NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL AGENDAS OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

WILLIAM G. IRVING, MAJOR, BRITISH ARMY
B.Sc.(Hons), Aston University, Birmingham, England, 1987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This thesis examines the enlargement of NATO from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, through the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative, to the present day with an emphasis on the effects of national perspectives and agendas on the formulation of NATO enlargement strategy. The study concentrates on the formulation of NATO enlargement strategy, the roles key organizations have had in shaping that strategy, and the impact on the process of national concerns and demands, including those of Russia.

This study concludes that NATO enlargement strategy has yet to fully address the concerns of all NATO members, especially in view of the unlikely prospect of Russia's resurgence and the growing tendency for Central and Eastern European nations to see joining the European Union (EU) as their primary objective. These and lesser considerations support the contention that perhaps NATO should forego enlargement in favor of expanding and strengthening the activities of PIP. Additional time would permit NATO both to dispel Russian apprehensiveness concerning enlargement and to fashion a coherent enlargement strategy. Such a strategy must address dealing with prospective members not admitted in the first wave, establishing a viable relationship with Russia, and deciding means and methods for improving military organization and infrastructure. Resolution of these and related issues will allow enlargement to achieve its full potential within the context of a changed European security architecture.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This thesis examines the enlargement of NATO from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, through the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative, to the present day with an emphasis on the effects of national perspectives and agendas on the formulation of NATO enlargement strategy. The study concentrates on the formulation of NATO enlargement strategy, the roles key organizations have had in shaping that strategy, and the impact on the process of national concerns and demands, including those of Russia.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Before arriving to start the Command and General Staff course, a previous British student here (and successful MMAS candidate also) urged me to enter the MMAS program as it “would provide an excellent opportunity to study a subject in depth and produce a piece of written work demonstrating educational rigor.” As a fellow REME officer, I trusted his counsel, and duly enrolled in the MMAS program.

Certainly I have read more in this year on a single subject than I can recall ever reading before, and rigor also played its part, especially when the weather was good and temptation to forego a few hours of reading or thesis drafting proved intense. Despite missed outings and time with my wife and sons, I have gained immensely from this project not least due to the experience, patience, and guidance of my thesis committee. Dr. Bruce Menning has been outstanding as the committee chair, and one of the principal reasons I have both enjoyed and gained so much from this educational experience. LTC Alan Moore and Dr. Jake Kipp provided first-class mentoring throughout the project, as well as timely advice, direction, and encouragement. I am also grateful to the advice and experience of Dr. Harry Orenstein who became an honorary committee member mid-way through the project and gave great encouragement and advice, as well as undertaking considerable editorial work on the thesis in addition to an already busy personal schedule.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

The reunification of Germany in October 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 heralded what many believed would be a new era in Europe. No longer would there be a need for foreign armies in Germany waiting to repel the expected invasion from the East. The end of the Cold War promised a new age of peace that appeared to sound the death knell for NATO. NATO was created in April 1949, and its raison d’être was to provide a security framework for collective defense of the North Atlantic region. Under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, an armed attack against one or more of the member countries would be considered an attack on all, and members might respond either individually or collectively under Article 5 of the United Nations Charter.¹ This understanding formed the cornerstone of the Alliance member-states’ defense policy for the Cold War era and overshadowed the remaining thirteen Articles of the Treaty.

The end of the Cold War brought with it a euphoria similar to that marking the end of the Second World War.² The “peace dividend” became a popular “sound bite” of the early 1990s. The Alliance was seen by some, in particular Russia, as having fulfilled its aim and so should be dissolved. Politicians looked to see where defense spending could be cut and where money could be diverted to more politically sensitive areas. The civil war in Bosnia ended this euphoria and shattered European complacency with a sudden and violent retort.

Rather than being redundant, NATO has remained a vital factor in maintaining a stable Europe. The benefits of wider membership, along with increased nonmilitary roles for the Alliance,
have become popular subjects for commentators and politicians alike. A wider, “out-of-area” role has been proposed for NATO, in addition to a change of emphasis from collective defense to that of collective security and nation building. Each member country views these and other initiatives from a unique perspective. Influenced greatly by their own history, geography, and social factors, the NATO countries hold different hypotheses on the future of the Alliance and what their nation's contribution will be.

The Topic

This thesis will analyze the issue of NATO enlargement and how issues relating to it reflect the perspectives of four members of the Alliance--the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France. Although NATO has sixteen member-states, these four are the key nations within the Alliance, and each presents a different perspective on the future composition, roles, and organization of NATO.

The last five years have seen considerable discussion and debate concerning the alternatives for NATO structure and organization. Much of the debate has centered around the question of enlargement. The case for both sides of this argument read well, but views are biased with respect to the national origin of the discussion.

Meanwhile, the changing nature of the threat has spawned new challenges. The arms control treaties negotiated between the two super powers of the Cold War are in jeopardy. Collapse of the Soviet Union removed sure control over a significant portion of weapons of mass destruction amassed during the Cold War. The emerging nations may use these as a means to obtain wealth by selling on either an open or black market. Before 1989, Central and Eastern Europe consisted of six countries, whereas the same region today consists of 21 countries. The ratification of previous arms control treaties will be difficult. The enlargement of NATO will remove some of these difficulties and could make control of these weapons more effective. Second, as emerging nations seek economic growth to support their new found freedom, they will require specialized help and assistance. NATO is
primarily a political alliance with a preeminent military element, but the Alliance should shift its focus
to a wider mission in the view of some. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was initiated in 1994
and is an attempt to involve new countries while the Alliance seeks support and mechanisms to enlarge
its membership.

The shift in conflict from a global to regional level portends instability for the wider
European region. A possible future role for NATO would be to undertake crisis management tasks to
address regional instabilities within a framework of collaboration and inclusion in the alliance. It is
unlikely that any conflict will spill across national boundaries. NATO will remain a principally
military alliance, offering collective defense and security; however, instead of being postured for a
large-scale conflict, NATO would be configured to deal with small-scale conflicts (similar to the
current Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment in Bosnia). Ultimately, the Alliance could become
increasingly an instrument of UN policy in both command and support. Alternatively, NATO could
become an "out of area" organization that maintains a deployable and credible force package. Clearly,
the difficulty with the latter option is that certain member-states may not wish to contribute to every
deployment, and certain deployments may be politically unpopular and, therefore, unlikely to be
supported across the Alliance. Although NATO exists primarily to secure peace and stability in the
North Atlantic region, Article 12 does provide for "out-of-area" operations to counter possible threats
to any of NATO’s sixteen members.4

A final scenario for NATO’s future is based on the premise that the collective defense
provided by the Alliance is no longer necessary and could be replaced with local alliances that rely less
on external intervention and support. The Western European Union (WEU) is one example that seeks
not to remove NATO, but rather to give the European Union a security “pillar” of its own, capable of
undertaking small-scale deployments without the need for U.S. ground troop involvement. The
principle is not to form a new security alliance in parallel with NATO, but rather to form a

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complementary alliance that operates in conjunction with NATO and utilizes the strategic assets of the alliance.

**Importance**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, numerous books, articles, and general commentaries have addressed the future of NATO, its likely composition, and what its roles will be (see chapter two—Literature Review). Despite the wealth of literature, no overarching summary examines alternative futures as they reflect varying national perspectives and influences. Yet, national interests and agendas impact greatly on what the future roles may be and what form the Alliance will take. Virtually no written text has provided a comparison and analyses of the alternatives from different nations’ viewpoints. One exception is the Strategic Studies Institute paper *Germany, France and NATO*, which offers a perspective of the future of the Alliance from the perspectives of the two countries.⁵

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the enlargement of NATO from the perspective of the above mentioned four nations. NATO enlargement is, for all practical purposes, a given, with the official announcement expected at the July 1997 summit. Remaining questions revolve around who will be invited to join and what will be done to maintain the interest and commitment of the nations which are not offered membership in the “first wave.” The Russian view on NATO has evolved considerably since the question of enlargement was first aired in 1992. Initially hostile to the possibility of enlargement, Russia has now accepted the inevitably of enlargement, although she maintains public opposition.⁶ The indirect influence of Russia over its former satellites remains a concern for Eastern and Western European nations alike, as does her possible influence over the West’s desire to enlarge NATO.

President Clinton’s speech during the 1996 presidential election campaign brought this and related issues into the fore. His mention of the likely candidates from Eastern Europe preempted NATO’s formal announcement likely to be made at the summit in July 1997. President Clinton stated
openly that he sees the first three countries as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and that they will be accepted by 1999. Although the widest held view of the likely new members coincides with that of President Clinton, his speech opens debate on the fate of those nations who fail to make first-time entry. The debate and commentary will turn on questions related to criteria used to determine who could join and what the future holds for those countries that are not offered membership. The enlargement issue will, at least initially, overshadow other future roles of the Alliance. This thesis focuses on the enlargement issue, key nation support for this departure, and reasons for their support.

Methodology

The thesis relies on a delineation, comparison, and analysis of the perspectives of the four key nations, taking into account historical, economic, social, and geographic circumstances. A brief historical perspective of the Alliance and a summary of the key milestones in its history provide necessary background to the major issues on which this thesis focuses. The heart of the thesis lies with a consideration of the issue of enlargement from the perspective of each of the four key nations. The Russian view constitutes a special concern, and stress falls on this concern where it impacts directly on the success of any of the alternatives. Consequently, the Russian view is included as an element of the thesis. The thesis concludes by offering a view of NATO which accounts for the differences of the member countries and emphasizes the areas in which NATO will have difficulty in achieving success and where its success will be most likely. Areas for further research and study will also be suggested, in particular, relations with Russia and those nations not admitted initially to the Alliance.

Sources

NATO’s future has been the subject of considerable research by several political and security orientated establishments and numerous commentators. There is no shortage of either primary or secondary source material. The majority concentrate on the likelihood of enlargement, the future new
members, and the order in which they will be admitted. Conditions for entry and the impact of new members on the existing organization are also examined, although this latter concern will become even more prominent once the enlargement decision is announced. Principal sources include articles from *NATO Review, RUSI Journal, Survival, Parameters*, McNair Papers, U.S. Army War College papers and research theses, and published works by security commentators.

NATO’s future role in European security has generated considerable comment. Sources can be divided into those which support continuance of NATO and those which support NATO’s decline. Of great interest are the views of European member-states as to the future of European security. These can be gleaned from various publications of European government agencies dealing with the issue.

The question of Russia’s position on the future of NATO has also been the subject of several articles and books, as well as Russian political commentary. Despite Russia’s apparent acknowledgment of the inevitability of NATO enlargement, there remains considerable opposition across the political spectrum to any enlargement of the role of NATO in Europe. Russia is still a formidable force in the world security arena and continues to exert considerable influence in the European region.

Additionally, conferences and seminars have presented possible models of a future NATO; papers and records of these conferences are available as excellent primary source material. A good example is the Wilton Park conference, *A Larger NATO*, held in February 1996, which addressed many of the concerns of member-nations, as well as those from countries wishing to join. As a participant in that conference, the author has considerable primary source material in the form of documentation and notes, as well as published papers from the conference.

**Definitions and Terms**

There are several definitions or terms that require either explanation or confirmation. The first of these is the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)*, which was established in 1991 as part of
NATO’s Strategic Concept. Essentially, NACC seeks to promote dialogue and cooperation between NATO and non-member-nations in various areas, including political, economic, information, scientific, environmental, and defense support issues. In 1994 it was agreed to formalize the NACC’s ad hoc partnership programs into a separate program. Partnership for Peace (PfP), established in 1994, has the mission of providing a framework for political and military partnership for potential new member and non-member nations. To date, some 26 countries are participating in the process together with the 16 NATO nations.  

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/CSCE) formally came into being in January 1995. With roots going back two decades, the OSCE represents a system whereby confidence is built by cultural, economic, technical, and scientific cooperation between member-nations. It also serves as a means of furthering human rights and basic freedoms by open cooperation. To date, some 53 nations are involved, including the United States and Canada.

The European Union (EU) came into being as a result of the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1991 and ratified in 1993.) Prior to that, the European Community (EC) had been the principal European alliance focused primarily on economic and administrative matters. The EC came into being following the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, which itself followed the merger of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Essentially, the EU today is a three-legged organization, with the more well known leg being that of economic and political union. The second leg is cooperation in the realms of civil and criminal law and home affairs, and the third leg is that of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.  

The latter has been embodied into the Western European Union (WEU) and is in the process of being developed further following the Petersburg Declaration of June 1992, which envisions the strengthening of the WEU. The WEU was established in 1954 to be not only a European defense and
security alliance, but also an economic, social, and cultural one. In May 1994, the Kirchberg Declaration created a system of membership and observer status to take account of the rising interest in the WEU from non member EU nations, including Eastern European countries in particular. NATO agreed to cooperate closely with the WEU, essentially making the WEU the European pillar of the Alliance, and to make its collective assets available to the WEU to avoid duplication of effort.

The Council of Europe was established in May 1949 to “achieve a greater unity between its members to safeguard and realize the ideals and principles which are their common heritage, and to facilitate their economic and social progress.” There are currently 33 members, including many former East European countries who joined the Council after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, non member-nations (currently including Croatia, Latvia, and Ukraine) can participate in certain activities.

Several terms and expressions have become accepted terminology in the security arena. Out of Area is a statement used to describe those areas outside of the region of the North Atlantic with which NATO is primarily concerned. Nation Building has become a term much used by politicians and the media to describe the actions of other nations in assisting an emerging nation to achieve economic, political, and social well being and stability. NATO’s part in this activity is not new, and consists of economic and political advice and, in some cases, assistance from NATO members. The term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) defines those weapons—primarily chemical, nuclear, biological, and derivatives thereof—that can cause massive casualties and infrastructure damage.

Assumptions and Limitations

The major assumption made in this thesis is that NATO will continue as an Alliance, and that enlargement in some form will take place. Given the current support from both within and outside its membership, it is unlikely that NATO will cease to exist, although its structure may undergo considerable alteration, as may its roles and capabilities.
The amount of published and available material on NATO, its future, the case for and against enlargement and the Russian view of the Alliance is vast. In order to make the thesis practical and, at the same time, valid, additional limitations have been necessary. The first is to limit the thesis to the study of the four leading member-nations—the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France. NATO without these four is difficult to imagine. Yet, each brings a different perspective and agenda that relates directly to this thesis. The U.S. and Great Britain were founding members (with France), and both maintain considerable influence within the Alliance, the U.S. in particular. France is unique in that it elected to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, yet maintained its membership and is a powerful political force within the Alliance. In 1996, France announced that it wished to rejoin the military structure. Germany was not a founding member of the Alliance, having been granted membership only in 1955. It is, however, the most economically and politically powerful of the European nations, and remains a major force in developing any new NATO strategy.

The vast quantity of material available on NATO’s future has been increased enormously since the fall of the Berlin Wall. While the articles and papers written immediately following the fall give an indication of the immediate thoughts on the future role of NATO, many have lost their relevance due to massive political and economic changes in Europe and Russia, and, to some extent, the United States. In order to limit the quantity of material to a manageable amount, only those items published since 1993 will be reviewed and drawn from in detail. Certain historical documents and books published prior to 1993 will, however, be required to illustrate particular perspectives.

In order to successfully analyze the materials available, a research cut off date of 1 January 1997 is imposed on the thesis. Clearly, events will occur that impact on the outcome of this thesis and study between the cut off date and eventual completion. Where this is so, the event will be remarked upon in the conclusion of the thesis. Of particular interest are developments in relations with Russia, the effects of new personalities in the U.S. government following the Presidential elections, and events
during the period leading up to the July 1997 Madrid NATO Summit Meeting, at which new members
of NATO are expected to be formally invited to join.

Relevance

Although limitations have necessarily narrowed the focus of this thesis, sufficient material
exists to conduct a detailed and comprehensive study of the enlargement of the Alliance from the
perspectives of four major nations. The issue of enlargement is one which will concern the Alliance
over the next four to six years, although it is by no means the Alliance’s only interest. Enlargement is
likely to generate a momentum of its own, to retain a currency and sense of significance which
transcend the politics and policies of the moment. Therefore, a study of enlargement issues promises
to shed light on an ongoing process which will continue to garner headlines well into the next century.
Imagery abounds, but there seems little doubt we are currently witnessing a major shift in the “tectonic
plates” upon which rests a newly-emerging European security architecture.

2Asst. Sec. Richard Holbrooke, “America, A European Power,” Foreign Affairs (March/April
Environment (New York: Praeger 1991) is an example.
5Dr. Peter Schmidt, Germany, France and NATO (Washington DC: Strategic Studies
Institute, 1994).
7Vyacheslav A. Nikonorov, “Transatlantic Security: Beyond NATO,” The Reserve Officer
8Terry McNeill, The Perils and Prospects of Russia’s Democratization (London: The Atlantic
10 *NATO Handbook*: 55.

11 Ibid., 193.

12 Ibid., 203.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

General

The material available on the enlargement of NATO is voluminous; in order to reduce the amount of literature under consideration, the restrictions cited in chapter one govern the following review. The material falls according to types of publication into the following categories: books, journal and newspaper articles, studies or papers produced by political or strategic study organizations, and the author’s primary source material from conferences he attended. The review will also briefly examine materials available that provide a historic background to the thesis. The announcement of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program by NATO in January 1994 marks a watershed in material on the future of the Alliance. The same announcement also marks the beginning of an examination of NATO enlargement, as the Alliance made its initial attempt at dealing with Central and Eastern European interest in cooperating with, and in some cases, eventual membership of NATO.

History and Background

The formation of NATO in 1949 created the first European defense treaty organization in which the United States was a vital part. The end of the First World War saw America revert to an isolationist foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson fought long, and ultimately futile battles with the Senate for U.S. membership in the League of Nations--a forerunner to the United Nations. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt experienced great difficulty in attempting to establish an American role in the United Nations. However, thanks to bipartisan support in the Senate, Roosevelt carried
the day, but his death left future relations with Europe and Asia in the hands of Harry Truman. At the end of the Second World War, Americans had no great desire for "entangling alliances."

Truman continued to work against the shackles of isolationism. In 1947, the major European nations signed the Brussels Treaty to establish a fifty-year collective defense agreement. Secretary of State George C. Marshall expressed U.S. approval of this action and agreed that America would support the Western European Union. Thus, the embryo of NATO appeared. Ensuing debates and political negotiations led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, following U.S. Senate approval. André de Staercke’s *NATO’s Anxious Birth* records in detail the formation of the Alliance and demonstrates the difficulty of its establishment, and the importance of America in its formation. The first chapter provides an overview of historical aspects of NATO and is used as the major text in the thesis for this purpose. The volume also contains useful perspectives from other nations on their reasons for supporting the formation of NATO, although they are not referred to in detail.

