A CRITIQUE OF THE ETHICAL REVISIONISM OF AGNES HELLER

- Hungary -

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A CRITIQUE OF THE ETHICAL REVISIONISM OF AGNES HELLER

[Following is a translation of an critique of the ethical views of Agnes Heller, by Maria Makai and Tamas Foldesi, in Magyar Filozofiai Szemle, (Hungarian Philosophical Review) No. 1, Budapest, Jan.-March 1960, pages 33-99.]

(Maria Makai wrote the "Introduction" and "Morals and Politics" chapters of this study, and Tamas Foldesi wrote "The ethical valuation of the State" and "Morals and Rights".)

INTRODUCTION

I.

The fight against revisionism is one of the most important fields in the ideological struggle of our times. Since the 1957 Moscow Conference of the Communist Parties, several works took up the critical evaluation of revisionism, analyzing the situation objectively, and designated revisionism as the principal danger to the international workers' movement. These works first analyzed revisionism in general, and then explained its characteristic aspects as they appeared in different countries.

The present period in its development makes it necessary that we examine revisionism not only on a general plane, but also in relation to the different branches of science. One of the relatively neglected fields of the struggle against revisionism is in the field of ethics.

In Hungary, the principal representative of revisionism in ethics is Agnes Heller, a pupil of George Lukacs.

So far, the criticism of Agnes Heller's ethical principles was rendered difficult by the fact that she expounded her revisionist ethical opinions in a coherent system only in two volumes, which contained the notes taken by her at university lectures. One of the unwritten laws of scientific ethics is, that the subject of criticism should not be a work which is still in manuscript form, or a collection of lecture notes which was prepared by the author only for teaching purposes and left unfinished, being compiled without the necessary thoroughness. This rule which is intended to safeguard the interests of the author and at the same time creates an obligation toward the work when it appears in book form - is correct in
general. The breaking of this rule in the present case was made necessary by specific reasons.

a.) Marxist ethics is one of the most neglected fields of Hungarian philosophy. One aspect of this is the fact that so far no complete work on Marxist ethics was published by a Hungarian author. At the same time, the need for such a work was greatly increased, because parallel with the accelerated tempo of building the material foundations of Socialism, in the course of fighting bourgeois ethics, Socialist ethics is gradually taking form. The revisionist, taking advantage of the shortcomings of the pre-counter-revolutionary party leadership (and within these especially the illegal actions) during the period of the ideological preparation of the counter-revolution, started to attack the norms of Socialist ethics also, and the results of this were keenly felt even during the period following the counter-revolution.

Heller in her work "Introduction to General Ethics", published in 1957, discusses these problems substantially and takes a definite stand on these questions. She claims to be a Marxist and methodically works with Marxist categories. These circumstances caused many readers to believe that Heller's ethics is really Marxist ethics. We have to examine whether the employment of Marxist categories corresponds to the Marxist contents - or if it is only an instrument to express such bourgeois ethics which are entirely foreign to Marxism. (See note).

(Note) Text of Note: In this respect the criticism of Heller's ethics is justified by the circumstance that the part of the philosophical notes used by technological and other universities is the abbreviated version of Heller's ethics - even though the philosophical notes used in party education took over this part substantially unchanged.

b.) In this fundamental relation the circumstance that Heller's ethics is only a collection of lecture notes, is of secondary importance. It is evident that there can be a difference between the work when published in book form and the material contained in a collection of lecture notes, with respect to quality and thoroughness. But there can be no such difference in regard to whether the book is Marxist but the collection of notes is anti-Marxist. In our opinion, even if the work of preparing the book for publication requires from the author a greater degree of watchfulness, this does not mean that the author of notes taken at the University is not responsible for the lectures and notes.

The study of University notes, in contrast to books, is compulsory for the students, and thus it often happens that some lecture notes have a considerably larger group of readers (including those who are not university students, but for want of a book, they gather their knowledge from lecture notes) - than have many books published for the use of the general public.
The responsibility of the author is increased by the fact that the lecture notes, in spite of their temporary character, fulfill an important role in the education of the University students. This requirement can be applied with a greater emphasis in the case of Heller's ethics, since the author was well aware that for want of a published textbook on Marxist ethics, her notes will be destined to play a much more important role than the usual University publications in such a critical situation, as was the year 1957. At the same time, she intended to publish her notes in book form in 1957.

All these reasons make it necessary that in criticizing Heller's opinion on ethics, we analyze what she says in her lecture notes.

The criticism of notes places the critics under a grave obligation. We are not allowed to forget that Heller considered her work as an experiment and she had no access to any detailed and scientifically written books on Marxist ethics. For this reason we take only the most important parts from her notes and criticize the coherent concept.

II.

Before we start the criticism of Heller's ethics, we must examine its relation to its original source: to the anti-Marxist concept of Lukács. Furthermore, we will endeavor to fit Heller's opinions into the frame work of the historical traditions of moralizing revisionism. Without considering these two aspects the criticism would be one-sided and superficial; among other things, it would unjustly ascribe certain theoretical merits to Heller. In the course of the criticism we will try to demonstrate the bourgeois character of Heller's revisionism, as it finds expression in the extraneous criticism of the workers' movement, the building of Socialism and in the upholding of Marxism only as a phraseology, and that she presents the shortcomings and faults committed in the building of Socialism as permanent and most substantial characteristics of communist practice.

I. This work of Heller's [Note: Agnes Heller: Introduction into General Ethics", Vol. I 53 pp. is nothing else but application of George Lukács' anti-Marxist and political and philosophical concept to the field of ethics. (Discussing this question, we take it for granted that the reader is familiar with the previous Lukács criticism.)

But this general statement immediately make it obligatory to emphasize the difference-making peculiarities. Above all, those peculiarities must be put in the forefront which originate from the contents of ethics and which create an abstract theoretical
possibility for the vulgarized, openly revisionist application of Lukacs' concept.

a) Ethics, considering its generalizing contents, is not restricted only to the field of forms of consciousness, but with its categories also reflects real sociological conditions in one aspect, that is the moral aspect of the sociological practices of men and their sociological-ideological relations. In this it is in opposition with esthetics, which in this sense is already a "secondary reflection" of reality, since its subject is artistic reflection and only through this does it deal with the common sociological relations of men.

However, in characterizing these relations, their ideological aspect must be emphasized; because the moral aspect of the relations between men already includes the activity of reflection, the reflection of a definite social and class-life in a more or less conscious, emotional and rational form.

Yet the ideological character of these conceptual systems and the institutions originating from them does not contradict its objectivity, because it is independent from the consciousness and the will of individual men, - although it emerged in the course of their practice and reflecting activity, - thus they are now faced with such a sociological, respectively class objectivity which they can refuse or accept, but in any case this is to be reckoned with.

Heller mistakenly defines morality itself when already at the outset she speaks about it as being a "practical relation" in general, and does not make it clear that this relation is ideological, that its objectivity is ideological objectivity with all the consequences of such ideological objectivity. For this reason when she faces their peculiar manifestations, (for instance, the morally good), she is not taking into consideration their ideological character and the consequences which follow. On the other hand, she reduces to a single moral relation the heterogenous multiplicity of these practical relations which connect man as a subject to "sociological objectivity". In this connection she outlines the possibility - which later on was realized - one-sidedly explaining the practice as a moral practice, placing it above the totality of man's practical manifestations, with which she herself deals later on, for instance with the legal and political practice.

b) Ethics stands not only in a closer relationship to reality than esthetics, but its key question is the social practice, the socially objective reflection of this practice in the conceptual system of morals. The practice here not only fulfills the role of a criterion, but around it and around its moral projection revolve and materialize all the ramifications of the system of ethics, beginning with the evaluation of the motives of activity to the place occupied by morals in the totality of society's activities.

This practice appears in the field of ethics in two forms: on the one hand, as the moral practices itself, taken in its narrower interpretation, being the moral projection of the practice of
individuals, and at the same time as transformations of this practice into forms of consciousness (norms, etc.) On the other hand there appears on the periphery of ethics the class and social practice in its broader sense, of which the above-mentioned, narrowly interpreted individual practice is only a subordinated form of manifestation.

In these two forms of practice, considering the objective range of their relations, that objective connection is manifested whereby the real contents and meaning of moral practice will be fully evident only in its organic connection with the totality of social actions.

As the disparaging treatment or brushing aside of the first form of ethics liquidates its right to existence and dissolves it in the theory of historical materialism, the neglect of the other form of ethics, on the other hand, destroys or makes the relation between ethics and historical materialism too direct, clothing ethics with idealist immanency. The scientific comprehension of ethics can have its foundation only in the recognition of the real reciprocity of the individual, class and social practice.

However, due to this accentuated role of practice, in ethics the class interest appears in a concentrated form and imposes the duty of taking a definite stand in party matters.

The motives for the acts of individual men can be realized only in practice (and became tangible) and in the final degree in that impact which is effected by them on the development of the class, respectively on the total of social activities; precisely for this reason Marxism, in the field of ethics, represents the primary role of the consequence, and assigns only a subordinate place to the weighing of that subjective purpose which partly calls forth the consequences. At the same time, inside this subordinateness, it acknowledges and takes into consideration the purpose, inasmuch as this contains the ethical viewpoint, the peculiarity of the moral judgment which distinguishes it from the legal and political judgment, (where, naturally, the motive also is taken into consideration,) only the objective subordination of the consequence becomes more pronounced.

Heller breaks with the Marxist conception of consequence-ethic already at the outset and makes the first step toward the building of such a purpose-ethic, which is gravely weighted down with contradictions. She calls the relation which exists between the motives of acts and consequence which is taking shape—"moral law". According to this opinion, the interpretation of the practice is narrowed down and exists only as individual practice. Heller stops half way, because the morality which is realized in practice and the scientific evaluation of this morality can be effected only by putting this individual practice into the class and social practice of the period. Later on this purpose-ethical line comes to the forefront intensified during the course of that doubly-united motion, in consequence of which the morality, the role of the subjective side of morals is increased and the weighing of the social effects of the individual practice
is decreased. In Heller's system it really becomes a "moral law" that the contents of an act's consequences should be weighed mainly according to its relation to morality.

c) In building the structure of ethics, a decisive role must be played by the assertion of that objective order of ranks which exists between morality and politics in social practice. In class-societies, the social practice - in its totality, independently from the consciousness of the individuals, etc. - always moves in the direction of the realization of certain class interests. Inside of the totality of this practice, mainly as the concentrated expression of the economical interest, - politics, directly and consciously performs the task of directing this practice into a definite direction, which is the direction of the realization of class-interests, while not every sphere of morals has such a direct connection with the class interest. However, the closer the connection of the moral aspect is to this class interest, the more indirectly does the unity of the moral and politics take shape. It is inside of this that the objective subordination of the moral sphere to politics that class interest is realized in the most effective manner.

Marxism, the scientific expression of the interests of the working class, consciously places the politics which expresses the class interest in a concentrated manner above morals, the political judgment above the moral judgment. The moral projection of practice can be evaluated scientifically only if it is viewed as a subordinated part in the course of the wider and more effective realization of the class interest. But Marxist scientific politics does not annex the moral sphere as a subordinated part so that it puts an end to its relatively independent field, or its justification altogether. No: it rejects that interpretation of politics which comprehends the interest and usefulness of the class on a practical basis only, having no consideration for the moral interest of the class, rejecting at the same time the proletarian moral and its scientific criteria under the pretext of disavowing any moralizing tendency.

On this basis Marxism maintains as entirely justified and absolutely necessary the political criticism of that ethics which generalizes the problems of morals. Subordinatedly, it holds justified the criticism over such politics which are practiced in the name of proletarian morals and ethics, because - sub alia specie - it maintains that this criticism is also political criticism. At the same time it rejects in its entirety that moral-ethical criticism that allegedly should have precedence over politics, asserting that such a moral criticism can be only the form in which such a political judgment which represents the interest of another class appears.

Heller's ethic tries to justify in principle that moral criticism which is "above every kind of politics". In theory, however, she gives only the illustration of this latter assertion, because, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, she renders judgment over the proletarian politics, from the petit bourgeois viewpoint. The moral form of the judgment serves only as a moral coloration.
In these general, inherent problems of ethics therefore, we are able to observe that abstract, theoretical possibility, that Heller, employing Lukacs's concept, on account of these inherent problems, increasingly distorts and vulgarizes this concept. These problems are for instance: the more indirect connection of ethics with social conditions than that of esthetics; the ideological character of these relations, the social objectivity of moral phenomena, the intensified role of the individual, class and party practice and its consequences in relation to party-mindedness, and the objective primacy of politics over morals.

In conclusion, only this: no matter how the revisionists are evaluating the place of morals and politics, no matter how they belittle the role of politics in its relation to ethics, it is becoming indisputable here, that the categories of ethics are always reflected through the prism of a definite class interest, that is, through the prism of a broadly interpreted political interest, stabilizing the moral-ethical transformation of the interest. On this level the class interest presents itself and becomes effective directly at the raising of every substantial question independently from the fact that these political contents can be thawed out from the already worked-out ethical categories only through a series of meditations.

What are the most characteristic features of the application, or rather distortion of Lukacs's concept in Heller's ethics?

1. In it those Marxist components, which form the abiding elements of Lukacs' life-work, are conspicuously relegated to the background. And parallel with this, Heller draws a conclusion from all the premises of Lukacs' which often were only heterogenously and equivocally outlined, but never reached by him.

Moreover, in Heller's ethics those idealistic and within these the moralizing 1919 faults of Lukacs are resurrected, although since then these are only latently contained in Lukacs's life-work; latently in that sense of the word, that although he did not repeat these faults, he - on the other hand - did not try to solve those theoretical problems which originated from them. Although, for instance, in his polemics with the existentialists the positive answering of these questions should have played a central role.

In the life-work of Lukacs the mixing of heterogenous and equivocal motifs with openly anti-Marxist reasonings, creates a situation in which Lukacs's works contain numerous statements which directly contain the refutation of Heller's revisionist opinions. On the other hand - and this is the other side of the coin - it can not be said about any of Heller's arguments that she is taking a stand in pronounced opposition to her master's standpoint, that no matter in what devious ways, with the help of complicated allusions she would not adhere to her master's judgment. In this contradictory sense - and taking into account that the developing and application of a faulty concept in itself intensifies these faulty tendencies - it can be safely stated that Heller's ethics is the offspring of Lukacs's revisionism.
Furthermore: In Lukacs's life-work there are some justified criticisms of the sectarian deviations - in definite circumstances and relations - although, here too, it has to be taken into consideration, that behind these justified episodes, when and where, in what measure, revisionist concepts also were gaining headway. However, in Heller's ethics - and this is an important difference - the always present and effective anti-deviationists main line, the interpretation of Heller's "single front" struggle objectively promotes only the expression of bourgeois contents. In Heller's work anti-deviationism is distorted into direct and open "anti-Stalinism"; the polemics against deviationism becomes only a transparent veil for the endeavor to discredit the theory of the Leninist left. Heller is unable and unwilling to differentiate between certain faults, or rather between the main line and contents of the workers' movement, and consequently even at those points where at the beginning her polemics are directed only against the really committed faults, later on she leaps over to the external, bourgeois criticism of the movement.

But here, too, there is the other side of the coin, the fact that Heller did not become disloyal to Lukacs at this point, either. Lukacs in the majority of the instances overexpanded the concept of deviationism, well over its justified boundaries and thus, in him also - although it is not as much as in the latent form - we can discover the "anti-Stalinist" tendencies. He himself openly admits these tendencies in those writings which were published before, and especially since the counter-revolution. One of the external forms of these admissions is, that for instance in the work: "Wider den missverstandenen Realismus", he says that it is not necessary any more for him to resort to that "Aesopic language", which he reluctantly had to use so far. It would be superfluous to explain that this is not really a problem of linguistic terminology, but an attempt to validate such bourgeois contents, which cannot be developed within the framework of the movement.

However, in this relation Lukacs' influence can be viewed only as secondary, because Heller lived through in a few years and generalized in one year from a bourgeois viewpoint all that negativism which Lukacs spent in the course of decades in the movement. The "partisan-poets" - and we might add, the "partisan-philosopher's Lukacs - concept was developed in the course of a complicated and contradictory long period of formation. For decades, Lukacs was unable to liquidate the effects of bourgeois ideology, but in the survival of this small middle-class influence, being present in the movement, deviationism also has played a certain role. At the same time, the conservation of these elements in the bourgeois viewpoint made it impossible for Lukacs to come forward against deviationism, upholding the concepts of Leninism. During the course of long years, he generalized this problem, which proved to be insoluble in this manner, the problem which symbolizes the reserved relationship of
the partisan principle in the movement. We are talking about an insoluble dilemma, because it strives for the impossible: it wants to overcome in the movement one of the representative forms of bourgeois ideology: deviationism, with bourgeois arguments. From this "anti-deviationist" fight, fought with such preliminaries, only the objective strengthening of the rightists (inside the movement, which is also bourgeois) could emerge first, later followed by the philosophical representation of revisionism. (Not to mention the fact that following the effects of strengthened rightism, the positions of deviationism also became more secure.)

With Heller the situation is different. She started to tread the road of revisionism when the liquidation of the faults of the old party leadership was already objectively possible and she explained her distorted concept, when - after the counter-revolution the country, under Marxist-Leninist leadership, was beginning an era of consolidation and further development in a purified atmosphere.

2. "The responsibility of the literate"? Yes, but it is more: the pretentiousness of the literate. Because Heller wrote such a claimed-to-be-Marxist ethics, which endeavored to justify on the same theoretical level the disillusionment, counter-revolutionary consciousness, passive and (oppositionist) active behavior of the bourgeois intellectuals, who withdrew themselves into an "immigration".

Consequently, she fixed as her starting point a critical, decidedly contradictory period of the Hungarian workers' movement, and inside of these contradictions the "bad features" of the contradiction and the bourgeois reflection of it, as generalized material for a "General Marxist ethics".

Heller's relation to the Hungarian workers' movement and the building of socialism - in its intensified distortion - is a caricature of that relation which connected Lukács as a philosopher to the international workers' movement. This relation, as Lenin explained it - in general is characteristic to the revisionists: they grab a phase on the given level of the development of capitalism, or the workers' movement, they interpret it arbitrarily and metaphysically and present it as the foundation of the reform of Marxism, which reform in their opinion is urgently needed. Heller did the same thing in her own fashion, but the material of her generalization, compared even with that of Lukács, was immeasurably narrow and one-sided. The reflection on the occurrences in the fifties, but mainly of 1956 and 1957 in her ethics sums up the results of her own experiences, although, as we stated, the attitude with the help of which such experiences might occur, is the projection of the revisionist relation to the movement.

This revisionist relation to the movement naturally originates only from the representation of bourgeois-small middle-class interests. In many instances the bourgeois intelligentsia becomes
a fellow-traveler through its own "logics", its theoretical training, the tremendous magnetic power of the classics of Marxism and the successes of the movement and of the building of socialism. On the other hand, the barbarism of fascism and of imperialism in general, its artistic and philosophical decadence stimulates the acceptance of Marxism. But at the same time, its "heart" recoils again and again, when the time comes for the realization of this theory, as soon as the "demand of the day" orders the violation of such class-interest, from which they would not and cannot detach themselves, and the representation of which - willingly or unwillingly - they accepted. This estrangement from the practice, and through it, the theory of the movement - naturally not in a mechanical way or a straight-forward way - when that complicatedness and "foxiness" of the reality (which is so many times mentioned by the revisionists when their interests are involved), makes headway with full force in the movement, also, when such critical situations develop which refute the metaphysical illusions which were formed about the unbroken, straight line of development of the movement. At such occasions they try to lift this "seeking of the way" to a theoretical level, although in fact it is nothing else but the "losing of the way". And at such times it becomes most significant that not only their sentimental identification with the movement was rather problematical, but that in their theoretical convictions also, there were present from the beginning those reserved tendencies which in these complicated and critical periods easily could change into open opposition.

3. More closely, Heller's ethics is such an "anti-fascist" ethics (about the inevitable inner inconsequences of this anti-fascism we will talk later) which carries over Lukacs's principle about the ideological coexistence to the territory of the practical coexistence, of the political class-peace.

[Note No. 2. Harry Pross made the remark about Lukacs's newest book, that in it Lukacs "consequentially liberates reason from the shackles of consciousness when he writes the following: We can consider fatalism equally on a religious or on a pseudo-scientific basis; the power of reason, the responsibility of the individual for the consequences of his determination can be founded just as well on a theodicy, as on a materialist - based theory of society. This sameness of the "world Outlook" therefore, which is produced in consequence of the peace-fight using Hegel's expression is "the sameness of the sameness and non-sameness" (on page 11). Moreover Pross sees the value of Lukacs's work in that he does not maintain the antiquated matching of capitalism-socialism against each other, but upholds the ideology of world peace. (Deutsche Rundschau 1958 July, page 11)]
What Lukacs is doing on the level of general world-outlook—and what can be summarized in his version of "reason"—with the slackening of Marxist forms, by "widening" them, and formally abandoning its basic principles—Heller does the same in the field of ethics. But we have to call attention already here to an important aspect. It is evident that the principle of ideological coexistence demands far-reaching concessions from Lukacs: that must come to the forefront in which even the believers of the most opposing world-outlooks can agree. Marxism appears in the equivocalness of clair-obscur (light-shadow). The light of the reflector falls only on those aspects with which, abstractly interpreted, even the representatives of progressive bourgeoisie agree, as for example, the prospective of the complete self-realization of a personality. And that in which they can not agree and what is the most direct and most actual expression of the interests of the working class—remains in darkness. But it is especially this latter idea which constitutes the very essence of Marxism, which definitely discriminate against it in given cases, for instance from bourgeois rationalism and makes it all possible the awakening to consciousness of the abstract, shadowy yearnings of the entire progressive humanity and their future realization. (For instance, the complete unfolding of the personality in a communist society which is entirely free from class-contrasts and class differences.) Thus, in the field of political theory we can talk about the class-struggle, perhaps beside Marx, also quoting the historians of the 19th Century—but not about the dictatorship of the proletariat, to mention only the most familiar example. We could call this immanent, primary requirement of the ideological coexistence the "ideological minimum". The situation is comparable to the case of ethics, built up with a similar aim. Here those acts are counted as the most moral ones—or the only moral ones—in the evaluation of which people generally or wholly agree, independently of their class-position. Such features—and we might add—positive moral features, come to the forefront, and the values are summed up in such a manner that every Tom, Dick and Harry is able to transplant his own concepts into them, and being summed up in such an empty-abstract way, etc., what else could this be than the above-mentioned "moral minimum," sanctioning the practice of the peaceful coexistence of the classes from the front of ethics, which forgets only what makes Marxist ethics what it actually is: revolutionary class struggle and class consciousness even in its general ethical concepts?

