PEACE OPERATIONS: A NEW USE OF FORCE?

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Preface

With the end of the Cold War there is increasing emphasis on what has been labeled "non-traditional" roles for the United States military. These non-traditional roles fall under the category of "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW). Categorizing peace operations—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—under OOTW leads one to believe that these operations do not call for the traditional use of force. Nothing can be further from the truth or more damaging to effective military operations.

In order to prevent more disastrous outcomes in peace operations, policy makers and the military must have a better understanding of the role force plays in peace operations. Only by thoroughly examining the entire peace operation planning process, can one determine where the problems lie. Any other type of an examination leads to shortsighted proposals.

We believe the debate on the military's role in OOTW has just begun. It is our hope that this research project provides the incentive to begin researching the topic at the top of the process instead of the bottom.

We greatly appreciate the contribution of Dr. Hollis Arnold. His insights and comments to this research project aided in our development of a useful product to the military, political, and academic communities.
Abstract

The end of the cold War has brought peace operations to the forefront of academic and military thought. Unfortunately, the majority of the focus is on the execution end of peace operations. This narrow focus stems from the belief that problems encountered during peace operations, such as Lebanon and Somalia, are due to the military's inability to come to grips, doctrinally, with the notion of peace operations. There is no doubt that the military has conceptual problems with the notion of peace operations, but to say that the problem lies solely with the military is incorrect and misleading. The problem is much deeper. The belief that peace operations—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—fall under the category of "Operations Other Than War" has led key decision-makers to believe that these missions entail a new use of force. Nothing could be further from the truth. Peace operations is about deterrence and compellence, thus the need for armed forces. As Clausewitz says, "Everything that occurs in war results from the existence of armed forces; but whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals are used, the idea of combat must be present" (emphasis in original). Approaching the use of military force from any perspective other than that dictated by the fundamental nature of war, and the centrality of combat to that nature, risks failure and needless loss of life. Why? Failure to see peace operations as either deterrence or compellence results in a miscalculated cost-benefit analysis which leads to misguided national policies that adversely impact on public and political will and the military's ability to reach the desired end state.
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the policy problem and sets the focus of peace operations, where it belongs, at the top of the decision process. It also provides a review of the literature pertinent to this study. Chapter 2 establishes the logic behind the problem and provides a model to help conceptualize the problem more clearly. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 are the application of the theory to specific case histories—Sinai, Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia, respectively. Chapter 7 concludes the study by evaluating the case studies against the stated hypotheses and provides suggestions for improving peace operations missions.
Chapter 1

Use of Force in Peace Operations

Introduction and Problem Definition

Samuel Huntington, a renowned writer on military and civil affairs, states the following about the US military's role:

The mission of the American armed forces is to combat, to deter, and to defeat the enemies of the United States. The American military should be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped solely for that task. Military forces should, where appropriate, be used in humanitarian and other civilian activities, but they should not be organized, or prepared or trained to perform such functions. The core purpose of a military force is fundamentally anti-humanitarian: It is to kill people in the most efficient way possible. It is only for that and related purposes that this country and other countries maintain military forces. Should the military perform other functions? Absolutely yes, and as I have indicated they have performed such functions throughout our history. Should these other functions define the mission of the military? Absolutely not. They should be spill-over functions the military is capable of providing because they have been well organized, trained, and equipped to perform their military functions of defending this country against its enemies.¹

Given the United States military’s recent experiences with peace operations, some academicians in the United States are debating Huntington’s claim that the military is well organized, trained, and equipped to perform peace operations.² Without establishing a causal relationship between the military’s current organization and its problems in peace operations, they are calling for reorganization, retraining and re-equipping of the
military. Following this path can spell disaster for the military's ability to ensure US security. A military organized solely around peace operations, which calls for a smaller and less heavily armed military, will not be capable of meeting the United States National Security Strategy of simultaneously fighting two major regional conflicts. In fact, it is debatable whether a force organized for peace operations can provide security for the United States.

Before the US government accepts a proposal to reorganize the military solely for peace operations, the peace operations process requires a full analysis. Instead of starting at the execution level, the analysis should begin at the decision level and then work down to the actual employment of force. The analysis needs to focus on the use of force and peace operations. In particular: What role does force play in peace operations? More importantly, how does one's concept of what role force should play affect the military's ability to carry out peace operations? Answering these questions requires an analysis that begins at the policy level with the decision to use force and then continuing to see how that decision affects the military's ability to perform peace operations.

**Thesis Statement and Research Scope**

Since the military is one of the means by which the US government carries out its ends, it is logical that analysis begins by looking at the ends—that is, what is it that the government wishes to accomplish by using force? The answer to this depends on one's view of the use of force and how this view translates into policy. Employing the military arm of force without a clear understanding of the role force plays in achieving those objectives leads to a belief that the military is unable to fulfill the objectives instead of
believing that the problem might actually stem from lack of congruence between the policy makers' objectives and the resources they utilize to obtain those objectives.

Borrowing Casper Weinberger's idea, with a slight tweak, if the policy makers do not understand the role of force in peace operations, they run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed. More specifically, if the policy makers do not understand that peace operations are about deterrence or compellence, then the likelihood of the military achieving the desired end state is extremely slim.

**Review of the Literature**

The thesis of this research project is predicated on the following premise: The ultimate goal in peace operations is to help ensure peace in order to protect a particular interest, whether it be vital or peripheral. The literature related to this premise is primarily focused in two areas, grand strategy (which includes use of force) and military operations. Grand strategy provides a broad umbrella for defining an interest and the means by which to achieve or protect the interest. In contrast, the military operation literature—from war to military operations other than war—is narrowly focused on covering military strategy, tactics, and doctrine. There is no systematic attempt to link the two when analyzing the success or failure of a particular military operation. The goal of this paper is to: (1) link the two, and (2) show how failure to realize this linkage leads to problems in execution. The peace operations process model, shown in chapter two, depicts the linkage.

Research and study of how the policy makers conceive the use of force in peace operations and its affect on peace operations have been neglected for several reasons.
First, because the subject has just recently come to the forefront with increased US involvement in peace operations. In the past, peace operations were virtually overlooked because attention was on events pertinent to containing the Soviet Union. However, with the dissolution of the USSR, and the corresponding increase in peace operations, the literature is now beginning to focus on some of these operations. A second reason for neglect is the perceived insignificance of operations other than war. Simply put, this “non-traditional” use of force is not as exciting as when force is used in the “traditional” sense—war and deterrence. Third, the institutional barriers that exist between the political and military establishments complicate any attempt to pinpoint military shortcomings at the political level. Since US law directs civilian control of the military and prohibits military commanders from political activism, those closest to the problems are deterred from documenting true cause and effect. Additionally, since the political leaders are deterred from unnecessarily interfering in the conduct of military operations, they lack the required military knowledge to draw any cause and effect between their concept of the use of force to meet political objectives and military operations. Finally, there is a perception—even by those in the military community—that peace operations entail a completely new mission for the military. This perception has created a need to begin a new body of research, instead of synthesizing existing information. Literature relevant to this topic includes: Political Science, Psychology, History (including diplomatic), Foreign Policy, International Relations, Military Science, and Peace Operations.

Despite the intellectual obstacles, the body of related literature exists. It simply requires synthesizing in order to fully understand the use of force in peace operations. The related literature that is important to synthesize falls under four main categories: (1)
Definition and Classification, (2) Analytical, (3) Evaluative, and (4) Policy. Following is a review of the most significant literature related to the use of force in peace operations.

**Definition and Classification**

The literature related to this aspect of peace operations addresses the following questions. How are peace operations defined? How does lack of a clear definition affect mission success? Do peace operations constitute a traditional or non-traditional role for the military? Answering these questions is an important step in understanding peace operations; as such, this project will provide some answers.

**Analytical**

This aspect of peace operations pertains mostly to the execution of peace operations. In trying to show cause and effect, the analysis begins with the military mission, instead of the decision to use the military as the means to achieve an end. Although analysis of external factors exist, the focus is on those factors that specifically affect the military, like doctrine, force structure, and available resources. This project analyzes factors at the government level that influence mission execution.

