THE SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIZATION FOR FOREIGN
INTERNAL DEFENSE IN 2010

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

CHRISTOPHER K. HAAS, MAJ, USA
B.A., Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**Title:** The Special Forces Organization for Foreign Internal Defense in 2010

**Authors:** Major Christopher K. Haas, U.S. Army

**Abstract:**
This case study analysis reveals that a successful 2010 FID/counterinsurgency organization requires unity of effort; coordinated and effective intelligence; minimum use of violence; integrated psychological warfare operations; effective mechanisms to enhance legitimacy (both U.S. and host nation); precision targeting of the insurgent infrastructure; perseverance; and patience. The organizational structure that has the capabilities of meeting these requirements is a "new" organization that calls for the current Special Forces Group organization to form the nucleus of this new Special Forces Group 2010. The organization consists of a group command structure augmented by an Interagency Coordination Detachment. Reporting to the group command is an enhanced group staff, two Special Forces battalions, one support battalion, one civil affairs company, one psychological operations company, one signal company, one military police company, one aviation company, and one engineer company. This organizational structure offers maximum flexibility with limited direct U.S. involvement while providing effective support for the host nation to win the support of its people and defeat the insurgency.
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The opinion and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIZATION FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE IN 2010
by MAJ Christopher K. Haas, USA. 165 pages.

Using the case study methodology, this thesis examines the question: what is the most effective Special Forces organization for the purpose of conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) combat operations in 2010? The subordinate questions are as follows: (1) what were the organizational characteristics and capabilities that directly affected the successful outcome of three previous counterinsurgency operations? (2) what characteristics best illustrate the probable 2010 counterinsurgency environment? This study focuses exclusively on three successful counterinsurgency operations, one British (Malaya) and two U.S. (The Philippines and El Salvador).

The case study analysis reveals that a successful counterinsurgency organization requires unity of effort; coordinated and effective intelligence; minimum use of violence; integrated psychological warfare operations; effective mechanisms to enhance legitimacy (both U.S. and host nation); precision targeting of the insurgent infrastructure; perseverance; and patience. The organizational structure that has the capabilities of meeting these requirements is a “new” organization that calls for the current Special Forces Group organization to form the nucleus of this new Special Forces Group 2010. The organization consists of a group command structure augmented by an Interagency Coordination Detachment. Reporting to the group command is an enhanced group staff, two Special Forces battalions, one support battalion, one civil affairs company, one psychological operations company, one signal company, one military police company, one aviation company, and one engineer company. This organizational structure offers maximum flexibility with limited direct U.S. involvement while providing effective support for the host nation to win the support of its people and defeat the insurgency.
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The inspiration for this effort comes from my parents, Kenneth and Sally. I would not be proudly serving in the U.S. Army today without their inspiration, guidance, and infinite love. My father also provided his literary skills to edit my thesis.

I also wish to thank my wife, Betty, without whose support and enthusiasm I would not have been able to undertake this project. Her many acts of unselfish love allowed me the time to complete this study. Finally, I wish to thank the Lord for his grace and countless blessings.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Only the dead have seen the end of war.¹

Plato

Background

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dramatic events that followed signaled the end of the cold war era. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union released much of the hostile tension between the East and the West and ushered in a new international security environment that United States government officials have characterized as the New World order.²

The former equilibrium in the international security environment based on the balance of assured nuclear destruction by the superpowers has become history.³ Likewise, the now obsolete policy of containment that directed the formulation and conduct of past U.S. foreign policy has been replaced by the policy of engagement and enlargement. As the nation enters the next century the breakdown and reconfiguration of the Soviet empire has made the international security environment a more complex arena and the nature of international conflict more confounding.⁴ In the last eight years since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the rise of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and religious intolerance have dramatically altered the causes of international conflict and reshaped the battlefield. Specifically, the forces of violent ultranationalism and ethnocentrism have propelled some regions, once dominated by the Soviet Union, into civil war and anarchy.⁵ When these internal conflicts are combined with those
currently plaguing what a decade ago was Yugoslavia, a more accurate description of the current international security environment is the New World Disorder.

Forces of violent ultranationalism and ethnocentrism threaten to disrupt and destabilize regions in other parts of Europe and the Middle East and Africa. In Slovakia, ethnic tensions seethe between Hungarian and Czechoslovakian minorities. In Bulgaria, the Turkish minority despite recent reform efforts by the government, demands more political influence in national affairs. In Western Europe, Basque separatists terrorize Spain in their quest for a independent state, while the Belgian government struggles with renewed Flemish and Wallon animosity. In the Middle East, Kurds struggle to carve out an autonomous homeland in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, while religious and secular factions vie for control of Afghanistan. In Israel, the tenets of Hebrew fundamentalism clash with the nationalistic aspirations of Palestinian with such distrust that all peace efforts are tentative while, across the Persian Gulf the forces of Islamic fundamentalism fostered in the mosques of Iran threaten to disrupt the current stability of the region. The ongoing Tamil insurgency threatens not only the stability of Sri Lanka but also its neighbor to the north, India. On the African continent, these same religious forces continue to terrorize Algerian society while, rival warlords and politicians wage tribal genocide in sub-Saharan Africa as they compete for hegemony. Particularly in the sub-Saharan regions, mounting evidence indicates that economic and demographic conditions will continue to deteriorate, increasing the possibility of a Central Africa entering into another period of war and chaos.

Historians and political scientist predict that these multiethnic nations will continue to experience instability, internal strife, and civil war. Sovereign governments will clash with ultranationalists and ethnic minorities. Government reform programs will fail to resolve internal grievances. Dissatisfaction with government programs will progress into acts of terrorism, lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. Sovereign governments will have to battle against these
forces to maintain their existence. Those governments that fail to defeat the insurgents will see their country divided into new national or ethnic homelands. Internationally recognized borders will dissolve as ultranational and ethnic factions declare their independence and carve out new territories. The recent civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union serve as examples for the next century.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction also threatens the new world order. Their introduction poses a serious threat to regional stability and to U.S. national security interests. The U.S. should expect rogue nations like Iran and Iraq to continue their aggressive policies to obtain nuclear weapons. Countering the proliferation of these weapons is a serious challenge for the U.S. in this post Cold War era.

Previously, the U.S. Army had the luxury of focusing primarily on the Soviet threat in Central Europe. The Soviet threat was predictable. The U.S. military intelligence community could easily template their military forces and predict their most likely course of action. The U.S. Army studied and understood Soviet tactics, doctrine, and procedures. In this post cold war era no such luxury exists. Passionate ultranationalism has replaced the expansion of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the primary threat to peace and stability. Foreign internal conflict and widespread regional instability no doubt will dominate the post cold war era.

The Role of Special Forces in the Future

U.S. Army Special Forces will play a vital role in combating this threat and in determining the successful outcome of foreign internal conflicts. Special Forces language skills, regional focus, and cultural awareness has the potential to increase the overall effectiveness of any U.S. military effort in regional conflicts. The unique and unconventional capabilities of these soldiers expand the potential options available to the National Command Authorities to restore stability to regions vital to U.S. national interests. These capabilities also provide theater
commanders with strategic and operational advantages that cannot be duplicated by general purpose forces.

Operation Desert Storm and the interventions in northern Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia demonstrated the unique and effective capabilities of Special Forces, across the entire spectrum of conflict. Recent interventions have demonstrated this nation’s commitment to stopping violent anarchy, subversion, and terrorism. Similar events in the future will no doubt trigger U.S. military intervention and the employment of Special Forces.7

Despite these recent events, the U.S. Army has undergone a significant reduction in force. The steady decline of personnel has taken the active force from eighteen divisions to just ten in less than a decade. The forward-deployed Army of the 1980s, has largely returned home to the continental United States. The Base Realignment and Closure program has significantly reduced the number of training bases for returning forces. Despite these significant recent cuts, further reductions and base closings loom on the horizon, and the debate continues to rage over the exact force structure for the twenty-first century Army. The Army leadership hints that the current end strength of 495,000 will most likely drop to 475,000 within the next few years. Some members of Congress talk of even deeper cuts in personnel. Regardless of the outcome, in the Army as a whole, Special Forces will have to contend with two competing realities: a limited (if not shrinking) operational budget and a growing number of threats to regional stability, which includes insurgency, terrorism and civil war.

The recent shift in this nation’s national military strategy attempts to compensate for these reductions. The 1995 National Military Strategy incorporates a policy of flexible and selective engagements involving a full range of military missions and capabilities designed to shape the evolving international environment.8 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, recently formulated an underlying strategy for all services to follow as they prepare
their forces for the twenty-first century. This underlying concept called Joint Vision 2010 serves as the operational template for the evolution of the Armed Forces into the twenty-first century. This template focuses on achieving dominance across the full range of military operations through the application of new operational concepts. It provides a common direction for all services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of programs and doctrine. Joint Vision 2010 incorporates the improved intelligence and command and control systems available in the Information Age and outlines the development of four operational concepts: (1) dominant maneuver, (2) precision engagement, (3) full-dimensional protection, and (4) focused logistics.\(^9\)

The Army, in response to Joint Vision 2010, recently released the Chief-of-Staff’s vision of the Army in the twenty-first century. This vision of the Army, entitled Force XXI, consists of new power projection forces, stationed primarily in the continental United States with the capability to rapidly deploy and operate across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army implemented the *Force XXI Campaign Plan* to redesign the entire operational force structure into a new power projection force. The end state of this ongoing redesign effort is to transform the Army into a lighter, more flexible force with the best available weapons technology and digital communications.\(^{10}\) Theoretically, the Force XXI Army will dominate information warfare and defeat adversaries with a broad range of sophisticated technology in a joint and increasingly multinational environment.

Today, only the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) actively participates in the *Army Force XXI Campaign Plan*. Eventually, the other four active groups will participate as the momentum increases to redesign all Army operational units. A commentary by Major General (Ret.) Sidney Shachnow, Commanding General of Special Forces Command from 1992 to 1994, recently expressed the importance of vision during this transitional period. He stated:

> Once we had achieved our goals, bureaucracy took over. We became top heavy and as an institution we forgot how to test, experiment, and learn new ideas. We began to prefer
debate to experimentation. It is time to remind ourselves that today’s profits are traceable to wise and bold decisions made many years ago. If we are to profit in the future, we must continue to focus on what is to be rather than what has been.11

The total Army concept outlined in the Force XXI Campaign Plan seeks solutions in improved technology, digitization, and restructuring operational forces. The Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) concept seems focused primarily on proposals to restructure the force. Lately, two proposals for restructuring ARSOF for the twenty-first century have received a great deal of attention. They are the Notional “X” Command12 and the “Exceptional Force.”13 General Shachnow is the proponent of the Notional “X” Command organization (figure 1). Major General (Ret.) William F. Garrison, who commanded the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School from 1994 to 1996 is the proponent of the “Exceptional Force” organization (figure 2). Both Shachnow and Garrison believe there is a need to completely reorganize the Special Forces Group organization in order to deal with such nontraditional missions as counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and promoting democracy on a full-time basis.

Therefore, both officers recommend new combined arms organizations, or tasked organized Army special-operations brigades. The two organizational concepts described by Shachnow and Garrison combined Special Operations Forces (SOF) with general purpose forces into brigade-sized organizations. The individual task organizations of their two organizational concepts are quite similar. For example, both organizational concepts include special forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, infantry, aviation, military police, and combat service and combat service support units under the command and control of a special operations brigade headquarters. Although these two proposals for restructuring Special Forces have received a lot of publicity within the special operations community, the future nature and structure for Special Forces remains undecided.
The fundamental problem for ARSOF in general and Special Forces in particular is how to restructure in the context of Joint Vision 2010 and Force XXI and still maintain the unique unconventional warfare capabilities of the force. A study of past counterinsurgency organizations can provide valuable information and ideas for any decisions regarding the restructuring of Special Forces for the twenty-first century.

Significance of this Study

This study contributes to the current debate on the most effective force structure for ARSOF in general and Special Forces in particular, for 2010. Considering the volatility and complexity of the new security environment, the time has arrived for the Special Forces community to consider alternative force structures better organized and better equipped to handle the new world disorder. The strategic and operational continuum has changed and the time is now for Special Forces to change. The problem lies in how and in what manner to change.

An analysis of past insurgencies and the organizations that defeated them is crucial to any future restructuring effort. By examining the organizations of past counterinsurgencies the community can gain valuable insight into their unique capabilities and characteristics that may no longer exist in today’s force structure. Capturing these capabilities and characteristics allows Special Forces to create a template or model for force structure development and to ultimately develop an effective organization. The foundation of this study rests on the development of an organizational template that embodies the capabilities and characteristics of successful counterinsurgency organizations.

The primary research question is: What is the most effective Special Forces organization for the purpose of conducting foreign internal defense (FID) combat operations in 2010? The subordinate questions are as follows: (1) What were the organizational characteristics and capabilities that directly affected the successful outcome of three previous counterinsurgency
operations? (2) What characteristics best illustrate the probable 2010 counterinsurgency environment?

Scope

This study focuses exclusively on three successful counterinsurgency operations, one British and two U.S., and the military organizations directly responsible for these successes. The study concentrates mainly on the combat operation phase of the counterinsurgency efforts. The entire spectrum of conflict and causes of the insurgency extend beyond the scope of this study. The time periods examined for each case study are as follows: (1) the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines from 1946 to 1954; (2) the British counterinsurgency in Malaya from 1948 to July 1960; and (3) the insurgency in El Salvador from January 1981 to 1992. This study focuses on three cases to corroborate the conclusions and recommendations. Whereas discussion points collated from two case studies could be considered coincidence, the discussion points and similar successes developed from three different case studies would more closely affirm potential conclusions and add more legitimacy to recommendations.

This study examines three successful counterinsurgency operations and organizations. For all intents and purposes this thesis eliminated operations and organizations in Vietnam. It also avoids the so-called parochial view of counterinsurgency operations. The Malayan Emergency case study was selected because it avoids the parochial bias of Vietnam and provides a chronologically significant study. The cases cover a time span from the close of World War II to the beginning of this decade. Although the insurgents operated in similar terrain, this terrain is located in different parts of the world. Even though the political ideology of all the insurgents was fundamentally the same (inspired by Marxist-Leninist doctrine) the external support or sponsoring parties for these insurgencies differed substantially. By selecting these three case studies this study deliberately departs from the norm and avoids restating the previously published
lessons learned concerning the usefulness and desirability of counterinsurgency organizations (based almost exclusively on the Vietnam experience).

Through an analysis of these particular case studies, this study can communicate the less provincial and often overlooked lessons learned in the Philippines and El Salvador. It is intended that the analysis of these three case studies will provide successful examples of counterinsurgency organizational structures which Special Forces can use to structure future, more effective counterinsurgency organizations.

This study does not intend to discount the importance of training, leadership, morale, or doctrine in counterinsurgency operations. Rather this study concentrates on the importance of organizational structure from which these other important aspects of counterinsurgency can evolve. Therefore, this study only discusses counterinsurgency doctrine, the insurgency organization, and the impacts of technology within in each case study to illustrate a direct correlation or linkage with the capabilities and characteristics of the counterinsurgency organization.

Limitations

This study uses only unclassified sources and documents. There exists a substantial quantity of classified material on this subject; however, the available open source documents are adequate to make this study valid.

Delimitations

This study does not address joint perspectives to restructure the United States Special Operation Command or proposals to restructure U.S. Army Special Operations Command. This study focuses exclusively on restructuring the Special Forces group organization and its subordinate commands down to the company level. It excludes restructuring the Ranger and
Special Operations Aviation Regiments or the Civil Affairs and the Psychological Operations units. The study addresses restructuring the Special Forces group for the sole purpose of conducting counterinsurgency as part of the overall FID program. The restructuring of Special Forces for each of its principal and collateral mission is beyond the extent of this study.

Most importantly, this study does not consider the complete FID operational framework as defined by joint doctrine. The complete FID operational framework consist of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements. The military element alone consists of three separate and subordinate categories. This study focuses exclusively on the narrowly defined combat operations category within the overall FID operational framework.14

This study focuses mainly on the term counterinsurgency and partly on the term Foreign Internal Defense. The delineation of these two terms is critical to the overall understanding of this thesis. Joint doctrine defines counterinsurgency as those military and paramilitary actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency15 and defines FID as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.16 The military plays a significant role in supporting the FID program. Military FID programs are categorized into three elements: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations.17 Traditionally the U.S. military’s involvement in FID has focused almost exclusively on counterinsurgency. Although much of the current FID effort remains focused on counterinsurgency, FID programs today may aim at other threats to host nation’s internal stability. These threats includes civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism.18 Hence, counterinsurgency or the support of a host nation’s counterinsurgency campaign is only one in a series of integral FID programs designed to protect or free a society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
Furthermore, the term FID did not originate in public law until 1986. Prior to this time, U.S. doctrine classified or grouped the myriad of operations currently defined as FID combat operations under counterinsurgency. Herein lies the interrelationship and distinction between the two terms. Therefore, this thesis will focus primarily on the term counterinsurgency, since it applies directly to the three case studies. The term FID does not appear in the reviewed literature, but does apply today and will apply in the future as the doctrinal term encompassing counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the primary research question uses the term FID.

Methodology

There are many methods to determine military organizational force structures. Historically, the organizational structures of SOF have evolved by learning from past successes and failures and by conducting a thorough threat analysis. The requirement to defeat a particular threat generates a specific force requirement which in turn generates a specific task organization. The new organization is then manned and equipped for its distinct mission. This thesis essentially follows that methodology in four sequential steps.

First, this thesis examines three successful counterinsurgency case studies to determine the principal characteristics and capabilities of the individual counterinsurgency organizations. The next step identifies the common characteristics and capabilities of all three organizations, by analyzing the combined data from all three case studies.

Step three entails developing a specific organization. The intent is to develop an organization that embodies the common characteristics and capabilities of past counterinsurgency forces and within the boundaries of current doctrine. For example, based on the hypothetical requirement to conduct reconnaissance and then precision strikes against a remote insurgent base camps, the organization would require an organization that includes Special Forces and Ranger
units. Following this methodology, this study can build a specific organizational model that resembles a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) unit at the Special Forces group level.

Step four compares and contrasts this organization with the current Special Forces group organization and makes recommendations to modify or validate the requirement for a new organizational force structure.

Assumptions

This study makes the following assumptions: The current security environment will not significantly change in the near future. For example, the emergence of another Soviet Union, peer or near peer opponent, will not occur within the next decade. Nationalism, civil war, ethnic, and religious hatred and insurgency will continue to influence the emerging international security environment. Special Forces will play the primary role in FID operations around the world. Joint and Army FID doctrine will remain essentially unchanged for the next decade.


6 Ibid., 21.


The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations is a National Command Authorities decision and serves only as a temporary solution until host nation (HN) forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. In all cases, U.S. combat operations support the HN internal defense and development (IDAD) program and remain strategically defensive in nature. The primary role for U.S. military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support and service support means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements. If the level of lawlessness, subversion or insurgency reaches a level that the HN forces cannot control, U.S. forces may be required to engage the hostile elements. In this case, the objective of U.S. operations is to protect or stabilize the HN political, economic, and social institutions until the HN military can assume these responsibilities.

Indirect support operations focus on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to the self-sufficiency of the host nation. The U.S. military contribution to this type of support is provided primarily through Security Assistance (SA) and nation assistance, supplemented by joint and multinational exercises and exchange programs. Direct support (not involving combat operations) are normally conducted when the HN has not attained the self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, and military threats beyond its capability to handle. Assistance focuses on civil-military operations (CMO), communications, intelligence sharing and logistic support.

Special Operations Forces are an integral part of FID. The U.S. Special Operations Command is, in fact, the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID mission. In fulfilling its mission, the command provides Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Special Operations Forces in support of geographic combatant commanders. Commanders should use these culturally oriented personnel to assist the FID mission. SOF contribute to the...
FID effort under the operational control of the theater Special Operations Command, which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. The primary SOF mission is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces. SOF operations in support of FID may be unilateral, but more likely these activities will support other ongoing U.S. military assistance efforts.

19Public Law (10 USC 167).
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

It should be the duty of every soldier to reflect on experiences of the past, in the endeavor to discover improvements, in his particular sphere of action, which are practicable in the immediate future.

B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts On War, 1944

Introduction

This chapter reviews the unclassified literature on each of the three case studies that form the foundation of this thesis. Additionally, it examines and highlights Army and Joint doctrine in order to describe the doctrinal interrelationship between counterinsurgency and FID. Finally, it identifies the common themes that dominated the literature and scrutinizes the authors' opinions in order to determine any bias or partiality. This literature review examines Army and Joint doctrine first, then the Malaya case study literature second, and finally the two U.S. case studies on the Philippines and El Salvador, respectively, to provide a more coherent flow of common themes.

Army Doctrine

The Army's primary publication on counterinsurgency and FID is Army Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, dated December 1990. This publication, currently being updated for publication in 1998, provides a foundation for understanding the complexities of operating in the four major types of low intensity conflicts. These four major operations, according to Field Manual 100-20, are: support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency
operations. The section on support for counterinsurgency describes in detail the interrelationship between counterinsurgency and FID and the role the United States military plays in both.

The role of the United States military according to Army doctrine is to provide equipment and training that supports the host government’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy. Field Manual 100-20 defines IDAD as:

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgents organizations pose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally preemptive strategy against insurgency; however if an insurgency develops, it is a strategy for counterinsurgency activities.²

Although each insurgency is unique, this manual furnishes four universal principles that can guide efforts to defeat an insurgency. These principles are: unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and responsive government. Field Manual 100-20 describes unity of effort as the essential means to coordinate action and centralize control at all levels to prevent or to defeat an insurgency. It refers to maximum use of intelligence as the basis for all action and minimum use of violence as the best method to maintain order and support in the society. Responsive government relates to the government’s ability to mobilize manpower and resources and to motivate its population.

Most importantly, the manual provides a model organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct counterinsurgency activities (figure 3). It states that although this model organization must vary depending upon the country and the existing situation, the basic architecture should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the host nation’s counterinsurgency plan. This model organization is for implementation at the national level for the purpose of achieving a coordinated and unified effort at both the state and local levels.
As stated previously, according to doctrine the U.S. supports counterinsurgency based upon the principles of the host nation’s IDAD strategy. More specifically, U.S. military resources provide support to a host nation’s counterinsurgency operations in the context of FID. Field Manual 100-20 defines FID as:

The participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. The U.S. ambassador, through his country team provides the focal point for interagency coordination and supervision of FID. Military support to FID is provided through the unified commander-in-chief. The U.S. conducts FID operations in accordance with the IDAD concept. Military resources provide material, advisors, trainers, and security assistance forces to support the host nation government’s counterinsurgency operations through security assistance organizations (SAO) and the Country Team Concept [figure 4]. More direct forms of support may be provided when required.\(^3\)

Herein lies the interrelationship. The host nation conducts counterinsurgency and, in accordance with doctrine, the U.S. military supports the host nation counterinsurgency effort through FID.

The manual describes three different forms of FID support: security assistance, advisor and trainer, and Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF) support. The FIDAF structure is the most relevant form of support for this study (figure 5). This FIDAF is a conceptual, composite organization which augments the SAO when needed. This FIDAF, when created, operates under a unified command or subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF). Its mission is to assist the SAO with training and operational advise to the host nation security forces. Field Manual 100-20, asserts that this force “should be a specially trained, area-oriented, mostly language-qualified, and ready force.”\(^4\)

Finally, the manual reinforces the importance of an indirect role for U.S. military forces. This does not mean excluding direct assistance, however, it does mean that the U.S. should rarely engage in combat operations against insurgents unless some unusual occurrence results from a unique set of circumstances. If such an occurrence arises then U.S. forces can use direct action in support of the host nation, but once again these operations should be strategically defensive in
nature. Direct support in FID focuses on intelligence sharing, communications support, civic action, and civil military operations, including civil affairs and psychological operations.

**Joint Doctrine**

Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, is the primary source focusing on the broad category of U.S. operations involving the application of all elements of national power in supporting host nation counterinsurgency efforts. This publication amplifies the fundamental principles of FID discussed in Field Manual 100-20 and expounds on the organizations, planning considerations, employment considerations, and training responsibilities associated with FID efforts.

This manual describes FID as a program involving all elements of national power in which the military element plays a vital and supporting role. The FID program includes a framework of: training, material, technical, and organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical operations. However, it states that the focus of FID is primarily diplomatic, with economics influencing every aspect, and the informational element enhancing the legitimacy of the entire program. The publication sums up FID as a multinational interagency effort requiring synchronization of all elements of national power and interagency efforts.

This publication also describes three “tools” in executing the FID program, they are: (1) indirect support that emphasizes security assistance to promote the host nation’s self-sufficiency; (2) direct support not involving combat operations that includes civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistical support; and (3) U.S combat operations in which the primary role for U.S. military forces in tactical operations is to support advise, train, and assist host nation forces through logistical, intelligence, or other combat support and service support means. This third tool also reiterates that U.S. forces may be required to engage hostile forces, but once again they should remain strategically defensive in nature. The objective of these
operations focuses on protecting or stabilizing critical political, economic, or social institutions until the host nation can resume responsibility. As in Field Manual 100-20, the IDAD program, FIDAF, the Country Team Concept and the Security Assistance Organization and the Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization are all discussed in detail to illustrate their relationships and importance to the overall FID mission. However, one of the most important discussions in this publication focuses on seven FID guidelines military planners must consider as they develop courses of action. These guidelines are: host nation sovereignty and legitimacy; plan for the long term; maximize intelligence capabilities; unity of effort; tailor FID operations to the needs and environment of the host nation; rules of engagement and economy of force measures; and finally, clearly define and focus on measures of success.

Both doctrinal manuals stress the same themes concerning FID or the support of counterinsurgency: unity of effort; maximize intelligence; minimum use of violence; tailor the FID force; focus on the long term; ensure legitimacy for the host nation and the FID effort. Overall and most importantly, the U.S. FID effort must support the host nation’s IDAD program. This equates to allowing the host nation to solve its own internal problems with its own forces. By following this guideline the U.S. reduces the likelihood of undermining the host nation’s legitimacy and committing U.S. forces into combat.