But Heller at this point goes further than Lukacs, not only in the progressive annihilation of those elements which made Marxism indigestible for a bourgeois democrat, but parallel with this, also in the uncritical acceptance of the idealist elements. Lukacs explains—in commenting on the quoted passage from his book—that from the viewpoint of the world-outlook that sameness of philosophical elements is discussed here, which originates from the higher-grade
sameness of the dialectic of the sameness and non-sameness. Heller, however, terminates the dialectic aspect of "non-sameness" and constructs the "sameness of the sameness and sameness", completely mixing together materialist and idealist morals, even when she believes, among other things that the abstract norms, compressing universal human interest are the same in both.

4. The principle of ideological and practical coexistence is only a final result, the consequence of the summed-up total of the concepts of Lukacs and Heller. We discuss here only a few, although the central relation of it. Heller's principle of coexistence could have been formulated without certain illusions connected with capitalism. Naturally, these are reflected in her work only in a highly indirect way.

Lukacs - rightly - during the period of the fading away of the "artistic era", and during the time of the rapid advance of capitalism following the correct recognition of progressive bourgeois ethics, saw the real merit of critical bourgeois realism in the fact that it consciously accepts, instead of the beautiful, the presentation of objectively developed ugliness, together with the deep and contradictory fight against it. In reality, the aim of a general Marxist ethics is similar to it, that is: it should make it clear that in matured capitalism not only is estheticality dissolved and seeks new ways, different from the old ones in order to re-establish a unity of a higher order, but ethicality, also. Heller, although she tackles this problem, handles it as a subordinate aspect only. But the main line of her general ethics, her opinion about the "historical and world-historical good" (which "good" detaches itself completely from the concrete historical periods and transfers the substance of ethics to a transcendental level) - nullifies all of these part-recognitions by her. Her objectively apologetic viewpoint on the problem of ethics is opposed to the correct esthetical analyses by Lukacs.

However, even this opposition is not absolute, because Lukacs analyzing the ideal of a harmonious individual (The Problems of Realism), points out Gorkij's outstandingly correct literary depiction and world-outlook (that beside depicting the course of the ruination of beauty and harmony, he also presents on the highest literary plane and with full consciousness the struggle against it. But the final resonance both of his writing and his standpoint is, that bourgeois realism is "the continuation of the great humanistic problems so far achieved in human progress." [Note No. 3. George Lukacs: A Realizmus problémái, Athaneum, 77 pp. The Problems of Realism.] Lukacs therefore is affected by the same general democratic and humanistic illusions as Heller, but at this point only as regards the perspective, while Heller makes this concept absolute, projects it into the past and this makes it impossible for her to outline the Marxist development of ethics.
5. But as these illusions can be organically embedded into the framework of practical coexistence, at the same time, even if, for the time being, we disregard Heller’s already mentioned political standpoint – necessary to discredit the transitory period, the building of socialism. Surely, the consistent, philosophical-ethical affirmation of the dictatorship of the proletariat would increase all those elements of world-outlook, which divide the two groups from each other, and primarily their intellectual representatives. For this reason, Heller in her ethics reflects the moods of that citizen, who “does not feel at home” in the transitory period, in the class-struggles for the termination of economical exploitation. But the philosophical consequences of this attitude are spiraling much farther, they sweep away the type of resigned partisan-philosopher, and in theory re-creates under the circumstances of the developing socialism that well-known ideology and attitude of decadence, which was, for instance, to a certain extent correctly characterized and criticized by Lukács, as in the cases of Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard. We will here discuss only a few aspects of this restored decadence: for Heller at the final phases of the transitory period, public affairs remain just as abstract and alien as for the decadent representatives of the bourgeoisie. Like these, Heller also finds in the smaller world, in private life, the primary field for the morally clean activity, while that concrete perspective which points to a society of a higher order realized in the practice of currently-living people, for her this simply does not exist. That man, who would try to construct himself on the basis of her ethics, - like the decadent types, would also live “incognito”, developing his own personality only in his own esoteric aspects.

In the passive or active opposition of ethical revisionism to the transitory period, an important part is played by that sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious concept, according to which the cessation of exploitation does not end the estrangement, nor does it affect the termination itself in any way. [Note No. 1: Lukács’s incorrect comprehension of the estrangement was pointed out by Joseph Szigeti, Tarsadalmi Szemle, 1958, No. 2, P. 39. The connection between the philosophical and political opinions of George Lukács.]

The foundation of this opinion in the circumstances of building socialism, rests in that political consciousness of the bourgeois citizen and of the bourgeois intelligentsia - originating from the conditions of their class - who airily disdains the essential changes in the economical structure and in the evolution of the state, does not see what is new and considers it to be only evil, that which impedes the development of his own personality. He projects his own extraneous, estranged relation to the power of workers, and makes it absolute. In the power of the state and in the political institutions in general he sees the objectification of something which is foreign to him. (And he is right, as far as he does not break out of his own bourgeois barriers.)
Heller reproduces this same alienation in her ethics. This comes to the forefront especially in the theoretical relation to the state and jurisprudence, but it comes into collision with Marxist practice and theory most indirectly, when it deals with the proper class and political activity. Objectively, she considers this as most clearly opposing the self-realization of personality, that is: genuine objectification, consequently the alienation at this point reaches its peak.

6. According to Lenin, one of the distinctive characteristics is that this tendency considers socialism to be the spontaneous result of democracy, something like an "outgrowth". In Lukacs' case criticism has already dissected this notion. With Heller the situation is more complicated and it needs a more thorough analysis. Essentially it is contended that at times Heller is forced to profess a certain "phony" radicalism, because of some problem of ethics which are connected or can be connected with the communist perspective - and she flashes the approaching bright perspective of communism. But this abstract perspective does not change the want of her concrete perspective, but rather sinks it even deeper. In spite of these evasions, she is following the same line as Lukacs; translated into the language of ethics: the good and the general "humanum" are materializing and carrying forward universal progress.

It is obvious that all these lines come together in the principle of ideological and practical coexistence. We can only point out here how quickly and inevitably this follows the total liquidation of Lenin's principle about party-mindedness.

II.

Heller not only distorts Lukacs' distorted concept to a greater degree, she is not only a beneficiary of the past faults of the workers' movement, but simultaneously, she continues to propagate that revisionist school, which appeals to the moral, and which in a developed form, emerged from the social democrat movement at the turn of the century. Substantially, it does not matter whether she reached back to these concepts consciously, or whether she echoes them unconsciously. It is certain that at some points she shared their opinions consciously, on the other hand it is much more probable that she reached the already developed moralizing opinions independently, that is under the pressure of class-influence.

For us, this latter circumstance becomes important and characteristic. Heller - viewed from abstract aspects - is a consistent and in her method, a relatively independent thinker, who, in general, tries to ponder carefully her theoretical premises and work out on these bases, all those political conclusions which are often openly expresses, but at other times - owing primarily to their
"delicate" political aspects - remain undisclosed. But because these premises and mental starting points, in the majority of cases, already contain the abstract or concrete possibilities of deviation from Marxism, her consistency and independence leads her to the outlining, or at times, the complete reiteration, of that moralizing anti-Marxist viewpoint, which were already developed before her by her predece-
sors. Thus, the relative independence and consistency of the analysis sweeps through to a developed dependence and to that in-
consequence which is a characteristic aspect of every revisionist writing, which does not break formally with Marxism but welds it with bourgeois features.

If we compare the moralizing revisionism of our days and thus, Heller's general ethics, with the theoretical struggles of the workers' movement during several decades, that noteworthy lesson emerges that similar false illusions and disillusionments - which were formed during the relatively peaceful development of capitalism inside the opposing Social-democratic party - mutatis mutandis - can also emerge from the circumstances of the building of socialism, when the party is in political power, during the stormy and contradictory period of development. But before we outline the most general philosophical and ethical concepts of this school, which in many respects is intertwined with bourgeois philosophy - of which Heller's ethics, viewed from this aspect is one of its belated echoes - we would like for a while to dwell on a few general political and ideological links of the old type, respecting Heller's revisionism.

1.) One of the theoretical starting points of not only the ethical revisionism, which started with Bernstein, but every revisionist undertaking, was the belief that capitalism is stable and endur-
ing. However, during the building of socialism, inside the workers' movement, these illusions can be formed only indirectly in such a manner, that on account of the sharpening of the inner contradictions of the movement, the disillusionment takes place over the delay of their solutions - among others - in intellectual circles, which no matter how transmitted, leads to the resurgence of certain illusions about capitalism.

Objectively, this means the support of the current imperialism, even if Heller's orientation is not based indirectly in the present, but only in the capitalist past, and even in some of its idealized historical periods. But this subjective orientation in itself is not as important as the circumstance that supplies its foundation, that disillusionment connected with Socialism, which acts as a deeply demoralizing factor on all those intellectuals who try or tried to approach Marxism in a heterogenous way. These can not be impeded in any manner in their progress, in their identification with the movement by any openly counter-revolutionary theory, concerning which they are even at this point immune; they are much more inclined to accept this aristocratic "critical" theory opposing the Socialist
present. And when this happens, for them the ineffectiveness of revolutionary demagogism is also terminated. Therefore, this in its slogans' anti-capitalist theory, discredits the movement, supporting those capitalistic illusions which some decades ago could be propagated openly by the pathfinders of revisionism. And it is natural that this type of arousing of the illusions under present circumstances sociologically fulfills the role of the Trojan horse of the counter-revolution.

Seemingly, the relation of the old-type revisionism (economism, etc.) to the movement and its final aim is similarly different from Heller's and thus: of today's revisionism. While those turned actively toward the problems brought to the forefront by every day's practice - although their practice, originating from this was a narrow objectivist practicism - on the other hand Heller, at the very best faces the reality of socialist progress with indifference and aversion, and whether she says it or not, her writing suggest passivity in either case. But the negativism and class-contents of this activity or passivity is essentially similar: to divert the working class and its allies from the class problems, from the conscious political class struggle, in case of the others from grabbing power, and here from the use of power and from the complete realization of class aims. It is obvious that in the inner logic of revisionism the most general attitude of its representatives toward reality, etc. is always determined indirectly by the actual degree of the movement's development and the aims originated by it, reflected through the connecting prism of the bourgeois-petit bourgeois interest. This pseudo-activity of the adherence to the socialist system, or - in Heller's case - its actual passivity, is only one of the abstract theoretical demonstrations as to what practical attitudes theoretical definition is demanded by the petit-bourgeois interpretation of the actual situation. In short: the trade-unionist practicism was changed to an aristocratic contemplation by the emergency of the socialist world-system. The once idealized movement sinks to the level of the absolute commonplace, as far as Heller's revisionism is concerned. On the other hand, the once so despised final aim, detached from and opposed to the movement is given such an idealized form by Heller, as the form given to the movement by the old-type revisionists.

But this concept, by devious ways, leads to the same result as did the old disparagement: rippin in two the unity of the movement and the final aim, discarding the really effective instruments which would make possible the realization of the final aims.

The main line of Bernstein, or today's revisionism in this relation, can be summed up in the following mottoes, which differ much less in essence than in semblance: in the old revisionism "the movement is everything, the final aim nothing", and in Heller's case: "the movement is nothing, the final aim is everything".
But furthermore, there is also present such a deep-reaching sameness which appears in every form of revisionism, sometimes completely hidden as an unexpected premise, yet at other times appears entirely openly. The revisionist, reformists, etc. coming forward either in the political field or that of economics or ethics, are unable and unwilling to comprehend and recognize the doctrinal superiority and primary importance of the interests of the working class, or for that matter all of its interests, including those moral ones which are rooted in the economical basis, above the totality of all the interests of every other class. On the basis of changing political concepts which follow the changing historical situations, this obtuseness can be discovered among others in Bernstein, Kautsky and Plehanov in the period of their turning into renegades, and also in Jaures, who is kept in evidence by the history of the workers' movement not only as an outstanding anti-militarist fighter but at the same time also as a devotee of the reformist concept. This "obtuseness" also permeates the writing of Heller.

On a theoretical level, the degradation of the interest of the working class is effected in most cases under the pretext that in the interest of the entire society and in its own interest as well, the interests of this particular class must be subordinated to higher, more general interests. The meaning of this higher interest often is disclosed only in a disguised form. With its real masters, however, the neo-Kantists bourgeois philosophers, it emerges openly with it bourgeois contents. These same contents also becomes more easily recognizable by the revisionists, if we bear in mind that on the theoretical level inside the movement, the first definite appearance of revisionism was accomplished in such a way that some theorists of the school attached themselves to the extraneous, bourgeois-philosophical criticism of the movement. The "critical Marxists" (that is, revisionists) carried exactly this extraneous bourgeois criticism into inside criticism, representing at the same time petit-bourgeois contents and interests. And thus they made this inside criticism into an instrument to help the annihilation of the revolutionary contents of Marxism. The framework of this study does not permit us to reach back to the first real fore-runners of the moralizing revisionist concept, mainly to Proudhon and to the ancestors of anarchism. We must be satisfied to take as a starting point that relatively late, but much more developed period of this tendency, which openly tried to bring about the revision of Marxism.

But this historical viewpoint also protects us from two incorrect extremeties, which are threatening in the evaluation of revisionism and inside this, Heller's revisionism. Thus, on the one hand we avow the tendency to see in today's form of revisionism such a new phenomenon, which in its newness happens only once.
It will be clear how unfounded and false the claim of this school is that it wants to constructively promote Marxism to a higher development because - even if we have only a sketchy knowledge of the earlier history of revisionism - we can see in it only that under the label of Marxism, it varies in a new way the realization of the bourgeois interest in the movement. At the same time the semblance that is connected with Heller's independence as a thinker, disappears for good: because the individualism of that road can not be considered as independence, with the help of which she produces well-known class-limitations in the field of theory. The other danger - which we also try to avoid - is that, according to them, there is an abstract sameness in every aspect of revisionism. In this case the determining aspect absorbs all the historical differences, consequently it disarms before the form of it actually appears. In today's Marxist polemic literature we find examples of both these extreme viewpoints.

2.) In the following we discuss a few such bourgeois problems, the mentioning of which - even in a sketchy manner - is important from the viewpoint of the questions analyzed in this study. These are the following: the contradictory character of the petit-bourgeoisie as a transitory class, the contradictory role played by the petit bourgeois in the different periods of the class-struggle of the proletariats, and finally: the role of the bourgeoisie of the bourgeois ideology and practice in the Communist Party, (we repeat: we are not aiming at completeness, even inside this condensation, we only want to emphasize one or two important circumstances.)

The petty bourgeoisie, in consequence of the position it occupies in capitalism and in the economical production, form a transitory and contradictory class. It moves between the terminal points of ascending into the bourgeoisie and descending into the proletariat; these two, antagonistic, fundamental classes affect it constantly in an always changing manner, alternately attracting and repulsing it. (As Marx said: the petty-bourgeois man is composed out of "on the one hand" and "on the other hand"). The determining magnetic power of the bourgeoisie, however, affects in general mostly the masses of the petty middle-class people.

Its contradictory role in the class-struggle of the proletariat in the different periods, is the consequence of this situation. The party in every new situation, considering the new aims, must determine on the basis of a scientific analysis the tactics to be used in relation to the bourgeoisie.

During the period of the bourgeois-democratic transformation in the era of imperialism, the petty-bourgeoisie attaches itself in great masses to the proletariat, which is the only group capable of accomplishing this transformation. The differences, are obvious, here, too, inasmuch as the bourgeoisie interprets the minimum demands of the proletariat as its own maximum demands.
However, when the movement reaches the threshold of socialist revolution, the progressive, revolutionary spirit and the role of the bourgeoisie disappears, as Lenin pointed out several times. In this momentum for instance, the attitude of the principal mass of the bourgeoisie and that of the peasant masses might deteriorate from vacillation to treason, just as the same can be expected in general from the role of the political representatives of the bourgeois democracy. During the course of socialist building the workers' power fights both for and against the petty bourgeoisie in the field of the achieved proletarian power, aiming at the winning over and the transformation of the bourgeoisie as a group of workers, to make it absolutely obedient to the discipline of the proletarian state and in the final analysis fights for the prospective interests of the workers.

The struggle for winning its confidence - in the course of which the party is building on certain democratic feelings of the bourgeois world-outlook, on the democratic patriotism, on the desire for peace, etc. - is inseparable from that constant struggle which is aimed against the practice and morals of the small-proprietors, from persuasion to administrative methods.

During the course of building socialism the dualistic aspect of the petty-bourgeoisie which characterized it in capitalism does not come to an end, but goes through an important change. Its great masses take part in the building of socialism more and more actively; at the same time in some definite periods of the class struggle, under the influence of inner and extraneous factors (among the inner factors the most important is the loosening of the worker-peasant coalition, and the loosening of the connections between the party and the masses) - certain strata of it, especially the city petty-bourgeoisie become the spring-board of counter-revolution. In general, the petty-bourgeoisie exists (even after the serious restrictions of small production which is its economical foundation) - it remains as a potential basis of capitalist restoration and inside the movement as an actual basis for every kind of deviation.

In our study we tried to keep in the forefront that the problem of the petty bourgeoisie must be discussed from two aspects, which aspects present its real contents. We differentiate between bourgeoisie as a separate class and the bourgeois ideology and practice inside the movement and the party. (Heller's ethics, as well as the discussion of the problem of revisionism were analyzed exclusively from this latter aspect). As soon as the question of the petty bourgeois ideology and practice is brought up inside the movement and the party, we can judge only as reactionary and retrogressive every single manifestation of this class. In this relation there is no place for differentiation between the ideology of the petty-bourgeois worker, or between the ideology of the petty-bourgeois exploiter, respectively. On one hand the inner-party petty bourgeois ideology reflects the
existence of the totality of this transitory class and not only its negative aspect; on the other hand, inside of this, even the ideology of the most progressive strata of the petty bourgeoisie is but a reactionary standpoint compared with the proletariat's ideology. The fight inside the party is waged not only against the negative characteristics of the petty-bourgeoisie - as in relation to the state - but against the totality of the petty bourgeoisie. Wholly independently from the problem of how certain elements of the petty bourgeois ideology crept into the party (for instance following the effects of the plain fact of socialism's strengthening, as Lenin pointed out in connection with Parnekok's pamphlet), independently from the fact that its representatives are workers who are affected by petty-bourgeois influences or petty bourgeois intellectuals. (The methods of struggle, however, are dependent on these and many other circumstances, for instance whether the person is getting nearer to or farther away from Marxism, what his ideological perspective is, or how this perspective is developing in practice, etc.) Because the movement is not separated from the other classes by a Chinese wall, the petty-bourgeois influences unavoidably will be sprouting in it again, beginning with the deviations up to the fully developed revisionism. But exactly so does the necessity of the struggle against them unavoidably follow.

In this sense we can discuss the history of revisionism in general, and inside of this the lasting and definitive essential identity among its different, historically changing forms.

3.) How did the experiment appear in the field of Marxism, partly inside the movement, partly in the theory of those neo-Kantist philosophers who extraneously came nearer to the movement and Marxism - which was directed toward the degradation of the interests of the working class? Through that unjustified emphasis in the experiment to add Kantian ethics to Marxism. (In the social-democratic movement primarily through the neo-Kantist revisionists and austro-Marxists, who were influenced mainly by the Marburg school of neo-Kantism. In another much less effective field became connected with begelizing endeavors. [Jaures]. The political foundation of all these experiments was the concept that there is only one possibility - and that conceivable only in the far future - for the working-class to gain power: through the smooth, evolutionary road of legally convincing the majority without any disturbances. This concept was identical with the tendency toward transformation of the workers' parties into a bourgeois reform party, that is, with that endeavor which was a living refutation of the activity of Lenin and the Bolshevik party which was created by him. Naturally here we can discuss only the ethical projection of this question.)

If we discuss the unjustified emphasis of the ethical sphere, the heart of the matter evidently is not the fact that some theorists tried primarily to elaborate the unsolved problems of Marxist
ethics, or to be concrete: the question of proletarian ethics. In opposition to this, their aim was to detach the cause of socialism from the class movement of the proletariat, in order to define the problem of socialism as the interest of the totality of mankind and primarily its moral interest.

It is evident that here not "only" the shifting of the proportions inside Marxism was considered, but the complete revision of the theory of Marxism and its political strategy. The unfinished state of ethics itself did not play an important role in this, because considering any branch of the Marxist discipline this relative under-development and backwardness of this branch of science can never be the cause or the source of these deviations. But even if it can not be its source it can take some part in the unfolding of revisionist endeavors, giving them a chance to a "hic Rhodus, hic salta", that is the chance to define such bourgeois and political interests, exactly in this field, which although claiming scientific progress, in reality are devoid of any scientific interest and objectivity.

We do not want to belittle those differences which concern the depth of this revision, those which are evident partly among the theorists inside the movement, and partly among them and those bourgeois philosophers who attach themselves to the movement only extraneously. For instance, Max Adler criticized Cohen, Vorlander and the other neo-Kantists of the Marburg school for that definition of the quintessence of socialism, according to which "socialism is right to that extent as it is founded on ethical idealism". But the essence of his criticism was resting on the same theoretical basis as that of the criticized savants, because according to his principal argument, such a concept of the relation of socialism and ethics would be an uncritical mixing of the territories of the theoretical and practical reason, so sharply separated from each other by Kant. (Note No. 5: Max Adler: Marxistische Problemen, Stuttgart, 1913, 143p.) Consequently, according to Adler, the Kantian ethics should not be welded together with Marxism, but - in Kant's spirit - "coordinated" to it, as an independent discipline.

The spokesman of Marxism's ethical completion did come forward not only with the argument that Marxism has no ethics, but primarily with that assertion, that in Marxism there is no place for ethics. From their own viewpoint they were right, because Marxism really does not provide any place for the bourgeois interpretation of the totality of human morals, which would be the aim of these critics. Those who wanted to build and implement the epistemological foundations of Marxism, held the opinion that inside the field of Marxism, as a science confined to the territory of theoretical reason, has its own justification, but on the other hand, it does not know what to do with that discipline which is suitable to the field of practical reason, which is ethics. (It is important to note that they narrowed
the field of practice exclusively to the moral practice.) Formally, therefore, they acknowledged Marxism; and inside of it, at least in words, they had to accept the doctrine about the primacy of the interests of the working class. At the same time, in practice, they did not coordinate, but superimposed that sphere of Kantian ethics which completely annihilated the contention of Marxism about the class struggle. The "totality of human interests", contemplated from the bourgeois viewpoint, consequently subordinated and terminated the class interest of the working class, the "practical reason" killed off all the rational recognition of "theoretical reason". What remains, therefore, of Marxism, becomes acceptable to any, more-progressive "desk-philosopher." Because this tendency, starting out with the purpose of implementation - logically developed as it is most clearly observed by Alder - going down deeply to the complete revision of the foundations of Marxism.