**Evaluative**

This aspect of peace operations focuses on how previous operations affect future operations. Most of the literature is a compilation of lessons learned. Again, the focus is on the execution level and not on the government decision-making level.
Policy

The literature on grand strategy provides the foundation for matching ends and means by first identifying an interest and then determining how to protect that interest, but it stops once the means have been identified. There is no attempt to discuss how the means attempt to meet the political objectives, nor is there any effort to connect one’s concept of the use of force with its actual employment. Under the rubric of grand strategy is Robert Art’s categorization of force into four different functions—deterrence, compellence, defense, and swaggering—which provide the foundation for arguing that peace operations are either about compellence or deterrence. Additionally, K. J. Holsti’s work on foreign policy decision making provides the framework for determining how the US government decides to employ its instruments of power. His key questions lead to a cost-benefit analysis—if the costs outweigh the benefits, then the proposed course of action should be re-evaluated. Although one of his questions asks whether the right means have been chosen, he does not explore the implications of the policy makers’ perception of the role the selected means play in achieving the ends.7

Overview

This paper analyzes what the group has termed the peace operations process. The process begins with the US government choosing interests, then performing a cost/benefit analysis to determine how to defend those interests, then stating an end state, then a policy in reference to the end state, then a mission for the military to protect the interest, then a military strategy, and finally, the allotment of resources to meet the strategy.8
Failure to agree on the role of force in peace operations leads to ambiguous policies and flawed military operations. Ambiguous policies lead to disastrous military operations like Somalia, Lebanon, and perhaps Bosnia. In each of these cases, the error lay in the government’s misperception of the role of force in peace operations. As a result, the government formulated flawed strategies. Strategies being a set of predictions: if we do A and B, the desired results Y and Z will follow. Ideally, there should be some explanation of why these results are likely to occur. Because the challenges states may face and the capabilities states can employ are affected by the way policy makers view the world, the definition they accept about peace operations and how force is utilized in them, plays a major role in determining the strategies they select. The success of these strategies not only depends on whether the definition and role of force they embrace is correct but also on how this definition and concept of force is translated into an end state. As such the group seeks answers to the following: What role does force play in peace operations? Do peace operations go beyond the traditional use of force (deterrence, compellence, swaggering, and defense)? How does the government’s concept of the use of force affect the military’s ability to fulfill its peace operations missions? Is the military, as currently trained, organized, and equipped, capable of performing peace operations?

This paper argues that one’s conception of the role of force in peace operations impacts on the military’s ability to accomplish the desired end state. Peace operations are about deterrence and compellence. Peace cannot be obtained through presence alone; a credible threat must exist in order to deter war. Combatant forces, backed by political will, represent a credible threat.
Once the peace operations process is understood, it will be easier to accurately judge the likely success of such missions. It will also show how recent US peace operations policy has been misguided, and help identify how present errors can be corrected. Thus, a theoretical understanding of peace operations will yield important practical results as well.

Definitions

Before discussing the methodology, the definitions that are pertinent to this research will be discussed. The study uses the Joint Publication 3-07.3, *JTPP for Peacekeeping Operations*, for the definition of peace operations. Peace Operations (PO):

**PO.** are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict.

**Peacekeeping Operations.** PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982. Joint forces support Peace Enforcement Operations to compel compliance with measures designed to establish an environment for truce or cease fire.

**Peace Enforcement Operations.** PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or cease-fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO are Operation POWER PACK conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993.¹⁰

The paper focuses on peace operations specifically because the two missions—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—focus on the force of the military while the other
Operations Other Than War missions focus on the logistical and structural capabilities of the military.

An end state is defined as what the National Security Authority wants the situation to look like after conflict ends. Conflict begins with a dispute and continues through pre-hostilities, hostilities, post-hostilities and finally settlement.¹¹

Methodology

The group chose a case history approach to the study of US peace operations. The principal evidence are peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions that the US military has been involved in over the past fifteen years.¹² Four significant missions were identified: Sinai, Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia. Although a larger number of cases would establish a more valid conclusion, the four aforementioned cases were significantly different enough to compare and validate the thesis.

After a brief history of each case, the specifics of the case are analyzed using the peace operations process model. The following questions apply to each case: What was the reason for US involvement? What was the stated end state or was there one? How was force envisioned to achieve the end state? How did the end state translate into strategic objectives? How did the strategic objectives translate into military objectives? Was the military means conducive to achieving the stated end state? In other words, was there congruence? Was the military properly trained to carry out the stated mission? Was the military able to achieve the stated end state? Why or why not? After which, the paper compares the results with the predictions of each hypothesis. Hypothesis 1: If the policy makers do not see peace operations as deterrence or compellence, then congruence is not likely to exist between each step in the peace operations process, thus creating
problems for mission success. Hypothesis 2: If peace operations fail, then the military was improperly trained, organized, and equipped to carry out the mission. Two questions are central: (1) Which hypothesis explains the role of force in peace operations? and (2) Are there identifiable conditions that affect whether force will be effective or ineffective (i.e., which hypothesis is likely to apply)? In order to answer these questions, the next chapter will provide the logic behind the argument—the theory—followed by four case history chapters and finally, the conclusion.

Notes


Notes


3 This is a use of force question. Do peace operations actually entail a new use of force? If the policy makers believe that peace operations are indeed a new role for the military, the way policy is written and implemented is bound to be affected.

4 Weinberger actually states, “Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply resources needed.” Taken from a speech delivered to the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, in which Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger cited the criteria the Administration should apply in deciding when to use US combat forces abroad. His six major tests are to be applied when weighing the use of combat forces abroad in regards to protecting vital interests; however, one could argue that the same tests can apply to protecting peripheral interests as well—especially the first four tests. See January 1985 issue of Defense magazine for an outline of Weinberger’s views on the commitment of US forces.

5 Although the vast literature on Vietnam speaks to the problem of matching means to meet ends, there is no attempt to show that the policy makers’ concept of the use of force may have caused this problem. The focus is on a mismatch between political objectives and military objectives.

6 There presently exists numerous definitions of peace. This presence of multiple interpretations creates considerable ambiguity as to exactly what is meant by undertaking a peace operation. “The resulting confusion is significant because without rigorous criteria to define the individual components of peace operations, a consensus regarding what each activity legitimately entails, what risks each portends, what results each can be reasonably expected to produce, and what measures are appropriate to appraise each operation’s success is virtually impossible to develop.” Robert D. Warrington, “The Helmets May Be Blue, But the Blood’s Still Red: The Dilemma of U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations,” in Essays On Strategy, ed. John N. Petrie (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 373-4.

7 K. J. Holsti’s conceptual framework that he sees policy makers explicitly or implicitly utilizing to formulate policy and strategy is as follows:

1. Given our goal, what do we wish the states in question (A) to do or not to do? (X)
2. How shall we get A to do or not to do X?
3. What resources are at our disposal so that we can induce A to do or not to do X?
4. What is A’s probable response to our attempts to influence its behavior?
5. What are the costs of taking actions 1, 2, or 3—as opposed to other alternatives?


8 This is similar to the campaign planning process model adapted by Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Weaver and Major Robert D. Pollock. See there work “Campaign Planning for the 21st Century: An Effect-Based Approach to the Planning Process,” in War Theory, eds. Maj Marsha Kwolek and Gwen Story (Montgomery, AL: Air
Notes

Command and Staff College, 1996), 13-20. Like Weaver and Pollock, the group will also consider contextual elements; however, the analysis will stop short of analyzing how operational art impacted on the military missions. The big difference between the two models is twofold; first, the peace operations process model can be applied to any military mission, and second, it starts with how the decision makers arrive at an end state.

9 Although Robert Art describes four functions of force, the only two that are applicable to this paper are deterrence and compellence.


11 See Sam Allotey and others, *Planning And Execution of Conflict Termination Story* (Montgomery, AL: Air Command And Staff College, 1995).

12 In order to be accepted as a case study, the US military had to play a major role in the peace operations.
Chapter 2

Peace Operation Planning Concepts and Theory

Introduction

The first section of the chapter lays out the role of force in peace operations. The second section begins with the peace operation process model in order to depict how a misconception of the use of force impacts on the military’s ability to fulfill a peace operation mission. The last section sums up the problem and its impact on US security.