Malaya

A sizable body of literature exists on the British counterinsurgency operation in Malaya, called the Malayan Emergency Operation. This literature review focuses exclusively on the open source material concerning British counterinsurgency operations. Frank Kitson, Sir Robert Thompson, Sam Sarkesian and John Coates provided the most insightful view and the most discerning information on the Malayan Emergency for this study. All four authors explain the
complexities of the Malayan Emergency. Each author analyzes the broad aspects and elements of the insurgency and counterinsurgency. More importantly, these authors (through their analyses of the Emergency) arrive at basically the same conclusions concerning the requirement or necessity for certain types of counterinsurgency (military and paramilitary) organizations as part of a larger and counterinsurgency campaign. Their conclusions encompass the following types of organizations: (1) a single or unified intelligence organization focused on human intelligence; (2) psychological warfare units; (3) small, highly mobile teams capable of conducting large-range, long-duration strike and reconnaissance operations; (4) a unified command and control structure that coordinates the activities of all government security forces particularly between the police and the military.

Frank Kitson's offers two primary works on the Malayan Emergency, *Low Intensity Operations* and *Bunch of Five*. He authored his first book, *Low Intensity Operations*, while in command of the 39th Airportable Brigade of the British Army in Northern Ireland. Kitson's combat experience from operations in Kenya and Malaya qualifies him as a primary source with personal experience in fighting insurgency organizations. He uses his knowledge and astute awareness of the political dimensions of counterinsurgency to examine the basic fundamentals for success. Kitson's book transcends the mere analysis or history of British counterinsurgency operations. His book provides answers and recommendations for future counterinsurgency operations.

Kitson outlines his four fundamental factors for success in counterinsurgency and low intensity operations. He purports that the tactical commander must devote a significant amount of his time, thought, and energy to handling information. He affirms that this task above all others is an inseparable function of the tactical commander and not in the sole domain of the intelligence community. He goes on to explain that the employment of Special Forces in this endeavor
offers many advantages over the employment of conventional troops. Ultimately, he makes the following recommendation:

There is an absolute requirement to develop contact information. It involves a system by which tactical commanders collect and analyze information from a variety of sources, including information from supporting intelligence organizations.  

He elaborates on the distinction between intelligence and information. He defines them in terms of two functions; collecting, and then developing information as part of an effective framework for handling information necessary to put police and combat troops in contact with insurgents. This radical concept created an enormous amount of controversy within the British military community. His recommendations also include numerous suggestions on how the army should prepare for and execute the tasks associated with combating subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping.

Kitson’s analysis of the British Army’s contribution in combating insurgency and subversion is divided into different phases of operations that include “Before Insurgency,” “During the Non-Violent Subversion” and the “Actual Insurgency Phase” or “Combat Operations Phase.” He compiles conclusions from the first two parts and then uses the conclusions to explain his concept of preparing the British Army for executing the tasks associated with counterinsurgency. He accentuates new approaches in training and educating the army for insurgency and subversion. He consistently evokes selected lessons learned from Malaya and other similar campaigns as the justification for his recommendations.

Kitson’s peers criticized the book for its theoretical methodology and for his failure to explain in sufficient detail the reasoning behind his conclusions. Regardless of this criticism, Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations remains as one of the most comprehensive and controversial accounts of the Malayan insurgency. He addresses the criticism in his next major work on the subject of counterinsurgency, Bunch of Five.
His second book combines a case study of Malaya with his personal memoirs. He devotes the majority of this book to describing his personal experiences in Malaya. He briefly describes his involvement in three other British counterinsurgency operations: Kenya, Oman, and Cyprus. This book provides a description of the events which he lived and from which he drew his conclusions for his previous work, *Low Intensity Operations*. He also describes the events which led to the development of his conclusions and views regarding the conduct and execution of counterinsurgency operations.

Despite his personal involvement in the counterinsurgency operations, Kitson maintains a relatively objective viewpoint. His descriptions of operations are extremely thorough, and he offers both criticism and praise. *Bunch of Five* is a highly selective chronicle of his personal experiences over a fifteen-year period that influenced his development of counterinsurgency theory and the maturation of his conclusions.

Kitson does not offer the general history of the Malayan Emergency but his own personal recollections of specific combat operations conducted during his tour of duty in Malaya. In these recollections he describes the level of frustration, uncertainty, discomfort, and fatigue associated with counterinsurgency operations. Kitson’s *Bunch of Five* is an insightful account of his experiences and the nature of the Malayan Emergency. Although Kitson becomes somewhat nostalgic at times, his historic account of the Malayan Emergency appeals to the veteran and active duty soldier alike. His ability to recount in detail numerous ambushes and reconnaissance missions, and the value he places on comradeship, teamwork, and shared suffering engages and holds the reader’s attention.

In *Bunch of Five*, Kitson presents his four pillars or requirements for waging an effective counterinsurgency campaign. He describes the first and most vital requirement as that of establishing a well-coordinated machine or framework that implements sound political, economic,
and security measures. The second requirement calls for influencing public opinion or what he characterizes as the battle for men’s minds. This requirement includes educating the public in order to develop a common frame of mind which rejects unconstitutional activity. It also involves taking measures to monitor and then to counter the insurgent’s propaganda with the government’s point of view. His third requirement for an effective counterinsurgency campaign deals with establishing an effective intelligence organization. This requirement is nearly identical to his previous and controversial recommendation expressed in *Low Intensity Operations*. He reiterates the need for intelligence organization(s) to expand, decentralize, and maintain contact with junior military commanders. His fourth and final requirement appears much more controversial than any other recommendation including his third. This recommendation directly concerns the legal system within the Host Nation. He writes;

> It is perfectly normal for governments not only to introduce Emergency Regulations as an insurgency progresses, but also to counter advantages which the insurgents may derive from, for example, the intimidation of juries and witnesses, by altering the way in which the law is administered. Ways by which the legal system can be amended range from changing rules governing the giving of evidence to dispensing with juries altogether, or even to introducing some form of internment without proper trial. It is a dangerous path to tread, and one that is justified only by the peril in which constitutional governments and democracy are placed by insurgency.

Kitson confesses that this fourth recommendation concerning Emergency Legislation constitutes the most delicate and intricate parts of his counterinsurgency campaign. Instituting such legislation opens a Pandora’s Box that may alienate the public and provide the insurgency opportunities for propaganda exploitation. The applicability of this requirement under all circumstances remains questionable. Kitson recognizes that the extent and the manner in which the government intervenes in legal matters rests in the context of particular circumstances. He also recognizes the intensely political nature of this decision. However, he does not acknowledge that this requirement applies almost exclusively to constitutional or democratic governments combating insurgency. Arguably any other system of government, particularly autocratic or
dictatorial regimes, would incur a furious or profound level of resistance both nationally and internationally for implementing Emergency Legislation. Thus, Kitson subtly confines the applicability of his fourth requirement to democratic or constitutional governments.

Sir Robert Thompson's book *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* offers another personal account of the Malayan Emergency based on his twelve years of experience (from 1948 to 1960) in Malaya. In the opening chapters of his book, he describes what he refers to as the three main phases of an insurgency: the Subversion Phase; the Guerrilla Phase; and finally the Open Warfare Phase. Out of these three phases, he offers five basic principles that governments must follow to combat an insurgency. He writes:

I suggest that there are five basic principles which must be followed and within which all government measures must fall. First principle. The government must have a clear political aim. Second principle. The government must function in accordance with law. Third principle. The government must have an overall plan. Fourth principle. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, and not the guerrillas. Fifth principle. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.

Thompson purposely avoids the operational detail of the Malayan Emergency. Instead he concentrates on outlining his basic theory of counterinsurgency and how governments should apply his theory in order to defeat an insurgency. In subsequent chapters he transitions to describing the organizations and types of forces required for a government to deal with and defeat subversion. Thompson writes:

Therefore, if subversion is the main threat, starting as it does well before an open insurgency and continuing through it and even afterwards, it follows that within the government the intelligence organization is of paramount importance. In fact, I would go so far as to say no government can hope to defeat a insurgent movement unless it gives top priority to and is successful in, building up such an organization.

Thompson also addresses the importance of coordinating and integrating psychological operations and themes into all the governments activities. He outlines a three point policy that all psychological operations should follow. These three points are: (1) encourage insurgents to surrender; (2) create dissension in the insurgent organization; and, (3) create a positive image of
the government.22 He also asserts the importance of the armed forces acting in a supporting role to the police (more precisely the civilian authorities) in order to enhance police legitimacy and power in the perception of the civilian population. He sees this as the only way to maintain political stability and law and order during an insurgency. He maintains that the army should reinforce the police in urban areas. Rural areas become the military’s sole responsibility. He goes on to state that “if there is an army of reasonable size which has been conventionally trained and organized for defense of the country, its immediate requirement is not expansion but retraining and reorganization for its counterinsurgency role. In the early stages of the insurgency this requires that the army should be able to operate in units of platoon to company size, though there may be a few occasions when battalion operations are necessary.”23 In closing his book he summarizes his basic theory on counterinsurgency by declaring:

The three indisputable qualities in counterinsurgency are patience, determination and an offensive spirit, but the last should be tempered with discretion and should never be used to justify operations which are merely reckless or just plain stupid.24

Sam Sarkesian’s book *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era* relies on primary and secondary sources both published and unpublished in addition to participant-observer assessments to emphasize the lessons learned from a comparative analysis of two case studies, Malaysia and Vietnam. His book uses four components: “State of the Nation;” “Military Posture;” “Nature of the Conflict;” and “Nature of the Indigenous Systems,” within a comparative framework and applies them to the conflicts in Malaysia and Vietnam. He further divides the “State of the Nation” component into three elements which follow the major political questions and policy issues of the period; the quality and effectiveness of executive leadership; the nation’s will and political resolve to carry out counterrevolutionary policy in the area in question; and socioeconomic patterns that affect counterrevolutionary policymaking efforts.25 His discussion of the Malayan Emergency provides valuable background information into the values and attitudes
of all the participants. He includes a description of the geographical characteristics of Malaya proper, which he asserts concentrated the insurgent movement within the Chinese community. He contends that the combination of communal identity and distinct cultural patterns, along with the British rule maintaining Malayan dominance contributed to the evolution of the Malayan Communist party as a revolutionary force.\(^n\) 26

Sarkesian's maintains that previous literature, based primarily on the counterinsurgency effort during the Vietnam War, nurtured and reinforced a narrow perspective on what factors contribute to or constitute success in counterinsurgency. Therefore, he uses the British experience in Malaya to present a broader perspective. He sees the Malayan Emergency as the most instructive and successful counterrevolutionary operation and is the least understood by Americans. Sarkesian writes:

From the outset, the British were convinced that revolution could be best countered by maintaining law and order and offering effective government administration. To respond more to the revolution with legal means, the British declared a state of emergency. Emergency regulations were announced to deal with the revolution, which were revised and amended periodically as the conflict progressed.\(^n\) 27

Sarkesian emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the police and the military in counterinsurgency. He describes how the increase in British military activities against the insurgents caused friction with the police force. The British military leadership reduced this friction and insured a unified effort by having their Director of Operations reaffirm a standing policy. This policy simply stated that the primary task of the police was to control the populated and industrial areas in order to break up the activities of the insurgent organization within these areas, while the primary task of the Army was to destroy the insurgents, bandit gangs and their armed ancillaries in the jungle and remote areas.\(^n\) 28

He chronologically describes the introduction of British military organizations and their roles and missions in the overall counterinsurgency campaign, called the "Briggs Plan." His
discussion of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) role in the counterinsurgency campaign sheds new light on the most ignored aspect of the operation. Sarkesian describes the RAF role as an ancillary one and their effectiveness as considerably unproductive, or "a waste of time." 29

Sarkesian also briefly discusses the role of the British Royal Navy. He describes their primary mission as one of maintaining the territorial integrity of the campaign through coastal patrolling. Taken together, these insights into the roles and missions of the British Royal Navy and Air Force in Malaya provide a deeper understanding of the entire counterinsurgency effort beyond the well-documented role of the British Army. His analysis of the Briggs Plan and the British War Committee in comparison to the U.S.-Vietnamese system reveals several important lessons. He views organizational structure and its command and control system combined with a consistent strategy and focus as the primary ingredients for success in defeating an insurgency. 30

In conclusion, Sarkesian's analysis and comparison of the Malayan and Vietnam experience affords the reader a critical understanding of the fundamental factors that comprised the successful counterinsurgency campaign. He draws on his conclusions from the comparative analysis of Malaya and Vietnam to elicit his four-point concept of U.S. strategy and posture in counterinsurgency. In his discussion of the concept of restructuring forces, Sarkesian makes a strong argument for a distinction between special operations and Special Forces within the framework of unconventional conflict. He describes the distinction as not only the purpose of the forces, but also in their training, planning, and moral and legal dimensions. He believes the two components must be distinguished by command, control, and operational structures, as well as by the nature of the conflict. 31 Although broad in scope, his proposals add an informed and enlightened perspective on the ways and means forces must be structured to effectively combat insurgencies in the future. Lieutenant General John Coates, Chief of the General Staff of the Australian Department of Defense, offers another operational analysis of the Malayan Emergency
in his book *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency 1948-1954*. His analysis examines the problems encountered by both the Malayan government and the British military in developing an integrated and coordinated counterinsurgency campaign. The focus of his operational analysis centers on the civilian government's interaction and integration with its military forces. He provides substantial information on the development and refinement of the Briggs' Plan. General Coates' backs up his conclusions with extraordinary detail and an impressive amount of facts, figures and statistics. He ties together the major strategic and tactical operations of the Malayan Emergency into a truly comprehensive analysis.

Thomas R. Mockaitis' *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era* furnishes a succinct summary of each British conflict within the larger framework of British counterinsurgency in the twentieth century. Mockaitis uses a unique combination of oral history and traditional document research within an analytical framework to examine how the British adapted sound principles from the Malayan Emergency. Although not a comprehensive study, it does focus on the Malayan Emergency as one of the most significant events in the development of British counterinsurgency principles and practices after 1960. He traces in extensive detail the evolution of British doctrine in both official and unofficial literature. Mockaitis considers the application of psychological operations, to discredit insurgent claims and to create a sense of security and confidence among the population as the most innovative aspects of British counterinsurgency doctrine.

**Philippines**

In the Philippine case study as in the Malayan case study the literature, the common themes follow a common thread of continuity. We once again see the requirement for a single or unified intelligence organization focused on human intelligence, psychological warfare units, small, highly mobile teams capable of conducting large-range, long-duration strike and
reconnaissance operations, and a unified command and control structure that coordinates the activities of all government security forces, particularly the coordination between the police and the military. However, we also see in the Philippine case study literature the inclusion of two new themes: the importance of the U.S. military in the adviser and trainer role (described as a discrete or low-profile role) and the development of civil affairs units capable of implementing civic improvement, development and defense programs. These themes also resurface in the El Salvador case study literature.

Larry Cable’s book *Conflict of Myths* evaluates the accuracy and suitability of U.S. doctrine and examines the experiences underlying the U.S. perspective of counterinsurgency operations. He tracks the evolution of American counterinsurgency doctrine by reviewing and then isolating what he terms “the salient characteristics of insurgencies or the guerrilla aspects of conventional conflicts,” which involved the U.S. military or directly influenced the U.S. perspective. Cable begins his book by examining the U.S. experiences in the Greek Civil War, followed by an examination of the Korea War and then the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. In succeeding chapters Cable examines the impact of the Malayan Emergency, and finally the U.S. Marine Corps experience combating counterinsurgency (1915-1934) in the Central American “Banana Wars”.

Cable makes a concerted effort to define the confusing terminology surrounding guerrilla war. He makes an excellent distinction between partisan and insurgent warfare. His basic premise of the book focuses on the failure of U.S. military doctrine to differentiate between partisan and insurgent warfare, and the failure of U.S. military doctrine to recognize that all guerrilla war is partisan in nature.

He characterizes the U.S. military involvement in the Philippines from 1946-1954 as tangential compared with the Greek Civil War. However, Cable still provides a detailed account
of the Huk insurgency and the Filipino and American response. He also provides an interesting look at the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intelligence gathering capabilities during the insurgency. Cable states that in 1950 the CIA rapidly developed a “network with a broad spectrum capabilities that facilitated and coordinated active collection and penetration operations” against the Huk insurgents. It is his opinion that the CIA played an instrumental role in the overall success of the counterinsurgency campaign.

More importantly, Cable examines the role of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in combating the Huk rebellion. Furthermore, he provides an in-depth analysis of key actors in the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign, such as Paul Linebarger, the senior Civil Affairs officer in the JUSMAG. Surprisingly, however, Cable only briefly acknowledges the contributions of Edward Lansdale. He generally criticizes Lansdale’s participation in the overall campaign. Regardless, Cable still offers a discerning and perceptive summation of key points seized upon by American analysts regarding the Philippine experience.

Cable also interjects what he terms as several overlooked points in the post conflict analyses. He states that “the Philippine experience indicated that military operations were best limited to a few discrete roles.” He perceives these discrete roles for the military as follows: providing static security to the population in contested areas; interdicting and interrupting of guerrilla communications and supplies through active patrolling; and finally, developing an effective mechanism for the collection, verification, analysis and dissemination of timely and exploitable intelligence.

He addresses the cumulative effect American analysts had on sensitizing American decision makers and, more importantly, their effect on formulating U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Cable utilizes the same methodology for his discussion on the Malayan counterinsurgency organizations, programs, and lessons learned. He also discusses the effect that
the Clausewitzian view of war had on shaping the perspective of American military planners on
counterinsurgency doctrine.\textsuperscript{40} Cable goes on to argue how American doctrine led to ultimate
failure in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{41}

Stanely Karnow's \textit{In Our Image} is a comprehensive, narrative account of U.S.
involved in the Philippines. His book encompasses the period from 1898 to the 1988, the
major events from the Spanish American War to the downfall of Marcos. He uses previously
unpublished documents, interviews and his own personal observations to compile a broad and
descriptive analysis of U.S. activities, policies, programs and intervention into Filipino affairs.
The book concentrates on answering three primary questions which are as follows: (1) What
propelled America into the Philippines? (2) What did America do there? (3) What was the legacy
of American rule. He obviously takes the stance that the Philippines was an American colony. He
examines the major figures in Filipino history from William McKinley to Corazon Aquino. Like
Cable, Karnow also addresses the role of the CIA in the Huk rebellion. However, Karnow
devotes much more attention to the roles of lesser known figures involved in CIA operations in
the Philippines.\textsuperscript{42}

He also only briefly discusses the role of Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay but
provides a more detailed and personal view of Huk leader, Luis Taruc. He personally interviewed
Luis Taruc in 1965.\textsuperscript{43} Although Karnow fails to provide a detailed analysis of the insurgency, he
does explain the overarching U.S. policy and some of the major events in the insurgency. In
contrast to the other literature reviewed, he devotes only 18 pages out of 452 to the Huk
insurgency. He seems to dismiss the importance of this event in the overall history of the Filipino
people. However, his extremely thorough notes on his sources furnished a wealth of alternative
material on the Hukbalahap Insurrection.
Major L. M. Greenberg’s case study entitled *The Hukbalahap Insurrection* is the most widely acclaimed case study addressing the U.S. role in the Hukbalahap Insurrection. It is a definitive source for any military reader wishing to examine the achievements of individual US servicemen during the insurgency. He examines in great detail the role U.S. foreign policy and U.S military advisors and trainers played in preventing the downfall of the Philippine government. He probes into the background of the communist Huk movement, the Filipino response, and he carefully assesses the American intervention. In doing so he identifies three critical factors that brought together a viable counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines. Greenberg writes:

Without American aid and assistance, the Magsaysay government would not have been able to defeat the Huk, but aid alone did not stop the insurgency. It required a unique melding of personalities, a revitalization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), dedicated efforts by the Philippine government to win back the peoples allegiance, and the right combination of American military advice and economic aid. Lacking any of these essential ingredients, the anti-Huk campaign might well have failed.

His examination of the JUSMAG provides a wealth of useful information on U.S. military actions during insurgency. In fact, he disagrees with Larry Cable on two meaningful issue concerning American activities during the insurgency. The role of Edward Lansdale and the activities of the JUSMAG advisors are given greater credence. Greenberg characterizes Lansdale as a “prominent factor in the successful anti-guerrilla campaign” and it was his “relationship with Magsaysay that provided an effective conduit through which American advice affected Philippine actions” during the insurrection. Greenberg describes the role of JUSMAG advisors as follows:

With very exceptions, American advisors were prohibited from taking the field with their Filipino counterparts until the latter stages of the insurgency. JUSMAG advisors did all they could to foster a sense of Filipino self-reliance. Whenever possible, they assumed back-row seats for themselves so that government officials could look good and receive the credit for successful operations. Even when programs succeeded as direct results of American efforts, the advisors played down their role and let a Filipino become the moment’s hero.

In contrast, Larry Cable minimizes the extent to which advisors participated in combat operations by stating, “U.S. officers did not accompany the BCT’s [Brigade Combat Teams] in
the field as advisors due to the perception that such was not necessary and would serve only to increase the risk of American casualties without compensatory improvements in AFP performance.” Cable uses a telegram from the Charge in the Philippines to the Department of State, dated 15 June 1951. Evidently, Greenberg does and Cable does not embrace the activities of the JUSMAG advisors over the last four years of the insurgency. Aside from Greenberg’s disagreement with Cable, this case study adds real substance to the body of literature on the Huk Insurrection.

El Salvador

Several sources of unclassified literature provided relevant information on the revolution in El Salvador and the corresponding U.S. military operations in support of the Salvadoran counterinsurgency effort. Revolution in El Salvador by Tommie Sue Montgomery and El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present by Max Manwaring and Court Prisk cover in great depth the history of the conflict. Additionally, there are two special reports by the RAND corporation assess the military, political and social dimensions of U.S. counterinsurgency policy. Manwaring’s book, more than the other source discusses the common themes seen in the previous case study literature. He emphasizes the essential requirement for intelligence organization was to focus on human intelligence, the importance of psychological warfare units to communicate the government’s message, and the urgency to reorganize the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) into highly mobile teams capable of conducting large-range, long-duration strike and reconnaissance operations against the insurgents. He outlines the prerequisite for a unified command and control structure that coordinates the activities of all government security forces particularly between the police and the military. And he also argues for in the importance of the U.S. military in the adviser and trainer role (manifested in this case as the Congressionally mandated fifty-five man limit on the number of trainers.
allowed in El Salvador at any one time). He also reaffirms the requirement for a civil affairs organization capable of implementing civic improvement and development programs.

The RAND report, *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador*, completed by Benjamin Schwarz in 1991 focuses on three major objectives that became the basis of U.S. counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador, which are as follows: reform the ESAF; land redistribution; and democratization. The report concludes that the efforts to reform the ESAF became the most essential task of the U.S. counterinsurgency policy. It is in this part of the report that reveals the importance of the American military advisor role. The analysis of these tasks provides the reader a better understanding of the major programs and policies undertaken by U.S. military advisors and trainers in El Salvador.

In addition, Schwarz examines the civil defense programs designed by American trainers and implemented by the Salvadoran government. The author’s discussion of the Salvadoran response to these programs and the ultimate frustration it created with U.S. advisors and trainers furnishes the reader extraordinary insights into the problems associated with counterinsurgency operations. Schwarz’s report concludes by examining the totality of the American counterinsurgency effort and what he describes as the “blemished results” of American policy. He stops short of calling the operation a failure but he does address the unique and complex problems encountered by U.S. advisors and trainers during the execution of the campaign up to 1991. Finally, he includes a summary appendix and chronology of the conflict from October 1979 to March 1991. Obviously, the author did not have the ability to see into the future and recognize the eventual success American efforts had in preventing the violent overthrow of the El Salvadoran government by the Communist insurgents.

The second report, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* written for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis by four active duty Lieutenant Colonels. LTC
Bacevich, Hallums, White, and Young, all with impressive military qualifications to include tours as advisors in El Salvador, provide an interim assessment of America’s experiment to reverse the record of failure in waging small wars. The assessment seeks to answer four primary questions which are as follows: (1) to what degree has American Military policy in El Salvador succeeded or failed? (2) of the various U.S. military initiatives undertaken in this complex struggle, which have worked and which have not? (3) are the U.S. government and defense establishment properly configured for supporting American involvement in such a war? (4) what lessons has the United States learned in El Salvador that may apply to other similar insurgencies. The authors concluded the operation was a failure long before the insurgency was over. This negative approach does bias perceptions on some of the more successful operations conducted by the advisors and trainers in El Salvador.

Their analysis on doctrine and training for counterinsurgency highlights the major points for the U.S. military to reform in order to fight small wars. They point to doctrine, to service school curriculum, to the Foreign Area Officer program and to personnel policy as the major areas for reform within all the services. Yet, the most engaging section of the report, and the only American effort the authors recognize as even slightly successful, deals with U.S. efforts to improve: El Salvadoran psychological operations; civil defense and civic action programs; and the effort to coordinate civil and military activities into a unified campaign. It is in this analysis, that the authors emphasize the activities and achievements of the only civil defense trainer assigned to El Salvador, Master Sergeant Bruce Hazelwood. The authors see Hazelwood as an important figure in the counterinsurgency effort because, in their words, “he gives an inkling of the impact even a low-profile training effort can have if the United States gets the right man in job and leaves him there.”
The report concludes with a summary of nine lessons learned for future application. They are as follows: (1) make room for the study of small wars in military schools; (2) clarify organizational responsibilities for fighting small wars, in Washington and in the field; (3) overhaul the procedures governing security assistance; (4) before undertaking any intervention, establish a vision of what you hope to accomplish and a consensus of political support to sustain that vision; (5) put someone in charge, vesting that official with real authority; (6) send your first team and permit its members the latitude needed to get the job done; (7) foster institutional change only where it will make a difference; (8) avoid introducing inappropriate technology; and (9) weight the other war (the psychological war for the hearts and minds of the population) as the tougher part of the proposition.54

The book *El Salvador at War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to the Present* by Max Manwaring and Court Prisk furnishes the most descriptive and illuminating history of the insurgent conflict in El Salvador. The two authors have intimate knowledge of the situation and both have impressive credentials and qualifications.55 Their book offers a unique view of the insurgency from the perspective of the key leaders of the American and El Salvadoran counterinsurgency effort. The book contains interviews with such key players as General John R. Galvin and General Wallace H. Nutting, two former Commanders-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command from 1985 to 1987 and from 1978 to 1983 respectively.