If socialism is a direct moral interest of the totality of mankind, then Marxism, as class and party doctrine, can not contain the perspective interests of humanity, only the special interests of a specific class. In that case, it is not enough to detach only the practical-moral sphere and superimpose it to Marxism as a party-scientific, in that case all these elements must be terminated in it, which are suitable rational reflections to the existence and interest of a definite class. Without conceding it and by devious ways, the neo-Kantist revisionism actually performed this. Fighting against Hegel, or Marx, they questioned the materialist world-outlook, and declared that the "ontological interpretation of logic", that is, dialectics is only a method, in other words only an aid to thinking. Here they joined the course of the current antihegelianism of decadent bourgeois philosophy, either continuing on an epistemological level the descriptive and methodological dualism of the neo-Kantian Freiburg school (toward the natural sciences, the non-recurrence of the culture-sciences) - or on the level of ethics. In this latter relation they denounced Hegel's "immoral" and merciless objective historical dialectics, resurrecting the Kantian antimony on a neo-Kantian basis between the existence and the "let it be" (casualty and theology), they designated a separate sphere for morals, placing it to the forefront and antihistorically, on an idealist basis inflating its subjective side, morality.

The contemplative and methodological dualism of neo-Kantism necessarily got near to the value-personalism, which openly opposes Marxism, to the theory of Scheler and N. Hartmann, which nominally came forward with the claim of transcending the Kantian ethical formalism and found a contentual ethics. Practically, however, - primarily Scheler - they filled with irrationally and arbitrarily selected contents the neo-Kantian "realm of aims", that is the field of the free moral individual and of morals itself. With these irrational contents, with the self-created value-hierarchies they not only failed to terminate the existing ethical formalism, but
rather deepened it. The neo-Kantian revisionists were separated only by a mental step from this logically outlined theory of values, from the value-personalism of Hartmann and Scheler, where the moral criterion, completely detached from history, was destined only to the registration of that relation which exists between the values that have a separate realm and the moral individual who tries to realize them. Thus the moral self-perfection became self-contained and became completely independent from the "prosaism of everyday existence."

But if individual moralism can be developed independently from the economical and moral structure, from the circumstances of production and ownership, if the moral, therefore "truly human" sphere is being detached from the sociological and political sphere, then - this "ethical socialism" has nothing to do any more with that "prosaic" movement, which indirectly is not trying to overthrow the existing system for the reason of creating a higher morality.

Ethical socialism can be realized without terminating exploitation, through the reform of consciousness and morals, in the aspect of total society. Indeed, out of the soil of this tendency sprout higher moral values, because for instance, it theoretically opposes that conception of civil war, which necessarily goes together with injuring moral values... These theorists express the consciousness of that class, which feels at home in the alienation following exploitation, and not that of the other class, which views the class struggle, trying to eliminate exploitation and the elimination of exploitation itself as a prerequisite to the development of real morality.

4. We have already mentioned that in Heller's - objective connections to moralizing revisionism that is characteristic and decisive, that she did not approach them having a thorough knowledge of the tendency, but under the pressure of similar class-influence. If we now characterize - generally - these connections, then we observe before all, that the earlier theorists expounded their opinions mainly before the victory of the October revolution, before the unquestioned triumph of Lenin's theory and practice and before its achieving controlling power in the international workers' movement. In those days, orthodoxy, that is loyalty to Marxism, by no means had inside the democratic movement that content and clarion-sound as in the communist movement of today. Moreover, many Marxian concepts were made indisputable by the victory of Leninism - for instance the dictatorship of the proletariat as an indispensable momentum in the transition to communism - which today can not be openly denied by any revisionist in a communist party possessing the governing power. In addition to this - concerning the formal side of the question - the expounding of revisionist opinions inside of a Marxist-Leninist party demands that "aesopic language", the use of which was not at all needed by the earlier revisionists.
Indeed, on the basis of the foregoing, it is necessary to critically analyze not only Heller's openly expressed thoughts, but those ideas also which were not expressed by her, but which organically grow out as the results of her premises. (Naturally we always differentiate between the two.) But, in our opinion, scientific criticism of every theoretical concept makes mandatory the deduction of these unexpressed consequences - here emphatically urged by the above-mentioned ideologico-political circumstances - since the philosopher in general is "responsible" not only for what he openly says, but even for what is organically derived from the construction of his theory and problems, that is from the logic of his ideas.

The ideological relationship between the earlier revisionists and Heller's writings was demonstrated by us primarily in that fact that like her predecessors, she similarly is unwilling to admit the precedence of the interests of the working class. In her writings this fundamental concept is not evident in the theoretical necessity of the ethical "implementation" of Marxism. According to her, there is "room", objectively, in Marxism for the development of ethics. However, she carries this out in such a manner that after all, unadmittedly implements Marxism with bourgeois philosophy - since it is impossible to prove with the methods of Marxist philosophy, the moral superiority of the working class.

Although by devious ways, her standpoint theoretically becomes harmonious with the opinions of the earlier revisionists, when she explains Marxism, not "implementing" - but diluting it, arbitrarily imputing to it the direct representation of humanity's moral interests. This concept, however, needs as a prerequisite the detachment of the idea of Socialism from the workers' movement, as a definite class movement, and this preconception is clearly discernible from Heller's standpoint, among others, where, according to her, the highest manifestation of Marxist moral development is to be found in the so-called "abstract" norms that express the universal interests of mankind.

Inseparably from this, she follows her predecessors when, like they, she also deeply undervalues the concrete morality of the workers' class and fails to observe that the moral values so far produced by mankind can endure and become common treasures of total humanity, inasmuch as being lifted up to a higher level they will become part and parcel of the morality of the working class.

Heller does not see that real connection which exists between the traditional values formed during the course of moral development and the morality of the workers' movement that is in reality the purification and improving assimilation of these values, and is accomplished every day through the class-conscious workers in bloody or bloodless class struggles. She does not see the connection and thus she not only degrades the morality of the working class, but at the same time builds barricades in the way leading
to the additional strengthening of the lasting values of moral development. And she assigns to them about the same place as do the revisionists, neo-Kantists and value-personalists: in the intermundia (spaces between the worlds) of class struggles.

Heller meets her forerunners not only on the field of "par excellence" moralizing concepts, but in a Kantianism, - which appears now openly, then in a veiled manner - and which permeates her entire system of ethics in that generally undeclared anti-hegelianism without which it is impossible to build up the system of moralizing. Naturally, in connection with Heller, we can not talk about such a primitive antihegelianism (that is the form in which anti-Marxism appears, and which for instance would deny the objective character of dialectics (like Max Adler), etc. We are thinking here primarily of the antidialectic and metaphysical analysis of the problems and of the fact that Heller did not employ positive elements of Hegel's work in the elaboration of concrete ethical problems and in some questions even emphasized an antagonistic viewpoint. This theoretical attitude of hers helps along the veiled expression of anti-Marxists contents. In her work the protestation against the "immorality" of the hegelian philosophy of history is just as deep, and it places in the center the distorted and inflated problematics of morality, just as her forerunners did. This naturally does not prevent Heller from using some of the reactionary elements in Hegel's theory, when her direct interest makes this use desirable. (See her concept about the state.)

The outlining of moralizing revisionism can not be achieved without any deviation from Marxism, and consequently Heller comes into collision with Marxism not only at the discussion of ethics proper. In her ethics she revises the concept of Marxism in relation to the state, to jurisprudence, and inside of these, especially its concept in relation to the socialist state, the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist jurisprudence.

5. Heller's revisionism is not a solitary, isolated momentum even in our days. Primarily, it is not unique, in that already mentioned sense that at its start it theoretically made articulate the disillusionment of large intellectual groups. Besides that, her attitude toward life comes in contact with existentialism at many points, her viewpoint can be paralleled by that of Kolakowski, who represents a more extreme wing of this moralizing tendency. Heller's often hidden "aesthetic" elements openly come to the forefront in the writing of this Polish philosopher. He openly draws the conclusions of his common premises, beginning with antihegelianism up to the definite rejection of Marxism. Yet, in our opinion, Heller's revisionism is more dangerous. Heller represents the type of classic revisionism which did not break formally with Marxism, and veils its essential opposition to Marxism with Marxist phraseology. Nobody is eager to learn the fundamental ideas of Marxism from
Kolakowski, but much more from Heller. It would be stupid to think that Kolakowski present any danger to the purity of Marxism, but this fear would be entirely justified in Heller's case. Primarily because she not only comes forward with a Marxist claim, but even proclaims that Marxist ethics, so far, had only a coarse, vulgar literature, and its real history is just beginning.

On the other hand, Heller was not a revisionist at the start of her career. In her first and best work about ethics, concerning Chernyshevskij's ethical opinions ("The problem of intelligent selfishness"), she took a Marxist position on most of the important questions discussed and on a high intellectual level at that. We are going to prove our viewpoint directly, later on, when we will point out in a few important questions: How it is possible to refute the Heller of 1957 with the concepts of the Heller of 1953-54. At the same time we can also detect in this work of hers, such deviations from Marxism, which although they did not make Heller a revisionist, but still: they already projected the concrete possibility of producing an expressly distorted concept in the future, which at first was voiced by her in the philosophical debates.

(Note No. 6: one of the authors of the present study, Maria Mokai, criticizing this book by Heller "Critical comments on a Marxist work", Filozofiai Szemle, 1957, (Kritikai megjegyzésekegy Marxista munkahoz") - espouses an incorrect ideologico-political standpoint. Her article was written immediately after the counter-revolution. The author overestimated the role of the sectarian deviations in bringing about the counter-revolution, together with its actual dangerousness during the following period. For this reason she did not recognize in Heller's antisectarianism certain, then only latently present bourgeois contents.)

In some parts of her work, "The dissolution of ethical norms" (1956), discussing some ethical problems, Heller crossed over the boundaries that divide the inconsequential, but essentially Marxist concept from the revisionist concept. She discussed this revisionist concept systematically in her general ethics.

III.

The ethical valuation of the state

The central question of the transition from capitalism to socialism is the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat. With the setting up and defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat, stands or falls the socialist revolution, the building of socialism. For this reason the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a criterion, with the help of which the proper place and class-content of an ideology can be correctly gauged.
It is not accidental that we also begin the criticism of Heller's ethical opinions by scrutinizing her viewpoints about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Heller in her works is not discussing in separate chapters the ethical valuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but she is fully aware of the question's importance and her opinions are determining in a considerable measure her entire ethical concept.

Heller discusses the ethical valuation of the state in the chapter: "Aims and Means" of her lecture notes. The central thought of this chapter is the problem of man's becoming an instrument. In her opinion a man's changing into an instrument is one of the most negative, morally absolutely unqualifiable occurrence in the exploiting society.

What are the main causes of this transformation in Heller's opinion? Among the causes, next to the exploitation, the chief role is played by the state.

"The state as an alienated sociological entity faced the individual as a subject and used these subjects as mere instruments or tools in the interest of the state's aims." (Note No. 7: Agnes Heller: Introduction to General Ethics, Vol. I, p. 130 Budapest, 1957, Bevezetes az alattalos etikaba.)

Man's becoming an instrument in Heller's opinion is a general lawful necessity, a common characteristic of every statehood.

"This characteristic of the central state power was and is present everywhere, where there was and is present a central state power." (My own emphasis, T. F. [Tamás Földesi])

[Note No. 8: Ibidem]

Somewhere else she expresses this thought even more clearly.

"In the force, exercised by the state, even in the force of the most progressive state, there is something morally negative. The state, precisely because it is an alienated power, in a certain sense, turns its entire population into "tools or instruments. This is absolutely true not only about those states which are in the hands of the exploiting class, but to a certain extent it is true even in the most perfect proletarian state which offers democracy in the most abundant measure to the proletariat."

(Note No. 9: Ibidem, p. 132)

According to Heller the use of people as instruments is a historically justified necessity, because the revolutionary force of the masses, owing to the weakness of the productive possibilities, is unavoidably followed by the force of the state.

"Having an 8 hour working day, the direct use of force and power by the working classes is precluded from the beginning, simply because they have no time for it. And at these times a certain bureaucratic system necessarily emerges, which is alienated from the masses." (Note No. 10; Ibidem p. 133)
It is exceedingly characteristic of Heller's opinion that she not only declares the application of the negative moral judgment about the dictatorship of the proletariat as valid and justified, but she pronounces an even harsher judgment than usual about the socialist state:

"Marxism begins with the contention that today human history has arrived to a period where there is no need for men to function as an instrument, that is when this phenomenon gains increasingly negative moral constituent elements." (Note No. 11: Ibidem, p. 134)

Heller's opinion about the dictatorship of the proletariat is seemingly contradictory. On the one hand, she takes an important step toward revisionism with the negative moral judgment of the socialist state, while on the other hand she also emphasizes the difference between the socialist and exploiting state. She maintains that the use of the subjects as instruments is justified absolutely in the exploiting state, while in the socialist state this use is only relatively justified. This semblance is strengthened by the fact that Heller characterizes the proletarian state as offering and guaranteeing democracy in the broadest sense.

The reader would be justified in entertaining the thought: whether the broadest democracy can be reconciled with the fact, that the socialist state changes ALL its subjects into instruments, Heller must choose between the two opinions. In her ethics the individual and the force of the state, the opposite of the bureaucratic state power is a central idea, being an organic part of her concept - and consequently the democratic character of the socialist state necessarily remains an empty phrase.

It is not an accident that Heller in the later parts of her work liquidates this contradiction so that she openly and unequivocally denies the democratic character of the socialist state.

On what fundamental basis is she denying the democratic character of the socialist state? According to Heller, the fundamental condition of social democracy is the satisfactory amount of leisure time that makes it possible that people themselves participate in the direction of the state and production, so this function would be performed by them and not by an outfit, which is alienated from them.

"With the 8 hour working day and naturally, with an even longer working day this is increasingly true - it is objectively impossible for the real and not formal democracy, for the working masses to actively and continuously participate in the social practice, in the direction of society and production." (Note No. 12, Vol. II, p. 239).

Heller is well aware of the fact that in the countries building socialism during the period of this procedure, the degree of development makes it mandatory to retain the 8 hour working day.
Being familiar with this fact the setting up of such a general rule can mean only that in the countries which are building socialism even in the Soviet Union, there is no real democracy. (The realization of the 7 hour work day in this relation does not mean a difference in quality.)

But Heller goes even farther. She not only deprives the socialist state of its democratic character, but sees in it the main obstacle to the evolution of human freedom.

Later on we will discuss in detail the freedom-concept of Heller. For this reason we examine here only the connection of freedom with the socialist state. Heller seemingly in harmony with the Marxist teaching, comprehends human liberty as sovereignty over nature, or society, and declares that human liberty continuously and gradually is increasing in the course of the development of sociological forms. She takes over formally that Marxist principle, also, according to which the increase of human freedom in the exploiting societies has a subordinated character and for this reason the total collapse of exploiting societies is necessary, so that the swinging over from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom could be possible.

When is this swinging over realized? This is the point where Heller's opinions radically come into collision with the Marxist concept, and at the same time they necessarily become metaphysical.

According to Heller, this swinging over does not come with the socialist revolution, but much later, after the withering away of the state. This means that from the viewpoint of freedom, she places the era of socialism on the same level with the situation developed in the exploiting societies, there is no radical change in quality.

"It is evident, that so far as the state does not exist, we can not talk about swinging over to the realm of freedom, even figuratively. For this reason those who believe that this figurative swinging over will come during the period of society's formation are romantic "utopists". (Note No. 13: Ibidem, Vol. I, p. 68)

Summing up: Heller's evaluation of the dictatorship of the proletariat is rather negative. She holds that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessary evil, which transforms the subjects of the state into instruments, using a force which is alien to man and is democratic at the very best, only in its outward appearance, but with its coercive power is one of the most formidable obstacles in the path of the realization of human freedom. This general description is not changed where Heller at some points evaluates the socialist state in a more positive manner, than the exploiting states. The fundamental tendency of her opinions is that the dictatorship of the proletariat primarily and definitely is a state and as such, carries with itself all the negative characteristics of statism, and even these characteristics become more and more negative in a society building socialism.

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So far we have only pointed out certain aspects of Heller's doctrine about the dictatorship of the proletariat, in opposition to certain critical observations. Let us now begin the critical analysis of her opinions.

1. Heller's starting principle is: that every state uses its subjects as instruments. In our opinion this assertion falsifies not only the essence of the proletarian dictatorship, but it can not be applied even to the exploiting states. Namely, Heller disregards the most fundamental feature of the state, the class-characteristic, and in connection with it, the characteristic of building this up. The methodological fault of her questioning is that she analyzes the problem of state-power as it appears in the connection between the state as general, and men as singular factors, but disregards the deciding factor, the class, as a specific contributor. In this relation, the state appears really as a power alienated from the individual. The comparison of the individual with the state verifies the dominating character of the state and the subject-character of the individual.

We obtain a radically different picture, if we include in this analysis the class-connections, also. In this relation the state loses its dominating characteristic. The state is in a subordinated position, because it is a unit of the ruling class, and its principal function, the defense of the economical power of this class, the defense of its proprietorship, the subjugation of the oppressed classes and the propagation of its power in foreign countries. In the relation between the state and the ruling class - although the ruling class also is composed of individuals - the state is the instrument in the hands of the "subjects", the members of the ruling class.

This fundamental determinative fact is not being changed by the circumstance that in the state of the exploiting societies, being an alienated public power, there is present the tendency to emancipate itself, even relatively, from the ruling class. And in certain exceptional periods it actually happens that the state accepts the balancing role between the exploiting class, (for instance, in certain periods between the absolute monarchy, the feudal class and the middle class.) However, this tendency is always of a subordinated character, because the state and the ruling class are not separate categories. The state asserts itself in the ruling class, which organized itself as a state, and in the persons who actually direct the affairs of the state.

Similarly, it does not change the instrument-character of the or the fact, either, that the will and activity of the state might harm the interests of some members of the ruling class, and in consequence of this, the state in exceptional situations might use some members of the ruling class as instruments.
Heller, therefore, commits a typical idealist mistake: she considers the state, that is the effect or result, as a primary factor. She is bogged down at that superficial phenomenon that the state is a separate public power, being in command of armed forces and outfits. The state as a volition is the embodiment of a general will, which is binding for everybody and which is not interested in whose power is represented by it and whose will is demonstrated through the activities of the state. Heller's fault, therefore, is that she 'absolutizes' the Marxist doctrine about the alienation of the state and thus neglects the fact that the alienation is only a momentum of low order in the relation between the ruling class and the state. In relation to the exploited classes the alienation of the state and its ruling power is derived exactly from the instrument-character of the state. The ruling classes use the state for such purposes which are foreign to the exploited classes and which are in opposition to their interests. For this reason the state had to be changed into an 'alienated' power.

It happens, not by chance, that Heller's faults are multiplied when she applies her concept to Socialism. While generally propounding her concept she disregarded "only" the class-viewpoints, but when she specially applies it to socialism, she disregards the radical differences between the proletarian state and the exploiting states also. In the case of the exploiting states the thesis:

"The state changes its subjects into instruments" - transmitted through the will of the ruling class, and becomes really effective in the existence of the exploited classes. Fundamentally, the idea is not foreign to the essence of the exploiting states. In the case of the socialist state, however, in consequence of the radically changed class-aims, the instrumental use of the working classes is basically alien to the aim of the proletarian dictatorship. On the contrary the proletarian dictatorship is the "instrument" of the proletariat and of the working peasantry in the building of socialism.

Marx' and Engels' remark about the state, which emerges in consequence of the Socialist revolution, that it is already a "half-state", insofar that the chasm disappears essentially which existed between the separate public power and the working masses. Naturally this does not mean that certain bureaucratic tendencies could not appear, subordinated to the activity of the socialist state, but the socialist conditions make it impossible that the state would try to be independent from the working classes and change them into instruments.

The moralizing theory of Heller is not only a faulty theory, but it is not even new.

The fountainhead of Heller's opinion is Kantian ethics. One of the fundamental tenets of Kant is that the social phenomena, among them the state and jurisprudence, are to be judged and evaluated according to their moral value. For this reason he constructed
his evaluation of the different types of state from the viewpoint: to what extent they support or hinder the realization of fundamental moral laws. The fundamental, basic principle of Kant, almost equal in importance to the "categorical imperative" is that man is never allowed to be considered as an instrument, but always as an end. With the help of this rule Kant judged the different states generally in a negative manner, because their activity hastens a change of men into instruments.

Heller is trying to transplant this fundamental idea and methodological principle into Marxist soil, - and we might add into a soil which is soaked with bourgeois notions.

There is a certain connection between Heller's opinions and the Hegelian concept of the state, which hold that the state is one of the most exalted embodiments of the absolute idea. That illusory contrast that the state in Hegel's opinion is the highest good and according to Heller one of the greatest evils, is dissolved in the contention that the mystification of the state-power and in consequence of this, the degradation of the subjects is common to both of these opinions. Hegel's opinion becomes the theoretical source of this criticized thesis for the reason that Hegel makes the state, as the incarnation of the world-spirit, the very end, to face the entire population, therefore not only the masses, but the great and outstanding persons also, who are equally instruments toward the realization of the will of the state.

Almost all of Heller's teachings can be discovered in the concepts of the neohegelians. Stirner, one of the founders of anarchism, not only mystified the state, but held it to be the greatest negative factor. Marx' and Engels' criticism of Stirner can be applied to the teaching of Heller almost word for word.

She transforms first the state to a personage, which "possesses strength". The fact that the ruling class changes its own role into public power, into a state, is explained and distorted by her in such a Germanic petty middle-class manner that the state as a third power is formed against this ruling class and contrary to the other, melts all the power into itself. (Note No. 11, Marx-Engels: The German ideology, P. 120, Szikra, 1952).

They refute and deride the concrete state-concept of Stirner in a very clever and witty manner and at the same point out the fundamental weaknesses of the state-concept of neohegelianism.

