IS JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING REALLY JOINT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

WESLEY L. REHORN, MAJ, USA
B.S. Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1984

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1997

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Is Joint Special Operations Training Really Joint?

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This study is an analysis of Joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) basic or common skills training. The study uses the United States Army Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSCSWCS) as a basis of evaluation of the effectiveness of the Department of Defense (DOD) inter service training within United States Special Operations Command (USOCOM). This thesis evaluates and suggests solutions for the future of joint core basic and advanced skill training and propensy associated with this training. This study also evaluates the research, design and fielding of SOF equipment and the equipment integration in the SOF schools. This thesis concludes that, even with recent improvements, the basic entry level and common advanced skills are being taught with varied techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) and each skills objectives remain the individual services responsibility. The disparity of training objectives leads to a flawed integration of these skills during joint exercise training and actual joint missions.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

IS JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING REALLY JOINT? by MAJ Wesley L. Rehorn, USA, 100 pages.

This study is an analysis of Joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) basic or common skills training. The study uses the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) as a basis of evaluation of the effectiveness of the Department of Defense (DOD) inter service training (ITRO) process. This study evaluates and suggests solutions for the future of joint core skills training and proponency. This study concludes that the basic entry level of joint special operations training is, even with recent improvements, an individual service system. Similar basic and advanced skills have varied techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) which leads to a flawed training system and difficult assimilation of joint training exercises and mission accomplishment.

This study provides suggestions on improving the design and implementation of special operations joint training for basic and advanced skills. The study also provides suggestions on improving design, testing and fielding of special operations equipment to assist in viable joint initial entry training and compatibility of future joint operations.

The study provides recommendations on how to redesign the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) training development base to incorporate each SOF components need. Each SOF component must align mission analysis, equipment mission need statements, design, development, and procurement to coordinate training resources and objectives.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that on a daily basis take the greatest risk of all, training their students 12,500 feet above the ground. Their dedication and commitment is equaled only by the men and women, military and civilian, of the United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School who support and train the premier peacemakers and peacekeepers of the Twentieth century.

I would also like to thank the three soldiers most responsible for my training and understanding of the Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) (SWTG) (A): COL Kenneth Getty, former SWTG (A) Commander and Director of Operations for the Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI), who retired in October 1996 after successfully meeting the challenge of every difficult job that Special Forces had to offer; CSM (Ret) David L. Clark, who has served his country admirably for over thirty five years in the 82d Airborne and Special Forces, on active duty and over 10 years as a civilian employee; and 1SG Paul Gann who brought humor, understanding, and experience to leading the NCOs of the Military Freefall School (MFFS), Co. B, 2d Bn, 1st SWTG (A).

Lastly I thank my wife, Charlene, and children, Leia and Steyer. Who at the beginning of every assignment are led to believe that this is the assignment in which I will spend more time at home.
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Force Education Training Center</td>
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CGSC  U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
CINC  Commander in Chief
CMF  Career Management Field
COI  Course of Instruction
CQB  Close Quarters Battle
CRB  Curriculum Review Board
CT  Counterterrorism
CTSB  Critical Task Selection Board
DA  Direct Action
DCD  Directorate of Combat Developments
DCSOPS  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DCSRI  Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Integration
DDS  Dry Deck Shelter
DMT  Dive Maintenance Technician
DOD  Department of Defense
DOTD  Directorate of Training and Doctrine
DOTMLS  Doctrine Organization Training Manning Leadership Systems
DZ  Drop Zone
EESD  External Evaluation and Standardization Division
EMT  Emergency Medical Technicians
FFM  Full-Face Mask
FID  Foreign Internal Development
FM  Field Manual
GPS  Global Positioning System
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<td>SCUBA</td>
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<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea, Air, Land Team</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion</td>
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<td>SF</td>
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<td>SFARTAETC</td>
<td>Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, and Exploitation Course</td>
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<td>SFG</td>
<td>Special Forces Group</td>
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<td>SMDR</td>
<td>Structure and Manning Decision Review</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SMU</td>
<td>Special Mission Unit</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>Special Operations Technician</td>
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<td>Special Operations Target Interdiction Course</td>
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<td>UDT</td>
<td>Underwater Demolition Team</td>
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<td>U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The goal of all training should be to prepare a unit to accomplish its tasks in such a manner that execution in war or peace becomes simply an extension of the training exercises.¹

USSOCOM Publication 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War*

Introduction

The lack of Special Operations Forces (SOF) interoperability in mission profiles, training, and equipment development, identified by the Holloway Commission back in 1980, still exists in 1997. The Holloway Commission was a result of the Desert One operation that FM 100-25 describes:

On 24 April 1980 about 180 members of a U.S. (sic) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) infiltrated Iran by air to rescue 53 Americans held hostage in Tehran. At Desert One, a secret landing strip 265 nautical miles from Tehran, the on-scene commander had to abort the mission because three of his eight RH-53D helicopters were unable to continue the mission. As the exfiltration began, one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a C-130 transport plane on the ground. Eight men died in the ensuing fire and explosions. The remaining JSOTF members flew to safety.²

The aborted attempt to rescue the hostages held by the Iranians brought the lack of interoperability to the forefront. Although the poor joint interoperability existed prior to 1980, the Holloway Commission findings and recommendations highlighted the issue.³ The Holloway Commission specifically stated, "Training was planned and conducted on a highly decentralized basis within an informal component command structure that does not appear to have been clearly established."⁴ The rescue attempt was also the genesis of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a joint command designed to combine the best of each service’s Special Operations (SO) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Unfortunately, JSOC has become the cornerstone issue
for many politicians looking for less inter-service rivalry and more efficiency and impact for the
dollar. One of the problem areas that the Holloway Commission identified, which was the lack of a
centralized mission training plan or agency, still exists within Special Operations Forces (SOF)
today. The quote from the mission after action review: "Individual and unit training was conducted
and evaluated throughout the period at widely separated locations" still applies to SOF training
today. Not only are the training bases separated by geography, but also by objective, mission, and
roles. Many people, both in government and the military, were under the impression that JSOC
would develop into the training panacea for joint interoperability. However, at the Special
Operations in U.S. Strategy symposium held in 1983, attendees noted that

inter-service rivalries became evident when the U.S. Army decided to develop a SCUBA
(Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus) capability for operations in inland
waterways to include caching and other activities. The Navy questioned that program
because underwater work is normally the domain of the Navy’s Sea, Air, Land Team
(SEAL) and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT). Similarly the U.S. Army wondered why
the Navy SEAL had to be a parachutist.6

Why, with the problem of incompatibility being identified even earlier than the 1983
symposium, the recurring incompatibility problems exist to this day is difficult to understand. The
compatibility of the Army’s, Navy’s, and Air Force’s equipment, training, and doctrine for
something as simple as SCUBA and High Altitude Low Opening (HALO), continues to be a
problem in 1997. Many mistakenly thought JSOC would serve in deconflicting different service
training and equipment anomalies, since that issue was identified as being at the crux of Desert One.
In addition, the mission of JSOC does include activities towards developing training and doctrine.
However, the Department of Defense designed JSOC as a joint standing operational headquarters to
deal with crisis and contingencies and not to supervise or act as a clearinghouse for joint training
issues. JSOC was never envisioned and should not be responsible for aligning the SOF training
base. JSOC issues training guidance to units over which it has operational control and TTP
required meeting deployment criteria. However, the overall coordination of training remains the
responsibility of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
The coordination problem is not at the operator level, although healthy interservice rivalries exist among different branches of SOF. In reality, the problem exists due to the lack of a functional agency or system that coordinates joint individual training. Many feel the friction among senior level leadership, where budget and missions are at stake, prevents a more amalgamated training system. Actually the major impediment to consolidating training is not the senior operational leadership. The real conflict occurs at the bureaucratic level where services compete for roles, missions, and dollars. In his paper *Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980’s*, published in 1983, Roger M. Pezzele noted: “there is always cooperation in action at the working level; the symptoms of inter-service rivalries are more noticeable, and indeed real, at senior echelons.” Operator level cooperation remains the strongest link between service SO personnel.

Upon his retirement in 1996, the former Commanding General of United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Lieutenant General James T. Scott stated that “the toughest thing to get by is parochialism in the schools.”\(^8\) Lieutenant General Scott had the unique opportunity to oversee the development of Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI), the amalgamation of the Military Free Fall School (MFFS), and the expansion of the U.S. Army Combat Diver Course (CDC) in Key West, Florida.

Even in March 1983 both politicians and military leaders knew that for both mission accomplishment and the survival of the military budget, joint training was here to stay. The mission statement for the 1983 Special Operations in US Strategy Symposium met with the purpose to first examine how special operations can complement an effective “conventional” defense capability; and second, to determine the means by which special operations could be legitimized as a crucial element in national security policy.\(^9\)

One of the studies from the symposium, written by Roger M. Pezzele and co-authored by Edward N. Luttwak and Michael D. Healy, states:

Inter-service cooperation is probably more vital in special operations than in most other areas of military activity. Special operations, by their nature, are almost always joint or collaborative undertakings. It is difficult to envision a ground/surface special operations mission of extended duration that does not require Air Force support...because joint
operations can be very complex, they demand organization, teamwork, planning, and practice-preferably, all on a continuing basis as part of an integrated joint force.\textsuperscript{10}

With the predominant theme of the symposium being cooperation, leadership vision, and training, why has the development or initiation of an agency like JSOFI taken so long? The teamwork that Ed Luttwak refers to is very evident on a visit to USSOCOM, which is the unified combatant command designated to man, train, and equip SO forces for utilization by the five regional CINCs in support of their theater strategies. The joint flavor of USSOCOM is very prevalent. However, the complexity and teamwork do not always pay dividends at the operator level when SO forces intermix. For example, a simple high altitude high opening (HAHO) infiltration raises the problems of: (1) the definition of what the Air Force considers crew rest for parachutists; (2) the altitudes at which parachutists of each service must use oxygen; (3) the regulations which cover each service’s oxygen equipment; (4) which automatic opening device must be used and at what setting each service prescribes their use, if any; and (5) the discrepancies between the definitions of a HALO jump run.

In Operation URGENT FURY, the lack of a single point of contact for static line airborne operations led to catastrophic results.

Part of the problem was that the aircrews were inexperienced; they had never practiced this type of operation under these circumstances. They were not well versed in the techniques, and one aircraft dropped well wide of the ship.\textsuperscript{11}

A static line infiltration is one of the easiest types of airborne infiltrations to coordinate and execute. If one can imagine the problems associated with conducting HALO operations, where the Drop Zone (DZ) is often one-hundredth the size of a static line DZ, one can begin to appreciate the need for joint training at the lowest level.

These are but a few anomalies that prevent true joint service HALO operations. These differences exist in other skills and tasks as well as HALO. Since even in 1983 Ed Luttwak and many participants at the symposium believed that joint military missions were the basis of the
majority of future operation, why does SOF still have a disparate training base and nonstandardized TTPs for similar tasks?

Congress passed legislative instruments to ensure that services fully participated in joint billet assignments with quality officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in mid-to-upper grade joint positions. Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) went so far as to set prerequisites for nomination and ultimate assignment to joint billets. Congress even mandated certain joint training as required for promotion to specific positions and set the promotions in grade of joint specialty officers equal to or greater than service promotion rates. This last action made a joint tour a little more palatable for officers not following the service approved career pattern. However, all of the attention on joint training has focused on the senior staff echelons and joint exercises. Many efforts are currently underway to combine facilities, resources, and training bases. Two examples of vision in joint individual training are the Special Operations Medical Training Center (SOMTC) opened recently at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the MFFS recently moved to Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Technically the term “joint individual training” is a misnomer, since each service is responsible for its own individual training. However, in the area of SOF, individual training is often conducted by other services. As an example, the MFFS recently incorporated all four services, in the training of HALO/HAHO parachute training, with instructors and students coming from all of the services. This formal consolidation has lead to a reduction in facility duplication, the opening of a viable dialogue to derive a true joint-service TTP and results in improved joint interoperability. It is imperative that SOF continues with the amalgamation of training of other skill bases because as Roger Pezzele states: “During the balance of the 1980’s and into the 1990’s, special operations units must be capable of flawless joint performance in peacetime and at all levels of war, whether in foreign internal defense (collective security), counter-terrorist operations, advance operations, unconventional warfare, direct action, or strategic reconnaissance.”\(^\text{12}\)
Without a standardized base of initial training each skill will develop into a separate TTP making the "flawless joint performance" Roger Pezzele speaks of more difficult to execute in mission conditions than necessary. The margin for error for SOF has decreased considerably. Increased media coverage gives the public availability of almost real-time video. With this real time feed, the public and political involvement in SO has increased. Even the successful extraction of belligerents supporting the warlord Muhammad Rarid Aideed in Somalia gave the impression to many Americans that the mission was a total failure. True, there were casualties, but combat is not a perfect science. The mission in all military views was a qualified success, but the resulting clamor by politicians left no doubt to the military that anything less than perfection was be acceptable. No one in the military accepts any death, in training or combat, as acceptable. However, leaders must ask the question, Are troops being trained to the highest standards possible to prevent unnecessary risks? The facts just do not support the idea that SOF, as a whole, is fully integrated in joint training or in the maintenance of those skills to the degree that SOFs require. A case in point is that, of the five active component Special Forces groups, at the time each of which had nine MFF teams, how many teams at any one time were level one qualified, or fully mission deployable during the calendar year? Due to the requirements of the number of jumps, the support of Air Force aircraft, and limitations on equipment and command support, very few MFF teams reached the highest level of readiness at least one time in the year. Maintaining the quarterly training requirements to stay at level one or real-world combat certified was even more difficult. Taking into consideration the fact that some missions may entail dealing with weapons of mass destruction, can the joint military ignore the basic individual operator training required to accomplish the mission?

**Purpose**

The purpose of this thesis is to show, using the 2d Battalion 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) (SWTG) (A) as a basis of analysis, how improvements can be made to improve the SOF joint training base. The thesis is important because it explains how the SOF training base
can train forces to a higher standard, with less of a training base and at less cost. The paper addresses additional issues of equipment development, fielding, and operational miscues based on nonintegrated research design and development systems. However, the examples of equipment problems and operational difficulties all relate directly back to the training base. Many of these issues were encountered in successive tours as the Battalion Operations Officer and Commander of B Company of the MFFS. The officers and NCOs of these organizations know these issues well and deal with them on a daily basis and epitomize the quote made in 1983: “Even when mission planning from on high was obviously weak, and support and cooperation from conventional forces lacked the proper selection, training and leadership carried the day” (Italics mine). 13

The hallmark for SOF is the level of training and scope of expertise. The core of SOF’s existence in the future will be the variety of missions and contingencies in which they will be expected to participate. Quality training cannot be sacrifices due to budget cuts and “downsizing.” No matter the assigned mission, or the leadership, that SOF is working for, be it US, NATO, UN commanders, U.S. SOFs must remain the best-trained tool of choice in crisis or contingency operations. They must lead the way in the world, SOF as the true professionals—the standards upon all others gauge themselves.

Assumptions

In conducting this study the researcher has made the following assumptions:

1. The United States will continue to require a joint SO capability.

2. That the world situation will continue to be characterized by uncertainty with increasing low intensity conflicts based on political, ideological, tribal or religious or even economic or resource based reasons.

3. SOF assessment, selection and intensive training will ensure the high quality of recruits and operators required for SOF success.

4. The personnel SOF assesses and selects will remain the cornerstones of its success.
And last but not least, that the SOF truths remain as valid in the future as they do for today:

1. Humans are more important than hardware.
2. Quality is better than quantity.
3. SOF cannot be mass-produced
4. Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Definitions of Terms

Advanced Skills Training System (ASTS) ASTS is normally associated with experienced SOF operators requiring repetitive training to maintain proficiency in HALO, SCUBA, Sniper or Close Quarters Battle (CQB).

Class A class is numbered iteration of a course for a given number of students or trainees.

Collocated A collocated course is a course used by one or more services on another service’s installation with shared classroom facilities and equipment. Training policies and curriculum are determined by the host service. Instructor requirements are calculated by the participating services and provided to meet their needs.

Consolidated A course consisting of a curriculum developed by two or more services. The faculty is normally multi-service. The curriculum may be common throughout or consist of a common core plus service unique tracks. Training policies, directives, and materials are determined by mutual agreement among the services. Instructor requirements are calculated on an ITRO formula that fairly shares the requirements among the participating services.

