfy it... The output of passenger aircraft in the country is associated with a series of difficulties. Few engines and no electronics. Say we have the PS-90 engine, one of the modern engines. But as soon as we begin to build an aircraft based on it, the result is either a TU-204 or an IL-96. So, you cannot get a variety of aircraft with this engine. While analyzing this state of affairs, we proposed the new AN-180 aircraft which is based on the D-27 engine, the Fatherland's first turbo-fan, to USSR MGA [Ministry of Civil Aviation] and MAP [Ministry of the Aviation Industry]. It is a good engine since it consumes half as much fuel when compared to the PS-90. It is currently already operating in engine test cells and there is no need to create it because creating a new one will cost two billion rubles.

We decided to bet the farm, as they say, on the use of the D-18T engine, the one mounted in "Ruslan" and "Mriya," having proposed an entire series of aircraft based on it, the AN-218, AN-218-100 and the AN-418.

Krikunenko] Of course, our readers are very interested in these aircraft.

Balabuyev] Glad to hear it. We will begin with the AN-218. This aircraft with two D-18 engines is designed for 350 passengers. It has a flight range of up to 5,000 kilometers. It can accommodate 300 people and fly up to 7,000 kilometers. If you compare it with the IL-86, the AN-218 will "consume" nearly two times less fuel to complete the same work. A modified AN-218—with a shortened fuselage—will be able to "travel" a distance of up to 11,000 kilometers with 220 passengers aboard. At that, its fuel expenditure is again two times less than the IL-62, today's longest range aircraft. Moreover, our aircraft is more comfortable and has only two engines, series production engines. And this means that it has lower operating costs...

We have also proposed an aircraft with four D-18T engines, the AN-418. It will carry 690 passengers a distance of up to 10,000 kilometers or take 500-550 persons aboard and cover a distance of 12,000-13,000 kilometers. It is "our Boeing 747-400" and is not inferior in specifications.

In proposing these aircraft, we proceeded from the fact that the country should have aircraft of various capacities and for routes of any length. Today, in the zone of farther than 4,000 kilometers, we have only the IL-96 with a flight range of up to 9,000 kilometers. And nothing more, either in passenger capacity or range. The field is bare. This cannot be tolerated.

Krikunenko] Petr Vasilyevich, you just mentioned the AN-180...

Balabuyev] This is a short-range airliner designed for 164-180 passengers and for a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. The configuration is ultra-modern; it has two seats, an aisle, two seats, an aisle, two seats... I can make myself comfortable in the passenger compartment, no one "crowds" me, and I feel free. I call the AN-180 an aircraft for the people. And it expends two times less fuel than the TU-154 which also carries 160 persons on board. We have received marvelous findings and the required approvals from the appropriate institutions on the AN-180. So, the new aircraft are not some sort of mythical projects, but realities.

Krikunenko] And nevertheless, when can we expect them?

Balabuyev] Our program has been adopted and has become a part of the civil aviation development program. Work on the AN-218 is proceeding at full speed. I think that the fuselage will be produced next year and we will submit the mock-up to the mock-up commission in March. Work has begun on the engine: we need to
increase its service life and get it certified. The AN-180 will be placed into series production during this five-year plan. It will go on sale in 1996.

But nothing is going on with the AN-418 for the time being. I really think we need to work on it. And then such aircraft as the IL-96, AN-218 and AN-418 will permit us to grab a good “share” of the anticipated increase to one billion passenger kilometers by the beginning of the century and to both earn hard currency and provide services for world passenger turnover. We will then enter the world market as a fully worthy aviation power.

Today, we appear to be outrageous because our entire aircraft fleet consumes 35-50 grams of fuel per passenger kilometer, but the aircraft of the entire world fly within 20-22. Moreover, we have a fuel shortage and aircraft are idle... We need to immediately reequip civil aviation, utilize the capacity that has been released from military orders, and boldly make aircraft. Sell them abroad. Because I am confident: the firms of Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed, that is, America and a united Europe, will not be “rapidly producing” enough aircraft to satisfy the world in the transportation of passengers. We have a place there today and we can sell many aircraft. And we will be involved with this.

[Krikunenko] So, is conversion occurring?

[Balabuyev] We were always “converted.” All of our production is not purely military—it is used both in the army and in the national economy. But, since freight transportation is decreasing as a result of Armed Forces reductions and the stream of passenger is steadily increasing, it is the need for passenger aircraft that is increasing. And we are increasing their volume. We are not making purely cargo or passenger aircraft. We are manufacturing passenger aircraft so that they can become cargo aircraft once the side has been cut and large hatches have been installed.

If you speak of conversions in the vulgar sense of the word, we are working on many things that are not characteristic for us. Right now we are introducing an experimental automated shop to dye leather for light industry. We have proposed seven models of various types of automated machines to pack bulk and liquid ingredients for the food industry. We are developing a trolley bus. One of the Kiev plants is being converted into a trolley bus plant and we will soon set up massive production of excellent vehicles. We are designing a very high class inter- city bus, using our technologies, including composites. We have developed an underground train that will be 30 percent more economical than subway trains. But all of that workload is like a passing affair because we are such a science- intensive syndicate that we need science-intensive production. That kind of production where we can apply our knowledge and skill of physics, chemistry, mathematics and mechanics. That is why we need to build aircraft.