The fall of the Berlin Wall during the winter of 1989 heralded the beginning of one of the most dramatic and important periods in European history. Less than a year later, Germany was once again unified after an enforced partition of 45 years. Within a year, the Soviet Union collapsed and the threat of all out war on European soil seemed to have vanished. Commentators, politicians, and several pressure groups began to demand the scaling down of military forces, now that the threat from the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Arguments for reducing military spending were convincing, especially in view of the declining state of many European economies. Some observers even questioned the relevance of NATO. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall several developments, including the period of détente following the Helsinki Accord in 1975, the reduction of troop levels, and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 limiting theater nuclear weapons, led some to believe that NATO had completed its mission and was no longer relevant. 13
Many commentaries from this period emphasize the disappearance of the threat and NATO's quest for purpose. Of these, Nelson S. Drew's *The Future of NATO* provides a detailed account of how NATO strategy responded to the Soviet threat and makes key recommendations for establishing a revised strategy. Drew does not advocate the disbanding of NATO, as he believes that it is not in either the U.S. or European interest to do so. NATO's role remains pivotal in ensuring the stability of Europe, and Drew presents a view of NATO that sees it evolving to a collective security alliance that remains relevant to both the Europeans and Americans.¹

Meanwhile, the New Strategic Concept of 1991 set out a new vision for the Alliance. This concept acknowledged that Europe was no longer in danger of a massive, full-scale attack, and that the Alliance's force structure should demonstrate this. The concept also highlights the multi-faceted nature of future threats to security, along with the possibility of the Alliance operating outside its traditional geographic boundaries. *The NATO Handbook* contains the entire Strategic Concept, as well as commentary on its impact on the Alliance. *The NATO Handbook* is also a useful source document for the Washington Treaty Articles, existing NATO programs, and definitions and purposes of the major security and defense structures in Europe, as well as a brief synopsis of the history of the Alliance.

**Books and Papers**

The material available on enlargement and the future of NATO following the publication of the New Strategic Concept is considerable. Many books and papers provide basic content and substance, while journal and newspaper articles give specific details on a narrow spectrum of information or concerns. Additionally, information from journals and newspapers provides an up-to-date reaction to the ever-changing situation in European security, whereas details in some of the books and papers cited have been overtaken by events.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) paper *Germany, France and NATO*, compares differences in French and German perspectives of NATO’s emerging strategy. Although the paper has been overtaken by France’s recent announcement of her intention to rejoin the military structure, the treatment provides a useful overview of the differences between two major European members in the Alliance. The paper highlights both the very different views on the future of NATO in European security and the European Union’s desire to establish a distinct security and defense identity. The unique relationship that France holds with NATO and its members is discussed, with the discussion emphasizing that France sees the future role of NATO in European security being reduced in favor of greater involvement for the U.S. in the European Union.²

In contrast, Germany sees NATO as an essential part of the European Security framework. Germany has incurred considerable economic stress as a result of both unification and its provision of economic aid to Central and Eastern European states and Russia. Shifting the alignment towards the East may cause Germany’s relationship with the European Union, and in particular France, to decline in favor of a stronger relationship with Russia.³ The paper contrasts the two distinct views of the Alliance that Germany and France hold and concludes that France continues to prefer a strong European defense alliance, with NATO playing a secondary role. The paper acknowledges that France is willing to accept a NATO role in regional security, especially under the circumstances in which its military structure and facilities complement those of the WEU.⁴

The SSI paper, *NATO Strategy in the 1990’s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?*, by William Johnsen presents the view that NATO’s Strategic Concept provides a viable framework to take the Alliance into the twenty-first century, but that differences within the Alliance prevent changes from being implemented to the fullest. Johnsen argues that members of
the Alliance are confused over the difference between collective defense and collective security, and that confusion stifles the progress of the Strategic Concept. Additionally, Johnsen sees as NATO’s greatest challenge the generation of the political will of member nations to make the Strategic Concept a reality, and the challenge of retaining credible force levels for Alliance purposes. The paper also provides a useful commentary on the New Strategic Concept, highlighting its major elements and their impact on the Alliance’s future roles. Johnsen examines the initiatives, both military and political, that have been undertaken by the Alliance as a result of the concept, including the reorganization of NATO members’ military forces as a result of the Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the establishing of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP. The author states that the key to NATO’s future is establishing a balance between what objectives it wishes to achieve, the way it wants to achieve them, what it can achieve, given the military forces, and the political wills of the member nations. This is the common problem of balancing ends, ways, and means. Without a solution to this equation, the Alliance is destined to flounder under the weight of uncertainty and divergent perspectives for future direction.

The North Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom publishes papers and books on NATO, and several of these deal with the future of NATO in a European security context. Fergus Carr’s *NATO and the New European Security* is a valuable European perspective on the future security of Europe. The paper outlines the changes that occurred in Europe between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s to usher in the new Strategic Concept. Carr highlights the fact that the period of détente in the mid-to-late 1970s did not damage NATO’s relevance. Détente established a climate of improved international relations, but did not address the divided Europe, in particular the division of Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a period of great change in Europe and the belief that peace in Europe could now be
achieved. The initial optimism that followed the events of 1989 and 1990 was, however replaced by the realization that tensions created between ethnic populations and among the former Soviet states could lead to conflict that threatened to spill into Western Europe. NATO has attempted to establish itself as the leading organization capable of dealing with the emerging challenges of European security. The London Declaration (July 1990) stated that the Alliance must “seek to enhance the political component...as provided for by Article 2 of the Treaty.”\textsuperscript{10} The Declaration goes on to state that NATO should now “help to build the structures of a more united continent.”\textsuperscript{11} Carr details the interaction that took place between the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and NATO and the eventual establishment of the NACC in December 1991.

The examination continues with the Rome Declaration of 1991 and the publication of the New Strategic Concept together with the relevance of the shift in threat from a single, massive military act to diverse and quite possibly nonmilitary threats, such as ethnic tensions, social and political strife, and territorial disputes. Carr goes on to examine the rise of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the relevance of the Western European Union (WEU) as the European pillar of NATO, and the challenges faced by peacekeeping missions, such as in the former Yugoslavia. In conclusion, Carr emphasizes that the Rome Declaration was a turning point in NATO's strategy, resulting in NATO's recognition that it held a role in future European security. He also states that while NATO is likely to become involved in security enhancing actions, its primary role is that of collective defense, and not collective security under either the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the UN.\textsuperscript{12}

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes the McNair series of papers. Of these, paper 40 NATO Enlargement and Alternative Future Security Alignments, by James Morrison is particularly relevant to the future of NATO and European security. The paper deals not only with the impact of NATO enlargement on European Security, but also on the wider
implications for out of area roles. Morrison considers six possible future alternative security alignments in Europe, of which three of these assume NATO enlargement\textsuperscript{13} He proposes various models of European security and comments on their impact on the region and existing organizations and structures. In dealing with the way in which NATO has tackled the issue of European security, Morrison considers the interaction of the various organizations involved and their current activities. As well as dealing with Western European organizations, Morrison also considers the efforts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to promote unity of effort and a form of collective security.\textsuperscript{14}

The primary element of this paper, however, is consideration of whether or not the Alliance should enlarge. Morrison gives three views. The first considers the reasons why the Alliance should enlarge its membership. The need to respond to Central and Eastern European requests for membership and the improved stability an increased membership would bring to the region are two key reasons given.\textsuperscript{15} The second argument centers on why NATO should not consider enlargement. In this section, the redivision of Europe and the creation of an isolated and possibly hostile Russia are given as arguments against enlargement.\textsuperscript{16} Finally, Morrison offers an argument for not enlarging NATO immediately, but rather in the near future. While not ruling out enlargement, this argument takes into account concerns regarding the infancy of some of the new democracies, and whether these nations are ready to be constructive members of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{17} The paper concludes that NATO should maintain primacy of the various security organizations in Europe, at the same time encouraging security enhancing and confidence building programs with Central and Eastern European countries. In dealing with enlargement of the Alliance, Morrison considers that a deliberate and methodical approach should be taken on an individual basis, while avoiding the setting of any new criteria.\textsuperscript{18} An essential element in any future strategy is establishing and maintaining good relations with Russia.
provides a view on European security and its future from the very center of the continent—Germany. As a well-known and experienced commentator on European security, Bertram offers that it is not just NATO that is struggling with its future, but also the European Union (EU) and the U.S. as they attempt to determine their place in the new European security order. The greatest threat to European security is the possibility of spillover from ethnic conflicts from East to West European countries. Additionally, the massive flow of refugees into Western Europe may undermine the stability of the Alliance as new, internal tensions between member states arise.\textsuperscript{19} Bertram suggests that the key to future European stability rests with maintaining existing, well-tried and established organizations that seek to reduce conflict by encouraging orderly change in emerging nations.\textsuperscript{20}

The EU and NATO emerge as the only two real candidates for launching a meaningful attempt to stabilize the situation in Europe. The future of both organizations lies not only with their ability to adjust to the challenges of enlargement and new membership, but also with their ability to work in concert.\textsuperscript{21} Bertram assesses the impact of both the U.S. and Russia on any changes proposed to NATO and assesses that both exert different pressures on the Alliance. The U.S. is becoming less attached to Europe and is encouraging a “Europeanization” of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{22} However, the leadership of the U.S. in the Alliance remains essential, and ensuring that the U.S. remains committed to the Alliance is a further aspect for consideration.\textsuperscript{23} In the case of Russia, some form of Russia-NATO relationship must evolve. To allay Russia’s fears that NATO enlargement is a threat, Russia needs to be persuaded that it has a role to play in the future security of the region.\textsuperscript{24} This effectively reduces the likelihood of Russia becoming resurgent amongst its former colony states, as Russia will ultimately benefit from inclusion in any future regional arrangements and organizations. The most demanding challenge of this proposal is
convincing Russia of the benefits of a positive relationship with NATO and of the non-threatening nature of future NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{25}

Bertram also considers the question of enlargement of both NATO and the EU, and he concludes that enlargement is inevitable for both, if they are to remain effective. Both organizations have confronted enormous challenges as a result of the changes in Europe and have generally adopted a strategy of enlargement to address these challenges. In the case of NATO, Bertram concludes that it must endeavor to maintain a meaningful relationship with those who are not among the first group of new members, and who may never be eligible for membership, or who do not desire membership, but who, nevertheless wish to continue working with the Alliance.\textsuperscript{26} The existing PfP program will play a major role in maintaining viable links with those countries on the fringe of the Alliance. Bertram further suggests that some intermediate membership status be available for those countries which, while not full members, warrant more than the PfP program can offer.\textsuperscript{27} EU plans for enlargement face challenges from within that appear to be at odds with the stated aims of enlargement. Although the EU has yet to implement a responsive decision-making system, it must develop a means of offering the benefits of membership to less stable economies in Eastern Europe--given the present fixation with interlocking economies sharing a single currency, this appears almost impossible to consider--and finally, the EU must achieve support for enlargement among its own members.\textsuperscript{28} Bertram concludes that the EU faces considerable challenge if it is to maintain its place in the European order and that it must adopt a less rigid approach to business to achieve success.

NATO and the EU must establish a frame of reference in which to operate to prevent duplication of effort, or, worse, the undermining of each other’s efforts. Bertram discusses the familiar model of the European security and defense identity (ESDI) providing the European pillar of the Alliance and of the two working in harmony with each other. He concludes that while this
is a commendable goal, the differences between the two organizations will force them to adopt separate approaches to enlargement and a modus operandi that will inevitably cause a degree of disharmony between the two.\textsuperscript{29} The primary aim of both organizations, however, must be to not only establish a framework to minimize these effects and to establish a coherent and complementary approach to the enlargement question, but also to their future roles and relationships in the new Europe. Bertram proposes that EU enlargement should precede NATO enlargement, given the low threat level in Europe, but that both organizations' activities must be coordinated.\textsuperscript{30}

Michael Mandelbaum's book \textit{The Dawn of Peace in Europe}, is a recent treatise on the future of European security and the future roles of the existing organizations. He gives an overview of the existing NATO structure and policies as they affect European security and then gives a unique perspective of the future European security environment. Mandelbaum asserts that common security provides the most realistic means of achieving lasting peace in Europe. Common security is characterized by the removal of interstate causes for conflict, and the recognition of potential conflict from anarchy and the means to deal with it.\textsuperscript{31} The importance of various arms control treaties--both nuclear and conventional--negotiated between NATO and the former Soviet Union provides the core of the new common security in Europe.\textsuperscript{32} If interstate causes of conflict are removed, the most likely cause of conflict is "the mistaken anxiety about the motives of others."\textsuperscript{33} Early arms control treaties, such as SALT, did little to establish common security, as the treaties were between the U.S. and USSR only. The treaties established later, including SALT 1 and 2 and CFE, differed greatly in that they included European nations in the details of the treaties, thus establishing the beginnings of a common security environment.\textsuperscript{34} By engaging former nations of the USSR through programs, such as PfP, Mandelbaum asserts that transparency and confidence will alleviate the misplaced anxiety referred to earlier. NATO also
offers a continued collective defense (or security) alliance that can respond to any serious reversal in the present peaceful situation in Europe.35

The final element of Mandelbaum’s treatise is a comparison of Russia and the U.S: how the internal situation has evolved in each and how the relationship between the two is pivotal to any future security situation in Europe. Russia has yet to establish a fully democratic system and is far removed from a market economy. Both of these developments could contribute to common security by reinforcing the need for external linkages and structures that accompany both democracies and market economies.36 Russia has experienced the collapse of its empire that Britain and Austria (among many) have felt in the past. The loss not only of territory, but also of regional and global influence, creates a volatile and dangerous situation, not only on the European border with Russia, but also on Russia’s Eastern border with China. Of particular relevance to European security is Russia’s relationship with both the Baltic States and the Ukraine. The Baltic States contain a relatively high proportion of ethnic Russians, who are viewed as aliens by the native Baltic population.37 Ethnic Russians were required to take language tests and meet residency requirements that few could achieve. Following political pressure from both Russia and European nations, these requirements were relaxed to make attaining citizenship easier. The underlying mistrust between ethnic groups, and the possibility of ethnic tensions producing the same disastrous situation that occurred in Bosnia, however, present a serious threat to European security. The situation with the Ukraine is similar, with added tension created by the failure to agree with Russia on the division of Soviet military assets and the maintenance of economic links between Russia and the Ukraine.38

The role the U.S. has in the common security of Europe is an extension of its previous commitment to the Alliance. Since NATO’s formation, the U.S. has been the major driving force in leading the Alliance, and NATO has formed the basis of the nation’s military planning and
foreign policy. Maintaining the U.S. in NATO and, more importantly, in Europe, is vital to securing common security. Central and Eastern European nations are not confident that Western Europe will be able to deal with Russia in the event of it moving towards resurgent authoritarian nationalism. From a Western European perspective, the U.S. has been a loyal and polite ally which has avoided interference in European affairs. Given the history of isolationism in America, however, particularly after the First World War, America is unlikely to have any desire to be drawn into Europe any farther than its present commitments. America has urged the Europeans to bear more of the burden of defense since the height of the Cold War, and with the Soviet threat removed, the pressure on the nations of Europe to contribute more to their defense is growing. Added to this, America’s need to reduce government spending makes a reduction or complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe a popular option. America’s historical links with not only Britain, but with the majority of the European nations—including those from Central and Eastern Europe—create, however, considerable pressure for maintaining forces in Europe. It is, therefore, likely that America will have a reduced presence in Europe, but one that still maintains creditability.

Mandelbaum concludes by asserting that the end of the Cold War did not bring about a new world order as envisioned by President Bush in January 1991, but did bring about a new security order in Europe. This new security order has created conditions for the lowest likelihood in recent times for a major war in the region. The common security order that exists is due to three changes in Europe: the collapse of the Soviet Union; the search for democracy by the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact States; and the impact of the various arms treaties on the countries of Europe. NATO retains a vital role in the future of the common security. It provides the vehicle by which America is linked to Europe and so offers Eastern European nations the security of a
militarily capable alliance. At the same time, Russia must be linked to the new common security order, either through NATO or through a U.S.-Russia treaty.

A useful survey of the challenges to be addressed in dealing with Russia is Terry McNeil's *The Perils and Prospects of Russia's Democratization*. McNeil argues that Russia's shift to a democracy remains caught in transition and that this state of flux is the most demanding challenge the West has in dealing with Russia. Russia has almost no experience with democracy and is struggling to complete the transition.\(^{44}\) NATO and the EU must appreciate the tentative situation that exists internally in Russia and strive to assist Russia in becoming a fully democratic nation. Some of the conditions that Russia must address include resurgent nationalism, ethnic tensions, economic failure, and military demands.\(^{45}\)

As NATO (and to a lesser degree the EU) seeks to enlarge, the view from Russia is that NATO is threatening her, as former "colonies" seek membership in the Alliance. While these democracies are in their infancy, they are open to external threats, and Russia may attempt to regain influence over them. The transition from communism (or any undemocratic regime) requires a sustained period of both political and economic stability.\(^{46}\) These are lacking in Russia, and their absence poses the biggest threat to regional security as the population of Russia loses patience with a leadership that promises more than it can deliver. In conclusion, McNeil offers the view that Russia's progress to democratization is still in transition, threatened by a failing economy, centralized control of both agriculture and industry, and growing support for nationalist policies.\(^{47}\) NATO and the EU are well placed to assist Russia in fulfilling its stated aim of becoming a democratic nation, but must approach the matter carefully and reassure Russia that a larger NATO is not a threat to her.

The speeches of Manfred Worner, chronicled in *Change and Continuity in the North Atlantic Alliance*, although somewhat dated (published in 1990), offer very useful insight into the
early direction that the Alliance was keen to pursue. In his speech to the Italian Senate in Rome on 19 April 1990, for example, he acknowledges the effectiveness of both NATO and the EC in providing stability and cohesion.\textsuperscript{48} He states that the challenge for NATO is “to extend security without diminishing it.”\textsuperscript{49} Worner saw the Alliance undertaking three tasks to achieve this extension of security: establishing a new European order that must be more durable than that of the Cold War; maintaining a lasting peace; and ensuring that the U.S. and the newly unified Europe continue the effective partnership established over the last forty years.\textsuperscript{50} Worner many times clearly articulated the need to enlarge NATO in conjunction with the EC and to establish a means of offering to prospective new members a vehicle that allowed them access to the Alliance and its benefits.

Journal articles are basically drawn from six main sources: \textit{Survival, International Defense Review, Strategic Review, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, NATO Review, and Joint Force Quarterly (JFO)}. A review of the material from the main source journals focuses on the following major topics in turn: NATO’s future; NATO enlargement; Partnership for Peace; Germany and NATO; America and NATO; France and NATO; Britain and NATO; and Russia and NATO.