Course A formal program of instruction that is identified by an assigned course number.

Course of Instruction (COI) A series of POI linked with an ultimate objective to train an individual or collective skill.

High Altitude High Opening (HAHO) Similar to HALO with the exception that the opening altitude is up to 17,500 feet AGL feet in the training environment.
High Altitude Low Opening Parachuting (HALO) Infiltration technique used with RAM air parachute. Training opening altitudes of 4,000 feet above ground level (AGL).

Individual Training Instruction given to qualify an individual for a needed military skill or to enhance such a skill by providing additional practice or supporting knowledge.\(^{15}\)

Inter-service Training Review Organization (ITRO) An organization of military services set up to improve the cost effectiveness and efficiency through course consolidations or collocations and standardization. There are three types of ITRO courses, collocated, consolidated, and quota.

Military Occupational Specialty Training Training that awards a Military Occupations Specialty (MOS) to warrant officer or enlisted personnel upon successful completion of the course.\(^{16}\)

Mission Letter A letter or order outlining the specific tasks, conditions and standards to accomplish a non-training mission.

Program of Instruction (POI) A formalized training plan for a class presentation of either laboratory, platform or field type instruction. Used to record objectives of a class and resources to include manpower required to each the class.

Quota A course managed, controlled, and conducted by one service that is used by another service. Participating services do not have curriculum input and use the course exactly as presented by the host service. Instructor requirements are calculated using the host service formulas.\(^{17}\)

Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) Term used to describe any underwater diving with assisted breathing apparatus. Normally divided into subsets of vertical versus horizontal diving and open-air breathing circuits versus closed.

Structure and Manning Decision Review (SMDR) The SMDR is designed to validate total U.S. Army training requirements and then reconcile those requirements to an affordable, acceptable, and executable training program. The SMDR will be conducted annually during the month of April.
Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Summary of organization of personnel and equipment needed to conduct training. In the training environment the POI includes an equipment summary that mandates requirements.

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Similar to TDA, but used for combat or wartime mission units. TOE is difficult to change on the short notice since it reflects doctrine, equipment and manning.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Tools used to meet any tasks within certain conditions and standards.

Training Resource Arbitration Plan (TRAP) A process to raise or lower training requirements normally associated with increasing the number of seats in a class or executing specially numbered courses of any service based on unforeseen needs or lack thereof. The TRAP attempts to provide sufficient training seats to train the total U.S. Army program plus other non-U.S. Army students who attend U.S. Army schools.18

U.S. Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) The major online Department of U.S. Army Information system for support of institutional training missions during peacetime partial or full mobilization, and subsequent reduction to the training base consisting of centralized training management database with interactive terminals.19

Limitations

In the development of this thesis there were few limitations other than available literature on this specific subject. Many articles exist on joint training at the staff and command levels, but few even contemplate the effects of basic joint-level individual training. One limitation was staying current with JSOFI. The officers, NCOs, and civilians from all services in JSOFI have really captured the spirit of joint training and are making significant progress towards deconflicting issues that hinder the joint training process. The expertise required to solve many of the SOF training problems lies within the retired military and civilian work force, who have the required years of
required experience and know of the bureaucratic process better than current active duty military personnel, who spend relatively short tours in the training arena. A glaring deficiency in SOF training is the lack of a council of active duty senior NCOs to focus on SOF training across service boundaries. For the purposes of this study the most knowledgeable person in training development and objectives is Mr. David L. Clark, past training assistant of 2d Battalion, 1st SWTG (A) and currently the Director of Training for JSOFI. Mr. Clark or an equally qualified retired senior SOF soldier should be maintained in JSOFI to give the institution the ability to use the experience from the past and the ability to see into the future. A long-term expert could chart a course with vision and see that vision to completion without the interference of parochial concerns, personality of the players, and the revolving door of the military leadership. The author of this paper also agrees with Mr. Clark that the military should be in charge of the military and that the director of JSOFI must remain a high-level military position. The director of JSOFI should be a former battalion or group commander of a training unit. He should be a Colonel or the equivalent, and have the necessary experience in training development, design, and execution. The learning curve in training is long and arduous with many agencies effecting the final product. To fully appreciate the connectivity of all the players a full-time director should be appointed.

Review of Literature

The only published thesis that approaches the subject of joint training in the SOF environment is written by (then) Lieutenant Colonel Thiery G. Curtis, “Special Operations Joint Training.”20 His paper addresses joint training from a training equivalent of the strategic level. His study has relevance to this thesis, but approaches the issue from a higher command and staff level. Interestingly, many of the ideas and suggestions that Lieutenant Colonel Thiery makes are applicable to the basic and entry training level. Many of the shortcomings he identified are the direct result of a divided training base that has little standardization of training or certification. These shortcomings could be solved if training were approached from the joint perspective in the
schools. The majority of the literatures used in this study are regulations and directives that guide integrated joint or U.S. Army training.

Delimitations

This study will not contain any classified material, which limits the number of positive and negative operational examples of joint training done well and poorly. The many historical examples of small unit infiltration using HALO or SCUBA are small, unpublicized, and covert. This study does not cover the historical perspective of Air Force or Navy SOF training.

Significance of the Study

This study is important because it outlines systemic solutions that will enhance joint special operations forces basic and advanced skill training. The study addresses “The real issue . . . failure to analyze USSOCOM institutional doctrine, training, education, material, and equipment roles, missions, and functions based on what is required of SOF in the twenty-first century.” The suggested changes to each service’s SO education system would reap benefits in better trained personnel, standardized qualifications, coordinated mission need statements (MNS) and logistical savings in purchasing and maintaining similar equipment. The reduction in duplicity alone would save money and reduce the overhead of personnel required to man the training force. The United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) has the instructors and doctrine developers who, if augmented with other service SOF personnel, could develop the SOF University (SOFU). SOFU was an initiative of then Lieutenant General, and later, General Wayne A. Downing, who at the time was the Commanding General of USASOC. He briefed a concept of the SOFU at the April 1993 commander conference held at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. Mr. Joe Alderman, of the DOTD, USAJFKSWCS developed the idea of a SOFU, which he briefed to General Carl Stiner, USCINCSOC. The SOFU would have combined the resources of personnel, facilities and training bases to save money by cutting overhead and manpower, but the
program has been delayed due to problems. With the retirement of General Downing so did his vision for the SOFU (largely due to the lack of a commitment of manpower the university would have required). Also, USSOCOM service components and the services remain unwilling or unable to consolidate the instructor-training base. One would have to assume that the major reluctance is the probable loss of funding, possible loss of self-determination, and the fears associated with change. It is well within the purview of the USCINCSCOC to direct that this occur, and he may ultimately have to direct the development of the SOFU to meet the needs of the warfighting CINCs for a joint institutional training base. The SOFU would be the focal point for all shared, and some similar, entry level and advanced skill training. USAJFKSWCS also has the ability to oversee POI development and stewardship of the U.S. Army selection and assessment programs for the Rangers, Special Operations, Aviation, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and JSOC. With the proper funding and personnel, USAJFKSWC could centralize all U.S. Army SOF assessment, selection, initial entry training, and advanced skill training to meet the needs of the SOF community.

JSOFI should become the USSOCOM agent in control of SOF specific training development, design, and execution for each service. As of 22 February 1996, the new JSOFI missions and functions statement signed by General Downing gave JSOFI the responsibility to be "the principal advisor to the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSCOC) on joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP), joint and common SOF training and education matters, and leader development."^{23}

In addition the new charter authorizes the Commandant of JSOFI to have "tasking authority for the functional areas of common and joint SOF training, education, training simulations, joint doctrine, and JTTP."^{24} The basis of a successful special operations mission is the ability to train separately as a small unit team for the majority of the available training time and then operate without having to adjust TTP at the last minute, which greatly detracts from final mission preparation and execution. The difficulty with present-day SO training is that once services come
together for training, exercises, or missions, the first order of business is deconflicting regulatory guidance, safety conflicts, differences in TTPs, and equipment limitations. USSOCOM has taken some tentative steps towards writing SOF manuals on training, safety, and TTP, but a serious consideration must be made to have JSOFI or USSOCOM write separate field manuals (FMs) and regulations unique for SOF forces. The first attempts to write joint SOF regulations have fallen short of the mark. Joint regulations must deconflict guidance from each service for the execution of identical tasks. Individual training programs must be structured to ensure that personnel achieve proficiency in service-related mission essential task lists (METL), while developing an understanding of the requirements for accomplishing those tasks in a joint and combined environment. For example, the first manual, USSOCOM Manual 350-3. *Training Airborne Operations (Parachuting).* Final Draft. does little to sort out the myriad of differences in TTP and safety regulations between the services.

This study will focus on the advanced skills taught by the different companies of the 2d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). Mainly because of my experience with this unit and the fact that the majority of joint training, with the notable exceptions of civil affairs, psychological operations, and language training, are taught in the 2d Battalion. In chapter two the training base will be discussed for joint SO training to include the Air Force Education and Training Command (AETC), and the Navy Special Warfare Center and School (NAVSPECWARCEN).

**Thesis Structure**

Chapter two is an overview of the three SO training bases, in particular the USAJFKSWCS, AETC, and NAVSPECWARCEN. Specifically the study will look at the classes each training center conducts and the focus of their training. The review will help the reader understand, by comparing and contrasting the services SO curriculum that many classes taught at each of the centers are service specific. However, there are a number of courses that share the same scope and objective. Specifically, many of the advanced skills share the same terminal learning
objectives such as: (1) High Altitude Low/High Opening Parachuting (HALO/HAHO); (2) Combat Diver Course (CDC); (3) Close Quarters Battle (CQB); (4) Target Interdiction or Sniper (5) Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion (SERE); and (6) Individual Terrorist Awareness Course (INTAC).

The idea that there should be one command or organization responsible for all SOF training is not the intent of this thesis. However, the above listed schools are certainly in need of an executive agent to ensure that each of the services SOF train on similar tasks with same tasks conditions and standard where applicable. The idea that one service is better than the other at a particular skill is not the issue. What is of concern is that SOF continues to pay for separate training bases that, for the most part, could combine at least the initial phases of training and similar advanced skills. The realignment of the training pipeline would result in a saving of training dollars, a streamlining of course development and save lives and improve operational mission success.

Chapter three is an overview of the ITRO process, ITRO’s faults, and suggestions for improvement. It discusses the ITRO process and the difficulties with implementing SOF training desires within the confines of that process. This chapter also discusses current training and the impact of the ITRO regulation on becoming truly joint in individual skill training. Specific examples using the HALO and SCUBA school highlight the difficulty in dealing with the ITRO regulation. The chapter also discusses the fallacies of designing joint training in the present structure.

Chapter four examines the single service development of equipment that affects the entire SOF community with little other service consultation. The areas addressed are:

1. The Critical Task Selection Board (CTSB) process as it is now and how it should be redesigned to incorporate joint training.

2. The Curriculum Review Board (CRB) and how improvements could be made to make the CRB a viable tool to focus training on what commanders need.
3. The responsibility of DOTD USAJFKSWCS to:
   a. Request input from these regional CINC's and SOF leaders on what skills and TTP they desire taught.
   b. Question the students on how well they were taught.
   c. Request input from the first line leaders and senior leaders on the quality of graduates they receive from the courses.

   Chapter four discusses the development of a requirement, the MNS, and the design, testing, and fielding of new SOF equipment. Although great strides have been made in the coordination of some items (the SOF handgun for instance) the entire airborne infiltration system, as just one example, is in great need of a central direction and singular body to coordinate the re-equipping effort.

   Chapter five discusses JSOFI's organization, structure, and mission, plus an overview of JSOFI's successes, capabilities, and limitations. The chapter specifically focuses on JSOFI's success in handling the HALO and SCUBA amalgamation. In conclusion, it discusses recommendations for USAJFKSWCS, JSOFI, USASOC, and USSOCOM to become truly joint in conducting individual training. The conclusion recommends ways to standardize training, share resources, and minimize the training base and the logistical requirements to sustain the force.
Endnotes

1U.S. Army, USSOCOM Publication 1, Special Operations in Peace and War (McDill AFB, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 1996), Appendix C-1.


4Ibid., 23.

5Ibid., 23.


7Ibid., 151.


9Pezzele, i.

10Ibid., 151.


12Pezzele, 151-152.

13Ibid., 158.

14Ibid., 17.

15Ibid.


17Ibid., 11.

18Ibid., 9.

19Ibid., 16.


22 Colonel (Retired) Kenneth W. Getty, interview by author, telephone interview, Fayetteville, NC, 7 March 1997.

23 Letter from Commander in Chief, USSOCOM, Re: JSOFI charter, dated 22 February 1996.

24 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING BASE

Operation BOLD ENDEAVOR

“Oh Man, I have a very, very bad feeling about this operation” was the thought racing through the head of Captain Vince Pullman. Pullman was the Commander of SFODA 065, the elite (and only) Combat Diver Detachment within the 2d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group. The omen of disaster ran through his head repeatedly as he and his team boarded the submarine on the pier. His detachment had been chosen by the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander to conduct a special mission within a hostile area, and the only way that they could infiltrate undetected would be to come in from the sea—underwater at that.

The SOF planners at the Theater CINC’s Special Operations Command thought that Captain Pullman’s detachment was ideally suited for this operation because all the of the teams assigned personnel had undergone very strenuous and extensive underwater training. In addition, his team was well versed with the region and the local language. SFODA 065, with one officer, one warrant officer and eight enlisted personnel, had recently completed a SCUBA requalification at the Combat Diver training facility located at Key West, Florida. His team was highly qualified even though they were not receiving “proficiency pay” to conduct underwater training. Still, none of this eased the trepidation the young Captain had about this mission.

The last time Captain Pullman had even thought about conducting training simulating anything near as difficult as this infiltration was during an annual training cycle mission that was set aside from the team’s biennial SCUBA requalification. It had been his personal ambition for his team to get a real submarine lockout or lock-in at least once during his time in command. In order to have that opportunity, his team had to conduct extensive training, under the tutelage of U.S. Navy SEALs assigned to the school, over a five-day period in the lock-in or lock-out chamber. Every member of the team learned, to the
highest degree possible, the exact procedure utilized by the U.S. Navy to conduct submarine lock-in or out procedures. Captain Pullman thought that the commanders of the submarines wanted to be absolutely sure of who operated on their boats. After the training on lockouts, the team would have to conduct another three days of extensive training on the submarines escape trunk, various breathing systems, stowage of the rigging equipment, and repeated full rehearsals of the lock out. Even if the team became proficient they had to assure the submarine Commander that the ODA would not endanger his boat or its crew.

Finally, the day had come for Captain Pullman’s team to do their real lock-out and lock-in. The submarine had been underway for about four hours when the commander of the boat directed the swimmers to their stations. All of the personnel moved to the trunk location, where their gear had been stowed, donned their gear, and made their last minute checks. To assist the Special Forces unit a rigging team climbed into the trunk for the first lock-out. The lock-out proceeded smoothly for the first phase as the command “flood the trunk to the bubble line” rang out. The escape hatch opened gently, and just as the team had rehearsed more than a hundred times, the lead swimmer swam to the conning tower to recover the rigging gear. The infiltration began to unravel when the lead swimmer had difficulty recovering the equipment needed to control the lock out of the other swimmers. Instead of taking the ten minutes as planned, the recovery ended up taking a full twenty-five minutes. As a result the lead swimmer was getting low on air, and his teammates sitting inside the escape trunk were getting cold and slightly annoyed at the unknown cause of the delay. The submarine commander was beginning to wonder if this infiltration was such a good idea after all. The submarine commander’s comment to his Executive Officer (XO) contrasted this operation to the SEALs past performances when he said, “whenever the SEALs do this, it goes like clockwork—what is the problem with these Army dudes—why do they not have the same capabilities as our guys in the Navy—after all, they are all Special Operations folks, are they not?”

By the time Captain Pullman’s team successfully locked out all their swimmers and they had recovered their equipment stowed on the sub, they were a full 45 minutes behind schedule leaving the boat commander furious with the delay. When the team finally arrived on the surface of the ocean, they all wondered what the return trip would be like if this was any indication of things to come. Here they were, the only SF team in the battalion that had this mission, they had trained extensively for over to two weeks, and now they were performing poorly in front of the submarine commander and his crew. “How could this
have happened?” wondered the young SF Captain — “well, there had to be a first time for everything, and the next time that we do this, we will make it right.”