[Krikunenko] Including sport aircraft?

[Balabuyev] We are doing a lot for sportsmen and aviation lovers. First of all, powered hang-giders. Our aircraft have even passed state testing. But, the trouble is that, despite of all our pains, there is not a small 50-60 horse power engine in the country. Right now it is as if the work of a designers’ collective is being planned so that we are waiting for a cheaper and lighter engine to appear. It is the absence of an engine that is delaying both the development of powered hang-gliding and SLA [homemade aircraft]. But, really, only flying fanatics can be involved with home-made products, and the more flying fanatics, the better. Having passed through SLA, a person can work in any sector of the national economy. These people are—individuals. We need to develop small aircraft and build engines. For the time being, we are manufacturing powered hang-giders with engines purchased from Japan and France. We have an entire series of hang-giders without engines, there are single- seater and twin-seater powered hang-giders, and there are agricultural hang-giders. And they will still occupy their place. We have a lot of orders for them.

[Krikunenko] Petr Vasilyevich, the magazine briefly reported on the “Mriya”—“Hotol” project.

[Balabuyev] Yes, we are working together with the English firm British Aerospace on a project to launch the firm’s “Hotol” craft into space from the back of the AN-225 “Mriya.” The project has been completed in the form of a technical proposal. We and British Aerospace and TsAGI [Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy] representatives reported on it to the European Space Agency. There is such a thing. It is made up of scientists from European countries and it coordinates space exploration policy in Europe. There are many varied projects, and we offered ours as the most realistic. In November, the ministers of the European countries will approve a multi-year plan for space exploration in Europe and we are counting on this theme being a part of it. It is advantageous because our system for delivering a kilogram of payload into space is 4-6 times cheaper than with a vertical launch. The experimental design bureau will present detailed material about this unique project to the magazine.

[Krikunenko] And this project in our most difficult times?

[Balabuyev] Progress cannot be stopped. Yes, civil aviation has no money, the Air Force is being reduced, and there are also no resources. We can very easily tear down science and the design bureau... Therefore, I think that aviation development programs should be all-union and international. While considering that vertical lines of management are being lost, we created the Association and united three plants—the Arsenyev, Omsk and Kharkov plants—that will produce the AN-74. Motor mechanics, the design bureau and series production plant in Zaporozhye, electricians and scientists have joined it. We are conducting negotiations with the Dnepropetrovsk plant leadership, the former “Yuzhnyzhash.” We are transforming this enormous combine,
which previously produced missiles, into a powerful aircraft enterprise to produce large aircraft like the AN-218. We have created our own top management. It guarantees the coordination of all plans and cooperation. So, the Association will be able to independently sharply increase the production of aircraft for both the domestic and the foreign market. We are proceed based on the assumption that the state's scientific-technical level primarily determines the level of its aviation science and technology. That is how it was and that is how it will be.

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Designer Recalls 'Caspian Sea Monster'
92UM0810B Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 11, Nov 91 pp 28-29

[Article by Valeriy Ageyev: "Where has the 'Caspian Sea Monster' Disappeared?"]

[Text] Although more than 20 years have passed, local residents still remember it. This enormous ship—not a ship, aircraft—not an aircraft always appeared in the early morning and swept over the smooth surface of the sea with a roar. Sometimes it would sink into the water, as if it was tired. Then, after a short run at full speed, it would once rise into the air and disappear into the maritime expanse at low altitude. Intelligence noticed the unusual object. The Americans named it the "Caspian Sea Monster". But it suddenly disappeared one day in a heavy fog.

Just what kind of events were these? The search led me to Viktor Vasilyevich Sokolov, general designer of trends for the Hydrofoil TsKB [Central Design Bureau]. He also slightly opened the curtain over the secret.

"During testing under difficult meteorological conditions at the end of the 1960's, the experimental dynamic hovercraft (or ekranoplan [wing-in-ground effect vehicle]) was involved in an accident and burned. It had really impressive dimensions. Length—more than 100 meters, wing span—nearly 40 meters. It weighed—nearly 500 tons."

During a record flight, its weight reached 540 tons which was an unofficial world record for aircraft at that time. It was broken only recently with the development of the AN-225 "Mriya" winged giant.

Ten VT-7 jet engines with a thrust of 13 tons each "pushed" this wing-in-ground effect vehicle at a speed of 500 kilometers per hour [kph]. They were joined in the nose section of the aircraft into a single power plant. The aircraft received the name "KM"—ship mock-up. This was a hovercraft designed for experimental research.

I learned that Lenin Prize Laureate R.Ye. Alekseyev, who was previously well-known as the creator of hydrofoils, became the ideologist of the development and general designer of the aircraft. He was the one who fundamentally substantiated the economic effectiveness of such vessels and he determined their technical and social significance.