The authors also include interviews with General Fred F. Woerner, the Deputy Commander United States Southern Command from 1982 to 1985, the former Ambassadors Edwin G. Corr (1985 to 19880 and Thomas Pickering (1983 to 1985). The book also relates the comments of Colonel John D. Wagbeinstein, Commander, U. S. Military Group in El Salvador, from 1982 to 1983. Comments by other key military and political leaders in the El Salvadoran government, such as former President Jose Napoleon Duarte provide the government side.
Interviews with former insurgent commanders provide an alternative perspective from those formerly mentioned.56

This oral history combines two general concepts into one compilation. First and foremost, it establishes a contemporary history of the insurgency. Then it compiles the primary military lessons learned from the viewpoint of all the major players in the counterinsurgency campaign. This book captures the most significant lessons learned of the insurgency from 1979 to 1987. This immense work consists of interviews with thirty-three different individuals and covers everything from the insurgents view of U.S. support and aid to the views of commanding officers in both the U.S. Military Group and the ESAF. The poignant and often passionate comments by the U.S. Military Group commanders provides a behind-the-scenes look at the true nature of American counterinsurgency efforts, both the successes and failures. The interviews with the senior military leadership in the ESAF give the reader a vision or window into the perspectives, beliefs, and attitudes of the some of the most central figures in the war. For example, in 1987 the authors interviewed General Adolfo Oncecifer Blando, Chief of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, and he stated:

Unfortunately, we were used as instruments for the politicians, a military president would be elected, and we would appear in the eyes of the world as a military government. But the truth of the matter is that the president was a military man surrounded by civilians. Therefore, to say it was a military government in El Salvador was only a front. The president would act as figurehead while the true governing body was composed of an elite sector, which ruled the entire country. When these people did not like the president’s attitude, whom they themselves had originally appointed, they’d promote a coup.57

This books departs from the conventional genre of military history. This book allows the central players in the war to tell their side of the story in their own candid words. More importantly, it surpasses the retelling of historical facts to encompass the most important lessons learned for each stage of the war from each of the major participants. Equally important is the analysis offered by the authors concerning the American efforts to support the Salvadoran
government during the insurgency. This book represents a truly unique and insightful account of
the war in El Salvador from 1979 to 1988.


2Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity

3Ibid., 2-18.

4Ibid., 2-19.

5Ibid., 2-24.

6Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
June 1996), vii.

7Ibid., I-5.

8Ibid., I-13.

9Ibid., III-9.

10Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping

11Ibid., 101

12Ibid., ix.

13Ibid., 96.

14Ibid., 8.

15Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), xiii.

16Ibid., 285.

17Ibid., 286.

18Ibid., 288.

19Ibid., 289.

21Ibid., 84.

22Ibid., 90.

23Ibid., 105.

24Ibid., 171.


26Ibid., 65.

27Ibid., 138.

28Ibid., 141.

29Ibid., 143.

30Ibid., 159.

31Ibid., 196.


35Ibid., 5.

36Ibid., 52.

37Ibid., 54.

38Ibid., 56. Major Paul Linebarger originated, planned and supervised the psychological warfare operations directed against Huk guerrillas.

39Ibid., 64.

40Ibid., 177.

41Ibid., 279.
42Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 349-350. Karnow writes: The CIA was created in 1947, and in the following year, the Office of Policy Coordination was founded under Frank Wisner, a high strung wartime spy who committed suicide in 1965. He hired Edward Lansdale in 1949 to be his primary operator in the Philippines. Wisner gave Lansdale instructions to build Magsaysay’s political base for the future while helping him annihilate the Huks. One of his [Lansdale’s] few CIA associates in country was Gabriel Kaplan. He formed the National Committee for Free Elections to propel Magsaysay into the Presidency. Lansdale’s main American military sidekick was Charles Bohannan, an army major who had fought as a guerrilla in the Philippines during World War II. Lansdale’s chief Filipino associate was Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, who commanded units called “skull squadrons” for their practice of beheading suspected Huks. But mostly, Lansdale communed with Magsaysay and they became friends.

43Ibid., 338.


46Ibid., 95.

47Ibid., 149.


50Ibid., 17.


52Ibid., 14.

53Ibid., 42.

54Ibid., 49.

55Max Manwaring, considered an authority on Latin American political-military affairs, wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on the military in Brazilian politics. He served in the Political-Military Directorate of the U. S. Southern Command J-5 staff from 1980 to 1982 and held the position of Chief of the Central American Section in the Research Directorate of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1982 to 1984. After leaving DIA, he served as the Latin American
Another strategic analyst by profession Court Prisk served as a faculty member of the Strategic Studies Committee, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College from 1971-1974. Later he served as the action officer in the Strategic Negotiations Division, OJCS-J5. He retired as a colonel in 1983.


57 Ibid., 260.
CHAPTER III
EXAMINATION OF CASE STUDIES

When men, working together, successfully attain to a high standard of orderliness, deportment, and response to each other, they develop the cohesive strength that will carry them through any great crisis.¹

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall

This chapter provides an examination of each case study to ascertain the principal characteristics and capabilities of the individual counterinsurgency organizations. It also provides a general overview of the major players and events of the counterinsurgency effort and does not attempt to reiterate the complete case study as provided in the case study works referred to in Chapter II, “Literature Review.” The examination of each case study follows the same order as in the previous chapter, which is as follows: the British experience and its organization in Malaya first, followed by the examination of U.S. counterinsurgency organizations in the Philippines and El Salvador, respectively. As in the previous chapter, the departure from a chronological examination is intentional in order to demonstrate a continuity of themes among the two U.S. counterinsurgency case studies.

Malaya

In 1786, England acquired Penang in the northwest portion of the Malay Peninsula, thus initiating the long relationship between the two countries. By 1914, the remaining states of Malaya accepted British Residents. Two substantial industries, tin-mining and rubber planting, expanded in the wake of British colonial rule. These industries dramatically improved Malaya’s
position in international commerce and, more importantly, radically changed the racial structure of the country. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century large numbers of Chinese and Indian laborers immigrated to Malaya to mine the tin and operate the plantations. The Chinese workers quickly established their traditional secret societies which combined the functions of local government, economic welfare and control over their population. The secret societies also created a sense of national unity within the Chinese community that would later play an important factor in the emergence of the communist insurgency.\(^2\)

Through the 1920s, the Chinese community in Malaya maintained their national identity with China. By 1930 as in China, the Chinese in Malaya established their own separate Communist Party, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Soon afterwards the world economic recession struck Malaya, and large numbers of Chinese workers suffered the loss of their jobs. Consequently, in the hopes of scratching out a living as farmers, many of these Chinese relocated from their tin-mining communities to the fertile river valleys near the Malayan jungles.

The Chinese agrarian movement in the 1930s isolated much of the Chinese community in Malaya. The Japanese occupation of the country in World War II reinforced this isolation. In another respect it provided the foundation for their eventual mobilization as armed insurgents. With British support, the Malayan Communist Party formed their own guerrilla army, known as the Malayan People's Liberation Army (MPLA) or the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)\(^3\). Despite their self-proclaimed role as protector of the people, the MPAJA spent more time and effort assassinating its political rivals than conducting a comprehensive partisan campaign against the Japanese.\(^4\) Likewise, Japanese reprisals focused on the Chinese community in an attempt to destroy the MPAJA support base.

In contrast, the Japanese treated the Malays more leniently, and this naturally caused a serious rift between the Chinese and Malay communities. By the war's end the MCP\(^5\) and its
armed component the MPAJA had firmly established their position within the Chinese community as a legitimate political force, and created ambitious goals for the future of Malaya. Frank Kitson writes in *Bunch of Five*, the MCP had every intention of taking over the country in the wake of the Japanese withdrawal. However, the war ended suddenly and this forced the MCP to postpone their plan to overthrow the government. Consequently, the British were able to re-establish their position, and they disbanded the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army with some expressions of goodwill, supplemented by gratuities and an appropriate issue of honors and awards.  

Britain’s initial post war plan for Malaya called for the establishment of a unified multi-racial republic which could ultimately become an independent country within the British Commonwealth. After the Malays strongly opposed this plan because it transferred sovereignty away from their Sultans, the British dropped the plan. The next plan, although favored by the Malays, infuriated the Chinese and Indian population, who together by this time formed almost half of the total Malayan population. This new plan united all nine states of Malaya into a new Federation. Having failed to gain control of the country at the war’s end and left out of the British post war settlement in favor of the Malays, the MCP began developing a strategy for armed insurrection.

The MCP decided to focus their campaign of urban subversion in Singapore. They followed with similar efforts in the urban areas of Malaya. The MCP plan consisted of four major phases; first, cripple the British planters and tin miners through harassment and strikes, while increasing guerrilla strength by capturing arms from police stations; second, assassinate leaders in industry and use sabotage to force government security forces away from the rural areas and confine them to the main roads and urban centers; third, murder government officials; and finally impose communist rule in “liberated areas,” expand these areas until the ultimate establishment of Communist Party rule in Malaya. The MCP placed the emphasis of the campaign on crippling
British and Malayan economic resources. The first act of the insurrection to accomplish these objectives occurred on 16 June 1948. They murdered three rubber plantation managers. Two days later, the British declared a State of Emergency and by July the British declared the MCP an illegal party.²⁹

Two British General Officers, Sir Harold Briggs and his successor Sir Gerald Templer deserve special recognition and acclaim for their leadership and direction of the overall counterinsurgency campaign during the declared emergency in Malaya. General Harold Briggs radically transformed the initial British and Malayan counterinsurgency effort from an inept and uncoordinated campaign into a cohesive and integrated effort. Later, General Gerald Templer revitalized and reinvigorated the Briggs plan to gain an ultimate and successful conclusion.

It took the British and Malayan governments two years to establish an effective counterinsurgency campaign and strategy. In early 1950, the British High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, on the advice of the British Defense Coordination Council,¹⁰ asked the British Government to appoint a new Director of Operations. He received a mandate to defeat the insurgency by coordinating the efforts of the civil administration and the security forces. In March 1950 the British Government appointed the recently retired General Briggs, as the Director of Operations. He was a distinguished soldier with an impressive army career, that included Commander-in-Chief Burma Command from 1946 to 1947. General Briggs, was convinced that killing guerrillas would not suffice. He devised a new counterinsurgency campaign that included breaking the guerrilla’s morale and severing their supply lines. Intuitively, he realized this meant the relocation of Chinese squatters from areas near the jungle regions to new settlements under government control thereby eliminating the guerrilla’s network of support.¹¹

Additionally, Briggs established a Federal War Council (figure 6) with subordinate councils in every state and district in Malaya. The state council included the local military and
police commanders under the chairmanship of a senior officer in the administration. The most significant aspect of his plan separated the Special Branch from the Criminal Investigation Branch of the police department for the sole purpose of collecting intelligence on insurgents and their supporters. He reinforced the Special Branch with Military Intelligence Officers from the British Army. He instituted measures to secure the Malayan population, to eliminate the communist organization by arrests and internment and to eradicate the terrorist faction by interdicting their supply lines of food and communications. He wanted the armed insurgents to expose themselves to his Security Forces, and he knew these measure would elicit that reaction. The most strikingly ambitious aspect of his plan required the relocation of some 400,000 Chinese civilians from their jungle villages to new settlements under the protection and supervision of a newly organized Home Guard. This effectively severed the insurgents from their essential bases of support.

The Briggs Plan depended upon a framework of security in all Malay States. Once in place, the army employed more active operations in order to defeat the insurgency. Security then became the key and essential element of the plan and Briggs instituted the following policy: (a) the police concentrate on fulfilling normal security functions, including the obtaining of intelligence through its Special Branch organization in all populated areas; (b) the Army maintains a framework of troops deployed in close conjunction with the police to cover those populated areas which the police cannot adequately secure. This strategy entailed a series of patrolled strong points; (c) the administration strengthens, to the utmost extent, their effective control of the populated areas by increasing the number of District Officers and other executive officers in the field, and ensure the effective administration of social services, e.g. schools, medical and other services.

General Briggs left Malaya in December 1951 and his successor General Templer, arrived in February 1952. Templer, another soldier with impressive credential and qualifications
that included a command of the 56th Division at Anzio Beach, Director of Military Intelligence and Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, immediately showed his keen appreciation of the situation by revitalizing the original Briggs Plan with renewed emphasis on energizing both the civil government and military operations.

General Templer had a decided advantage over General Briggs. His appointment combined the positions of both the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations. This appointment empowered General Templer, with unparalleled authority, and allowed him to alter without restraint or immediate oversight the entire counterinsurgency campaign. His first actions involved granting Malayan citizenship to immigrant races and fixing a firm date (1957) for Malayan independence. He also made three matters absolute priorities. He wanted to improve the organization and training of the police force, including the Special Constabulary; improve the intelligence service; and expand the information service.

Although the strength of Security Forces operating against the insurgents reached its peak in 1952, the types of organizations and the types of activities conducted by the army remained basically consistent, with some exceptions, under both the General Briggs and General Templer administrations. The number of organizations increased, but this did not alter their organizational structure and missions.

The situation in Malaya in August 1948 made it evident that neither the conventional army nor the police could handle the insurgency. The army and police had undertaken two separate but equally unsuccessful campaigns. To rectify the situation Templer folded together elements of the police, the Special Branch, with elements of the army and molded their efforts into a cohesive plan of action. This new and adhoc organization became known as Ferret Force (figure 7). This organization consisted of a number of small elite units under British Officers, most with combat experience during the Second World War in Burma. The rank and file
consisted of soldiers from the Malay and Gurkha Regiments. Each officer spoke at least one Malayan language and the enlisted troops spoke either Chinese, Tamil, or Malay. In all, the British organized six Ferret Groups, with the mission to operate deep in the jungles of Malaya against the armed guerrillas.

The British aggressively employed the Ferret Force in reconnaissance operations to locate guerrilla camps and then directed conventional forces in for the kill. According to Larry Cable, the Ferret Force caused not only physical casualties to the guerrillas, but “a galloping sense of insecurity” within the entire insurgent organization. The jungle, previously a friendly and nurturing environment for guerrillas, suddenly became a hostile place with unforeseen peril and death at the hands of Ferret Force. Despite their success at interdicting guerrilla bases and lines of communications the government disbanded the adhoc force by January 1949. Yet, the Ferret Force survived long enough to buy the time for British reinforcements to arrive in country and for the police and its Special Branch to obtain vital information about the number of armed insurgents, their auxiliary groups, and their sympathetic or tacit supporters.

The Ferret Force taught the British several important lessons in combating insurgency. It demonstrated the feasibility and usefulness of small, aggressive patrols of men with knowledge of the local area, language, and customs to strike and disrupt the guerrillas before they could organize in large numbers. The Ferret Force organization led to the later establishment of the Police Jungle Squads and the Civil Liaison Corps of Interpreters (civilians attached to British Army units). Based on the problems of diverting key British officers and civil officials away from their original civil administration jobs to lead the Ferret Force, the British decided to permanently dissolve the force. Unquestionably, the Ferret Force achieved remarkable success during a desperate time in the British counterinsurgency campaign. This force provided the British and Malayan government the time necessary for both the Special Branch of the police and the conventional army to receive
reinforcements, to organize, and to train. The force took a lead role in the counterinsurgency operations, known as the Priority Operations, throughout the country. The force essentially bought the time necessary for the rest of the Malayan Security Forces to deny the insurgents a strong hold in any one area, or to allow the MCP to shift to larger scale operations.

The British also utilized another unconventional force, an aborigine force to conduct counterinsurgency operations against armed guerrillas operating out of the jungles. The Malayan aborigines achieved great success in gathering intelligence and providing Security Forces with tactical information. So much so that by 1956, the British had organized, trained and equipped squads of aborigines known as police aboriginal guards or the Senoi Pra’ak (literally “Fighting People”) to hunt down and destroy MCP couriers operating from within the jungle. This force of some three hundred aborigines accounted for more insurgents killed than all of the Security Forces combined.20

The British established the Special Branch in August 1948. The Special Branch did not live up to immediate expectations and failed to provide the substantive intelligence required for combating the armed insurgents, particularly in the areas of the MCP leadership and armed insurgent locations. In April 1952, General Templer appointed J. H. Morton as the new Director of Intelligence. Morton, previously in charge of MI5 in Singapore, received the mission of overhauling the Special Branch to increase its effectiveness. His predecessor, Sir William Jenkins, appointed by General Briggs, only coordinated intelligence within the Police and lacked the authority to coordinate intelligence among all federal agencies. Thus, Special Branch did not effectively provide intelligence across organizational boundaries. Army commanders obtained only a small fragment of available intelligence due principally to the lack of integration and coordination with the Special Branch. Templer abruptly changed this situation by making Morton directly responsible for the coordination and integration of all intelligence. This stands as one of
the most significant decisions of the entire counterinsurgency campaign. Now the intelligence collected through Army aerial and ground reconnaissance was funneled through the Special Branch where it was integrated with human sources for analysis and synthesis. This made the Special Branch the principal recipient and recording agency for all available intelligence on the insurgents.

Morton restructured the Special Branch in 1952 to handle this new mission and responsibility. The previous organizational structure, essentially from 1948 to 1949 organized itself along ethnic lines. The Special Branch maintained separate desks for intelligence on subversive activities within the Chinese community and within the Malayan community. Under Morton’s administration Special Branch organized itself along political lines (figure 8). Additionally, Special Branch now had four subordinate desks: external communism; underground communism; banditry; and other manifestations. The new Special Branch organization under Morton functioned with much more sophistication.

Another new desk dealt exclusively with MCP operational techniques. Yet, another dealt with guerrilla organization. Some desks remained the same, such as the two desks on subversives within the Malay and Chinese communities. However, the real improvements in the organizational structure of Special Branch resulted from the attachment of military intelligence officers. This addition immediately improved the ability of Special Branch to furnish ground combat commanders within timely and accurate intelligence so vital and necessary in the development of counterinsurgency operations. This, in turn, improved the effectiveness of combat units operating against the insurgents. These MI officers functioned as collectors, processors, and disseminators of appropriate intelligence for use by the army against the insurgents. John Coates in *Suppressing Insurgency* writes:

In June 1951 the war diary of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles recorded only two items of intelligence interest but by October 1952, when the battalion was operating in a state where an MI officer
was attached to the Special Branch, the number of exploitable items had increased to sixty-five.²²

The year 1952 saw a simultaneous improvement in the government's psychological warfare campaign. The Malayan Government created several new departments to communicate their messages to the nation. These departments included the Department of Information, the Emergency Information Services, the Malayan Broadcasting Service and the Malayan Film Unit. Templer appointed A. D. C. Peterson, a World War II veteran of Burma and an experienced practitioner of psychological warfare, to coordinate the government's psychological operations campaign. Templer charged Peterson with disseminating two primary messages: first, disassociate the noncommunist from the MCP and convince them to fight for the Federation of Malaya; second, reduce the insurgent's will to fight and encourage defection from the MCP. Peterson emphasized Templer's new policy of granting Malayan citizenship to immigrant races along with it the right to vote in state and federal elections. Peterson's use of these policies in combination with the government's counterinsurgency campaign demonstrated a commitment to an independent Malaya.²³

The Psychological Warfare Section²⁴ under the supervision and direction of Peterson orchestrated the key components of the campaign. This section instituted two major programs to break-up the MCP. The first program, and arguably the most controversial, involved increasing the rewards to members of the public for information leading to the capture or killing of insurgents. For example, the new reward increased the amount from $80,000 (the original reward under General Briggs) to $250,000 for information leading to the capture or killing of the MCP's Secretary General. The government also announced similar increases for other major party members. This new reward system also paid individuals more money if they risked their personal safety. The program, despite creating serious criticism in England from the Labor and Communist Parties on moral grounds, however, these proved exceptionally successful.²⁵
The second major program involved direct communication with the insurgents through two mediums: leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations. This program also proved exceptionally successful. In fact, the MCP tried to counter the leaflet campaign by executing any party member in possession of a government leaflet. By 1953, the government dropped 54 million leaflets on general topics and another 23 million specifically addressed to key individuals in the MCP. Correspondingly, the Psychological Warfare Section initiated a program of broadcasting from aircraft surrender appeals and promises of safe passage for insurgents. By 1954, the program involved broadcasts to approximately fifteen different jungle areas per week. In that year, more insurgents surrendered than ever before, and more than half of them pointed to the government's psychological operations campaign as the primary reason for their surrender.

Finally, two British infantry battalions deserve recognition for their successful counterinsurgency operations. The 1st Battalion, Suffolk Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, Green Howards, both arrived in late 1949 and stayed until early 1953. In terms of insurgents killed or captured, these organizations were the two most successful British Infantry battalions of the Emergency. In a three year period, these two battalions succeeded in killing or capturing 298 insurgents in contrast to their own casualties of only twenty-one killed and twenty-four wounded. The success of the infantry battalions lay in their ability to adapt their tactics to the unconventional warfare environment which they found in Malaya. The tactical adaptations of particular significance to this study are as follows: the reliance on excellent small unit leaders; the insistence on rigorous training in patrolling techniques and marksmanship; the preference for employing platoon or squad-sized units known as “flying columns” as the principal combat formations; the use of the “framework deployment” of troops in a specific area; the emphasis on building rapport with the local Chinese population; the recognition of the necessity of cooperating and coordinating with the local civil administration and police force; and finally, the maintenance of a
focused counterinsurgency effort in one particular area for more than twelve months (e.g., the
operations in Kajan and Tampin).\footnote{31}

An analysis of the Malayan Emergency reveals several principal organizational
characteristics that directly contributed to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign. First, a
unified command and control structure as seen during the tenure of General Templer and his
administration. This facilitated the requisite amount of civil-military cooperation during a critical
period of the counterinsurgency program, both military and civil. Second, the decision to operate
on the tenet of minimum force by employing small, highly mobile units, such as the Ferret Force
and the Senoi Pra‘ak. These organizations helped solve the major problem confronting
counterinsurgency organizations in their efforts to defeat insurgents -- the problem of finding
them.\footnote{32}

The British experience also demonstrated the effective use of conventional forces,
primarily infantry regiments, in the absence of unconventional or Special Forces to assist police
forces in protecting the civilian population and in eliminating the insurgents. These forces, mainly
the Green Howards and the Suffolk Regiment, had the ability to continuously saturate an area with
platoon-sized combat patrols, and thereby deter and destroy the insurgents operating in the area.

Common to all these organizations was the concept of centralized planning and
decentralized execution. The regimental and other subordinate unit commanders clearly
understood the intent and purpose of their missions. During the later stages of the
counterinsurgency campaign, post 1950, the British civil-military organizations operated under a
single, nested purpose outlined in the Briggs Plan.

An analysis of these units reveals the importance of utilizing indigenous or aborigine
personnel to support conventional and police forces. More importantly, the analysis highlights the
prominence and paramount importance of the Special Branch. This centralized intelligence
gathering organization with a system or network for liaison directly to the military and police counterinsurgency units proved highly effective. This case study clearly demonstrates the necessity in counterinsurgency or FID operations to employ an organization capable of collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence to support the security forces. The Special Branch’s ability to collect human intelligence (HUMINT) coupled with the concept of using small, mobile patrols stand out as essential factors in the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya.

British psychological operations units, also established their effectiveness in reducing the number of armed insurgents. The Psychological Operations units, characterized by loudspeakers operations and leaflet drops, under the centralized control of the Director of Operations helped to nullify the support of local Chinese civilians, create defections, undermine the legitimacy of the MCP and reinforce the legitimacy of the government.

Success also equated to a unit’s duration in country. Those organizations that stayed in country and, more importantly, in one certain area for extended periods of time gained invaluable experience in combating the insurgents. These units achieved much greater success than units that rotated in and out of the country. Consequently, these units developed a special relationship and excellent rapport with the local Chinese and indigenous population. This relationship, based on mutual trust and cooperation, solidified the legitimacy of the government’s counterinsurgency effort in the eyes of the civilian population. It also demonstrated the government’s commitment to protect the civilian population from terrorism and subversion.

This case study demonstrates that success in counterinsurgency and FID combat operations relies upon three mutually supporting organizations: an intelligence organization focused on HUMINT; a small, flexible combat force; and an organization capable of implementing a civil defense program. The flexible combat force must embody the following tenets: centralized control and decentralized execution; long-range strike and reconnaissance.
capability; understanding of the primacy of political-military factors; incorporation of psychological operations in all activities; use of a minimum amount of force; adaptation of tactics, techniques, and procedures to the particular situation; and knowledge of the culture, language and nuances of the society. The Ferret Force, the Suffolk Regiment, the Green Howards, the Special Branch and the Psychological Warfare Section embody these characteristics and capabilities.

Philippines

The Hukbalahap Insurrection, otherwise known as the Huk insurgency originated from events and conditions in Philippine society that predate World War II and go back as far as the pre-colonial period. Economic, social and political inequalities existed before the arrival of the Spanish. The conditions only worsened under Spanish colonial rule and mercantilism. The conditions continued to worsen well into the Twentieth Century under American foreign policy. The social and political history of the country divided the Filipino nation into two distinct classes the wealthy, who shared exclusively in the nation’s profits and economic fortune, and the impoverished, who had little or nothing but a desperate desire for change.$\textsuperscript{33}$

American policy towards an intervention in Philippines affairs began in 1899 with the Philippine Insurrection. Although the war only lasted three years, overt Philippine nationalism was squashed, but the bitterness it produced among the Filipino people endured for many years. After the war the United States tried unsuccessfully to rectify the long standing problem of land-tenure. This program, designed to sell Church-owned land to peasants, was corrupted by local Filipino officials. The land sale program failed to transfer land to the peasantry and instead allowed those Filipinos with wealth to increase their already disproportionate holdings. Ultimately, the program only perpetuated the problems between the Filipino oligarchy and the peasants that worked the land.$\textsuperscript{34}$
During the early Twentieth Century American interests in the Philippines focused mainly on economic matters. By 1934 the America administration had enacted into law the Philippine Commonwealth, which ensured United States control of Filipino foreign affairs, defense, and foreign trade policy while granting the Filipinos sovereignty over their internal affairs.\textsuperscript{35}

The Philippine Commonwealth did little or nothing to alleviate the severe problems of poverty and land distribution. Landlords grew increasingly rich while the peasant farmer, who worked the land, became more indebted to his landlord. Productivity remained low as the incentive to work became stifled by the landlord's greed and the peasant's lack of upward mobility. By 1941 the situation looked hopeless for nearly 80 percent of Luzon's farmers. The majority were either tenants or hired labor. For example, in the Pampanga Province alone, 70 percent of the farmers were tenants. The other provinces in the Philippines shared similar statistics.\textsuperscript{36} The social and economic conditions of the country, coupled with the government's lack of concern, set the conditions for insurgency.