But now practice time was over and this infiltration was for real. There was tension in the air, because intelligence confirmed that the enemy beach security were actively probing for the possibility of an underwater infiltration and were prepared to effectively deter any such attempts. The commander of the submarine, very aware of the danger to his boat, made it very, very clear to his Army passengers that this infiltration would not take very long. If necessary he would shoot all of the team out of the torpedo tubes and be underway regardless of their situation.

The submarine commander felt somewhat assured by the presence of the sixteen-man SEAL platoon. The JSOTF had tasked the SEAL’s to conduct an infiltration using Mark 15 Advanced SEAL Delivery Vehicle’s (ASDV’s) which were basically mini-submarines. The ASDV was capable of transporting SOF personnel on long infiltrations saving the swimmers energy and strength by using the ASDV to get them from one location to another. The sub commander had taken a tour of the Dry Dock Shelter (DDS), a large metal container bolted to the top of a submarine, which held the ASDV. The DDS also stored the SEAL platoon’s equipment, and it even had a hyperbolic chamber for treatment of diving related injuries. The captain was impressed with the equipment and the state of training that these SEALs possessed. The commander felt these SEALs were definitely professionals at underwater operations. The SEAL team commander had twelve lock-outs and lock-ins to his credit, six of these with this platoon, which made him very comfortable at the prospects of a successful infiltration. He had not worked with Army Combat Divers to any degree, especially at something as complex as what they were about to undertake. This mission would be trying for even the most experienced SEALs, and he had seen more than a few good SEALs drop their coveted Trident badge on the CO’s desk after completing a “nightmare” mission.

Captain Pullman and his team did not feel nor display this outward confidence. Sitting in the forward section of the sub, CPT Pullman discussed the mission with his team. The team questions ranged from “what happens if we have trouble rigging our rucksacks?, what happens if we don’t immediately link up with the reception committee on infiltration? Are you sure that you have the right GPS coordinates loaded in the machine?” to “What do we do if everything goes to hell?” All of these questions were
questions that would have normally been so well rehearsed in the isolation phase of the mission planning that the team would never have needed to ask such basic elements of a mission. Captain Pullman felt that the reason for the nervous questions was that the closest any of them had ever been to a DDS was looking at pictures, and that the mini-submersible submarine was a complex, and cramped enclosure that made a coffin look spacious. But there would be no turning back now. The SEAL’s would control the lockout and the SF team was just along for the ride. As the word came over the boat’s intercom for the SF team to move up to the escape trunk, one of the crew of the boat peered his head into the room and wished the team good luck in their mission. What the Navy ensign did not hear was the comment from more than a few of the SF soldiers after their replies of “Thanks” was the muttering of “we’ll need all the luck that we have to make this infiltration on time, together as a team and alive.”

To begin the analysis of joint training, the thesis must first provide some background on the entities, which conduct the training, and the system, which supposedly tells them what and how to train. First the thesis will include a look at the missions of each of the SO units and then the schools and the SO classes they teach.

Each SOF school has a different focus and history. The education programs at the SOF schools were developed long before the publication of the USSOCOM SOF education strategy with the CINC’s education vision and the four SOF education goals.5

USAJFKSWC

Mission

USAJFKSWCS’s focus is on training. “Of sixty-eight courses sic taught, fourteen provide a range of educational subjects (ranging from 100 per cent to 5 per cent of the curriculum). There is no published component education policy for Army SOF.”3 This highlights the fact that JSOF is actively engaged in coordinating the SOF Professional Military Education (PME) tracks from component to component. However, the following skill classes are just beginning to see some of the efforts of skill proponent oversight.
Classes

Combat Diver Qualification Course (CDQC)

CDQC is one of the courses identified by JSOFI's Warfighting Study as redundant. The study cited CDQC as "virtually the same as the Open Circuit Diving module of the U.S. Navy Special Warfare Center (NSWCS) Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUDS/S)." One point of difference, that the study recognizes, is that the BUDS/S course is an accession course for the Navy, whereas CDQC is an advanced skill taught for: Army Special Forces (SF), Army Rangers, Air Force Para-Rescue and Combat Control Teams, and Army Special Mission Unit (SMU) personnel on Combat Diver teams. Of importance to note, Lieutenant General J. T. Scott reduced SF SCUBA teams in 1996 from three teams to one per battalion. In fiscal year 97 CDQC had 170 students from all services start the course; 133 graduated (an attrition rate of 22 per cent). The majority of drops from this course occur in the first week, which focuses mainly on physical fitness and the student's comfortability in water. CDQC teaches the student to use the water as a means of infiltration. The major difference between CDQC and BUDS/S is that the BUDS/S training views water as an operational environment. The Army SCUBA school, located at Key West, Florida, recently completed a major facility overhaul costing approximately eighteen million dollars. The main disagreements in amalgamating the two courses arises over who will take over the control of the Key West facility and the problems with incorporating advanced skill needs of the Army with the assessment of Navy SEALs into the same course.

Combat Diver Supervisor Course (CDSC)

CDSC is another course that the JSOFI Warfighting study identifies as redundant with a Navy counterpart course. This course should not be that difficult to combine, with the obvious exception of closed circuit re-breather training. In 1995 Lieutenant General Scott, then Commanding General of USASOC cancelled all closed circuit training, maintenance and sustainment. General Scott based this decision on feedback from regional CINCs, who had no mission requirement for the skill. Many SCUBA team leaders would argue that closed circuit is indispensable as an infiltration method, but the added conflict of roles with the Navy SEALs and high cost of maintenance doomed the Army closed circuit
diving. The Army currently enrolls sixty-eight personnel in this course and graduated fifty-four (for a twenty-one per cent fail rate) in fiscal year 96.

Dive Maintenance Technician (DMT)

JSOFI identified DMT as a redundant course with the Navy course taught. However, the basis of comparison for the water infiltration courses was the "learning objective" of each course. Some of the separation in course conduct arises from the difference in each services equipment and TTP. The differences have been reduced through 1996 by the Navy’s renewed interest and efforts to perform their duties as the proponent of all waterborne training operations and the Army’s willingness to exchange proponency for maritime operations for the lead in airborne proponency. In fiscal year 96, fifty-two students attended the course with forty-five graduating (13.5 per cent failure rate).

Military Free Fall Parachutist Course (MFFPC)

This is the first course to receive the full attention of JSOFI’s efforts to establish a single training base to reduce redundancy and increase proficiency. From its inception until 1995 the course was ran in its entirety at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The MFFS course has been located in Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, since June of 1996. The final step to total joint SOF HALO/HAHO training is the incorporation of Special Mission Units (SMU) into normally scheduled classes on the ATRRS. If the SMU require continued training for special TTP, a separate course could be arranged at Yuma to provide the isolation required. The continued running of SMU special courses for HALO/HAHO at a different location requires the additional training and sustainment of a separate instructor base, which comes out of an operational manpower pool. In addition, separate courses require additional maintenance and base support of a separate training facility. In fiscal year 96, the basic free fall course enrolled 614 students with 575 graduating (a failure rate of 6.4 per cent). The course is now four weeks long, versus the five weeks two day course formerly at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The move to Yuma, Arizona, also allowed an increase from an average of sixteen jumps per person, per class to approximately thirty six per class. Stationing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, led to the delay of graduation or cancellation of a course due to weather, shortage of aircraft, or unavailability of drop zones which occurred in the fall of 1994. The Navy Development Group had one class of twenty-two students, which was run outside of the ATRRS in fiscal year 96. The Air
Force also had a class of eighteen students, as did the Army Special Mission Units with a class of twenty-two students, and the Navy with classes totaling forty-nine. These classes are above and beyond the resourcing formulas, which support the school with instructors, equipment, and funding.

Military Free Fall Jumpmaster (MFFJM)

This course has made the greatest advancement of any course within any course taught by USAJFKSWCS in the last four years. In the past, the course had a fifty per cent failure rate, which was accepted by the entire community as a quality cut for the high-risk nature and high degree of responsibility of a HALO/HAHO Jump Master (JM). The NCO leadership in the school revised course’s teaching methods in 1996 to teach Jumpmaster Pre Inspection (JMPI) without lowering the high standards required for safe airborne operations. This is one of the few SOF courses that has a long-standing recognized proponency. The advances made in the course are directly related to the course director’s ability to assess the conduct of the course and act as the sole proponent in making changes to provide for a better graduate. In fiscal year 96, 276 students enrolled in the course through ATRRS of whom 207 students graduated. For fiscal year 96 the overall failure rate was twenty-five per cent, the best graduation rate for the course in its existence. The school ran special courses for both Navy and Army SMU in fiscal year 96 as in previous years. But the further conducts of separate courses for the SMU are not necessary and, in fact, detract from Navy and Army SOF missions.

Advanced Military Free Fall Parachutist Course (AMFFPC)

The school designed this course in 1996 to fill two major shortcomings in the conduct of HALO operations. First, to provide to the force a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in freefall issues and second to help standardize the training of prospective instructors assigned to the MFFS. The course has been a success on both levels. Commanders now have a SME who can assist with the planning of any HALO/HAHO operation, discuss the capabilities of the tandem bundle system, and assist the command with questions of TTP and the quarterly conduct of currency training. The students are taught advanced air skills, system capabilities, training design, and how to conduct safe training for allied forces and US. The course runs four times per year with twelve students per class. This class is also a direct result of the
proponent for airborne operations identifying a gap in training and capabilities and taking positive action. In fiscal year 96, thirty-seven students enrolled and thirty-six graduated (a 2.7 per cent failure rate).

**Tandem Bundle/Personnel**

The Tandem course is presently a course internal to B Co., 2d Bn, 1st SWTG (A). The school taught this unique skill to instructors in anticipation that the SOF Air Delivery Modernization Program would realize that the ORION, a Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation system bundle, and the Aerial Precision Delivery System (APADS) were not nearly as accurate, available, and trainable as the tandem bundle system.

**Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC)**

SOTIC is the SO version of a sniper course. The Marines and conventional Army both have their own sniper courses, which vary mostly in equipment but very little in technique. Sniper operations are utilized at every level of operations and are therefore not considered solely SO. As a result, each service has generated a need to have its own school to train their service personnel. The USAJFKSWCS course experiences a 24 per cent failure rate in the SOTIC. The instruction is extremely professional but the high standards account for the majority of the attrition.

**Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis, and Exploitation Course (SFARTAETC)**

SFARTAETC exists to make sure that in a close quarters battle (CQB) situation "the first time a soldier does something, shouldn’t be while people are shooting at him." SFARTAETC graduates soldiers who are immediately available to the theater CINCs to perform missions at the highest level of stress and risk. The only shortcomings the graduate would face are limited knowledge of their future team’s internal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The success of this course is found in the Army’s ability to interface at the user level to ensure that the SFARTAETC units in the field are getting graduates who are capable of meeting standard skills and newly fielded equipment. Company D has one of the few advanced skill units that specifically recruits commanders and first sergeants have experience in CQB.
Special Operations Training Course (SOTC)

SOTC is one of the two CQB courses taught by USAJFKSWCS. "SOTC is focused at the detachment, fire team, squad level." The primary objective is to focus on small-unsophisticated targets for the relative beginner in a high-risk target takedown planning and violent execution. The best utilization of the SOTC is as a team-training event for improving Foreign Internal Development (FID) or Mobile Training Team (MTT) mission preparedness.

Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion (SERE)

SERE, the U.S. Army currently has a nineteen day POI taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and stands steadfastly by that figure to complete requisite skills for what is considered as minimal SERE training for selected SOF personnel. However, the Air Force, as the proponent of SERE, proposed an ITRO process evaluation of the consolidation of SERE. General Frederick Franks, then CG of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), passed the responsibility to the Joint Service SERE Agency (JSSA). The JSSA is supposedly a joint agency, but in fact is almost totally manned by Air Force active duty or retired personnel. Many U.S. Army personnel affiliated with the SERE school see the Air Force not only as threat to the POI developed by the late Colonel Nick Rowe, but also as a transparent threat to assume directive proponency thereby making the two courses more similar. Once the two courses are similar, then the ITRO process may incorporate the two schools under JSSA, and Air Force control. The SERE School handles 694 students per year. Of that total 653 graduated in fiscal year 96 for an attrition rate of 6.0 percent.

Air Force Education Training Center (AETC)

History

The JSOFI Education Study Executive Summery states that "The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS) focus is fully on education. All 15 courses are 100 per cent education." The AETC has participated in Air Force (AF) SOF training since 1 January 1996. AETC is responsible for institutional training and in its present structure is responsible for the Combat Control Team (CCT) and Para-rescue training that provides graduates to the conventional and SOF Air Force. As of the publication of this paper, efforts are ongoing to transfer control of the CCT and Para-rescue training pipeline to the Air
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This move was to be one of the cornerstones of this thesis, asking why the transfer had not already occurred. The biggest factor in any of the moves of institutional training bases from component forces to USSOCOM subordinate commands is the perceived and actual loss of control of the curriculum by the component force. In the case of Air Force CCT and Para-rescue training, one cannot emphasize enough the advantages of having the SOF oversight for the course planning and execution.

Training

CCT and Para-rescue personnel attend a pipeline-training regimen that takes them through their initial training in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, to the final phases of training either at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina for the CCT, or Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, for the Para-rescue. The recruits for AF CCT and Para-rescue personnel differ greatly from Army SOF candidates. The main differences are the age, rank, and experience levels. Consequently, the AF indoctrinates the candidates for six weeks in Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in physical fitness and basic skills. Then the candidates start the "pipeline" training that takes them through the Army static line airborne school, the Army SCUBA school, the Army MFFS, the AF survival school and then finally the AF water survival school. The Para-rescue (PJ) candidates attend the newly designed medical course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, then the CCT, and PJ students receive their individual skill training. The AF has experienced a high attrition rate in this pipeline. In addition, the lack of any great control, and often-minimum participation, in developing course goals has left the AF dependent upon the Army for their pipeline flow and alignment.

Classes

Para-rescue

The primary mission of PJ is to provide emergency medical treatment in peacetime and combat situations. The PJs, as they are more commonly referred to as, are trained to infiltrate using SCUBA gear, both open and closed circuit, static line jumps, they can deploy parachutists capable of both HALO and HAHO infiltrations, and sub locksouts. (An infiltration method consisting of existing a submerged submarine using either SCUBA equipment or a submersible mini-sub.) Depending on the team area orientation, the teams may be proficient in mountain operations, helicopter infiltration, motorcycle or all-
terrain vehicle operations, and some may possess a high degree of arctic movement skills. The PJs are generally more medically oriented than the CCT and the PJs have a lower skill level in these other disciplines than the CCT.

Combat Control Teams

"The mission of the Combat Control School is to train United States Air Force and selected Joint and allied personnel in basic combat skills supporting control of air traffic in an austere or combat airhead area." The school also conducts advanced training in static line jumpmaster and survey operation skills. The CCT use the full realm of infiltration techniques to infiltrate into both semi and non-permissive environments. Once on the ground, they establish assault zones or landing areas with air traffic control support. The CCT can assist in recoveries and exfiltration of most types of equipment personnel or downed aircraft. The CCT also provide fire control for the AC-130 aerial gunship platforms and, like most SOF assets, have a very capable communications package to assist the commander. The CCT are an extension of the original Army Pathfinders that, after the establishment of the AF as a separate service in 1947, the AF established in 1953. The CCT are more technically capable than Pathfinders, who graduate from the Army school with an additional skill identifier, but not a MOS.

Naval Special Warfare Command

Mission

The mission of Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command is to prepare Naval Special Warfare forces to carry out assigned missions and to develop naval special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics. He exercises operational control of all United States based Naval Special Warfare forces and is responsible for the administration, training, maintenance, support, and readiness of all active and reserve Naval Special Warfare forces. Under his command is the Naval Special Warfare Development Group and the Naval Special Warfare Center (NSWC). The Development Group, located in Little Creek, Virginia, provides centralized management for the test, evaluation and development of current and emerging technology ... also develops maritime ground and airborne tactics for Naval Special Warfare and possible Department of Defense wide application.
Naval Special Warfare Center

The Naval Special Warfare Center located at Coronado, California, conducts the majority of their advanced training skill classes for the SEALs only. USAJFKSWCS does have liaison personnel assigned to Coronado, California in exchange for Navy personnel stationed at the USAJFKSWCS maritime operations school in Key West, Florida. One can already see some of the confusion over joint responsibilities by looking at the mission statement of Development Group. The development of airborne doctrine is specifically an army function, just as the development of maritime operations doctrine is a navy function. Regardless of whose responsibility it is to develop these two areas of expertise, one can already begin to see that there are agencies within each service working towards the same objective with different concerns. These differences in TTP and equipment result from dissimilar needs in the training base, thereby requiring separate classes and training bases.