NATO’s future, in general terms, has been covered considerably by the majority of the journals listed above. In addition to the material contained within the numerous books on the subject, the various journal articles offer supplementary materials or a different perspective. Alyson Bailes, writing in the Autumn 1996 edition of \textit{Survival}, argues that NATO’s approach to managing the changes upon which it has embarked could seriously reduce its effectiveness. Not only is NATO undertaking an enlargement program, it is also in the middle of internal changes in such areas as military command structure, the French relationship with the Alliance and the increasing demands for a wider “Eurodefense” capability.\textsuperscript{51} Bailes compares the EU approach to
enlargement, in which the entire Union is being reviewed (via the Inter-Governmental Conference), to the piecemeal approach of NATO, and considers the differences and similarities between the two situations. Bailes asserts that the scattered pieces of the puzzle are all present, it is simply a matter of time before they are collected and assembled. The challenge ahead for the Alliance is to convince the governments of the member nations and Russia that the arguments for NATO and its enlargement are valid and understood.52

"NATO: Deepening and Broadening?" an article from NATO Review by the Dutch politician Frits Bolkestein, supports Bailes’s comparison of differing methods of enlargement employed by the EU and NATO. While admitting that NATO must adopt and reform to a more security orientated alliance with a larger membership, Bolkestein asserts that NATO’s primary role must be collective defense.53 In broadening, NATO must progress with care. None of the immediate new members are under a direct threat, so there is no need to accelerate the membership process. If membership is offered to too many too quickly, the significance of NATO membership will be reduced, and hence the effectiveness of the Alliance also.54 Any new members must be admitted as full members, thus avoiding a new form of membership or temporary membership; and above all, any enlargement must enhance European stability and security. The political as well as military impact of enlargement must be considered by NATO members before the decision is made to offer membership to any new country.55

The article also reiterates the need to involve Russia in the enlargement process. Already a member of the PfP program, Russia also plays a crucial role in NATO through the "sixteen plus one" meetings and the influence that she maintains in her former satellite nations. The point is made again that an enlarged alliance that does not improve European security and stability is worthless.56 PfP provides a vehicle that, although initially a temporary measure, has provided the opportunity for non member states to work more closely with the Alliance. This interaction builds
confidence and establishes new cooperation in the military, security, and defense fields, as well as along the scientific and administrative avenues that are also part of PfP. Bolkestein emphasizes that PfP provides the means to maintain European stability without entering into hasty new membership arrangements for the Alliance. Until the impact of enlargement has been assessed and agreed to by the member nations, PfP should be the focal point of Alliance activities with prospective new members.57

"Recasting the Atlantic Alliance" by Philip Gordon in the Spring 1996 edition of *Survival* examines the relationship between the U.S. and Europe and the importance of reshaping the Alliance to meet the needs of both. Gordon examines the changing nature of the Atlantic Relationship with respect to changing U.S. domestic priorities, the changing nature of traditional and cultural links to Europe, and the growing desire to establish a European defense identity.58 In an approach to recasting the Alliance, the article examines various options under consideration to maintain the Atlantic link. These range from establishing a free trade area between Europe and North America (TAFTA), maintaining the relationships of the last fifty years rather than attempting to rewrite or compose a new NATO charter, enlarging the Alliance carefully and selectively to maintain military structures and capabilities.59 In essence, keep the elements of the Alliance that work and alter only what is essential to maintain NATO’s vitality. In conclusion, Gordon recalls that every other military alliance has faded away after the threat vanished. Because of the shared interests and cultural heritage of the U.S. and Europe, however, NATO is unlikely to disappear. By careful transformation and the realization that both the U.S. and Europe must demonstrate their commitment to the Alliance, NATO will remain the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic relations.60

John Hillen’s "Getting NATO Back to Basics" in the Spring 1996 *Strategic Review* argues that NATO succeeded as a collective defense alliance and that the current schemes to
redefine the role of the Alliance will serve to severely reduce its effectiveness. Further, NATO is an American alliance that links the U.S. to Europe. Any future U.S. commitment to Europe should be undertaken via NATO. The challenge is to convince the American public and politicians that the expense of keeping troops stationed in Europe is a good investment and that American national interests are being furthered. To do this, American leaders must ensure that the U.S. public understands that European security and stability are in the U.S. interest and must develop a clear and meaningful policy to support that claim. Hillen restates issues made in Philip Gordon’s article concerning a common heritage, common interests, and interdependent economies. Hillen also warns of the dangers of collective security. Unlike the UN, which has a diverse range of possible missions, NATO had but one--collective defense. Neither the U.S. Congress nor the U.S. public will tolerate NATO running from “one media generated crisis to another.” This does not rule out NATO’s participation in peacekeeping or other diverse missions, but U.S. participation in them cannot be guaranteed.

America has unique capabilities that make its continued role in Europe essential. NATO must recognize this and ensure that all members of the Alliance contribute to the cost of defense. Any contribution that America makes should be that which is decisive in nature. In short, if Europe can guarantee its own security, then America should disengage all forces from Europe.

Hillen also reminds us that NATO has already enlarged to former Soviet countries through the acceptance of a unified Germany in the Alliance. While the situation regarding Germany’s membership is unique, a united Germany set a precedent for new members that cannot be ignored. Further, warnings against a reunified Germany are the same that are used against enlargement of NATO. Hillen concludes that NATO must refocus itself and its activities in order to maintain U.S. involvement in the Alliance. Enlargement to include several of the former communist nations (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) will maintain the vitality of the Alliance and
also American interests in it. In concert with this, the U.S. must define and articulate its role in Europe and NATO.\textsuperscript{65}

The RAND Corporation has undertaken several studies into the alternatives open for the Alliance, their impact on existing and future members. The first to be considered is the Spring 1995 \textit{Survival} article “NATO Enlargement: The Next Steps.”\textsuperscript{66} The article relates three reasons for Alliance enlargement and describes the effects on NATO’s strategy towards enlargement and how each will effect military forces in extending the Article 5 collective defense commitment to new members. The first path is that of Evolutionary enlargement undertaken to establish security in the region allowing the emerging economic and political structures of the Eastern and Central European countries to become established in a stable environment. This path assumes that membership in NATO is secondary to membership of the EU which provides the best means of establishing economic and political stability—the ultimate goal being membership of both.

The second path of Promote Stability argues that the political situation in Eastern and Central Europe is fragile and that the security vacuum between Russia and Germany threatens to sweep away the infant democracies returning the region to the familiar stalemate of the Cold War. A strong security framework would prevent this vacuum from imploding and allow democracies to become more stable and deep rooted. The final path is that of Strategic Response. Russia poses no threat to the emerging nations of Eastern and Central Europe today. Therefore, why does NATO need to respond to a non-threat? This path assumes that sufficient time will be available for the Alliance to react to any Russian threat and extend membership to the Eastern and Central European nations at short notice. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages and the article relates these in terms of political difficulty and military commitments to fulfill them. The article also relates the importance of Russia to any NATO futures and concludes that the
Alliance must develop new means of consultation with Russia to ensure that her concerns are expressed early in the decision cycle, while not permitting Russia a veto of NATO decisions.\textsuperscript{67} The article by Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee "What will NATO Enlargement Cost?" in the Autumn 1996 \textit{Survival} is the second of the RAND studies to be drawn on. The arguments against enlargement indicate that the costs to both the West and East will be prohibitive. The article establishes various alternatives for NATO defense postures that offer less costly alternatives. Depending on the option chosen, the costs involved range between $10 billion to $110 billion.\textsuperscript{68} The authors highlight four tasks that will decide what measures are required to prepare NATO for any future Article 5-type missions: Preparing Eastern and Central European forces for NATO membership (taking into account both routine improvements and also those items unique to joining NATO); upgrading the infrastructure for both Eastern and Central European and NATO forces; basing NATO forces in Eastern Europe (not immediately likely, but possible in the future); and preparing NATO forces for projection and regional reinforcement (the principal mechanism through which NATO will enhance the stability of Eastern and Central Europe).\textsuperscript{69} The article presents four alternatives in projecting the costs of enlargement, each of which has associated risks and benefits. Self-defense support assumes that new members will be able to meet their security needs and rely only on command, control, communications, and information (C3I) and logistics support from other Alliance members. Airpower projection is essentially the same self-defense support, but with the addition of NATO airpower. Joint power projection builds on the two previous options and allows a forward projection of both ground and air forces. The final and most costly option is forward presence, which is the worst case scenario and involves the basing of forces in the Eastern and Central European nations.\textsuperscript{70} The final decision will be made by the governments of both existing and future members of the Alliance, after advice from the military planners. In concluding the article, the authors return to the question
raised in previous articles regarding the who and when of enlargement. Until these questions are answered, the costs involved cannot be assessed. However, the Alliance can start to work on answering them and establishing political consensus on issues, under the leadership of the U.S., which will maintain an active role in the future Alliance.  

Lieutenant General Daniel Christman's article in the Spring 1996 *JFO*, "NATO's Military Future" and Colin Gray's "NATO: In Trouble at the Crossroads Again" in the Summer 1995 *Strategic Review* argue that the underlying feature of NATO's future should be that element which has served it so well in the past—the military dimension. The strength of the military pillar of NATO has been demonstrated by actions in the Gulf and Bosnia. Although the Gulf was not a NATO operation, many of the coalition members represented NATO forces, and the obvious procedures and standards adopted were those of NATO. In Bosnia, a wide range of participating countries has adapted to the NATO systems and structures for unity of effort. NATO's underlying strength is its ability to form effective military alliances among fifteen different nations (Iceland has no army), and this ability must be preserved in the future.  

The importance of military involvement under the PfP program has grown and is proving to be a vital factor in establishing and maintaining links not only with former communist nations and non-member Western European nations, but also with Russia. The current implementation force in Bosnia (IFOR) reflects the success of PfP, given the wide range of countries involved in that operation. Christman asserts that the military cannot afford to rest on its laurels and that it must adapt to perform new and different missions. The concept of a combined joint task force (CJTF) is one such area that will be key to the success of the Alliance in the future.  

In his closing remarks, Christman makes two points which deserve attention. First, the future of PfP rests very much on the availability of funds and with structured programs in which to operate. Second, the U.S. stress on the importance of engagement in Europe is reflected in its national military strategy. In effect,
American leadership is the key to successful European security.\textsuperscript{74} NATO must avoid at all costs "the British way in statecraft," whereby the Alliance muddles through challenges and events with no clear purpose.\textsuperscript{75} Gray also argues that Russia, although never indifferent to NATO enlargement, is unlikely to be concerned over the enlargement of NATO, providing it does not include any of the Baltic or CIS States, or the Ukraine. A limited enlargement to the "Visegrad" states would enhance the prospects for democracy in Russia.\textsuperscript{76}

Arguments for and against NATO enlargement are both numerous and diverse, depending on the perspective from which they originate. Arguments for enlargement essentially revolve around two principle viewpoints. First, enlargement would keep the Alliance alive and lend it a new raison d'\'être. Second, enlargement would become the principal way in which European security could be achieved. John Peters, writing in the Autumn 1995 Strategic Review, makes the point that NATO must address several key questions before proceeding with enlargement. The shortlist of countries that are likely to be offered membership is well known, but the conditions attached to their joining, reasons for enlarging, and actions required to maintain relations with Russia remain unanswered. Further, the impact of additional members on the decision-making capability of the Alliance, and the very practical aspects of enlargement, such as cost, lack of interoperability, and the added burden of a wider area of mutual defense for members, are considerations that the Alliance must address before embarking on this program.\textsuperscript{77} Perhaps the biggest stumbling block is NATO's future role, which remains unclear. The growing importance of other organizations and structures in Europe, such as the OSCE and the WEU, means that NATO is likely to be operating with them closer than in the past. NATO remains the means by which the U.S. is linked to Europe. Any serious erosion of NATO's importance would impact on America's future commitment to European security. Peters addresses some of the issues affecting the criteria for membership. Geography plays a crucial role. It makes little sense to offer
membership to a country separated from a member nation—the ability to enforce the commitments of Articles 4 and 5 is impractical. Additionally, the new members must possess a capable military structure in order to participate in their share of the security responsibilities. NATO will not simply enlarge its coverage—burden sharing is part of the agreement.\textsuperscript{78} In examining potential new members it is unlikely that any will emerge as a perfect new addition. Indeed, all of the Visegrad nations bring some element of doubt with them. In each case, what is required is a balance of capability with liability.

Karsten Voigt, the Chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly, writing in the March 1996 NATO Review, confirms that the concerns raised by Peters and addressed by the NATO study on enlargement are still present. Unless movement is made towards accepting new members soon, the process of enlargement is likely to grind to a halt. Voigt emphasizes the benefits of enlargement, including the increased stability in the region and a reduction of national tensions.\textsuperscript{79} Voigt also argues for an increased role of PfP in the enlargement process. Having exceeded the hopes of its founders, PfP provides the vehicle not only for establishing a system of cooperation in defense, but also for providing experience of closely working with NATO and increasing the transparency of the Alliance and its partners.\textsuperscript{80} Concluding, Voigt reaffirms the point that enlargement is essential to maintaining American interest in the Alliance and that the momentum achieved in the enlargement process to date must be sustained.\textsuperscript{81}

One of the recurring options for NATO is to enhance the PfP program. Currently, participation in PfP is mandatory for potential members of the Alliance. The program has achieved far more than its originators ever envisioned. The key to its success, however, remains funding and developing an integrated program to ensure coordination of effort. Articles in Armed Forces Journal of June 1995 and JFO of Summer 1994 support the program and reiterate the need for adequate funding to ensure success. The JFO article also gives an excellent summary of

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the road to establishing the program and the intended method of operation. As a counter to the success of PfP, the articles, “NATO’s Partnership for Peace: A Critical View” and “Polish Perceptions of the Partnership for Peace Initiative,” both published in International Defense Review Defense 95, offer the Polish experiences of PfP. The articles assert that PfP is a limited program that seeks to offer potential new NATO members a practical means of cooperation (as opposed to NACC) and provides breathing space for NATO as it attempts to establish a new strategy and identity. Both articles conclude by agreeing that PfP will have a far-reaching effect on European security.

Nick Williams, writing in the Spring 1996 edition of Survival, assesses the effects of PfP and presents three futures of the program. First, PfP is part of the NATO outreach program, designed to further cooperation made under the NACC. No concession is made to those countries who wish to become members, and PfP promotes the aims of NACC by allowing transparency of the Alliance, democratic control of defense forces, development of cooperative military relations, and provides experience in operating with NATO forces. Second, PfP can be viewed as a framework for joint action. In the event of a partner nation being threatened, the Alliance may assist the partner. There is no guarantee of assistance, but there is a commitment to solidarity in the face of a threat. This aspect increased the procedural depth of NATO’s cooperation activities beyond that which existed prior to the PfP program. Finally, the program provides a means for potential members to negotiate an individual package of activities in order to establish their credentials as possible worthy new members. The article also remarks on the growing evidence that suggests Russia now supports involvement and cooperation with NATO, although not through involvement with PfP, even though she has signed the framework document.

One of the limitations imposed on the thesis was to focus on the perspectives from the four key members of the Alliance. In general, many of the views and arguments expressed in the
articles already reviewed indicate the diverse nature of these perspectives, depending on where the writer is located. As stated previously, NATO is essentially an American Alliance, and much of the material reviewed serves to reinforce this understanding. Articles also seek to confirm America as a European power, despite the geographic separation from the region. Consideration is given to the shift in U.S. priorities as it disengages from Europe, however, and turns to the Pacific region. Richard Russell’s article, “The American National Interest in Europe,” in the Summer 1995 edition of *Strategic Review*, seeks to reaffirm the importance of European security to America and the need to maintain the Transatlantic link. The relationship between the U.S. and Europe goes far beyond historic and cultural ties, although these remain key. Shared interests in establishing a stable and secure European region constitute the major reason for continued U.S. involvement in NATO and, therefore, Europe. The article illustrates failures from the U.S., following both world wars, to engage in European security and highlights the Marshall Plan as a means to fulfill the national interest of countering Soviet domination of the region. The U.S. needs to maintain the same commitment to Europe today, and it is NATO that provides the mechanism to achieve this.

The Clinton administration’s dedication to enlarging NATO is the biggest security commitment that America will make in the foreseeable future. This view is stated in Gary Geipel’s and Robert Manning’s article in the *ROA National Security Report* of September 1996. NATO has been the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and by committing support for the enlargement of the Alliance, NATO is likely to remain so. American leadership in the Alliance remains key, as demonstrated by the Bosnian Peace Agreement and subsequent IFOR mission. The article argues that NATO must seek to coordinate its efforts with that of other organizations, such as the EU and the OSCE, as they offer the political and economic expertise that NATO simply does not possess.
Former Secretary of Defense Perry gave details of six postulates in Issue 4 of *Defense '96*. Essentially, these postulates summarize U.S. expectations for the future of NATO and indicate a U.S. commitment not only to the Alliance in general, but to enlargement and the development of a cooperative relationship with Russia in particular. Perry concludes the article by stating that it is now possible to realize George Marshall's vision of a "united Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." Richard Holbrooke writing in the March 1995 edition of *Foreign Affairs* provides a useful overview of the current situation in Europe, while holding that both NATO and the EU have roles in securing the future security of the region. Holbrooke reaffirms much of the material found in the previous articles reviewed and confirms that the U.S. sees itself as a European power, with vital interests in securing the stability of the region by engagement and support for NATO enlargement.  

Germany became the focal point of future Alliance strategy following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Not only did Germany undergo unification, but it inherited a region that had been subjected to the ravages of Soviet centralized control and a population eager for the lifestyle of the West. However, the socio-economic ordeal that accompanied unification has created economic faltering and renewed xenophobia. Victor Gray writing in the Autumn 1994 *Parameters*, asserts that the relationship between Russia and Germany will be the dominating factor in the foreseeable future of European security. Germany was the eastern border of the Cold War battleground, and now, despite the end of the Cold War, Germany is still the area upon which threats to European security impinge. Germany is determined to push Europe's frontier as far as possible to the East, thereby placing Germany nearer the center of Europe. The "baggage" of World War II which has prevented Germany from fully participating in events is only now being discarded. The task for the Alliance is to fill the vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gray argues that German national interests are a key factor in comprehending the future
security of Europe. Germany is the most powerful EU member, and relies heavily on exports for its economic strength. By extending the markets eastward via enlargement of both NATO and, in particular, the EU, Germany will be able to secure a position that it believes its new economic and political status warrants.\textsuperscript{90} Gray concludes with the belief that allowing the European members of NATO to fill the vacuum in Eastern Central Europe will result in a stronger NATO through a developed European pillar that may evolve into a pan-European system involving Russia and the U.S.\textsuperscript{91}

Germany's new status in Europe and NATO is reflected in Franz-Josef Meiers' article, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," in the Autumn 1995 \textit{Survival}, and in Lothar Gutjahr's article in the Summer 1995 \textit{Strategic Review}, "Competitive Interdependence: Germany's Foreign Policy in a Changing Environment." Essentially, the two articles describe the new position that Germany has established within Europe, along with its vision of a wider Europe extending to the East. In order to achieve this, Germany has sought a more active role in security affairs, an example of which is the Bundeswehr's role in UN peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{92} Despite the political will to increase Germany's military role, the German public has a great aversion to seeing its forces employed in military operations outside German territory, and so the political will to commit to such actions is unlikely to be strong. This realization reduces Germany's prospects for becoming the principal leader in the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{93} Germany's emerging foreign policy emphasizes three issues: integration and reform in Western Europe; a geopolitical partnership with America; and a stabilization of political and economic processes in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{94} Germany essentially remained on the edge of the field during the Cold War and has yet to establish legitimacy in the international arena and, as Meiers argues, the initial attempts of German international influence created considerable unease among the Western Europeans.\textsuperscript{95} Meiers concludes that Germany must establish its role without reawakening fears of resurgent nationalism. Both authors conclude
that Germany at present is constrained politically and economically both by its central position in Europe and by the considerable "baggage" that a successful Germany carries both within and without the country.