The Huks directly traced their roots to a collection of Marxist labor groups and peasant organizations, most notably the National Peasants Union organized in 1924.\textsuperscript{37} Six years later the movement gave rise to the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and its five guiding principles or objectives: (1) to mobilize for complete national independence; (2) to establish communism for the masses; (3) to defend the masses against capitalist exploitation; (4) to overthrow American imperialism; and (5) to overthrow capitalism. By 1932, the Philippine government declared the party illegal and jailed many of its leaders. However, the party gained considerable influence and popularity over the next six years as socioeconomic conditions remained unchanged for the tenant farmer. Consequently, the organization's influence and popularity spread from its traditional stronghold in central Luzon to the islands of Bataan,
Zambales, Cebu, Panay, and Negros. Only the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 prevented the escalation of random acts of violence into full-scale civil war.38

On December 10th, 1941 the Philippine Communist Party pledged their support to the allied war effort and urged its members to begin preparations for guerrilla war against the Japanese invaders. In a rather unwise move, the Philippine government rejected the PKP offer. Despite the official rejection, the communists guerrillas fought the Japanese, and by 1941 had earned the reputation as “patriotic” fighters with the local peasants. They remained the most visible opposition to the Japanese occupation. On March 29th, 1942 the PKP reorganized itself into the Hukbalahap, a Filipino acronym for the anti-Japanese Army.39

This politico-military organization grew to become the largest and most powerful of the resistance groups in the Philippines.40 Yet the organization’s political objectives clearly extended beyond opposition to the Japanese occupation. No other Filipino political organization played such a distinct role in the resistance movement. This provided the Huks a definite advantage over its political rivals in staking a claim for power in the post war government.

The leader of the Huk coalition was Luis Taruc.41 He would lead the coalition from its birth as a guerrilla organization fighting against the Japanese to its virtual demise nearly a decade later. During the war, Taruc concentrated his efforts on eliminating his conservative enemies in the government by accusing them of collaboration. The reign of terror and chaos created by Huk attacks, Japanese reprisals and collaborationist activity further polarized Filipino society. The almost total destruction of Manila only compounded the problems for the post war Philippine government.42 At the war’s conclusion, the country’s transportation and communication systems barely functioned, and in some areas of the Philippines, food production and distribution disappeared. Post war Filipino society teetered on the brink of revolution. Unemployment was rampant, and with no export industry to nourish the economy, the country barely functioned.
Graft and corruption quickly replaced law and order as the society’s norm. Additionally, the American and Filipino authorities refused to pay the Huk guerrillas for their wartime service as they had done with other guerrilla organizations. The United States responded to the conditions in the Philippines by providing economic assistance in the hopes of repairing the economy and by promoting an enlightened climate for political and social reform. The program although implemented with the best of intentions failed. The blanket of corruption that covered Filipino society and economy simply channeled the aid into the black market. Overt government corruption claimed its fair share of aid, and in the end the program only succeeded in further alienating the public from the government. This, of course, increasingly worked in favor of the Huk movement.

By the summer of 1945, the people of Luzon had serious doubts about the aims and goals of their new government. The government police and army troops made matters worse by robbing the peasants of the little food and money they possessed. The government, realizing the potential threat within the Huk movement, began arresting known Huks and their relatives. These actions did not sit well with general public who regarded the Huks as patriotic freedom fighters. Many peasants viewed the Huk movement as the solution to their problems. Certainly the government had done little to ease the suffering of the peasant class. Adding to their sense of disillusionment was the post war election of 1945 in which Manuel Roxas won the presidency. Many Filipinos considered Roxas a war-time collaborator which served to undermine the legitimacy of his election. The issue of collaboration played heavily on the minds of many Filipinos, and the issue quickly became a key element in the Huk propaganda campaign.

Thus, as the nation approached independence in 1946, little meaningful change had taken place since 1941. The Manila government, riddled with corruption and collaborators, showed no visible concern for the peasant farmer. Rather, the government reestablished the status quo of the
post war period. Wealthy landlords and businessmen maintained control in the government and instituted policies (aided by post war U.S. policy) that favored their own interests. The peasant felt abandoned and saw no hope for substantial social or economic change. The U.S. promise of independence for the peasant was more a threat than a reward. These conditions laid the foundation of unrest and resentment that led to the eventual insurrection in 1946.

On July 4th, 1946, the Philippines received their independence from the United States. In that year the country held its first post independence election and Roxas once again emerged as the elected president, although he lost heavily in central Luzon. In keeping with his campaign promise to eliminate the Huk resistance, he declared “open season” on the Huks. Luis Taruc who had won a congressional seat in the Federal government quickly realized that the Roxas administration would not allow him to serve. He returned to the mountains near Mount Arayat, and in May 1947, reorganized the Huk General Headquarters. Roxas, on the other hand, dispatched the police and the Civil Guard (a paramilitary unit raised by provincial governors) to fulfill his campaign promise. Together these forces carried out indiscriminate “Huk hunts” throughout the country. They terrorized the local population in search of Huk sympathizers. They often stole food and tortured peasants for information. These forces also provided the Huks opportune and extremely popular targets. More importantly, these government sponsored forces encouraged many peasants to join the Huks, and ultimately, proved the best recruiters for the movement. This activity marked the real beginning of the insurgency known as the Huk Insurrection.

At the beginning of the insurgency, the Huk movement comprised three types of people: (1) communist and socialist politicians; (2) former wartime guerrillas; and (3) a small criminal element of thieves and bandits. This last group would later undermine the organization’s cohesiveness and effectiveness, but reality dictated that Taruc accept recruits from whatever
source. These Huk insurgents fell into three basic, functional groups. The first group comprised the movement's fighters or guerrillas. These were the truly die-hard followers of the movement, and they conducted raids, ambushes, kidnappings, extortion and terrorism campaign. The second group consisted of their supporters, who functioned much in the same way as do our current combat service support units. This group comprised mainly of farmers, occasionally fought along side the guerrillas, but usually they remained in their villages and tended to their farms. The third and largest group consisted of the civilian (peasants or farmers) support base. This group provided food, sanctuary and information to the guerrillas. This group rarely fought along side the guerrillas. However, they formed the foundation of the Huk movement and without their support the Huk movement was incapable of challenging the Philippine Armed Forces. By 1950, the generally accepted number of Huk supporters ranged close to one million.

The Huk's adopted a three phased strategy for the eventual overthrow of the Philippine government. The entire organization worked toward specific goals and objectives to seize power. The first or preparatory phase would attempt to win the support of the working and peasant classes. The second phase would focus on building a mass political base. The third and final phase would accomplish the takeover of the government by inciting a mass uprising of the people on such a grand scale that "the existing capitalist government could not stand in its path." The period between 1946 and 1950 marked the first phase of the insurgency. The Huks chose the central Luzon region to establish their base of operations. They sought sanctuary in the mountains near Mount Arayat, (referred to as Huklandia) the traditional area from which they had fought against the Japanese. The Huks expected the mountains near Mount Arayat to protect them from government security forces, just as it had protected them during the Japanese occupation. The area encompassed some 6,000 square miles of the richest rice growing region in the
Philippines. The population consisted mostly of farmers who felt little empathy for, or loyalty to, a government that ignored their plight.³³

During this first phase of the insurgency, Taruc used these feelings of discontent to gain local peasant support and assistance. Outnumbered, outgunned and outsupplied, Taruc needed and depended on intelligence to carry out his campaign to overthrow the government. Therefore, he actively recruited local farmers, police and government officials as informants. He even succeeded in recruiting Philippine Army officers. He usually gained their cooperation by threatening them or their families. He gained local peasant support through a propaganda campaign that exploited the country’s poor social conditions and the corruption and fraud within the government. He adopted two prominent slogans, “Land for the Landless” and “Bullets, not Ballots,” to gain support at the local level.³⁴

During the first phase of the insurgency, Huk squadrons operated unmolested throughout the central Luzon region. In the first major battle between government and Huk forces, a squadron ambushed a patrol from the 10th Military Police Company in the town of Santa Monica killing all ten soldiers. The Huks did not lose a single man. The victory provided the Huks a tremendous morale boost and validated their tactics. The Huks followed this attack with more ambushes on Army patrols and garrisons. These events culminated in the capture of the city of Nueva Ecija, the provincial capital of the region, by 200 Huk guerrillas. The government did nothing in response.

Huk raids and ambushes steadily increased in size through the spring of 1947. In May, the Huks attacked an Army garrison in Laur, looted the village bank, and kidnapped the local police chief, who they held for ransom. At the same time, Huk squadrons attacked key targets in several other provinces in central Luzon, which only added to their string of successes. In response, Roxas ordered the Army to attack the Huk stronghold around Mount Arayat.
operation (Operation Arayat) spanned two weeks and included two thousand Army troops. The Army only succeeded in killing twenty-one guerrillas and capturing small quantities of rice and a few weapons. Huk informants learned of the operation and provided the guerrillas with the Army’s timetable and direction of attack. As a result, the Huks slipped through government lines and avoided contact.

As the insurgency progressed into its second year the Huks felt extremely confident about their prospects for success. Confidence had grown as they consolidated their control over Huklandia. So much so that they began to build training camps, schools, and production bases. Taruc also seized the opportunity to integrate Huk military and political activities within the surrounding towns and villages in an effort to solidify his control over the civilian support base. He astutely realized that to overthrow the government would require a firm and resolute base of popular support. Then, in April 1948, President Roxas died of a sudden heart attack and his successor, Elpidio Quirino, declared a temporary truce and opened negotiations with Taruc.

The truce lasted only four months, but Taruc used this time to his advantage. He establish new arms caches, reorganized his guerrilla force and used the negotiations to increase Huk propaganda. However, by the end of 1948, the Huk’s internal cohesion and cooperation began to unravel. Two factions emerged within the Huk leadership. One favored the Maoist strategy, and the other favored a Marxist-Leninist strategy. The argument centered on where to concentrate Huk efforts. They Maoist wanted to concentrate the insurgency in rural areas and the Marxist-Leninist wanted to concentrate the insurgency in urban areas. Although this argument created an ideological rift between the two factions within the organization it did not prove fatal to the insurgency. Yet, the dissension it created, reduced the organization’s cohesion.

The Huk’s resumed their campaign of raids on government installations in and around central Luzon, which by 1949 had reached their peak. But in April of that year, the guerrillas
made a monumental miscalculation that would eventually undermine all their previous gains and successes. A guerrilla commander named Alexander Viernes, alias Stalin, with two hundred men ambushed the motorcade of Aurora Quezon, the wife of former Philippine president Manuel Quezon. The attack killed Aurora Quezon, her daughter, and several government officials.

Although Viernes claimed a great victory for the insurrection, the ambush created a public outrage against the Huks. Viernes and Taruc completely misjudged Quezon’s popularity with the Philippine people. Many Filipinos considered her husband (who died in exile in the United States in 1944) a true hero of the Philippine resistance during World War II. She in turn represented his legacy of Filipino nationalism and resistance. As a result the Huks lost a great deal of the popular support and confidence they had enjoyed prior to her murder. Taruc tried to distant the party from any involvement in the ambush by claiming Viernes acted overzealously and without official party approval. Nonetheless, the Huk insurgency never regained the popular support it had once held or would so desperately need in the coming years.

In 1949 Quirino won the general election by a slim margin, and the Huks responded by stepping up the intensity of their raids and attacks on government facilities. In 1950, Taruc broke ranks with the political leadership of the movement over the direction the insurgency should follow. Following the split, Taruc continued his guerrilla attacks against government facilities with almost daily raids. As the attacks escalated, Quirino abandoned his conciliatory stance, and the insurgency entered into a new stage of violence and terror as both sides retaliated against each other.

In contrast to the Huk mobilization of 1946, the armed forces of the Philippines consisted of only 25,000 poorly trained, armed and led troops that had demobilized from their former strength of some 132,000. The organization underwent several changes during the post war years leading up to the start of the insurgency. Initially, General MacArthur authorized the formation of
the Military Police Corps, a force which consisted of thirteen companies of armed policeman, with the mission to maintain internal peace and control. In addition to this force the government had a small navy of some 3,000 sailors and an antiquated Air Force of some 3,800 airmen.\textsuperscript{56}

In 1947, following the failed offensive against the Huks around Mount Arayat, President Roxas dismantled the Military Police Corps in favor of a beefed up Police Constabulary Force of 98 companies. The preoccupation with building a police force to handle and confront the Huks illustrates the government's serious underestimation of the problem. The government consider the Huks criminals and not a well-organized and highly motivated guerrilla force. The U.S. government shared a similar perception of the situation. U.S. policy makers failed to recognize the extent of the popular support at the grass root level for the Huks and their cause. They also failed to recognize that the Huk movement was a communist revolutionary insurgency capable of massing support from a large, disenfranchised peasant class. Based on this misperception, the U.S. did little to bring about real change in the socioeconomic conditions in the Philippines.

When the Philippine government did take action against the Huks the results usually ended in failure. Lawrence Greenberg in \textit{The Hukbalahap Insurrection} writes:

President Roxas vowed to attack the Huks with a "mailed fist" but, except for independent forays by ambitious local authorities and few military police units, the mailed fist was stuffed with cotton. When the government mounted operations against the Huks it seldom succeeded in anything but alienating the local villagers who felt the burnt of troops' frustrations. Roxas seemed more amenable to seeking the spoils of office for himself and his followers than to fighting the Huks on their homeground.\textsuperscript{57}

Following Roxas death in 1948, President Quirino recognized that the insurgency required a larger force than the constabulary. Quirino assigned the 5th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from the Army to the Police Constabulary Command (figure 9) to alleviate this shortcoming. After two years of failure, Quirino reorganized the constabulary under the Secretary of National Defense and removed it from the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior.\textsuperscript{58}
Shortly after this reorganization, the Secretary of Defense formed the country’s first authentic counterinsurgency force, called “Force X” (figure 10). This force, organized from the 16th Police Constabulary company secretly screened the police force for the most dedicated and aggressive officers and men. Force X trained and operated under strict secrecy. Only President Quirino, the Army Chief of Staff, and three of the president’s aides new of its existence.

Force X used three captured guerrillas as instructors to train them in Huk customs, practices, and tactics. After four weeks of intensive training and careful reconnaissance, Force X initiated its first operation. Greenberg writes:

Force X recruited two walking-wounded soldiers from the Army hospital in Manila and secretly transported them to the training camp. At 1700 hours, 14 April 1948, Force X fought a mock battle with two police companies and withdrew with their “wounded” into Huk country. Four hours later they were met by Huk guerrillas, interrogated as to who they were and where they had come from, and were taken into Candaba swamps where they met Squadrons 1 and 17. The Force X commander convinced the Huk commander of his authenticity [a story based on the death of a genuine Huk leader] and was promised that he and his forces would be taken to Taruc.

Force X spent the next two days gathering intelligence on local officials, mayors and police chiefs who sympathized or provided information on the constabulary to the Huks. On the third day two others squadrons joined the group, one of which was an enforcement squadron whose members specialized in assassinations and kidnappings. By the sixth day, the Force X commander grew suspicious of the long delay and decided to attack the assemblage. In a thirty-minute battle that ensued, Force X killed eighty-two Huks, one local mayor and captured three squadron commanders. Force X’s outstanding success did not stop with this engagement. They radioed for reinforcements to secure the area, and conducted a two week long search and destroy mission. This time accompanied by two infantry companies. Two weeks and seven engagements later, Force X with its two infantry companies succeeded in killing another twenty-one guerrillas and capturing seven. Remarkably, the Force X operation had a rippling effect throughout the Huk organization that no one could have anticipated. Three weeks later, two Huk squadrons that
stumbled unexpectedly onto each other and, assuming that the other was Force X, opened fired. This chance encounter and firefight cost the guerrillas eleven more dead. Force X had created panic and anxiety for the first time within the Huk ranks. Unfortunately for the government, Force X represented the only successful counterinsurgency unit mobilized during the first phase of the insurgency, and it operated too infrequently to produce dramatic results.

The other counterinsurgency operations involving large conventional units and conventional tactics consistently resulted in dismal failures. These large ineffective sweeps of areas harmed more civilians than Huks. Even when the operation succeeded in capturing a few guerrillas follow-up operations never materialized. These operations did little to restore the people's confidence and allegiance to the government.

From 1946 to 1949, the Philippine military remained ineffectual in the central Luzon area. Poor tactical leadership, slow responsiveness, slipshod security, almost no accurate intelligence and an inadequate logistical support structure characterized the majority of military operations during this period. Dedicated counterinsurgency operations by either the Army or the police remained few in number and insignificant in effect. There was one exception, the government operation undertaken after the murder of Mrs. Quezon.

President Quirino ordered two constabulary battalions and one army battalion (some 4,000 troops) not to return to garrison until they had killed or captured all the Huks responsible for Mrs. Quezon's murder. The force entered the Sierra Madres mountains and divided itself into three task forces, one to block and two to maneuver. The two maneuver task forces further divided themselves into five companies to conduct aggressive patrolling until they made contact with the Huk force. After almost four months of relentless patrolling and sporadic fighting that killed one hundred and forty-six guerrillas and captured forty more, government forces finally cornered Viernes. His death and the deaths of many of his fellow commanders succeeded in
destroying the entire Huk regional command in the Sierra Madres. However, after the conclusion of this operation, conditions in the Philippine military returned to their previous ineffective and corrupt state.

By mid-1950, it was clear that the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) lacked an overall counterinsurgency campaign or strategy. Army units in the field received their orders directly from the government in Manila. The army and police intelligence system lacked direction and coordination and, more importantly, no one in the armed forces or the government seemed interested in correcting the problem. The Philippine army acted more like an occupation force than a combat force attempting to quell a rebellion. While the Huks gained the support of larger and larger segments of the populace of central Luzon, the army concentrated its efforts on protecting the large estates of landowners and businessman. Even when the army decided to dispatch patrols, they invariably stayed close to their bases and returned before nightfall. Most local commanders during this period maintained these practices as standard operating procedures as long as their respective areas of responsibility stayed out of newspaper headlines. Simply stated, army commanders seemed more interested in a comfortable life than prosecuting an aggressive and effective counterinsurgency campaign. Something dramatic needed to transpire within the Philippine government, or the Huks would win.

That something occurred in July 1950, Ramon Magsaysay was appointed the Secretary of National Defense. American, rather than divine intervention or inspiration, led to Magsaysay’s appointment. As member of the Philippine legislation, he had gone to Washington in April 1950 to seek military aid and assistance. During his trip he met and befriended Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale an Air Force officer working in the Office of Policy Coordination, an organization responsible for covert operations within the Central Intelligence Agency. Lansdale, who knew the Philippines and the threat posed by the Huks, recommended to his superiors that
they support Magsaysay as the "guy to lead the fight against the insurgents." Consequently, the State Department dispatched an Assistant Secretary of State to Manila with the following proposal for President Quirino: appoint Magsaysay Defense Secretary and U.S military assistance would increase. Quirino agreed, and in April appointed Magsaysay to the position.

Although Magsaysay faced an almost insurmountable task of reforming the Philippine military, he entered office with a clear vision and purpose. He realized the necessity of first conquering the major problems in the army before moving on to prosecuting an effective campaign against the Huk insurgency. On his first day as Secretary, he relieved the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Constabulary, and he ordered other high ranking officers into the field. He then began a personal routine that included extensive (unannounced) trips to see units in the field and local civilians alike. He also demonstrated swift and decisive leadership when the situation warranted it. He personally selected new and younger battalion commanders, and he order their units to new areas. On his daily trips to units in the field, Magsaysay personally inspected the men, their weapons, their equipment and facilities. Officers found derelict in their duties or involved in graft and those he deemed reluctant to carry the fight to the guerrillas were relieved immediately. In doing so, Magsaysay hoped to build morale, destroy the system of corruption, and reduce the tensions that had built up between the local people and the army.

These surprise inspections became so numerous and effective that leaders throughout the military began to improve conditions of their units. At the same time, he rewarded honest and hardworking soldiers and officers with money and promotions. In his first twenty days as Secretary he used U.S. military assistance funds to increase the monthly salary of the military. He also equipped each patrol leader with cameras to document and, thereby, verify enemy casualties. These two policies allowed the soldier to purchase rather than steal his daily ration from the local
villager and prevented units from fabricating Huk casualties. The latter policy also caused the gruesome practice within some AFP units. They began to cutoff the heads or ears of guerrillas.\textsuperscript{69}

While visiting army units, Magsaysay also stopped and spoke directly to the local villagers. He told them that if they had complaints about his forces to tell him, and he would take corrective action. To establish his credibility and to encourage open communication, Magsaysay authorized free telegrams from villagers and insured that either he or his staff answered each telegram.\textsuperscript{70} Within just a few months of his appointment, Magsaysay made dramatic and positive changes in the AFP, and then he turned his attention to addressing the next significant problem, a viable and effective counterinsurgency strategy.

Magsaysay recognized that the government’s strategy and tactics need a drastic adjustment. Although he had originally favored large-scale, conventional sweep operations, he changed his mind (on the advise he received from Lansdale) after he examined the results from previous operations and determined that they mainly inflicted suffering on the local population. Magsaysay decided to base army tactics on small-unit operations, relying on large scale conventional sweeps only when the situation demanded it. By doing this he hoped to maintain greater pressure on the Huks, reduce intelligence leaks (associated with large sweep operations) and reduce the enemy’s sense of security in Huklandia. In a speech delivered to the Philippine General Staff, Magsaysay explained his purpose and rationale for his new counterinsurgency strategy by stating:

\textit{Gentlemen, I know you all have graduated from the military establishments here and in the United States. Now I am telling you to forget everything you were taught at Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Benning and the Academy. The Huks are fighting an unorthodox war. We are going to combat them in unorthodox ways. Whatever it was that hurt me most as a guerrilla is what we are going to do now to the Huks.}\textsuperscript{71}

To support his new strategy, Magsaysay began to increase the size of the Army to twenty-six battalions. These battalions would operate in four tactical commands. The heart of the
program was the formation of BCTs. By 1955, with the assistance of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) (figure 11) and funds from the U.S. Military Defense Assistance Program, Magsaysay increased the size of the Army by 28,000 troops. He added to the size of the Police Constabulary as well, increasing it the number of companies to ninety-one.72

Beginning in 1950, at the direction of Magsaysay, AFP tactics underwent changes. Long range patrolling combined with psychological warfare became the main effort of the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. Army patrols that once stayed close to their base became more effective as aggressive new leaders sent patrols deep into the jungle in search of Huk base camps. BCT commanders now relied on Scout-Rangers73 to conduct long-range patrols that often spent several weeks attacking Huk supply lines and gathering information.

In 1952, Magsaysay realized the results of promoting dissension and mistrust in the Huk organization through psychological warfare were effective, and increased the effort. Later that year, the AFP, with the considerable assistance from the U.S Information Service, established a Public Affairs Office for Psychological Warfare and Public Relations.74 Two of the most successful programs were the payments for information leading to the capture of guerrilla leaders and the “Cash for Guns” campaign.75 Both programs worked to disrupt and reduce the effectiveness of the Huks. The Air Force also provided platforms to drop leaflets with surrender appeals and promises of safe passage if they surrendered. The most ingenious psychological warfare effort involved planes flying over small battles between Huks and government troops. The pilot would broadcast the names of Huk guerrillas and thank them for being informers and for their help in allowing the army to engage Huk guerrillas.76

A second major program to elicit support from villagers and undermine the support of Huks also began in 1952. This program encouraged Army commanders to establish Civilian Commando Units in friendly areas susceptible to Huk raids. These units composed entirely of
local volunteers and led by Army NCOs protected their barrios and thus relieved government forces from these stationary duties. By 1955, this program grew to include some 10,000 people, and it cemented a cooperative attitude between the people and the Army. Furthermore, it allowed the Army to commit a larger proportion of its troops to active pursuit operations against the Huks.  

Magsaysay also placed a priority on intelligence collection. He recognized the indisputable fact that no amount of military reorganization or change in tactics would prove effective unless he developed an effective intelligence organization focused on gathering information on the location of Huk guerrillas. Using Lansdale’s advise, Magsaysay directed all his battalions commanders and intelligence officers to focus on the Huk order of battle. He instructed commanders to compile files on known or suspected Huk members, their local intelligence nets and their logistical network. As commanders and intelligence officers compiled the information and related it to other information gathered previously, the Huk order of battle became so complete by 1954 that Lansdale remarked that if the Huks wanted to know where any of their other units were located all they needed to do was ask AFP intelligence.

The Force X concept underwent a rejuvenation as a direct result of this emphasis on intelligence collection. During this second phase of the insurgency, Force X operations supplied the government with intelligence and destroyed the Huk’s feelings of security in Huklandia. Operations usually consisted of disruption of Huk communications and elimination of Huk leadership. One of the most successful Force X operations conducted during this period occurred on the island of Panay. This operation succeeded in crippling the entire Huk organization on the island for the duration of the campaign. Much of the success achieved by Force X during this period can be credited to the efforts of the Philippine Intelligence Service and the graduates from the intelligence school (both organizations revitalized on the strong recommendation of Lansdale).
The government also gathered information on Huk activities and personnel from a variety of other sources that included undercover agents in Manila prisons, captured guerrillas, and their relatives.80

Another method used by the army to gain information involved the enlistment of local indigenous populations, such as the Black Pygmies and Negritos who lived in the Luzon mountains. These minorities were often victimized by the Huks and their bands. Magsaysay capitalized on their animosity toward the Huks and convinced them to act as guides and informants.81 Together with the other programs mentioned, Magsaysay’s intelligence campaign achieved resounding success at a time when the government needed a well organized and coordinated intelligence program. Magsaysay’s effort produced an intelligence collection system that gave the army the information it needed to strike the Huks in their base camps (arguably their most vulnerable point). This allowed the army to gradually sever the guerrillas from their main source of food, information, and arms—the local peasant.