Peace Operations and the Role of Force

A great deal of debate and misunderstanding has surfaced in military as well as academic circles concerning the proliferation of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions since the end of the Cold War. Lecturers at military institutions continually underscore the need for the military to come to grips, doctrinally, with the notion of “peace operations.” There is little doubt that conceptual confusion exists in the minds of the US Army’s doctrine writers. In Field Manual 100-5, Operations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are grouped into the category of “Operations Other Than War” or OOTW. The conceptual difficulty arises when one digs further and finds that this designation also embraces humanitarian relief and disaster relief. In other words, operations such as those carried out in Lebanon in 1983 and the distribution of food in
Florida following Hurricane Andrew are viewed similarly in terms of doctrine. Despite the euphemistic terminology, peace operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement rely on the military's possession of weapons, while humanitarian and disaster relief rely on the military's unique logistical capabilities. There is a conceptual flaw in grouping the two together doctrinally. In fact, the main argument in this paper is that peacekeeping and peace enforcement represent the use of force in international politics and must be viewed as such by both the military and civilian policy makers if the proper national policies, translatable to coherent military strategies, are to be formulated.

Robert Art provides what is considered by many to be the definitive categorization of force in international politics. He argues that force is used to serve four functions: deterrence, defense, compellence, and swaggering. Defense and swaggering, for purposes of this discussion, are set aside in order to focus on deterrence and compellence. Art defines deterrence as "the deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it." Art defines compellence as "the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken." This paper contends that peacekeeping is, at its essence, about deterrence, and peace-enforcement is fundamentally about compellence. Indeed, FM 100-5 notes that "the peacekeeping force deters violence by its physical presence at violence-prone locations." It also notes that peace enforcement "implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions." Why then is there such confusion and ambiguity in formulating
national policy and military doctrine and strategy? Because policy makers still have not accepted that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are about deterrence and compellence.

Many argue that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are fundamentally new uses of force that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. This position is often based on the supposition that the intranational nature of conflict that has emerged is a new phenomenon. To argue that ethnic, tribal, and religious strife is new is to ignore the entire course of human history. What is relatively new is that the United States is not faced with a major adversary since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US can therefore pay more attention to other conflicts around the globe. The fact that the US did not notice them before does not mean they were not going on. This point has eluded many commentators on the subject. The advent of mass media and real-time pictures of internecine strife, coupled with the absence of a significant threat to the physical security of the United States, has spurred a tendency to want to “do something” and thus brought peacekeeping and peace enforcement to the fore in security studies and military doctrine.

What of the supposition that peacekeeping is really deterrence at its essence? Breaking peacekeeping down to its basics proves the point. The idea behind peacekeeping is to place a neutral force between two recently warring parties so that a ceasefire may hold long enough for them to solve their differences diplomatically. In order to do so each side must feel confident that the other will not seek to gain an upper hand or improved position by returning to force of arms to achieve a better settlement. Given that the two sides were recently at war, it follows that what Robert Jervis refers to as the “security dilemma” runs high. Goodwill and trust alone will not provide the necessary confidence, hence the peacekeeping force. If the confidence level is to be high enough to
reduce the "confusion, worry and fear" engendered by the security dilemma each side must believe that the other will conclude that the cost of attacking through the peacekeeping force will exceed the benefits to be gained. A potential aggressor must fear the pain of violating the agreement and both sides must be convinced of this. In other words, they must both be convinced that the other will be deterred. In order to be effective in its peacekeeping role, the peacekeeping force must represent a credible deterrent. It must be able to inflict sufficient pain on a violator to deter the violation. Therein lies the rub. The failure of peacekeeping missions most often lies in the inability to provide a credible deterrent. This occurs for several reasons. First let us examine the principles of peacekeeping developed in the United Nations by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1956.

The principles of peacekeeping operations enunciated by Hammarskjold are the accepted ones, even by the United States, to this day. He declared that a peacekeeping operation must have the following four prerequisites before being adopted: a cease-fire must be in place, the peacekeeping force must be seen as being absolutely neutral, the force must be lightly armed, and the superpowers (US and USSR) should not participate. The first two principles seem to be beyond argument. In order to keep peace it should first exist to some degree, and it would seem unlikely that any warring party would invite in a force allied with the other side. The fourth principle is a relic of the Cold War (although the presence of both American and Russian troops in Bosnia may prove instructive), wherein any involvement by the US or USSR could broaden a conflict or involve a Security Council veto. The third principle deserves deeper scrutiny. To say that peacekeepers must always be lightly armed and only for self-defense defies the logic of
peacekeeping as deterrence as described earlier. Clearly the nature and armament of the force must be tailored to the particular set of circumstances involved. Placing a lightly armed force between two heavily armed antagonists is not likely to produce the deterrent effect needed for a mitigation of the security dilemma. This is not to say that deterrence is achieved solely by military power. Indeed, the political and economic instruments of power may play a significant role but that will have to be decided on a case by case basis depending on the nature of the parties involved. These principles seem to reflect the bureaucratic and political realities of the United Nations rather than a real deterrent. States, in calculating interests and risks, simply have not been willing to place armed forces of any significance under UN control (not withstanding arguments that the UN controlled the force in Korea in 1950). Hammarskjold described a set of principles based on what could be done in the UN, not what needed to be done. Thus the failure of so many UN peacekeeping efforts.

**Impact of Misperceiving the Use of Force**

Effective deterrence depends on two things: capability and will. In order to be deterred a potential aggressor must be convinced that the force opposing him has both the military capability and the political will to make any benefit he might derive from aggression too costly. The UN and the US have failed in both these areas. The problem for the United States, as will be seen in the case studies, is that by failing to see peacekeeping as the use of force, requiring the necessary capability and will to deter effectively, national policies and military strategy become flawed. If the policy maker accepts the logic of peacekeeping as described above, then he must determine if the
necessary will is present to provide an effective deterrent. First, he must realize that the object of the force is to deter. Having done so he must ask himself what he is willing to do to actually provide a credible deterrent. What capabilities will be used? If the force is actually tested (i.e. deterrence fails) what is the US willing to do? What is it willing to put at risk? Or, put another way, what costs (in blood and treasure) is the US willing to accept? This brings the policy-maker back to the issue of interest.

After accepting the logic of peacekeeping and the use of force as deterrence and asking the questions stated above, the policy maker must then balance those answers against the nation's interest in a particular matter. If the potential costs outweigh the interests he must demure. If he does not there will almost invariably be a policy strategy mismatch as was displayed in Somalia and Lebanon. To hope that in the interest of “doing something,” the cost of deploying military force in a deterrent operation will not arise is to invite disaster. The unwillingness to balance cost against risk will not be lost on a potential aggressor. If will is not clearly indicated at the outset, initiative passes to the aggressor and the policy maker is left trying to create will ex-post facto or pulling out of an operation at the first sign of cost, as happened in Lebanon and Somalia. This also has the undesirable effect of bringing will into question in future operations, inviting a test by a potential aggressor. Such an unwillingness to calculate cost and interest creates flawed national policy and like an orienteering course where the participant loses the first point and cannot, therefore find the next, the military strategy that flows from such policy will be flawed also. The following model depicts the linkage between interests and the role of force.
Figure 2-1. Peace Operation Process

The model explains the peace operations process. The process begins when the US government identifies interests. The next step is a cost-benefit analysis. The government must decide how it wants to protect the interest. In so doing, it determines which instrument of power to utilize. Knowing how that instrument of power will protect the government’s interest is critical to a proper cost-benefit analysis. When deciding to use the military instrument of power the government must accurately perceive the role. Misperceiving the role means the government will not accurately calculate the costs of employing force. The next step is to identify an end state—that is, what does the government want the situation to look like after the military mission is complete. The end state is then translated into political objectives, and finally to a military mission. The military develops a military strategy from its mission, and based on that strategy establishes a force structure (forces and resources necessary to accomplish the mission).9 The elements of the process cannot be considered in isolation as they are linked in a complex relationship. As Weaver and Pollack note in their work on the campaign planning process, a change in one element will create a need to change the other elements. Specifically, if the end state changes, the corresponding strategy and military mission must change in order to achieve the new end state—congruence must exist between each step. The process should form a loop that continuously evaluates objectives and their intended results against the desired political end state.10

The government’s misperception of the role of force in peace operations upsets the entire planning process. Interests, vague or concrete, suddenly become less costly to
defend. In turn, the end state seems easier to achieve and tends to take on a vague meaning. Formulating political objectives from vague end states becomes difficult. This leads to a problem in determining the military mission and thus continues to spiral downward where finally the allotted resources are inappropriate for reaching the desired end state. The lack of a clear end state and an understanding of what role force should play in attaining it disrupts the planning process and leads to the perception that the military has failed when in fact the problem lies at the policy level.