France leads the European debate on the continued role and involvement of the U.S. in European security. France has remained outside of NATO's integrated military structure for over thirty years, only recently indicating a willingness to return. France and Germany have maintained close cooperation in defense issues, but their evolving differences over the future role of NATO in Europe have caused some to doubt their continued closeness, as indicated in Carey Schofield's article, "France as the Wild Card in NATO?" in the July 1994 International Defense Review. Schofield also remarks on the ability of the French to disturb relations between European countries and cites France's continued nuclear testing program as an example. Contre-Admiral Phillipe Mallard, writing in the Summer 1994 edition of JFQ, reinforces the French view of the need for a separate European security and defense identity. Mallard argues that the aim is not to replace NATO or to establish a new organization, but to create the ability for Europeans to act autonomously, should the need arise. Key to this is French relations with both Germany and Britain. The article also outlines key features of the French security policy, including the retention of a nuclear deterrence and France's responsibilities as a former colonial power.

William Johnsen's and Thomas-Durell Young's articles, "France and NATO: The Image and the Reality" in the Winter 1994/1995 Parameters, and "France's Evolving Policy Toward NATO," in the Summer 1995 Strategic Review, are essentially the same in many areas, but the latter has been updated to account for possible change in French policies as a result of the end of Francois Mitterand's presidency. Both articles stress the impact on French policy of Gaullist strategy, which has finally been undermined by events in Bosnia, the unification of Germany, and by the widening of the EU. Each article assesses the impact of the various French policy-
making departments and structures in Paris and the importance of internal rather than external
political necessity in establishing policy. In contrast with previous articles, the *Livre Blanc* on
France’s Defense policy in 1994 allowed France to take part in the NATO Military Committee on
a case-by-case basis and is viewed by the authors as a sign that France now views NATO as an
important feature of European security. Equally important is France’s willingness to place forces
under NATO command, as illustrated by the EUROCORPS subordination to the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe (SACEUR) in times of crisis. Both articles conclude that, while the
changes in French relations with NATO are encouraging, there remain considerable differences
that mitigate her impulse to rejoining NATO’s integrated military structure (such as an
independent nuclear deterrent). These differences and the legacy of Gaullist strategy lead the
authors to suggest that France will maintain its relations with NATO on an as and when basis.
However, the realization that France must alter its approach to NATO is a sign of
encouragement.

“France’s New Relationship with NATO” by Robert Grant, published in the Spring 1996
edition of *Survival*, provides an excellent review of the progression of French policy towards
NATO from the end of the Cold War to the present. Grant also assesses the reasons for France’s
more tolerant view of the Alliance and highlights the shift in attitude over U.S. linkage to Europe
as a key factor in this change of opinion. Grant confirms the departure from Gaullist strategy,
referred to in Johnsen’s and Young’s articles. The proposed alterations to the NATO command
structure and their broad similarity with the French proposals on the matter have attracted much
French interest. Were NATO to implement these reforms, the likelihood of France returning to
the integrated military structure is greatly enhanced.

Britain’s perspectives on NATO and European security are essentially a balance between
those of Germany, France, and the U.S. Many of the articles already reviewed contain references
to Britain's importance in securing U.S. linkage to Europe and to Britain's role in the emerging ESDI. However, Britain's unique geographic position and historical past play equally important roles, and these are examined by Lawrence Freedman in the Summer 1994 *JFO* article "Britain, NATO, and Europe." He affirms the view that Britain not only supports NATO's continued involvement in European security—thereby ensuring continued U.S. involvement—but also supports an increased role for the WEU as part of the ESDI. Britain sees this as a complement to NATO and not an alternative. Britain countered the French view of a separate security system in Europe at the Maastricht Treaty Conference and clearly established an increased role for the WEU as an alternative. However, following the Gulf War, and as already mentioned in Mallard's article, Britain and France emerged as the leading exponents of European policy towards NATO and support for continued U.S. involvement. Freedman concludes by highlighting the dramatic changes in Europe that affect the need for Britain to remain linked to the continental "mainland." During the Cold War, the need to remain linked was to prevent the rise of one power in Europe. Today, that power struggle is over, and the emphasis on linkage is sustained by the need to maintain economic health in the EU as a result of the Maastricht Treaty.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor, writing in the October 1996 issue of the *RUSI Journal*, gives justification for Britain's evolving relationship with Russia. Britain has established numerous business relationships in Russia and has been a leading European contributor to PfP activities with Russia. He also highlights the importance of establishing both military and political cooperation with Russia and illustrates this with reference to the "sixteen plus one" meetings that have taken place. However, he argues for broadening the agenda to establish a high degree of confidence in this relationship, thereby allowing Russia to understand that NATO enlargement is not a threat to her.
Integration of Russia presents the greatest challenge to both the EU and NATO. Much of the material reviewed contains references to the importance of establishing both military and political links with Russia. In order to present a balanced view of the alternatives for NATO, however, a part of the thesis will be devoted to examining Russian fears of an enlarged NATO and the concerns she faces in dealing with the new European security environment. Writing in the Autumn 1995 issue of *Survival*, Leszek Buszynski outlines the demise of the pro-western position that motivated Russia in the early 1990s (led by the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev) and the impact that alternative considerations have had on Russian foreign policy. He also considers the impact of the war in Chechnya, not only on Russia, but also on NATO countries and former communist states. While demonstrating Russia’s instability and the weakness of its military against a guerrilla style enemy, the Chechen War also raised fears in the West and among Russia’s neighboring states that such conflict threatened the stability of the region. Russia established a policy with the West that the relationship between the two was conditional on Russia’s being able to maintain its territorial unity by force if required.109 Buszynski discusses areas where there is contention between Russia and the West. These include NATO enlargement—seen in Russia as a direct threat following “defeat” in the Cold War—and in which Russia is demanding a means to influence decisions reached by NATO; renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, which Russia believes bears little reality to the existing situation in Europe; and nuclear sales and the issue of arms control.110 In concluding, Buszynski believes that Russia is likely to improve its relations with China and the Islamic world as a means of forcing the West to accede to her demands. Additionally, the West should seek to maintain stabilizing relationships with Russia as she attempts to resolve the internal domestic turmoil that exists at present.111

Stephen Cimbala, writing in the Spring 1996 issue of *Strategic Review*, concentrates on the impact of NATO enlargement and Russia. Cimbala asserts that one of the major consequences
of NATO enlargement is the spread of the nuclear umbrella to Russia's doorstep. Possible effects of this are that Russia may renge on her commitments to the START Treaties and may, as suggested by Buszynski, turn to China in an attempt to apply pressure to the West.\textsuperscript{112} This and the fact that NATO's own unity of effort is sometimes precarious (French re-entry to the integrated military structure, American reductions in favor of a Pacific orientation) one might ask as to what purpose will enlarging serve?\textsuperscript{113}

**Newspapers and Magazines**

Newspaper and magazine articles referenced in the thesis are intended to clarify a particular argument made in a paper or article or to illustrate a particular argument with a recent event. No deliberate review of newspaper or magazine material will be made in this review. Newspaper sources have been taken in the main from either the United Kingdom daily quality press, such as *The Times* or *Daily Telegraph*, or from the more widely read U.S. daily broad sheets, such as the *Washington Post* or *New York Times*. The principal sources used for magazine resources included *The Economist* and *National Review*. Theses sources provided either background information or clarified facts mentioned in articles and papers which were either unclear or perhaps out dated.

**Other Sources**

In assessing the importance of NATO to the U.S., the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* provide specific rationale and details the continuing importance that America places on European security. In particular, the *National Security Strategy*, by its title alone, indicates the importance placed on enlargement by America.\textsuperscript{114} The document quotes examples of American initiatives in either resolving situations or in establishing new avenues for NATO, such as PfP.\textsuperscript{115} More importantly is the statement that the "NATO alliance will remain the
anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security," ensuring for the immediate future America’s continued involvement in European security. Likewise, support for NATO enlargement contained in the strategy confirms U.S. support for new membership of the Alliance, and commitment in maintaining strong economic links with the EU indicate that American involvement in Europe will be maintained for the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

The richness and diversity of various materials on NATO enlargement reflect the complexity and significance of the problem. The materials also reflect the perspectives of the more important members of NATO. How these perspectives impact on the enlargement issue will be the concern of this thesis’ substantive chapters.


2Peter Schmidt, Germany, France and NATO (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 17 October 1994), 5.

3Ibid., 3.

4Ibid., 19.


6Ibid., 35.

7Ibid., 25.

8Ibid., 36.


10Ibid., 10.

11 Ibid., 10.

12 Ibid., 22.

14 Ibid., 11-12.

15 Ibid., 29-30.

16 Ibid., 36-38.

17 Ibid., 41-42.

18 Ibid., 127-130.


20 Ibid., 12.

21 Ibid., 99.

22 Ibid., 95.

23 Ibid., 89.

24 Ibid., 36-39.

25 Ibid., 31.

26 Ibid., 50-51.

27 Ibid., 50.

28 Ibid., 56.

29 Ibid., 76.

30 Ibid., 82.


32 Ibid., 81.

33 Ibid., 82.

34 Ibid., 88-91.

36 Ibid., 126.

37 Ibid., 133-134.

38 Ibid., 135-137.

39 Ibid., 156.

40 Ibid., 158-159.

41 Ibid., 169.

42 Ibid., 171.

43 Ibid., 173.


46 Ibid., 18.


48 Manfred Worner, *Change and Continuity in the North Atlantic Alliance: The speeches by the Secretary General of NATO* (Brussels: The Office of Information and Press, NATO, 1990), 151.

49 Ibid., 151.

50 Ibid., 151-154.


52 Ibid., 37.


54 Ibid., 21.

55 Ibid., 22.

56 Ibid., 24.
57 Ibid., 24.


59 Ibid., 44-51.

60 Ibid., 51.


62 Ibid., 43.

63 Ibid., 46.

64 Ibid., 47.

65 Ibid., 50.


67 Ibid., 29.


69 Ibid., 10-11.

70 Ibid., 12-17.


73 Ibid., 79.


75 Ibid., 7.

76 Ibid., 10.

78Ibid., 20.


80Ibid., 18.

81Ibid., 19.

82Nick Williams, “Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?,” Survival 38, no 1 (Spring 1996): 102.

83Ibid., 103.

84Ibid., 105.


89Ibid., 87.

90Ibid., 91.

91Ibid., 96.


93Ibid., 85.


95Meiers, 95.


98 Ibid., 20.


100 Ibid., 19.

101 Ibid., 20-21.

102 Ibid., 22-23.


104 Ibid., 72.


106 Ibid., 17.


108 Ibid., 4.


110 Ibid., 118-121.

111 Ibid., 123.


113 Ibid., 55.


115 Ibid., 5.

116 Ibid., 37.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to attempt to relate the evolving strategy for NATO enlargement to the national perspectives and agendas of four key member nations of the Alliance--America, Great Britain, France, and Germany. Additionally, the impact of Russian concerns regarding the enlargement of NATO are considered, although this is not the primary focus of the study. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the strategy developed thus far by NATO for enlargement, and considers alternatives that the Alliance may consider in pursuing its desire for increased membership.

Research Model

The thesis research will essentially be a combination of analytical and comparative methods. Analytical research is defined in James Mauch and Jack Birch's book, *Guide to the Successful Thesis and Dissertation*, as "the collection of data and conduct of studies to discern and explicate principles which might guide action."1 The same volume defines comparative research as "the study of two or more situations in order to determine and explicate their likeness and differences."2 The research undertaken for this thesis seeks to determine the current strategy adopted by NATO on the issue of enlargement, the national perspectives and agendas of four members of the Alliance, how the national perspectives have driven the development of the strategy, and whether the current strategy is likely to be successful in maintaining the Alliance’s viability.
Selection of Research Topic

The fall of the Berlin Wall appeared to many commentators to signal the beginning of the end for NATO. Since 1989, however, NATO has sought to maintain its central role in European security by undertaking a number of initiatives centered on cooperation and engagement with former Communist nations. Enlargement of the Alliance became a central issue in 1993 following the statement from German defense Minister, Volker Ruhe, that Germany sought a rapid enlargement of NATO. From this announcement emerged the American initiative of PfP, and subsequent collaboration with the majority of the former Communist nations of Europe, together with traditionally neutral European states. The issue of enlargement is perhaps the most important in the recent history of the Alliance. As a NATO officer, the author has a close interest in the future of the Alliance, which is a cornerstone of every NATO member’s defense policy and, therefore, of great importance to any serving officer.

A brief review of literature on NATO enlargement indicated that the topic of NATO’s future received wide and voluminous coverage, being assessed in books, journal articles, commentaries, and newspaper articles. Despite the wealth of material, there appeared to be a lack of coverage in relation to the impact of national agendas on the Alliance strategy formulation, and how effective the decision-making structure of NATO was at defining a coherent strategy that balanced the differing perspectives on enlargement and the Alliance’s future in general.

Limitations and Assumptions

The sheer volume of material available on the issue of NATO's future, and enlargement in particular, demanded the imposition of a limitation on the amount of material to be reviewed. Since the initiation of PfP in 1994 heralds the beginning of the enlargement process, the events of the preceding year having considerable bearing on the enlargement issue must be included in any
analysis, and so 1993 marks the earliest material to be reviewed. Further, rather than attempt to
cover every NATO member’s perspective on enlargement, four nations were selected for
consideration. The reasoning behind the selection is self-evident. America is the leading nation
within NATO, and therefore any strategy is likely to be greatly influenced by her national agenda.
Germany, newly unified and the strongest of the European NATO members, is at the very center
of the enlargement debate, and has played a key role in calling for rapid enlargement. France has
remained outside of the military structure of the Alliance since 1968, yet has continued to exert
considerable influence within the Alliance, and her decision to consider re-entry into the military
structure of the Alliance indicates a shift in traditional French attitude towards NATO. Britain has
been the traditional ally of America in Europe, and at the same time a moderating influence on the
extreme views of some European nations. As such, Britain offers a balanced view of NATO
enlargement due not only to her influence on both sides of the Atlantic, but also in her detached
position from mainland Europe.

The Madrid Summit in July 1997 will see the formal announcement of those nations
invited to join NATO as new members and will, no doubt, be preceded by a flurry of
commentaries on NATO enlargement and the issues associated with an enlarged Alliance. In
order to prevent the thesis from being overtaken by events in the run-up to the summit and to
ensure the successful completion of the thesis without degradation of effectiveness, a research
time limit of 1 January 1997 is imposed. Clearly, events following this date will impact on the
thesis, and where they do so will be covered in the concluding chapter.

NATO has a number of issues currently placed at or near the top of the Alliance agenda.
These include WMD proliferation together with the proliferation of the relevant technology,
conventional force reductions, and the continuance of traditional Alliance tasks. The enlargement
issue is, however, the principal concern of NATO in the immediate future, and is an issue that the
Alliance has placed firmly at the top of its agenda. No matter how the issue is handled, the results will impact on member and non-member nations alike. The challenges for the Alliance in dealing with the enlargement issue are therefore the most important from the author’s perspective as a NATO officer. The concentration of the thesis solely on enlargement does not indicate neglect of other issues pertinent to the Alliance, but highlights the momentous nature of enlargement to not only the Alliance, but Europe as a whole.

Sources

The brief review of literature undertaken early in the preparation of the thesis topic indicated the quantity of material available on the issue of enlargement, and having applied the limitations mentioned above, the author was faced with a still voluminous amount of material that threatened to swamp the study. With the understanding that the nature of the thesis topic is to consider national perspectives, the author sought materials of commentators from the four nations being considered, thereby gaining a national perspective on the issue, as well as information on enlargement in general.

Published books and papers were used, in the main, to provide background and historical detail for the thesis research. Both sources tended to be overtaken by events, to some extent, a development which necessitated considerable reliance on recent journal articles and commentaries less than six months old to ensure relevance of detail. The choice of journals from which information was gathered was guided by the renown of the journal, the authorship of articles, while taking into account the desire to gather information written from national perspectives, and also the recommendation of materials by the research committee. In general these articles provided focused material on specific issues affecting the enlargement of the Alliance, and in most cases from a unique national perspective. Newspapers and current affairs publications were
used to capture the most recent of events that impacted on the research, and generally did not provide historical or background material.

In examining the materials available, the author applied criteria to the authors and sources of material in order to ascertain the origin of information and their reliability in providing a nation’s view rather than a personal representation of an issue. The criteria applied separated authors and sources into informed opinion, enlightened commentary, and national position or policy. The critical difference between each of these criteria is the value of the information as being truly representative of a national view, rather than a purely personal or organizational view. The most valuable sources were found in journals and commentaries which represented independent assessment of issues or which analyzed a national policy statement. Sources which were placed under the informed opinion tended to include those articles and sources written by authors who, while not unqualified to comment, perhaps dwell on the personal view and do not assess events as objectively as those sources considered under enlightened comment. The major difference between the two was the clouding of issues with personal bias, not necessarily that of the national stand-point.

**Issues Arising from Research Material**

Having assembled and reviewed the material for the thesis, several issues arose that were clearly related to NATO enlargement and which would be essential to any study of this topic. These issues form the substance of the analysis of the thesis and deal with the emergence of NATO enlargement and the policies and strategies that have emerged since 1993. The historical background to the formation of NATO and the reasons for the Alliance’s formation in 1949 are useful in assessing the continued relevance of NATO today. Therefore, a brief historical overview is included prior to commencing the primary issues affecting NATO enlargement.
The issues that form the basis of the analysis of the thesis center on those topics which impact directly on the enlargement of NATO. The first of these is if the strategy adopted by NATO in embracing former Communist nations and how the principal outreach initiatives came into being, along with assessments of their success. The actual issue of Alliance enlargement is considered both from the perspective of 1993 and today. In particular, the shift in priority for securing membership of the EU and NATO by the former Communist nations is examined. Criteria for new members is another area that has witnessed considerable comment, and clearly have become an issue that has created several different standpoints both from NATO members and potential new members of the Alliance. Alliance restructuring is an issue that is already underway, but several commentaries have highlighted the need for changes in both the military and political structures of NATO, should enlargement be undertaken. Finally, the issue of costs is an area which has been largely assumed away and is only beginning to become a consideration. The critical factor here is what return or benefit are nations going to receive for their considerable investment in new members military structures to ensure interoperability with NATO assets, and how willing will nations be if there is none or a negative return? As the Madrid summit draws closer, this issue in particular will certainly become more prominent in commentaries as nations seek to determine the costs and benefits of enlarged Alliance membership.

**Thesis Construction**

The thesis generally follows the traditional five chapter model described in Mauch and Birch, but with some departures. Given the nature of the thesis as an analysis and comparison based document, the review of literature undertaken in writing the thesis is considerably thorough and complete, perhaps being beyond that normally encountered in such a document. The process of comparison and analysis that follows relates the material covered in the literature review to the thesis statement: "How does NATO enlargement reflect the agendas of the key member states?"
In this chapter, the issues indicated above are discussed in turn, and the impact of each on Alliance enlargement assessed. Additionally, the concerns of Russia with regard to NATO’s enlargement are presented as a separate element of the chapter. The national perspectives of each of the four nations are presented in a separate chapter, and coverage deals with the impact of each nation’s actions, perspectives, and policies regarding Alliance enlargement.