Above all other considerations, Magsaysay realized the utmost importance of stopping the government’s terror tactics. He knew from his days as a guerrilla leader that the campaign depended on gaining the people’s support, allegiance and cooperation. Therefore, he instructed every soldier to perform two essential duties: to act as an ambassador of good will toward the people; and to kill Huks. He also instructed Army lawyers to act as free legal counsel on behalf of peasants in court cases against wealthy landlords. Soon children began to run and greet Army trucks when they entered villages rather than running to hide in the jungle as they done before Magsaysay instituted his reform policies.82

In December 1950, he turned his attention to reorganizing the Police Constabulary. He ordered the Police Constabulary under the command and control of the Army for the duration of the insurgency. He also placed regular army officers in command of police units and provided
them additional training and newer equipment and weapons. By subordinating the police to the military, Magsaysay demonstrated his willingness to thoroughly improve the government’s posture to counter the insurgency.

As part of his overall counterinsurgency strategy, Magsaysay incorporated a civil resettlement project, known as the Economic Development Corps (the EDCOR Project). The project had four aims. All focused on resettling former insurgents on government land away from the central Luzon area. Magsaysay wanted a means to entice active Huks away from armed struggle, and he envisioned the EDCOR Project as the means to demonstrate the government’s commitment towards land reform and private land ownership. The EDCOR Project succeeded almost immediately and surpassed even Magsaysay’s expectations. Applicants soon outnumbered available government land. By 1954, the original project had expanded to four new project areas, in several different locations outside of Luzon. This project also furnished Magsaysay with a significant propaganda victory. The Huk slogan of “Land for the Landless” now resided firmly in the hands of the government. Despite Huks attempts to sabotage the program, the persistent reports and stories about the wonderful conditions at the EDCOR sites made these Huk attempts counterproductive.

Philippine military success steadily continued. Huk forces had lost nearly 13,000 members to combat action or surrender since Magsaysay took office. In April, 1953, a captured guerrilla revealed the location of Taruc’s headquarters near Mount Arayat. Based on this information the Army launched a major offensive. The Army with two BCTs reinforced by three rifle companies, pursued the Huks through the center of Mount Arayat. Although the Army did not kill or capture a large number of Huks, it did demonstrate that the government now had the capability and will to operate in Huk territory. This aggressive operation destroyed the Huk idea
of an impenetrable fortress around Mount Arayat, and, equally as important, forced the remaining 2,000 guerrillas to constantly move in order to avoid government troops.85

Ramon Magsaysay was elected President of the Philippines in 1953. Once in office, Magsaysay concentrated on the civil affairs component of the counterinsurgency effort, such as the EDCOR projects.86 He also constructed new roads and irrigation projects for farmers, and, with the help of American aid, he established the Liberty Wells Association. This organization supervised the digging of more than two thousand sanitary wells in villages across Luzon. Magsaysay also continued to keep the pressure on the Huks with his aggressive operations against Huk production bases. He also served as his own Secretary of National Defense. By 1954, the Huks no longer presented a serious threat to Magsaysay or the central government. They numbered less than 2,000 and their popular support had eroded in the wake of Magsaysay’s enlightened reform programs. The high point of the year came on 17 May when Luis Taruc surrendered. A mass surrender of Huk leaders followed. By 1955, the Huks had all but disappeared, and with their organization destroyed and their support base gone they resembled roving bands of thieves rather than revolutionary freedom fighters. The Huk insurgency ended in 1955 not with a bang but with a whimper.87

Few individuals have directly affected an entire population as did Ramon Magsaysay. His deep concern for the problems of his countrymen won him acclaim, popularity and loyalty unprecedented in Philippine history. His campaign plan that combined military operations with civic action projects and his strategy of unconventional operations (while systematically improving the professionalism and competency of the armed forces) proved a resounding success. However, to overlook the contributions of Edward Lansdale and the other advisors and trainers in the JUSMAG would neglect one of the most prominent aspects of the entire campaign. By 1953, JUSMAG efforts had made a significant impact on both the effectiveness of the AFP
and had a positive impact on the overall conditions in the country. Luis Taruc saw the momentum swing in favor of the AFP and blamed the United States for the AFP and the Philippine government good fortunes. Taruc stated: "He (Magsaysay) was given an American Military Advisory Group to train his armed forces, to train them for war against the peasants, and he was backed up with the promise of greater aid if the people's movement got too strong for him." American advice, training, and aid made a significant impact, even in the view of the Huks.

Edward Lansdale developed a close and personal relationship with Ramon Magsaysay beginning in 1950. They maintained an intimate friendship until Magsaysay's death in 1957. Although assigned to the JUSMAG as the G-2 advisor, Lansdale was given exceptional freedom of action, and quickly he became Magsaysay's personal advisor. To maintain this close relationship and personal contact with Magsaysay, Lansdale obtained permission from the Chief of JUSMAG, General Hobbs, to accompany Magsaysay on his visits to AFP units. It is important to note that all other JUSMAG advisors were prohibited from accompanying their AFP units in the field. During their long tours together, they realized the urgency of a massive overhaul of the AFP. Under the influence of Lansdale, Magsaysay began his military revitalization programs: improve pay and morale; eliminate corrupt officers; and foster his campaign to win back the peoples' support for the AFP and the government. Stanley Karnow in his book *In Our Image* writes:

Lansdale communed with Magsaysay and they became *compadres*. Their talks rambled into the wee hours, the two of them often sharing a bedroom in Lansdale's villa. Lansdale usually ventilated ideas in his patient, sometimes didactic style and Magsaysay listened reverently. A Filipino nationalist once charged Lansdale with keeping Magsaysay in custody. Lansdale privately remarked years later that, having concluded that Asia needed its own heroes, he had in effect invented Magsaysay.89

As part of the revitalization campaign, Lansdale helped establish the intelligence schools and the Philippine Military Intelligence Corps. The graduates from these schools joined BCTs in the field and convinced commanders of the importance of intelligence to their operations.
Lansdale also helped Magsaysay devise the psychological warfare campaign that was remarkably effective.⁹⁰

In late 1953, Washington ordered Lansdale back to the U.S. for a follow on assignment to Vietnam. Magsaysay called President Eisenhower directly and succeeded in having Lansdale reassigned to Manila by early 1954. Lansdale stayed until May but when he left on orders to Vietnam, to do there what he had done in the Philippines. In later interviews, Lansdale credited his success to the following reasons: he treated the Magsaysay and the Filipinos as friends and equals; he advised them on counter guerrilla tactics and helped them lessen their reliance on conventional operations; he always made sure the Filipinos were responsible for the decisions; and finally he maintained a low-profile and allowed the Filipinos to take credit for successful operations. He later stated that “the Filipinos knew the problems and knew how to solve them and they did just that with U.S aid and advise, but without U.S domination of their effort.”⁹¹

The JUSMAG supported the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign during the first half of the 1950s through a multi-faceted approach that included advice, training and direct material and financial aid. However, this multifaceted approach did take time to develop. Initially, the JUSMAG’s small size, less than twenty officers assigned until 1952, reflected American post war philosophy of reducing U.S. military presence overseas. The Huk insurgency prompted many changes in the JUSMAG’s organizational structure.

In late 1950, Congress passed the Military Defense Assistance Act. Subsequently, the JUSMAG became the sole source of all military assistance to the Philippines. Shortly thereafter, the JUSMAG, under the command of Major General Leland Hobbs, increased in size to seventeen officers and twenty-one enlisted men. During the summer of 1950, while U.S. advisors helped Magsaysay reorganize the Army in BCTs, officials from the Mutual Defense Assistance Program conducted an assessment and recommended immediate American military and financial

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assistance. Despite the recommendations from the Mutual Defense Assistance program report the JUSMAG focused exclusively on the military aspects of the insurgency and ignored the broad social and economic issues that fueled the insurgency. Lansdale later commented that “in early 1950 Philippine and American officers barely mentioned the political and social factors of the insurrection and dwelt almost solely on the military situation.”

In 1951, The JUSMAG reorganized and became the executive agent for American military assistance to the Philippines under the general guidance of the ambassador and not the Commander-in-Chief Pacific as had previously been the case. In April, Major General Albert Pierson replaced General Hobbs as the Chief Advisor and Chief of the JUSMAG. However, this all occurred after the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted Hobb’s proposal to reorganize the JUSMAG with additional officers to advise and train the Philippine military. The proposal adopted by the Chiefs directed the JUSMAG to have a chief of the army section and five divisions chiefs one for the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and a Constabulary Division (figure 12). They also officially set the total strength at “such numbers as required.” Although ambiguous, this clause allowed the JUSMAG to once again increase its size, this time to thirty-two officers and twenty-six enlisted men. During the duration of the campaign the JUSMAG retained this basic structure with the slight addition of nine civilian stenographers to assist in administrative duties.

This reorganized JUSMAG had four areas of responsibility. Under the guidance of the Ambassador, it provided the following: advice and assistance to key members of the Philippine military; financial support through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program; training to the AFP; and standardization within the AFP.

In the fall of 1951, the JUSMAG began a its first major programs to train and equip the Philippine army. The programs included professional military education courses for officers and enlisted men on communications, maintenance and supply. Another program provided over 200
wheeled vehicles and other military items to the Army to increase their tactical mobility, which had been a long standing problem within the AFP. The JUSMAG also provided MDAP funds in the sum of $48.9 million for Magsaysay to organize and equip his twenty-six BCTs. By 1953, the overall efforts of the JUSMAG paid off as the AFP continued to operate more effectively and efficiently against the Huks.

At this point in the insurgency, an important philosophical change took place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff permitted JUSMAG advisors to accompany their counterparts into the field. Prior to this time, the JUSMAG policy prohibited advisors (except for Lt. Col. Lansdale) from going into the field with their counterparts. However, this did not mean that advisors could participate directly in combat. The JCS termed the advisors as "non-combatant observers." However, the new policy did allow advisors to see firsthand the actions of their units. Subsequently, the advisors provided improved advise to their respective commanders.

From 1950 to 1954, JUSMAG advisors and trainers implemented and successfully executed a series of programs that reorganized the Philippine military into a larger, more effective and professional force. American financial aid funneled through the JUSMAG allowed Magsaysay to devote the bulk of his country's finances to social programs and land reform. From 1951 to 1954, the Philippine government received $94.9 million in aid and assistance. This enabled the Philippine government to devote over 50 percent of the total budget on non-military programs even at the height of the insurgency.

More important, and less visible than the financial figures, was the ability of JUSMAG advisors to instill a sense of self-reliance in the AFP. It was not by accident that the advisors assumed a low profile. The Korean War also contributed to this low profile engagement. The U.S. had no readily available combat troops to send. Without U.S. troops to assist them and with advisors not initially allowed to accompanying them into the field, the AFP had to learn and to
develop on its own and under its own leadership. As already described, this allowed the Philippine military to gain the support and alliance of the people without U.S. involvement. This ultimately allowed the AFP to achieve legitimacy as the protectorate of the people and not as the surrogate force of what the Huks called, American imperialism. Once the AFP achieved a positive image in Filipino society, the Huk movement gradually disintegrated. In the end, the AFP defeated the Huks, and the JUSMAG advisors played a vital, albeit supportive, role in their success.

El Salvador

The violent struggle for democracy in El Salvador has a 400 year history. Its fundamental causes involve many internal factors. Approximately the size of Massachusetts with a population of nearly five million, El Salvador exhibited the characteristics common to most of its Central American neighbors: an economy dependent on agricultural exports; a unequal distribution of land and wealth; a series of authoritarian governments committed to maintaining the status quo; a history of official corruption and widespread repression of opposition groups; and, a military establishment that regarded its role as the final adjudicator of political power.98

The nature of the Salvadoran political system had affected the society’s ability and willingness to cope with economic prosperity and to transition to a more democratic political system. Unlike other Latin American countries El Salvador had not suffered from the divisiveness of ethnic conflict. A thorough process of miscegenation and cultural assimilation of the indigenous Indian population had prevented ethnic strife. First ladino (assimilated Indian) and then mestizo (mixed Indian and white) comprised the overwhelming majority of the population. Additionally, the Salvadoran economy which remained under government control had not experienced United States intervention as in Nicaragua..
Prior to independence from Spain in 1821 and from Mexico in 1823, Salvadoran society remained relatively stagnant. Cacao and indigo comprised their major exports. El Salvador’s geographical location outside the main trade routes of Europe and United States contributed to this stagnation. An extremely low literacy rate, and no more than half of the land under commercial cultivation, limited even moderate improvements in agricultural exports.

After independence from Mexico, the economic and political situation for the poorest citizen of El Salvador worsened. As the population increased, access to land decreased exponentially. The country’s liberal party backed free trade and anticlericalism while the conservatives pushed for tariffs and the closer union between church and state. Between 1825 and 1871 there were some twenty-five armed conflicts as local armies fought for their respective agendas. These conflicts devastated the country until the liberals achieved victory in 1871. The country entered a new period as liberals implemented their laissez-faire economic policies. They abolished communal lands and promoted the cultivation of coffee. Soon coffee replaced indigo as the country’s major export product. The export of coffee fueled an accelerating growth in the economy. However, coffee also created a new series of problems for El Salvador.99

Between 1880 and 1912 many new coffee farmers could not afford the initial start-up costs of planting and harvesting. (It takes approximately five years for coffee plants to yield their first crop). Therefore, these farmers had to tender their potential profits as collateral in order to receive credit advances. The credit advances came from large coffee processors and export brokers. A condition for these credit advances often included farmers having to sell their coffee below market rates to the coffee processors. When the market prices fell, the farmer’s profit disappeared and repayment of loans became impossible. In the absence of government relief or subsidies, the farmers found their loans in default and their farms repossessed. Consequently, the number of small family owned coffee farms decreased and the number of large family farms

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increased. Enrique Boloyra, a contributing author to the book, *Latin America Politics and Development*, writes the following about El Salvador:

In the early 1960s these large farms, representing less than 0.5 percent of the 226,800 in the country and averaging 502 acres in size accounted for 38 percent of the land under cultivation. By contrast, the more than 207,000 smallest farms averaging 4.10 acres in size and representing 91 percent of the total farms, accounted for only 22 percent under cultivation. In 1978, according to some estimates, 1,139 large proprietors representing 0.08 percent of the economically active population (estimated at 1,420,000) controlled about 68 percent of the net surplus of production. At about that time, households in the top 5-percent income bracket controlled 21.4 percent of the national income whereas the majority of wage earners, concentrated in the five lowest brackets, controlled only 22.5 percent. These discrepancies may appear sufficient to produce civil war in El Salvador, but comparable data from Mexico and for the rest of Central America would indicate that Salvador’s was hardly the worst case of socioeconomic inequality.

If socioeconomic inequities were not sufficient cause for civil war, then the question becomes, what other factor contributed to the civil war and insurgency in El Salvador? The answer lies in the labor market and labor unions. The major export producers of coffee needed cheap and abundant labor to keep their production costs down and their product competitive on the world market. El Salvador had an abundant supply of workers. The nation’s population growth assured a cheap supply of labor. The absence of unions insured this workforce would remain inexpensive. The government ensured this reality. Beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing in the early twentieth century, the government began enforcing a vagrancy law that forced vagrants to work on farms. This provided the large farm owners a steady supply of workers. In the 1920s the government reinforced this condition by preventing the formation of agricultural unions. As the access to land eroded from the many into the hands of the few, the country moved closer and closer to conflict and civil war. Baloyra writes:

Between 1960 and 1980, land-man ratios shrank in El Salvador by 50 percent. El Salvador was now devoting more land to non-traditional crops, particularly cotton and sugarcane, and land available for domestic-use agriculture diminished very markedly. Between 1950 and 1980 the areas dedicated to cotton and sugarcane in El Salvador increased 289 and 154 percent, respectively, and vast tracts were turned over to grazing further depriving the peasants of access to even the marginal lands that they exploited for subsistence agriculture. In other words, peasants were driven to the wall by the success, not the failure, of export agriculture.
In contrast to El Salvador’s success in agricultural, its industrial sector did not expand fast enough to assimilate the vast quantity of available workers. The large landowners maintained almost total control over the economy, characterized by Baloyra as the “magic square of the oligarchic domination.”

This term represented the small number of wealthy planters who controlled the economy through their ownership of the largest farms and their control over the country’s production, exports, foreign exchange and domestic credit. Additionally, the economy suffered from a lack of diversification, limited access to the larger Central American market, and almost no foreign investments.

The government’s attempt to improve the plight of agricultural workers proved futile. In 1965, the government of Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera established a minimum agricultural wage and the planters countered by eliminating their program of providing two free meals to the workers. The minimum wage resulted in many young people and women losing their jobs as planters replaced them with temporary workers. By hiring temporary help the planters could avoid paying the minimum wage. Consequently, wage reform destabilized the traditional relationship between laborer and landowner and did nothing to improve the economic condition of the peasant class.

All these factors contributed to the political repression and economic oppression of the peasant class. These conditions provided fertile ground for revolution and an armed mobilization of the peasantry led increasingly by the educated and disenfranchised middle class. When the world’s economic recession struck El Salvador in 1970 and coffee prices plummeted the delicate peace deteriorated quickly. The succession of inept and repressive military regimes did little to thwart the impending revolution.

Many historians and observers of El Salvador often date the revolution from the overthrow the Salvadoran government in 1970, when the first of five political-military
organizations appeared on the scene. However, the revolutionary movement first acquired its communist ideology in 1932, with the formation of the Communist Party of El Salvador, or the PCS. This party added two essential ingredients in the recipe for revolution, the means or method for organizing and the revolutionary vision of establishing a new Salvadoran society. The government responded to PCS opposition by outlawing the party and jailing many of its leaders. Its party leadership would eventually form the first of five political-military organizations that emerged in the 1970s.

In 1970, a small group of the PCS leadership resigned and went underground and began building the first political-military organization called the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL). The FPL focused on the military aspects of the struggle and placed a secondary importance on the political aspects of the struggle. They believed that its organization should focus on mobilizing the campesinos first and then union workers. Furthermore they discarded any possibility of an alliance with the military.

The second major political-military organization emerged two years later, with the formation of the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP). This organization also drew its constituency from the PCS. However, its composition consisted not only of young communists members from the PCS, but a radical segment of the Salvadoran bourgeoisie. The ERP like the FPL had a strong militaristic disposition and placed less importance on the political aspects of the revolution. The ERP leadership more than any other organization emphasized military strategy as the means to achieve power. They embraced the foco (nucleus) theory, a Latin American term that referred to a small group of committed, armed guerrillas who did not need a popular based organization in order to achieve victory. Despite their adherence to this theory, some ERP members wanted to pursue a more political course, based upon a popular organization. Ultimately, the differences over which course to follow led to a split in the ERP. A new faction
emerged in 1975, called the United Popular Action Front (FAPU) and the subsequent assassination of its leader Roque Dalton, spawned the immediate formation of the second political-military organization, the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN).  

The third political-military organization emerged in early 1980 when the ERP finally recognized the need for a popular organization to compliment its small group of committed armed revolutionaries. Therefore, the ERP leadership decided to affiliate with the popular organization called, the 28th of February Popular Leagues (LP-28). Together the two organizations formed the Party of Salvadoran Revolution (PRS).

The fourth political-military organization, the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) was created in 1976. Many of its founding members previously belonged to the ERP, while the bulk came from labor unions. This organization focused more on the regional (Central America) aspects of the struggle and not specifically or solely on the struggle within EL Salvador.

The fifth political-military organization to arrive on the revolutionary landscape occurred in late 1979, when the PCS decided to create a armed militia. This new organization became the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). The impetus for organizing the FAL came in the wake of the in the 1977 massacre in the Plaza of Libertad. The PCS concluded that the time for armed struggle had come and the purely political struggle would no longer suffice.

By 1983, the Farbundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) appeared as the unified body of all five groups, with an estimated strength of 12,000 armed guerrillas. A teacher’s union known as the National Association of the Salvadoran Educators provided the manpower for the insurgency, drawing from a pool of young university students and radical middle-class citizens. The organization received most of their external support from Nicaragua and Cuba. The FMLN organizational structure had three main elements: (1) the guerrillas; (2) the militia; (3) and the
popular neighborhood committees. The guerrillas organized themselves into squads of three to eleven men, platoons of twenty to thirty men and sometimes larger units. The guerrillas operated in both the rural and urban areas, and their operations ranged from traditional guerrilla operations such as kidnappings, raids and ambushes to more conventional operations which they demonstrated during their major offensive campaigns. In fact, by the mid 1980s the guerrillas called themselves the Revolutionary Popular Army.\textsuperscript{107}

The militia consisted of peasants and workers with some military training and weapons. They organized themselves into brigades for different tasks, such as production, self-defense, and security of towns and guerrilla territory. Initially, the militia served as the security force for union leaders and organizers, but eventually their main functions evolved into military engineering and construction of underground caches for supplies and equipment.\textsuperscript{108}

The third organization, the Popular Neighborhood Committee, organized themselves into blocks or zones. They had the responsibility of stockpiling food, water, ammunition and arms for the guerrillas. They served in a combat support and service support roles by erecting barricades and providing logistical support for the guerrillas. They also provided political education for new members by conducting study groups in their neighborhoods. By mid-1981 most estimates of FMLN strength ranged around 4,000 plus guerrillas and some 5,000 militia members.\textsuperscript{109}

Tommie Sue Montgomery, the author of Revolution in El Salvador, depicts the Salvadoran revolutionary movement as a series of phases beginning in 1970. Montgomery writes:

efforts and need to expand political base. Political work in rural and urban areas, caused by electoral process creating political space, closed previous four years. 1989-1991: Negotiating struggle. Continued geographic expansion. Wide-ranging analysis of the situation led to audacious proposal for popular participation in elections. War brought to the capital with attacks on military targets for the first time. Serious peace talks began. 1992-1994: Transition. The revolutionary movement becomes a legal political party and participates in the 1994 elections.110

The initial US response to the events unfolding in El Salvador lacked a consistent and unified strategy until the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this time period several significant events occurred in succession that prompted the U.S. to finally adopt a serious and comprehensive policy towards the affairs unfolding in El Salvador.

The first event was the military coup that transpired on October 15th, 1979. The widespread dissatisfaction with the repressive regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero triggered a bloodless coup by a group of young military officers intent on reform. Despite months of planning, the new junta never delivered on their promises of reform. Instead of implementing reform, the new government embarked on a new campaign to eliminate subversive forces within the country. In the first three weeks following the coup, more people died than in any equivalent period during the Romero regime. The junta's failure to deliver on promises and to control security forces provoked widespread criticism and condemnation from popular organizations and the Catholic Church. Eventually the junta collapsed, then the second and finally the third junta collapsed in 1980. This all happened while the factional groups of the opposition organized themselves under the banner of the FMLN.111

The FMLN took full advantage of the chaos and discontent created by the coups to gain mass support for their movement. By August 1980, the FMLN had mobilized all three organizational elements, and on January 10th, 1981, the FMLN launched their first major offensive. Although the FMLN offensive failed to achieve the outright victory they expected, it did demonstrate their widespread support as well as their tactical expertise over the poorly trained
and poorly led El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF). Despite government announcements that the FMLN had been routed, that the Salvadoran Army had won a great victory, and that the threat of revolution in El Salvador was over, the exact opposite was true. The FMLN offensive had clearly demonstrated the insurgents ability to operate throughout the country with little or no opposition from government security forces.

General Gutierrez, the leading member of the Civil-Military Junta which took control of the government on October 15th, 1979, echoed this point when he stated the following in a 1986 interview:

At the moment of the coup, the armed forces did not have more than 12,000 men, including paramilitary security forces. It was a limited force. There were three fundamental deficiencies in the armed forces: a total lack of equipment; lack of training; and an adequate intelligence system to deal with a revolutionary war.

The U.S. effort in support of the Salvadoran’s counterinsurgency campaign consisted of more than just a valid doctrinal concept of direct support. The effort included a unique organization capable of accomplishing a multitude of complex tasks and missions in support of the Salvadoran’s counterinsurgency campaign, without introducing U.S. combat troops into the conflict. That organization was the U.S. Military Group (MilGrp) in El Salvador. It achieved remarkable success in many areas and had limited success in other areas. The MilGrp achieved success by integrating and employing a augmentation force known as the Operations, Plans, and Training Team (OPATT) and adhering to two fundamental principles which are as follows: the maintenance of direct support through the country team concept; and the steadfast determination not to commit U.S. troops in combat.

Observers of the conflict point to the U.S. State Department “White Paper” released in February, 1981 as the primary catalyst that changed U.S. policy in El Salvador. This report offered evidence of a clandestine support system operated by the Soviet Union and Cuba for the FMLN movement. Within days of its release the Reagan administration increased military assistance to El Salvador by $25 million. And March 1981, the administration also approved the
deployment of a fifty-five man OPATT to assist the MilGrp in the following areas: liaison with the ESAF; train the ESAF in intelligence collection, patrolling, communications, maintenance, reconnaissance and air mobile operations.\textsuperscript{116}

Shortly thereafter, the Reagan administration commissioned then Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner to accomplish three tasks which are as follows: develop a national military strategy for El Salvador; produce a situation report for the administration; and put into effect a security assistance program for El Salvador. The General’s subsequent report, known as the \textit{Woerner Report} quickly accelerated U.S. involvement in the conflict.\textsuperscript{117} More importantly, the report recognized the importance of limiting the role of U.S. troops. From the early 1980s, the guiding principle behind the U.S. role in El Salvador became known as the "KISSSS" principle, for keep it simple, sustainable, small and Salvadoran." \textsuperscript{118}

The task of physically putting into effect a viable security assistance program fell to the MilGrp. This was an extremely difficult mission considering the tremendous reorganization required within the ESAF. By this stage of the insurgency the ESAF posture was defensive. Their large scale military operations had proven ineffective against the FMLN. Furthermore, the ESAF had perpetrated a number of serious human rights violations, which casted them in the role of oppressor rather than that of protector. The combination of these factors created a situation that significantly reduced the government’s chance of winning the counterinsurgency fight.

Commensurately, the MilGrp launched a variety missions to reverse the situation. These missions fell into two general categories: develop the ESAF into an effective counterinsurgency force; and develop the ESAF into a professional military organization.\textsuperscript{119} The MilGrp tackled both missions simultaneously in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles.

It was clear that in the early 1980s, the FMLN seemed well on the road to achieving complete victory. They owned the night and in many areas of the country they operated openly
without fear of government attacks. The FMLN’s freedom of maneuver had more to do with ESAF incompetence than FMLN competence or superiority. According to Colonel John Waghelstein, the MilGrp commander in El Salvador from 1982 to 1984, the ESAF adhered to a conventional approach of dealing with guerrillas. Their standing operating procedure consisted of ponderous multi-battalion operations conducted in a short time span. The ESAF rarely conducted night operations, and a company was the smallest unit capable of independent operations. He noted that the ESAF made no real connection among the various elements of counterinsurgency actions including combat operations, intelligence collection, civic action, psychological warfare, protecting the nation’s infrastructure or winning the support of the population. Waghelstein saw the real problem facing the MilGrp was “how to covert this conventionally oriented Army into an effective counterinsurgency force.”