"Jadques le bonhomme believes that: the state owns the factory as a possession, owns the manufacturer only as a feudal tenure, fief or estate; - exactly in this way "owns" the dog, that watches my house, the house as a "possession" and I myself "own" it only as a "feudal tenure" or fief from the dog." (Note No. 15.-Ibidem, p. 12.)
It is not devoid of interest to point out that the neohegelian doctrines are developed fully in the workers' movement, in anarchism. Bakunin in his debates with Marxism expounded such opinions, which are identical with those of Heller. The main characteristic of these opinions is that, unlike the neohegelian ideas, they have a bearing not only on the bourgeois state, but also on the socialist state. According to Bakunin, socialism and state are theoretically irreconcilable. Socialism brings about the liberation of the workers, while the state is the greatest obstacle of the workers' rule. The state, exercising the rule of a separately chosen class, thus gives the governing power to the minority. (Note No. 16. Bakunin: Marxism, freedom and the state. p. 63 London, 1953.)

The state as an oppressing machine gradually subdues the people, and consequently its essence is anti-human - says Bakunin. (Note No. 17. - Ibidem, p. 30.)

Bakunin's opinions, however, in spite of the contextual identity, in one point differs importantly from Heller's concept: In consequence of the negative factors denies the necessity of the Socialist state, in opposition to Heller, who emphasizes its necessity.

Yugoslav revisionism also makes this final step. The Yugoslav revisionists do not think that it is not a general necessity to place the state above society and classes. In their opinion the state, in general, is a class-state, but during the periods of imperialism and the building of socialism, in consequence of certain special causes, the situation changes. In imperialism the rapid increase of the producing factors makes unavoidable the state's intensified interference with the economic life, and so state-capitalism begins to take form.

"The state and the state-machinery takes over important economical functions, gains an independent economical foundation and on this basis, the new social role of the state-machinery is gradually shaped." (Note No. 18. The program outline of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Ujvidek, 1958, p. 19.)

According to this program outline the consequence of this is the state's elevation above the classes.

"The state-machinery in its endeavor to perform independent functions, elevates itself above society and tries to restrict the role of the private capital and of the working class as well." (Note No. 19 - Ibidem p. 20)

Yugoslav revisionism, therefore, is justifying the detachment of the imperialist state from society with the economical function of the state.

They also justify the socialist state's bureaucratization and detachment from the proletariat mainly on this basis.
"Performing the economical functions, the state tries to take away from economy its inner moving power, in order to present itself as a social necessity and to appear as such. This procedure originated that endeavor, that the state and party machinery should be independent and become a power above society." (Note No. 20. - Ibidem, p. 33.)

The program outline of the Yugoslav Communist Party, after the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, considers this procedure as an historical necessity, at least as a transitory step. That is, after the stabilizing of the dictatorship of the proletariat, partly in the interest of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, partly in order to organize the new socialist economy it needs centralized state power which performs an economical function. According to them, this necessity is only temporary, because the state has to be gradually deprived of its economical function, economy must be decentralized and thus it will be possible to prevent, that the state transforms its people into an instrument.

As a natural consequence to the state's independence, in the Yugoslav ideology there emerges the notion that the state not only detaches itself from the classes, but becomes their overlord.

"These phenomena exert their influence to the effect that this machinery, instead of remaining the servant and executive branch of the community, grows to be its master." (Note No. 21 - Ibidem).

According to the Yugoslav revisionists, this phenomenon characterizes the states of the peoples' democracies and of the Soviet Union and they declare that Yugoslavia is the only state which has broken with the idolatry of statism.

It is not a coincidence that Heller's concept is wholly identical with one of the basic principles of the philosophical jurisprudence of modern American bourgeoisie. An American jurist-philosopher, H. W. Jones wrote in an article that was published last year:

"There is substantial agreement in American thought that the rule of the law's great purpose is protection of the individual against state power-holders." [Translator's note: This quotation is not a translation, but the original words in the article.] (Note No. 22 - Jones: The Rule of law and the welfare of the state, p. 113. Columbia Law Review, 1958, II. L.)

Between the basic Kantian idea and the Yugoslav revisionists there is a series of chain-links, in which we can find some of the ideas of Heller's concept. By Kant, the idea of the moralizing state, by Hegel the absolutization of the state, by the neohegelians the negative evaluation of this, the reversal of the relation between the state and classes, by Bakunin the application of the idea of the alienated state to socialism, while in the Yugoslav ideology at least the unavoidableness of this is presumed.
Naturally, we do not try to maintain through all this, that Heller picked up her ideas necessarily from these sources. We tried, however, to prove that Heller's concept is not only faulty but that it is long-standing, old, a concoction of different idealist, anarchist and revisionist ideas.

2. In Heller's opinion the use of subjects of a state as instruments is effected with the aid of the force of the state. She holds this force to be evil in general and judges especially negatively the force of the state, in opposition to that force that is used by the revolutionary masses.

Heller's idea about the force is the concept of the bourgeois humanism and as such, is alien to Marxism.

The fundamental fault of Heller's concept is that she examines the problem of force from the viewpoint of the universal abstract morality, placing this method of observation above that, which examines the problem from the class-viewpoint. According to Heller, when force is used against a man, independently from the fact that it is political, physical or moral force, makes man an instrument, hinders his freedom and thus deprives him precisely of his human essence.

Heller can not deny that historically, force also plays a progressive role in the workers' movement, but she underlines very distinctly, that force is a necessary evil and in this connection she places the emphasis on evil.

Heller disregards the fact the societies, split into different and opposing classes are interwoven from top to bottom with the presence of force. The ruling classes make secure their power with the help of diversified means of non-economical and economical coercion. The deciding factor of liberation and of becoming a man for the exploited classes, is the use of revolutionary force against the ruling classes. (The class-struggles preceding the revolution are of a similar character. The economical and political form of the class struggles is essentially the use of force, forcing the will of the class on the other class.)

For this reason the question: whether force is ethically good or evil in the societies which are split into classes opposing each other, can not be answered with the help of general, abstract, ethical norms.

Evaluating the morals of the exploited classes and their entire situation

The morals of the exploited classes, evaluating the general situation of the exploited classes, assert that the force used in the class struggle and revolution, is positive.
It is no coincidence that the classics of Marxism unanimously oppose that bourgeois opinion according to which force is an absolute evil.

"In Mr. Duhring's eyes force is an absolute evil. In his opinion the first act of force is a fall into sin, his entire talk is a "jeremiad" about the defilement of the entire history through the original sin, about the shameful falsification of every natural and social law, which is nothing else but the power of Satan, manifested through force. However, that force also plays another role, a revolutionary role in history that - according to Marx' words: "it is the midwife of every ancient society, which is pregnant with a new society, that force is the instrument by which social progress blazes a path for itself and dashes to pieces stiffened, dead political forms" - about these Mr. Duhring does not say a word. (Note No. 23 - Engels: Anti-Duhring, p. 168, (Szikra) 1950).

Engels also points out that Duhring's standpoint is essentially moralizing, a judgment based primarily on the moral evaluation of political questions. Moreover, Engels also emphasizes, that according to its own logic, this moralizing is incorrect. Reality refuses the chief anxiety of moralizing Duhring, namely that force degenerates him who is using it.

"He permits only groaning and sighing over the possibility that force also may be necessary to the destruction of the exploiting system, - alas - because every use of force demoralizes the man who is using it. And he says this in spite of that high moral and spiritual revival which followed every victorious revolution." (Note No. 24 - Ibidem.)

It is not a coincidence that the absolute rejection of force was one of the main ideological weapons against bolshevism in the hands of the opportunists during the period which followed the October revolution.

According to Lenin, Otto Bauer summed up the essence of world-opportunism in the following sentence: "The use of force in the class struggle of modern democracy would mean the force against the social-power factors." (Note No. 25 - Lenin: Muvei, Vol. 31, p 228.)

Lenin points out that behind the nebulous expression of "social-power factors" the defense of the exploiting classes and the recolling from the dictatorship of the proletariat is concealed. For this reason, Lenin holds it to be extraordinarily important to educate the masses in the spirit of the class struggle and violent revolution.

"The fundamental principle of the entirety of Marx' and Engels' teaching is that such systematic education is absolutely necessary, in order to develop such convictions toward the question of violent revolution. (Note No. 26 - Lenin: Muvei, Vol. 25, p. 420.)
Again, with all this, we do not want to assert that Heller's standpoint is completely identical with Duhring's or Otto Bauer's standpoint. Heller makes a distinction in that who, when, under what circumstances and against whom was force used. But it is still justified to place into parallel the above-mentioned opinions with Heller's ideas, because in the fundamental question in the negative evaluation of force, Heller essentially shares the concepts of Duhring and Bauer. Indeed, we are going to see that Heller's concept is really nothing else but a modernized variation of these opinions.

Namely: Heller's theory of force is directed straight against the dictatorship of the proletariat. When she tries to differentiate between the different types of force, she confronts the force used by the masses, which is directed by the many against the few, and for that reason is less negative - with that force which is used by the dictatorship of the proletariat, applied by the few against everybody, which for this reason is considerably more negative.

But such comparisons between the revolutionary force and state-force is false and is founded on the total negligence of class-aspects. In the comparison of the two types of force the basic question is: which class uses force and against whom? And in this deciding connection the revolutionary force is essentially identical with the force of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both are used by the proletariat and the classes allied with it against the overthrown exploiting classes.

This is not changed by the fact that after the consolidation of the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat applies force against the exploiting classes through separate means, - because the real strength to the state's organizations of force is supplied not by weapons, but by the supporting potentials of the classes, the working masses.

That part of Heller's doctrine is radically false, according to which the dictatorship of the proletariat uses force against everybody, thus against the revolutionary masses, also. The radical difference between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the previous dictatorships is demonstrated in the fact that while these use force against the large majority of the population in an uninterrupted continuity, on the other hand the dictatorship of the proletariat uses force in a temporary manner against the exploiting minority and its aim is the creation of a classless society, and thus, the elimination of force. And the truth of this is proved by the 1956-57 history of Hungary. Hardly could a more difficult situation be imagined for a dictatorship of the proletariat, than the situation was after the counter-revolution, when the counter-revolutionary powers were temporarily successful in influencing wide masses of the working population. In this exceptionally difficult, and in the history of proletarian dictatorships, so far
solitary, case the dictatorship of the proletariat actually used force not only against the former exploiting classes, but also against some groups of the deceived working masses.

But this force could be applied successfully and it could be followed by a speedy consolidation only because, fundamentally, it was identical with the interest of the entire proletariat and of the working classes. This example shows that even in such an extreme situation, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is compelled to use its retaliatory force against a group which is considerably larger than the average, - even then it is out of the question that the state would use its suppressing function against the majority of the working population or against the totality of its people.

The reproduction of Heller's reasoning spontaneously recalls the debate which took place almost four decades ago between Lenin and Kautsky. In this debate, which was about the acceptance or rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Kautsky rigidly contrasted the Soviets with one another as the instruments of the revolutionary force and the Soviets as the outfit of the state-power. Kautsky evaluated Soviets as functionaries of the revolutionary activities in a positive way, but sharply rejected the phenomenon of the Soviets assuming the governing power of the state and declared that the Soviets can play only a subsidiary role beside the outfits exercising the state power in a democratic republic.

Interesting, but hardly a coincidence, that the opportunist Kautsky in this relation comes essentially to the same conclusion as Sorel, who attacked the proletarian dictatorship from an anarchistic viewpoint.

Sorel detaches force from the idea of the state and on this basis approves the revolutionary force. However, he condemns the state-power which emerged during the course of the revolution. Heller analyzes Sorel's viewpoint through several pages and essentially agrees with it. It is true that at the same time she also criticizes Sorel, but this criticism is nothing else but a veiled acceptance of Sorel's theory. Namely: Heller points out that the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state power is actually force, and for this reason it is theoretically incorrect to call one type of force exclusively positive, and the other exclusively negative. In her opinion both types of force essentially are morally negative although from the viewpoint of social progress, it is a necessary evil. And thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat is also progressive.

That Heller's concepts are basically identical with that of Sorel's (and Kautsky's) theory, is proved by her comparison of the dictatorship of the proletariat with revolutionary force, in consequence of which, - in spite of the similarities - she believes the former to be much more negative. The mold into which Heller pours her conclusions, is characteristically revisionist. She
agrees with the Sorel-Kautsky problem, but "unlike" they, she does not think that the question is insolvable, only "for the time being" insolvable.

"Of course it is a new problem that even after the founding of the proletarian dictatorship the revolutionary activity of the masses must be - and can be - preserved, that activity, that the functionary of this activity, even in the future, must be the masses as masses, and not as a narrowing and diminishing power. It has to be stated, that so far history did not solve this question. (Author's note: my own emphasis). (Note No. 27 - work quoted, Vol. I. p. 131.)

Reading Heller's opinions, it would be justified to ask the question: If the more than four decades' practice of the Soviet Union and one or one and a half decades' practice of the European and Asiatic democracies "could not" solve this problem, then what is the difference between this standpoint and the other, which contends that the difference between the revolutionary force and the proletarian dictatorship is theoretically insoluble and unbridgeable? The absolute idealization of force does not naturally or necessarily follow from the criticism of the "force" concept of Heller.

Proletarian morality contends that the force, exercised by the proletarian dictatorship against the class-enemy is positive, which is made necessary definitely because of the exploiting classes and the inner and international class struggle. This, however, does in no way mean that the unnecessary force of certain faults and illegal acts committed in the practice of proletarian dictatorship would be morally positive, because these occurrences are not unavoidable concomitants of social progress and they are also opposing proletarian morality.

It also has to be borne in mind about the teaching of Lenin, that force exclusively and primarily is not the essence of proletarian dictatorship, and that its use in the building of communism is showing a diminishing tendency.

Heller's "anti-socialist state" concept reaches its summit on the question of freedom and democracy. She handles the question of human freedom and the state as a petrified, unbending alternative. In her concept, the realm of freedom is a realm without a statehood.

While Heller's previously discussed beliefs deviated surprisingly from the viewpoints of socialism's classics, on the other hand her freedom-concept seemingly agrees with the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

Marx and Engels, and later Lenin also, really considered the slogan of "free state of the people" as incorrect. But we are not to forget under what circumstances they declared that this expression is not correct and against whom this criticism was directed. Marx and Engels - in opposition to the opportunist wing of the German Social Democrats, which mystified the power of the state and
advocated its upholding, declared that the slogan of a "free state of the people" can be used temporarily in the agitation, but scientifically it is unsound. This expression might have two kinds of meanings: either the state is independent from society, but such a tyrannical state can not be the aim of social democracy, or the state guarantees freedom. But this latter expression is also untenable scientifically, because the socialist state is also an oppressing outfit and in this sense is not free.

Lenin in opposition to the opportunists of the 2nd Internationale, expressed essentially the same thoughts.

The opportunists of the 2nd Internationale when they betrayed the socialist revolution, demanded exactly that explanation from the proletarian dictatorship, why does it not guarantee freedom, equality and democracy for everybody? They disapproved the proletarian dictatorship because it is not a free state.

Lenin, in order to make the criticism more effective, sharpens the problem: every state is a separate oppressing power to oppress the oppressed class. For this reason, every state is a non-free and non-people's state. (Note No. 26 - Lenin: Muei [Works] Vol. 25, p. 24.)

He even goes so far that he places state and freedom into sharp opposition and writes the following: "While there is a state, there is no freedom; when there will be freedom, there will be no state."

Knowing all this, is it fair to condemn Heller for such opinions, which are shared by the classics of Marxism?

If the classics of Marxism would have emphasized only these features in the connection of the state and freedom, then the criticism would be unjustified. But the above-mentioned concepts do not embrace all of the problems about the relation of the state to freedom. One fundamental question remained unanswered: what the proletarian state means to the freedom of the working classes?

The classics of Marxism discussed this exceedingly important question, also, and defined the relation of the socialist state to the freedom of the classes in a radically different manner. Marx in "The criticism of the Gotha program" on one hand disclaims the "free state" slogan, on the other hand, however, he points out that the fundamental condition of human freedom is that the state must be an instrument in the hands of the workers.

"Freedom consists in that, that the state, as an instrument placed above society, should be changed into an instrument which is subordinated to society. Even today the forms of states are more or less free to such an extent as they restrict the 'freedom of the state!'" (Note No. 29 - Marx-Engels: Valogatott muez, [Selected Works], Vol. II., p. 24).
The teachings of Lenin about freedom are not exhausted in confronting the state and freedom with one another. According to Lenin, in a society which is split into opposing classes, the class interests of the bourgeoisie are concealed behind the undifferentiated, generalized question of freedom.

"The generalized phrases about freedom and equality actually are nothing else than wild parroting of those notions which are the impressions of the conditions of commodity production. To solve the concrete aims of the proletarian dictatorship with the help of these generalized slogans would mean the settling down all the way on the theoretical principles of the bourgeoisie. From the viewpoint of the proletariat, the question can be formulated this way: "Freedom? But liberation from the oppression of what class?" (Note No. 30 - Lenin Muvel; [Works] Vol. 30, p. 103)

So Heller's opinions are devoid of exactly the essence of Marxism, that is: that the dictatorship of the proletariat means not only oppression and want of freedom for the exploiting classes but at the same time it is the decisive guarantee of the liberation of the working classes.

In this connection, freedom as a ruling power, based upon the recognition of social and natural laws, can be realized for the proletariat and its allies only with the help of proletarian dictatorship, and for this reason the opposition between state and freedom is relative and socially not all-embracing. (Note No. 31.

In the interest of sharp comparison we disregard here the fact that the freedom of the working classes is realized gradually, [see pp. 19-20] and whether the socialist state can be an impediment - in certain relations for the freedom of the working classes. See the part about individual freedom.)

The most obvious practical proof of this thesis is supplied by the events of 1957 in Hungary. The Hungarian people's democracy was able comparatively quickly, to liquidate the anarchy which threatened the almost overthrown people's economy with annihilation, and to stop the strikes which were called to help the counter-revolution and to establish economical and political consolidation because the proletarian dictatorship suppressed the counter-revolutionary forces, taking away from them their freedom, thus guaranteeing for the working classes the return to socialist conditions and the preserving of a free life, with no exploitation.

From the above-mentioned, however, it does not follow that it is correct to call the proletarian dictatorship a "peoples" free state.

Neither is the state free in the case of the proletarian dictatorship. The proletariat and the working classes allied with it, that is: the state of the proletarian dictatorship is therefore not free, but freedom-guaranteeing (for the working classes) and freedom-oppressing (for the overthrown exploiting classes.)
Heller, who considers herself a Marxist, formally accepts the examination of human freedom, done from the class-viewpoint. But the category of class-freedom remains only an abstract phrase during the course of the actual examination of freedom.

The most important proof of this is, that when Heller examines the situation created by the socialist revolution, she denies that the decisive momentum of jumping into the realm of freedom has already happened, and relegates this jump into the distant future. If Heller would have examined the question in this case from the class-viewpoint, she could have observed that for the proletariat and its allies, the proletarian revolution brings a decided change from a freedomless condition into freedom, even when the complete realization is also a continuity for the proletariat, which is consummated with the building of communism. (Note No. 32: That the jump into the realm of freedom in connection with the socialist revolution, in Heller's opinion, is only a romantic Utopia, in this case she examines the question formally, from the viewpoint of society's totality, from the viewpoint of "humanity" (if there is oppression, - there is no freedom). Basically, however, she is thinking with the head of the former exploiting classes and widens their oppression into universal oppression and want of freedom. (Note No. 33 - It is not without interest to also point out that Heller, owing to her incorrect concept, defines the conourse-points of progress in total opposition to those of Marxism. While, according to Marxism, the grabbing of power by the socialist revolution in an explosion-like jump and radical transition, and the development into Marxism is gradual and not like an explosion, - Heller contends, that viewed from the problem of freedom, the socialist revolution is only a gradual transition, while the development into communism is a radical, explosion-like jump.)

On what theoretical basis is she denying the democracy of the proletarian dictatorship? She emphasizes essentially two reasons:

a.) The main characteristic of socialist democracy is that the masses themselves direct the affairs of the state, and that in the connection of state and masses, the state should be an implement in the hands of the masses. Heller - as we analyzed in detail - denies this relation, and for this reason in her opinion the existence of the state is irreconcilable with democracy.

b.) Heller deducts the want of socialist democracy not only from its being placed above the state-society, but from the relative underdeveloped condition of the productivity of labor. The societies, split into opposing classes, but even the socialist societies, are characterized by the 8 hour, or longer, working day, and for this reason Heller thinks the realization of genuine democracy is impossible.
We have already discussed the first reason for Heller's concept of democracy, in detail, therefore here we are going to examine the second problem only. Heller's questioning is based seemingly on a Marxist thought: the emergence, development and termination of the state is actually connected with the division of labor and the productive potentials of labor.

In this relation we can emphasize one indirect and one direct connection. The indirect connection: that the fundamental cause of the emergence and preservation of state is society, split into opposing classes. The formation, preservation and termination of the classes, moreover, is connected most closely with the division of labor and the increase of labor's productive potentials. Engels in the "Anti-Dühring" observes that one of the basic reasons of the formation and preservation of the exploiting society is that in the interest of increasing productivity, owing to the low standard of labor's productivity, the instruments of productivity necessarily will be concentrated in the hands of a few.

The direct connection: the primary class society which grows out of the primitive community needs the separate state-power not only for the reason that the ruling class can make its rule over the exploited secure only through it (although this is the decisive reason), but also for the reason, because the low standard of labor's productive potentials make it impossible to perform the increasingly complicated functions of the state through the method of social self-government. In this relation the formation of the separate state-machinery is the peculiar form of the division of labor.

Heller's concept, however, disclaims democracy not only for the present but also for the future of socialism. According to Heller, the condition of the realization of genuine democracy is such a decrease in working time, which can be realized only under fully developed communism.

Heller is well aware of the fact that democracy is a "state-concept", it has meaning only in relation to the state. With the dying-away of the state, democracy also dies, because without force and oppression, the question becomes senseless: who are free in the state, what class can use its democratic rights. The consequence of Heller's concept, therefore, is that genuine democracy is realized only when it actually dies away and ceases to exist.