Classes

**Basic Underwater Demolition/ SEAL (BUD/S)**

This course is perhaps the most physically demanding military course in the world. It stresses extreme levels of physical and mental conditioning, consists of extensive physical training, long distance running and swimming, beach reconnaissance and survey techniques, small unit tactics, practical demolition techniques, principles of diving, and open and closed circuit SCUBA diving.

**MARK16 Underwater Breathing Apparatus (MK16 UBA)**

Graduates of this course, primarily SEAL personnel and SEAL delivery vehicle personnel, will be operationally familiar with the functions and employment of the MK-16 UBA with MK-24 Full-Face Mask (FFM).

**Submarine Lock-Out/Lock-In using Free Swimming Ascent and SCUBA**

A lecture/demonstration of free swimming ascent techniques is followed by a practical application period, in which the student makes one free-swimming ascent from 25 feet and one from 50 feet. A film and lecture on Submarine Escape Procedures precedes the practical application period, in which the student performs one submarine lock-out/lock-in utilizing free-swimming ascent or SCUBA (optional).
SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV)

The SDV is a mini submarine, which is completely wet on the interior allowing personnel to infiltrate in SCUBA gear while in the sub. The two phases of the course consists of classroom instruction on theory and design characteristics and a practical phase consisting of driving, navigating, and maintaining the MK-8 SDV.

MK-16 Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA) Maintenance and Repair

Instruction covers physical characteristics, technical manual familiarity, routine maintenance, safety precautions pertaining to maintenance, Failure Analysis Reporting, and corrective maintenance.

Naval Special Warfare Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Selection

This course is a demanding screening process to select those candidates who show the best possibilities to enter BUD/S and become a SEAL. Physical tests and a personal performance profile follow instruction in physical conditioning and swimming to include underwater knot tying and life saving.

Combat Fighting Course (CFC) Basic

Training is conducted at an intense level covering CFC mind-set, methodology and practical skills. Instruction covers basic training to perform hand-to-hand and hand-to-weapon techniques.

CFC Advanced

Training is conducted at an intensive level covering CFC mind-set, methodology, and practical skills. Course covers basic and advanced training to perform hand-to-hand and hand-to-weapons techniques.

Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SOF Open Circuit Scuba

Instruction will cover fundamentals of open circuit diving (SCUBA) equipment, medical aspects of diving and provide practical experience with SCUBA equipment.
SDV Electronic Maintenance

Graduates must be able to maintain, troubleshoot and repair electronic systems to associated SDVs under all conditions of readiness.

Special Operations Technician (SOT)

Instruction in diving physics and underwater physiology enables the special operations corpsman to understand the effects of pressure on the human body. Instruction is given with particular emphasis on treating compressed gas illnesses, accident prevention, dangerous marine life, the treatment of diving accidents including differential diagnosis, neurological examination, physical examination, treatment table, hyperbaric operations, and recompression chamber operation. Upon completion of the SOT training pipeline, the SOT corpsman is academically prepared to practice dive medicine with SEAL/SDV teams or other special operations units.

Diving Supervisor

The course includes classroom instruction in diving medicine, air decompression and treatment tables and a thorough re-familiarization with the various scuba diving apparatus used in SEAL/SDV operations. Practical instruction is given in diving supervisor pre-dive checks and pre-dive briefings.

Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL Indoc/training

A progressive approach to physical conditioning of running, swimming, calisthenics, and obstacle course. Attention is given to sufficient recovery time between physical evolutions to eliminate injuries due to fatigue and poor conditioning, with emphasis on achieving a passing score on the BUD/S physical-screening test. This course is high-risk.

Diving Maintenance

Students will be qualified to perform duties without supervision of an open circuit, closed circuit, Draeger MK-25 MOD-1 (Low Mag) and MK-6 Life Preserver technician, platoon diving representative, HASKEL oxygen pump maintenance, and RIX air compressor maintenance in Naval Special Warfare Command diving departments or while independently deployed. A portion of this course will also familiarize students with diving related reports and reporting procedures.
Open Circuit Procedures

This course is designed for personnel who conduct MTT teaching to train non USN qualified diving personnel to successfully use USN open circuit diving equipment and standardized procedures.

Closed Circuit Procedures

This course is designed for personnel who conduct MTT teaching to train non USN qualified diving personnel to successfully use USN closed circuit diving equipment and standardized procedures.

Draeger Lar V Transition

Instruction will include medical aspects of closed circuit diving, Draeger familiarization, combat swimmer attack board, swimmer sneak attack and both day and night dives under various conditions.

Maritime Operations (MAROPS)

Preliminary classroom instruction consists of lecture and demonstration in basic and advanced navigation with in-class practical work. Actual practical application in Zodiac F-470 combat rubber crafts includes preoperational planning and over-the-horizon navigational transits.

Static Line Jumpmaster

Students will learn the duties and responsibilities to safely manage personnel conducting parachute operations from various aircraft platforms.

Ram Air Parachute Transition (RAPT)

This course of instruction will prepare students to safely use the MT-IXS/SL ram-air parachute from a static-line mode.

SEAL Weapons System (SWS)

Initial classroom instruction consists of lecture/demonstration with inert training devices and media supported presentations. Training includes operator level maintenance procedures. Practical applications include the use of open/closed circuit SCUBA diving with both inert and live ordnance items.
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

USSOCOM oversees joint training from two primary levels and one tertiary aspect.

The first two are joint Professional Military Education (PME) training and joint exercise training.

Directive Number 350-25 states:

The goal of USSOCOM training is to produce a combat ready, professional force, physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win, across the full spectrum of conflict.13

USSOCOM plans to use a training strategy of:

1. Standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by special operations forces (SOF) will be a central focus of training programs, as well as documentation of these standardized TTPs for future benefit to others.

2. Individual Services will provide personnel, that have completed the prerequisite training to meet the Service standard, to begin SO, CA or PSYOP qualification training.

3. USSOCOM components will establish the standards and evaluate the effectiveness of selection, qualification, and advanced skills training programs.

4. Service and USSOCOM training responsibilities for SO, CA and PSYOP training have been defined in memoranda of agreement (MOAs) between each Service and USSOCOM. These MOAs will be updated as required to ensure their continued accuracy.14

Other non-SO personnel and skills need to be taught elsewhere. Instructor ratios applied to the support of these classes by SOF do not offset the conventional price:

While specific responsibilities for conducting individual training are split between the services and USSOCOM components, USCINCSOC retains the responsibility for establishing training standards and evaluating the effectiveness of all SO, CA and PSYOP training programs. He also retains the responsibility for ensuring that Service component individual training tasks reflect joint conditions and standards when the task will be performed in a joint environment.15

The problem begins at the top and the "top" in this case is USSOCOM. Even though USSOCOM J3 Training performs many tasks admirably, it does not coordinate each service's present or future training requirements. USSOCOM’s charter tasks it to: "analyze future institutional doctrine, training education, material, and equipment . . . roles, missions and functions based on what is required of SF in the 21st century."16 With this responsibility USSOCOM should have a systemic program awareness to coordinate all three service's requirements into a training version of MNS. With a MNS, resource managers could
look at numbers of students for each type of training, a task performed currently by the USASOC DCSOPS Training section, timing of the fielding of new equipment and its incorporation into the training base and to the operational units. Later I will discuss two examples of uncoordinated equipment fielding that almost led to disastrous results. This chapter will also discuss some of the improvements that the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Integration (DCSRI) has made since that time to improve equipment fielding and new equipment training. In addition, a USSOCOM level training alignment section could marry future doctrine and missions of SOF units to a prioritized training list. This prioritization would assist in the proper disbursement of the limited training dollars SOF has to the most critical of skills.

For example, a 1993 study made by the group operations officer of 1st SWTG (A) estimated that MFF course cost $3,580 per student. Although I doubt the actual dollar figure is any where near accurate in capturing the costs of the MFF course, estimators applied the same formula to each of the advanced skill POI to give a comparative analysis of costs. These comparisons could be used to prioritize classes within USSOCOM’s core critical task list. Even more importantly, an entity that could plan the training vision of SOF to align with new equipment, doctrine and future missions would not only save money for SOF, but also ensure a properly trained force for the mission at hand. At present no system or agency exists to accomplish these tasks.

At a January 1997 briefing, given by Colonel Seigfried Hildebrandt, the USSOCOM J5/7, to the SOF students attending to U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he highlighted the progress USSOCOM had made in “nesting” each equipment research and development, equipment acquisition, and procurement program. The concept is to “nest” equipment programs within one or more of the SOF core critical tasks. The review of USSOCOM priority missions provides the command with a template to justify equipment and exercise expenditures in support of assigned theater CINC missions. Although the budget for research and development of military equipment declined to hold at a steady rate over the past few years, the comparison of the ratio expenditures to missions helps justify the continued upgrade of equipment provided to SOF. However, USSOCOM, or JSOFI as its agent, has the ability to use this report to a greater degree in focusing on training in a joint environment. It is unfathomable that similar efforts were not being made to ensure SOF training is also up to date and on target for present and future roles and missions. One JSOFI study however requested a
method to determine "how well the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community's joint and common institutional training programs support the USSOCOM's core, essential, and supporting tasks." 17 In addition to this overall three-service study, the USAJFKSWCS has initiated a project to incorporate SOF critical tasks into the Army SOF training base. USSOCOM's core critical task list should be forwarded to each respective service's training center, to give them guidance on training priorities for SOF forces.

One of the problems associated with joint training is language training. Not a foreign language although some would compare each service's training language as foreign, but in training languages. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force do not speak the same training language, no matter how cooperative their effort. The U.S. Army has a long-standing tradition of basing training, equipment, and organization structure on doctrine. Although the actual term "doctrine" is fairly new, the system itself has survived since the early 1930s. Army SOF relies heavily on doctrine for training development, whereas the navy SOF relies heavily on the blue water navy for support and direction, which is often unrelated to SOF requirements. As a result the Navy SOF training base appears to be disjointed and inefficient. Do not think that the inefficiency is totally an inter service issue. Even within Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) the duplication of similar training bases depletes the operational forces and drains already stretched training dollars. For example, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces and Special Mission Units all conduct their own selection and assessment training and, to varied extents, their own specialty skill training. All of these units conduct what is commonly referred to as institutional training, which is theoretically the responsibility of USAJFKSWCS. To illustrate, the Ranger regiment runs the Ranger Orientation Program (ROP) for Ranger qualified officers and NCOs due to enter the Ranger regiment and the Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP) for initial entry personnel in the lower enlisted grades to assess and select personnel for assignment to the Ranger battalions. RIP and ROP are a weeklong crucible to test the physical stamina, mental willingness, and resolve to face the high operational tempo that the Ranger battalions face in both training and real world deployments. RIP is "designed for the kids coming out of Jump School and just entering the Regiment . . . three weeks in duration . . . used as a weeding out tool and to expose them to standards, operating procedures, and general life within the battalions." 18
The RIP participants are not Ranger qualified, which is the major difference from ROP. RIP is three weeks long and supports soldiers from the ranks of E-1 to E-6. ROP supports Ranger qualified soldiers from the rank of E-5 and above and is two weeks in duration. RIP and ROP utilize a cadre of operational personnel from the Ranger battalions, which should be filling TOE positions—in other words war-fighting positions. Are RIP and ROP necessary? Yes, the vettement process provides a valuable service. First, it reaffirms the commitment and physical fitness of personnel returning to the Ranger Regiment who have been away from the insular society that the Rangers have developed. Second, RIP and ROP establishes a common baseline between officers, NCO’s and enlisted personnel that establish shared bona fides. The Infantry Center and School run the Ranger school itself, which leads to the Ranger Regiment having “strong ties to the Infantry School and that branch.” Some type of arrangement between the Ranger School and USAJFKSWCS would need to be arranged to take responsibility for the management of RIP and ROP. However, it makes sense that USAJFKSWCS, the schoolhouse for USASOC, would have oversight of the troops assessed into the Ranger Regiment, since the latter is subordinate to USASOC.

In addition to the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) has its own institutional training base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The 160th has an initial training unit, named the Green Platoon, which trains all personnel transitioning into 160th. Every pilot attempting to assess as a fully mission capable pilot, pilots assigned as administrative personnel and non aviators attend some or all of the four phases of Green Platoon training. Portions of the phases are not always in sequence due to the availability of class slots outside of the Green Platoon’s control. Phase I includes SERE level C, conducted by USAJFKSWCS in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for those who will become mission pilots or may face the likely possibility of becoming hostages or prisoners of war. Phase II includes academics for all pilots regardless of their assignment after the Green Platoon. This phase of the course is different for non-aviators. The class includes personal protection, marksmanship, unit history and indoctrination and basic unit in-processing. Phase III includes basic flying skills regardless of the eventual aircraft the candidate may fly upon graduation. The candidates learn to brief, plan, and prepare maps for navigation, all within 160th standard procedures. This is the phase where the pilots begin to fly every day on “slick” or non specially equipped aircraft to learn how to navigate. The pilot candidates work in four to
six man teams and must pass this phase to graduate to Phase IV with a "check ride" to evaluate their intermediate flying and navigation skills. Phase IV is for mission capable candidates only and begins to assess and train students in one of the six specialty aircraft that 160th utilizes. The total length of the course for enlisted personnel is four weeks plus SERE school, if they are going to a job with inherent risks of capture. Those aviator personnel evaluated as mission capable pilots have a twenty-one week curriculum in addition to a five-week transition course for the newer ECHO or KILO models of the MH47 or MH60. Other pilots have a nine-week stint in Green Platoon for their aircraft. Administrative or non-mission capable pilots have a three-week training phase. 21

Presently the school is commanded by a lieutenant colonel in an O4 position and efforts are underway to make the position the equivalent to a battalion command position for an O5. 22 Some may think this is an over inflated position for a lieutenant colonel but, when one considers that there are twenty-four of the most sophisticated aircraft in the world in the training platoon it is relatively easy to validate the position for battalion command. The TDA has twenty-five personnel, of who four are military, with the commander and two captains and two chief warrant officers; four who are the safety and standardization officers, twenty-one are army civilians. 23

Not only does Green Platoon run the training and the twenty-four aircraft to support the training, but it also runs two of the most advanced and sophisticated flight simulators in the world. The Aviation Center in Fort Rucker, Alabama, has signed a waiver to allow Green Platoon to conduct transition aircraft training at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for the E and K model aircraft. The issue is that 160th conducts institutional training that overlaps into the USAJFKSWCS realm of expertise and oversight. It is not recommended nor feasible that 160th come under the purview of USAJFKSWCS totally, nor should Green Platoon be left to fend for themselves. Green Platoon resulted from a 1983 General Officer Panel chaired due to the high rate of lethal accidents that 160th suffered that year. 24 This is an example of the disconnect between USAJFKSWCS and the units it is required to support with institutional training. It is not feasible to move Green Platoon to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, nor is it suggested, but Green Platoon could benefit greatly from the standardized POI and COI development expertise of USAJFKSWCS. USAJFKSWCS has dedicated doctorate degree level personnel to assist with the design, documentation and execution of training. In addition 160th would benefit from having a liaison with USAJFKSWCS to help coordinate
SERE training dates and share POI development or TTP changes in the core basic non aviation skills, that USAJFKSWCS teaches in INTAC and basic shooting skills USAJFKSWCS teaches in SFARTAETC. Just within USASOC, the standardization of training could be improved dramatically and the historical documentation developed to continue the courses over time with the proper evolution, instead of passing the class structure and purpose from generation to generation. Now consider, in light of the comments made by the Holloway Commission on the execution of the hostage rescue, why USSOCOM has not addressed the completely separate and disparate training programs that the U.S. Air Force and Army aviators utilize. True, the aviators have different missions and different platforms, but can they operate jointly any better than they did in 1983?
Endnotes

1Major Mike Langley, "Operation Bold Endeavor," Draft, Unpublished (E-mailed to author), 123.

2Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, JSOFI Education Study Executive Summary, 8.

3Ibid., 8.


5Ibid.

6Morris, Will Major (1997, February). Notes on Joint Training: Commentary on Joint Training. Available E-mail: xxxxxx@aol.com.

7Ibid.

8Ibid.

9JSOFI Education Study Executive Summary, 9.

10CCT School Command Mission Brief, slide supplied by Major Paul Venturella, no date or name on Brief.


12Ibid., 4.


14Ibid., 1-2.

15Ibid., 2-3.


18Gallagher, Pat, Major (Retired) (1997, February). Notes on Joint Training: Commentary on Joint Training. Available E-mail: xxxxxx@aol.com.
19Ibid.

20Ibid.


22Ibid.

23Ibid.

24Ibid., 10 February 1997.
CHAPTER 3

REGULATORY GUIDANCE FOR JOINT TRAINING

The process of designing a joint special operations course falls into four broad but basic categories: requirements, plans, execution, and assessment. The final draft of Joint Training Manual CJCSM 3500.03 outlines these planning factors. Although this sounds like an oxymoron, the steps to design a course are systematically easy, but with inter service differences in purpose and desired end states, often difficult to achieve.

The difficulty in reaching a shared COI is attributable to three problems. First, each service has a different plan for assessing individuals into their training base. Second, the method of designing a course and the management of resources and the time line to design and implement training is different for each service. Third, each service has a different equipment and doctrine development base, which calls for different training POIs and varied utilization of the specialized skills. There is a perceived lack of understanding of the separate systems of training development between services. There is not normally a lack of cooperation, just minimal understanding of the mechanics, resources and time constraints each training base manager must administer. The ITRO process should alleviate many of the differences in training development and conduct. Although ITRO is not specifically responsible for training development, the effects of combining courses to save money and make training more efficient does influence training development. For example, the ITRO process itself does not study or assess training development, but once a course is earmarked for ITRO oversight, the ITRO regulation specifically delineates who has what rights and
responsibilities in changing training design and execution. ITRO, which is a service wide process, deals with the "responsibilities, and procedures required to manage U.S. Army individual training requirements and resources."¹ The U.S. Army version of the ITRO regulations specifically states that it manages its own training requirements. The overall DOD ITRO process deals with the supposed seamless assimilation of U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy training resources and systems to provide an efficient and effective training platform for conventional and SO forces.

Two of the major tools that the U.S. Army uses to accomplish internal coordination are the Critical Task Selection Board (CTSB) and Curriculum Review Board (CRB). The CRB and, less used CTSB, are training development tools which the U.S. Army uses to design and align training to meet the requirements of the force. However, these processes do not fully meet the requirements of joint special operations in their current configuration. The process USAJFKSWCS currently uses to oversee U.S. Army SOF courses development design and adjustments in scope and execution are the: (1) Critical Task Selection Board (CTSB); (2) task selection; (3) curriculum review; and (4) training Evaluation.

The JSOFI Warfighting study points out very clearly that some SOF courses, each taught by the Army, Navy, and Air Force are redundant in scope, objective and at a minimum redundant in individual POI of certain courses. The training design that USAJFKSWCS uses for Army SOF requirements needs adjustment to incorporate a more service wide flavor. Each course needs to address the individual training plan of each course, then chair a critical task selection board, and continue the process to develop a curriculum and training plan that benefits SOF overall.

The Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), for the USAJFKSWCS, has one of the most important responsibilities in the training process. However, due to budget cuts and manpower reductions, the three-legged stool that once supported U.S. Army special operations training is in dire jeopardy of falling over. Those three legs of the stool: field input into the direction of a course;
supervisor input into the readiness of the graduate; and student input into the applicability of the course, are not in synchronization.

The first of the three pillars of training is USAJFKSWCS’s responsibility to establish what the field views as mission critical tasks, either by visits to the units or conferences held in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The first question to be asked in the process of developing effective training is: What skill does the training seek to develop? How much does the skill being trained differ from the actual skill to be used on the job?²

In accordance with USAJFKSWCS, Regulation 10-1 will perform the following mission and functions:

**Mission.** The Special Forces Development Branch manages the development of STP’s and SDT’s for CMF 18. It develops MQS materials for SF officers. It manages the development and production of training materials for the SFQC and ANCOC, and other related training courses.

**Functions.** (1) Coordinates the preparation of proponent ITP’s. Ensures the ITPs, CADs and POIs are consistent; (2) Participates in Critical Task Selection Boards (CTSB’s), Subject Matter Expert Review Boards (SMERB’s) and CRB to support individual training products and courses. Contributes input on directions, concepts, and strategies of individual training; and (3) Coordinates all actions related to CMF 18 individual training with other SOF and services.³

Technically, USAJFKSWCS conducts a CTSB only at the implementation of a new course. However, since most of the special operations courses are long standing, the CTSB does not really effect course design or implementation. The CRB, which USAJFKSWCS is supposed to conduct every two years for each course, supposedly assists in the mid-course correction, or updating, of existing courses. The weak link in this system is that the CRBs are poorly attended, even by U.S. Army personnel, much less the representative from the sister service’s SOF. The CRB should not only be a review of the course teaching methods, but a review of doctrine on the employment of specialty skills, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and how well the training base is meeting this requirement. All too often the CRB focuses on teaching methods that vary from service to service. "Training programs must accurately define the skill that is desired. Only then can that skill
be reliably trained." Often units send whoever is available to attend the CRB, without taking into consideration that the decisions made at the conference are the impetus for USAJFKSWCS to initiate changes in POI. One of the significant impacts of the POI (the POI has equally important sections including the Course Administrative Data and Equipment Summary) is that it drives the number and type of contact hours for instruction. The contact hours are then used to calculate the number of instructors USAJFKSWCS and the sister services must have on hand to teach the course. Although this sounds logical, the problem arises when USAJFKSWCS begins to change the POI based on CRB results, only to find that commanders in the field and sister services have different ideas on the direction they would like a course to take. This became even more evident when the Freefall School became truly joint. One good example is the change in the POI of the SCUBA course in Key West, Florida, in 1994. When USASOC decided to eliminate the closed circuit portion of the course, USASOC made little effective coordination with the Air Force on the deletion of the LAR IV UBA, and the inclusion of Water Infiltration Course (WIC) skills for the USAF personnel. True, the U. S. Army runs the course, but technically, according to the ITRO process, the Navy oversees the course content. However the course is run solely for the purpose of meeting the stated U.S. Army training requirements. This led to the Air Force’s decision to “graduate” their personnel early to avoid the water infiltration course skills that they felt their personnel did not need. This further complicated matters that were already murky, since the U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force all have a basic combat diver badge, which is identical in design, but three different qualification standards. Of these three, the U.S. Army and Air Force students graduate from the same school! Each service may be happy with whatever quality and TTP of the graduate they derive from the course, but in the long term Special Operations is developing a future generation of “unjoint” special operations forces. To the casual observer, this has little impact on daily operations and training. However, considering that the first option seems to have been for infiltrating a joint Air Force and Navy SEAL platoon into Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury was via a sub
lockout operation, the results could have proved fatal. In the end the commander of forces scrubbed
the mission using a sub infiltration due to the SEAL platoon personnel not up to standards for this
type of mission. 5 In the end, the SEALs attempted to infiltrate twice by surface means but failed,
thus depriving the operational commander of much needed intelligence. Would the mission have
been successful as a sub lock out infiltration? Most likely, yes, if the SEAL platoon was up to
speed on training. But it is a moot point, since the Air Force qualified SCUBA personnel on the
mission had never even attempted an actual submarine lock out. This is but one example of trying
to mix and match forces for a mission that was thwarted from the very beginning by the lack of
shared common skills.

The second pillar of training is USAJKSWCS’s responsibility to conduct surveys. Those
surveyed include commanders, team sergeants, and first line supervisors of the skill level of the
trainees graduated from USAJKSWCS courses. In accordance with USAJKSWCS Regulation
10-1, the office of the director, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES), recently
renamed the Evaluation Branch of Analysis and Evaluation should develop “policies and
procedures to conduct selected internal and external evaluations to determine the competency and
utilization of graduates and the adequacy of training support materials.”6

In fact there is an entire division tasked to ensure that the force is receiving the proper
training. That division is the Internal Evaluation and Standardization Division (IESD), who
conducts “internal evaluations of training programs and materials to support field unit requirements.
Provides technical guidance and assistance in the development and use of end-of-course critiques.”7

The IESD has the responsibility, listed as “functions,” to accomplish the following:

1. Conducts selected internal evaluations of USAJKSWCS courses to monitor quality of
resident/nonresident training focusing on student learning, instructor competence, and
course content reflecting adherence to current doctrine.

2. Analyzes data obtained and provides information to proponent activities to assist in the
adjustment of institutional training and doctrine development. Recommends alternative
courses of action to optimize fielded products, programs, and systems performance.
3. Develops and administers evaluative surveys and questionnaires and conducts interviews with students and instructors, as required.

4. Participates in IPR’s to determine if USAJKSWCS’ products are in compliance with regulatory standards and procedures.

5. Provides technical expertise in test designs to the training companies and approves questions for use on tests.

6. Conducts standardization visits to 1st SWTG (A) proponent units in order to provide advice and assistance regarding the executions of training programs.8

Within this purview, USAJKSWCS should conduct either written surveys or conferences with a collection of, not only, U.S. Army but sister service first line supervisors also. The personnel invited to the symposium should be primarily first line supervisors and commanders. The supervisors should have the best idea of the recent graduates’ individual and collective abilities to perform METL tasks. The first line supervisors should be a collective body of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force personnel who have no affiliation with the USAJKSWCS, AETC or COMNAVSPECWARCEN schools, but are assigned to TOE, or their service equivalent, units. The difficulty involved in assembling SME for this type of symposium is twofold. First, the SME must be very well couched in the doctrine and TTP of his individual service. Based on past U.S. Army only CRBs, SMEs are more interested in changing basic or advanced skills to meet their team or unit mission profile than meeting the needs of the entire force. Attendees must understand the overall purpose and doctrine of each skill or the purpose of the class POI in question. Too many times attendees at such meetings have had personal agendas that have sidetracked the school’s or that service’s progress. For example, in 1994 a conference was held in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to discuss the direction that the MFF Course would take to focus the course on training to each service’s standard. During the meeting the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy representatives decided that teaching HAHO at the school was not the school’s job and that HAHO was an advanced skill that should be taught at the unit level. USAJKSWCS honored the decision and focused on teaching students to achieve safe jumping skills, but with minimum tactical proficiency. This
decision was in direct contradiction to the needs of U.S. Army SO. FM31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, lists air infiltration as “the most rapid means of clandestine infiltration” and HAHO as the primary tactical means of airborne infiltration for SOF. Where else but in the initial training courses would it have been safer, more standardized and more professionally taught to learn these very specific techniques? Luckily, the commanding general of USAJFKSWCS saw the disparity between the desires of the conference attendees and the desired needs of the armed forces and now HAHO is included in the COI of the MFFS basic course. To illustrate further, the MFFS now conducts a series of jumps at the end of each class that qualify graduates to go straight to an operational unit and perform night, combat equipment, HAHO, oxygen jumps. Similar incidents exist in SCUBA, INTAC and SFARTEC. The collective SME should not focus only on what is being taught, but the mission capability of the graduates. The conference should address shortcomings in the graduates’ skills due to either the type, or lack, of training. For example, in the SCUBA course the basic underwater skills were the long time focus of the COI. Special Forces team leaders and team sergeants informally surfaced the issue that graduates had not completed an underwater combat equipment swim prior to arriving on a team. Similar to the HAHO issue, USAJFKSWCS was graduating SCUBA students who could not perform the primary skill in SCUBA infiltration. Fortunately, the SCUBA school has included the rucksack swim in the curriculum and is now graduating more prepared SCUBA team members. However, the corrections of the HAHO and SCUBA situations happened by chance, and due to the vision of the instructors. A systematic SME conference is supposed to assist in having training parallel unit METL and equipment to graduate a better prepared SO operator.

The second problem with conducting supervisor SME conferences is the logistics and cost of getting the participants together. Scheduling conferences in SO is often a hit and miss proposal, since many of the participants rotate through jobs too fast to establish the experience necessary to contribute effectively to the long term training process. Also, many of the SME in SOF are
deployed without notice and cannot attend the CRB. As an option, written surveys sent to units are very ineffective for two reasons. First, the response percentage is low and secondly, the surveys are rarely answered by the true SME in the operational units. Often, USAJFKSWCS company commanders are the only link between the training base and the needs of the operational forces. For example, Major Pat Gallagher, former commander of D Company, 2d Battalion, 1st SWTG (A), "made it a point to visit the operational units to ensure that we, USAJFKSWCS, were meeting their needs."

The currency of the applications taught in Major Gallagher’s courses was very apparent from the high demand from the operational units for his courses and the constant updating of the company POIs. This trend continued when Major Will Morris took command of Company D. Although both commanders did well at meeting the operational needs of the customers, the oversight by the system designed to approve changes was, and remains, limited.

The third pillar is to survey students who have graduated from basic or advanced skill courses on how the instructed POI meets field requirements and standards. In accordance with USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-1, the External Evaluation and Standardization Division (EESD): "conducts (sic) external evaluations to ensure that training programs and materials support field unit requirements. Conducts surveys of the USAJFKSWCS course graduates and their supervisors, as required. Maintains lessons learned database."

Within the function portion of this division are the tasks of:

1. Conducts selected external evaluations to ensure that products of USAJFKSWCS' training programs are adequate and meet the needs of commanders and units in the field.
2. Acts as the USAJFKSWCS independent agent to provide useful information to the field and collect specific information from users pertaining to training, doctrinal, organizational, and equipment deficiencies.
3. Analyzes from various sources the data obtained and provides information to the proponent activities to assist in the adjustment of institutional training action to optimize fielded products, programs, and systems performances.

As of 1995, USAJFKSWCS infrequently conducted surveys of classes as they graduated. Normally the surveys concentrated on the student’s opinion of the instructors. Little of the
feedback, with the exception of some of the experienced NCOs returning from the field to attend advanced skill courses, was pertinent in the assessment of the applicability of the course.

In addition, USAJFKSWCS is also responsible to assess “training for which USAJFKSWCS has been designated the DoD or USSOCOM executive agent by evaluating other services school courses for standardization and interoperability.”

This mission has yet to be fulfilled. Only recently have proponents taken the lead in establishing some semblance of standardization in training. The navy has stepped in and taken oversight responsibility for the Army CDC to include maritime operations, basically assuring that the POI meets minimum training and safety standards. The U.S. Army has taken the first step towards standardizing freefall, but still has entities that bestow “qualifications” on basic jumpers outside of the safety or training purview of USAJFKSWCS. DOTD should transfer personnel to JSOFI to conduct Joint Special Operations Curriculum Review Boards (JSOCR) in conjunction with a cell of DOTD responsible for matching equipment and TTP trends to training development. As of the initiation of this study, no single agency was responsible for the development of U.S. Army Special Operations doctrine and training. However, the recent publication of the JSOFI missions and functions statement gives SOF its first clearly defined “single focal point for joint doctrine development; standardize joint and common institutional SOF training, eliminating unnecessary redundancy and achieving training efficiencies.” JSOFI’s charter is a definite step in improving on the joint SOF mission capability. With the advent of the JSOFI, and the new willingness of joint SOF to cooperate in training programs, doctrinal development, and TTP, hopefully a quote such as this will seem a thing of the past.

Air Force and U.S. Army special operations units were collaborating and conducting effective clandestine air operations training for years, while “official” procedures were still being worked out at the headquarters level. There is always cooperation in action at the working level the symptoms of inter-service rivalries are more noticeable, and indeed real, at senior level echelons.
Endnotes


4. Lawton & Drillings, PRACTICE.


7. Ibid., 8-3.

8. Ibid.


10. Major (Retired) Pat Gallagher, interview by author, E-mail interview, VA, February, 1997.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 8-5.