To say that there is a tendency of the US to gloss over the potential cost of peacekeeping operations, and thus an inability to generate sufficient will, is evidenced in the FM 100-5 view of peacekeeping quoted earlier, “the peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations.” As discussed earlier, however, presence alone is not a sufficient deterrent.

Peace enforcement seems to be less problematic. It is much more transparent. The use of force in a compellent role is much more clearly seen and thus it is a mission rarely embarked on but a term widely used. The body of evidence in terms of case studies is thin. The UN rarely performs peace enforcement missions because again, these missions more clearly envision the actual use of forces in combat, not something many states are willing to trust the UN to do. A peacekeeping mission may become a peace enforcement mission when deterrence (peacekeeping) fails but that is normally a transition phase prior to withdrawal as was evidenced in Somalia and the UN effort in Bosnia. Secretary of Defense Perry has been adamant about describing the US mission in Bosnia as peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping, but that may be more the need to move on to a new euphemism given the negative connotation peacekeeping has for many Americans.
Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are deduced from the preceding argument:

**Hypothesis 1:** If the policy-makers do not see peace operations as deterrence or compellence, then congruence is not likely to exist between each step in the peace operations process, thus creating problems for mission success.

**Hypothesis 2:** If peace operations fail, then the military was improperly trained, organized, and equipped to carry out the mission.

These competing hypotheses will be tested against US peace operations performed in the Sinai, Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia. The intent of the analysis is to determine the policy makers’ conception of peace operations and how this conception affected the military’s ability to fulfill its mission.

Summary

The paper underscores that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not new uses of force in international politics. They are deterrence and compellence and require the same policy calculations given to both in the past. The use of euphemisms is a tried and true tactic of policy and strategy. It does not however, relieve the policy maker and military strategist from the responsibility of recognizing reality. There is a principle of international law that states, “the law flows from the facts, not the labels.” Policy-makers and military planners would do well to recall Carl Von Clausewitz’s warning:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
Notes

1 Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 100-5 Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993). Chapter 13 is entitled “Operations Other Than War” and includes those missions where soldiers “may not involve combat.”


3 Ibid.

4 FM 100-5, 13-7.

5 FM 100-5, 13-7.

6 The security dilemma derives from the fact that there is no central authority to ensure that states behave themselves. With this in mind, states must protect themselves. When a state builds up its security, a neighboring state sees this as an offensive move and therefore, must build up herself or face the potential for invasion.

7 This involves the concerned parties determining what they want and what they are willing to risk in order to achieve it. The work by K.J. Holsti, discussed in the introduction, depicts the important questions that states must ask in order to perform a cost-benefit analysis.


9 This is similar to the Campaign Planning Process developed by Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Weaver and Major Robert D. Pollock in “Campaign Planning for the 21st Century: An Effect-Based Approach to the Planning Process,” in *War Theory*, eds. Maj Marsha Kwolek and Gwen Story, (Montgomery, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1996), 13-20. However, instead of beginning with the end state, the process begins with identifying an interest and then figuring out what the government is willing to risk in order to protect that interest. This is an important addition, for without an identified interest it is difficult to establish an end state and without a cost-benefit analysis it is impossible to determine what resources to apply and to what degree in order to achieve the desired end state.

10 Lieutenant Colonel Larry A. Weaver and Major Robert D. Pollock, “Campaign Planning for the 21st Century: An Effect-Based Approach to the Planning Process,” in *War Theory*, eds. Maj Marsha Kwolek and Gwen Story, (Montgomery, AL: Air Command And Staff College, 1996), 13-20. Their model is designed for Air Force assets; whereas, the model above is applicable to force in general.

11 FM 100-5, 13-7.

Chapter 3

The Sinai

Although the focus of this chapter is on the successful US participation in the peace following the fourth Arab-Israeli War, this role is only appreciated by understanding the circumstances that led to it. Following World War II, four main developments led to instability in the region. First, the French and British withdrew from their colonies, thus creating a power vacuum.

Second, was a resurgence of nationalism throughout the Middle East. This “Arab awakening” became more powerful in the struggle against the foreign powers that were dominating the region. Stemming from this, a number of political movements emerged throughout the region. They coalesced against imperialism and around the idea of political unity of the Arab world.

Third, the establishment of Israel and its victory in the 1948 war became a source of conflict. The presence of Israel presented a direct challenge to the nationalist sentiment now present in the Arab world. Loyalty to Arab nationalism meant strict opposition to Israel. The Arabs believed the only way they could achieve political unity was to ally against Israel and restore Palestine.

Fourth, Soviet and US commitments in the Middle East were growing rapidly. However, their interests were at odds. While the US was trying to promote a new pro-
Western region, the Soviets directly opposed this by encouraging Arab nationalism. The Middle East became a cornerstone in the US-Soviet power struggle.¹

The four aforementioned developments set the stage for a regional as well as a superpower rivalry. Specific to this paper, is the rivalry that developed against Egypt and Israel and of course, the US and the Soviet Union. The contention between Egypt and Israel led to a number of regional wars, beginning with the Sinai War in 1956 and culminating with the October War in 1973. Israel’s main concern was her survival as a nation. In the 1967 war Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt prompting a more insecure status for Egypt. The Sinai provided Israel with a defensible border and a buffer zone between itself and Egypt. Israel’s main goal was to deter war. However, if deterrence should fail, Israel was prepared to go on the offensive but yet provide a strategic defense. In the operational offense, Israel’s goal was to significantly destroy the Arab force. If war should break out, she also wanted to gain territory in order to use it for negotiations.²

Egypt’s interests were to keep alive the Palestinian issue, enhance Arab unity, and exchange ties with the US. Primarily, however, she wanted to break the political stalemate that developed after the cease-fire in August 1970. After the war, Egypt thought it could use superpower influence in negotiations with Israel to regain the Sinai Peninsula. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw Egypt as fighting a war not to acquire territory, but to restore Egypt’s self-respect and thereby increase its diplomatic flexibility.³

The ongoing competition between the Soviet Union and the US led to the US playing a major role in negotiating and ensuring peace between Egypt and Israel. The US did not
want the Soviets to gain superiority in the area and possibly upset the flow of oil. Additionally, the US was following its policy of containment by doing whatever it could to curb the spread of communism. The Soviets, however, were more interested in weakening US presence then they were in spreading communism to the Middle East. Their intent was to cause a petroleum crisis that would seriously damage the free enterprise system. The crisis would hopefully isolate the US from its allies and create divisions that would favor the global designs of the Soviet Union.⁴

By the time the fourth war commenced in 1973, the Soviet Union had gained large inroads into the Middle East, primarily through supplying arms and aid to the Arabs. Egypt was one of the primary recipients of Soviet arms and money. In fact, some believe that the Soviets actually instigated the October War by providing the Egyptians with massive training and logistical support.⁵ This did not go unnoticed by the US. However, the US was not sure how to reduce Soviet influence without creating a confrontation that could ruin détente. The answer finally came, when after the war, Egypt abandoned the Soviet Union. The US quickly filled the void and began to play a dominant role in the postwar peace process.

Although President Nixon was responsible for sending Kissinger to Cairo in order to restore diplomatic ties, it was President Carter who set the stage for the Framework for Peace in the Middle East. US mediation and financial pledges helped bridge the obstacles to peace. Exactly why the US devoted so much time and energy to the peace process is a mystery, but the memories of the October 1973 war, the threats of Soviet intervention, and the oil price shock of that year surely played a role.⁶
What the preceding history depicts is a bipolar world, with the Soviet Union and the United States trying to balance one another out. Neither party wanted the other to gain more than the other. If the Soviets gained more in the Middle East, then the US would lose out. Key to this zero sum game was oil. The US would not allow the Soviets to control such a vital resource. If the Soviets managed to gain direct control of the oil, they could virtually hold the world at ransom. The US believed the only way the Soviets could gain a foothold was if there was a major war that disrupted the entire balance of the Middle East. Thus, by deciding to play a key role in the peace process, the US was indirectly preventing the Soviets from gaining a foothold in the area.