The conclusions reached as a result of the research and analysis have followed logically from the defined criteria regarding each issue examined. The issues considered have been assessed with a view to the impact on NATO enlargement, and, more importantly, what has the Alliance stated as its policy or strategy regarding the issues. Where no clear statement of either policy or strategy exists, the author has concluded that the Alliance is lacking in this area, and where the strategy or policy appears to be at divergence with the majority of information and accepted views found in the research, the author suggests the requirement to adjust NATO policy accordingly. The conclusions are presented as a distinct chapter, together with an assessment of the possible future studies that have emerged as a result of carrying out the research for this thesis, especially in light of the forthcoming Madrid summit.

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2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 154-155.
CHAPTER FOUR

NATO: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Formation and The Washington Treaty

While the principal aim of this thesis is to examine the enlargement of NATO, a brief historical review is useful to establish both the background to the existing NATO structure and the continuing relevance of the Washington Treaty. Readers who require a more detailed examination of the history of NATO should examine André de Staercke’s NATO’s Anxious Birth.

The carving up of nations following the end of the First World War set the stage for the rise in the late 1930s of German revenge and retaliation. The Treaty of Versailles, together with other associated treaties, was little more than a crude division of the spoils of war as a means of punishing Germany and other defeated states. The Versailles Treaty imposed restrictions and demands on Germany that were to have reduced the country’s ability to accumulate wealth, rebuild military power, and restore influence in Europe. Also, the Treaty relied on the continued cooperation of America, Great Britain, and France. This cooperation faded rapidly in 1919 when the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Treaty, leaving implementation to Europe. Meanwhile, President Wilson’s League of Nations sought to manage the post-war order, but lacked both the support and the means to carry out its role. Cooperation between Britain and France effectively ended when France occupied the Ruhr in retaliation for German default in payment of reparations (as part of the Versailles Treaty). Britain considered the value of trade with Germany to be more important than reparations. Thus, by the mid-1920s the Treaty of Versailles had effectively ceased to be a plausible security guarantee in Europe, leaving the way open for the rekindling of
aggressive German nationalism in the form of the Nazi Party. The League of Nations declined in the same era and by the mid-1930s was displaying the terminal condition of collectivism which preceded the Second World War.

The conclusion of the Second World War bought with it the potential for the imposition of an imperfect peace, reminiscent of that established at the end of the First World War. At Yalta in 1944, and Potsdam in 1945, the big three—Russia, America, and Britain—essentially established the conditions for the start of the Cold War, although the Conference aim was to lay out the future architecture of post war Europe. Despite bipartisan sentiment for the new United Nations, America seemed certain to return to an isolationist strategy following the death of Roosevelt and his replacement by Truman. Isolationism had been a feature of the end of America’s involvement in Europe in the 1920s, and Truman’s Missouri background led many to believe that he would adopt the isolationist policies so popular in the American Midwest. Truman was an advocate of the Wilson and Roosevelt policies of involvement in the security of Europe, and the rise of Soviet expansionism and Stalin’s unwillingness to reduce military forces provided a focus for both America and the Western European nations. In East Europe, Soviet occupation gradually gave way to a form of colonialism which stoked the fires of Cold War threat. In response, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan helped set the conditions for the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949. It was the advent of NATO which decisively affirmed the demise of American isolationism.1

However, American involvement was not established without a commitment from the European nations. The signing of the Brussels Treaty between France, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries in March 1948 actually preceded the formation of NATO as a means of demonstrating European resolve in the matter of security for the new Europe. Both the Brussels and Washington Treaties were a direct response to the expansionist policies of the USSR and
either the imposition or the birth of undemocratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe and other regions in the world.

The Washington Treaty establishes fourteen Articles that govern the role, conduct, and operation of the Alliance. The Treaty commits member nations to sharing the risks, benefits, and responsibilities of collective defense. The key article relating to collective defense is Article 5, which states that “an armed attack against one or more of them (the members) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Article 4 provides the means of conflict prevention by “ensuring the parties involved to consult when their independence or security is threatened.” Under the conditions of Article 10, the Treaty allows for the possibility of new membership, upon agreement of all member nations.

NATO Developments from 1949 to 1989

Throughout the period from 1949 until 1989, NATO’s preoccupation was with the collective defense of Europe against threat of Soviet invasion. Even so, NATO undertook enlargement of membership on three occasions during this period. The first was the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany was admitted in 1955; and, finally, Spain joined the Alliance in 1982. Despite French departure from the NATO’s Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the 1960s and 1970s generally witnessed the first easing of tensions in Europe since the Alliance’s formation. Three factors led to this easing of tensions: the acceptance by the Alliance of the Harmel doctrine in 1967, designed to ease tensions between East and West by establishing communication between the leadership of the major power bases; the introduction of “Ostpolitik” by Germany’s Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969, which sought to achieve a more positive relationship with Eastern Europe; and finally, the adoption of the Helsinki Accord in 1975, which established standards for human rights issues and introduced further confidence-building measures between East and West.
Even during the height of the Cold War, NATO played a key role in resolving contentious East-West military issues. NATO brokered the first in a series of arms control treaties in 1970 (SALT I), finally ratified by the USSR in 1972. The arms control process established a stable relationship between the two superpower blocs and facilitated almost continuous dialogue between them from 1970 until 1992, when the CFE Treaty came into place. The Helsinki Accord of 1975 established a process of dialogue between the member nations that was embodied in the Conference of Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) initially launched in 1972. The CSCE allowed its members to discuss confidence-building measures, that eventually led to the 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). Part of the evolving CSBMs led to the CFE Treaty between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact nations that sought to limit conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Additionally, NATO became the focal point for activities related to the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One of the key contemporary challenges to global security is the need to establish control and monitoring over the vast stocks of WMD that have been scattered as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that some of these weapons and the technology to build nuclear devices have already been transferred to nations that were previously non nuclear. NATO’s role in this sphere is to establish mutual cooperation among nations to ensure that the proliferation of WMD and the associated technology does not become an undermining factor within the region.

NATO’s Role from 1989 to Present Day

In response to the collapse of the USSR and the perceived removal of NATO’s raison d’être by several commentators, the Alliance sought to undertake far-reaching reforms to ensure that NATO remained a relevant part of the European security structure. Instead of the single threat posed during the Cold War, Europe now faced an uncertain series of threats, ranging from
the spill over from ethnic disputes to the destabilizing effect of mass migration across the recently opened borders as East and Central Europeans migrated to the West to find prosperity. In response, the London Declaration of July 1990 detailed wide ranging proposals, including offering cooperation between West and Central and Eastern European nations. In November 1991, the Alliance formalized its offer of cooperation with publication of the Rome Declaration and the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC initially brought together nine Eastern and Central European nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Czechoslovakia) with NATO members in order to establish a forum for consultation. By 1994, NACC membership had grown to include most of the former countries of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, as well as nonmember Western European nations, such as Finland, Austria, and Sweden (as observers).

As the post-Cold War euphoria subsided, the Alliance sought to offer a more formal means of practical cooperation, and in January 1994 the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was announced at the Brussels Summit. The U.S.-led initiative sought to enhance the consultative nature of NACC by allowing nonmember nations to become fully involved in PfP activities with NATO nations in individual programs designed for each nonmember country. A major purpose of PfP was to provide greater transparency of NATO and to introduce real experience of the Alliance and its capabilities and structure to non member nations. PfP has enjoyed unprecedented success, surpassing the expectations of the Alliance. As such, it has become a vital tool in the security architecture emerging within Europe, with more permanence than at first envisioned. While PfP carries no guarantee of defense if a participating nation is threatened, the arrangement does provide a strong linkage to NATO for consultation in the event of such a threat.
“Bigger and Better” or “Small is Beautiful”? 

PfP serves two functions: as a vehicle to moderate the rate of transition, and as a possible means for entry to NATO. The arguments for and against NATO enlargement have been voiced since the Rome Treaty of 1990 at which NACC was formally announced. Although no immediate mention was made of enlargement, the terms and manner of the Treaty reflect an openness towards the Eastern and Central European nations that implies enlargement as a possible future goal of the Alliance. The January 1994 Brussels Summit also failed to address enlargement, although President Clinton raised the issue in his speech to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that same year. However, several key decisions were taken—most notably that of the introduction of NACC and PfP, the approval of the establishment of an European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the announcement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).9 The NAC meeting in Brussels in December 1994 was the first time the issue of enlargement and new members was discussed in earnest, and a resulting statement reflected the Alliance’s position on the matter. In short, any nation that could further the principles of the Alliance and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic region would be welcome.

The process of enlargement carries with it both risk and gain for NATO. Some analysts have defined the enlargement issue as feasible but not desirable.10 The gains anticipated include increased security and stability in the European region, continued engagement of the U.S. in Europe through a vibrant and relevant NATO, containment of conflicts that would otherwise go unchecked, and maintaining of support for emerging democracies in Eastern Europe still fearful of a resurgent Russia. Likewise, enlargement carries well-defined risks. Future enlargement lacks credibility of purpose without absolute guarantees that NATO will honor its commitments to new members. Enlargement has the potential to cause a new division within Europe, including the alienation of Russia (and possibly those nations not accepted into NATO). Enlargement also risks
overstretch among NATO members as they seek both to reduce their forces and to extend security guarantees to a wider area. The cost of enlargement in terms of new equipment and reorganizing NATO command and political structures poses a substantive and undefined challenge. Consideration of these issues is where the analysis now focuses.

NATO's decision to seek new members corresponds with the need to retain relevance in European security issues as addressed in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. As the Alliance wrestled with the loss of its principal focus in the early 1990s, the publication of the Strategic Concept in 1991 represented a departure from previous Alliance strategies. The Strategic Concept reinforced the fact that the Alliance remained primarily defensive in nature, but also raised issues concerning its future posture, in view of the emergence of a new post-Cold War security environment in Europe. Crisis management and conflict prevention became major foci for the Alliance, with the employment of NATO forces outside of the traditional boundaries of the Alliance implied in the Strategic Concept. By emphasizing the need to prevent conflict before it spills over into the Alliance region, the Strategic Concept laid the foundations both for Alliance enlargement and also for a departure from the defensive role of the Alliance. The Alliance was evolving to a security guarantor, although mutual and cooperative defense remained its preeminent function. Within this context of prevention rather than cure, arguments for enlargement flow easily. Finally, the major role France played in establishing the Strategic Concept signaled a return to the bosom of the Alliance by one of its more isolationist members, and indicated a possible future return of France to the military structure of NATO.

The ability of the Alliance to retain a continued preeminence in European security rests largely with its positive track record in dealing with crises over the last fifty years. NATO reaction to recent changes in the European security arena can be judged in retrospect as adequate, notwithstanding the absence of a well defined or easily recognizable threat upon which to base its
strategy. The Alliance engaged in a series of conferences and initiatives over the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union in an attempt to further refine the initial thrust of the new Strategic Concept. Of these, the decision to enlarge membership of the Alliance remains perhaps the most far reaching, and for that reason is likely to be the source both of great promise and of misgivings.

The strategic reasoning behind enlargement is an important issue in itself. The newly formed democracies of the post-Communist nations were in a fragile state in the years immediately following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Concerned over the threat of resurgent Russian nationalism, these nations looked towards NATO for security guarantees to protect their still fledgling democracies and emerging economies. The industrial infrastructure of many of these countries had been neglected under the Communist regime and were still shackled to centralized control and the legacy of command direction—witness the shambles of the Russian economy. Much of this decay remains in the emerging nations yet, the promise of Western standards, together with the benefits of democracy and a free market economy, have eluded all but a few of these nations.

As the fears of a resurgent Russia eased, the post-Communist nations sought membership within the major economic power base in Europe—the European Union—as a means to obtain the benefits of free market economies. The EU, while responsive to these requests and recognizing the value of potential markets in these nations, has been unable to answer affirmatively, due to the ongoing internal difficulties of the unionization process as a whole, and monetary union in particular. Therefore, although EU membership now has the priority, the post-Communist nations have continued to seek NATO membership as a stepping stone towards their eventual goal of full EU membership.
NATO's Cooperation Initiatives

In 1991, the concerns of these nations prompted NATO to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Although NATO had already entered into an informal dialogue with its former adversaries in the form of liaison between Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, there was no formal structure to address the increasing demands from the post-Communist countries for contact with and involvement in NATO. In December 1991, NACC convened for the first time with some twenty-five countries taking part, including former states of the USSR in the form of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The aim of the NACC was "to provide a forum for the discussion of and cooperation in security and politically related issues." Not limited to these two avenues, NACC provided the opportunity for emerging nations to discuss other matters concerning democratic society with NATO members, such as civil and military relations and the conversion of military production to civilian industrial facilities. In short, NACC provided the first step in assisting nations in gaining some experience with democracy, following the influence of communism in their society.

The inherent limitations of NACC convinced NATO to seek a more practical avenue for cooperation within the NACC framework. More importantly, America sought to address the insistence of Germany's Defense Minister, Volker Ruhe, for rapid enlargement of NATO. In January 1994 at the Brussels Summit, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the formation of a "practical program to transform the relationship between NATO and participating states that goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership--a Partnership for Peace."

The focus of PfP has been on practical means of cooperation in spheres such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and the democratic control of defense ministries. Each nation sets its own agenda for PfP activities in consultation with NATO. Practical realization of activities within PfP include, but are not limited to, military exercise, inter
military exchanges and the involvement in NATO operations, such as IFOR in Bosnia. PfP has now taken on a key role in establishing a forum for developing interoperability and cooperation for likely future members of NATO.

Although PfP appears to have been established as a means of providing further cooperation between NATO and the former Communist nations, it also serves the purpose of delaying the admission of new members before the Alliance has formulated a coherent strategy beyond the new Strategic Concept. In essence, PfP has created the impression of the Alliance welcoming those nations seeking membership, while in reality keeping them at arm’s length. The expression “make haste slowly” appears to fit the Alliance’s progress towards enlargement perfectly.

Commentators have taken a bipolar view of NATO’s reaction to changes in the European security environment. One end of the spectrum concludes that NATO has been successful in reorienting its forces and establishing concepts and organizations to meet the challenges of the future. In contrast, those who feel that NATO has been ill prepared to meet the demands of emerging nations highlight the very slow and almost unwilling manner in which NATO has progressed towards accepting new membership, and the Alliance’s inability to articulate a strategy for dealing with both Russia and those nations who do not achieve membership in the first wave.

A New Set of Membership Rules?

A key enlargement issue focuses on the exact criteria for membership. The possible establishment of additional criteria for membership is an area that requires some examination. The Washington Treaty establishes criteria for membership of the original members of NATO, and the subsequent membership of Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. In summary, these requirements are contained in the preamble to the Treaty Articles and establish that member countries must be devoted to democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, that they will
promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area, and will be prepared to participate in collective defense of the region. Article 10 is the overriding authority regarding enlargement. Accordingly, existing members may invite a new member providing that it is a "...European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." A close reading of Article 10, together with precedent, would hold that, the criteria for joining NATO are linked to political reform, economic growth and stability, military capability, and geographic position. Equally cogent arguments can be made, however, for and against applying different or additional criteria to prospective new members.

The U.S. Permanent Ambassador to NATO, Robert E. Hunter, highlights several reasons for the application of additional criteria. Most importantly, he believes that unlike a country club, in which a majority vote will gain admission for a prospective new member, NATO requires a unanimous vote from the existing sixteen member nation’s parliaments. The implication, therefore, is that NATO will seek to admit those whose passage through this process is likely to succeed. Moreover, to ensure that the new member is a "producer and not just a consumer of security," new members will need to convince each parliament that they will be able to honor that commitment. Firm criteria will provide assurances that this process will be more equitable to all those seeking membership.

A more direct reason for insistence on additional criteria proceeds from the very simple fact that NATO has been overwhelmed by the rush to join and is in need of breathing space in which to formulate a coherent strategy. This view has generated its share of advocates among analysts who are wary of the clamor to define a new role for NATO and of the Alliance’s seizing upon enlargement before thinking through associated problems. The fact that the NATO study into the possibility of enlargement was commissioned after it had already been announced that the Alliance would enlarge seems to support these views. NATO’s policy on enlargement has
possibly been too firmly linked to U.S. domestic policy, which subjects the Alliance to a timetable that neither recognizes the strategic necessity of such enlargement, nor appears to adequately address the impact of enlargement on the West's relationship with not only Russia, but also those countries not admitted in the "first wave." The application of criteria that are unlikely to be met by any potential new member in the near future (say four to six years) will gain the Alliance considerable time in which to devise and articulate a strategy that adequately deals with enlargement. Stringent criteria will also send a clear message to those countries that are unlikely to be admitted because of their inability to meet requirements, and a strategy must also be developed that maintains their interest and involvement with NATO.

Arguments against applying any new criteria are equally coherent. Previous NATO enlargement recognized only those criteria that were present in the Washington Treaty. Additional or totally new criteria would establish a double standard in the Alliance, suggesting that those joining now are in some way inferior to existing members. The advantage of the existing criteria, and the unanimity required of members in inviting additional countries (as given in Article 10 of the Treaty) place the Alliance at a great advantage when dealing with new members. Criteria have the effect of becoming a yardstick against which performance can be judged. Once a potential new member meets these criteria, it will argue that entry into the Alliance should be automatic. The dangers of this are all too clear. If a nation's situation is strategically untenable, yet the nation meets the criteria, how can it be refused? Such dilemmas would create dissent in the Alliance that could threaten its survival.

The advantage of not stipulating criteria is that new members are approached by NATO, not vice versa. The Alliance retains the initiative as to which countries are approached, thereby allowing it to select those that it wants, not those that simply meet a list of criteria. However, the issue of enlargement has become almost a moral crusade for some of the leaders of the former
Communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Vaclav Havel’s passionate plea to NATO to open its doors to new members pricked at the conscience of many European nations who watched the former Czechoslovakia being overrun by Soviet troops in 1968. Germany’s Defense Minister Volker Ruhe responded by advocating rapid enlargement, although Chancellor Kohl was not completely supportive of this initiative. The U.S. recognized the need for a positive response also, and President Clinton’s remarks in 1994 regarding new members of “not a question of if but when” afforded some solace. The difficulty facing NATO in dealing with the issue of enlargement is that the question of enlargement has been thrust upon it, and the Alliance has assumed a reactive posture in attempting to formulate a coherent policy.

The Paths to Enlargement

The RAND Corporation has produced several studies focusing on the enlargement process and the impact of enlargement on the costs of collective defense and security to new and existing members. In carrying out research for this thesis, the author found that these studies were often quoted in other reference material and have been central in examining future strategies and scenarios of the Alliance. A more detailed examination of the studies is warranted, including recognition of any potential shortcomings. The studies’ findings in relation to the national agendas of the leading nations will be addressed in the following chapter.

The first RAND study concerns possible alternatives for NATO enlargement (“NATO Expansion: The Next Steps”). This study indicates that there are three possible enlargement options. It provides a guide to the possible future strategy of NATO and indicates the impact of enlargement on NATO members as they carry out the Article 5 commitment of collective defense in support of countries newly joined. The three options or “models” provide a useful guide for establishing the possible rationale for Alliance enlargement, and more importantly, what the impact will be in terms of increased or decreased stability and defense commitments. What is
clear from the study is both that NATO faces choices and that the selected option may well
determine the relevance of the Alliance to the future European security environment.