The core of Heller's faulty concept is that she narrows down the idea of democracy to primitive democracy. She generally identifies primitive democracy with democracy itself and everything else which does not fit into the framework of primitive democracy, she excludes from the idea of democracy. With Heller the pattern, the polis-democracy of Athens, which has sunk irrevocably into the past, where the individual and social interest was not yet separated, when every free individual participated in the state's affairs, when the common and individual matters of men melted together.
Heller's conception is equally faulty and distorted historically and theoretically. The picture painted about the polis-democracy is strongly idealized, an utopia projected into the past. Heller "forgets" that the history of ancient Greece is interwoven with class struggles, just like the history of later class-societies, and not only with the class struggles between slave-owners and slaves, when abstractly - one would be able to imagine the unity of slave-owners, as Heller depicts it, but with the desperate class struggles between the slave owners themselves. The frequent changes in the Athenian constitution illustrate very demonstratively that in the polis-democracy of Athens, behind the formal equality, what bitter struggles were waged between the poor and the rich, and among the rich, between the different groups, and in consequence of this, how the individual interests of certain groups of the free did not coincide with the interest of the total society, and to what extent some groups exerted themselves to use the state in order to further their interests.

Heller, therefore, when she evaluates the Athenian polis-democracy, makes the form absolute, disregards the contents and so highly overestimated the importance of primitive democracy.

The idealization of polis-democracy and the upholding of it as a pattern for modern democracy shields a characteristically unhistorical attitude. The primitive democracy is particularly the democracy of the city-states, than can emerge only in small communities.

In larger states the primitive democracy is unattainable and it is not accidental that in the societies following the slave-owning society - with the exception of a few Italian city-states - the direct, primitive form of democracy did not take root either in feudalism or capitalism.

With all these, we do not intend to say that primitive democracy was not an early and relatively highly-developed form of democracy, the democratic character of which was extraordinarily plastic, and directly perceptible by men.

We find among the positive characteristics of primitive democracy that all of its beneficiaries participate in the discussions and activities related to the affairs of the state, and consequently they consider themselves direct participants in the state power. The possibilities of bureaucratization, of climbing above society, are also very limited in the primitive democracy.

But that generalization of Heller is exceedingly faulty, which points out these characteristics as indispensable criteria of democracy and for want of these, she disclaims the existence of genuine democracy.
Heller forgets that democracy in the societies, split into opposing classes, is always the advocate of the actual governing power of a certain class, expressing its rights to freedom and to other democratic rights.

Every state is a class-state and as such, the bearer of the oppositional unity of democracy and dictatorship.

From a theoretical viewpoint every exploiting state is partly a democracy and partly a dictatorship. The difference is in the forms of democracy and dictatorship, or whether that democracy is applied to the whole ruling class, or only to a certain segment of it. For this reason, the modern bourgeois democracy - which is not a direct democracy, because it is not built up on the representative basis - for the bourgeoisie is a genuine democracy just as the primitive democracy was genuine for the Athenian polis-citizen.

The unity of the opposing nature of democracy and dictatorship asserts itself in the proletarian dictatorship, also. Proletarian dictatorship primarily means a genuine democracy for the oppressed, even when the forms of government of the proletarian dictatorships are indirectly democratic, that is built up on a representative basis. The proletarian dictatorship naturally must endeavor to melt the positive features of the "primitive" democracy into the mechanism of the proletarian dictatorship and draw as many people as possible into the direct performing of state functions. The progress of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union and in the peoples' democracies advances in this direction, the councils continuously are drawing more and more people into their work and the mass-organizations are taking over an increasing part of the state functions.

The reader probably notices that the criticism of Heller's state concept is essentially nothing else than placing the well-known Marxist-Leninist ideas about proletarian dictatorship in opposition to Heller's opinions. But this is not our fault. One of the main arguments of Heller's revisionism is that we should not debate with her about detail-problems inside Marxism, but because she brings forward - even if she does not say so - the most fundamental questions of Marxism and makes them subjects to debate.

Before we close the criticism of Heller's state concept and start to examine the social sources of her concept, we must discuss her opinions about the mutual influences of morals and rights, which are organic parts of her moralizing state-concept.

IV.

Morals and Rights. [Morality and Legality?]

Heller, contrary to her state-concepts, dedicates a separate chapter to the relation between rights and morals. This chapter has the peculiarity, that it does not discuss at all the problem of
socialist rights and morals. She examines the problem on the
general level of rights and morals. Heller wrote a work about
general ethics and she naturally has the right to lift this uni-
salinity to such a high level, that she is able to disregard even the
general problems of the socialist rights and morals as particular
ones, and excludes them from the problematics of general ethics.

The examination of morals and rights, however, detached from
the social forms - in case the author pursues closely her goal-
would have brought only very meager results.

Heller is not satisfied with a few general remarks, which
are genuinely connected with the totality of rights and morals, but
reveals a whole chain of connections in the relations of the two.
The secret of the surprisingly numerous general characteristics:
Heller mechanically transfers the legalities of the rights and morals
of the exploiting societies to the socialist community.

Heller by revealing the general legalities of moral and
rights goes even beyond her revisionist concept about the state.
There, at least, even if subordinatedly, she discusses the qualita-
tive difference, although it is true that the tendency of this was
directed to the leveling of the difference. Discussing morals
and rights later, she does not acknowledge any qualitative dif-
fERENCE. The legalities of exploiting rights and morals as generally
dominating principles, appear as principles valid in any society.

The central idea of Heller's legal concept is that right,
like the state, is morally negative. There is a close connection
between her state and legal concepts. We are not to be misled,
however, that Heller discovers the difference between legal and
moral, the immorality of legality, with the help of formally parti-
cular reasons. Behind all this, her anti-state concept is con-
cealed and the dehumanized right of the alienated state faces "human"
morals.

What are Heller's basic principles? According to Heller,
the first and fundamental cause of the collision of rights and
morals is the formality of rights. She thinks right to be ab-
stract, that examines man not in his totality, but as a trans-
gressor, who injures what is right. It starts out not from man,
but from some abstract legal category into which it pigeonholes
the man himself.

She finds the other cause of the differences between rights
and morals in the emergence of legal mechanism which is the legal-
appearing form of the alienated state power.

"The legal adjudication and judgement is done mechanically
at the courts. Every man, every "case" loses its uniqueness and
particularity. Legality as the great leveler of the state power
grinds the individuals in the legal system also." (Note No. 34 -
Heller, quoted work, Vol. II p. 260.)
The conclusion of Heller's anti-legal concept: placing the "outward" right in opposition to "inner" morality.
"For this reason right, as formal right, always faces man as an outward power. Man never can feel it to be his own." (Note No. 35, Heller, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 209.)

And in order that we should not remain in doubt that the extraneousness of right is valid only for the opposing class, Heller states unequivocally: Similarly to the general use of men as instruments of the state power, right is an extraneous, strange power for everybody.

Right, as part of the alienated state power is extraneous not only for the exploited, but also for some members of the exploiting class, whose class interest became objective in the existing legal system. (Note No. 36 - Heller, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 259.)

Heller's anti-legal concept betrays not only the fundamental ignorance or distortion of the socialist jurisprudence, but the misinterpretation of the legal concepts and morals of the exploited societies, also.

The basic fault of her concept is that she magnifies the difference between the legal systems and morals in the exploiting states, and thus makes their mutual characteristics secondary. In consequence of this the fundamental truth disappears, that the rights of the exploiting societies and the morals of the exploiting originate from a common source and serves identical class aims, and for this reason, considering their social functions, the mutual characteristics are the dominating ones.

The situation is not, therefore, one in which the state in the class struggle would play a generally negative role in the development of society and in the rights of exploiting societies. The fault of Heller's concept is that in confronting rights with morals she disregards the negative features of the morals of the exploiting classes and thus creates such a polarizing process, in which morals will be considerably more positive as the actuality, and the rights more negative.

To reach her goal, Heller starts a metaphysical play. When comparing rights and morals, she compares not the totality of rights with the morals existing in society, but selects certain aspects of the rights and compares those sometimes with the totality of class morality, but only with the righteous moral judgment.


When we compare rights with the totality of the morals of the exploiting societies, it will be evident that this morality is characterized by essentially the same features. And if the right, as indirect expression of the class-interest, shows these features in a sharper outline, the difference is only in degree and not qualitative.
Heller's first argument concerning the differentiation of rights and morals, that when she judges man, she starts out not from man, but from a legal rule. Posing the question in this way is one-sided. To condemn someone on the basis of one legal rule, not one, but two factors are needed, one norm and one man, who injures the norm. The norm in itself is just as insufficient to condemn someone, if that person did not injure the norm, as the human action itself - not generally, but in the infringement of the right becomes legally impeachable.

In this connection right is not different qualitatively from morals, where similarly the action of the man and the moral norm will be connected.

Heller supports her arguments, asserting that man is an individual as far as morals are concerned, but he is not that for the right. Heller here falsely identifies the primitive, long-obsolete exclusively action-considering legal concept with the modern legal teaching, the basis of which is the individual attitude, that is the examination of the individual circumstances, aims, etc. of the legal transgression. Naturally, modern jurisprudence has such a field also, where essentially the system of objective responsibility is established, for instance, the responsibility of the owner on a dangerous concern, but this is an exception. Heller, therefore, in order to contrast rights and morals in the sharpest possible manner, identifies an infinitesimally small part of the modern bourgeois legal concept with the whole.

For this reason Heller is mistaken when she says that right absolutely detaches itself from man, whom it is willing to consider only in his relation as a legal transgressor. (The other aspect of Heller's contrasting similarly follows a misleading line. As far as the contention that right examines only one aspect, is misleading, to such a degree is the other notion false, that it is exactly ethics which would be the "science of evaluating sciences", which examines every connection before it pronounces ethical judgment - when Heller herself points out that an occurrence might be morally negative and at the same time politically or in some other connection, positive; this means that the moral consideration either is total, but is composed of given aspects.)

Not less faulty is Heller's second argumentation, according to which right always faces men as an extraneous power. Heller tries to prove this contention primarily with the assertion that the history of societies does not know any absolute legality. "There is no right without legal transgression" - she writes. Legal transgression, however, is a proof to the extraneousness of right, proving that right is alien to man.

Heller's viewpoint can be attacked from two aspects, even when it is narrowed down to the field of exploiting states' rights and morals: the necessary legal transgression is not a peculiarity of the legal norm, but an unavoidable concomitant of every system.
of norms. As far as it is true, that there is no absolute legality, to the same degree it is true that there is no absolute morality. In certain exploiting societies the injury to moral rules - exactly because of the want of state-force - is even a more general than the legal transgression.

But legal transgression either is not a valid argument about the general extraneousness of right. Heller here again transposes the ideas and identifies right with legal transgression.

The proof of this is that when Heller wants to make concrete the extraneousness of right, she brings forward legal punishment as an example. She states that men do not feel the punishment as connected with them, and then identifying punishment with right draws the conclusion that generally men face right as strangers. Heller overlooks the fact that right is achieved not only when it is transgressed against, but even then, when it is generally complied with by the masses. It is true that the observation of right in itself is not yet a refutation of its extraneousness, because its observation might be originated by the force of extraneous fear. But the exploiting class does not observe right generally through the masses (in spite of legal transgression in some fields) - because the observation of right is assured by the state-force, but because the legal conditions, as sanctioners of the proprietorship of the ruling class, are identical with the most fundamental interests of the ruling class. (Note No. 36 - Marx and Engels in "The German ideology" point out that the contradiction of the interests of some members of the ruling class with the state and right is subordinated to the common interests of these same members. "Exactly the assertion of the will of the individuals, who are independent from each other and of the will of their own - which will, in its antagonistic attitude to each other is necessarily egotistical, making self-negation mandatory in law and right - self-negation in the exceptional and assertion of their rights in the every-day case." (Marx-Engel: A nemet ideológia - The German ideology, 1952, Szikra, p. 112.)

With all these, naturally we do not want to say that the contrasting of rights and morals does not have some relative justification. Right, as the will of the ruling class, becomes objective in the form of laws and for this reason, it functions for men - owing to its appearing-form - as a rule issued from an outward source. Heller, however, overlooks the fact that the extraneousness of right is primarily formal. Whether men think this formally extraneous rule to be extraneous also as regards their contents, or not, is decided by whether the extraneous rule coincides with their class-interests and with those inner requirements of theirs which are formed on this basis. For this reason, the complete contextual and formal extraneousness of right exists only in relation to the exploited classes, for whom the legal rules generally represent such directions which are inimical to their interests.
In this relation right genuinely opposes the morals which reflect the interest of the exploiting classes.

The shortcomings of Heller's contentions come really into bold relief, when we try to apply them to the relations between rights and morals. In this relation, Heller—owing to her fundamental concept—in the socialist rights emphasizes those, which are identical with the preceding rights, that what differentiates "right" as a form of consciousness from the other forms of consciousness and neglects the essence, that this right is Socialist and for this reason, even in its legality it essentially loses the negative characteristics of the exploiting legal systems.

The general characteristic of the socialist right is that educational function, which becomes more and more its prominent duty. Socialist right can perform this educational duty only if it does not scrutinise man in the solitary relation as a legal transgressor and does not treat him mechanically, "grinding the individuals into the legal system."

Even the extraneousness of right essentially disappears in relation to the majority of people. Socialist right expresses the will of the working population and as such, following its main line, it is in harmony with the interests of the working masses.

I would like to discuss two examples to prove this. Is the constitution of the peoples' republic which is not one legal rule of the many, but a fundamental law, to which every law must conform as an extraneous power facing the masses as an alienated product of an alienated state power? Actually the constitution is the realization of centuries-old struggle and of the desires of the masses, which the masses regard as their own. Is the law of the Plan which is the fundamental law of the peoples' economy, such a leveling factor of men, which uses the individual only as a screw in the huge machinery? The law of the Plan emerges with the active cooperation of the masses, its realization is the result of an immense amount of initiative and innovations. All this proves that people regard a plan which is in harmony with the economical laws of socialism as their own and do not consider it to be something that is a power foreign to them or is forced on them.

The extraneousness of the socialist right, therefore, asserts itself consistently only as regards the former exploiting societies. It can be noticed again, that when Heller holds right generally as extraneous in relation to socialism also, she generalizes the relation of the vanquished exploiting classes to right and makes it represent the totality of society.

The socialist right becomes "inner" through a process, which starts with the emergence of the proletarian dictatorship and lasts until the right dies away. Socialist right is differentiated from the identically class-featured socialist morals in that it employs
state-force also, and this way when discontinued or maintained, the characteristics of extraneousness also are discoverable in it. In this relation the branches of the socialist legal system diverge from each other; the directions of the penal law that the offenders generally think to be more extraneous than, for instance, the rules of the civil process. (We must not forget, however, that in penal law, even if the transgressor holds the penalty as foreign, the injured and damaged ones see the legal rule as their own.)

We are not to think that the extraneous features of the diminishing socialist right would appear facing the socialist morals. In the overwhelming majority of cases those people think right to be extraneous, whose moral concepts differ from the norms of socialist morals and for this reason, in their opinion, the legal rule is an extraneous force.

Heller's negative estimation of the Socialist right has another source, also. Namely, she mixes the transgression of law and the transgression of right together. She disregards the fact that the transgression of law is a subdivision of the transgression of right, which can be committed only by the representatives of the state power, state government or legislature, when they abuse the rights lawfully given to them.

The transgression of legality really contradicts the socialist morals, and is incompatible with socialist morals. The transgression of legality, even if it cannot be completely eradicated from the socialist order, essentially is a foreign and exceptional occurrence in socialism and therefore it is incorrect to construe this phenomenon as an aspect of general legality. The use of transgression of legality, moreover, contradicts Heller's own logic, also. Heller can not deny either, that in the cases of legal transgressions the collision is not between morality and legality, - therefore not positive morals are opposing the negative legal rule, but the positive legal rule opposes an obsolete morality.

Heller's legal and moral concept is no new discovery, by any means. It is nothing else but the resuscitation, in "socialist form" of the Kantian opposition of legality to morality. Although in the first part of her work Heller separates herself from Kant, this separation, when examined, remains an abstract one and the element of agreement becomes the dominating factor. How can it be proved that the opinions of Heller and Kant are essentially identical in this question? If we compare the Kantian idea with the Marxist concept, we will see that Marxism does not reject the Kantian idea "a limine" (completely from the beginning) and concedes its rational core. Kant is right when he says that the observation of legal rule might contradict the inner moral imperative of men, that is; the extraneousness of right and the inwardness of morality under certain conditions and inside certain limitations can be contradictory.
Kant's fault, therefore, is not that he admits the possibility of contradiction, but that he disregards the concrete changing contents of right and morals and thus overstresses the reality of contradiction, beyond the boundaries of validity and makes it a general and universal law.

Heller's opinion differs from Kant's concept in that she does not remain entirely on the level of generalization, but makes a detour discussing the relation between class-rights and class-morality. Through a concrete analysis, however, she does not reach such conclusions that would weaken the Kantian thesis, but on the contrary, the analysis, conducted from a class viewpoint, only strengthens it.

"Owing to the class-character of right and to the peculiarity resulting from it relation to morals, the most absolute and most completely developed contrast of right and morals is springing forth." (Note No. 39 - Heller, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 261.)

Heller, therefore, discusses the connection of class-rights and class-morals from the beginning on the Kantian basis, and for this reason emphasizes in the connection of class-rights and class-morals strengthening Kant's thesis. How far behind she leaves, thus, the attempt to establish the concrete truth, is proved by her assertion that follows the above quotation.

"And this contrast is, that although the moral sense of the exploited in certain cases indifferently acknowledges the injury of right, while in other cases approves it." (Note No. 40. - op. cit.)

In the first sentence she mentions that the analysis, made from the class-viewpoint, leads to the most absolute contrast. (Note No. 41 - Heller, in order to justify the Kantian thesis, even violates the Hungarian language; inasmuch as the word "absolute" means something complete, perfect and total and as such cannot not be graduated, there is no such thing as more absolute or most absolute, because the original word means an ultimate value.) Her next sentence, on the other hand, asserts that this possibly most general contrast can be proved by the fact that in certain cases the transgressions of the law is viewed by the exploited (therefore not even by the total population) with indifference or approbation. Heller's arguments, therefore, contradict the fundamental thesis, and prove the relativity of the contrast and not its universality.

From all these we are justified in drawing that conclusion, that Heller's standpoint is the modernized variation of Kantianism, augmented with such an experiment, which serve to prove: that the class-character of the rights and morals does not contradict the Kantian legitimacy, but on the contrary, strengthens it.

Heller's Marxism-deviating revisionist concept theoretically reflects the pro-counterrevolutionary attitude of certain segments of the petty bourgeoisie, and its support given to the forces which
defeated the counter-revolution. These segments were vacillating be-
tween capitalism and socialism before 1956 and in connection with
the counter-revolution, they entertained such utopian-eclectic
daydreams, that the counter-revolution will preserve for them cer-
tain positive, by them acceptable features of socialism (for instance,
the liberation from big capitalist competition, the termination of
economical crises, the democracy, etc.) and at the same time ends
the negative features of proletarian dictatorship, the planning
economy which restricts private commercial and industrial activity,
the dictatorial characteristics of the proletarian dictatorship,
etc. in a word: they desired contradiction-creating bourgeois way
of life, without contradictions.

These segments never viewed the proletarian dictatorship,
for inwardly they did not consider it as their own, and for this
reason, they easily generalized the faults committed before 1956,
to make them appear as unavoidable, regular and legitimate short-
comings. In their opinion the suppression of the counter-revolution
was the continuation of these shortcomings, and consequently they
viewed the future pessimistically.

These segments genuinely feel as foreign, certain measures
of the socialist state, regarding themselves as instruments in the
hands of the state. Their standpoint as regards force is exceed-
ingly illuminating. These segments of the petty bourgeoisie do not
generally reject force and they do not disapprove the changing of
the peoples' democracy with the help of force. However, that force
of the state which is directed against them, and especially the
suppression of the counter-revolution, in their thinking, is
entirely negative.

The thesis that "every subject is an instrument of the state"
and the negative evaluation of the force of the proletarian dictator-
ship, with Heller is really nothing else than the projection to a
general level of the bourgeois consciousness, and the generali-
ation of the consciousness of the less-educated petty bourgeois
segments.

For these people the socialist right really appears as extra-
necous, and the observation of the legal rules often revive in them
the conflict of legality and morality.

The categorical negation of the jump into freedom also origin-
nates from the emotional experiences of the petty bourgeoisie segments.

The peoples' democracy radically transforms the situation of
the petty bourgeoisie, also, and to a certain extent also restricts
its rights, for instance: makes it impossible to become the big-
bourgeoisie. (At the same time the entire procedure coincides with
the objective interests of the petty-bourgeoisie.)

On account of this, the petty bourgeoisie feels that, in a
certain respect it is liberated in the socialist order, while in
other respects it feels that restrictions are hindering its progress
and thus the idea of the jump into freedom appears to be ironical.

The negation of socialist democracy, relegating its realization into the distant future, actually expresses the yearning of the petty-bourgeoisie for a bourgeois democracy. The petty-bourgeois citizen is misled to the greatest degree by the formal character of bourgeois democracy and consequently in his opinion the discontinuation of certain forms of bourgeois democracy (for instance the cessation of the multi-party system) is nothing else but the liquidation of democracy.

One of the illusions of these segments is that they take seriously the assertion that bourgeois democracy is the state of the entire population and in consequence of this, in the proletarian dictatorship, in the rule of one class, sees not only the restriction of democracy, but its final cessation. Demonstrating the petty-bourgeois character of Heller's concept does not necessarily mean to say that Heller subjectively identifies herself with this petty-bourgeois standpoint. This, however, does not change the fact that Heller, influenced by the revisionist ideology and by her own experiences, expresses this standpoint ethically.

Morals and Politics.

We have already emphasized in the Introduction that we intend to present the political criticism of Heller. So far this was obvious, since we discussed its connection with the state and right, where the political content of the ethical viewpoint is most conspicuous. Here, however, we turn to the criticism of ethical categories themselves. Here, in a certain sense of the word, the connection is enhanced between ethics and politics, because in the center of the analysis there stands not the relation of the individual - which also necessarily and directly has political coloring - to the state and right with their condensed political content, - but the building up and finishing of the ethical problems and categories.

But the problem precisely is to demonstrate that these peculiarly ethical questions and that graduated abstraction, demanded by the subject, not only does not terminate, but if possible, even brings into sharper relief the political connections.