KM—a unique wing-in-ground effect vehicle—was the concluding craft of 10 experimental craft of various weights, the test results of which permitted the development of a design and construction theory and methodology of practical models of wing-in-ground effect vehicles. One of them became the "Orlenok" [Eagle] transport wing-in-ground effect vehicle with a take-off weight of up to 140 tons and capable of carrying 20 tons of cargo at a speed of 400 kph and to a range of up to 1,500 kilometers.

Various modifications of this wing-in-ground effect vehicle are being developed based on it in the passenger and cargo-passerger variation for use in areas with a poorly developed system of airports and on inaccessible tourist routes both in the USSR and abroad.

In general, wing-in-ground effect vehicles have nearly a 70-year history. Scientists and maritime engineers have noted from time immemorial: If you raise a ship out of the water, its speed will significantly increase. This is explained by the fact that air resistance to movement is nearly 800 times less than the resistance of water. Torpedo hydroplanes had already appeared during World War I thanks to this observation. Then the idea of using the so-called hovercraft variant received its development in the work of K.E. Tsiolkovsky, Aircraft Engineer P.I. Grokhovskii, and Professor V.I. Levkov. In 1935, Levkov built the first hovercraft in the world. Two years later, one of his designs demonstrated a record speed for that time—72 knots and could move both over water and over land.

Soviet Aircraft Designer R.L. Bartini was also interested in the problems of these amazing aircraft—wing-in-ground effect vehicles, that combined within themselves the features of a ship and an aircraft. He came to the conclusion that the aerodynamic screen (air cushion) would call into being the aircraft of the future—the ekhranolet [wing-in-ground effect aircraft] which would be able to land and take off anywhere.

Bartini turned out to be correct. Independently from him, R. Alekseyev managed to cross the path from idea to creation of an actual model, having created a new direction in the system of transport craft—wing-in-ground effect vehicle construction. Right now work is going on as fast as possible at the hydrofoil central design bureau. Along with large wing-in-ground effect vehicles, there I became acquainted with the simplest "Volga-2" surface-effect vehicle. This is a twin-engine passenger dynamic hovercraft, with a length of 11.4 meters and a height of 3.3 meters. It attains speeds of up to 120 kph. It can cover nearly 500 kilometers without refueling. The engine-propulsion unit consists of two engines (mounted on a wing that is symmetrical with regard to the surface), two inclined shaft lines and two four-bladed air propellers in ring
nozzles in front of the wing. Four VAZ-413 model series production, four-stroke, two-section, rotating piston gas-powered engines with air-liquid cooling systems are used as the main engines. A reduction gear and an expanding clutch have been installed in the air propeller drive system. There are remote-controlled horizontal blades-flaps on the rear section of the ring nozzles that are designed to divert the air stream and also additional rudders behind the propellers.

The inflatable pneumatic tube floats, that are installed on the hull and on the side skegs and which ensure year-round operation in summer—on the water, in winter—under conditions of broken ice and drift ice, are rubber structures that consist of durable external shells. They are equipped with a pumping system and a pressure regulator.

The tail fin structure consists of metallic elements and a cloth sheath, a horizontal stabilizer and a vertical stabilizer that are connected by braces and blocks. The primary materials of the metallic elements are aluminum alloys. The overall strength of the air wing is provided by a system of metal box girders. Local loads are absorbed by a flexible cloth sheath that is reinforced with a metal frame. All of the systems for controlling the flaps, spoilers, rudders and engines are made in the form of tubular cable linkages. The electrical power sources are: batteries and shaft generators. A UHF radio has been installed and an attitude indicator and speed indicator are envisioned. Aircraft style chairs have been installed in the compartment for the driver and passengers. Everything is simple and comfortable.

The Raketa-2 wing-in-ground effect vehicle appeared to me to be more interesting. It has been designed to transport 90 people at speeds of 150-180 kph with a range of up to 800 kilometers. Three TV7-117 aircraft turboprop engines with an output of 1,785 kVt each are installed on it. The wing-in-ground effect vehicle is capable of accessing a gentle sloping bank to disembark passengers and also for maintenance which significantly simplifies its operation.

The main thing about the wing-in-ground effect vehicle is that it is an ecologically clean mode of transportation. It does not create waves, it does not disturb vegetation while moving over land, and noise does not exceed health standards.
The only thing left to add is that our amateur designers are also continuing this interesting matter. An experimental wing-in-ground effect vehicle will soon be produced from the “shop” of the Krasnoyarsk DOSAAF Aircraft Sports Club. We are reporting this in confidence, contrary to the request of Pilot D. Karnaukhov, one of the designers: do not divulge the secret until completion of the work. But we are calculating in such a way that the article will be published at the time when the Krasnoyarsk DOSAAFers are testing their brainchild.

Work on wing-in-ground effect vehicles is also being broadly and successfully conducted abroad. However, the defining and primary role in the creation and development of this highly effective transport craft belongs to our fellow countryman, the distinguished Designer Rostislav Yevgenyevich Alekseyev, who would have been 75 years old in December 1991.

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