The ESAF suffered not only from a lack of basic counterinsurgency skills, but also it suffered from a lack of strategic focus. Consequently, the MilGrp devoted enormous time and resources to develop the ESAF into an effective counterinsurgency force. The second mission of developing a professional army involved persuading the ESAF to respect human rights. The MilGrp wisely inculcated this theme into every aspect of training provided by the OPATT trainers to the ESAF. Additionally, the MilGrp advisors made it clear that human rights violations jeopardized the appropriation of additional military assistance funds.

The MilGrp experienced early difficulties in both mission areas. According to Deane Hinton, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1982 to 1983, “There were all kinds of efforts by MilGrp commanders to reform the way the war was being conducted by trying to get the ESAF out of their garrisons and into the field. By the time I left in mid 1983, it seemed to me it was still in doubt as to whether the Salvadoran Army would ever be an effective force.”
The MilGrp remained undaunted and resolved the immediate problem, the small size of the ESAF, by helping it to expand from 10,000 in 1979 to 56,000 in 1987. Additionally, the MilGrp pushed through an increase in security assistance funds to solve the shortages of weapons and ammunition.\textsuperscript{123}

Another serious problem in this area concerned the ESAF leadership and their \textit{tanda} system.\textsuperscript{124} Colonel Waghelstein, to whom the responsibility of transforming the ESAF first fell, stated: "out of the 14 departments there were only two departmental commanders that were worth a damn, the others being notably ineffective. There were lots of young lieutenant colonels who knew what to do, but they were viewed with some suspicion." It was Colonel Waghelstein's opinion that General Garcia, the Salvadoran Minister of Defense from 1979 to 1984, was more intent on maintaining his power base within the military than defeating the insurgency.\textsuperscript{125}

By 1983, after the consistent urging of the MilGrp and Embassy officials, Congress officially approved the deployment of a fifty-five man OPATT with the following mission: train the ESAF in communications, intelligence, and logistics in order to improve their capability to interdict the FMLN guerrillas and respond to terrorists attacks.\textsuperscript{126} The essence of the program provided arms, equipment, economic aid, intelligence support, strategic counsel and tactical training from OPATT trainers, while preserving the fundamental principle that U.S. military personnel would not willfully engage in combat operations.

The MilGrp and Embassy leadership encouraged and supported wholeheartedly this principle. They realized intuitively the nature of the conflict and the appropriate role of the U.S. military trainers. They realized that introducing U.S. combat troops would only undermine the legitimacy of the Salvadoran government and the ESAF, in essence making it a "gringo war" with a "gringo solution." Colonel James Steele, who commanded the MilGrp from 1984 to 1986, in his commentary on the role of the MilGrp stated:
The MilGrp provided basically three things. We provided material, training and advice. It was consistent with the policy of the U.S. government. Training focused more and more on their cadres, their instructors and their leaders than to train their soldiers and their units. Early on in the conflict we focused heavily on training their units in Honduras and in the States that was probably absolutely critical at that time. One of our problems is that there was a tendency for us to want to organize their units around how we are organized. This gets right to the issue of what kind of people do you need here? How many do you need? And so on. Nobody cursed the fifty-five man limit more than I probably have in the last two and half years, but I just have to tell you that doing it with a low US profile is the only way to go.127

Thomas Pickering, the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1983 to 1985, expressed a similar opinion. He stated that in the last analysis, the policy on the number of U.S. military was “an ingredient for success rather than failure.” It proved the general belief that a lot of U.S. military and embassy personnel held that if the MilGrp could in the words of Pickering “stay lean, trim and mean for a very long period of time and keep the lid on personnel bloat, you can win or at least you can hold your own.”128

Within this framework, the MilGrp set out to reverse the situation in favor of the government of El Salvador. Their first actions included developing a strategic focus for both the government and the ESAF. Then Mil Group commander, Colonel John Waghelstein, with U.S. Embassy staff drafted the National Campaign Plan (NCP). Whereas the Woerner Report focused on creating an army capable of successfully combating the guerrillas, the NCP focused on the broader issue of developing a comprehensive strategy to win the war. The campaign called for an integrated effort, that involved all four instruments of national power, the military, the economic, the diplomatic, and the informational. Specifically, the NCP called for a comprehensive civic action and defense program with an intelligence network behind a strong framework of security provided by the military.129

The first and most critical component of the campaign plan centered on converting El Salvador’s garrison-bound army into an aggressive counterinsurgency force. This meant forcing the ESAF to abandon its ponderous brigade size sweeps in favor of small, lightly armed units capable of precisely locating and then interdicting the guerrillas. The U.S. advisors and trainers encouraged the ESAF to mirror the guerrillas, by setting out a
ambushes, launching night attacks and conducting saturation patrolling in squads of five to ten men. The MilGrp advisors also urged the employment of civil defense units to help augment the regular security forces.\textsuperscript{130}

At the brigade and battalion level, OPATT trainers began training long range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) units, rapid reaction infantry battalions, anti-terrorist battalions, and two elite special operation units know as the 1st Prial, a LRRP type unit and the 2nd Hacha, a SAS type unit.\textsuperscript{131} These organizations formed the core counter guerrilla units within the ESAF and they received their training and support directly from the MilGrp. By early 1983, the military situation began to improve.

In June 1983, with considerable help from the MilGrp, the ESAF launched Operation Well Being. The operation targeted the San Vicente province located in the geographic center of the country. Its purpose was to deny the FMLN access to the area and to establish a civil defense program capable of preventing the FMLN from reestablishing an effective presence in the area. The operation consisted of two phases: phase one consisted of securing the operational area. This was accomplished by saturating the area with LRRP units and rapid reaction infantry battalions. Behind this shield of security, the government launched a combined civil/military effort that recruited civil defense detachments, organized peasant cooperatives, reopened schools and medical clinics, restored local government and conducted extensive civil action projects.

Although extremely ambitious, the first hundred days achieved enormous success. The ESAF pushed the FMLN guerrillas out of the area and accomplished the majority of their civil/military objectives.\textsuperscript{132}

The FMLN responded by launching a counteroffensive in the eastern portion of the country. Consequently, neither the ESAF nor the government could sustain Operation Well Being, and by the fall 1983 many of the battalions providing the shield of security for the civil defense units moved on to other areas to combat the rise of FMLN activities. With the majority of
the battalions gone, the FMLN returned to San Vicente and dismantled the operation's achievements. The guerrillas overran civil defense outposts, closed schools and clinics, and forced local government officials to retreat to the capital city of San Salvador. In the end, the operation failed for a lack of sufficient troops, resources and funds.\textsuperscript{133}

Despite this failure of Operation Well Being, the MilGrp stayed on course and continued to push for similar operations, such as Operation Phoenix.\textsuperscript{134} This effort soon produced tangible results. Benefiting from the U.S arms and training programs, the Salvadoran military began to hold its own against the guerrillas. Bitter fighting occurred between 1982 and 1985. By the latter year when the fighting started to subside, it was apparent that the ESAF had clearly thwarted the FMLN's attempt to achieve a decisive military victory.

By 1986, the FMLN with its strength reduced to approximately 6,000 fighters, down from 12,000, reverted to a new strategy of protracted warfare. They discarded the concept of large battles with the ESAF and reorganized their guerrilla force into smaller units. They also opted for a less risky hit and run strategy aimed almost exclusively at economic targets as a means to undermine the economic stability of Salvadoran society and its legitimate government.\textsuperscript{135} The FMLN did not totally abandon large scale operations, rather they saved this course of action for later and for more strategically important stages of the insurgency.

Throughout the offensive mounted by the ESAF the MilGrp advisors continued to insist on the preservation of human rights and the humane treatment of the civilian population. Colonel Waghelstein described this strategy as "the only territory you want to hold is the six inches between the ears of the campesino."\textsuperscript{136} To a great extent, the trainers and MilGrp advisors managed to change the attitudes of the most senior Salvadoran military leadership.

After the personal visit by then Vice President George Bush, the issue was reemphasized in 1983. He warned the Salvadoran political and military leadership that if death squad violence
continued the U.S. would end its aid and support. The Salvadorans got the message and curbing human rights violations took on a new sense of importance and urgency.

Colonel Mauricio Vargas, one of the more enlightened Salvadoran senior officers, also insisted during that period that unless the ESAF addressed the causes of insurrection, the civil war would go on. He pointed out that one of the greatest causes of the insurrection had been official human rights abuse.

Another Salvadoran senior officer, Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, echoed the same concern over ending human rights violations, when in 1987 he stated:

We understand the function of the armed forces in a democratic society is to provide support in giving impetus to the democratic process. But one of the most significant advances made during these past years [since the arrival of American advisors and trainers] has been to create an image for ourselves in the eyes of the international world as a respecter of human rights and a terminator of abuses inflicted on the people by governmental authorities. We must face the fact that we were, at one time, responsible for the brutalities and ill-treatment imposed on the citizens of this country. I repeat, the support and impetus given to the democratic process and the socioeconomic reforms were essential.

Even though the human rights issue evoked powerful emotions, the effort succeeded. The Salvadorans drastically curbed their human right violations for two reasons- first they realized it worked it gaining popular support or at least diminished the campesino’s justification for supporting the FMLN; and the second, many officers truly believed it was the right and moral course of action. The statistics show that in 1981 the Salvadoran and right wing death squads committed over 10,000 political murders. By 1990, the number dropped to 108. This does not imply that 108 political murders are acceptable in counterinsurgency operations. On the contrary, political murder is totally unacceptable. However, the drastic reduction in death squad activities is significant. This is a remarkable accomplishment considering the nature and history of Salvadoran politics, military, and society. The fact remains that this effort was an important moral and ethical step in the right direction and contributed immensely to the success of the overall counterinsurgency effort.
The task of putting together the civil defense program fell primarily on the shoulders of one individual, Master Sergeant Allen B. Hazlewood. For several years, he served as the only OPATT civil defense trainer in El Salvador. He converted raw recruits (those deemed capable by the Salvadoran leadership to handle the delicacy’s of civil defense operations) into a cadre of twenty-five personnel who had the mission to enter rural communities and recruit and organize civil defense detachments (figure 13). Despite limited resources and the government’s resistance to arming civilians, Hazlewood achieved remarkable success. He succeeded in training a core cadre that eventually led to the establishment of national-level civil defense architecture and over 240 civil defense detachments (figure 14).† Although many of these detachment lacked proper equipment and training, this “voluntary” program succeeded in providing a viable mechanism for the people to support the government. The civilian, in committing himself to protect his village through civil defense, takes a stand in favor of the existing government and rejects revolution. The program also provided a measure of control over the population and supplemented the efforts by regular security forces to secure the countryside.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering later commented that the Embassy was only able to focus on a few priority tasks and that everyone involved had to constantly reinvent wheels. He pointed to one key example as the whole civil defense program. He stated: “When I was there, the program was in the hands of one Special Forces sergeant. He did a superb job. It was the sort of thing which, in other circumstances you might have expended to a company of Special Forces. But the real reason why it got done well was because this guy had the right conceptual approach, the training, the experience and the background to put it rapidly on the back of the Salvadorans that he had trained.”†

Similarly, the ESAF had no meaningful psychological warfare campaign until OPATT trainers and additional MilGrp advisors arrived in 1984. In contrast, the FMLN as early as 1980,
had an impressive psychological warfare campaign targeted against the government, the armed forces and the Salvadoran people. In that year, the FMLN began broadcasting throughout Central American their propaganda messages from their clandestine radio station, called Radio Venceremos.143

The Woerner Report did not specifically address psychological operations and the process of developing a comprehensive campaign remained extremely slow until October 1984. In that year the MilGrp started assigning a full-time psychological operations advisor to the ESAF. Then in May 1986, a psychological operations mobile training team (MTT) arrived in country to revamp the entire program. By 1987, the MTT helped the ESAF to expand its organizational structure to comprise a Directorate of Psychological Operations. This new organization included four officers and 140 civilians, among them intelligence analysts, psychologists, and technicians.

Subsequently, each of the ESAF’s six brigades acquired its own psychological operations section. These new organizations dramatically improved the brigades’ capability to conduct psychological operations. U.S. security assistance helped purchase printing machines, loudspeakers, and video production equipment, AM/FM transmitters and one aircraft mounting a sound system. Eventually, this MilGrp effort succeeded in developing the Salvadoran armed forces first radio station, called Radio Cuscatlan. It began broadcasting in late 1986. Capable of broadcasting messages throughout El Salvador, the radio station quickly established itself as the primary means of distributing the government’s propaganda messages.144 Colonel Steele summarized the overall campaign when he stated the following:

There is an interest in psychological operations within the Salvadoran armed forces that’s far greater than anything that we saw in Vietnam. It’s an integral part of what they are doing. The idea of getting people to defect is central to the plans of every brigade. They are training Psychological Operations experts for every unit. We’ve played a role in that process and I think it’s one of the things that we can really be proud of. They are putting out a lot of leaflets. They are using loud speakers. They are using radio spots very effectively. It hasn’t always been that way. I think we played a role in that education process, but they’ve seen the results that have come from successful psychological operations and that has been an impetus to what has been done.145
In the area of intelligence the MilGrp experienced less successful results. The Salvadoran intelligence structure consisted of two intelligence organizations at the national level. The Directorate of Intelligence (DNI) and the C-2 of the Combined General Staff of the Armed Forces. Theoretically, the Salvadoran’s created the DNI to provide strategic, or what the Salvadorans termed, political intelligence. The C-2 was created to develop operational intelligence. However, during the insurgency, the DNI geared all of its efforts toward the development of tactical intelligence and neglected the development of strategic intelligence.

Despite assistance from the CIA, the 407th Military Intelligence Group in Panama and the MilGrp that included analysis of operational areas, photography and imagery interpretation and the interception of guerrilla communications, the DNI remained fixated on developing tactical intelligence for the Salvadoran army. Furthermore, both the DNI and C-2 sections relied more on technical resources and indicators than on human sources. And the United States provided the majority of the sophisticated platforms. This technical support in many ways undermined the effort to develop a HUMINT capability.

The MilGrp tried to used the platforms as a means of focusing Salvadoran HUMINT operations. The MilGrp tried unsuccessfully to convince the Salvadoran leadership that the sophisticated platforms can provide extremely useful intelligence as long as they have reliable human intelligence to complement and support them. The MilGrp also stressed the importance of an integrated intelligence infrastructure that could support ongoing civil action and psychological operations.

Despite the Milgrp’s best efforts the program never gained the momentum and urgency necessary to develop a viable HUMINT organization within the existing Salvadoran intelligence system. The final blow to the program came when the FMLN changed their strategy in 1985 and reorganized into smaller more compartmentalized guerrilla units. General Wallace Nutting, the
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command from 1979 to 1983, summed up the situation when he stated:

Another lesson learned (from this conflict) is the indispensable requirement for intelligence. If you do not have a system, an intelligence collection system, with an analytical capability and distribution process that can feed first a policy formulation process in a sensible way and then coordinate for execution, then you can't get to first base. And there is, in my opinion, an unreasonable tendency to rely on technical means, which are much less relevant in this form of conflict. We don't do the human intelligence thing very well. The capability we did have was dismantled 10 years ago and what we put back together is too slow and inadequate for long periods of time. I think we in the government have to acknowledge the indispensable need for intelligence and put together a system that combines the best capabilities of technical means and human sources and locate the analytical capability where it can operate most efficiently and go from there. We have not done that very well.\textsuperscript{147}

Consequently, the ESAF had little or no warning before every major FMLN offensive. And the HUMINT operations that the security and intelligence units did undertake often produced misleading information or focused on the wrong FMLN organization. A prime example occurred prior to the FMLN's November 1989 offensive into the capital city of San Salvador. In this instance, the FMLN used newly released political prisoners to set up phony nongovernmental organizations. The DNI and C-2 agents focused their collection efforts on these organizations, while the FMLN infiltrated and organized their guerrillas units throughout the capital.\textsuperscript{148} Despite poor ESAF intelligence operations the war remained a stalemate.

In March 1989, the ARENA candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, won the presidential election and committed his government to negotiating an end to the war with the FMLN. This marked the beginning of three years of negotiations that finally resulted in peace and an end to the insurgency. Eventually, the ARENA party and the FMLN came to consider ending the war their primary political objectives. Both sides realized that this could only be achieved through negotiations. Beginning in April 1990, the FMLN and the government adopted an agreement concerning the manner of negotiations leading ultimately to a permanent peace. The peace process had many
difficult moments including two major FMLN offensives, but by January 1992, both sides signed the Chapultepec peace accords.\textsuperscript{149}

The MilGrp played a vital role in bringing peace to El Salvador. The U.S. had invested nearly $6 billion in aid and assistance. Calculated from 1981 to 1992, U.S. assistance to El Salvador averaged $1 million per day.\textsuperscript{150} It was a noteworthy long-term investment and commitment to peace from a nation accustomed to immediate results and instant gratification.

The lessons learned from this experience in El Salvador points out the importance of an organization capable of blending the military, psychological, political, social, and economic activities into a cohesive counterinsurgency campaign over time. The MilGrp did just that as part of the primary instrument of U.S. support to the Salvadoran counterinsurgency campaign.

The basic nature of any insurgency is the fight for legitimacy or the struggle for the moral right to govern between the insurgent faction and the government in power. The MilGrp in El Salvador understood this basic principle of insurgency and never violated the legitimacy of the Salvadoran government, rather it fostered it through direct support. The MilGrp adopted a strategy of support, advise, and training that stressed the themes of pacification, civil defense, security and protection of human rights. However, it was its unique organizational structure (the addition of the OPATT element) that gave it the multi-functional capability to promote these themes. The MilGrp did not win the war rather it helped to create the conditions for a peaceful political solution.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Robert A. Fitton, \textit{Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition} (Boulder: Westview Press 1990), 41.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Frank Kitson, \textit{Bunch of Five} (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 70.
\item \textsuperscript{3}John Coates, \textit{ Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 10. The British trained specially selected members of the MCP in guerrilla warfare and a total of 165 were put through the ten-day course. Although the fortunes of the MPAJA groups were in the early stages precarious, they survived and attracted many recruits. The ultimate effect was to produce a force of some 6,500 men. In 1943, it
strength was augmented by direct assistance from British officers out of South East Asia Command. For many Chinese, the MPAJA was the focus of their continuing struggle against Japan. For the MCP itself this was a watershed event in its political life. For the first time in the history of the party it had a military organization.


5John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 53-55. The MCP organization was based upon the orthodox Leninist “cell” structure. Cells within similar industries and trades were coordinated by branches. Above these branches, in ascending order came district and then state committees. The highest echelon was the Central Committee and subordinate organizations included the Organizational Bureau, the Propaganda, Educational, Racial Bureau, and the Departments of Labor and Trade Union. After 1948, an Armed Forces Department was established in every state or regional committee. In theory, each Armed Forces Department at the state and regional level was to control a regiment or brigade. The regiment usually consisted of two to four battalions ranging in size from 112 men at the very minimum to 3,300 men at the very maximum. Each regiment had two to four battalions, each battalion had two to four companies and so on, down to the section level which comprised a force of between seven and thirteen men. Special Branch intelligence indicated that in 1957, the Central Committee had eleven subordinate Regional Regiments and one Border Committee with an approximate end strength of 3,395 men.

6Kitson, Bunch of Five, 71.

7Ibid., 72.


9Cable, Conflicts of Myths, 73.

10Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 79. When the tide of insurgency began to flood out of control early in 1950, the impetus of change came not from Gurney but from the British Defense Coordination Committee, Far East in Singapore which, in giving its analysis of the situation, stated flatly that the present direction of the campaign was unsatisfactory and suggested that a civil coordinating officer, under the High Commissioner, be made responsible for prosecuting the campaign. The committee added that heavy reinforcements of troops and air power would not bring the needed improvement, unless paralleled by vigorous action on the civil side.

11Cable, Conflicts of Myths, 79.

12Kitson, Bunch of Five, 75.

13Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 83.

14Ibid., 114.

15Ibid., 123.
Cable, *Conflicts of Myths*, 77. Some British troops volunteered along with trackers from Borneo.

*Ibid.*, 146. A Ferret group was normally about eighty strong. With each group were eight liaison officers who were used to interpret and gather information. The groups were given rapid and rudimentary training in small arms and basic techniques of patrolling in a ten day course run by the Malay Regiment at Port Dickson. Each group divided into four patrols usually of twelve soldiers with an interpreter and a tracker. When troops in the patrol were Malays they worked under civilian officers; British or Gurkha troops worked under their own officers. It became general practice in most groups for three patrols to search different areas simultaneously, leaving one patrol to rest and guard the patrol base. The usual patrol was eight to ten hours in duration and individual patrols worked for three days out of four.

*Cable, Conflicts of Myths*, 77.

Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*, 147. The insurgents themselves admitted, they did not worry much about large police-military sweeps as they “come and go,” but they disliked the Ferret Groups who “go too far and stay too long.”


*Ibid.*, 140. The Psychological Warfare Section was originally included in the Director of Operations Staff under the Head of the Emergency Information Service. However in March 1954 the Psychological Warfare Section was separated under that title, and made a separate department within the Director of Operations staff. It worked very closely with the Special Branch of the Federal Police.


*Ibid.*, 349. Framework deployment was nothing more then a reversion to the area system which had been used throughout the interwar period. Battalions were allocated specific areas of operations and companies were further deployed in subareas. The 1st Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment had discovered that by locating patrol bases near food sources it could not only
compel the insurgents to concentrate their efforts on getting supplies, but also could force them into battle on the government’s terms.

30Ibid., 349. Assigned to given area, a unit could begin to win the confidence of its people. With this object in mind, Darcy Manders of the Green Howards brought out the families of his officers. His reasoning was the best way to convince the Chinese that his battalion would really protect them was to have British wives and children share the risks of the native population. (Darcy Mander, conversation with author, 4 June 1987)

31Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 178.


34Ibid., 6.

35Ibid., 7. In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 127, the Tydings-McDufffie Act. This act, ratified in May 1934, by the Philippine Congress promised full Philippine independence by 4 July, 1946 and established conditions under which the island would be governed until that time by the Philippine Commonwealth. This act created serious dissension within the Philippine government, for it promised independence at the price of formalizing economic ties with Washington for the next twelve years. Many critics in the Philippine government that included a growing communist and socialist parties objected strongly to the near total disregard for Philippine nationalism that these controls mandated.

36Ibid., 7.

37Ibid., 8. In May 1924, the Philippine Communist Party joined the Philippine Socialists Party and formed the Kapisanang Pambansa ng mga Magbudkid sa Filippinas (KPMP) in the Nueva Ecija Province a stronghold of peasant unrest and violence. Soon the Nationalist Peasant’s Union spread across the island of Luzon and into the Philippine capital city of Manila. The National Peasant’s Union exploited social conditions, the continued colonial status of the island, and the land-tenure system and the deteriorating climate between landlords and peasants, to become the leader of a confederation of labor unions, known as the Philippine Labor Congress. In 1927, the organization officially associated itself with the nation’s first legal communist political party, the Worker’s Party. Later in that year, the leadership organized itself into four new socialist and communist organizations and began to plan for what they called a “class struggle” against the Manila government.

38Ibid., 10-13.

39Ibid., 15.

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Organized into five, 100-man squadrons, they obtained much needed arms and ammunition from Philippine Army stragglers. The Huk recruitment campaign progressed slower than the leadership anticipated due in large part to the U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrilla units. Although restrained by American sponsored guerrilla units, the Huks nevertheless took to the field with only 500 men and even fewer weapons. Despite several setbacks at the hands of the Japanese, the Huk guerrilla movement grew in size and efficiency throughout the war. They emerged at its conclusion as a well-trained, highly organized force numbering some 15,000 armed fighter and capable of threatening the post-war Philippine government.

Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 339. Luis Taruc was born in a barrio of Pampanga Province, the son of a sharecropper. Typical of Filipino peasants, for whom education is an escape from poverty, his father sacrificed to put him through high school. His favorite course was American history. He went to college in Manila where he worked part-time as a ditch digger. By accident he met an American army master sergeant, Tom Farrell, at a political rally. Farrell provided him with some Soviet pamphlets and other Marxist literature. He later recalled that “suddenly I knew that there were answers to our problems.” Too poor to continue college, he returned to Luzon and began work as a tailor. Following the world economic slump that devastated the Philippines, Taruc left his tailor shop and volunteered to help organize the local Socialist Party. Recognized as a skilled organizer, the Party leadership gave Taruc the command of the Huk coalition to fight the Japanese.

Even General Eisenhower remarked that, “Of all the wartime capitals, only Warsaw suffered more damage than Manila.

In October 1945, approved $100 million in emergency economic aid to the Philippines. This act provided for several important actions to assist reconstruction. The first provisions established a Philippine War Damage Commission, charted by Congress, to investigate and pay claims for property lost as a result of military action. The Commission owed its conception as much to an August 1943 promise by President Roosevelt to assist in the repair of damages caused by war as it did to concerns about the conditions on the islands. Congress hoped this assistance would put the Filipino economy back on track.

In February 1945, Luis Taruc was arrested for refusing to disarm and disband his armed Huk squadrons. After twenty-two days in prison Taruc was released when mass demonstrations threatened to undermine peace in central Luzon. However, he was arrested again in April this time by U.S. CIA agents for vowing to continue his fight against the government and the U.S. He was released a second time in September 1946. This time Taruc and many of his subordinate leaders took to the mountains around central Luzon for protection.

Roxas, a pre-war politician of prominence as well as brigadier in the Philippine Army and longtime friend of General Douglas MacArthur had cooperated, apparently voluntarily, with the Japanese occupation authorities. While Roxas was
freed from any charges many other equally voluntary collaborators were imprisoned. To the majority of the Filipino people this sequence of events reeked of an unacceptable disregard for crimes during the occupation which had cost the lives of tens of thousands of patriotic Filipinos. It also appeared as another intervention into their internal affairs by the American government.