President Carter, along with his immediate advisors, believed that the deadlocked situation in the Middle East in 1977 could gradually deteriorate and cause unfortunate results from the point of view of world peace. Thus, the US, through President Carter's direct request, became the intermediary between Israel and its neighbors to help overcome deep distrust and historically rooted antagonism. Although both Egypt and Israel saw the benefits to peace, without outside help, neither could trust that the other would negotiate in good faith. Fortunately, the US, with its vast economic and military resources, helped change the calculus of benefit and risk for the parties. By utilizing US economic and military power, President Carter was able to convince President Sadat and Prime President Begin to sign the Treaty for Peace.

After many years of strife, an agreement came into force on 25 April 1979. The agreement stipulated that upon completion of a phased Israeli withdrawal over three years "the parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of the security arrangements." The intention was to use UN forces
and observers to perform a variety of tasks. UN forces would be stationed in certain areas adjoining the demilitarized zone on the Egyptian side, and the UN observers would patrol a certain area on the Israeli side of the international boundary. The US was entrusted with establishing two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. The US function was to perform visual and electronic surveillance at the stations. In support of the stations, the US would establish tactical early warning and verify access to them in the Mitla and Giddi Passes. These stations were to be operated by US civilian personnel. Additionally, in an annex to the agreement the US stated that if the Security Council should fail to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President would be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force. Carter also stated that since peace in the area was so important, he promised to take action if the Treaty of Peace was violated.

The PLO and many Arab countries strongly opposed the Treaty of Peace, making it extremely difficult to form a viable force. Ultimately, the Soviet Union vetoed a UN peacekeeping force, forcing the Council to decide on 24 July not to extend the mandate of UNEF. This spelled disaster for any hopes of peace in the area. As stated previously, based on a long history of mistrust, there was no way the Egyptians or Israelis would believe that the other would abide by the treaty without some intermediary present to ensure there were no violations.

If the US did not want war to erupt in the area again, then it had to decide on how to replace the UNEF mandate. In deciding on a strategy, the first question the policy makers
had to ask was what was the goal? Based on President Carter's intervention in the peace talks, it was obvious that the goal was peace. Peace was to be achieved by reducing the security dilemma between Israel and Egypt. US national policy was focused on stability in the Middle East in order to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil. The next question was how to ensure this peace. The policy makers could choose between direct or indirect involvement. Once they decided to become involved, the next step was to decide which resources or instruments of power would be appropriate. Which instruments of power would ensure the maintenance of peace between Israel and Egypt? This was almost a fait accompli since the Treaty of Peace had already stipulated the need for a military force.13 Since the US aided in the peace agreement, it was obvious that she felt military force was required in order to achieve the peace, thus Holsti's fourth question in reference to choosing the correct resource to achieve the desired behavior had already been determined. The final question refers to a cost-benefit analysis in which the US has to ask whether sending in force is worth the benefits it might entail. In other words, may it cost more to send US troops, in terms of loss of life and/or domestic/political turmoil, then the US was willing to pay to maintain peace in the Middle East. Answering this depends on the size of force sent in and the mission it is assigned. A large force and an unspecified mission may be costly in terms of loss of life which could spell political and domestic upheaval and thus turn more costly than any benefits gained from preserving peace in the Middle East.

Arriving at the proper military force requires knowing the desired end state. What exactly is the peacekeeping force suppose to accomplish? Once this is spelled out, the military can plan an appropriate force size. Fortunately, the functions and responsibilities
of the peacekeepers were spelled out in the Treaty for Peace. In accordance with the Peace Treaty Article VI: The mission of the United Nations Observers is to Observe, Verify, and Report. Four essential tasks were assigned:

- Operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
- Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of the Annex to the Treaty of Peace, to be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
- Additional verifications within 48 hours after receipt of a request from either party.
- Ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran.\textsuperscript{14}

As seen from the above, the mission does not entail a large force, but this does not automatically mean that the risk is low because a small force may not be a credible enough threat to deter war from breaking out. A small force has to be seen as more of a trip wire—that is, if harm did come to the force, the US would quickly respond.\textsuperscript{15} The US signals this intent by having a desired end state that can be translated into a political strategy as well as military objectives and then to the parties involved—so they know the US has the political will to reach its desired end state.

In the case of the Middle East, the US achieved this in a couple of ways; first of all, by formally stating that the US would take action. In a letter from President Jimmy Carter to Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, March 26, 1979, Carter states the following: “The US promises to take action as deemed appropriate to help achieve compliance if there should be an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace.”\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, the US did not decide to just use any force, but to use the best soldiers. The Army Chief of Staff decided that the best soldiers
were paratroopers.\textsuperscript{17} By sending in “elite” forces, the US illustrated its resolve—its determination to uphold the peace.

Risk was further reduced due to the nature of the agreement. Egypt and Israel risked their own security, by coming to the bargaining table, thus indicating that they were truly interested in peace; they just needed a mediator to help with the years of distrust between the two parties. The following statement, along with their signing of the peace treaty, indicates a strong desire for peace, “...the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts.”\textsuperscript{18} Since the US was intimately involved in the negotiation process, she knew that the parties were truly interested in peace.

Based on the above, placing a small elite force in the Sinai did not engender a high level of risk; however, without a clearly stated end state, this small force could very well become its own trip wire. Application of the peace operations process model will allow one to figure out how much risk the military faced. In applying the model the first question to ask is: What was the US interest? US interest was twofold: maintaining détente and maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East by keeping the Soviets out. The next step was to perform a cost-benefit analysis in order to determine how best to protect the interest. During the cost-benefit analysis all of the instruments of power were chosen (economic, diplomatic, informational, and military). When deciding on the military instrument of power, the US realized that the military role was as a deterrent. Was there a clearly stated end state? The desired end state was peace in the region; the US wanted stability between Egypt and Israel for fear that if another war erupted, the SU
might use the instability to gain a foothold in the region. Next, how was peace in the region translated to a political objective? The strategic objective was to ensure that Israel and Egypt abide by the Peace Treaty. If both parties adhered to the agreement then peace would follow, thus keeping the SU out of the area. Third, was the political objective translatable to a military mission? The political objective was easily translated into a military mission and military strategy given the specifics of the Treaty itself. As shown above, the Treaty clearly delineated the job of the peacekeepers. All the military had to do was figure out exactly how many troops were required to carry out the mission. It was decided that three airborne battalions would be large enough (no more than 2,000 troops), given that other countries were also sending troops. In carrying out the strategy, were there centers of gravity that the military could focus on in order to meet the objective of maintaining the peace? Again, the centers of gravity were the specific zones that were established for the peacekeeping troops to monitor. The Treaty spelled out specifically what was to be considered a breach of the Treaty and thus something that the peacekeepers were to report. The individual tactics that were employed in order to “hit” the centers of gravity were simple patrol and observation skills that coincided with the peacekeepers (airborne soldiers) mission essential tasks. Finally, in closing the loop, were these tasks capable of producing the end state of peace? In other words, have the peacekeepers succeeded in their mission? The answer so far is yes. There is still peace between Egypt and Israel. In fact, the overall goal of maintaining stability so that the Soviets could not gain a foothold was also achieved.

The Sinai peacekeeping mission, although still in progress, can be considered a success. It was successful because the US conducted a proper cost-benefit analysis that
allowed for the correct use of force in a peace operation. The policy makers realized that if the Soviets were to be kept out of the Middle East, the US had to play a role in bringing stability to the area. The decision to send peacekeepers was not based on values or morals, it was based on the need to protect a vital interest—that is, the free flow of oil out of the region. With this interest in mind, President Carter decided the best way to protect it was by playing a role in ensuring peace in the area. He was willing to send in US troops; although a relatively small force, it had the necessary backing of the US to present a credible threat to the Egyptians and Israelis. The elite airborne troops came highly qualified to carry out their mission, and they also arrived with the President’s promise that the US would do everything in its power to keep the peace between the two parties.