The first model is that of "Evolutionary Expansion." In essence, Eastern and Central
European countries are assumed to be facing mainly political and economic problems, while the
security threat from both external and internal sources remains remote. The principal desire of
these countries is membership in the European Union to overcome their economic and political
difficulties. NATO membership is a secondary concern, although still important because of
unknowns, including Russia, other possible conflicts, and proof of legitimacy for eventual EU
membership. If these concerns are the case, NATO need not rush to embrace these new members,
but rather should continue the existing means of consultation and practical cooperation embodied
in NACC and PfP. This option has the advantage of not threatening Russia with immediate
enlargement of the Alliance and may create the conditions necessary for Russia to feel less
threatened by the continued role of NATO in European security, thereby allowing for closer and
more dependable links with Russia.

This option, however, has a serious deficiency and is the weakest of the options presented.
By allowing the emerging nations of Eastern and Central Europe to join the EU without joining
NATO, there exists the possibility of implied (or "back door" as the study refers to them) security
guarantees. Implied involvement of NATO could arise in the event that an EU member of
NATO became engaged in a dispute alongside another EU (and WEU) member which does not
belong to NATO. The most obvious example is that of Germany and Poland. Consider a
situation in which Germany assists Poland, both being WEU members. Germany as a NATO
member, and because of the strategic importance Germany places on its Eastern border, may
request NATO assistance in dealing with the situation. Such implied security guarantees are not
only an unknown quantity, they are likely to create division within the Alliance.
"Promote Stability" is the second RAND model. In this case, the political situation in Eastern and Central Europe is considered to be fragile. Russia and Germany are both staring across a security vacuum, each concerned with the other's actions. Such a vacuum could rekindle nationalism and return the region to the Cold War era of geopolitical competition. Conditions for enlargement under the terms of this model would rest not on the ability of emerging nations to meet EU criteria, but on the Alliance and its determination of strategic imperatives for the region. Enlargement would, therefore, be more rapid, certainly before the end of the century, and would not be linked to EU membership. This option clearly establishes NATO as the controller of its own destiny, and removes the threat of implied security guarantees. However, this option also raises issues of force projection and military and economic commitments that the Alliance would have to undertake to honor Article 5. These issues are examined later in this chapter. Another implication of this model is that the Alliance would have to confront Russian fears of an enlarged NATO and the possibility of a new divide between Russia and the West.

The final RAND model is that of "Strategic Response." In this case, NATO does not enlarge until Russia threatens the emerging nations of Eastern and Central Europe. Clearly, this option involves no risk of disturbing the current good relations with Russia, but does little to acknowledge either the requests from the former Communist nations for access to NATO or their security concerns. The obvious drawback to this option lies with the difficulty in assessing that threat and the capacity for NATO to react quickly enough to a Russian threat. Yet, an advantage of the model is that it allows the Alliance to concentrate on relations with Russia and issues of Russian stability. Such concern for Russia would effectively negate any enlargement of the Alliance to include the Eastern and Central European states, but would establish an overarching security environment in Europe that offers linkage between Russia and NATO without mutual
conflict or mistrust. In this case, PfP and NACC remain essential elements in ensuring continued stability and security for the emerging nations of Eastern and Central Europe.

The RAND report concludes that there is no need for NATO to rush into deploying forces into the territories of any new members of the Alliance. The recent events in Chechnya illustrate the dire straits of the Russian military machine, which has fallen prey to lack of investment, support, and declining prestige. Russia in the form of a rapid, massed military attack no longer presents a threat to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. Any such action would be preceded by considerable preparations, and NATO would be able to project forces forward in time to counter such an attack.

The report fails, however, to acknowledge or to address the major threat posed to European security from Russian implosion. Internal conflict within the former Yugoslavia has created a destabilizing effect on the edge of the Alliance boundary, exposed the failure of existing European institutions to effectively manage such a crisis and illustrated the complex and unpredictable nature of such conflicts. In much the same way, only more severely, Russian implosion may threaten to engulf the Eastern boundary of the Alliance, creating the very real possibility of the entire continent of Europe descending into ethno-nationalist conflict and chaos. The success of maintaining a stable European security environment rests with effective conflict prevention, and should this fail, being able to manage conflict without it spilling over into neighboring nations. NATO must address the very real threat of Russian implosion and establish a coherent and effective linkage with Russia in order to stabilize that nation and make Russia an integral part of the European security architecture.

What Price Success?

Alliance enlargement carries with it the very real impact of cost, not only to new members, but also to existing members as they take on a larger area of commitment, with smaller
military forces. The economic impact of enlargement is clearly articulated in the RAND report as one of the key implications of enlargement that NATO parliaments and their publics must be clear on before enlargement can proceed. However, the degree of cost is linked not only to the method by which the Alliance enlarges, but also to the mechanism that is established to commit NATO forces in carrying out Article 5 commitments and security guarantees to new members of the Alliance.

NATO faces several challenges in extending its collective umbrella. Key to the issue is maintaining a stable and non threatening posture towards Russia. Balance of capability is essential, but it is not the only element of this complex issue. Other elements include the willingness of a new member to accept foreign troops garrisoned on its soil, what the new member’s military needs are, and the military capabilities of the country itself. NATO must establish the details of these with each new member to design a strategy that will not only meet the needs of NATO, but also those of the host nation and provider nations. The results of these decisions will determine the costs of enlargement for both new and existing members of NATO.

A second RAND Corporation study suggests several models for assessing the impact of enlargement on NATO, and the ability of its members, both existing and prospective, to meet the costs of so doing. The study is linked to the previously discussed report, “NATO Expansion: The Next Steps,” and links the costs of enlargement to the three enlargement strategies considered. While the arguments for enlargement appear attractive for security and stability reasons, one aspect lacking consideration is the cost of enlargement, particularly to existing NATO members. How keen will NATO member nations be when presented with the bill for enlargement, even if this represents only a moderate increase in commitment? A recent letter in The Times by the Director of the British American Security Information Council illustrates this point well. The U.S. Senate has requested a cost-benefit analysis of enlargement before it agrees to release funds.
In Britain, while both major parties in the Commons support NATO enlargement, ground swell sentiment amongst the back bench politicians is skeptical. They argue that the British public needs to know the risks and benefits of enlargement, and, more importantly, what it will cost. Until the costs of enlargement can be related to the benefits, national commitment to enlargement is unlikely to progress beyond strong support. Once the cost-benefit equation is established, the support voiced for enlargement may well turn to skepticism and a shift favoring some form of looser arrangements to extend the security zone of Western Europe.

The second RAND study highlights several important factors for consideration, with respect to the costs of Alliance enlargement. Membership in NATO has been cost effective in providing collective defense for the European region without each nation having to bear the enormous costs of achieving the same degree of defense afforded collectively by NATO. This is the key attraction for potential new members, whose fledgling economies would not be able to support the considerable simultaneous burden of providing adequate defense forces and developing sound economies. Collectivism does not, however, mean NATO will be the door to free defense. The key feature of the Alliance’s approach to new membership remains what a nation can contribute. New members will be expected to contribute to the defense of their nation, and that of others if required, and the impact of NATO membership will be felt internally in the way in which a potential member’s defense budget is allocated. NATO members already have a wealth of assets that in some cases far exceed the need. The example quoted in the report is that of air forces, an area in which the Alliance is the world’s leader. Air assets are costly, and shifting defense spending to a different area and allowing existing NATO members to deal with any air missions will save Eastern European countries the considerable expense of air modernization.

NATO has four tasks to carry out regardless of the way it decides to implement the guarantees of Article 5 commitments: preparing Eastern and Central European forces for NATO
membership, upgrading infrastructure in these countries, basing NATO forces in the new members nations, and preparing NATO forces for projection and reinforcement. Each of these tasks can be implemented in a number of different ways and at varying levels, thereby allowing NATO to retain a considerable range of options. Existing and newly admitted NATO members face the critical task of deciding what posture they are going to adopt, given the unique strategic position of each. What is clear at present is that this process is in its infancy and a considerable amount of time will elapse before a coherent procedure and strategy evolve.

The study develops four possible options that combine considerations of NATO enlargement criteria and required tasks. The first option presents the least expensive of the four and relies on new member nations to provide their own self-defense forces for immediate security needs, with NATO providing assistance in command and control, logistics, and force improvement. The main thrust of this option is to improve the ability of Eastern and Central European forces to work with NATO forces and command structure. Greater interoperability would be achieved by establishing communications centers, upgrading key elements of infrastructure (e.g., petroleum pipelines) and technical compatibility (e.g., refueling nozzles and fuels). Although the least costly of the four options—the authors estimate between ten to twenty billion dollars—and the least threatening to Russia, the disadvantages are considerable. Perhaps the most important to consider is that the entire structure, equipment, and tactics of Eastern and Central European countries remain essentially Warsaw Pact in nature. The time required to achieve full integration into NATO will take years, and this option seeks to upgrade the forces of new members so that they may defend themselves better. Meanwhile, this option does not allow for the employment of NATO forces in support of an Article 5 mission, which is arguably the principal reason that Eastern and Central European nations wish to join NATO.
The second option is that of airpower projection. As already discussed, NATO is the world’s leader in airpower, a factor which would greatly enhance the defensive capabilities of any new member nation. This option proceeds from the self-defense support option in that airpower is added to the elements already present. In essence, the assumption is that Eastern and Central European nations can adequately handle the ground force requirements of defense, but need augmentation from NATO air forces. The major cost is that of upgrading, and, in some cases, establishing mobile logistics and command structures for the air force elements tasked to support this option. This option is more costly than the first, but still represents a relatively inexpensive means of supporting new members. The study estimates a cost of between twenty and thirty billion dollars. Much of this cost would center on command and logistics facilities, but also on the important requirement to train for cooperation between ground forces and NATO air force elements. In contrast with the first option, airpower projection would greatly enhance the capabilities of existing Eastern and Central European ground forces. However, the disadvantages are similar to that of the first option, and the key question remains that of the ability to adequately support Article 5 missions.

The third option represents perhaps the most likely path in carrying out Article 5 commitments. Essentially, the first two options are combined with a ground force to establish a joint force power projection option. The forces, as in previous options, remain stationed in Western Europe and deploy to the Eastern European region in the event of crisis. The obvious advantage of this option is that forces are committed to the defense of new members and, unlike in the previous options, clearly support Article 5 commitments. Some reconfiguring of forces would be required to achieve this package, but essentially the cost involved is between 2 to 3 percent of the cost of maintaining an armored division. The total cost of this option would be between thirty to fifty two billion dollars, depending on the exact mix of forces used in the package. The
option also has the advantage of remaining relatively non-threatening to Russia. A major
disadvantage is the requirement for large ground and air force units to train regularly with their
Eastern and Central European partners in order to maintain effectiveness.

The last and least likely option is that of forward-deployed forces. In this scenario,
NATO forces would be forward deployed in Eastern Europe to counter a short-warning attack in a
similar manner to the strategy used during the Cold War. Not only is this the most costly at
between fifty-five and over one hundred billion dollars or more, it is the most provocative to
Russia, the least necessary strategically, and the most likely to result in a renewed division of
Europe. The massive costs revolve around either refurbishing existing Eastern and Central
European bases or building new bases for the forward-deployed NATO forces.

Whatever scenario obtains, the most likely manner in which enlargement occurs will be for a
limited number of countries to be admitted before the end of the century, most probably Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The manner in which Article 5 commitments are met will not
involve forward-deployed forces, the most provocative option towards Russia. Rather, NATO will
maintain a system of exercises and cooperation based largely upon the experience of PfP and further
the advances made already in operating with the new members. This limited engagement is adequate
for the time being, given the unlikely threat of Russian resurgence in the near future; allowing existing
NATO members to demonstrate commitment to new members through relatively inexpensive and yet
highly visible training exercises. The difficulty will arise when a threat is posed, be it from Russia or
elsewhere, that involves a major deployment of NATO forces into a new member nation’s territory.
Actual deployment will be the true test of the Alliance’s commitment to its new members.

NATO Restructuring

Clearly, the calls for a peace dividend that were heard following the collapse of the Berlin
Wall have all but disappeared, and the Alliance is seen as playing a vital role in the future security
structure in Europe.26 Although some commentators advocate a policy of "do not fix what isn't broken," others see the need to restructure NATO to meet the challenges of the new Strategic Concept, which places less emphasis on static defense and more on interventionary missions and force projection operations. The restructuring of NATO also plays a key part in drawing Russia closer to the Alliance. If Russia were convinced of the non-threatening nature of NATO enlargement and could identify a shift in emphasis away from the Cold War strategy and policy of NATO, change would achieve much. Continuing on the same road that has been followed for the last forty years, however, may not be the comfortable ride some are expecting.

Military restructuring remains a less visible but nonetheless obvious task for NATO. Structures and headquarters remain largely static in nature, designed to control the defense of Europe against a massed Soviet invasion. New requirements might include deployable headquarters in support of both out-of-area missions and the ESDI and the possibility of the WEU using a NATO headquarters as the command and control apparatus for European-only missions. NATO has already recognized this need: Allied Command Channel has been combined with Allied Command Europe (ACE), leaving only two major commands in Europe--ACE and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Further, the creation of three regionally oriented commands in the south, central, and northwest regions of Europe indicates that the requirement for deployable headquarters has already to some degree been implemented.

The process of decision making and consensus achievement is another area that NATO will be required to examine before new members are admitted. Achieving consensus among sixteen nations has not been easy, but a single, well-defined threat assured that decisions were focused and agreement between nations reasonably easily established. The multifaceted complexity of the existing European security environment and the disparate national agendas kept in check during the Cold War may well come to the fore and present difficulty in achieving...
consensus. Add to this the challenge of achieving consensus with more members, even if only a modest increase of four or five, and consensus attainment becomes a much greater challenge than in the recent past. Unlike the European Union approach to adaptation, whereby the Inter-Governmental Conference is designed to address such issues, NATO has yet to establish a means of addressing the same problems. One possible alternative to unanimity is replacement with majority rule, a suggestion made by then NATO Secretary General Willy Claes.27 Were this to be implemented, the ability of NATO to maintain a coherent military capability would be severely restricted. Nations are not as likely to be willing to support a military mission with forces if they do not support the mission in the first place. Such divisions within the Alliance would prove unhealthy and reduce the Alliance’s ability to maintain a strong position within the European security environment. Consensus has been the bedrock of the Alliance, even though achieving it at times has been difficult. If majority rule replaces consensus, the Alliance will probably loose a vital asset. NATO must also consider the enlargement scenario beyond the initial four or five to possibly a much larger future number. Were NATO enlargement to cover the countries currently members of the OSCE, such a large number would create a significant degree of turmoil, possibly causing NATO to drastically alter its operations and decision and policy-making structure.28

NATO’s credibility will also be strained if it relies on past success and the notion that what was good in the past holds good for the future. NATO has the mechanisms to deal with adaptation, but the Alliance must accept the fact that considerable realignment of effort is required. In particular, the political structures of the Alliance will need to establish a more effective linkage with the military structures, not only at NATO headquarters, but also in the capitals of its member nations. Compromise will become a greater challenge, and the ability of countries to accept compromise will require a considerable degree of diplomatic effort to ensure
that the Alliance does not lose its ability to form consensus, even with only a moderate increase in membership.²⁹

NATO’s success during the Cold War stemmed from the ability of the members to forego the pressure of domestic politics, and to act for the common good--that of the Alliance. NATO needs neither a new legal nor institutional framework in which to exist.³⁰ Now that the old-style threat focus (the Soviet Union) for the members has been removed, domestic politics have begun to play an increasingly obvious role in the workings of the Alliance. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this was the initial response of the U.S. to Europe’s involvement in Bosnia. America was quick to oppose a European dominated policy in attempting to deal with the situation. The U.S. was unwilling to commit ground forces to the operation, except a 25,000 strong force afloat (or on standby) to cover a possible withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia. The insistence for air strikes against not only Serb but also Croat and Bosnian positions, when the U.S. had not one soldier on the ground, provoked outrage from Britain and France, in particular, which had the majority of the ground forces involved. Perhaps the lessons learned here will be made clear for all members. In essence, act like allies through the manner in which statesmanship is conducted. Where particular national interests do not coincide with those of the majority, be prepared to act for the good of the Alliance, rather than pursuing divergent polices which will damage the Alliance severely.³¹

One of the most important aspects of NATO evolution is to avoid restructuring the Alliance into something that is ineffective and too broad in its policy and operation. In much the same way as the UN has been accused of administrative ineptitude and mismanagement of resources, NATO needs to be aware of the dangers of change for the sake of change. More importantly, NATO must avoid the path, suggested by some European ministers, of establishing yet another Atlantic Assembly. The existing North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) has been focused
solely on security matters, but the proposed assembly would deal with economic, political, and other "potential areas for discord."\textsuperscript{32} The NAA is largely ignored in the member nation's parliaments, and many European and American politicians are inclined to view any such new assembly as being equally ineffective.

The restructuring of NATO must also address a crucial area that will seriously impact on the European security environment and NATO's ability to continue to proceed with the enlargement of the Alliance with Eastern and Central European nations—relations with Russia. While this issue will subsequently be discussed more fully, it requires brief comment here. How NATO decides to develop its relationship with Russia will determine the success of the common security order that many analysts believe should be the goal in Europe. Unlike previous eras, when power politics and regional domination were key issues, the proponents of establishing a common security order in Europe argue that these issues are no longer relevant. Common security has two major components. The first is absence of state level conflict. Simply put, the days of nations going to war to gain either territory or prestige are probably gone. The need to maintain defense forces against the possibility of one (or more) nation reneging on previous promises, however, still exists. The second component is the realization that anarchy and, therefore, the potential for conflict, exists, and that conflict or crisis-prevention steps should be taken.\textsuperscript{33} The relationship established between Russia and NATO will be the defining factor in the success of a common security order in Europe in which NATO still has a valid role.

\textbf{Russia: Friend or Foe?}

The issue of Russia's relationship with NATO warrants an entire thesis alone. However, a brief overview of Russia's principal concerns regarding enlargement is required for completeness. Throughout the Cold War, the primary alignment of NATO was against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Now that both potential enemies are extinct, what is NATO's purpose in the new
European security environment? NATO sees itself as being able to maintain stability and extend the security umbrella to new members beyond the Cold War boundaries of the Alliance, against indistinct, yet highly destabilizing threats. Russia sees NATO’s continued presence in the European security environment as being an extension of the Cold War; the name of the Alliance itself carries considerable baggage that still rankles with many Russian military and political leaders. They view enlargement of the Alliance as a direct threat against Russia, bringing NATO’s border, and more importantly, the nuclear forces of the Alliance ever closer to Russia.34

Russia is the largest of the European nations, is a nuclear power, still maintains considerable influence throughout the region, and must, therefore, be effectively included in the future European security structure. The great difficulty is that Russia remains skeptical about NATO being the leading fixture in the European security environment. Russia would prefer to see either a new organization to encompass the entire Euro-Atlantic region, or a more robust OSCE that would be capable of implementing its own decisions, rather than relying on a third party to do so.35 The creation of such a trans-Atlantic forum today is almost inconceivable, given the lack of a unifying threat that would almost certainly be required for such an organization. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev sought to establish the CSCE as the principal vehicle of European security in the early 1990s, thereby allowing NATO to wither away.36 By 1993, however, NATO by default had become this vehicle and Kozyrev’s design fell by the wayside. However, to allay fears concerning the effects of rapid enlargement on relations with Russia, PfP evolved as a means of slowing the admission process.