CHAPTER 4

DESIGN OF COURSES AND STANDARDS

If we teach it and believe it we'd better buy the weapons to make it work.¹


Operation Purple Dragon

In this national scenario, the National Command Authorities deploys a JSOTF, "Hammer" to recover or destroy sensitive computer encryption equipment lost during recent civil unrest and smuggled out of the Central American country of Anapmas and into neighboring Caragua. Caragua is not friendly towards U.S. interests or policies. Intelligence sources have identified the location of the equipment. The equipment and technicians are housed in a small government compound, located in the center of a small Central American town located approximately forty-five kilometers from a major city.

A twenty-four man garrison of national police guards and controls access to the compound. The current shift is billeted on the complex. A company of light infantry is stationed twelve kilometers south of the compound, and can reinforce the police garrison with a platoon of infantry within thirty minutes by helicopter, with the remainder of the company arriving within 1.5 hours by truck. The police are armed with a mix of pistols and assault rifles. The light infantry are armed with the assault rifles and the general purpose machine gun.

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JSOTF Hammer consists of members of SEAL Team 7, members of Company C, 3rd Battalion, 17th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 2d Battalion (A/MH-60), 261st Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Their mission is to conduct an early morning raid on the compound to retrieve or destroy the sensitive item to deny enemy forces access to U.S. encryption.

The JSOTF Commanders selected is Lieutenant Commander Paul Williams, a veteran Navy SEAL with extensive NSW background. His intent is to infiltrate enemy airspace undetected, hitting the enemy compound immediately and conduct a fast, violent assault of the compound using surgical fire to destroy the enemy, while minimizing civilian casualties, recover or destroy the encryption equipment, and successfully exfiltrate enemy airspace without enemy interference.

Elements of the Army SF will infiltrate using fast rope methods directly into the compound, assault and neutralize the police garrison building and outlying guard towers and positions. Sub-elements of Company C, acting as snipers, will maintain supporting fire from aerial platforms throughout the assault. On order, they will provide blocking positions along the main avenues of approach and secure the nearby athletic field for extraction. The SF must be prepared to assume the main effort and be able to assault the objective. Be prepared to conduct overland movement to alternate exfiltration site HLZ Oklahoma.

SEAL Team 7, conduct fast rope infiltration onto Objective CIPHER and secure the encryption device. On order SEAL Team 7 will link up with Company C for exfiltration. Be prepared to assume blocking position role. Be prepared to conduct overland movement to alternate exfiltration site HLZ Oklahoma.

The 2d Battalion, 261st SOAR, initial priority of effort, suppress guard towers with aerial fire. Provide airlift and supporting fires to all assault elements during infiltration. Maintain sniper coverage. On order, conduct aerial reconnaissance for enemy reaction forces. On order, conduct exfiltration airlift. Be prepared to interdict enemy forces in support of ground operation. Conduct in-flight refueling rendezvous with USAF HC-130 upon return trip.
It is now 12 February 1977, 0130 local time, and the assault force rapidly approaches the shoreline having departed from the USS Mythical, a helicopter carrier, stationed 30 miles offshore of Caragua. The assault force and aviation assets have conducted numerous rehearsals, most of them live fire, and are confident that each element is capable of assuming any portion of the operation. All weapons are loaded and breaching charges are prepped, minus their firing systems. The helicopters are skimming the water's surface below enemy radar coverage at 110 knots. The assault force rapidly approaches the coastline and the mission point of no return. In the rear of their respective aircraft, the ground commanders anxiously await the call of "feet dry" so they can begin discerning their route and identifying checkpoints. No one is leaving navigation completely to the automated global positioning satellite navigation systems. Off coast, a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) command and control aircraft monitors their progress and enemy activity.

Once over land, the tension builds, with each soldier checking and re-checking his weapons, batteries, night vision goggles, and various items of kit for the thousandth time. Element leaders begin calling off checkpoints so that everyone can maintain a mental location and timetable to the target. Approximately fifteen minutes out from the objective, the operation experiences the first glitch. Super 5, the aircraft carrying the SEAL assault element experiences a reduction in power and has to break off from the formation. HAMMER 6 immediately implements the contingency for the Army SF personnel of Company C to conduct the assault. Upon learning the SEAL aircraft is still viable, HAMMER 5 orders the SEAL team to air land in the athletic field and occupy the blocking position.

At the objective, the initial aircraft engage and destroy the guard towers. The assault elements descend into the compound and make entry into their respective targets. The police guards on duty initially resist; however, they are rapidly overcome. The remainder of the guard force awakens to the mini-gun fire and explosive entry charges. Disoriented, they quickly surrender.
and are subdued. The assault element recovers the encryption equipment; however, since it is
disassembled they place delay timed explosive charges on the computers in the laboratory in order
to destroy any notes or schematics the technicians may have developed. The time is 0321. The
mission is right on schedule.

While the assault force is consolidating on the objective and preparing to begin movement
to the exfiltration helicopter-landing zone (HLZ), the SEAL Team occupies the blocking position.
Super 5 now limps back out to sea to rejoin the MC-130P and to continue on to the mothership.
Super 3 announces that twelve large vehicles are rapidly approaching the blocking position from the
direction of the reaction force and are approximately three kilometers distant. This is an unexpected
event; however, the blocking position should delay the enemy forces long enough for the force to
egress the objective. HAMMER 6 orders the helicopters to engage the trucks prior to their entering
the town limits. Super 3 and Super 4 begin engaging the vehicles, they successfully destroy three of
the vehicles before they too come under fire from shoulder launched missiles. Forced to break off
the attack, the aircraft watch as the remaining vehicles enter the town.

The SEAL Team prepares to meet the enemy while to their rear the assault force is securing
the HLZ. At a range of 400 meters the main element of the enemy force disembarks from their
trucks and moves towards the compound.

The enemy commander establishes a mortar position for his 60mm mortar and sends a
single truck forward to meet and fix the enemy. Knowing that his enemy must use aircraft to
escape, and therefore the athletic field, he directs his men to encircle the athletic field. Further
realizing that his enemy is reluctant to use their superior firepower in the tight confines of the town,
he deploys his remaining two missiles onto the surrounding rooftops and orders his men to advance
through the buildings of the town. With any luck his last two missiles will find the aircraft carrying
the snipers, which are methodically killing his men and slowing their advance. The forward
element truck is now under heavy crew served weapons fire some 200 meters to his front. He deploys his supporting fires to available high ground and urges his men forward towards the HLZ.

The SEAL commander is concerned. Having planned to conduct close quarter battle, he has only two M60E3 GPMGs and a few AT-4 rockets with the majority of his men are armed with various models of the MP5 9mm sub-machine gun. This is the SEALs preferred weapon for CQB, due to its characteristics of being small, light, accurate, and controllable on burst fire, and is ideal for fighting in the confined spaces of a building. The 9mm pistol round is considered an advantage inside a building or ship, where it dissipates its energy more quickly than a rifle round and, in theory, reduces the threat of ricochet or secondary injury. Unfortunately, its range and lethality is no match for the 7.62mm G-3 rifles the enemy is employing, and therefore most of his men are unable to effectively return fire.

Realizing his blocking position is in danger, HAMMER 6 deploys a detachment from Company C to reinforce the SEALs. The army operators, armed with the M4A1, a carbine version of the M16A2 rifle, can provide effective fire at rifle ranges. For this very reason the army chose this weapon for such missions.

Having stabilized the situation, HAMMER 6 begins withdrawing his force. The blocking position begins falling back, leapingfrogging to the HLZ. The SEALs have taken heavy casualties due to the limited range of their weapons and carrying their wounded slows their progress. Finally, all personnel are accounted for and the last aircraft lifts off from the HLZ. Several of the aircraft display damage from small arms fire, inflicted during the exfiltration and while attempting to draw enemy fire. The mission, though successful, has taken a heavy toll.

The link between equipment development, techniques, tactics and procedures is a critical one. As the scenario shows, the differences in TTP and equipment make mission planning and execution more difficult and incompatible than necessary. The equipment incompatibility begins with the research, development and procurement of equipment. The variety of options to introduce
new equipment into the military system is endless. The Airborne Test Board at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Natick Laboratories in Massachusetts, and the U.S. Army Research Laboratory in Maryland are but three agencies that test or design new equipment. However, there is little coordination between the testing of new technology, application to existing or developing mission requirements, procurement of new equipment and the fielding of this equipment within the training and operational base. For the purposes of this paper the examples will revolve around military free fall. Do not be misled that these situations exist only in freefall. There are just as many equally important and similar conundrums in diving maritime operations, and CQB within the U.S. Army SOF alone. The complexity of the issues involved in special operations communications systems and in joint application is even more convoluted. The systemic process of equipment design and procurement within USASOC has made gains within the last two years. The development of the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) was initially a USASOC led forum, which was closed to input from either the training base or the operational units. However, recent iterations have included the “Commander or his representative.” Also, USASOC has recognized the value of the schoolhouse as the de facto SME on certain emerging and existing equipment matters by virtue of their experience. The participation of USAJFKSWCS SME in the MAA is an important link in the procurement of equipment, since the instructors often are the most informed in equipment durability, functions and capability. Like it or not, many times the instructors in USAJFKSWCS and, most likely, AETC and NAVSPECWARCEN, have the most exposure to, and use of, different types of weapons, parachutes, oxygen systems, and TTP due to their commitment to learning all they can about their trade. Often USAJFKSWCS instructors, and their commanders, feel professionally frustrated when they see out of date or inadequate equipment being purchased or see good equipment, which is really needed, constantly pushed back to “next year’s” budget. Even more frustrating is when USAJFKSWCS advanced skill commanders are told that their charter does not include testing of new equipment, but then are held responsible for using old or outdated
technology. Even though the expertise exists within USAJFKSWCS to assist with equipment design and development, the schoolhouse should not be responsible for equipment procurement. The overall importance of a piece of equipment in relation to a mission and its priority within the budget is a USASOC level decision. Two developments in the USASOC equipment procurement process should assist in the long-term process of acquiring the right equipment for the right mission. First, the MAA is using a system to match equipment purchases to Mission Supporting Tasks (MST), which will help prevent the procurement of equipment of suspect benefit to existing missions.  

Technology

Technological advances and urban sprawl are to some extent, slowly overcoming the parachute infiltration mode. The number of third world countries that have radar, or even advanced radar, capability has increased significantly in the past five years. Radar is capable of detecting the parachutist, and possibly his system, in freefall 5 and even more importantly detecting aircraft at low altitudes. This combination makes HAHO infiltrations more feasible for an undetected infiltration. However, even though this shortcoming was identified in 1985, the military has not fielded jumpsuits or parachutes that will escape radar detection. The urban sprawl, radar capability and plethora of surface to air armament make mass tactical static line infiltrations more difficult. The primary SO infiltration technique will become HAHO or HALO, but to make this feasible SOF must design, or request design of, a parachute that uses cloth links and no metal and a suit that restricts the body water content of the jumper. 6 True, much of the equipment soldiers carry will be metal, but there is a limited amount of signature that is inevitable. The number of linear drop zones that are not covered by either some type of radar or viewable by the general population make clandestine HALO and HAHO operations imperative. It seems that the development of equipment to assist in this mission would be a primary mission for the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) within USAJFKSWCS. Only within
the current calendar year has USASOC broken up the DCSRI section and put Concepts Analysis (CA) and Combat Developments (CD) back into USAJKSWCS. This was an important move, since it marries the SME expert pool, the instructors, with the more accessible CA and CD sections.

Three examples of the difficulties involved in procurement, testing and fielding of equipment are the tandem bundle and personnel parachute system, the AR2 automatic opening device and the MC5 parachute system.

The tandem bundle, primarily, and personnel systems have led an up and down life on the rocky road to procurement and implementation. As we will discuss in this chapter, rucksacks are the primary carriers of life support and mission essential equipment for HALO and HAHO operations. However, the old USASOC Regulation 350-2 only condoned the use of one type of rucksack to be rigged for these operations. The regular Army rucksack that has been in use since the early 1970s of Viet Nam. Many SO units use the CFP-90, the Lowe or some variation of a commercial rucksack. None of these are legally cleared to be used on a training or operational exercise. The new USASOC Regulation 350-2 simply refers the reader to other FM, Training Circular (TC) and unit SOP on the rigging or jumping of nonstandard gear. Even when the regulation clarifies which rucksack is legal to use in airborne operations, the capacity of that rucksack severely limits the teams. The limitation to certain types of missions is due to the weight capacity of the MC4 parachute system, regardless of the size or make of the rucksack. The solution to the infiltration weight problem has been available since 1988 and, interestingly enough, is still not used by SO teams but by the civilian skydiving public. The answer is the tandem bundle parachute system. An article in the Special Warfare magazine stated that:

An example of a recent sic Concept Evaluation Program (CEP) is the Tandem Parachute System. This system is designed to permit an experienced Special Forces military free-fall parachutist to infiltrate an inexperienced individual (doctor, political figure and technician) into an otherwise denied territory. The total suspended weight that can be carried by the commercial tandem is 450 pounds.

The tandem parachute system consists of a passenger harness, pilot harness, one main parachute and one reserve parachute. Both the main and reserve are the square, ram-air
type that is highly maneuverable and capable of high altitude/low-opening or high-altitude/high-opening operation. The parachutists are fastened together in the harness and exit the aircraft. A drogue pilot parachute is released after exit and helps stabilize the two parachutists as they fall. The pilot parachutists control the descent and landing with minimal assistance from the passenger. A secondary mission of the tandem parachute would be to carry oversized or exceptionally heavy items of equipment. The CEP was a success. More than 450 jumps were made without incident and the idea was accepted as valid. Thanks to this CEP, SOF soldiers can expect some form of the Tandem Parachute System to be fielded in the future.

Interestingly enough, this article was written in the Special Warfare magazine in October of 1988. And, at this date the tandem bundle parachute system is only in the inventory of one SMU.

The article is accurate in every way but two. First, the drogue chute may be set in freefall by the tandem master, or by assistants on the ramp of the aircraft during exit. Second, the greatest advantage of the tandem parachute system is the increased loads teams will be capable of jumping in for cache supply or resupply with pinpoint accuracy and at night. The MFFS in Yuma, Arizona has pushed the issue attempting to fulfill the role of SME test bed by training their instructors in the use of the tandem and tandem bundle systems write everything on its capabilities from specifications. The Military Tandem Vector System (MTVS) is capable of carrying up to 400-pound loads. It is presently rated for 400 pounds, but may soon receive clearance to carry even heavier loads. The minimum weight is 240 and the maximum suspended weight is 650 pounds.

The SO may utilize the MTVS in HALO or HAHO missions. The training maximum altitude is 25,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) and a minimum of 4,000 feet MSL. The MTVS is not included in the SOF Air Delivery Modernization Program. However, the program does address the long-standing problem of an adequate oxygen system by purchasing the Parachute Offset Oxygen System. The point of highlighting the MTVS is the fact that the schoolhouse is developing equipment that fills a legitimate mission requirement that operational commanders do not understand. May have not or will not ever see a demonstration of the capability of the MTVS. The commander's lack of exposure to the advances made in new technology (even though the MTVS has been around since 1983) prevents the units from writing a MNS to support the purchase,
fielding, training and utilization of the best system to infiltrate the ODA with adequate equipment. Attempts by the MFFS to demonstrate the MTVS at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training Center (NTC) rotations have been met with resistance, since the training and demonstration of the MTVS is not part of the MFFS mission. But who else is capable and more disposed to assisting the Airborne Test Board in the mission of reviewing and testing emerging technology? A permanent relationship between the instructors, the schoolhouse and the Directorate of Combat Development (DCD), (which has just returned to DOTD) should alleviate the time gap between recognition and testing of emerging technology.

One of the remaining fallacies of SOF equipment procurement is the old Army philosophy that new equipment can be fielded on a fifteen-year cycle. SOF is the leader in off-the-shelf equipment testing and purchasing, but SO still has the remnants of the fifteen-year system. It is estimated that technology now changes every seven years, making our procurement system far too unresponsive. The lack of a current (technology) oxygen system for HAHO is but one example of a need that has been identified but as of yet unfulfilled. The one link missing in the procurement process is the system for soldiers in the field to forward information up the chain of command on equipment ideas. True, the system exists, but it is haphazard and ignored without a MNS from the field. The best example of a piece of equipment that has great applicability to existing missions but has not been purchased because of the lack of a MNS from commanders is the tandem bundle system. The fielding of the tandem bundle system is paramount for the future of MFF.