The Sinai mission has also been a success due to the fact that an end state was clearly stated and achievable. The military could take the political objective, that of ensuring the Treaty of Peace was upheld, and translate it into achievable military objectives down to the tactical level, thus ensuring that the end state, peace between Egypt and Israel, was achieved. Granted, the fact that Egypt and Israel were truly interested in peace, played a large role in maintaining the peace. Neither party, however, would believe that the other would keep the peace without some intermediary—one that both would see as a true deterrent for the other. Israel believed that Egypt would be deterred from breaking the peace if US peacekeepers were present and vice versa. Why? Because the US sent a credible deterrent—one that if crossed would be more risky than beneficial for either side.

In sum, the Sinai case history supports the hypothesis that if peace operations are conceived as compellence and deterrence, then the military will be able to translate the policies into achievable objectives. Additionally, by realizing the mission was one of
deterrence, the US realized that the military required proper political backing in order to achieve its mission. And finally, an accurate cost-benefit was accomplished because the policy makers accurately viewed the mission as a deterrent mission. They realized that the troops were being sent to the Middle East to deter Israel and Egypt from beginning another war. Without this deterrent force, the area would become unstable and create an interruption in the flow of oil. A proper conception of the peacekeeping mission as a deterrent mission allowed the US to achieve its end state—peace between Israel and Egypt and the free flow of oil.

Notes

4 "Events in the Middle East And Asia" The Army Quarterly, Vol. 104 No. 2 Jan 1974, 147-149.
5 Ibid.
9 Siilasvuo, 338.
10 Siilasvuo, 379-380.
11 Quandt, 377.
12 Siilasvuo, 339. UNEF I was already operating in the area based on a previously signed mandate. The intent was to simply expand its mandate to uphold the Treaty of Peace.
13 The U.S. could have used other instruments of power, such as economic, to entice other countries to pick up the peacekeeping mission, but given the unpopularity of the mission, this may not have worked. On the other hand, economic aid did play a large role in getting the two parties to sign the peace treaty.
15 This is what Thomas Shelling refers to as latent force.
Notes

16 Quandt, 406.
18 Quandt, 377.
19 “Sinai Area Handbook” Department of the Army, Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307, 1 November 1983. A multinational observer mission was established by the US to replace UNEF. The mission of the MFO was the same as what was established for UNEF under the guidelines of the Treaty for Peace. Below are the specifics for the MFO mission:

The MFO was created to help carry out the terms of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. It was established by a protocol signed by Egypt and Israel on August 3, 1981.

The Peace Treaty called for Israel’s final withdrawal of armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula by April 25, 1982. The Sinai Peninsula became part of the sovereign territory of Egypt and was divided into four zones (A through D). Both Egypt and Israel agreed to strict limitations on the number and types of armed forces in each zone.

Zone A/B were Egypt’s; Zone C was for the MFO; and Zone D was Israel’s.

MFO infantry troops (Fiji, Columbia, USA) were stationed in Zone C. MFO (US civilians) will perform the supervision and inspection functions of the Peace Treaty in all four zones—monitored the reconnaissance gear.

The MFO is under the supervision of the Director General, who is a US national. He reports directly to the governments of Egypt and Israel.

Functions and Responsibilities of the MFO (II-2 through II-3)

a. The mission of the MFO shall be to undertake the functions and responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty of the United Nations Forces and Observers.

b. The MFO shall supervise the implementation of this agreement and employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. This will include some of the following activities:

(1) Operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B, and within Zone C.

(2) Periodic verification of the implementation of the agreement carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by Egypt and Israel.

(3) Additional verification within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Egypt or Israel.

(4) Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article of the Treaty of Peace.

c. When a violation has been confirmed by the MFO, it shall be verified by the respective Party within 48 hours. The Party shall notify the MFO of the rectification.

d. MFO aircraft will not cross the international boundary without prior notification and clearance by each of the Receiving States.

e. MFO reconnaissance aircraft operating in Zone C will provide notification to the civil air control center and, thereby, to the Egyptian Liaison Officer therein.
Notes

f. Members of the MFO will at all times carry their personal identity cards issued by the Receiving State. Members of the MFO may be required to present, but not to surrender, their passport or identity cards upon demand of an appropriate authority of the Receiving State. The passport or identity card will be the only document required for a member of the MFO.

MFO will consist of a headquarters, three infantry battalions totaling not more than 2,000 troops, and logistics and signal units.

The MFO units will have standard armament and equipment appropriate to their peacekeeping mission as stipulated in the agreement.
Chapter 4

Lebanon

How could United States participation in what the Reagan administration proclaimed as simply a presence mission end so badly? If the United States’ interest was peace in Middle East, why was it not willing to commit the forces necessary to achieve its interest? If the policy of the United States was limited to a presence mission, why did the Marines take offensive action? The intent of this case study is to examine how United States policy makers viewed participation in Lebanon, and whether the policy makers’ vision of the operation impacted on the success or failure of the mission. Some important questions are: (1) Did United States interest change? (2) Did United States policy change? (3) Did a change in United States interest or policy have an impact on military operations? (4) Finally, was the use of force effective in Lebanon?

Israel invaded southern Lebanon for the second time (the first in March 78) in June 1982 in retaliation for PLO raids into northern Israel. The United States followed quickly with diplomatic interventions leading to the commitment of 800 US Marines in August 1982 as part of a non-UN multinational force (MNF) of peacekeepers totaling 7,000. The National Command Authority (NCA) tasked United States Multinational Force (USMNF) to assist in the evacuation of PLO and Syrian combatants from Beirut. There was an obvious possibility that fighting between Israeli and PLO-Syrian forces might be
rekindled, but the US Marines were not deployed to Lebanon with intentions of fighting a war. Even when Marines were redeployed into Beirut in late September 1982, there was still virtually no intent that US military forces would threaten other parties directly.¹ One year later, however, when the US Sixth Fleet opened fire in support of the government of Lebanon (GOL), US military commitments had changed from a neutral “presence” force to one operationally engaged in support of an unpopular government. The US elected to become actively involved, albeit in a constrained way, in Lebanon’s emergent civil war.

The framework for the Marine’s mission came out of negotiations between US Special Negotiator, Phillip Habib, and the Lebanese and Israeli governments. It was a “presence” mission, a term not taught in any military school. The diplomats envisioned the “presence” mission as helping establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of its capital.² Building upon what the diplomats created, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the United States European Command (USEUCOM) prepared a mission statement. It was approved by the Secretary of Defense and tasked the United States Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) as follows:

Establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut Area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce US Forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect US Forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.³

The lack of a traditional military mission perturbed the military authors of the mission statement. Their discomfort resulted from the absence of clear, precisely defined
terminology. They were unclear as to what the administration meant by “establish an environment” and by the objectives of a “presence” mission.

Compounding the ambiguity, the JCS instructions to USEUCOM stated that US Forces would not be engaged in combat. In accordance with the standard USEUCOM Peacetime ROE, US Forces were tasked to exercise restraint and to use force only in self-defense so as not to escalate any conflict, endanger innocent lives, or become embroiled in factional infighting. The neutrality of the US Forces was to be scrupulously maintained. US Forces were not to take sides politically or militarily, nor give the perception of having done so. These directives made the mission sound like a peacekeeping mission, but at the time of deployment, there was no peace to keep.

The following account of the peacekeeping mission focuses on key events and actions which is necessary for one to gain full appreciation of the escalating hostilities faced by the Marines and the inability of US politicians to reach consensus regarding Lebanon foreign policy and US peacekeeping policy.

The Marines were involved in Beirut as peacekeepers on two separate occasions totaling 18 months. The first lasted several weeks with the Marines assigned the mission to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Beirut. The next Marine involvement began shortly thereafter. It is the second mission that proved to be so ambiguous and disastrous.

President Reagan announced on 28 September that the Marines would remain in Lebanon until all of the Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces had been withdrawn, not from Beirut but from all of Lebanon. By implication the duration of the peacekeeping mission became indefinite. President Reagan had changed the political objective from “out of Beirut” to “out of Lebanon.” The strategic objective became more ambiguous and
required an increased military “presence” on the ground (that never occurred) in order to both deter and compel the Israel, Syrian, and PLO forces to withdraw from Lebanon.

The second peacekeeping mission began on 29 September 1982, 19 days following the first withdrawal. It was marked by a change in strategic objectives, increased hostilities by factions toward the GOL and the MNF, and incremental steps by the US away from neutrality towards supporting the GOL. Because the USMNF was directed to remain strictly neutral, the political complexity remained ambiguous. US diplomats thought the strengthening of the GOL was of central importance while US military leaders insisted on the JCS to define the military mission of “neutral presence.”