Russia has repeatedly argued against NATO enlargement, viewing it as a direct threat against Russia and her “near abroad” responsibilities. The key question Russia asks when dealing with enlargement of the security umbrella is, “whom are you threatened by?” Russia is also concerned with the imbalance that will be created in the negotiated arms control treaties,
especially CFE, if NATO enlarges. Brokered between the two power blocs of the Cold War, the CFE Treaty set limits on conventional forces that are likely to become untenable if NATO enlarges. Russia is currently linking the ratification of the CFE Treaty (and others such as START II) to the issue of NATO enlargement, thereby providing Moscow with a powerful bargaining chip.\textsuperscript{37}

Russia is a participant in both NACC and PfP. Both IFOR and SFOR in the former Yugoslavia have included considerable Russian contingents. NATO established special command arrangements for the Russian troops—an indication of the importance of their inclusion in the missions and of the need to promote the openness of NATO to Russia. NATO is clear on the need to establish a coherent and effective link with Russia. The understanding is that without Russian involvement in the European security architecture, instability and tension will remain high. At the same time, however, the general feeling within NATO is that Russia must not be given a veto over the enlargement process.

Although a PfP contributor, Russia is not a junior partner in the security process. Russian sensitivities and the fact that she is the largest of the European powers, and seeks to be treated as such, cannot be overlooked.\textsuperscript{38} Russia remains a vital component of European security, and inclusion of Russia in the European security process beyond NACC and PfP is essential. To that end, several options exist to bring Russia into the arena. First, rather than seek to establish a totally new Euro-Atlantic forum, NATO could develop a "special" relationship with Russia, in which she would be granted considerable involvement in Alliance processes, but would not be able to veto security decisions. Such a relationship would create a two-tier Alliance, with Russia linked closely to, but not a member, of it. Another (and arguably weaker) possibility is for Russia to develop a more effective relationship with individual NATO member nations, especially the U.S. and Germany. Strengthened bilateral relations would avoid the two-tier NATO, but would
place considerable strain on the intercountry relations were Russia to revert to an aggressively nationalist and threatening foreign policy. The importance of establishing a firm relationship between Russia and the Alliance is vital to the success of the future European security environment.

While Russia maintains a strong objection to enlargement, it is worth considering what she potentially loses if the current path of objection is continued. NATO has already stated it will not accept a Russian veto on the enlargement issue. Russia receives considerable economic, industrial, and other assistance from the West. Can Russia afford to lose this aid by continuing to obstruct the course of enlargement? Likewise, can NATO afford the massive destabilizing consequences that removing assistance to Russia may cause? The ultimate solution to both of these questions may well be that Russia will relent on the issue of the enlargement, provided that she secures guarantees for considerable economic, industrial, and monetary assistance. In short, Russia realizes the importance of her role in European security and probably understands that NATO has become the primary vehicle for future European security. Russia also understands that by holding out against enlargement while at the same time brokering a special relationship with the Alliance, she will secure the world role she seeks and the economic and monetary assistance she needs.

**The Way Forward**

NATO faces critical decisions in the next twelve months concerning not only the issue of enlargement, but also the establishment of a stable and effective relationship with Russia. NATO must devise a strategy for dealing with those countries not admitted to the Alliance in the first wave of new members, while simultaneously restructuring not only the military organizations of the Alliance, but also the decision making and political structures vital to maintaining the effectiveness of NATO in the future European security structure.
The principal focus in the enlargement issue must remain on being able to offer a credible means of collective defense, while at the same time expanding the Alliance's roles to include non-Article 5 missions and a shift towards common or mutual security guarantees. Formation of a new or revised treaty should probably be avoided at all costs. NATO's great strength lies in understanding the Washington Treaty and the experience of the member nations of working within the established Alliance structure. Enlargement of the Alliance will create many potential difficulties which, if well examined and planned for now, will not become insurmountable issues later. Maintaining relevance, coherence, and unity of effort within the Alliance and establishing a meaningful and effective relationship with Russia are the most important tasks for members as they seek to keep NATO at the center of a wider European security community.

The most important factor in restructuring the Alliance is that of maintaining unanimity within NATO's decision-making bodies. The economic issue has traditionally played an important part (perhaps overly so) in Alliance decision making. The need to consider the expectations of new members, the abilities of new and existing members, and the strategic situation will demand that the economics of enlargement play an equally dominate role. If this is not the case, NATO may well end up offering a half-hearted commitment to new members that will undo the several years of good will and trust accumulated since the formation of NACC and the advent of PfP.

Finally, NATO has established a valuable security enhancing process in PfP. The implied guarantees of involvement in the process do not represent the same binding commitments that accompany full membership of the Alliance. PfP is non threatening to Russia and extends the security umbrella of NATO far beyond that which would be achieved by enlargement alone. Perhaps the importance of PfP will come to the fore when the costs of enlargement are realized, and alternative arrangements are sought. By extending the role of the partnership process, NATO could create a viable and cost effective security environment that will prove more resilient than limited enlargement.


3. Ibid., 31-32.

4. Ibid., 74-83 details the CFE arms control process and includes details of START I and II, and the impact of these agreements on the security environment in Europe.

5. Ibid., 86.

6. The *NATO Handbook* provides an excellent explanation of both NACC and PfP should further information be required.


9. Ibid., 25.


12. Ibid., 265 (preamble to the PfP framework document).


20 Ibid., The authors use Norway as a means of illustrating this situation.


23 Ibid., 9.

24 Ibid., 10-11.

25 Ibid., 15. The authors use the American armored division as the base for costing. Its life cycle cost is about sixty billion dollars.


27 Morrison, 76.

28 Ibid., 77.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 47.

33 Mandelbaum, 75-77.


CHAPTER FIVE
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Background

Examining the impact of national perspectives on the emergence of NATO strategy with respect to enlargement is the second element of this thesis. In order to effect a uniform approach, each of the topics covered in the previous chapter on enlargement will be analyzed from the perspective of each leading nation. These areas are Alliance enlargement (strategy and process), NATO cooperative initiatives, criteria for new members, enlargement costs, and Alliance restructuring.

German Perspectives

Germany provides a unique perspective with regard to the enlargement issue. As a country which joined NATO after its formation, Germany is now at the center of the European security environment, both politically and economically. This shift in position has created a sense of *deja vu* amongst many European nations who do not wish to see a powerful Germany at the center of European politics and economics. Germany has sought to re-establish itself as a true world power by shrugging off the shackles that have restricted it following the Second World War. A clear demonstration of her new found position was the recognition of Croatia in 1991, despite urgent demands that she not do so from America, France, and Britain. Similarly, the calls for rapid enlargement of NATO from Defense Minister Volker Ruhe in March 1993 created considerable concern, especially from the U.S, whose PfP initiative—while supportive of the calls for enlargement from both Germany and the former communist nations of Central and Eastern
Europe—applied a considerable brake to the enlargement process. However, neither Chancellor Helmut Kohl nor Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel fully support the rapid enlargement envisioned by Ruhe. Both prefer a more controlled and deliberate process in which the risks and costs to Western nations are reduced. These issues are centered on the economic inability of these new nations to meet the demands of membership and, therefore, the likelihood of both EU and NATO members subsidizing these nations, and to the need for preventing the import of potentially destabilizing internal conflicts into the established organizations of Western Europe.

German unification presents several challenges to EU and NATO members. Germany is the only European nation to experience the extraordinary costs of reunification first hand, and the admission of former East Germany to NATO has created a precedent of permitting previous Warsaw Pact nations into the Alliance. The economic and political strength of a unified Germany has also led to a shift in equilibrium within the EU that has raised concerns in several European nations who do not wish to see a single nation, especially Germany, as the principal force within the Union. These concerns have been borne out in foreign policy initiatives that seek to link Germany to European structures, thereby reducing her ability to wield undue influence within the EU.

While not totally comparable, the costs involved in unifying Germany are a precursor for the possible costs to be encountered in enlarging NATO. The German economy is under considerable pressure following reunification, and this enormous financial burden is an indication of some of the costs likely to be encountered in the NATO enlargement process. In 1993, Germany faced a public sector borrowing debt of over 130 billion dollars, and over four million unemployed today testify to the impact that unification has had on the leading economy of Europe.¹ By embracing the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany seeks to establish itself as the benevolent brother of these nations and offer goods and services in an
attempt to increase the performance of these fledgling economies. By expanding the range of her markets, Germany will be better placed to reverse the economic trend of decline in her own economy and maintain her current position as the most successful European economy. Germany is more than aware of the costs involved in Alliance enlargement, and yet realizes the importance of the potential markets in Central and Eastern Europe. To maintain her economic prosperity, Germany will continue to be an advocate of expansion of both NATO and the EU.² Indeed, both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel urge an integrated enlargement of NATO and the EU.

Germany sits on the edge of the security vacuum created as a result of the end of the Cold War. On the other side of this vacuum sits Russia. Germany has already initiated a series of bilateral cooperation and economic aid agreements with Russia and other former communist countries in an attempt to reduce the uncertainty of the security vacuum—a further sign of Germany’s self-confidence in foreign policy matters. It is important to recall the crucial role that Chancellor Willy Brandt played in establishing conditions for dialogue between East and West during the Cold War. Germany’s pragmatic approach to her relations with post-Communist central and Eastern Europe is essentially a continuation of former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which established conditions for dialog between East and West during the Cold War. The acceptance of a unified Germany in NATO by Russia owes much to the pragmatism of Germany’s approach to foreign policy issues.

Pragmatism is also a reflection of demographic realities. Within Russia (as well as Poland and Ukraine) there are over two million ethnic Germans. Germany has a reputation for being a refugee-friendly nation, and her willingness to accept refugees from virtually every crisis point has had a profound impact on her economic and social structure.³ The open borders that now exist across Europe create conditions for mass migration of ethnic Germans back to the
Fatherland. Germany is keen, however, to encourage these Germans to remain where they are. To make the pill of rejection less bitter, the German government has entered into a number of economic aid agreements with Russia, designed for impact in the main at areas of Russia where ethnic Germans live. Clearly, this policy is seen by some as divisive and a source of resentment among the majority populations. However, unless a rabidly nationalist government appears in Russia, or unless ethnic Germans in Russia become more assertive, the situation is unlikely to become a flash point.

Germany has also extended a considerable degree of preferential treatment to several other East European countries, resulting in concern among the other members of the EU. The German economy, and more importantly the Bundesbank, is a critical factor in the formation of a true European union. Germany's decision to go it alone in Eastern Europe has forced other nations to follow suit fearing the loss of opportunity and prevention of a German monopoly in the region. Germany's actions have prompted EU engagement with Eastern Europe both to show European support (the one for all and all for one notion) and to prevent Germany from losing interest in and possibly abandoning the unionization process. Although Volker Ruehe advocated vigorous expansion of NATO, the principal thrust of German foreign policy now is to expand the EU as soon as possible, a situation brought about by the realization that the threat from Russia has diminished, and that Central and Eastern European nations are more concerned with economic security as opposed to the security guarantee implicit in NATO membership.

Germany has been constrained in her ability to fully take part in military operations outside NATO's geographic borders by her constitution, the lack of popular support for such action, and a strong commitment to preserving NATO. The decision in July 1994 by the German Constitutional Court that the 1949 constitution does not prevent German troops from taking part in military missions outside NATO territory is a further sign that Germany is ready to re-join the
international community as a "true nation". German troops are now deployed in the former Yugoslavia, and took part in missions prior to the court ruling, including serving as AWACs crews in NATO's flight monitoring operation over Bosnia. The establishment of the German/French Euro Corps, the support for an ESDI and CFSP in the EU, and the recent agreement between Germany and France regarding nuclear forces are also illustrations of the growth of German leadership in Europe and preparedness to play a full role in the future European security organization.

Perhaps the clearest indication that Germany is now considered the leading nation in Europe is the growth and strengthening of the American/German relationship. The historic "special relationship" that existed between London and Washington has given way to a new Bonn/Washington relationship. In a statement given in February 1995 following Chancellor Kohl's visit to America, President Clinton described the relationship as "a force for positive change in the post-Cold War world." George Bush had earlier declared that Germany was now America's partner in leadership, an assertion which found affirmation as early as 1993 in the need to establish a lasting cooperation with the new leader in Europe. Germany and America also share the same view on future relationships between Russia and the West. Both highlight that it is necessary to include Russia in an effective European security organization and emphasize that NATO enlargement must be carried out in such a way that Russia does not feel threatened or isolated. Establishing dialogue and cooperative instruments now and ensuring that the Alliance enlargement process is totally transparent seek to establish confidence in Russia that NATO enlargement is not postured against her, and that enlargement of the Alliance seeks to preserve and strengthen stability of a wider Europe.
American Perspectives

America at first viewed the rise of German leadership in Europe with considerable concern. German recognition of Croatia created conditions which basically forced the European Union, as well as NATO and the UN, to recognize the independence of the former states of Yugoslavia, further fueling the nationalism that finally erupted into tragic civil war. Then Secretary of State Christopher was outraged at the intransigence of Germany in disregarding American concerns for the outcome of recognizing Croatia, and frustrated by their reluctance to commit to the UN peacekeeping mission that followed. German insistence for rapid NATO enlargement prompted America to announce the PIP initiative in an attempt both to reaffirm U.S. leadership in European security and to check the headlong rush towards Alliance enlargement that threatened its very survival. Essentially, the U.S. has supported enlargement of the Alliance from the outset, although preferring a more conservative approach as problems and realities of enlargement have arisen.

In the 1996 version of the U.S. National Security Strategy, the future enlargement of the Alliance and the continued role of America in European Security (through NATO) find clear articulation. This strategy presents the reasons for American support for both NATO and its enlargement as reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe’s eastern half. America, like Germany, seeks to gain new markets for its goods and services in order to preserve its own economic well being. Europe remains a considerable importer of American goods--over 25 percent of all U.S. exports were destined for Europe in 1992. Likewise, America imports heavily from the European Union. In 1992, 20 percent of all imports to the U.S. were from Europe. While it is clear that trade with Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region will grow, the importance of maintaining links with Europe is essential for the continued economic stability of America. The National Security Strategy bears this point out, emphasizing that the U.S. is
committed to the encouragement of bilateral trade and investment in countries not part of the European Union. By ensuring the economic well being of Europe, the U.S. will maintain a strong market for both goods and services as the emerging economies of Eastern and Central Europe seek these items, and have the economies to support such trade. NATO is fundamental to America's ability to benefit from these new markets and opportunities for the simple reason that, if the U.S. does not play an active part in NATO, it will be unable to influence the shaping of the future European security structure and so be unable to benefit from it.

Alliance enlargement was effectively made irreversible when President Clinton announced after the 1994 NATO Summit that "it was not a question of whether NATO would take on new members, but when and how."10 Designation of the date of accession of new members made during the 1996 U.S. presidential election may have created a hurdle for the Alliance that will prove too difficult to skirt, despite the consensus required to sanction the admission of new members. The date of 1999 set by President Clinton was seen by many as a vote winner during his Midwest tour, where many of the voters are direct descendants of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech families who emigrated to America.11 While the announcement has not created any surprises on the "who" of Clinton’s statement, the "when" has ruffled feathers in NATO, which is not due to announce the timetable (nor the prospective new members) for enlargement until the summit meeting in the summer of 1997. Simply put, the conditions for new membership are linked to requirements that may not be satisfied by 1999, and the pressure created by the President’s announcement may force early admission of countries not yet capable of fulfilling their obligations to the Alliance.

A more basic reason for America’s continued emphasis of the importance of Europe is found in the ethnic makeup of the population. Although the influx of Hispanic immigrants from Latin America has increased, the population of America is still over 75 percent European in
Furthermore, although the total will fall over the next thirty years, Europe will remain the predominant area of ethnic origin for Americans. This point is not lost on politicians who seek to define the ethnicity of their voters in order to send the “right” message on Europe. The Clinton speech in the American Midwest during the 1996 Presidential campaign, afforded only one example of this tendency among American politicians.

America appears to favor new criteria for membership for Central and Eastern European nations, and Congress has passed several acts and bills in relation to enlargement of NATO. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 gives six criteria—democratic institutions, free market economy, civilian control of the military, rule of law, protection of citizens rights, and respect for neighbors integrity. The Act stipulates full and active participation in Partnership for Peace as a requirement, in addition to conformation with the requirements of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that any European nation invited to join NATO must be in a position to further the principles of the Alliance. The National Security Revitalization Act, passed by the House of Representatives in January 1995, acknowledges the six criteria given in the above mentioned bill. The 1995 Act also advocates potential new members and a time line for their admittance to NATO. The “first string” of countries to be invited include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The House justifies its choice on the basis of progress made towards democratic, economic, and institutional reform. Rather more optimistically, the Act also stipulates that these countries should be admitted no later than five years after the inception of the PfP program. This would allow the four countries to be considered for membership from January 1999. The Act also states that countries to be considered would be “European countries emerging from Communist domination,” which imposes yet more criteria on potential applicants.

The U.S. defense budget is under increasing pressure, and the need to pare down military spending has become a major concern in American politics. The emergence of the ESDI and a
European pillar of NATO has created conditions for America to reduce troop levels in Europe, and yet maintain the vital involvement in NATO that the U.S. seeks. Rather than blocking European attempts to establish the WEU as the embodiment of the ESDI, America has supported the “Europeanization of NATO.”

Allowing the Europeans to act in military operations that do not affect the vital interests of America, and so are unlikely to receive direct U.S. military support, yet permit European forces to draw on NATO/U.S. facilities and resources, gives the U.S. the opportunity of reducing its defense commitments in Europe. At the same time as reducing commitments, however, the U.S. is demonstrating support for European-led initiatives that will ultimately allow NATO to be better able to honor Article 5 and non-Article 5 commitments to the new members of the Alliance. The overriding concern of the U.S. regarding the ESDI and the WEU forming the European pillar of NATO is that the Alliance comes first and European nations maintain their commitment to NATO above the creation of a separate security organization as a “competitor” to NATO.