49 Ibid., 41.

50 Ibid., 45.

51 Ibid., 48. In order to control Huk activities, Taruc developed an extensive and well organized structure very similar to the MCP model. The organization included the following hierarchy in descending order: the National Congress; the Central Committee; the Politburo; the Military Department; the Organizing Department; the Education Department; the Finance Department. The organizations under the command and control of the Military Department included the following: the Hukbalahap General Headquarters and ten regional commands. The regional command consisted of a single regiment with two subordinate battalions and each battalion had two subordinate companies. One hundred men usually formed a company and each company was composed of two platoons, with each platoon having four twelve-man squads. During the first phase of the insurgency, 1946-1950, the Huk force ranged between 14,000 and 15,000 guerrillas, and over 100,000 supporters in the central Luzon region with a population of two million. By 1950, the number of guerrillas fell to about 12,000 but the number of supporters remained steady at about 100,000.

52 Ibid., 39.

53 Ibid., 49.

54 Ibid., 55.

55 Ibid., 57. Taruc broke ranks with the political wing of the movement based on their insistence that the movement transition into an urban campaign and begin the mobilization of the masses. Taruc felt this move was too premature and maintained that the original agenda of guerrilla operations would eventually expand their popular base.

56 Ibid., 68.

57 Ibid., 68.

58 Ibid., 70.

59 Karnow, *In Our Image*, 350. Force X was also called the “skull squadron” for their practice of beheading suspected Huk guerrillas. Army Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, commander of the Nenita Unit, a special constabulary force that operated in the area of Mount Arayat from 1946 to 1949 selected the 16th Police Constabulary Police company under the command of Lieutenant Marana to become the Force X. Colonel Valeriano and Lieutenant Marana personally screened and then selected three officers and forty-four men for the unit. Colonel Valeriano
directed the training and subsequent missions of Force X. He later commanded the 7th BCT, one of the most successful counterinsurgency units. Colonel Valeriano was also responsible for the reintroduction of the Force X units on a broader scale with the approval and encouragement of Ramon Magsaysay.


61 Ibid., 72.

62 Ibid., 76.

63 Ibid., 78.

64 Karnow, *In Our Image*, 346. Magsaysay while Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, traveled to Washington on a quest to obtain financial aid for the faltering government in Manila. He spoke with President Truman and the National Security Council. He received $10 million in emergency aid to pay his military and offer rewards for information about the insurgents, and he was promised additional assistance under the Military Assistance Agreement of March 1947. He also met and befriended newly appointed Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale.

65 Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 96. Lansdale who served as an intelligence officer for the Office of Strategic Service (the forerunner of the CIA) and the Military Intelligence Service in the Philippines during World War II, was teaching intelligence and counter-guerrilla operations at Lowry Air Force Base. At a Ft. Myer reception, Lansdale caught the imagination and serious attention of Magsaysay. Later that year, as the JUSMAG began to play a more prominent role in the counterinsurgency campaign, Magsaysay asked President Quirino to request Lansdale's assignment to the JUSMAG.


67 Ibid., 350. Magsaysay and Lansdale toured the country together arriving unannounced at army posts, and their discoveries appalled them. In many places supplies had disappeared into the black market, leaving soldiers without guns and even boots. They found cannibalized vehicles and tanks without spark plugs. One morning they found officers asleep after an all-night poker game. They realized the urgency of a massive overhaul and, under Lansdale's tutelage, Magsaysay energetically started the job.

68 Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 85. A captain was offered 150,000 pesos to forget about a Huk ammunition cache his men discovered. The officer accepted the bribe, but instead of keeping the money, he went to Magsaysay, who at the time was attending a state dinner to honor President Quirino. Between courses, Magsaysay awarded the captain a cash reward for his honesty and promoted him to major.

69 Ibid., 85.

70 Ibid., 86. In the first year of the program, Magsaysay received 59,000 telegrams, each of which was answered in three days or less.
After the fall of Bataan, Magsaysay joined a USAFFE guerrilla unit. He led nearly 10,000 guerrilla fighters in the area near Mount Pinatubo. His prowess as a military commander became well known and resulted in the Japanese placing a 100,000 peso bounty on his life.

JUSMAG trainers placed the emphasis on small unit (company, platoon and squad) patrolling, especially night patrolling and hit and run tactics similar to those used by the Huks.

Scout-Ranger patrols consisted of five man teams. They adopted Force X tactics and ambushed Huk patrols and planted booby-traps in Huk weapons caches. Additionally, they covertly distributed propaganda leaflets in areas thought secure by local Huk guerrillas. The most successful leaflet was “The Eye.” It showed a single human eye (open) with the words “The Eye” printed underneath. Another favorite tactic originally used against the Moros, involved planting altered ammunition in enemy caches. This ammunition exploded when it was fired. Besides destroying the weapon and injuring the man firing it, the tactic caused a great deal of mistrust within Huk ranks. They could never be sure that their ammunition would fire and who was to blame. The list of exploding items included radios, flashlights, and altered Huk weapons that were secretly placed in Huk caches.

Paul Linebarger, the foremost authority on psychological operations in Asia and an employee of the CIA, repeatedly wrote and lectured that most of the psychological warfare and operational procedures employed in the Philippines were American in origin. Linebarger is also believed to be the motivating force behind the effort and that he personally developed many of the mechanisms for implementing the operation.

Magsaysay authorized a bounty of $50,000 for Luis Taruc. He authorized even larger rewards for some less important Huk leaders. Jealousy sprang up between different groups whose members were upset that their leader’s bounty was less than other leader’s. The “Cash for Guns” campaign financed with money received from the U.S. was so successful that it is estimated that it reduced the weapons stores of the Huks by nearly 50 percent.

Commanders were directed to compile information complete information files. The files contained information about specific people, Huk intelligence and logistic nets and other information obtained by Scout-ranger patrols. When the BCT was transferred to new area, the intelligence files and the S-2 Intelligence section remained in the area to brief the incoming BCT. Periodically, the files were collected and their information was consolidated at AFP General Headquarters.

This Force X, consisted of three military intelligence agents with twenty former Huk guerrillas. They infiltrated into the island’s interior and after three months of gathering information and establishing themselves as a bona fide Huk unit they ambushed the Panay Huk leadership. Other operations included locating production bases or farms. These bases
were kept under surveillance until just before harvest time when government forces would attack and destroy it. This procedure proved effective because it forced guerrillas to work and guard the base, only to have it destroyed just before they could harvest the crops. This cut deeply into the Huk food supply and demoralized the force as well.

80Ibid., 125-126.

81Ibid., 117.

82Ibid., 88.

83Ibid., 89. The four aims were as follows: The former insurgents were given title to the land; captured or surrendered Huks who were not wanted for criminal activities could participate in the program; once screened by army intelligence they received re-education and indoctrination about the benefits of belonging to a peaceful society; and finally the army provided transportation to the land and education on how to care for the land and what crops to grow.

84Ibid., 92. Reports of the EDCOR project spread beyond the Philippines. British officials from Malaya came to see the settlements. Before the end of the insurgency many guerrillas surrendered to government troops and the first question they asked was how they could get their own farm. By 1955, government officials estimated that nearly 1,500 guerrillas had surrendered in order to take advantage of the EDCOR Project.

85Ibid., 136.

86Ibid., 61.

87Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 141. By 1955 the Huks numbered less than 1,000 strong. All toll government troops killed nearly 6,000 Huk guerrillas, wounded an estimated 1,600 captured over 4,000 and accepted the surrender of yet another 16,000. In contrast the government suffered 642 killed and another 710 wounded.

88Ibid., 109.


90Ibid., 351.


92Ibid., 101.

93Ibid., 104.

94Ibid., 105.

95Ibid., 108. This program also included sending Philippine officers to U.S. military schools such as the Command and General Staff College.
Most of the equipment from the United States during this period came from surplus WWII stocks. The equipment was simple to use and maintain and allowed the AFP to adapt quickly to it and keep it operational. The preponderance of newer equipment was committed to Europe and Korea. During 1950, the AFP received following items in various quantities from U.S surplus stocks: .45 pistols; M1 and M2 carbines; .30 machine guns; .50 machine guns; 60mm, 81mm, 105mm mortars; recoilless rifles; 105mm howitzers; utility and cargo trucks; scout and armored cars; half-tracks; and light and medium M4 and M5 tanks.


Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 104. Many among the ERP leadership were Christian radicals of the 1960s. A large number within the National Resistance (RN), an ERP faction were Protestants and at least two were Baptist ministers. The members of the RN emphasized the organization of the people and emphasis on political action as well as military action. Many RN members encouraged the formation of the FAPU, most notably Roque Dalton, El Salvador’s leading contemporary poet. His insistence on the need for a political as well as a military line led to collective decision by the ERP militant leadership to charge him with treason, try him in absentia, find him guilty and condemn him to death. Dalton was assassinated in May 1975.

In 1977, the National Opposition Union (UNO), a reform party nominated their candidate, retired Colonel Ernesto Claramount, for the presidential election. This party consisted of a coalition of opposition parties that wanted to transform the country’s existing political and economic systems. The ruling government party stuffed ballot boxes and prevented many other Salvadorans in rural areas from voting. The UNO denounced the stolen election and Claramount and 15,000 of his supporters gathered at the Plaza Libertad to protest publicly. Three days later the crowd had grown to 50,000. On the night of 28 February, the National Police moved in with armored cars and fired on the crowd killing forty-eight people. Claramount subsequently went into exile, and as he departed he issued the warning that this event was not the end but only the beginning.

The 28th of February Popular Leagues was founded by ERP sympathizers within the University of El Salvador on February 28, 1978, the first anniversary of the massacre
that occurred when National Police cleared the Plaza Libertad of Colonel Ernesto Claramount and his supporters. The LP-28’s founding was the result of a belated recognition by the ERP that if it did not create its own mass organization, it was going to be overpowered by the FPL and RN. The LP-28 consisted of about ten thousand members.

107 Ibid., 111.
108 Ibid., 112.
109 Ibid., 112.
110 Ibid., 102-103.

111 Ibid., 75. On Monday morning, 15 October, Colonel Gutierrez, in the name of the Coordinating Committee, called President Romero and the High Command and ordered them to leave the country. After several hours Romero left for Guatemala. Gutierrez was mainly responsible for thwarting most of the planned initiatives to reform the government. In less than twenty-four hours after the coup, the most reactionary remnants of the officer corps had reasserted control over the government and the Armed Forces. These officers believed that it was necessary to deal first with the “subversion” and later address the socioeconomic problems of the country. Consequently, the nation entered into a new period of repression.

112 Ibid., 115.


114 Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), II-13. The term, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group at one time identified all Armed Forces organizations with security assistance responsibilities permanently assigned to diplomatic missions. However, this and other similar terms such as Military Group, Joint United States Military Assistance Group may be replaced by the generic term “Security Assistance Organization” or SAO. The specific title of the SAO may vary depending on the host nation where it is located. However, these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the host nation. The SAO is the most important FID related military activity under the supervision of the Ambassador.

115 Cynthia Arnson, El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies Transnational Institute, 1983), 107. The OPATT consisted of mostly Special Forces personnel with specialized training in counter guerrilla operations and intelligence. The OPATT also later included intelligence personnel, psychological warfare and civil affairs specialists.


117 Ibid., 299. The Woerner Report defined three specific goals. First, persuade the Salvadoran officer corps to subordinate itself to civilian authority. Second, convince the Armed
Forces to respect human rights. Finally, convince the military to change their internal methods of promotions in order to recognize and promote talented officers, while simultaneously weeding out the incompetent officers.


120 Ibid., 19.

121 Ibid., 27. For example, the OPATT trainers in teaching ESAF soldiers how to set an ambush incorporated human rights training. They did this by putting a civilian through a mock ambush to see if the ESAF soldiers killed the civilian. In the event this happened, the soldiers were reminded of how important it was not to kill civilians and made to repeat the ambush course until they avoided killing the civilian.


124 Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 165. The U.S. helped expand the Salvadoran officer corps by training some 500 military cadets at Fort Benning, Georgia. However, one of the major obstacles that the U.S. advisors and trainers had to face repeatedly and tried to overcome in their efforts to reform the ESAF, was the *tanda* system. Under this system each graduating class, or *tanda*, from the military academy moves up the ranks together, regardless of ability. Members of the same *tanda* establish deep bonds of loyalty and reciprocity toward each other and often they serve as godfathers to one another’s children and help shield fellow members from prosecution or punishment. Adding to the pernicious effects of the *tanda* system is the Salvadoran military’s practice of operating not through a clear chain of command but through a complex system of consensus within and between *tandas*. The careers of high ranking officers are made or broken more often by such political machinations than by their performance on the battlefield. The final consequences of the *tanda* system is that officers are not held accountable for their actions, no matter how egregious. Therefore human rights abuses go unpunished, military incompetence is tolerated, and corruption runs rampant.


126 John T. Fishel, interviewed by author, 26 February 1997, Leavenworth Kansas. In 1983, Congress officially established the OPATT and limited its size to fifty-five. However, it is important to note that after 1983 the number of U.S. military personnel in El Salvador often exceed this mandated ceiling. For example, between 1987 and 1988 the number of military personnel in country wavered around 120 personnel.


128 Ibid., 405.


Nigel Thomas, *Central American Wars, 1959-89*, Men at War Series (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1990), 16. The long range reconnaissance patrol units are known as *PRALs*, the rapid reaction infantry battalions are known as *BIRIs* and the anti-terrorist battalions are known as *BIATs*. By mid-1983, with the help of U.S. aid and assistance from the MilGrp, the ESAF had increased its strength by almost 12,000. It reorganized itself into basically three components: six infantry brigades (formerly three) positioned in static defense on strategically important locations; heavily armed *BIRIs* of 1,100 to 1,400 strong, air mobile using U.S. supplied UH-IH helicopters in search and destroy operations; and 14 *BIATs*, small (350-400 strong) lightly armed and mobile units distributed one per province and trained in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism at the local level. These units would be backed up later by the employment of civil defense units and village militia. The two special operations units serve as national or strategic assets for the government of El Salvador.


Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 198. The ESAF began Operation Phoenix in the Guazapa area in January, 1986. A combination of elite forces, continual operations and massive air attacks cleared the zone of guerrillas and their supporters. This operation forced the FMLN to scale back their operations. This offensive is described as the ESAF’s greatest success in the war.

Bacevich, *et. al.*, *American Policy in Small Wars*, 6. The U.S. supplied UH-1M and MD-500 attack helicopters proved extremely effective against large FMLN formations. However, once the FMLN opted for a strategy of protracted warfare these lucrative targets all but disappeared.


Bacevich, et. al., *American Policy in Small Wars*, 40. The government provided the civil defense detachments with U.S. supplied M14 rifles and M2 carbines and small radio transmitters for communications. Training consisted mainly of rifle marksmanship.


Ibid., 486.

Ibid., 487.


Ibid., 226.

Today's military leaders cannot have scientific knowledge alone. They must be students of warfare with an imagination capable of projecting forward the principles of the past to the specific requirements of the future.

General Maxwell D. Taylor

First, this chapter identifies the fundamental tenets derived from an analysis of all three case studies. Secondly, it describes the common organizational characteristics of all three counterinsurgency organizations by examining the combined data from the case studies. This chapter also identifies under the headings "tenets" and "characteristics" the subordinate organizations that exemplify these characteristics. Finally, it identifies and describes the general requirements for a 2010 counterinsurgency/FID organization as a segue for the development in Chapter V of a specific FID organization for 2010.

Tenets

An analysis of the three case studies recognizes the importance of adhering to six tenets to achieve success in counterinsurgency. The first tenet is the necessity for a well-informed leadership. The organizational leadership of the host nation (HN) and the U.S. must understand the political nature of insurgency and the military dimensions of the conflict. This equates to understanding the limitations of military force in achieving political ends. In all three cases the civilian and military leadership used military (lethal) force for political and psychological purposes as well as for achieving specific military objectives. In all cases, the leadership could have escalated or focused solely on the military aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign. For
example, they could have employed saturation ambushes and sustained the constant interdiction of guerrilla supply routes to increase contacts with the guerrillas. Instead they implemented a comprehensive strategy that included psychological and civil-military military operations in support of political, informational and economic programs. In each case study the leadership recognized that you cannot kill your way to victory in an insurgency. In the case of the Philippines and El Salvador, the U.S. civilian and military leadership understood the necessity of maintaining a supportive and indirect role in the HN counterinsurgency campaign.

The second tenet requires the HN, at the national level, to organize, coordinate and establish with the requisite U.S. support and assistance the essential political and military objectives. A 2010 FID organization requires personnel with expertise in both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare to assist the HN in this endeavor, as well as, help the HN resolve the myriad of political and military problems associated with an insurgency. Their combined efforts should pursue the development of both a unified campaign plan and a unified military organization with the capability to direct operations and subordinate organizations from the national level down to the regional and district levels. The Federal War Council, the JUSMAG, and the MilGrp all had unity of effort and unity of command.

The third tenet requires the U.S. effort to support the HN in gaining and maintaining the voluntary support of the local populace. This tenet is essential not only for increasing the size of the HN armed forces but also for organizing viable civil defense and civic action programs. When the HN resorts to widespread coercion, it ultimately fails in gaining the support of its people. Coercive techniques alienate the civilian population and undermine the legitimacy of the government. The HN that uses restraint and seeks to implement programs through a cooperative mutually supporting effort eventually gains the voluntary support of its populace. The EDCOR Project, the Phoenix operation and the civil defense programs are manifestations of this endeavor.
The fourth tenet requires the creation of a counterinsurgency organization with the ability to deny the insurgency their sources of external and internal support. Consequently, the organization must have the capability to decisively engage guerrilla units. This equates to finding, fixing and destroying guerrilla sanctuaries, disrupting their lines of communication and killing their military leadership and soldiers. The organization must also have the capability to support the implementation of an effective civil defense program to exploit these successes by expanding the government’s control over “pacified” areas. In all three cases the counterinsurgency organizations made a concerted effort to deny the insurgents sanctuary (external and internal) and sources of support. The case studies also demonstrated that squad-sized, long range reconnaissance patrols and battalion-size rapid reaction forces achieved the best results.

The fifth tenet requires the establishment and management of an all-source intelligence organization. The HN organization must have the capability to control and direct, at the strategic level, the focus of collection, production and the rapid dissemination of intelligence down to the tactical level. The paramount capability is the production of contact information. This demands a single or unified intelligence architecture that comprises military, police and civilian agencies. It also demands an effective HUMINT capability to identify the insurgent leadership and covert infrastructure. In the case of the Philippines and Malaya the emphasis was on a cooperative or combined intelligence architecture. A 2010 intelligence organization in support of the HN organization also requires an all-source collection capability. Additionally, this 2010 intelligence organization must tie into a data-gathering system. The Special Branch in the Malaya insurgency exemplified this organizational capability.

The sixth tenet encompasses the integration of psychological operations in every aspect of the counterinsurgency campaign. This tenet focuses on exploiting information to discredit, neutralize and eventually eliminate the insurgency by inducing it members to defect, surrender or
quit. As with the other tenets, the HN and U.S. counterinsurgency organizations have to integrate psychological warfare into every aspect of their operations. This integration needs to occur at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This means utilizing of all the available means and elements of the mass media.

Success in this endeavor requires the HN to have a national psychological operations plan that coordinates and guides subordinate plans and programs. Only after developing a national plan can the organization execute a coordinated psychological operations campaign aimed at supporting and enhancing the legitimacy of its anti-subversion and civil-military operations. Both the Malayan and Philippine counterinsurgency organizations incorporated psychological warfare operations into every major aspect of their campaigns. As a result, these organizations experienced remarkable success in influencing the behavior of the guerrillas and their supporters. Whereas in El Salvador, despite significant improvements due mainly to American assistance, the psychological warfare effort produced few discernible results. The main reason was the failure of Salvadoran’s to integrate psychological operations into their civil-military operations.

**Characteristics**

An examination of the combined data from the case studies reveals eight principal characteristics shared by all three counterinsurgency organizations that must be incorporated into a future FID force. These characteristics are: (1) unity of effort; (2) coordinated and effective intelligence; (3) minimum use of violence; (4) integrated psychological warfare operations; (5) effective mechanisms to enhance legitimacy (for both the U.S. and HN efforts); (6) precision targeting of the insurgent infrastructure; (7) perseverance; and (8) patience.

The term “unity of effort” describes the function of building consensus and establishing effective liaison among the different governmental agencies. This definition includes all the
instruments of national power, the diplomatic, the informational, the military and the economic
integrated and mutually supportive of each other in the pursuit of a common goal - the defeat the
insurgency. In all three case studies, the government succeeded in prosecuting the insurgency by
coordinating and integrating the efforts of the agencies involved within a cohesive system or
framework. The military achieves unity of effort through unity of command and command
authority. However, the other governmental agencies usually have loosely defined command
arrangements, and since the military may not be the lead agency in an insurgency, the importance
of achieving unity of effort becomes paramount. The Federal War Council in Malaya, The
JUSMAG in the Philippines and the MilGrp in El Salvador coordinated and integrated the efforts
of several different governmental agencies into a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign.
These organizations integrated civilian (governmental) agencies, with paramilitary and military
units under the direct authority of a civilian chief. These organizations maintained centralized
control over the campaign while decentralizing the execution of specific programs or missions to
the respective subject matter experts. The framework of security established by the Briggs Plan
exemplifies this characteristic by defining the roles of the police, the army and the administration.

In both the Philippine and El Salvador cases, the American ambassadors coordinated all
four instruments of national power. Furthermore, the ambassadors coordinated and implemented
the civil-military aspects of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort through a clearly defined chain of
command beginning with the Chief Advisor and the Commander of the MilGrp, respectively.
Most importantly, these U.S. organizations recognized two fundamental factors of successful
intervention in a counterinsurgency environment. The first was the importance of maintaining
HN legitimacy, and the second was the recognition of the political nature of the conflict. During
both counterinsurgency campaigns the U.S. organization made a concerted effort to resolve the
insurgency through political as well as military means. A 2010 FID organization must achieve
unity of effort in the counterinsurgency/FID environment. It should bring together combat, combat support and combat service support, psychological operations, and civil affairs units under the command and control of the U.S. ambassador in country through a single military operational point of contact. It should provide for the integration, coordination and consolidation of U.S. intelligence efforts.

The term “coordinated and effective intelligence”, describes the importance of a cooperative or combined (as in the Philippines and El Salvador) military intelligence organization to direct and support the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The tactical is the most important level. Focused intelligence allows tactical units to locate and selectively engage guerrilla units. Kitson referred to this as “contact information.” The full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations includes an intelligence operations cycle. Intelligence operations must derive information from the other counterinsurgency operations including psychological, civil-defense, population and resource control, and combat operations. Later in the intelligence operations cycle, intelligence provides the direction and focus for the other ongoing military operations, as previously listed.

Coordinated and effective intelligence also describes the importance of integrating the military, the police and other governmental agencies into the overall collection system. In this way, the government experiencing the insurgency maximizes all of its available intelligence resources under one unified organization responsible for collecting, analyzing, processing, and disseminating intelligence.

In all three case studies the emphasis was placed on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts and techniques. The sophisticated electronic and overhead imagery techniques, while a necessary adjunct, are not capable of identifying the covert infrastructure of the insurgency.
so critical to the success in counterinsurgency. This covert infrastructure is generally considered
one of several centers of gravity of the insurgency.

The other critical intelligence targets are the insurgency sanctuaries, their guerrilla units
and their sources (internal and external) of support. These intelligence targets generally require a
HUMINT organization with supporting electronic intelligence systems. In Malaya, the Special
Branch represented this unified organization responsible for collecting, analyzing, processing and
disseminating intelligence. The Special Branch achieved success by focusing its efforts on human
intelligence techniques. The Filipinos had a less unified but equally successful Military
Intelligence Corps, that coordinated that vastly improved HUMINT efforts of Force X units and
BCTs. The military intelligence officers from this unit focused on gathering information by
interrogating Huk defectors and organizing indigenous informants, such as the Black Pygmies and
Negritos. In El Salvador the C-2 (Combined Military Intelligence Section) focused less on
HUMINT efforts and more on sophisticated collection systems and platforms provided by the
U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency. Although the American advisors and trainers
continually lobbied for development of viable HUMINT organization, the Salvadorans
consistently relied on imagery and signal intelligence. These techniques did produced results but
not on the same scale as the Malayan Special Branch. Ultimately, the British and the Filipino
systems, based primarily on HUMINT collection produced more effective “contact information”
than did the Salvadoran system. A 2010 intelligence organization needs to connect with
sophisticated national systems in the U.S. and work with HN intelligence organization, while
concentrating on HUMINT as the key element in intelligence gathering.

The term “minimum use of violence” refers to the concerted effort by the organizations to
limit collateral damage and the unnecessary loss of life in the process of maintaining order.

Minimum use of violence also extends to combat operations against guerrilla forces and their
supporters as well as activities directed towards population and resource control activities. This term also indirectly refers to preventing the escalation of violence caused by the introduction of foreign (conventional) combat troops into the insurgency. In the case of Malaya, the British conducted the majority of their combat operations in the jungles and directly against the armed guerrillas. By operating in the insurgent sanctuary and against their armed members, the British minimized collateral damage and the killing of innocent civilians.

The same holds true for the Philippine case study. Once the AFP began extensive combat operations in the jungle terrain around Mount Arayat in central Luzon civilian casualties were minimized. In both the Philippines and El Salvador, the American advisors were successful in persuading the AFP and the ESAF to dispense with large scale, conventional-type operations that achieved little in the way of eliminating the insurgent infrastructure. The American advisors also succeeded in persuading the AFP and the ESAF to adopt small-scale operations directed specifically against the guerrillas' units and their leadership. The case of El Salvador provides another example, when the MilGrp advisors succeeded in reducing the number of human rights violations committed by the ESAF. Most importantly, the JUSMAG and the MilGrp organizations did not recommend the deployment of U.S. conventional combat troops to assist the AFP or ESAF. A 2010 FID organization does not require conventional combat troops to be assigned. However, the inclusion of Special Forces within the organization provides the capability to conduct direct action and precision strike missions, while simultaneously providing a capability to train and advise HN conventional, unconventional and paramilitary forces.