On 28 October 1982, President Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 64, which set as a US objective his statement of 28 September (Israel, Syria, PLO, out of Lebanon). NSDD 64 also suggested that the USMNF might not be withdrawn but remain until the GOL could once again control, administer, and defend its sovereign territory. With NSDD 64, the US strategic objective changed without directing a larger force required to attain the new objective. The JCS reacted by forwarding orders to establish a more visible military presence by conducting daylight motorized patrols in East Beirut. NSDD 64 also directed “limited” noncombat-related support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as an acceptable add-on interpretation to the Marines “presence” mission. This directive changed an earlier directive of the JCS to remain neutral. From then on the USMNF would be viewed as a non-neutral force attempting to prop-up a new government. Thus, the thrust of US policy in Lebanon was inconsistent with any strict interpretation of USMNF “neutrality” and moved the Marines a step closer to an operational mission and a step away from a “neutral presence.”
In support of NSDD 64, the US government dispatched Brigadier General Bartlett, US Army, and a team of military specialists to Lebanon to assess the Lebanese Army’s capabilities. The Bartlett report recommended a major effort to rebuild the LAF. As a direct result of the Bartlett Report, in November some $80 million in economic and military aid, and $150 million in military equipment was approved by Congress for the GOL. Further, the Department of Defense established the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in Beirut to oversee the Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP) in which the US Army was tasked to train the LAF. The Marine peacekeeping force was charged with training small units of the LAF as well. What was sought was a LAF strong enough to establish and preserve law and order throughout Lebanon and provide the Israelis with some expectation that Israel’s northern border would be secured against resurgent PLO presence in South Lebanon. This new mission not only changed the Marine’s mission but put them at risk of attack. By deciding to train the LAF, the US government broke the rule of impartiality and thus could no longer claim the Marines were there as a peacekeeping force.

The continued lack of congruence between the strategic and military objectives further jeopardized the USMNF. March 1983 marked the beginning of stepped-up hostilities directed against all the MNF until the mission was terminated. In April, the US Embassy was car bombed. There were 57 KIA, 17 of them US. Beirut had become a place where daily random acts of violence were the order of the day. Over the next several weeks, events escalated. The USMNF commander’s helicopter was fired on, and Druse artillery rounds landed short of the Navy transport ship, Fairfax County.
Although there were frequent flare-ups between factions and the LAF, May through June 1983 was relatively uneventful for the USMNF. Some random artillery shelling and rockets had landed in the USMNF positions around Beirut International Airport (BIA) in the previous months leading to the temporary closure of the BIA in late June. In July, Robert McFarlane (Habib’s replacement) sought to reduce association between the USMNF and the LAF in an attempt to move closer to neutrality. However, in August, he sought to associate the USMNF with the LAF again as trainers, advisors, and observers.\textsuperscript{11}

August 1983 saw an increase in hostilities. The OMC was threatened and intentional shelling of the BIA occurred on August 10. As rounds fell in the area that day there was one minor injury to a Marine officer and the barrage almost hit Ambassador Robert McFarlane. It was the first time that Marines responded with artillery fire and Cobra support. The Druse claimed responsibility and McFarlane responded to the attack by cutting off all negotiations with them. Because of the increase in hostility the CINCEUR recommended withdrawing the USMNF. His answer from the JCS and the NCA was no. Secretary of State Shultz was not willing to concede defeat and convinced President Reagan that it was too early to withdraw because the US would be viewed as having lost the peace in Lebanon and abandoning yet another emerging government. McFarlane and Shultz convinced members of Congress that the USMNF were not intentionally targeted and the hostilities were merely isolated acts.\textsuperscript{12}

On August 28, hostilities in Beirut erupted between the LAF and the Moslem militia lasting four days. A Marine artillery fire mission was conducted, a mortar position had been located and targeted. It was dictated that illumination rounds were to be fired, to signal the enemy mortar that they were targeted and should cease-fire. The enemy
mortars did not cease fire, and Marines expended high explosive rounds destroying the target. For several days the Marines returned fire to the extent permitted by their ROE. As a direct result of hostilities, Marine patrols were terminated and a garrison posture was taken.\textsuperscript{13}

USMNF ROE changed to include defense of the OMC, the McFarlane team, and the US Embassy; however, the USMNF were directed to remain neutral. The Marines were beginning to feel abandoned by the administration. As Eric Hammel notes, “The Marine commander had no difficulty in seeing that the civil war was between the Lebanese, but he was having a great deal of difficulty understanding why he was saddled with an outmoded and emasculated mission directive in the face of so radical a departure of the real from the ideal.”\textsuperscript{14}

Up to this point one can see the degree of wavering from neutrality to assisting the GOL and the LAF, and back to neutrality again. This US indecisiveness, along with the decisions not to withdraw the USMNF and increase their size, strongly indicates a lack of clear policy objectives regarding peacekeeping and foreign policy in Lebanon.

A turning point occurred on 9 September when the LAF commander, LTG Tannous asked Special Ambassador McFarlane for direct US support for his LAF in the Shouf near Suq Al Gharb. On 11 September, LTG Tannous’ request was approved by President Reagan with special instructions to the Marine commander to lend support only if Suq Al Gharb was in imminent danger of falling.\textsuperscript{15} Here again a change can be seen in the military mission with no change in the strategic objective or end state.

On 19 September, Palestinian forces attacked the LAF forces at Suq Al Gharb. The fighting became heavy. The LAF requested support and it came in the form of US naval
gunfire which turned the tide of battle for the LAF. The Marine commander recognized that the support given to the LAF had changed the nature of his mission from one of peacekeeping to a more operational type mission. Although there were previous non-combat related violations of US neutrality, this combat involvement caused the anti-government factions to no longer consider the Marines neutral—they became legitimate targets. USEUCOM asked the JCS for mission guidance and was informed that the Congressional War Powers interpretation complicated explanation of the mission. USEUCOM responded by telling the JCS to reinforce or withdraw the USMNF; however, there would be no changes in the mission or the size of the force.

On Sunday morning, October 23 at 0622 a Mercedes truck carrying about 12,000 pounds of explosive crashed through the barrier of the Marine HQ at the BIA. The truck drove into the open atrium of the building and released the trigger which detonated the explosive and brought down the three story concrete and steel building killing 241 Marines and wounding many others. Moments later a second truck bomb exploded at the French Military HQ, killing 59.

The Reagan Administration tried to sort out the next steps with regard to Lebanon. By 28 October, NSDD 111 was passed. The US made every possible effort to regain the initiative in a bold way and not give the impression of tactical defense or strategic weakness. The NSDD also recognized the need for greater US involvement in getting Lebanese President Gemayel to make compromises in achieving a more equitable distribution of political power in Lebanon. This was not an initial US objective.

The controversy between the Secretaries of State and Defense continued with Secretary's Shultz and Weinberger opposing one another in an even stronger manner.
Shultz wanted the Marines to stay and Weinberger wanted them withdrawn. It was the announcement of two investigative committees that temporarily brought a halt to all ongoing efforts in Washington and in EUCOM to clarify the USMNF mission in the aftermath of the September fighting and the October bombing.\textsuperscript{18}

By November the US had not retaliated and the fighting in Lebanon was escalating. A truck bomb was driven into the Israeli military HQ, killing 61. Israel immediately retaliated with air strikes against Palestinian targets. The LAF and the Druse had artillery exchanges some spilling over into the BIA and killing more Marines. The Marines were restricted to self-defense.

In December, US Tactical Air Reconnaissance Photo System (TARPS) flights were attacked for a third and final time before retaliation was taken. Twenty-eight Navy A6 and A7 jets attacked three targets. Two jets were lost to SAM and AAA fires. By nightfall the USMNF outposts and BIA had fallen under heavy ground and indirect fire attack. Seven Marines were killed. CINCEUR, General Bernard Rogers, was fuming over the lack of an explicit US strategy and ROE.\textsuperscript{19} The Reagan Administration found itself beset by criticism from all sides. Finally, a new ROE was agreed upon which allowed the Marines to respond to attacks from any quarter and under any circumstances. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Kuwait was truck bombed. On 14 December, President Reagan announced that the USMNF would be withdrawn from Lebanon in the event the Gemayel government collapsed.\textsuperscript{20}

Shiite militiamen surged into South and West Beirut in January 1984. Large numbers of Shiite soldiers in the LAF defected to the opposition and the situation was immediately untenable. The Marines were sniped, shelled, and under constant threat. On
30 January, heavy fighting erupted around the BIA. On 4 February, Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan, the senior Moslem in the Gemayel government, resigned from office.