The powerful role of the U.S. within the Alliance decision-making structure and the influence that the America maintains in European security issues ensure that the U.S. will largely determine the course of NATO enlargement. The establishment of PfP indicated U.S. resolve to undertake leadership in sensitive Alliance issues, and the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord confirm the need for American leadership in European security. At the same time as maintaining U.S. leadership in the Alliance, America seeks to reduce defense commitments in Europe while maintaining active support for European initiatives. America, like Germany, realizes the importance of the potential markets within Central and Eastern Europe in maintaining economic success, and that unless the U.S. is a part of the enlargement process and actively engaged in European security issues, she will be unable to reap the rewards of these new markets.
French Perspectives

France has been a key member of the Alliance since its formation in 1949, but has traditionally maintained an aversion to the level of U.S. involvement in European security issues. The current wrangling over the command of NATO’s Southern Flank illustrates this ambiguity. Although France has moved towards closer military cooperation with NATO, possibly to include rejoining the military structure, it remains a volatile, independent, and strong influence in Europe. Indeed, for a time, France sought to establish a Europe that relied on its own abilities for defense, rather than on that of the U.S. and, to some extent, NATO.\textsuperscript{15} The French view of European security is shifting, not least due to the initial failings of European countries to effectively deal with the crisis in Bosnia. The underlying trend, however, is for a Europe capable of undertaking missions, with little or no reliance on U.S. ground forces, while maintaining NATO engagement in European security. Consequently, France has been the leader in the establishment of the ESDI. France and Germany seem unlikely bedfellows, given the experiences of the two world wars, but the successful establishment of the Euro-Corps in 1991, the commitment to a shared nuclear umbrella, and reliance on each other for certain defense related commodities—such as pilot training—indicate that the two countries are prepared to back the rhetoric of an ESDI with practical actions. In 1992 the Corps was placed under NATO command, easing the fears of open competition between NATO and the WEU.\textsuperscript{16}

France has also undertaken considerable diplomatic maneuvering in its relations with Great Britain. While there has been an \textit{entente cordiale} for many years between France and Britain, the likelihood of a truly close relationship between the two countries was remote. The shared experiences of the Gulf War and Bosnia in particular have, however, drawn the two countries ever closer. President Chirac extended a hand of friendship during his first visit to Britain in May 1996, and encouraged Prime Minister Major to maintain Britain at the heart of
Europe. The Franco-German relationship developed out of France’s desire to keep Germany firmly linked to European institutions and the impulse to pursue Britain as an ally in her attempts to forge a tripartite leadership of the EU, with the understanding that France’s relationship with Britain was as important as her relationship with Germany. But Britain remains skeptical, however, of French and German desires for a federalist Europe, and this perception created some friction in the EU, especially between Germany and the UK, which France successfully mediated.

The impact of de Gaulle and his strategy (often referred to as Gaullist strategy) for France in Europe so tainted the nation’s feelings for NATO and, perhaps more so America, that France has only recently started to return to the bosom of the Alliance. The decision of France to remove herself from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1968 established a unique membership status in NATO of being in yet out. France benefited from being able to maintain her own defense policy in support of specific French national interests, while at the same time allowing U.S (and other) forces stationed in Germany to shield her from the Warsaw Pact threat. Although France garrisoned forces in Germany, retained membership in the Alliance, and cooperated with the NATO military structure, her principal aim in Europe was to establish a pan-European security identity. Unfortunately, the events of the Cold War did not support de Gaulle’s strategy for France, and when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, the inheritors of this legacy were thrown into confusion. Gaullist strategy had essentially been one of only a few areas in which French national policy and politicians were agreed on. France, however, is driven more by domestic politics rather than national political imperatives. As such, the need to establish France at the head of the European security architecture following the end of the Cold War prompted France to oppose the American led attempts to shift NATO from a collective defense to collective security organization under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.
France favors a strong European Union, with the capability of taking on the collective
defense responsibilities, including the type so recently undertaken by NATO. Europe’s past and
continued difficulties in reaching consensus, however, have caused France to rethink her stance.
In fact, France not only accepted that NATO should remain committed to collective defense
missions, but also that Europe needs NATO and the U.S. in NATO (and, therefore, in Europe).
More importantly, as already mentioned, the Euro-Corps, established to promote the European
defense identity, was assigned to a NATO command under SACEUR for wartime operations.
France thus relented in her Gaullist view that French forces would not be commanded by NATO.
France still advocates that an ESDI complementary to but not a replacement for NATO in her
defense and security strategies, should be embodied in the WEU.

France leads the calls for all major NATO commands to be European led while SACEUR
remains a U.S. appointment to establish a truly European command structure available to the
WEU. In particular, the French are keen for a European to be Commander Allied Forces Southern
Europe (AFSOUTH). The principal opponent to this is the U.S. The U.S. Sixth Fleet is
commanded by the commander of AFSOUTH, and the need for the fleet to be under command of
a U.S. admiral is paramount justification for maintaining the command as American. The French
regard this as ridiculous, given that U.S. forces elsewhere in the Alliance are commanded by non-
American commanders. This discussion also rests on the ESDI concept of undertaking European
only missions. If the regional commands are not European led, France then asserts that the ability
to deploy WEU forces will be severely constrained.

France’s views on enlargement are generally supportive, although with some reservation.
France has been a supporter of PfP activities with Central and Eastern nations. Having remained
outside of NATO’s military structure for so long—only now considering rejoining—France,
however, fears military overstretch in delivering Article 5 commitments to new members. France
has, like Germany, been engaged in Eastern and Central European countries since the end of the Cold War. France has a high technology industrial base and is keen to support emerging regional economies with both assistance and products. Enlargement of NATO would give France a closer tie to the region, but would place a greater strain on her military forces in honoring Article 5 commitments, if the need arose. This is especially so, given the recent move of the French Army to a professionally based organization without conscription. France also remains committed to furthering the European Union and the federalization of Europe, the EU enlargement program, continued support for an ESDI, and a common foreign and security policy for the EU.

**British Perspectives**

Great Britain remains the bridge between the European mainland and America, despite the UK’s closer physical proximity to Europe. The Washington/London relationship remains a vital link between the U.S. and Europe. Not only do the nations share a common heritage and language, the U.S. respects the very real contribution that Britain makes in crises such as the Gulf War and Bosnia.\textsuperscript{19} Despite the rise in importance of the Washington-Bonn relationship, Britain remains the principal linkage with Europe for the U.S. Britain also acts as a balance for the extreme elements of European unionization and federalization who seek to establish a super-Euro state, even if this stance is greeted with cries of Euro skepticism—most notably from Germany and France. Britain realizes, however, the importance of remaining closely involved with the European Union and maintaining a position of influence within the Union. Without being a part of the process, Britain stands to become isolated and impotent in the region’s economic, political, and security environments.

In general, Britain supports the Alliance policy of enlargement and engagement of post-communist countries. Cautioning against massive change, Britain echoes American concerns for moderate and well thought through enlargement rather than the rapid rate espoused by Germany.\textsuperscript{20} Ensuring that Russia is linked to the new European security architecture and not either isolated or
provoked by NATO enlargement are additional areas over which Britain has expressed concern. Like France and Germany, Britain has engaged Russia economically and is providing considerable assistance to not only Russia, but also other CIS countries in an attempt to stabilize the economies of the region. In 1995, Britain’s trade with Russia amounted to nearly two billion pounds, and Russia received substantial trade credits to assist in establishing reform and lasting economic growth. Britain has urged the EU to open its markets to Russian goods and products, perhaps even establishing a free trade agreement between the EU and Russia.21

In concert with France, Britain supports the establishment of the WEU as the European pillar of NATO and the embodiment of the ESDI. In this respect, Britain and France share a mutual fear of American disengagement in Europe, mistakenly assumed to be the case during the UN-led mission in the first three years of the Bosnian conflict. Both countries committed forces to the region, but were amazed and concerned that the U.S. did not share the same enthusiasm for action in Bosnia. Essentially, the outcome of the first three years of solely European actions in Bosnia was that of zero gain—the Europeans lacked the political focus and commitment to create what it took America to achieve. A major task for the WEU in confirming itself as the credible European pillar of NATO is to establish a capable and effective means of political decision making and control.22 This does not mean subordination to the EU, as preferred by France and Germany, but maintaining both organizations separately and ensuring coherence of action between the WEU and EU in a time of crisis. Both Britain and France realize that a separate European pillar without linkage to NATO (and therefore the U.S.) is doomed to failure. Britain has, like many other NATO members, experienced dramatic cuts in military forces that have highlighted the need to maintain the Alliance as a means of securing European security. In short, Europe cannot afford to go it alone—both in economic and military terms.23

One of Britain’s principal concerns rests with the credibility and effectiveness of an enlarged NATO, and the ability of existing members to offer defense commitments to new
members, given the reduction in forces and, perhaps more importantly, defense spending. Maintaining capable force structures is a concern for all NATO members as defense budgets are pared down to the bone. One factor often overlooked by supporters of IFOR is the cost to equipment programs and re-equipping programs that are deferred in order to support a nation’s commitment to IFOR.24 In other words, as the commitment to IFOR goes on, critical modernization and renewal projects go unfunded and unimplemented.25 Britain’s concern is that the Alliance may develop a credibility crack if the enlargement process is not undertaken carefully to ensure that Article 5 commitments do not completely overwhelm the ability of the Alliance to honor them.

Britain has been wary of joining European defense industry initiatives--the Euro-fighter one such example--where the costs to each country involved has spiraled. France and Britain have, however, moved closer in a number of defense related areas. Britain and France are Europe’s only nuclear powers. While there is no formal doctrine between the two nations, considerable sharing of information and experience has taken place. Britain has also been considering joining the European Armaments Agency proposed by Bonn and Paris. Perhaps less willing to commit than France and Germany, Britain’s decision to buy American attack helicopters over the European version did little to indicate faith in the European defense industry.

Summary

The events in Europe in 1989 and 1990 did not result in the peace dividend or stable Europe imagined by some at the end of the Cold War. National priorities and concerns, previously left to rest, rose to the fore. With German unification playing perhaps the most crucial role in establishing Germany as the principal force economically and politically in Europe, France moved quickly to link the resurgent Germany to European organizations to prevent a powerful Germany going it alone at the expense of the remainder of Europe. Germany, while committed to
the enlargement of both NATO and the EU, is capable of undertaking its own version of international power playing as demonstrated in the recognition of Croatia against the advice of America, France, and Britain. The U.S. acted quickly to counter German insistence for rapid enlargement of NATO, demonstrating both leadership in the Alliance and a commitment to European security that appears to be long term in its outlook. What is clear is that national priorities and agendas will play a more prevalent role in the future of European security than in the Cold War.

The U.S. has for much of NATO’s Cold War effort contributed a high proportion of the cost burden of security in Europe. The perception in Europe is that the U.S. is no longer prepared to maintain this level of commitment. There are several reasons for this. The U.S. military faces the same budget constraints as those forces in Europe, as well as pressure to reduce manpower levels. Also, as the ESDI emerges in Europe, America will not feel obliged to commit so much to the overall cost of European security, and so more of the financial burden will fall to the European members of NATO. While America is keen (and has been for some time) for the European partners in NATO to take on more of the liability for their defense, it is only now that the opportunity arises to really achieve such a shift in commitment. Europe is therefore eager to maintain maximum engagement of the U.S. in Europe, and also to establish an ESDI that does not seek to replace or parallel NATO, but form a strong European pillar of the Alliance capable of undertaking missions which do not require U.S. ground forces.

1"The Germany that can say No," The Economist, 3 July 1993, 45.


3“Germany’s Europe,” The Economist, 11 June 1994, 45.

4Gray, 93.


24 Ibid., 31.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis has sought to examine the enlargement of NATO and how national agendas have affected the process. In the course of completing the thesis several major events have occurred which impact on the enlargement issue, but are outside of the limitation of 1 January 1997 imposed for material to be considered for the study. For completeness, the author will briefly mention them here, as the future actions of the Alliance will be dependent on these developments and initiatives.

While acknowledging that NATO recognized the need to shift its posture regarding former-Communist nations with the publication of the new Strategic Concept in November 1991, the almost haphazard manner in which the enlargement issue has been dealt with indicates in this case an absence of defined strategy. Further, the absence of a single, common threat against which to posture has allowed national issues and agendas to rise to the fore, creating difficulties in achieving consensus. Finally, as the July 1997 NATO summit meeting in Madrid draws nearer, NATO members are now starting to seriously examine the costs, as well as the benefits, of an enlarged NATO. Given the planned admission date for new members of 1999—the fiftieth anniversary of the Alliance—NATO has much to do in the next two years in terms of formulating a meaningful policy for those nations not admitted in the first wave, of improving Alliance relations with Russia, and of establishing the means to achieve consensus among an enlarged membership with increasingly diverse national agendas and perspectives.
German and American national agendas played major roles in establishing the current conundrum facing NATO today. German ascendance as the principal European nation following its unification in 1990 aroused concerns in Britain, France and America. In particular, German insistence for rapid enlargement did not sit well in America. In order both to calm the situation and to demonstrate continued American leadership in European security issues, the announcement of PfP in January 1994 sought to offer the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe a means of practical cooperation with NATO members, while at the same time giving the Alliance a breathing space in which to formulate a strategy and preserve the status quo of dominance within the Alliance. Since the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former-Communist nations feared a resurgent and aggressive Russia. Since then, however, it has become clear that Russia does not present a serious threat to these emerging democracies, and that the principal aim of former-Communist nations is to gain membership of the EU. The EU is not, however, ready to admit these emerging economies and is unlikely to do so until the IGC is complete and the unionization process is well advanced. This situation has forced former-Communist nations to seek membership in other Western organizations in an attempt both to gain the benefits of membership, and to establish a track record of involvement in such organizations so as to appear more acceptable to the EU.

PfP has achieved much more than its creators ever envisaged. Given the success of the initiative, the lack of a direct threat to former-Communist nations from Russia, and these nations' own ultimate objective of EU membership, NATO should not be undertaking an enlargement of membership. Rather, the Alliance should concentrate its energies in the PfP process, and seek to extend the existing programs, thereby offering a more effective and embracing involvement with NATO, without the need to enlarge membership. Politically, this departure would be seen as a climb down from the previously stated positions of several NATO member nations leaders--
President Clinton being but one—and therefore unlikely. This impasse is the direct result of NATO not establishing the strategic reasons for enlargement, and the consequence of being forced to travel a path established by two of the four leading nations within the Alliance—Germany and America.

Given the fact that enlargement is therefore unavoidable, albeit limited in this first round, how does the Alliance proceed with its relations with those nations not admitted in the first wave and, more importantly, Russia? The PfP initiative will continue to play a major role in linking those nations not admitted initially to the European security structure, and the Alliance must ensure that sufficient funding and emphasis is placed on PfP to maintain momentum in nations not admitted in the security process. The key issue here is convincing these nations that PfP is a worthwhile vehicle. Unless the Alliance commits more funding to the initiative and increases the level of involvement of participating nations, these nations interest in PfP will wane.

Russia is likely to continue to maintain her objection to the enlargement of NATO, but is unlikely to prevent the first wave from being admitted. The Alliance has to build a meaningful relationship with Russia that establishes her as a fundamental player in European security issues. In her recent world tour, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called on Russia to acknowledge a “new NATO.” In return, she was asked to acknowledge that there existed a “new Russia.” The announcement of the proposed U.S and Russian brigade for peacekeeping missions is an example of the importance being placed on relations with Russia, and the need to link her to European security as firmly as possible. Such bilateral initiatives are clearly useful, but do not fully link Russia to the European security architecture.

In the report to the U.S. Congress on NATO enlargement, the issue of relations with Russia is acknowledged as a fundamental part of the enlargement process. Further, the report intimates the possibility of a NATO-Russia relationship that would establish a permanent
mechanism of consultation and that the CFE Treaty could be adapted to take into account the new
situation that exists in Europe today. The latter statement provides Russia with almost what she
has been insistent on since NATO enlargement was first raised. Russia is a key player in the
future security of Europe, not only from a geographic standpoint, but also an economic one.
Russia has an abundance of raw materials and natural resources that either lie untapped or poorly
managed at present, but with increasingly good relations, resources that could be utilized by
western nations. Western Europe imports huge amounts of Siberian gas and were the presently
good relations with Russia to degenerate, the impact on both the European and world economies
would be dramatic.

The rise of national imperatives and agendas impacting on NATO policy making bodies is
another area that must be carefully managed as nations become less focused on European security
issues, and more on national issues. The announcement by Turkey to veto any enlargement of
NATO unless Turkey achieves EU membership is one such case in point. Placing the conditions
of EU membership before the Alliance indicates the very real possibility of nations putting self
before the common good. Turkey is not the only nation which has raised a domestic agenda as
part of the enlargement issue, a sign of the decreasing focus afflicting NATO members as a result
of the lack of a common threat. The Alliance has to ensure that national agendas and domestic
issues do not become bargaining chips when dealing with European security issues. Failure to
separate such issues from the decision making process of the Alliance would bring about the end
of NATO as a constructive and meaningful element of European security.

The costs versus benefits calculus for enlargement is a growing feature of the arguments
against Alliance enlargement. While the RAND study examined previously indicates relatively
modest amounts are likely to be involved, how willing will member nations be to commit to this
process if the benefits are not obvious? Given the poor display of Russian war-fighting ability in
Chechnya and the fact that many former-Communist nations no longer feel threatened by Russia as perhaps they did in the early 1990s, why enlarge NATO? The answer may be linked to a sense of moral duty and, to some extent, guilt, as a result of the failure to counter the expansion of Communism following the Second World War and the impact of impassioned speeches by the leaders of former-Communist nations calling on Western nations to make amends for the last fifty years.

U.S. domestic politics plays no small role in this process, given the large numbers of Americans descended from the countries most likely to be considered for first wave membership. Basing a strategy for the future on such idyllic and chivalrous notions will not maintain the Alliance as a vital element of European security. Instead, NATO would be reduced in effectiveness and ability to reach consensus, thereby removing one of its key elements of success. The Alliance must articulate a clear and well defined strategy for enlargement, with emphasis on cost and benefit, on how the Alliance intends to deal with those nations not admitted in the first wave, and how on Russia will be drawn into the European security system in a lasting and meaningful fashion. The Madrid Summit in July 1997 will be the ideal moment to announce such a strategy and to give the Alliance a clear direction as it embarks on a most critical stage in its history. Extending PfP and not enlarging the Alliance is an option, providing the ability exists within the framework document to extend Article 5 guarantees should those nations committed to the process by threatened.

The oft quoted reasons for the formation of NATO, as delivered by Lord Ismay in 1949, to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” may still have some relevance, even if they are not politically correct, today.² In simple terms, Lord Ismay’s statement may be reworked to encompass the existing situation in Europe, and what NATO is attempting to establish as it wrestles with issues of enlargement and embracing the former-Communist nations
of Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps a more politically correct version of Lord Ismay's statement should read as preventing one single power from dominating Europe, maintaining American involvement in European security, and preserving stability among the wider European nations.

This thesis has concentrated almost exclusively on the enlargement issue with little or no consideration for any other NATO activity or initiative. The Madrid summit in July 1997 will surely determine the future pattern of activity for at least the next three to five years and will be a rich source of further study. In particular, the author believes two key areas for further study to be in relation to those countries not offered membership rather than those that are. First, attention must be devoted to an examination of the Alliance's strategy for maintaining those countries not offered membership in the first wave. What are their options and can NATO successfully maintain their interest through existing structures (i.e.: PfP), or will new and more costly initiatives be required? Second, can Russia be linked to NATO either through a parallel accord with the Washington Treaty, or by means of a separate document? How will Russia react to further enlargement of NATO and in particular to the membership of the Baltic states? Both of these areas could provide ample research opportunity for future studies within a master's degree program.

1Impact of Enlargement on Russian Policy and Relations with Russia, Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement, http://www.nato.int/usc/docu/r970224e.htm.

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