The term “integrated psychological operations” describes the organizational characteristics of the Psychological Warfare Section, The Public Affairs Office for Psychological Warfare and Public Relations and the Directorate of Psychological Operations in Malaya, the Philippines and El Salvador respectively. In all three cases, these psychological operations
organizations became integral participants of every aspect of their respective counterinsurgency campaigns. These organizations utilized almost every available medium from printed products to radio broadcasts to enhance the legitimacy of the government’s effort while undermining public support for the insurgents. A key theme in disrupting or neutralizing the insurgent organization’s infrastructure is to convince the guerrillas and their supporters to defect. In each case study, the non-lethal efforts of the psychological operations organization succeeded in significantly reducing the strength of and popular support for the insurgency, while simultaneously enhancing the counterinsurgency effort of the HN government. A 2010 FID organization needs to consolidate psychological operations and insure the proper coordination with HN public affairs operations in order to effectively coordinate their efforts with those of the U.S. Information Services in the embassy.

The characteristic of "enhancing host government legitimacy" refers to the effective implementation of a broad spectrum of civil-military operations. This involves the joint military and civilian effort to improve conditions, protect the local populace, expand the government’s zone of control and to ultimately deny the insurgents their civilian base of support. Civil-military operations include civic action to improve the lives and living conditions of the local populace and civil-defense to protect the local populace. An active and viable civil-military program that involves both civic action and civil defense programs serves not only as force multiplier, or as means to control the population and its resources or even as new source for collecting information on the insurgents, but also as the primary mechanism for gaining or re-establishing the loyalty and faith of the local populace in their government. The primary examples in each case study are: the relocation project of Chinese civilians into strategic hamlets and the Home Guard in Malaya; the EDCOR Project and the Civilian Commando Unit in the Philippines; and Operation Phoenix and the Community Protection Forces in El Salvador. A 2010 civil affairs organization should
provide direct support to U.S. elements and possess a sufficiently robust capability to provide
indirect support to the HN. This will ensure that the HN security forces work directly with and for
their fellow citizens against the insurgents.

The specific characteristic of a “precision targeting capability against the insurgent
infrastructure” involves the planning and executing of surgical strike operations by maximizing
the use of small, mobile, special units. This characteristic manifested itself in many forms
depending on the particular case study. However, in each case study the purpose of small unit
deployment remained the same, to physically degrade or nullify the insurgents offensive
capabilities by targeting and eliminating their leadership and infrastructure by either combat or
indirect psychological means. The Ferret Force, Senoi Pra’ak, the Green Howards and the Suffolk
Regiments in Malaya, the Force X, Scout-Rangers and the Battalion Combat Teams in the
Philippines, and the PRAL, Cazador companies, and the Rapid Reaction Infantry Battalions
(BIRIs) in El Salvador, all qualitatively represent this organizational characteristic. Each one of
these organizations achieved remarkable success in disrupting the insurgent infrastructure. This in
turn degraded the guerrilla’s offensive capabilities by eliminating their leadership and interdicting
their lines of communication and resupply. Correspondingly, these organizations supported the
other counterinsurgency efforts such as protecting the citizenry; gathering intelligence;
psychologically creating a sense of insecurity within the guerrilla organizations; and ultimately
enhancing the HN government’s legitimacy by demonstrating their ability to maintain order and
deter subversion and terrorism.

The importance of this characteristic is that it focuses the military effort on the
infrastructure and not on the guerrilla units. Each case study demonstrated that a government or
its military cannot win or defeat the insurgency by focusing on the guerrillas. The Salvadoran
military tried to defeat the insurgency in this manner and only achieved a stalemate. The other
two counterinsurgency organizations focused more on the infrastructure and achieved much greater military success. Despite their effectiveness and their remarkable successes, these types of counterinsurgency organizations did not defeat the insurgency through their efforts alone. Rather, they created the conditions and provided the time for the other governmental agencies to implement diplomatic and economic programs that ultimately achieved the successful or favorable end to the insurgency. A 2010 FID organization must have the capability and expertise to assist and advise the HN in planning and conducting precision strike operations. Furthermore, the organization must maintain the unilateral capability to plan and conduct precision direct action missions. This includes the launching, supporting, and recovering of either air, ground or sea-based special units.

The term “perseverance,” represents these organization’s preparation and commitment for a protracted application of military resources in support of the overall counterinsurgency campaign. Only through perseverance did these organizations develop and execute effective operations, programs, and systems, such as: an integrated intelligence system; a comprehensive civil-defense program; and an integrated psychological operations. In each case, the organizations understood that it may take at least a decade to achieve the desired results, since the root causes of the insurgency made it difficult to achieve decisive results quickly. Consequently, they implemented long-term (two to three years) projects and lengthy (one to six months) operations ranging from civil defense to continuous and aggressive patrolling of insurgent areas.

The term “patience” relates directly to these organizations’ ability to cope with the frustrations caused by competing resources and programs and by their ability to adapt to and eventually accept the inherent ambiguities in the counterinsurgency/FID environment. It also pertains to the organizations’ ability to control (not overreact) its reactions to the insurgent’s criminal and terrorist activities. Dual based, smaller focused units provide a greater ability to
maintain a long term presence and not overreact to the tactical events within the strategic campaign.

One principal characteristic common to both the Salvadoran and Philippines organizations was limited U.S. direct support. The JUSMAG organization in the Philippine and MilGrp organization in El Salvador exemplified this characteristic. A limited U.S. presence characterizes the philosophical approach taken by both organizations during the duration of the insurgency. In particular both organizations focused on advisory and training operations in support of their respective country's counterinsurgency campaign. The training programs focused on the fundamentals of small unit operations, intelligence collection, psychological operations and civil defense. Equipment support consisted of uniforms, boots and basic infantry and artillery weapons. Deliberately absent from both efforts was the idea of supplying or introducing high tech gadgetry into the counterinsurgency campaign. Consequently, it prevented the escalation of U.S. involvement, specifically in terms of preventing U.S. troops from engaging in combat operations. This concept of maintaining a low profile also strengthened and reinforced the legitimacy of both the Filipino and Salvadoran governments.


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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Figure out how to do things so that you can get the maximum effect and the least bloodshed.¹

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, circa fourth century B.C.

This study has examined counterinsurgency and FID doctrine, three counterinsurgency cases studies, and has outlined key tenets and characteristics necessary for success. The following recommendation for the most effective Special Forces Group organization for purpose of conducting FID combat operations in 2010, derives its organizational characteristics from the doctrinal study and the analysis of the three case studies.

This study argues that insurgency and revolutionary warfare will emerge as a significant threat to U.S. interests in the twenty-first century. Surely, many forms of protracted warfare and violence will emerge as the international security environment coalesces. Of these, insurgency or the use of terrorism, subversion and armed conflict by an organized movement to overthrow a constituted government will certainly persist.² Insurgency, more than any other form of conflict has persisted throughout history. The history of U.S. military interventions and operations supports this fact.

The 1995 National Military Strategy points to the increasing likelihood that our nation’s military will support the counterinsurgency efforts of nations in vital regions around the world. The author of this strategy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili states: “the current national security strategy articulated by the President recognizes four principal and ever increasing threats to our national security. These threats are regional instability, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organizations and the dangers to democracy and reform.” As stated previously, the revival of ideological, ethnic, and nationalistic tensions in the form of terrorism, sabotage and insurgency present the greatest threat to regional instability. Therefore, it is critical to restructure the force to successfully combat this emerging threat.

This recommendation argues for the current SFG(A) and staff organization (figure 15) to form the nucleus of this new SFG(A) 2010 (figure 16). However, this new counterinsurgency unit includes several new subordinate elements that radically change the current Special Forces group structure. This new unit consists of the following subordinate elements: a headquarters and headquarters company (an augmented group staff); a interagency coordination detachment; two special forces battalions; one support battalion; one civil affairs company; one psychological operations company; one signal company; one military intelligence company; one aviation company; one military police company; and one engineer company. Each one of these subordinate elements serves a specific function and provides the necessary capabilities and characteristics for success in the counterinsurgency environment. This study does not provide specific tables of organization and equipment (TO&E). Further studies to determine the exact tables of organization and equipment are needed.

This organization should incorporate the emerging systems associated with Information-Age technology being developed within the guidelines of Joint Vision 2010 and Army Force XXI operations. These emerging systems include the following: microelectronics; spaced-based intelligence and communications systems; satellites backed up by wide-band terrestrial means; molecular engineering; and digitized imagery. The battalions and companies outfitted with this technology provide this SFG(A) 2010 organization with an exceptional array of capabilities, including the eight principal characteristics discussed in the previous chapter. In line with further studies on the exact tables of organization and equipment, specific studies on communications,
intelligence, strike operations, psychological operations and future technologies are critical to enhance Special Forces capabilities in the counterinsurgency/FID environment.

Similar to the mission of the FIDAF, the fundamental mission of this SFG(A) 2010 focuses primarily on training and advising the HN military in counterinsurgency. However, it differs in one important aspect from the FIDAF. This organization does not contain conventional combat (infantry) forces, rather it allocates a second special forces battalion for the purposes of conducting special reconnaissance, direct action, and other limited unilateral missions.

Historically, conventional force commanders have been resistant and reluctant to subordinate their combat forces to SOF commanders. Conventional forces train and think differently about warfare. The conventional military mindset focuses almost exclusively on defeating a peer opponent with overwhelming combat power. For many years, the conventional leadership within the U.S. Army ignored the lessons of Vietnam and other counterinsurgency operations. The conventional army classified the Vietnam War as an aberration. Similarly, the conventional force has generally viewed Special Forces as another asset (combat multiplier) for the conventional force commander. Even today, the concept of assigning conventional combat troops to a SOF commander remains alien to the conventional force. However, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, otherwise known as the Goldwater-Nichols/Cohen-Nunn Act, has helped to change the way all of the services operate and structure their forces for conflict and war. As the year 2010 approaches, and joint force structures become more of a reality, and as the theater Special Operations Commands mature there exists the strong possibility that conventional forces could become a part of this organizational structure, under certain prescribed circumstances.

The two Special Forces battalion concept provides this SFG(A) 2010 organization with the capability and flexibility to execute two simultaneous operations, which are as follows:
training HN counterinsurgency and civil defense forces; and unilaterally attacking the insurgent organization’s infrastructure and guerrilla units. Both operations contribute either directly or indirectly to the process of destroying the insurgencies leadership, their sanctuaries and their external and local sources of support.

If the requirement never arises for unilateral combat operations then one or both battalions can focus specifically on training and advising the host nation’s military and paramilitary forces. The two Special Forces battalion concept offers other alternatives. While one battalion is committed to training, the other can support or augment the civil affairs and psychological operations battalions or the military police and engineer companies in the execution of their missions. Regardless of the situation or the environment, the relatively small size of a Special Forces battalion compared with the size of a conventional infantry battalion significantly minimizes the overall U.S. military presence in the host country. Furthermore, their capability to conduct precision strike operations with a relatively low profile and low probability of collateral damage substantially reduces the risk of escalating the level of violence or of inflicting casualties on the civilian population. Consequently, the use of Special Forces achieves the requirements to minimize the use of violence and limit the number of U.S. military personnel in country in direct support of the host nation’s counterinsurgency campaign.

The basic Special Forces group structure provides unity of command and facilitates unity of effort within the organization. The primary function of the group headquarters staff is to serve (when required) as the Army staff component of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) or as a JSOTF when augmented by forces and resources from other services. The group staff should be augmented with an additional special staff section, specifically a public affairs officer (PAO) and associated staff section. This PAO section serves as one of the primary mechanisms (along with psychological operations) for enhancing the legitimacy of the U.S. effort in country.
The PAO section should utilize U.S. and HN mass media organizations to disseminate the approved messages concerning the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the HN. The addition of this public affairs section departs from the current group headquarters company organizational structure. An enhanced civil affairs and psychological operations (S-5 section) staff section within the group should also be added to insure planning and coordination within the unit and with the HN (figure 16).

One of the most critical new elements of this new organization is the addition of an Interagency Coordination Detachment (figure 17). This detachment will expedite the integration and coordination of the entire group organization in support of a SAO or facilitate the enhancement of a JTF planning and liaison capability. This detachment will in both cases help expedite not only unity of command, but unity of effort throughout the entire U.S. and HN military and civilian command structures. This permanent (TO&E) detachment function as either a liaison coordination element with HN military and paramilitary forces or as a fusion cell between the group and outside civilian agencies and other U.S. military organizations which may include the following: the Joint Special Operations Command; the Special Operations Aviation Regiment; the CIA; the Peace Corps; the U.S. Information Service; nongovernmental agencies; and private volunteer organizations. More importantly, this detachment eliminates the need to organize ad hoc liaison and coordination elements from the group’s subordinate battalions and companies which so often delete the command and control of subordinate units.

The two Special Forces battalions consist of a battalion headquarters detachment, and three Special Forces companies. In contrast to the current organization, these two battalions lose their individual (TO&E) support companies, which are consolidated in the group support battalion. The Special Forces companies and Operational Detachments within this FID Force
organizational structure remain identical to the current force structure. This organization gives up one Special Forces battalion to offset the enhancements.

The support battalion, with its maintenance, medical, rigger-air delivery, food service, aviation maintenance, and supply and transportation companies functions as the critical combat support and service support unit for the group. Although the primary function of the battalion is to sustain the organization, individual companies within the battalion can provide, on a limited basis, their particular expertise and support to HN civic action and civil defense programs. Specifically, the medical company can support or augment a HN civic improvement program with its veterinarian and preventive health personnel. Even though the surgeon’s and dentist’s assigned to this medical company have the responsibility to first provide support and medical care to U.S. military personnel, they can also make a positive psychological impact on the local populace by supporting certain medical aspects of HN civil-military operations.

The military intelligence company consists of up to three detachments (one to support the group headquarters and one for each Special Forces battalion if deployed separately) with the following capabilities: HUMINT; all source collection, management, production and dissemination; counterintelligence; technical control analysis; interrogation; signal intelligence; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with high-resolution video and forward-looking infrared radar; and, most importantly, an internetted information and intelligence broadcast system. The internetted broadcast system capability coupled with the UAV capability will greatly enhance the effectiveness of intelligence operations, as well as enhance the FID Force commander’s ability to verify intelligence collected through HUMINT sources. The improved speed at which intelligence can be disseminated through the internetted broadcast system will allow the FID Force commander and his subordinate battalion commanders to conduct simultaneous operations in-depth to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives.
This military intelligence company serves the function of managing an all-source intelligence organization while coordinating and effecting intelligence across the full spectrum of both U.S. and HN operations. It maintains both a data link to the national systems in the continental United States and a interface with the Joint Intelligence Center or Joint Analysis Center at the theater level.

The principle of emphasizing intelligence to direct and support the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations remained a consistent and important theme throughout all three case studies. Therefore, to achieve this capability a robust military intelligence organization with advanced technology is required. A military intelligence company was selected because it provides the necessary manpower, resources, and facilities to function in two vital capacities while maintaining a relatively small footprint in country. First, it contains enough personnel to provide advisors and trainers to HN combat forces or augmentation to their existing intelligence organizations to improve their intelligence gathering capabilities, especially in the area of HUMINT collection.

Beyond its capability for sharing intelligence and expertise, this company contains the additional manpower, resources, and facilities to operate unilaterally, when required, in support of a JSOTF or JTF. Finally, this organization functions not only as a the primary conduit for information and intelligence between agencies within the country team concept, but also as primary conduit for force protection information and intelligence. This last function equates to the company’s counterintelligence units and other HUMINT activities that can prevent or provide early warning of terrorist attacks against U.S. forces. Counterintelligence and other HUMINT activities also assist in the planning and execution of strike operations against the insurgent leadership, their infrastructure or insurgent terrorists units.
The psychological operations company is multifunctional, regionally oriented and dual based with direct data links to the theater and home station psychological operations and intelligence units. Its primary function is to integrate the HN psychological warfare campaign. Although separate from the PAO elements, the psychological operations company along with the assistance of the public affairs section enhances the legitimacy of the entire counterinsurgency effort.

Likewise, this company has the capability to train and advise the HN as well as conduct unilateral psychological operations in support of current and future U.S. or HN counterinsurgency operations. This company can also function as the primary mechanism in targeting (psychologically) the infrastructure of the insurgency. The absolute requirement for an effective psychological warfare campaign linking the strategic, operational and tactical levels normally necessitates a battalion-sized unit. Even though it is a company-sized unit, data links back to the theater oriented psychological operations battalion and group headquarters would allow this company to reduce the footprint in country while maintaining responsive support advise and assistance. Any force structure smaller than a company would considerably reduce this new organization’s capability of successfully implementing a psychological warfare campaign at all three levels.

The civil affairs company designed for FID and unconventional warfare also generally retains its current active duty structure within this new group organization. This civil affairs company also maintains a data link to the reserve civil affairs command in the U.S. for coordination, liaison and support. The reserve units can provide tailored personnel support and access to subject matter experts, as required. This company with the direct support of the engineer company can significantly enhance U.S. and HN legitimacy through civic improvements and civic action programs. Another vital function of this civil affairs company is to support the Special...
Forces battalion's efforts to coordinate and implement a viable civil defense program within the
HN. This civil affairs company will operate a Civil-Military Operations Center to coordinate the
efforts of U.S. and HN governmental and non-governmental agencies providing aid and support to
the civilian population if needed.

The engineer company provides the expertise and the manpower to either train host nation
forces or execute military construction projects unilaterally. This company also serves to augment
(or when directed to support directly) the engineer capabilities of the Special Forces battalions by
providing a secondary source of equipment, resources, and expertise not organic to the Special
Forces battalions. It also can provide liaison and coordination with reserve component engineer
elements in support of the FID effort.

Additionally, both the civil affairs and engineer companies can serve in a strictly advisory
role. Their combined expertise and capabilities function as two more means to enhance U.S. and
the HN government’s legitimacy. The civil affairs company also provides the FID Force with the
capability to enhance unity of effort by coordinating the interagency aspects and activities of civil-
military operations.

The signal company consists of headquarters company and three (direct support) signal
platoons and a electronic maintenance platoon. The advent of new technology and
communications equipment can reduce the size of this unit and enhances its capabilities. This
signal company operates the group’s base station and provides signal support to all subordinate
battalions and companies. This battalion provides all the necessary communications equipment,
systems and architecture in support of all group’s operations. The inherent capabilities of this
company provide not only the primary means for effective command and control within the
group, but also provide each subordinate unit with the capability to communicate and coordinate
with outside civilian and military agencies. The necessity for real-time communications in a
counterinsurgency/FID environment coupled with the structure of the new SFG(A) 2010 requires a company-sized organization with the most technologically advanced equipment.

The aviation company functions as the primary lift and maneuver asset for the group organization. This composite company consists of reconnaissance, attack, and medium lift helicopter platoons. The recommended aircraft for this company are platforms with capabilities similar to the OH-58D (Kiowa Warriors) and the UH-60 (Black Hawks) helicopters. The OH-58D helicopters function as both reconnaissance and attack aircraft. The UH-60 helicopters function as the primary lift aircraft, although they can function in a secondary role as reconnaissance and attack aircraft.

This aviation company can also function in the advisory role or provide trainers to HN aviation units. However, this unit's first responsibility is to provide the group commander with the capability to insert, extract, and support his forces throughout the depth of the operational area without HN assistance. Additionally, this company provides the capabilities of attacking (unilaterally) the insurgent infrastructure, gathering intelligence, or supporting certain aspects of civil-defense and civic action programs. This company can create a tremendous psychological impact on the guerrilla organization by allowing the group commander the ability to rapidly place selected forces and capabilities across the depth of the operational area and strike targets with precision, despite terrain, weather, and visibility limitations.

Finally, the military police company functions as the primary trainers and advisors to the HN police forces (subject to the restraints of U.S. and HN laws). Their expertise in law enforcement, civilian disturbances and battlefield circulation allows the Special Forces personnel to concentrate on training HN forces in counterinsurgency techniques and procedures. This company can also support the intelligence collection efforts of HN forces and the group military intelligence company through the proper interrogation and questioning of known or suspected
insurgents and their supporters and liaison with HN military police and civilian police
organizations. The military police company can also function in a force protection role if the
situation requires a significant physical security presence around group operating bases and
facilities.

The SFG(A) 2010 group organizational structure allows the commander significantly
enhanced flexibility in supporting a HN counterinsurgency campaign. This structure also affords
the ambassador, the chief of the SAO and the theater commander the ability to tailor a force
depending upon the factors of METT-TC (the mission, the enemy, the terrain, the troops and time
available, and the civilian situation). The size and organizational structure of this new group
permits the rotation or introduction of subordinate units on an as needed basis while maintaining a
viable counterinsurgency effort in country. Consequently, this capability or flexibility to tailor the
force allows the commander to achieve a limited, long term U.S. military presence, as well as
exercise patience in resolving protracted conflicts. And since this new group can conduct and
maintain continuous, low visibility operations over a long period of time in an austere
environment, the U.S. effort perseveres.

This recommended group organization provides a rapidly deployable, immediately
available, culturally and geographically oriented, cohesive and technologically sophisticated force
with the personnel, expertise and capabilities to successfully support the counterinsurgency efforts
of any HN. However, this new group organization does have significant impact on several Special
Operations commands and elements within the Army. The United States Army Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) would have to provide company-sized units
to build this new group structure. The Special Operations Support Command would also be
required to provide forces currently assigned to its command. Finally, this new group structure
would require conventional units to provide elements of their limited military police, engineer and
rotary wing assets. While this would best be accomplished by assignment of these type of units to the SFG(A) 2010, the possibility exists of long term attachment or habitual relationships to accomplish the mission.

Suggestion for Future Research

Future research should address the following five major issues. First, there is the requirement of developing the exact TO&E structures for the group, the liaison coordination detachment and for the subordinate battalions and companies. Second, the impact of the recommended organizational structure on the current Special Operations and Special Forces commands in particular and the Army in general deserves analysis. The third issue involves research into the training requirements for the new Special Forces group organization. This issue is extremely important considering the diverse training requirements of the aviation, engineer, military police, civil affairs and psychological operations companies. Fourth, based on emerging Information Warfare technology and capabilities, an analysis of its impact on the command and control architecture within the group organization is an appropriate area of study. Finally, the impact of the group organization on Army Reserve and National Guard elements, specifically the National Guard Special Forces groups and the Army Reserve civil affairs and psychological operations battalions, requires considerable research.

Conclusion

George Santayana’s caution that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” has particular relevance for this study. The past offers three examples of successful counterinsurgency campaigns - Malaya, the Philippines and El Salvador. In light of the fact that insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare represent the most likely forms of conflict in the
twenty-first century, history requires that we extract the lessons of past successful experiences. In this study those lessons have been formed into eight principal characteristics of a successful foreign counterinsurgency intervention.

The analysis of these characteristics leads to the development of a new SFG(A) 2010 organizational structure that not only incorporates these eight principal characteristics, but also maintains maximum flexibility with limited U.S. involvement, while providing effective support to the host nation’s counterinsurgency effort. This new structure contributes to current debate on the future structure of Special Forces in particular and Army SOF in general, rather than providing a definitive organizational structure for 2010.

If the past is prologue, then continual study of military history, especially in the area of counterinsurgency and FID, is a necessary requirement for successful military planning. Through a realistic examination of the past it is possible to reasonably predict the impact that the vagaries of the emerging century and the advanced technology it will bring with it will have on Special Forces and the SOF community. While insurgency and counterinsurgency clearly will form much of the twenty-first century battlefields, the capabilities of employing advanced technology on those battlefields and the impact it will have on the structure of forces that will participate in the battles remains unclear. Only through gaining a better understanding of how to wage counterinsurgency warfare and FID within the context of the expanding demands of economic, political, technological and military pressures common to unconventional warfare can Special Forces succeed in 2010. History is the preparation for the future.


6 Joint Pub., 3-07.1, *FID*, 1-13. In all cases, the objective of U.S. (unilateral) combat operations against the insurgent organization remains focused on protecting or stabilizing the HN political, social and economic institutions until the host military can assume these responsibilities.

7 Ibid., 3-11. Current Force XXI plans call for long-endurance UAVs to be employed at the tactical level. These UAVs will be linked to a variety of other sensors and ground stations. These UAVs and sensors will locate, identify, and track enemy formations with a high degree of accuracy. This and other future reconnaissance and active and passive target-acquisition and surveillance systems will provide commanders continuous wide-area battlefield observation at greater ranges, prevent fratricide and provide joint battle damage assessment.

8 Ibid., 3-6. The internetted information system is based on the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) concept. This system capitalizes on the power of Information-Age technology. The concept calls for ABCS and software to broadcast battlefield information, as well as information from other sources, and integrate that information, including real-time friendly and enemy situations, into a digitized image that can be displayed graphically in increasingly mobile and heads-up displays. These images will depict a unit's battle space and permit commanders at every level to share a common, relevant picture of the battlefield scaled to their level of interest and tailored to their special needs. Advanced Army and joint intelligence systems will feed into ABCS and allow commanders to detect and track enemy force throughout a given battlespace.

Figure 13. 25 Man Civil Defense Instructor Team - El Salvador. Source: Alan B. Hazelwood, "El Salvador National Civil Defense Program" privately printed, 1983. Typewritten, 12
Figure 16. Recommended SFG(A) Organization for 2010
Figure 17. Recommended Interagency Coordination Detachment as part of the Organizational Structure of the SFG(A) for 2010.
APPENDIX

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

The clarity of this study relies on the definitions of key terminology. The official authority for current military definitions are in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary and Associated Terms and Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Where no doctrinal definition exists, a description is provided based on an analysis of historical publications and other available documents. The following terms are provided.

**Campaign Plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

**Civil Affairs.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

**Combat Service Support.** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war.

**Combating Terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism, which include defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts.
Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Foreign Internal Defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.

Host Nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

Host Nation Support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations.

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of the country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Internal Defense and Development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD.

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Joint Task Force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called a JTF.

Military Assistance Advisory Group. A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the U.S. military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called the MAAG.

Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

National Command Authority. The president and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called the NCA.

Propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizational groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP.

Sabotage. An unconventional warfare activity involving an act(s) intended to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or
attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and material.

**Security Assistance.** All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions.

**Special Forces.** U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations in the full range of SOF principal mission areas less CA and PSYOP.

**Special Forces Group.** A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in operational environments in peace, conflict and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company and three special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, the group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. Also called SFG.

**Special Operations.** Operations conducted by specifically organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during war and operations other than war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional or other non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine,
covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

**Special Operations Forces.** Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.

**Subversion.** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength or morale of a regime.

**Terrorism.** The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

**Unconventional Warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape. Also called UW.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction.** In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon (draft definition).
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