The general ethical character of Heller's ethics seemingly contradicts this. Assuredly, general ethics discusses those universal questions of morals, which have certain mutual characteristics in all class-societies. (Such as for instance, Heller's legality-morality problem, discussed in the Introduction.) And for this reason often the semblance presents itself, as if it would be absolutely necessary to maintain the correct political viewpoint when some concrete class-morals are discussed, but would be much
less satisfactory in the field of ethics. The semblance is as if Heller's "above class", "free of politics" standpoints would originate from this general character of ethics, or rather from this also. This is correct to the extent that this discipline, abstractly makes it actually more possible for the objectivity of the ethical reflection to slide down into the direction of objectivism and thus end the party-mindedness. But this can happen only as an abstract possibility, because at this high point of ethical abstraction the same Marxist principles and political contents must be asserted, as on the lower level, for instance in the analysis of a concrete class moral.

On the level of general ethics two bad extremes can put this abstract possibility into practice. One of these conceivable bad extremes - originating from the political-theoretical concept of the "leftist" deviation - stiffly projects into the past that highest form of the relation between morals and politics, which becomes socially characteristic during the transitory period, and inside the framework of this, projects it back into the past - as a truism equally valid to all class-societies - the essentially problemless connection of the social progress and parallel development. This bad extreme - carried out "ad absurdum" - would try to present universal definitions about the explanation of the morals of different periods on the basis of the morals of today's workers, detached from moral progress and made absolute. The second bad extreme - and this is Heller's - on the other hand can not go beyond all that emerged in the field of morals before the development of proletarian morality and became socially-formally accepted, weighing proletarian morality itself on the basis of those moral traditions which are validated, but are interpreted according to their arbitrarily given contents. The first bad extreme at least has that advantage over Heller's that it perceives in the morality of the workers the most developed morality of the class-society, although not seeing it in its actual and final complexity, it can grasp it only as a situation, but not as a upward-arching continuity, - in spite of its interruptions - and the consummation of this continuity: the transformation of the worker-socialist morality into universal-human morality in the class society.

These two bad extremes - both in its own way - are forced to declare their own bankruptcy before the central problem of general Marxist ethics. This main structural demand is that the actual historical march of moral progress must be recapitulated on a logical-theoretical level, and thus can the road be determined that leads to its highest point, the contradictoriness of this progress and its disruptions, then its arching higher and higher in our own historically interpreted period. This is the question: Is it able to portray inseparably the steadily widening stream of the disillusionment from bourgeois norms, with the increase of the acceptance of the new socialist norms? Is it able to condense
theoretically in its categories this historical development and as one of its episodes, the purified resurgence of the positive elements of the moral inheritance in the socialist morals of the workers, is it able to describe the seeds of the communist morals? Is it able to condense this "paleontology" of moral progress, beginning with the ancient community to the last phase of the class-societies, and, as a central point, can it describe the morality originating from the workers' movement? And is it able to discover the shaping - "embriology" - of this later development in the consciousness of the workers, where this process is taking place in an abbreviated manner?

No, the understanding and materialization of this process will be impossible for Heller, owing to her political starting-point. This starting-point makes her theoretically incapable of walking the road from the summit of moral development, reached in capitalism, which would lead forward, to the understanding of the morality of the working class. The second bad extreme at the same time can not walk this same road backward. While Heller, precisely for this reason, is unable to understand specially the morality of the working class, the "leftist" deviation comes confusedly to a dead stop before the problem of moral inheritance. But is it possible to "understand" one side of a contradictory unity, that we are unable to comprehend the other side? Evidently not. And thus, on one side, Heller's, becomes overvalued, illusory, what becomes underestimated and degraded on the other side, that is: the problem of moral inheritance. We can see that the political attitude, the acceptance of the standpoint of the most progressive class, or its refusal (the bad interpretation of this at the "leftist" deviation) condensedly appears in the field of the structural problems of general ethics. But only those tendencies are achieved here on a higher grade, which most directly present themselves in the most concrete problems of ethics. Let us take for instance, the problem of legality and morality. Heller here is unable to demonstrate the perspective of these two factors, unable to go beyond their capitalistically featured essential antimony. But here, on the higher abstract level of general ethics, that fact comes forward that it can not and will not see in our everyday life, in the thousand facts of reality the new relation between socialist right and morals, is unable to understand and interpret socialist right as the minimum of our morality. Therefore, in the general ethical concept of legality-morality, in the lifting of this problem above classes and history, finds only an abstract expression the fact that Heller from her "third fellow-traveler" standpoint is unwilling and unable to understand the facts of socialist progress.
In the totality of ethics, however, the most formal, most structural features constitute a concrete totality with the features having the most concrete contents. The source of the deformities and faults which appear in the structure of theory, which is the most abstract expression of the contents, always can be traced back to the most concrete political standpoint, as this latter also gains a structural form for itself in the structure's erection.

Thus, in connection with general ethics there disappears the illusion of being "above-class", that illusion as if the political contents could remain comparatively hidden on this level. But, inseparably from this, that opinion is unveiled, which, even if it is undeclared permeates Heller's ethics, which is evident at every turn, according to which scientism can not be compatible with that aim of the Marxist ethical philosopher, by which he wants to secure such a place for the epoch-making, ethical problems originating from the interests of the working class, which place is in accordance with reality. This claim, however, is not verified even by the historical analogy, because, for instance, the theoreticians of the revolutionary bourgeoisie by no means saw their own theoretical weakness, but rather their ideological strength in accepting openly the ideological representation of the interests of their class, even when being conscious of its falsity - they accepted it as the representation of the general interests.

If we claim to present a political criticism this evidently can not mean that political criticism does away with ethical criticism. It means only - as we explained in the Introduction - that the all-embracing criticism is the political one. In the opposite case, that is: if the ethical viewpoint would be emphasized, the aim would be to point out in Heller's ethics the faulty line of her "purpose-ethics", from its very beginning to the open anti-Marxist conclusion. This, however, undoubtedly would make more difficult - or, in the case of being unfamiliar with Heller's ethics-impossible for the reader to understand the problems.

The other viewpoint, according to which we let the "par excellence" ethical criticism assert itself only on the second line, is as follows: We are not criticizing Heller because as an ethical philosopher she failed to solve the principal problems of general Marxist ethics. We are criticizing her, because she came forward not with an impartial Marxist claim, but in the interest of conjunctural political aims, distorted the main problems of Marxist ethics. We would like to demonstrate that it is impossible to outline scientific ethics on the basis of a revisionist political concept.

This is the reason why we are discussing under the summary title "Morals and Politics", the main problems analyzed in her ethics. These are the following: Class morals - universal human morals; Individual morals - class morals; Freedom? - The freedom of
the individual! The problem of the norms; Morality-necessity, compulsion; Good and evil, sin; Value-world-historical Good; Aims and means. After all this, we sum up the most important ideological and political consequences, the essence of Heller’s teaching.

I.

Class morality - universal human morality.

One of the greatest shortcomings of Heller’s concept is to be found in this complexity of problems, her distorted notion about the universal and class morality, which permeates the entire system of her ethics. Here we find four different groups of problems:

a.) universal human interest and class interest;

b.) universal human interest in relation to proletarian class interest;

c.) "ethical socialism" and communism;

d.) class morality, the morality of the working class.

a.) Universal human interest and class interest.

Heller, at her starting point, - following Engels -, denies the existence of the so-called "eternal moral values." At the same time she points out that there are existing universal human values, that is lasting moral achievement, positive characteristic abstract norms, which had their development in the course of history. (Note No. 12 - We are going to discuss the problem of the norm's contents and its criticism in the next chapter. This discussion, unexplained and therefore devoid of primary criticism, is made necessary, because as a starting point in this chapter, a more comprehensive beginning of Heller’s ethics is to be made clear, since not only the norm problem, but the starting point of the entire distorted question of raising the problems must be elucidated.)

These universal values (for instance: individual love, honor, honesty, human feelings, etc.) are functioning as abstract norms, which with Heller means, that opposite to certain concrete class norms, they can be explained differently on different class bases; formally every society maintains them, but socially they cannot be realized in the class societies. (Thus for instance, nobody denies openly the existence of individual love, or honesty, etc. but they interpret them differently, in other words, deny them in practice.)

According to Heller, what is the source of this differentiation between universal and class morality, class interest and norm? In her opinion "this was caused by the existence of the class
societies, the differentiation between class interest and universal human interest." (Note No. 43: Heller, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 105.) In consequence of this, the abstract norms are "above the classes, having human characteristics." (Note No. 43, op. cit.) The abstract norms became abstract in consequence of those particular class interests, which always carry with them something of the universal interests. (Note No. 45.- op. cit.)

But Heller raised the question without differentiation in that connection also, that she did not state any difference between the moral interest of the whole mankind and of the classes, as well as between the other components of the complexity of interests (for instance, economical interest.) Namely, until the emergence of the working class, there is a contradictory relation between the moral interest of humanity, the moral progress and the historical progress, which was emphasized most effectively by Marx when he analyzed Great Britain's colonization in India. If Heller would have included this problem - otherwise well-known by her - into the problem - complexus of universal interest, she should have gone beyond the undifferentiated viewpoint of "differentiation."

This would have been necessary from two decisive viewpoints: on the one hand, she would have abandoned the notion that she has to impute such a relation which is characteristic between universal interest and class interest, equally to all historical periods. Because in this way she can reach only such an empty abstraction, by which she does not state anything essential concerning neither the class societies nor the period of Socialist development. On the other hand, she should have kept in mind the center of this procedure, the fact of the historical and world-historical intertwining of the universal and class interest.

She sees though, on a theoretical level, that "the general social contents are carried in a relatively most absolute manner always by the given most progressive class." (Note No. 46 - op. cit. Vol. I, p. 104.) She perceives also that this "general" is presenting itself in the components of the particular class interests. But as soon as she goes further toward the outlining of this thesis, and inside of this to the universal interest, she stabilizes it in a metaphysical separation and originates a separate moral sphere from it. (Note No. 47 - Here too, as in many other cases, Heller solves that ethical problem that has kept the social democrat theoreticians briskly occupied, the problem of the genesis, or rather the function of the moral ideas; that in the field of genesis she acknowledges the historical material concept of morals, but only in the interest of the liquidation of this concept in the question of function. Thus, these values representing universal values, also emerged in the course of the historical class-struggles, but regarding their functions, became "above class and human." At
this point, Heller's fault is not that she makes the problem of
the function more important than that of the genesis, that is:
examines it on the level of ethics as to: What role these once
developed moral customs, norms, play in the life of society,
therefore she does not examine primarily, from what these were
transformed, but what they became, what is their role in the parti-
cular field of ethics. The fault is not the emphasis placed on the
function-problem, but that "only" the historical materialist con-
cept got lost.

With Heller, this separate moral sphere contains the
"genuinely" human element, in opposition to the "class characterized",
which is determined by the special class interest, which is there-
fore "not genuinely" human. In the course of ethical concretization,
purifies the general from the special, the special from the general,
placing the general-made essential in itself, above the merely
special.

This way, however, the class-likeness becomes the opposite
pole of the above-class character, and similarly: the opposite
pole of the merely special, becomes the merely general.

In this idealist ethical concept that historical truth be-
comes distorted in the final analysis, that every class interest
has its historically changing generality. Not counting the interest
of the working class, these interests are developed from being
special to the temporary representation of the social interests,
and later - during the period of the decline of the class, are
submerged into the merely special.

In these social interests, which are formed, developed and
decayed, and again represented by another new class, but always
carried by them, - is the social interest itself or the universal
human interest realized. The universal interest is the constantly
changing aspect of the existing special class interests, the very
same interest goes over to from the special to the general, and
from the general to the special.

The more consistently one class realizes its special and
economical aims during the period of its emergence and victory,
the farther does it promote the universal interest. The special,
in itself consistent, goes over to the general; the attempt to divert
the special from this road - in the interest of falsely interpreted
"general interest" - always injures the general interest. Marx
criticized in this sense those romantic, or rather vulgar economists
(Sismondi, Malthus,) who attacked, claiming "universal interests, or
rather "corrected" the Ricardo economy which affirms the unrestrict-
ced development of capitalist potentialities of production, as an
obsolete, utopistic theory, representing the interests of the small
 producers or other contemporary parasitic factors.

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The emergence of this generalization in the class-societies, naturally is always contradictory and distorted, - as inside this process the progress of morality also goes through certain contradictions, - the other side of the economical progress is the recreation of poverty and misery, the objectivization, fashioning of the creative activity of mankind is done by much modes of production and in such social conditions, that this process at the same time brings forth alienation, change to one-sidedness and distortion, - with different contents on different grades - by all classes of contemporary society. But, no matter how filled with contradic-

toriness this procedure may be, the discussions about the two poles of one contrast, about the mutually defined two sides of the same process. Actually, no extra structure is applicable to the development of humanity, in opposition to the progress of that class heading this march of progress. According to Marx, the special interest of the progressive capitalist class, on a well-defined historical level, materializes "the development of the powers of human pro-
ductivity, and therefore the development of the richness of human nature, as an end in itself. (Note No. 46 - Marx: Theorien über den Mehrwert, Stuttgart, 1905, Vol. II, p. 1/309.)

The procedure, increasing "the richness of human nature" has no special structure in contrast to that process, which is closely connected with the most vital life-sustaining conditions of a special class and which makes human wealth alien through exploitation. Such a special structure can only be created through an idealist abstraction, emphasizing and stiffening of one occurrence of the whole process.

Above the special class-determined historical-economical structures towers a separate floor, a structure which contains universal relations. The situation is identical in the field of moral development, also. *In Heller's "above-class" universal morality, two elements became mystified as forms of consciousness. *On one hand, the primitive norms, that is those minimal, social and moral requirements which are unavoidably necessary for the survival of society, on the other hand the higher-type moral require-
ments, developed through the moral progress (Heller's "abstract norms") of which only their abstractness is mutual, because their interpretation is determined by their class-contents. Heller sees the realization of the universal interest in the mechanical summation of these elements.

The universal moral interest, however, is a higher category than the simple sum of certain formal, "abstract" norms and princi-
ptive norm-components. The universal moral interest can present itself only in that concrete norm-system, it can be developed and realized historically in which the totality of mankind's positive moral inheritance is present, interpreted according to its most pro-
gressive norm-contents, united with the new norm-contents of the
revolutionary class, - in our times only in the moral system of the working class.

Therefore, two important relations are to be emphasized. On one hand that the moral requirements, expressing the universal interest can be realized and made effective only on a special-class basis, on the other hand, that they must appear in contents, and not merely in abstract formal occurrences. Heller interprets universality from the "above-class" and formalist viewpoint. She thinks that she discovers the "universal" in that, for instance, that the landed proprietor and the serf equally holds up as a formal principle the commandment: "Thou shalt not kill." But in this partly that moral fact comes into relief, that both are living in the same society and they both formally acknowledge that moral requirement which is indispensable for the upholding of this society. Therefore, in this the fact of humanity's moral progress is expressed, and in no way its universal moral interest. In other respects, the oppressed express the remembrance of their ancient, primitive community, as well as the confident hope that the empire will be realized one day, where there will be no need of killing off people. Naturally, in both relations of the primitive norms genuine human contents are expressed. But these universal interest, which dialectically carry forward the human contents, which will, in the last analysis, realize the universal interest, can emerge only when these are unified with progressive class-contents and moral contents. But at the same time they lost their formalism, stiffness, one-sidedness, the primary "universal" partnership between landed proprietor and serf will break off, and on the highest level between the bourgeoisie and proletarian.

Heller not only lifts up the universal interest metaphysically into a higher sphere, but with a mechanized and leveling formalism, "distributes" it among all the people living in a given society. Here we already see outlines, - in her opinion about the undivided community of the universal interest - of a practical coexistence, as the final practical result.

In every man there is something human, and the survival of this is of universal interest, - this is the summation of the message of the progressive bourgeois ethicists. The bourgeois ethicist however, stops here, while the Marxist considers it as an unavoidsble, essential, although critically observed starting-point toward the definition of the universal moral interest. This progressive citizen is justified if he mystifies this mutually "human" and with it the achievements of moral progress as "humanum", and assigns it to a special sphere, in order to save it this way by the inhumanity of capitalism. But what is understandable in connection with a non-Marxist theoretician, living in capitalism, it is unforgivable in connection with an ethicist, who claims to be a

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Marxist, who, undoubtedly transfers this "humanum" to the "above-class" sphere, but not in a defensive manner toward capitalism.

In Heller's universal human interest that abstract bourgeois humanist concept is resurrected, which already, long ago, - exemplifying its theoretical and practical impotence - fled into resignation, passivity and contemplation, after it was sentenced by history to this fate. But in the history of the pre-Marxist philosophy, where philosophy was the expression of unelucidated revolutionary contents, played an important progressive role, in spite of all the illosoriness of form. Heller herself pointed out this fact in Chernisevskij's case. She emphasized, that when Chernisevskij talks about the "abstract universal interest of mankind" he always means the actual revolutionary interests of the Russian peasantry. Chernisevskij's heroes actually were not inspired by the eternal "mutual interest" of humanity, but by the class-interest of the Russian peasantry, the class of the "plain people" (Note No. 49 - Chernisevskij etikai nezetei-Chernisevskij's ethical opinions, Szikra, 1956, p. 217.)

Similarly, Heller expounded the thesis, - attacking the mystification of the mutual or universal interest, that "the proletarian does not need the mystification of its own "class-interest" character into universal "mutual interest", since it is actually the "class interest" of the whole humanity, also. (Note No. 50 - op. cit.) At that time Heller was well aware that since the emergence of what bourgeois goals are served by this mystification showing itself either in the interpretation of history, in the theory of politics or in the field of ethics.

After being detached from the road of historical progress through Heller's general ethics, the "humanum" is unable to wage even those pacifist rear-guard skirmishes, which are designated by Lukacs to be the sole business of our century's bourgeois humanism, and from which early in our century, pacifism could have originated, which was filled with false illusions, but was still heroic, (for instance, Jaure's, but we will talk about this later) «(Note 51 - George Lukacs: A polgari filozofia valsaga, The Crisis of bourgeois philosophy, Budapest, 1949. Hungarian, p. 122).

No, because according to Heller, following the logic of occurrences, in the final analysis this "human" changed to an abstraction and made to be "above-class". flowing over to the "non-human", the widest and most general universal interest into the most depleted and most special interest and moral. Heller, discussing the moral contents of the institutions, points out that "...... the more distant is an institution from expressing the important class-interest, or the more universal human content is expressed in it, the more necessary .... (is) the universal joining of forces, "toward the violators of its laws". (Note No. 52, Heller, op. cit.)
What institution is in a given case nearest to the expression of the essential class interest, or, which is equivalent with Heller to the realization of the universal content? For instance, the institution of the state or party, where the class-interests are concentrated in their densest forms. And what is farthest distant, what contains, therefore, the most "human", with which everybody can agree in an abstract way? In a given case, the institution of angling or stamp-collecting, their organization and ideological contents. Heller, therefore, in the last analysis, squeezes the "human" over to the peripheries of social life and saves it by ruining, degrading it, by making it ridiculous. That moral "maximalism" with which she starts her ethics, in the course of ethics, during the period of growing itself to the social concreteness, is being degraded to a "moral minimum" and becomes nullified and discredited. Not only the class-content of the "universal human" is liquidated, but at the same time its most abstract connection with the development of humanity is also ended.

But the theoretical basis of this consequence—here carried only to the extreme—was hidden in Heller's notion, by which she supposes that after the abstraction from class-interest, the universal human interest remains, and after the abstraction from the class moral, the universal human moral. What else is this, than that "eternally" human which was courteously asked to leave, and after going through a change of form which is indispensable for a seemingly Marxist ethics, climbs back again through the window. As, according to Engels, in Marx's theory, at the end only the female monkey remains out of the "eternal woman", so in Heller's thesis—during the course of the practical consequences, which on the ultimate level follow the abstract premises—out of the universal interest and moral, something remains what specifically can not be considered as belonging to the human race.

Heller's faulty concept about the questions of universal and class-morals, universal and class-interests, is only a cultivated consequence of that distorted viewpoint, that she maintains in the question of the fundamental categories of the problem—complex (general, special, singular).

Previously we already have seen how the relation of the general and special was distorted by her. But the distortion of this relation—that is the transforming of the general into independent essentiality, its separation and opposition to the special, the submersion of the special to the level of the merely particular, etc.—necessarily brings about the break in those relations also which tie the singular to the general and the special. Because as soon as the special is downgraded, a concrete possibility present itself, that the singular directly attaches itself to the general, circumventing the special.
But the open or veiled exclusion of the special, as a class interest and the degradation of the special, as a class moral, is the most general structural principle of the bourgeois ethics, the most abstract expression of its objectively apologetic essence. Keeping these in mind, it will be clear later how this revisionist ethical experiment can, - which at the beginning wanted only to partly modify - flow at the end into openly bourgeois, ethical concepts, primarily into that ethical value personalism which radically liquidating this "special", places into the center the general mutual relations of the merely individual man and of the merely general interests.

Through all their existence, the fight against Marxism and proletarian politics never ceased, always being waged in the name of the universal humanum, robbed of its revolutionary class-contents. Heller at this point merely objectively resurrects, and in its final consequences grotesquely exaggerates the viewpoint of those bourgeois theoreticians or revisionists, who are flirting with the movement. Here revision is in part naturally more open, on the other hand more primitive, but its main direction is coincident with that of Heller. The notion of universal interest for a certain period became mystified through the guest appearance of L. Woltmann in social democracy. In Woltmann's opinion, the history of mankind is not only the history of class struggles, but also of the struggles for the interests of all humanity. According to him, human morals are partly developing jointly with class morals, and are partly opposing them, but in any case, it finds its final place in the higher regions. Woltmann characterizes the contents of these morals: "Higher, comprehensive notions about the duties, which control the totality of society and in the continous progress of mankind, establish the notion of universal human obligations." (Note No. 53 - Woltmann; Der historische Materialismus, Dusseldorf, 1900, pp. 400, 396, 410, 376.)

Jaures, who in the theoretical-political field was a revisionist, himself did not fill the most general moral and legal ideas with class-contents. He did not perceive the immanent unity between the strategical aims of the working class and the moral values, developed by mankind. Being a theoretician who deliberately tries to coordinate the idealist and materialist philosophy of history, he exaggerated the function of the moral ideas much more than Heller, inasmuch as he saw in them not only the main-spring of moral progress, but also partly that of the social development. The humanum content of his universal moral ideas shows substantial similarity to the general humanistic illusions of the bourgeois democratic revolutions, with the difference, that with him, from the compact idea of the virtue-terror of Robespierre the terror is already worn off, and consequently virtue itself narrowed down; as a rule the plebeian methods and
plebeian virtues become wholly alien to him. With him abstract humanism means only the resuscitation of bourgeois contents, such a theoretical and practical weakness, which can exert only a defensive pacifism and which symbolizes a childish credulity in the smooth, evolutionary progress of the bourgeois society. "The respect for human dignity" - writes Jaures - is at the same time the respect for human greatness and its unending progress, the respect of nature in every individual, and that duty that we must guarantee the mutual respect for all these individuals to bring them together in an always increasing community, which is governed by the laws of harmonious freedom." (Note No. 54 - Jaures: Pages Choisies, Paris, 1922, p. 228-9.)