The MC5 Static Line Ram Air parachute system is an example of a testing and procurement system gone awry from the input of higher headquarters. The MC5 is a modified MC4 parachute system designed for static line deployment of a square or ram air parachute. Many felt that the MC5 offered a distinct advantage over the circa WWII technology of the round static line parachute system. The advertised advantages of a static line deployed square parachute are:
MC5 Static Line Ram Air Parachute

Lower Level Deployment

The MC5 supposedly offered a lower level of deployment than the MC4 (the normal HALO/HAHO system). However, due to the safety requirements, or limitations, the minimum safe altitude to safely allow the deployment of the reserve, in case of main malfunction is 2,500 feet above ground level (AGL). The opening altitude for training purposes for the MC4 is 4,000 feet AGL. While the MC5 does allow the plane to lower its flight altitude from up to 35,000 feet down to 3,000 feet, there is no advantage to a lower flight profile. The proliferation of third world countries using advanced radar and possessing adequate surface to air missiles limits the number of sites one could select for low level infiltrations. The increased ability to detect and destroy low flying aircraft makes low infiltration risky. Lower flight profiles detracts from SOF infiltration and limits the number of missions SOF can undertake.

Group Cohesiveness

The MC5 was touted as a improvement over the MC4. The MC5 would supposedly deploy soldiers in a tighter vast group in the air, thereby assisting in a tighter grouping both under canopy and ultimately upon landing on the ground. In fact, the MC5 does not offer significantly better grouping on landings. The MC5 is not an adequate replacement for good training. With the opening altitude limited to 10,000 feet by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), the separation of the parachutist under canopy from 9,000 feet to the ground will increase, negating any gains of an automatic static line opening at 10,000 feet.

Less Training

Many supporters of the MC5 pointed towards the shortened training period to qualify personnel for operational jumps. On the surface this looks good as the trainers would incur substantial savings, since you could cut the body stabilization training out of the curriculum;
thereby eliminating the Vertical Wind Tunnel (VWT). Also, proponents of the MC5 stated that MC5 training would not require any oxygen training thus eliminating the need for a trip to the hypobaric chamber and any training on oxygen. This position diametrically opposes the manufacturer’s stated salient feature of the MC5, which is to provide a good group opening at high altitudes. Without supplemental oxygen the MFF parachutist is automatically limited to conducting airborne operations no higher than 12,500 feet above sea level. Not only does this limit the altitude but also the missions the MC5 could be used for, but also limits the number of drop zones available.

The MC5 system provides two actual benefits in non standard gear and water jumps:

**Non Standard Gear**

The MC5 is an excellent tool to infiltrate nonstandard gear. Although the MC5 has no advantage over the static line parachute system for the same purpose, it does have a substantial advantage over the MC4 in carrying nonstandard shaped or sized gear.

**Water Jumps**

The MC5 is also an excellent system for the SEALs and Army water surface infiltration since its high degree of maneuverability gives the operator the ability to land much closer to a boat or rubber raft from low altitudes.

The MC5 is an excellent example of the mixing of responsibilities and tasks in the fielding of equipment within the U.S. Army. The Airborne Test Board in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, initially tested the MC5, which fell well within their mission statement. However, after the initial test, their involvement in the drive for fielding the MC5 led to members of the test board actually writing the MNS and training personnel outside the Airborne Test Board on the MC5. The 7th Special Force Group (SFG) became an operational test bed for the fielding of the MC5. However, USASOC placed no single agency in charge of the procurement, training and ultimate fielding of the MC5. The lack of a single agency to coordinate the different aspects of the MC5 ultimately
delayed the opportunity to field the MC5 en masse. For example, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) put together an ad hoc working group to test the MC5 and design the training procedures, without considering the logistical impact of the parachute. The lack of a clear vision of why the MC5 was necessary over and above the existing round-parachute static-line system, added to the overall ineptness of its fielding. There are commanders who feel that HALO/HAHO takes too much time, and too many resources, to adequately train on, and even then the skills are too perishable. Although this may be true, introducing a system that will take as much as three times longer to pack and not adequately providing additional riggers to support the system was shortsighted. Throughout the development of the MC5 proponents insisted the MC5 would not replace the MC4. This was a ludicrous claim since the very assets required to train on the MC5; time, aircraft, rigger support and drop zone coverage were already in short supply for training on the MC4.

The fielding of the MC5 is included in a thesis directed towards training only to illustrate that good intention, good people, and possibly even good equipment do not constitute procurement system. The MC5 also highlights that any system of designing, testing and fielding equipment needs to be fully incorporated into the institutional training system to find problems existing with the equipment, develop TTP, and train the develop a plan for training the force. In the end, CG, USASOC decided to field the MC5 because as he saw it, “either field the MC5 now or it’s never going to happen.” The author believes he realized that the mechanics to correctly field the MC5 did not exist. Without the information from a consolidated committee or board, (which JSOFI should have chaired) he decided to field the MC5 with the full knowledge that the process was not going to be well coordinated or efficient. This theme has been prevalent in the fielding of recent SOF equipment, such as the M4 rifle and various communication pieces. In the end the decision was made to accept problems with the testing, fielding, and training in exchange for getting better, more capable equipment to the troops in a more timely manner.
The fielding of the MC5 highlights the lack of an integrated system within Army SOF. But when one considers the number of projects that each service propagates without USSOCOM oversight, one can begin to get the picture of the impact that the lack of a joint integration system has on the school houses, which are trying to satisfy three services’ TTP. As of March 1997 the MC5 was dealt the final decision on its fielding by USASOC and has been deleted from the procurement process and will eventually be deleted from the training base. In the final evaluation, SOF requires a centralized system to validate needs not only for U.S. Army SOF, but also for all of SOF forces. JSOFI should serve as the conduit from the fielding, to the training base, to the Board of Directors (BOD) within USSOCOM. In the case of the MC5, USASOC and USASFC developed the MC5 without input or inquiry from the other services. The decision not to consult with the other services on the MC5 was unfortunate and decidedly delayed the process. Fortunately, USAJFKSWCS was able to utilize the Marine’s experience with the MC5 in developing training POI, drastically reducing the workload and timeframe to complete an effective POI.

Another example of disconnect between development, testing and fielding is the AR2 automatic opening device. The present service standard automatic opening device is the Irvin Hite-finder automatic opening device. The Irvin, more commonly referred to as the FF2, is attached to the main parachute of the MC4 system. The FF2 is an always fire system provided as a backup in case the parachutist fails to activate his main ripcord. The FF2 has been the standard for military freefall for years, because technology could not provide a device that could accurately measure altitude and freefall speed and be attached to the reserve parachute. Even civilian parachutists realized the FF2, and comparable apparatus like the FXC, did not offer sufficient reliability to prevent premature firing. Premature firing on either the main or reserve in freefall is potentially dangerous to the jumper and those around him. The obvious solution was to find a device that was attachable to the reserve parachute and measured altitude and freefall speed accurately enough to tell when a jumper needed his reserve to open as a last resort. In addition, the new AOD would not
require constant maintenance and would require much less frequent replacement. The interim solution was the AR2, which could be attached to either the main or reserve and fired only when the jumper passed through a pre-set altitude calculated on a base barometric pressure. The implementation of the AR2, which at this time is still meeting major fielding problems, highlights the problems with the assimilation of technology and its ultimate fielding in SOF. The first sign of trouble of the transition from the FF2 to the AR2 was the deletion of supply parts, maintenance contracts and calculation devices for the FF2. The termination of maintenance contracts and the inability to replace spare parts prior to any distribution or testing of the AR2 within the U.S. Army system led to both systems being inoperable. Without a central agency in charge of coordinating the testing and fielding not only within the U.S. Army, but also within the SOF community, the FF2 was being phased out without any approved substitute. With some low-level coordination, the MFFS re-established the FF2 maintenance contract and USASOC DCSLOG emergency ordered the FF2 spare parts. But the fact remains that the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force MFF community were almost made undeployable, or at a minimum faced restricted training, due to the lack of an AOD, all as a result of a shortsighted fielding plan.

The AR2 situation is not solely an U.S. Army concern. Of even more glaring importance is the fact that the decision to switch from the FF2 to the AR2 was done totally inside the U.S. Army. True, the U.S. Army is according to USSOCOM, the component responsible for airborne training. However, there should have been some coordination between the service representatives for three reasons. First, the change of equipment would have left the navy and air force without a contract for FF2 maintenance and spare parts. Secondly, the change would have left the MFFS training basic jumpers using the AR2 and the Air Force graduates would matriculate to a unit that used the FF2, with which they would now be unfamiliar. The MFFS saw this situation developing and made an on the spot decision to teach both systems, but this POI change was made without coordination with the Navy or Air Force through necessity. Third, the MFFS would have to incorporate both the
FF2 and AR2 maintenance, repair, setting and calculations training in the Jumpmaster course to sustain both pieces of equipment in each of the three services. Throughout the meetings that USAJKSWCS coordinated with USASOC, USAJKSWCS, SMU, the MFFS, Natick Laboratories and contractor representatives, no sister service representation was coordinated. How the sister services were left out of this process, especially considering the impacts on training, operations and logistics of each, highlights the lack of a joint SO system to oversee these actions. Similar situations with the unilateral decision to delete closed circuit SCUBA from the training in Key West, Florida and add surface maritime operations to the POI point to the lack of an effective ITRO system, or any joint system, to coordinate equipment development, fielding and training.

Many of the conflicts with developing, fielding and training new equipment may be overcome with the advent of USASOC Integrated Concept Teams (ICT) that look at the full range of effects equipment procurement has on USASOC. The ICT will use the full Doctrine Organization Training Manning Leadership Systems (DOTMLS) venue to assess the changes in TTP, effects on doctrine and relation to assigned missions.10 Hopefully the ICT will assist phasing in equipment through the schoolhouses prior to issue to operational units. The ICT should take advantage of the expertise in not only the schoolhouses, but also in the JSOFI arena. USAJKSWCS is responsible for approximately seventy-five percent of the SOF training base, but almost all decisions made on equipment effects the training base. Therefore, changes have direct effect the sister services, which, by necessity must send their students to attend USAJKSWCS courses. Any decisions made by the USASOC BOD which effect USAJKSWCS automatically effect the sister SOF forces. Therefore, the BOD should consider JSOFI participation at either the ITC or even USASOC BOD level.

After establishing that doctrine and equipment changes have direct effects not only on the individual service schools but also on the final product, the joint SO community must realize the importance of devising a system to coordinate the operational needs and school focus of the
disparate services. The ITRO process has fallen woefully short of its intended purpose, especially in the SO arena, of standardizing training and minimizing duplicative costs.
Endnotes


3Tony Guise USASOC DCSRI, interview by author, telephone interview, Fort Bragg, NC, 2 February 1997.


5Getty, Kenneth W., Colonel (Retired) (1997, January). “Notes on Joint Training: Commentary on Joint Training.” Available E-mail: xxxxxx@aol.com.

6The primary success of any HALO/HAHO infiltration is based upon stealth. The existence of metal on the parachute rig was long thought to be the reason radar could detect parachutist in the air, thereby losing stealth as an advantage. Recent studies have concluded that the water content of the jumpers' body was more of a signature than the metal and more than sufficient enough to be seen by radar. Theorists conclude that a suit of a specific material could hide the water content of the human body giving the freefaller relative invisibility.


9Tony Guise USASOC DCSRI, interview by author, telephone interview, Fort Bragg, NC, 7 March 1997.

10Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

THE FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING

The solution for efficient effective joint SO training starts with training coordination at the USSOCOM level and rests on the shoulders of an expanded JSOFI mission. First, USSOCOM needs to address the issue of base line training in jointly subscribed skills, which was just recently addressed in the JSOFI Warfighting Study. Secondly, USSOCOM needs to publish the SOF core critical tasks as a guideline for each component command in designing and prioritizing training, which USAJFKSWCS has taken the initial steps to do within the last month. Third, USSOCOM needs to co-ordinate the writing of joint regulations that cover the execution of SOF skills in training and or training exercises. Fourth, USSOCOM needs to appoint JSOFI as the lead agency within SOF for the standardization of training and give them oversight of the entire SOF training base. The new JSOFI charter published during the completion of this study gives JSOFI limited directive abilities.

The JSOFI is the future of SO training design and coordination. As of now JSOFI has mainly inserted a joint flavor into areas that are obviously joint or shared training concerns of SO. HALO, SCUBA and medical training have all received the attention of JSOFI, either in the planning and coordination phase, as in the instance of the new SOF school of medicine and as arbiter for HALO and SCUBA. But the author sees a more expanded role for JSOFI that DOTD, USSOCOM J3 Training and the USSOCOM BOD do not fulfill nor address. JSOFI should be given personnel from each service to complete the tasks that DOTD is not presently resourced to complete. First, JSOFI should be resourced to control all CTSB from a joint aspect. Once the
decision is made on what each service sees as a service peculiar need, in any of the advanced or combined courses, JSOFI should oversee any changes. To preclude the system being personality based, the initial survey should be a survey of commanders, first line leaders and operational personnel. The Air Force would benefit from this system the most, since many of the senior officers who oversee AETC are not SO qualified. For example, at one time the commander of the unit of AETC that controlled SO Air Force training was an aviator, who had not attended nor worked with any of the Air Force SO schools. In addition, he was not SO qualified nor had acquired any of the specialty skills from AF or U.S. Army SO schools. He was a senior officer capable of managing the school, but had limited experience with which to base training decisions. With each service SME present, and in possession of the surveys from the field, JSOFI should be able to give guidance to whichever training base to best support the needs of USSOCOM, without infringing on the necessary core of skills each component requires. However, make no mistake in thinking that USAJFKSWCS, AETC or NAVSPECWARCEN should be focused on anything but meeting the needs of the joint SOF community. As parochial as this appears, the USCINCSOC has the responsibility for assuring that each regional CINC is provided sufficiently trained SO operators. If the USCINCSOC does not have the direct control or influence through a component agency (*i.e.*, AFSC), then the organization of the Air Force SO training needs to be reorganized to place all aspects of Air Force SO training under AFSC oversight. For example, it is presently under consideration to move the para-rescue and combat control team (CTT) training under the command of SO training at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico or Hurlburt Field in Florida. This move would assure that AFSC had a sufficient input into the development of POI and base line skills for PJs and CCT to support USSOCOM core tasks. As of now, the USAF Air Component Command requires Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) at the B level only, while AFSC requires pararescue or PJs to perform at the EMT-P level. Even the uninitiated who do not understand the difference in ratings should understand that the requirements of each service are
disparate and presently require multiple training bases. True, each service’s training base has a responsibility to teach similar skills to the conventional side of their service. However, the driving force should be the core task list that USSOCOM publishes. As an example of training crossover the Marines have heavily subscribed to SFARTAETC which, in all aspects is a higher degree of training that provides more than their stated mission mandates. But, in the effort of the Marine Corps, specifically the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), to become “SO capable,” Marines attend SFARTAETC and then deploy to security force battalions or reconnaissance units that have no specific need for these skills. The Marines should focus on Special Operations Training Course (SOTC) and open up more course slots for the Army SF in SFARTAETC. The SOTC course has similar mismatches of students to POI. The Marines, Rangers and Navy, for the most part, have had difficulty passing SFARTAETC, but only because such a small percentage of the candidates had the requisite shooting skills prior to enrollment. The Navy could save money, just like the Marines, by attending SOTC, since many of the graduates were going to units that did not require SFARTAETC skills but SOTC. The target audience for SOTC is SF Operational Detachments and Rangers. The course is not totally suited for the Rangers, who use a different style of marksmanship and rarely use handguns, which are needed in CQB situations. The Rangers suffered the highest attrition rate in the initial stress tests, which is a shooting stress test to assess the student’s confidence, ability, and safety in relation to himself and other students. Since the Rangers are not a hostage rescue unit, but focus primarily on raids and airfield seizures, USAJFKSWCS conducted MTTs to the Ranger Regiment to adjust the course to better suit the Ranger’s mission.

The purpose of this course is to train the operator in safety and standardization of CQB training and mission execution. However, many units viewed the SOTC graduate as a trained instructor, as Major Morris states: “ODA’s used it as a train the trainer course, a concept I wholeheartedly disagreed with.” In fiscal year 96 this course had a 16.6 per cent failure rate. The Marine Corps has steadfastly under subscribed this course to attend the more advanced SFARTAETC. However,
due to an unclear mission statement USSOCOM and USASOC are denying Army personnel, assigned to positions requiring this training, the opportunity to attend SFARTAETC.