In this view of the universal interests, - which is detached from the class struggles and covers the entire society and all its members, - here in the field of ethics appears the abandonment of the class-aims of the proletariat primarily, and only in the second place - of course indissolubly from this, - the desertion of the actual conservation of these values. Roger Martin du Gard described vividly with critical realism, how the ideology of Jaures can co-exist with the essence of that bourgeois revolution which, in conformity with its own nature, does not touch the social foundations of capitalism.

The hero of the novel "The Thibault Family", Jacques, - if we mention this problem now only in connection with the universal values of morality-defending these empty, abstract-humanist values, was unable to identify himself with the revolutionary aims of the workers' movement, his pacifism became bankrupt when the first world war started. In a futile, desperate and again "rebellious" manner, threw his life away for these values. The writer brilliantly portrays that Jacques' death was just as senseless as his life, and that these values can not be transferred into practice this way, but can not at all be preserved.

Since the emergence of Marxism, but especially since the theoretical and practical victory of Leninism, this dilemma ceased to be a dilemma. Lukacs himself often declared - on an abstract level, viewed from the widest historical perspective, - that the interests of humanity are concentrated in the interests of the proletariat. He writes in connection with Liebknecht and Dimitrov, that the proletariat represents "the really progressive interests of the revolutionary class, of the progressive nation, of the whole humanity, of the human race." (Note No. 55 - George Lukacs: Goethe und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1955, p. 37.) Would Heller be able to portray this line on the plane of ethics, after achieving revision according to the Marxist concept of class interest and universal interest?
b.) The relation between universal human interest and proletarian class interest.

No, although abstractly, there would be a possibility to explain in the continuation of her concept, - by whatever theoretical break -, that her thesis about the "man above class" loses its validity when the proletariat as a particular class steps forward. This is one of the most decisive, if not the most decisive watersheds between the Marxist and generally bourgeois, petty bourgeois ethical concepts. The problem is not only ethical, in the narrower sense of the word, but embraces that universal Marxist historical concept, according to which only the working class is able to realize the interests of the entire humanity. We saw that Lukacs, on an abstract level, did uphold this Marxist thesis, although the practical validity and significance of his thesis was wholly distorted by the fact, that this perspective always remained abstract with him, because theoretically and in practice alike, he capitulated before the everyday realization of "the progressive interests of humanity", and before the concrete problems and contradictions of the transitory period. But this real capitulation of Lukacs received Heller's openly anti-Marxist sanction.

Heller in her work "The dissolution of the moral norms" already depicted the historical perspective of moral progress, that "it realizes the absolute components of the abstract norms." (Note No. 56 - Agnes Heller: Az erközi normák felbomlása - The dissolution of the moral norms, 1957. Kossuth, p. 15.) "As soon as the class societies ultimately and all over the world, are followed by the classless society, and that in its communist period, this difference between the abstract and concrete norms will disappear, or rather the abstract norms will be dissolved in the concrete norms and become concrete norms" - she states in her general ethics. (Note No. 57 - Heller: Introduction ... Vol. I, p. 105.) Later she says about these norms that exactly because they are expressing universal interests, "although the concrete norms become unrealizable in practice, still, as requirements can express this universal human interest, and thus they can become the motor and at the same time the means of expression of the human-moral progress... Motor in that sense of the word, that concrete unrealizability does not mean permanent unrealizability, since the history of class-societies, whether men were aware of it or not, objectively leads to the classless society. And means of expression in that sense that the current moral situation of a class can be determined by its norms, in what relation those concrete norms - near or distant, harmonious or opposing - are with the abstract norms and whether they are able to create such new abstract norms or not?" (Note No. 58 - Heller, op. cit. p. 101-5)
And finally, in what does Heller see the guarantee that moral
progress is absolute, in spite of every contradiction and degenera-
tion? In connection with that characteristic of the financial con-
ditions, which "tear asunder" the old sentimental and moral rela-
relationships", she remarks that this moral degeneration did not happen to
the proletariat, which has a different code of morals. "But the
other reason was because the old moral traditions, at least in the
form of abstract norms, remained with the bourgeoisie, and became
realizable for some. And while the abstract norm remains, so long
does the moral material not die away either, represented by the
155).

Translated to the ethical level, what that thesis of Marx
means, according to which the proletariat is that class "which can
not claim any historical justification, only the human one," (Note
that viewpoint of Engels, by which the proletarians recognized
"that their interests and the interest of the totality of mankind
are identical." (Note No. 61 - Marx-Engels: "Collected works,
Budapest, 1958, Vol. II., p. 219). This could mean, without a
doubt, only that all values of the moral inheritance can be realized
only in the concrete class morality of the proletariat, that this
is the only road to achieve moral progress, that the moral values
realized up to that time gain a new interpretation, filled with
class-contents, in the morality of the working class, and finally
that with this class movement begins that period of the moral pro-
gress, which, on a higher level, - as proletarian, socialist and
then as communist morality, - realizes all these requirements.
Concretely: for instance the idea of humanism, which on the highest
level we inherited from bourgeois progress, can be realized and be-
come the actual common treasure of mankind, if its really valuable
and positive components, in a subordinated position are assigned to
their proper place in that proletarian-humanism, which, besides
bringing something new world-historically, attaches itself to the
old, bourgeois-democratic and plebeian contents of humanism. This
attachment, however, is performed in such a manner, that in the
meanwhile, it sheds the formal abstract, contemplative and hypo-
critical limitations of them.

The meaning of Heller's concept is that according to her
supposition, the realization of moral values is generally inde-
dependent not only from the class struggles, but also from the most
advanced morality of the class societies. This concept maintains
that these traditional, bourgeois and in every case degenerated,
distorted and hypocritically misinterpreted moral values to not have
to go through the purifying fire of revolutionary movement and morality
to be transformed into real values.
But beyond this, it also means that the seed of the morals of the future is not proletarian morality, but the formally and generally recognized moral traditions. Heller's standpoint - to be analyzed later - does not leave any doubt, either, that the road to communism is prepared by these traditional values.

The actual connections are broken off, even they are standing topsy-turvy - no matter how many times Heller points to the communist society. This formation by her, on the ethical level, become utopistic, to a final spasmodic clutching to the phraseology of Marxism, because in the field of morality she denies the only existing line of progress, and not only from socialism to communism, but from capitalism-through the workers' movement-to the transitory period of the building of socialism. She does not see that with the workers' movement something begins, that is qualitatively new (naturally not in the field of morals, primarily), and she does not attach the totality of mankind's interests to this movement, which already became a world-system. But, if she is not doing this, she can expect the rescue of the humarmun, the realization of values only from these values themselves even if she does not say so.

According to Heller "during the communist period of the classless society", the discrepancy between abstract and concrete norms will cease. In her concept only in this period will the universal human interest coincide generally with the class interest. Marxism, however, dates this coincidence much earlier: from the emergence of the workers' class as an independent class. (We have already mentioned that Heller knows this thesis theoretically, but here it is also revealed that she does not consider the ethical application of its to be obligatory.) Therefore, if we would try to characterize the only existing road of the progress of moral inheritance with Heller's phraseology, it would sound something like this: the abstract norms gain a new class-interpretation in the practice of the workers and in their system of moral norms, since the universal and proletarian interests form a complete unity. In practice, the complete overflowing of the abstract norms into the concrete norms of the workers happens during the period from the beginning of the workers' movement to the realization of Communism. In this case the idealist wagueness would serve only as a veil over the actual contents.

About all this there is not a word from Heller. According to her, progress develops on the field of the abstract norms (the "absolute occurrences"? of these are realized) and the concrete class-norms are passively "waiting" for the overflowing of these absolute occurrences.

As, according to Heller, the moral progress follows the line of the abstract norms, she determines the same way in these norms, the "motor" of this progress, and at the same time its "means of expression."
Here Heller does not point out by what production-social conditions inside the moral sphere this moving power is transmitted and so this direct interpolation of the notion of "motor" has idealistic nuances. Surely, in the moral aspect of human practice and in the forms of consciousness reflecting this, the changes influencing the total life of society or maybe only a few decisive fields of it, show themselves always "post festum". And here we never can talk about progress in the immanent, reflected and only deducted sense of the word. Even the self-perfection of the individual does not mean immanent progress toward the realization of higher moral requirements - even if it would seem so to him at the end of a relative period of this process. This thesis could be much less valid concerning the whole of humanity, the moral progress of which is depicted by Heller at this point, that its moving power is supplied by those unrealizable norms which will be realized later in communism.

If, however, we drop the misleading notion of the "motor", we can only ask this question correctly: which are the most agile components, which react most directly to the changes in the production-social and political sphere?

If we designate those elements of progress which are most agile, then at the same time we are also pointing out those that express the actual level of this moral development. According to Heller, the abstract norms always indicate this moral level, and only on this can the contents of the particular class morals also be weighed.

However, the connections here, too, are made topsy-turvy again, but in this the structure of Heller's distorted concept finds adequate expression, in the fact that she is unable and unwilling, too, to condense the true march of morality's progress in her theses and categories. Namely: The essence of her viewpoint is that in the field of morality that expresses the most human, most universal value, what is most generally accepted and asserted by men, and with what the social average can agree, irrespectively of its own class-standpoint. We have already previously mentioned this relation of the problem, which defines this "universally human" on a leveling and formalistic basis. Now we are bringing up the problem from the aspect of moral progress, and inside this, from the aspect of the new moral contents, as they appear in the workers' morality. Let us take, for instance, the norm of loyalty. This norm, even today, lives in the mental and sentimental sphere of mankind's majority containing those elements which accumulated in them in the course of capitalistic progress. Whether Heller puts this norm of loyalty between parentheses or not, it is unquestionable that even in the most generally determined form of loyalty these are the contents that are effective. In the morality of the working-class, however, there exists another definition of loyalty, having class-contents. One of its new, distinguishing characteristics is that in it, class-loyalty is placed above the loyalty to friends, and the
latter, influenced by this subordinated position, gains new contents. It is indisputable that the generalized and formally universally recognized norm of loyalty produced valuable human contents during the course of its historical development; but are not contents of a higher order expressed in the new working class rooted norm of loyalty with which naturally not "everybody" agrees, but which expresses universal interest? Even when in the course of its realization and general acceptance it has to go through a series of grave human-moral conflicts. Among other things, it might bring about the breaking off of old-type loyalty to friends or such inner-conflicts, which originate from the primacy of class-loyalty and in the final analysis from the primacy of the norms of public life over the requirements of private life. But this new-type interpretation of loyalty expresses the universal interest not only because it is rooted in the objective aim of the progressive, socialist transformation of society and effects its course with its own peculiar methods, but at the same time - considering its consequences - because only the practical realization of the primacy of class loyalty can bring about such conditions, in which unity destroying political class-conflicts will totally disappear. The already developed and formally generalized human contents therefore, must be trans-valued, further developed in a special non-generalized system of norms not only to express, but to realize the universal interest.

Heller handles formally and one-sidedly this question also: whether a man is justified to report his friend to the authorities because of political reasons. According to her, this is the gravest sin under any circumstances. She does not discuss the political-moral contents of the friend's deed, its gravity and the consequences of it, - although it is evident that these contents must determine the solution of the moral-political conflict, the methods of the solution, that wide scale which makes innumerable varieties possible, from convincing to the complete and conscious breaking off of the loyalty to a friend. And in a given case, the reporting of the friend to the authorities, if he became a counter-revolutionary. As we mentioned previously: the Marxist gives precedence to the requirements of public interest above those of private life. But at the same time he does not deny that out of the realization of this, grave human-moral conflicts might emerge, the basis of which is the collision of moral values of different type and rank. This open disclosure and conscious carrying-out of the conflicts, differentiates at this point the Marxist opinion from that sectarian viewpoint which does not see any conflict here because it sees human contents and moral value in the loyalty to the class interest only.
Marxism in rejecting this fetishized interpretation of the moral norms of private life, on a level of higher quality, reaches back to the highest grade of the pre-Marxist revolutionary moral practice: to the Jacobinical and in general to the plebeian moral-political practice. Thus, on the scale of Heller's "universally human", this latter also is being condemned, even if it is not expressed.

According to Heller's concept, more human content is expressed in the generally accepted norm of loyalty, than in the most progressive, concrete class-norm. On the one hand, she is not taking into consideration the fact that what is most generally accepted, at the same time condenses in itself not only the positive results of moral progress, but that it is most heavily weighted down with the negative, conservative traditions of progress, also. On the other hand the dialectics of moral progress - reflecting the historical progress in the most comprehensive sense of the word, - at this point demonstrates that those moral requirements which became human or at least formally accepted in general, incessantly lag behind the new "human" requirements, which are in the state of emergence, strictly bound to the class interest and consequently, due to their nature are not accepted generally.

This thesis is especially valid in our age, when the moral regeneration of the whole of mankind is taking place. One of the main aspects is precisely the radical re-evaluation of the crystallized, but at the same time ossified moral norms, through which in the course of the revolutionary social-practice evolves and works out new contents and forms, to replace those that so far were socially (formally) accepted in general, and carries moral progress to the highest level imaginable in the class-societies.

Heller neglects the fact also, that the "most human" of a given age appears not only on the social field in that form which was correctly characterized by Hegel as bad, but on the field of morals also, as the subverter of the hardened and inherited moral norms, as something that "desecrates", or at least loosens these norms. She does not see the contradictions which weigh down the unfolding of the morality of class-societies, and as it generally happens, she stagnates here also on the unconnected, uncritical level of every-day thinking. What average petty-bourgeois citizen would doubt that the most human moral feeling - always, under any circumstances is the upholding of loyalty to a friend?

But this uncritical, every-day thinking nails down old, anti-revolutionary theoretical traditions. The smooth, evolutionary idea of the "universally human", although through long transmissions, attaches itself to that organic theory of progress, that - in the course of bourgeois development - since the formulation of Burke's theory, became an ideological weapon against the
political and moral practice of the revolutionary movements. Let us consider now only the ethical aspect of this problem. Here Burke’s argument against the French revolution is, that it destroys the already crystallized moral values and thus threatens the whole world-system of morality with disintegration. A modern capitalistic apologist, who consciously adopts Burke’s legacy, Raymond Aron, turns this argument against the proletarian revolutions when he completely detaches the "human" and makes it independent from historical progress and puts it into opposition to the revolutionary progress. According to Burke, Aron - and every apologist of the capitalist system - the "most human" concept, which contains the most "humanum" is always the already crystallized and socially accepted moral requirement, and any new movement which opposes it, at the same time undermines the moral values of the entire mankind, the universal human.

In Heller’s concept this theory openly originates from apology and strengthens that. In the primary premises of her general ethics it appears only in abstract outlines: in the one-sided, distorted and evolutionist interpretation of the universal interest and humanum. But as she proceeds toward concretization, this objective apologetic tendency is increased and comes to the forefront.

If, therefore, we reject that concept of Heller’s which condenses the universally human in abstract norms, and weighs the concrete class-norms in their relation to these, in what aspects can we observe the most developed components and most agile elements of moral progress? Unquestionably in those elements in which the new facts of social reality can find their most categorical expression, and inside this, in the moral requirements of the most progressive class in the given period, originated from the class-conditions and objectively determined by them. In those elements, that is primarily in the new class-norms, in which the most progressive class-interest expresses itself most directly and most quickly. On the other hand - and inseparably from this, parallel with it - the whole contemporary norm-system goes through a qualitative transformation, but the center, the starting point of this qualitative change is always the total sum of the norms. Let us consider, for instance, the proletariat. Its organization into a class during the course of the progress of morality is characterized primarily by the transformation of solidarity into class-norms. But the inner-contentual aspect of this solidarity is not only the solidarization of the workers, but at the same time the solidarization in opposition to the capitalists and exploiters in general, the joining of forces against the exploiters. And in accordance with this the inherited norm of humanism goes through a qualitative transformation, because it is filled not only with the new elements of proletarian solidarity, but at the same time with the militant and consciously admitted class-hate of the enemies of class.
And so, in opposition to Heller's idealist construction — the signs of the highest moral progress and its more agile elements are to be looked for in those occurrences, which reflect most quickly the changes in production and class relations and those changes in behavior and consciousness, which primarily are derived — through the channels of political consciousness — from these transformations, and are deeply characteristic of the moral physiognomy of the class.

In what do we find the reason, that Heller designates the criterion of all the moral norm-systems in their relation to the so-called abstract norms? We find it in the fact, that she makes a universal law out of the lesson of that historical fact, that fascism trampled under foot the entire moral inheritance. With Heller it becomes a universal law to evaluate every norm-system in their relation to the already accepted traditional norms, which developed during the course of historical progress. But while this comparison with the traditional norms might express in the field of morality that essential moral degeneration, what fascism means in this relation can in no way express that qualitatively higher grade development, which is filled with new contents, as it appears in the morality of the working class. To what extent can only anti-Marxist opinions be hidden behind Heller's concept, - we might call it "anti-fascist-centric" concept - is evident through the circumstance that while she attacks fascism, she is compelled incessantly to polemicize with the - for her in this sense bad - other extreme, communism, with sociality morality, which similarly means the impairment of those illusorily interpreted abstract norms, which in her eyes are lifted to an ideological pedestal. But in this dread of "extremes", in this rejection of "excesses" at the same time here is being outlined the narrow and vacillating character of her basis; because the praise of the "middle" (the necessarily formal clinging to the abstract norms) can find its conclusion only in the praise of the behavioristic forms of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, she gets dangerously close to that "anti-totalitarian" bourgeois theory, which alluding to the "interests of the social and moral status-quo", to the "moral and social interest of humanity", brings communism to a common denominator with fascism.

This theoretical basis is narrow and illusory, similar to the concept which is hidden deeply in it, that antifascist democracy of Inkaas, which Heller tries to justify on the ethical level.

But since we are not applying the measurements of antifascist democracy to the dictatorship of the proletariat, similarly the stage of advancement of the morality of the working class can not be determined by applying those norms which condense in themselves the earlier moral development. This process is not scientific and objective, not only because it tries to compare the historically and contentually more developed with the less developed, not
only because this moral legacy is by far not so clear and unequivocal as Heller imagines, but - inseparably from this - for the reason also, that because the relation of the proletarian morality to the traditional norms is only a subordinated result of another, contentual criterion of proletarian morality to the traditional norms is only a subordinated result of another, contentual criterion of proletarian morality, of that fundamental requirement which is put up to the class norms: whether they follow the main line of that class and social progress and class practice, from which they originated, and do they express properly this progress and hasten it according to their own fashion? If we answer this affirmatively, then in this there are already present their positive relations also to those traditional norms, in which is expressed in a condensed form the sum total of mankind's morality so far achieved. At the same time we went beyond that theoretical limitation here of Heller's, according to which the contemporary condition of the moral progress can be diagnosed exclusively from the moral sphere and of its system of values. Although here, also, as everywhere, from the problem of morality's progress up to the criterion of the deed's moral contents, in conformity with the Marxist requirement it is necessary incessantly to go beyond the proper field of morals, to the social and class relations. Naturally, this does not mean the liquidation of morality's specificity, only the termination of that bourgeois theory of moral immanency, which is effective in Heller's concept, also.

The only scientific, contentual examination of morality's problems demands the methodological and ideological recreation of that road which not only led to the genesis of moral ideas and systems, but which determines their peculiar social function, giving them a permanent character: that is the support and help to the realization of the concrete class interests in the case of the specific concrete system of norms. We have pointed out already that Heller methodically and theoretically as well, disconnects from each other the problem of the genesis and the function of moral ideas. Here this disconnection so appears in a developed form that Heller puts between parentheses the class-contents of the function of these notions and the role of these notions in the realization of historical-social class aims. She entirely disconnects the criterion of morality's progress from social reality and special class-aims, when she tries to explain their progressive contents out of their relation to the norm system. This idealism, however, can be effective only when it is coupled with its methodological supplementary factor, formalism, that formalism which naturally is inconsequent and unidirectionally prejudiced; because it excludes from its field all contents in general, but "only" those moral contents which originate from the interest of the
most progressive class. But this is only the logical and necessary consequence of formalism and not its starting point: because the starting point is that it purifies the moral legacy (abstract norms) from its social and class determinedness, from that connection which attaches the moral legacy to the real historical perspective of humanity.

Heller is fairly clear in her explanation, that in her ethics she wants to defend the moral legacy of mankind against sectional factionalism and its "moral nihilism". But if this experiment is attempted on a political revisionist basis, or philosophically on an idealist formalist basis - the result can only be the opposite. Heller - on the basis of her inner logic - in the final analysis can go only that far, that she tries to "defend" and conserve this traditional moral substance not only from the sectarians, but from the communist theory and practice also. At this point, however, we are only at the starting-point of her concept, at the first, abstract turning upside down of connections. (Inside this are the connections between the traditional morality and the morality of the working classes.) But these distorted consequences already appear on this level also. Heller uses the illustration that in the policy of cadre-management before the counter-revolution, they neglected to call upon the "cadres" to account for the attitude which was based on the traditional moral values. "When for instance they selected a cadre to do some type of work which necessitated the employment of workers, they examined whether the man agrees wholly with the policy of the party, whether he is loyal to the class, etc. It is correct to ascertain all this. But in their opinion it would have been a petty bourgeois procedure to ask such questions, that for instance, the man to be appointed is kind-hearted, is he a loyal friend, generally truthful (not only in filling out the cadre sheet), etc. That is: it was not considered important in appointing men to certain party posts that these traditional moral values would be discussed.

Among other things, this was the reason that party loyalty could become the safe-conduct of cruelty, inhumanity, personal envy, etc., that is of negative moral characteristic also."