JSOFI and USAJKSFWCS have recently incorporated the USSOCOM core SOF tasks into a study that delineates the expenditure of training funds in relation to the priority of the SOF tasks.\(^2\) This study should be a hallmark in organizing U.S. Army SOF training priorities to best support the regional CINC's warplans. The agency responsible for the application of this study, DOTD, should realize that a dollar by dollar comparison of training is beneficial, but not the panacea of prioritizing training expenditure. For example, SERE and HALO are fairly costly training iterations that, on the surface, provide little immediate return to the CINC's. However, the importance of a robust SERE and HALO training base is very apparent when someone is captured (i.e., Chief Warrant Officer Two Mike Durant in Somalia) or the CINC needs a one time pinpoint clandestine HALO infiltration (to support a non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) mission). Now that the U.S. Army is "nesting" its training priority and expenditure within the SOF core critical tasks through the auspices of DOTD, the joint training base should do the same through the oversight of JSOFI.

Before JSOFI can align SOF training to meet each component and SOF specific training needs, JSOFI first needs to determine what each services baseline requirements are for each skill. JSOFI should use internal or external assets to survey course graduates from each service. Each graduate of a SO course should receive a survey after serving six months in an operational unit. The survey should address the applicability of the training they received at the school, compared to on the job training (OJT) they received, once assigned to the unit. This survey, if properly administered and data collected, would give an accurate reading of how well the schools are teaching, what the components really need, and what skills each component has to make up with OJT training.

USSOCOM should empower JFJSOFI to survey commanders and leaders of prospective students to ensure that each component's core critical tasks for that skill are addressed. JSOFI
could act as an unbiased non-parochial entity to fairly assess the needs of each service and the abilities of the training base to meet these requirements. For example, in 1995 the CG, USASOC at the direction of the USCINCSOC, made a unilateral decision to delete closed circuit SCUBA training from the Army curriculum. The underlying purpose was to task the Navy for all SOF maritime training. Lieutenant General Scott based his decision on the fact that the U.S. Army lacked a stated mission for closed circuit diving infiltration, the cost of maintaining the equipment, and troop proficiency. However, two critical systems were bypassed in making this decision that may have provided CG, USASOC key information in making his decision. First, if a survey completed by JSOFI had shown that closed circuit training was the primary reason Air Force SOF attended SCUBA school in Key West, Florida, the CG, USASOC could have considered the importance of the training to the Air Force prior to his decision. He could have offered the Air Force the opportunity to pick up more of the support of running that phase of training. This would have decreased the cost of the training to the U.S. Army and let the Air Force carry the burden of continuing the training. This would have also supported the Air Force METL tasks as approved by USSOCOM. The Air Force would not need to develop another training base. Second, if JSOFI had had the opportunity to address the change in training to the services, which is now in 1997 the mission of DOTD, the training deficiency would have been noted. One can argue that the Air Force does not need closed circuit SCUBA training, but that decision begs the question of who in USSOCOM is responsible for oversight of what training the component forces receive. It is the author’s opinion that USSOCOM should have the ability, through JSOFI, to tell component forces that USSOCOM will support the phases of training that are SOF related, but any additional tasks will be supported outside of the parameters of the ITRO process.

The definition of “consolidated” or “quota” courses should be largely ignored by USSOCOM training schools because proponentcy takes precedent over the consolidated quota relationship. Since USSOCOM is responsible for its own training base, they should take control of
the resources to establish and maintain the schools. JSOFI could act as the agent to review the applicability of each course that SOF must attend, both within the SOF community and in conventional schools within each component service. This would provide two services to SOF in general; first, JSOFI could provide a consolidated input from all SOF forces to the CRB process of each school SO personnel attend. For example, many U.S. Army SO personnel attend schools outside of the purview of SOF, but have little input into the POI. With the inclusion of SOF in most missions, it seems only logical that SOF should have some input into the development and conduct of classes that affect their mission. The present system has each component surfacing issues at scheduled CRB representing the components only. JSOFI could consolidate each SOF component requirement and have concerns presented that not only supported the component SOF requirements, but also supported USSOCOM JMETL. The reductions in military strength have manifested themselves most dramatically in the manning of the training bases. The reductions in instructors assigned to USAJFKSWCS are symptomatic of a larger problem that exists within TRADOC also.

Dr. Robert J. Seidel, of the Army Research Institute (ARI), recently wrote on the possibility of OJT taking the place of institutional training to save manpower:

"Future reductions in training resources within TRADOC will have the effect of increasing the number of critical skills that will be trained in the field through OJT. This phenomenon is a natural consequence of reducing the number and quality of instructors, the amount of time allocated for training, the number of tasks selected for training and the availability of equipment to be used for training."³

This is a totally unacceptable alternative to SOF training. Even Dr. Seidel comments that: "The number of strategies and the quality of their skill in delivery of OJT were found to vary greatly among the providers. It appears that the amount of experience (number of years and/or various jobs) as an OJT provider is not necessarily related to OJT instructional skill."⁴

The concern is that if JSOFI cannot recommend a course of action that minimizes the joint SOF training base, that Congress will task each component service to reduce the institutional training base and dilute the quality of training and the mission capabilities of the SOF graduate. To
maximize the efficiency of SOF training, the Army needs to have a SO consolidated objective for
TTP and standards. For example, the Air Force has a very different view of a “graduate” of a course
than the Army. The latter will not graduate a person from a skill course unless he can perform that
skill to mission capable standards. The Air Force will willingly graduate a student (i.e., SCUBA) to
allow him to proceed to his first duty station, where he learns the majority of his skills OJT. The
Air Force depends heavily on OJT to complete basic skill efficiency, unlike the Army, which uses
OJT for special techniques and repetitive training. The ARI study already highlights the disparity
of efficiency and quality of OJT. Now consider the unacceptable possibility of Air Force personnel
conducting or supporting a mission when on OJT status. A recommendation is that each
USSOCOM component service should be in charge of the training base that provides the majority
of its operators. The Air Force is the prime example of a service that needs control of its SOF
operators under the component agency responsible to USSOCOM. If AFSOC had control of the
schools, which provides its assigned personnel, the author is confident that the standard of
graduation would increase and the POI would more accurately reflect the needs of USSOCOM.

Lieutenant General Scott (Retired) states that one reason JSOFI has had difficulty in
establishing a Joint SOF training base is because “if you want a joint school you will need to put
milestones on it . . . get successors to sign up for it, which won’t be easy.” The lack of manpower
within JSOFI, and the shared mission statement with DOTD, restricts JSOFI’s ability to complete
its published mission. For example the following tasks are excerpts from the JSOFI draft charter
which clearly they cannot accomplish with their present manpower and most of which conflict with
the already stated mission of DOTD within USAJFKSWCS in USAJFKSWC 10-1.

USCINCSOC has the responsibility “In accordance with Title 10 U.S. Code (USC),
Section 167, CJCSI 3500.01 (21 November 1994), Joint Training Policy for the Armed Force of the
United States, and, CJCSI 1800.01 (31 August 1995), Officer Professional Military Education
Policy” to:
1. Ensure close cooperation between SOF education and training communities to focus training and education objectives on common goals, reduce redundancy, and provide the best product for the U.S. Armed Forces.
2. Monitor the effectiveness of all joint SOF education courses and programs to ensure SOF capabilities to support theater CINC’s mission requirements.
3. Establish SO School objectives in consultation with Services, unified and specified commands, and reserve components.6

If USSOCOM has the responsibility to complete these three tasks, which organization within USSOCOM has the assigned task? A convincing case could be made that the J3 Training Section has the oversight. Within the last year, J3 Training has authored USSOCOM Manual 350-3, Training Airborne Operations and is completing a USSOCOM Manual for Maritime Operations. The USSOCOM Director of Operations, J3 is also responsible to: (1) serve as the staff focal point for training policy; and (2) provide input to JSOFI concerning addition, deletion, and refinement of learning areas and objectives of SO-related courses to address specific operational deficiencies in SOF education.

However, the involvement of J3 Training in the development and conduct of training does not fulfill the requirements of Title 10. USSOCOM has not had representatives at any of the CRB for the advanced skills taught within 2d Battalion USAJFKSWCS of which the author is aware. If USSOCOM is involved in these decisions, how did the proliferation of courses occur without any oversight? For example, the Navy Special Warfare Center ran its own HALO school until 1996. Even today, JSOC still runs its own HALO school, which requires three operating bases with all of the costs associated and, even more importantly, the manpower. Where does the manpower come from to run these extra schools? Even after the HALO school was combined to some degree in Yuma, Arizona, the U.S. Navy still ran a static line jumpmaster school that required facilities and manpower. They argued that the manpower slots needed to run the Navy jumpmaster schools are part-time positions and that personnel from San Diego, California, have the time to go to El Centro, California, and run the course four times per year. With the dwindling resources, is it really possible that someone can have a part-time job in the military? The argument that U.S. Navy SO
needs its own static line jumpmaster course because they cannot obtain sufficient class quota slots is the same argument that JSOC personnel use to run their own HALO school. In fairness, JSOC does have some operational security requirements for certain TTP. However, these skills could be taught after a normal rotation of the existing Freefall School. The navy could use JSOFI to procure sufficient slots in the static line jumpmaster classes in Ft. Benning, Georgia. The savings in base operations alone by closing the Jumpmaster Course in El Centro, California, would exceed any associated TDY costs. The same situation exists for SCUBA and maritime operation classes between the Army and Navy.

JSOFI has the ability to fill this gap that the USSOCOM J3, on a joint level, and USAJFKSWCS on the Army component level, have the inability to fill because of USSOCOM’s higher priority tasks and USAJFKSWCS’s limitations to Army matters. JSOFI has incorporated the following tasks into their draft mission statement as stated by CINCUSOSOCOM Draft Directive Number-XXX-XX: Develop and integrate joint special operations doctrine, training, education and leader development across the spectrum of joint operations. Review and validate SO instruction at service, joint and SOF schools. Serve as USSOCOM principal advisor on joint and common SO institutional training. As Frank Barnett states:

Inter-service cooperation is probably more vital in special operations than in most other areas of military activity. Special operations, by their nature, are almost always joint or collaborative undertakings. It is difficult to envision a ground/surface special operations mission of extended duration that does not require Air Force support, CIA input, and so on. Because joint operations can be very complex, they demand organization, teamwork, planning, and practice-preferably, all on a continuing basis as part of an integrated joint force.

The reductions in military strength have manifested themselves most dramatically in the manning of the training base. The reductions in USAJFKSWCS are symptomatic of a larger problem that exists within TRADOC also.

The significance of the difficulties with OJT training is that with an ever-dwindling budget, the appeal of OJT training begins to increase. OJT requires fewer personnel in the training base,
less pooled equipment in the schools and shorten pipeline times to assign personnel to their operational units. One flaw remains in this scenario, SOF skill training requires a high level expertise, standardization and quality. None of the SOF component forces can afford to assess personnel without a full vetted process prior to assignment to an operational unit, where they may be required to perform these tasks in a crisis situation without ever having received adequate training. The SOF training base remains the bedrock of the SO community and deserves equal share of priority and involvement in the development, design, fielding and training of equipment and TTP.

In summary, USSOCOM now has the charter and the responsibility to manage a SOF training base that produces the best quality personnel from each service to perform SO missions. This mission must be accomplished with the minimum amount of personnel, facility and logistics overhead so as not to distract from the budgeting of the operational mission of SOF. Each component has the responsibility to cooperate, under Title X U.S.C., in this endeavor of joint training without taking mission capability away from their parent component forces. The empowerment of JSOFI which will, without bias, streamline and focus the SO training base, incorporate equipment development and oversee a shared objective for training development and execution is without reservation the foundation of any future for special operations.
Endnotes

1Tony Guise USASDOC DCSRI, interview by author, telephone interview, Fort Bragg, NC, 7 March 1997.


4Ibid.


7Ibid., 1-7.

APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Special Forces

Although the primary mission of the Special Forces in the 1970s was unconventional warfare the five universally accepted missions of the 1990's for SF are: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Counterterrorism (CT). USSOCOM has developed new mission priorities in the last year, 1997, but for the most part SF doctrine, METL and TTP revolve around these five main staples. "While Special Forces soldiers are capable of performing all of these missions, an increasing emphasis is being placed on foreign internal defense for FID, and coalition warfare support." Each team has twelve personnel each with a specific individual skill that complements the five core missions. There are two engineers, two medics, two weapons men, two communications experts, the intelligence NCO, team sergeant, team warrant, and team leader. The hallmark of a good SF soldier is his understanding of foreign cultures, morays, and languages and his ability to teach and think with clarity and imagination under stress.

Rangers

The Army Ranger Regiment can "deploy anywhere in the world with 18 hours notice." The Rangers are the elite infantrymen in the world combining all out guts and stamina with a new application of technology in weapons systems and communications to make them a highly lethal and very determined adversary. Although the Rangers have numerous capabilities which include:

1. Infiltrating and exfiltrating by land, sea and air

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2. Conducting direct action operations

3. Conducting raids

4. Recovery of personnel and special equipment

5. Conducting conventional or special light infantry operations

The primary mission of the Rangers remains direct action. Specifically, “Rangers are the premier airfield seizure and raid unit in the Army.” The Rangers do maintain the normal array of light infantry skills practicing ambushes, movement to contact, reconnaissance, airborne and airmobile operations.

160th Special Operations Aviation

The “Nightstalkers” have the envious position of being the world’s best rotary wing aviators in the world. Specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense to specifically support special operations the 160th flies more night missions than any other unit in the military. They fly an assortment of MH6/60/47 and AH6 aircraft with an equally diversified collection of “velcro” weapons systems to support joint SOF. The advanced avionics available on most 160th aircraft provides them with a “heliborne lift and attack capability (sic) in a wide range of mission profiles, including force insertion and extraction, aerial security, armed attack, medical evacuation, electronic warfare, mine dispersal, and command and control support.”

Navy SEALs

“Navy Special Warfare units are organized, trained and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime and riverine environments. They are deployed in small units worldwide in support of fleet and national operations.” Although the SEALs offer a variety of teams all with special skills of infiltration and each with a different focus on missions one could compare the SEALs to the Army Rangers in mission type, length and impact. Many people think that the SEALs and the Special Forces Combat Dive teams share the same mission. However, the easiest
delineation between these two become apparent when one considers that the SEALs use the water as an operational environment whereas the Army teams only use water as a means of infiltration. Secondly, SF missions include language familiarization and the ability to teach in that language. Most SEAL missions are short in duration and do not include the mastery of languages. “SEAL platoons are not equipped for sustained direct engagements against enemy forces. SEAL platoons carry minimum amounts of equipment, munitions, and light armament consisting of primarily individual weapons.” SEAL teams are basically organized into three configurations, SEAL or SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams, and Special Boat (SB) units or squadrons.

Combat Control Teams

Combat aviation air controllers are responsible for setting up hasty or prepared airfields for follow on airborne or air landing operations. CCT assets can infiltrate using HALO or HAHO, static line, airland or even underwater methods to infiltrate denied enemy areas. The CCT carry a full complement of weather assessment skills and often work in conjunction with SF or SEAL assets. The primary skill of the CCT is the knowledge that they bring in setting up the airfield or drop zone and using Air Traffic Controller skills to manage the airspace and air craft. CCT are also capable of operating forward area rearming and refueling points, directing aircraft for fires, designating targets assisting offensive or defensive operations and providing human intelligence on the battlefield.

Para Rescue

The Para Rescue (PJ) are combat medics capable of treating medical trauma due to crashes, combat or natural disasters and assisting in the evacuation of personnel after they have stabilized their medical condition. The PJs are best known for their ability to get to the patient or injured victim no matter the surrounding environment. PJs are skilled at HALO, HAHO, static
line, combat diver and airland infiltrations. The PJs are similarly trained as SF medical sergeants but have the primary mission of medical support and rarely perform tactical missions.
Endnotes

1 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Handbook, Advanced Special Operations Class A525 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 17 May 1996), 4-3-1.
2 Ibid., 4-2-2.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
8 Ibid.,
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