Heller here absolutizes individual occurrences and generally turns them against Marxist cadre-politics, and at the same time detaches cadre-politics from the social conditions. While, for instance, in capitalism a "good cadre" of its own class and rank could and can be only that man who is able to realize in a more than average measure those characteristics which are useful for the bourgeoisie, but are negative from the standpoint of moral legacy (the cruelty, inhumanity, personal envy, etc. mentioned by Heller) - on the other hand it stems from the essence of socialism that a "good cadre" can be only that man who besides being politically
reliable (correctly interpreted), inside this has the positive moral characteristics in a larger than average measure. (If discussed at all, the plain mention of this can not be neglected in general ethics.) Even pre-counter-revolutionary cadre-politics could not change this essentially, although it is an undisputed fact, that the degeneration of cadre-training in that period made possible to a certain degree the division and disillusionment between party loyalty and certain positive human characteristics. But in the majority of cases, party loyalty was only formal here; the conditions made it possible for the bourgeois elements, that hidden behind this formalized party-loyalty, to live within certain limitations according to their negative moral contents. In other respects, no such moral and political life became solidified, which would have helped the loyal and morally solid and unwavering workers and functionaries in their further development. The problem, however, has other and much more important relations, which should have been considered by Heller, if she wanted to express in her ethics more than conjectural political aims. Primarily: Heller often makes the remark that socialism is to be created not by perfect men who are imagined through romantic-utopian concepts, but by such who are carrying with them the deforming effects of class societies. This demagogic allusion to Lenin comes to the forefront with Heller especially, (as we are going to see), where she sees the moral requirements of communism in their completed form in those formally recognized positive characteristics, which were developed in the class societies. Here, however, where the question is an important moral and practical problem of the transitory period, she "forgets" this thesis. The complete assimilation, purification of the moral inheritance, its placing on a proletarian basis through the workers, happens during a long historical course. The workers become the carriers of the most important characteristics of the morality through class and party loyalty, primarily from the direction of the political virtues. Acquisition of the socialist morality naturally can be effected with the help of socialist ideology. The way of the development of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia is different: this segment of society reaches ultimately, the party-loyalty and the elements of socialist morality through that procedure which fills the new contents certain components of the moral inheritance. When the party selects its cadres, primarily the political viewpoints are taken into consideration. But Heller forgets - and on the level of general ethics this is a grave mistake—that class and party loyalty, on a Marxist basis, already contains the most important virtues of public life, together with the willingness to appropriate the most essential positive characteristics. When she acts on one side party-loyalty against the positive moral characteristics on the other side, she obscures that real relation which exists between the workers' political virtues, and generally between their morality and the moral inheritance.
This false concept of Heller's is being made concrete among others, in her opinion in connection with the continuity of moral progress, according to which what guarantees the absolute character of this progress in capitalism, is that the working class remains free "from the degrading effect of the money-relation", and that the moral tradition survives in the bourgeoisie also as an abstract norm or practice. Heller here sees in these two antagonistic classes two carriers of moral progress, having essentially the same rank, forgetting to emphasize the historical and world-historical role of the working class (and of the workers' morality) which exclusively guarantees the continuity of this progress.

In this, that circumstance is playing an important role, that she trusts her abstract norms with a naive and almost superstitious confidence. If she talks about the realization or survival of the positive moral inheritance in the practice of certain bourgeois, and at the same time for the entire bourgeoisie, in the form of "abstract" norms, then she forgets entirely (what she points out at times), that according to her the abstract norms are the appearing forms of the concrete class norms. But she forgets this side-line of her ethics, only to place in the proper center the main line, which sometimes is only hidden; that is: she entirely neglects these class-contents and puts in the forefront only their formal determinedness.

The question naturally, is not that not a single momentum of humanism survived with the people of our own age, as coming from a historically developed requirement (about this later) but solely that in this respect, that is in the relation of the absolute character of moral progress, the moral values remaining with the bourgeoisie do not guarantee this at all. Heller's formalism, however, is able to find positive contents and guarantees for absolute progress, where these contents, viewed historically, are completely emptied and are turned backward. George Lukacs himself pointed out the final apologetic character of formalism, of ethical formalism, already in the case of Kant. Whether she desires it or not this formalism of Heller also flows into the apology of the capitalist society and its morality, and inseparably from this, she theoretically builds a barricade in front of the realization of a historical aim of a "special" class, the working class, the aim of which is to undermine this order and overthrow it.

Surely the moral legacy as an abstract system of norms, as a partial practice, etc. remained preserved on both fronts of the class struggle, and thus the class struggle necessarily involves the partial destruction of these values by the proletariat.
c.) "Ethical socialism" and "communism".

If the universal interest of humanity and consequently its moral interest is not concentrated in the movement of the working class, then that conclusion of Heller's is justified, according to which the universal "above class" moral inheritance contains the subjective, moral requirements of the communist society. Then it is really the direct and undifferentiated common interest of mankind to realize this system. We watched the emergence of this revisionist opinion, from the first distorted appearance of the universal interest and class interest to the false evaluation of the continuity of moral progress, to the essentially identical justification of the human contents of opposing classes.

After these, it is logical that Heller sees the theoretical expression of remembering the ancient community and opening a perspective to the approaching communism, there, where she discusses that Kantian demand that man should not be an instrument for man. (Note No. 63 - op. cit. Vol. I., p. 133-35.) Her following opinion in relation to the universal norms is also logical: "These are those moral norms and customs, which are the pre-requirements that the ancient history of mankind could be concluded and the real history of humanity could begin." (Note No. 64 - op. cit. Vol. I., p. 153) "Would it be at all possible to talk about the communistic distribution as a moral problem, if people, inside a certain circle, the family circle, would not have practiced it through thousands of years? Surely the family, where there are small children, unquestionably is such a community in which the members participate according to their needs, work according to their capabilities, and where the corresponding moral customs and requirements, even is contradictorily, but unquestionably became developed. Would it be at all possible to talk about the possibilities of communism, if through thousands of years, it would not have developed such human characteristics as friendship, solidarity, sympathy, kind-heartedness, helpfulness, humanitarian feelings and consciously at that, on the basis of morality? The morality of the coming communist society, to be developed, will not drop down from the skies, but will develop out of those thousands-of-years old laws of people who lived, struggled, fought, suffered and meditated in the period of the class society. (Note No. 65 - op. cit. Vol. I., p. 156)

Why do we think that Heller is logical when she evolves communism's perspective from the Kantian demand? When the theoreticians of the movement alluded one-sidedly to the classic German philosophy, - since the development of Marxism, - this always was a sign that they wanted to put something "above class", "human interest" into the movement. Engels himself has pointed out in the preface of the second German edition of his work "The condition of
the working class in England", that in his opinion at that time, "which represents only one phase of the embryonic development of modern socialism" that fact is demonstrated, that "one of the predecessors of modern socialism is the classic German philosophy."

"Thus, for instance, - especially at the end of my book - I emphasize energetically that communism is not only the discipline of the working class, but such a theory, the final aim of which is the liberation of the entire society - including the capitalists, from the contemporary restricting conditions.

This assertion is correct in an abstract sense, but in practice is mostly useless, and even worse." Engels explains that because the well-do-to classes are opposing this liberation with all their might, the working class alone will be able to accomplish this revolution. And in connection with those who at that time (in the early 80’s) also preached socialism, which is "above the class-contrast and class-struggle" - "allegedly on an impartial basis" Engels offers the following opinion: "These people... are either beginners, who have yet to learn much more, or the worst enemies of the workers, wolves in sheep's clothing." (Note No. 66 - Engels: A munkascsozta helyzet Angliában, Szikra, 1954, p. 26-7. "The condition of the working class in England.")

This is that thesis "correct in an abstract sense", which is grabbed one-sidedly by revisionism and made absolute - and thus made devoid of its rational contents, - while the "leftist" revision of Marxism excludes it from its perspective as nonexistent. It finds expression in the field of class morality so that the latter neglects to take into consideration that the workers' fighting morality in socialism will be transformed to the communist morality of the entire humanity, after the liquidation of the class-enemies, the re-education of the working masses, that is: after the complete realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the creation of communism. In opposition to this the former, that is revisionist opinion, tries to reconcile this socialist morality with bourgeois contents and want to implant in the contemporary communist movement this bourgeois notion of the wider interest-representation. But at the same time - fortunately - on the ideological level-terminated this socialist moral and the real movement as well.

The particular appearing-form of the standpoint, which is characterized by Engels as "above class" or "impartial" in the field of moralizing revisionism presents itself in the open or veiled theory of the equal moral corporate system. It appears in this manner with Heller, also, inseparably from the Kantianism which shows itself in her theory (the analysis of this will be discussed later), and from the anti-Marxist concept as well, which is connected with the moral legacy. One of the most essential contents of ethical socialism is, that it finds the most necessary subjective pre-requisite
of its "communism" in the directly ready-form of this moral inheritance. On the theoretical and political level alike, this theory reaches the point of giving up scientific socialism, because the uncritical, that is: antialectic, bourgeois and anti-Marxist concept of moral inheritance and corporate system "forgets" what is most essential. It forgets that the realization of the positive elements of the moral inheritance and of the corporate system can emerge only as the result of a long, contradictory and painful procedure, the most essential contents of which is the life and death struggle of the different antagonistic interests, equally on a political, economical and moral level.

Ethical socialism portrays this perspective, realized in class-struggles, not as the final result of a contradictory process, but as such a condition, of which the most concrete prerequisites already developed in the period of class-societies. It holds up this condition as an obvious, concrete reality, while it is transformed into an empty and unearthly abstraction, - and actually communism and its morality can only be "dropped down from the skies." This kind of a lying and mendacious illusion-creating "concreteness" can find its worthy counterpart only in the idea in which communism was made an empty abstraction. (Compare with the criticism of Heller's theory of state: here on the particular ethical level appears that opinion of hers, that the socialist revolution can mean only gradual transition and in no way a revolutionary leap.) However, the necessariness of which she theoretically terminates is the transitory period itself; the historical period of the building of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism, the struggle of differently justified interests and morals.

With Heller the antibacterialism, originated by revisionism here also flows over into the bourgeois criticism of Marxism and inseparably from this, it also proves its theoretical bankruptcy. In a demagogic manner, Heller, in her above-quoted sentence, asks the question: whether we could talk at all about the possibilities of communism without the development of certain, formally unquestionably positive moral characteristics. But the question is equally justified: would it be possible to talk about the possibilities of communism without the dialectic negation of these historically developed characteristics. And on this basis - to use Heller's expression - without such positive characteristics, which developed similarly "consciously" and "on the basis of morality" like anti-solidarity (in opposition to Heller's solidarity, as for instance, the anti-solidarity of the workers against the capitalists in a strike), like selfishness (in opposition to Heller's unselfishness, like justified selfishness, created in the higher class-interests) like denying help (in opposition to Heller's helpfulness), like antipathy (in opposition to Heller's sympathy,)
etc. etc. Unquestionably we are not the ones who in this way are
denying the moral inheritance, the moral achievements of the class-
societies, when we interpret them dialectically and contentually,
when we break through the narrow-minded, bourgeois formalism and
pedantry, with which Heller interprets these achievements, illusorily
on the one hand, and on the other hand - unwillingly, but in con-
sequence of logical necessity, - in a narrowed and mutilated form.
Heller, with her entire concept of moral inheritance, becomes
an unoriginal spokesman of the acknowledged line of ethical socialism.
Not only the neo-Kantians of Marburg, but of Freiburg, also,
including Windelband, saw in the German classical philosophy's and
inside of this Herder's steadily widening idea of embracing all
humanity, the guarantee of the life-community of those peoples which
developed during the period of progress. (Note No. 67: Windelband:
Wesen und Wert der Tradition in Kulturleben, Wien, 1906, p. 12)
However, Vorlander of Marburg came forward in the most decisive
manner with that many-sidedly explained and "proved" theoretical
demand, that the cause of socialism must be taken away from the
"narrow" sphere of the workers' movement and socialism must be
declared as the foundation of the "community-ethics" of all humanity,
which would mean the realization of socialism as a "moral world
outlook." He also deducts the socialist perspective from that thesis
of Kant, that man should be an end in itself, also for the other
man, and not only an instrument. (Note No. 68 - Vorlander: Kant
und der Sozialismus, Berlin, 1900, p. 5-7.) Staudinger, another
neo-Kantian of Marburg, saw the guarantee of the creation of a
society of a higher order in the unbroken continuity of moral
development. According to him, modern socialism is nothing else
than the realization of those ideas which developed in mankind
since Jesus. According to him the aim should be merely to augment
these ideas with Kantian ethics.
These openly bourgeois ideas later on were transplanted
into the movement. (At the turn of the century the social-demo-
crathe theoreticians, like Mehring, Plehanov and Kautsky - on
account of different reasons we are unable to explain here - did
not always succeed in reaching the bourgeois roots and anti-
Marxist soil of these notions. However, the struggle against the
revision of Marxism went on unceasingly. For example: Mehring
already in 1900, correctly pointed out - refuting Vorlander's
above-mentioned book - that Kant on the ethical level did not
enrich German socialism with anything, but rather strengthened the
anti-socialist liberalism of Ruge, Treitschke and others. (Note
No. 69 - Compare Neue Zeit, 1900, II. p. 62) Beside Plehanov,
it is mainly Lafargue's action which is praiseworthy in the struggle
against idealist moralizing. For instance, Lafargue was the first
to state that Jaurès tries theoretically to coordinate Marxism with
the elements of bourgeois ideology.)
Jaures, on the basis of the documents published by Vorlander already in 1891, probably was the first to declare in the social-democratic movement, that socialism did not originate from the extreme Hegelian left, but from the idealism of Luther, Kant, Fichte and Hegel. In consequence "socialism does not concern a party alone, but the whole of humanity and it has to be considered sub specie humanitatis." (Note No. 70 - op. cit. p. 112)

Rappaport, who later also became a revisionist, criticizing the concept of Jaures, pointed out correctly that with Jaures "the revolution starts from the legislative chamber and not from capitalist concern." (Note No. 71 - Rappaport: Jean Jaures, l'Homme, le Penseur, le Socialiste, Paris, 1905, p. 423.) His thesis needs correction only in that Jaures always opposed the idea of revolution and in his mystified legal ideas saw the guarantee not of the revolution, but of that ethical socialism which can be achieved without revolution.

The bad continuity of moral progress and the concept of the all-human moral corporate system is being modified by Heller to that extent, that she sees the expressly subjective moral pre-requisites of the communist society in those positive characteristics, which develop in every human being. The difference, however, is not essential, it is nothing else but the historically necessitated change of color of ethical revisionism, that does not touch its essence, because, for instance, Jaures himself did not entirely neglect the economic requirement of the road leading to communism. The deciding factor is that Heller also sees the moral guarantee of communist society in the positive moral characteristics - viewed without differentiation, abstractly and without contents, - of entire humanity. Meanwhile, in a bourgeois manner, she is forced to distort the category of the family, which carries with itself condensedly all the antagonism of the class-societies. At this point she lags far behind even the utopians and accepts a certain ideological relationship with the syrupy "genuine socialism". Her opinion also has an objective apologetic essence. Surely the family is society's smallest economical unit, its cell, and if in everyone of these units or cells this principle of harmonious distribution is developed, then the progress of class-societies, and especially of capitalism carries unlimited possibilities in itself: it is able to realize communism in the field of morality, even if only in isolated family units. It might be necessary to confront Heller's pertinent opinions with the viewpoint of Marxism's classic about the family. (See, Engels: The origin of private property, family and state.)

Heller is looking at the type of the petty bourgeois family, praising this as the embodiment of communist distribution while the proletarian family - objective - remains in the background in the field of morality. Actually the conditions of existence developed
only in the bourgeois and petty bourgeois families so that generally the principle of "participation according to need" can be achieved. But in the capitalist society, the workers' families often have to face the situation when the existence of a family as a unit and the fulfilment of the basic needs of the working members can be achieved only through the inhuman reducing of the needs of the non-working children, etc., or even through the shortening of their lives or undermining their health.

According to Heller's measuring rod, the principle of unquestionably non-communist distribution would come to naught to that worker family which is mentioned by the proletarian poet:

"Tell me, what ripens the fate of the man, who is working for his family; They are quarreling; who gets the runt, And only the big girl goes to the movies." (Attila, Jozsef, Tell me...)

Translator's note: the runt, the hard inner core of cabbage is considered a great delicacy by the poor people.

Heller here lifts up the notions of the uncritical petty bourgeois every-day thinking to idealized heights, because - primitively - every petty bourgeois morality deeply despises that proletarian family, the meager existential basis of which makes it impossible to distribute according to need and the development of the corresponding "positive moral characteristics". Heller here goes further only in that respect, that she implements this contempt which is based on petty bourgeois arrogance and aristocracy, with historical and theoretical moral justification.

However, on the basis of this uncritical standpoint, which considers the illusion to be the essence, the subjective prerequisites of communism are much better prepared and worked out by the well-to-do, that is: ruling classes, than the oppressed and the exploited.

The most essential, unexpressed basic idea in Heller's revisionism is, that in the moral sphere - already during the period of the class-societies - men as moral individuals, in their mutual relations, in their judgment, etc., go beyond the class antagonisms and their moral projection, that is: in their own sphere they terminate the alienation. However, this is only the other side of the coin, because we have already mentioned that Heller sees the termination of exploitation as the fundamental requirement of ending the alienation. But in this is included immanently - as we have seen among other things in Heller's concept about the family - that the moral progress spontaneously produces the prerequisites of a society of the higher order, spontaneously, and by itself brings about the liquidation of the important relations of alienation. The communist movement, therefore, bringing the open criticism of the bourgeois family, is either harmful as
regards moral progress, or - in most cases - is pounding on the
gates of the communist fortresses, already realized in microcosmic
dimensions. Therefore it is pounding on open gates, consequently
it is useless and futile.

If we are using Rapoport's thesis - quoted and corrected by
us earlier - which is closely related to the concept of Jaures and
apply it to Heller's opinion about the universal and class-morality,
than, according to Heller, the moral requirements of the communist
society are not originated from the capitalist concern, but from
the sovereign seat of moral judgment of such moral individuals who
are above class antagonisms.

Class morality - the morality of the working class

The previously discussed concept of Heller's is necessarily
followed by the faulty and distorted definition of the problem of
class morality. We are going to mention this only briefly. Heller
pays little attention to it, and her opinions are unclarified and
contradictory.

Proposing Marxism's matured standpoint about class morality
as questionable, she asks: Can we talk at all about class moral-
ity? Her answer is affirmative, but only if we avoid the "vulgar
Marxist" typologization." According to her, this means "to analyze
through abstract types, with their help, instead of analyzing
us take, for instance, a representative of the American proletariat
as a subject for an ethical examination. The worker has several
such moral characteristics, which unquestionably do not fit the
type of "proletarian morality." For this reason the problem seems
to be solvable only, if they declare that this man has not a pro-
letarian, but a bourgeois or petty bourgeois morality. Heller
therefore objects to the "vulgar typologization" because "moral
deviation from the abstract morality is nothing else but the mani-
festation of the morality of another class." (Note No. 73 - op.
cit. p. 151.)

Heller explains her own standpoint in opposition to this
typologization. The essence of her concept is that the workers'
morality has to be considered in a given period and country, as a
solid, concrete totality, and not separated inside this, for
instance the proletarian and bourgeois characteristics. This is
THE proletarian morality as such. On the other hand, there exists
a "proletarian morality in its abstract purity" which "is manifested
by the proletarian which became fully conscious... Naturally there
is no absolutely conscious class." (Note No. 74 - op. cit. p.
150-151.)
Heller is right only about the vulgarization of Marxism. The vulgarizers are apt quickly to classify a man with undeveloped consciousness and retarded proletarian morality as belonging to the bourgeois category, not making any difference between the retarded worker-morality and the peculiarly petty-bourgeois mentality, neglecting the fact that this worker is a representative of a higher morality, although on a lower level of it. But in the final analysis Heller is wrong even in her standpoint against vulgarization.

First, because in the above example also, this worker has partly shed inherited and acquired petty bourgeois characteristics on the level which he so far succeeded to reach in acquiring the workers' morality. Second - and this is decisive - Heller in her fight against vulgarization pours out the baby with the bathwater, denying the fundamental thesis of Marxism about the class-determinedness of morals, and inside this, of the moral customs and norms. Because every deviation from the proletarian morality is the manifestation of the morality of another class, the projection of class interests.

On the basis of Marxism there is no need for any particular proof, but in spite of this, we quote Lenin's standpoint in connection with proletarian morality, who expressly talks about "a morality corrupted by small-proprietor existence" in capitalism. Lenin further emphasized that in the worker there are still lurking the "instincts of small-proprietorship, in opposition to the consciousness of the communist-proletarian of the future", and that these characteristics of the working class are "inherited". (Note No. 75 - Lenin: Musvik, Sai jra, 1951-2, Vol. 31 P. 117 and Vol. 27, p. 401. - Lenin's works.)

Heller's anti-Marxist standpoint has its own ethical-political purpose. She needs to outline on one side the "concrete morality of the workers" (for instance the contemporary morality of the American workers), as the only existing and genuine morality of workers, the workers' morality as such. She is doing this without demonstrating the forward-pointing and backward-pulling tendencies in this heterogeneous totality, the phases of the already developed morality which - led by political consciousness - are progressing in a continuous warfare, fighting the customs of small-proprietorship. On the other hand, as a counterpole, outlines "proletarian morality in its abstract purity" (what is this if not the most definite typology?) that never can be realized because "no absolutely conscious class exists". The situation here is identical with that which we have seen in the case of democracy; the building of socialism is unable to guarantee genuine democracy, and, anyway, in communism there can be no talk about democracy. Changing what has to be changed: Heller's abstract proletarian morality can never be achieved" in its abstract purity". That grade of the workers'
consciousness, which here is a prerequisite of Heller's, can be achieved only in communism, - but then not as "proletarian consciousness" and the morality built upon its foundations can not be proletarian morality, either.

We have mentioned that Heller's standpoint is self-contradictory, because in addition, she herself is forced to admit that the morality of the different classes mutually affect each other and is forced to loosen that abstract antithesis, which is construed by her between her own typology and the concrete morals of workers. The main line, however, remains as characterized above: Heller handles the particular concrete morals of workers as homogenous totalities and by not disclosing in them the struggle between the old and new, she leaves them stagnant on the theoretical level and degrades morality. And she tries to measure it with such an unattainable gauge, which by itself hallmarks the inferiority of the concrete morals of workers. Heller does not want to see that in this field the real aim can be only the describing of that process in which the practical-political practice and consiousness - influenced by the essential class-interests - produces the proper moral characteristics and norms, - in a never ceasing struggle with the "inherited" negative, bourgeois-petty bourgeois customs and norms.

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