On 6 February, US air strikes and naval gunfire responded to attacks against BIA. The next day, USEUCOM began evacuating non-essential US military and civilian personnel from the Beirut area. President Reagan was ready to announce a gradual withdrawal of US forces. He was not ready, however, to completely abandon the GOL.21

As more of Beirut fell to the Shiite and Druse militia the US-UK Embassy became surrounded. President Reagan announced on 14 February his intentions to withdraw the USMNF within 30 days. On 26 February, the Marines were safely aboard their Sixth Fleet support ships having turned over their positions to a Shiite battalion. US leaders nevertheless continued to signal their willingness to provide US assistance. To that end, USEUCOM was directed to create a small US military headquarters known as Joint Task Force Lebanon (JTFLEB) to oversee the Marine company left to guard the US-U.K. Embassy and to facilitate continued US support to the LAF while the GOL endeavored to create a new plan with its domestic and Syrian opposition. JTFLEB remained in position until 26 April 1984. Its departure marked the end of the USMNF in Lebanon.

The Marines and the Sixth Fleet were caught in the middle with an ambiguous and changing mission, increased hostilities, and ineffectual ROE while US politicians sought a compromise solution involving too many players—the Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, Lebanese, moderate Arab states, Christian and Moslem factions, and US allied nations who were part of the MNF. It would be impossible to satisfy all of them.

The 23 October terrorist attack and, more accurately, the subsequent investigations22 created disturbing media revelations suggesting that the small force of Marines had not
been given a clear mission, adequate support and supervision, or the means and authority to properly defend itself. The notable lack of military success during the 4 December air strikes seemed to confirm the allegation that something was not right with the way the US military was being employed. Administration officials and their critics haggled in public over what the problems might have been, usually with a suggestion that congressional meddling, or the in-fighting between senior administration officials (Shultz, Weinberger, and McFarlane) and between field military leaders and diplomats, had paralyzed the process by which obvious shortfalls might have been identified and corrected.23

The US goal was to bring stability to Lebanon in the form of deterring war. To accomplish this the US saw that Israel, Syria, and PLO forces must leave Lebanon. To deter war and compel the hostile parties to depart Lebanon, the US established a military force, albeit, a small one. How could such a small force with its lack of combat power and ROE constraints both deter and compel so many different factions and forces to the degree required by the US national objectives? US diplomats and politicians saw a small US force acting as a tripwire that would deter and compel hostile forces to leave Lebanon. US diplomats and politicians did not accurately account for the civil war taking place in Lebanon. US policy makers did not recognize that hostile forces and factions within Lebanon did not want peace—a prerequisite before establishing a peacekeeping force. As US policy wavered back and forth, from that of strict neutrality to openly supporting the GOL, the USMNF mission seemed even more ambiguous. Hostile factions identified the USMNF with the non-representative and unpopular GOL. With that came increased hostility directed at the USMNF culminating with the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks. US policy makers continued to drive forward, despite increasing hostilities,
rising US casualties, and the EUCOM commander asking not only for clarification of his
mission but also for withdrawal or reinforcement. The policy makers still hoped to bring
peace to Lebanon with the military force that was initially established and with little
change to the ROE.

In 1984, Secretary of State, George Shultz, said, “Diplomacy not backed by military
strength is ineffectual. Leverage, as well as goodwill is required. Power and diplomacy
are not alternatives. They must go together.”24 Secretary Shultz felt that the diplomatic
strategy pursued in Lebanon had suffered from insufficient military strength, not to
mention military responsiveness to the overarching diplomatic purpose for which the
USMNF had been commissioned. Shultz expected three things of the available military
force. First, the “presence” of the US forces was to help the Lebanese Army to deter any
outbreak of internecine violence in the Beirut area. Later, when violence erupted, Shultz
expected the US military to credibly threaten the antagonists (to include Syria) with
punishments sufficient to compel an end to that violence. Finally, when the level of
violence continued to escalate to the disadvantage of the friendly forces, Shultz expected
the US military to both deter any expansion of Syria’s direct involvement and deny the
hostile Syrian-supported factions the ability to either forcibly overthrow the GOL or
otherwise compel it to abrogate the 17 May Lebanese-Israeli Peace Accord.25

Shultz’ expectations did not match the mission given the USMNF. The mission of
“presence” and “neutrality,” and the restrictive ROE made it difficult for the USMNF to
protect itself, let alone compel the GOL and deter the Syrians. The USMNF were not
given the task of deterring, compelling, or denying in the sense that Shultz saw. Shultz’
ideas did not prevail because of the limit on force size. President Reagan explicitly
limited the number of troops in Lebanon. Congressional pressure and the advice of senior military officials, including Secretary Weinberger, convinced Reagan not to increase the size of the force in Lebanon. There were many, however, that believed the Marines lacked sufficient firepower and strength to achieve US objectives. In fact, US military leaders estimated a massive intervention involving six US Army divisions would be required to subdue Lebanon’s civil insurrection and compel a Syrian withdrawal.\textsuperscript{26}

In applying the Weaver and Pollock model the first question is: Was there a clearly stated end state? The answer is no. The perceived end state was stability in the region with stability defined as peace between Lebanon and Israel. As discussed earlier, stability is not easily defined and achieved. There is controversy whether peacekeeping operations and military force play a role in achieving stability. Failure to agree on how stability is achieved leads to ambiguous policies. Therefore, the term “stability” alone is not an effective or clear term to use as a desired end state.

The next question is how was stability in the region translated to a strategic objective? The strategic objective announced by President Reagan was for all non-Lebanese forces (Israel, Syria, PLO) to leave Lebanon, and later, an add-on objective of assisting the LAF and GOL with the GOL capable of defending its own sovereignty.

Third, could the strategic objective be translated to a military objective? No. This supports our first hypothesis, if peace operations are conceived as something besides compellence and deterrence, then the military will have problems translating the policies into achievable objectives. Although initially given a peacekeeping mission, the Marines and the Army were directed to assist the LAF while Congress appropriated economic and military assistance to the GOL. These missions violated what was supposed to be strict
neutrality. Specifically, when the 6th Fleet fired in support of the LAF at Suq Al Gharb, the USMNF mission changed from a neutral peacekeeping force to a more traditional operational role. Given the sudden change of mission, with no subsequent troop reinforcement, it was difficult to plan a military strategy or even define a military objective. The mission statement was ambiguous because the administration was not clear on what they wanted the end state to look like, nor were they willing to commit enough forces to support the strategic objectives.

The Lebanon case certainly indicates lack of congruence between the desired end and the mission given the Marines. Directives of the NCA limiting the size of the USMNF, coupled with the changing missions and violations of neutrality, provides evidence of flawed employment of a peacekeeping force (deter and compel). Given the limited force size it was impossible to deter and compel hostile forces to leave Lebanon.

The Marine peacekeeping mission in Beirut was not a failure caused by the military structure, doctrine, or inadequate training. Lebanon was a political strategy failure brought on by ineffective bureaucratic mechanisms for ensuring synergistic effects of the political, diplomatic, and military instruments of power. A great deal of ambiguity is identified in the end state and the strategic objective. Ambiguity from the start led to an ambiguous military mission. Compounding this is a high degree of political in-fighting with respect to the type of outcome being sought and the application of military force. All this proved to be the reasons why the US did not achieve its end state of stability, or its strategic objectives of forcing the PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces out of Lebanon.

What did we learn in Beirut? LTC Abizaid, US Army sums it up,
Once committed in a dynamic peacekeeping situation, our forces must have the tools to fight and win. Mobility and flexibility to fight, even if only in self-defense, should never be sacrificed. ROE must be clear and make provisions for self-defense. We should never allow our peacekeepers to deploy with a business as peacetime expectation.\textsuperscript{28}

Notes


\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 30.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 31.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 32.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 35.

\textsuperscript{7} On the ground, the Marine peacekeeping force constituted a battalion of infantry, a tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a standard mix of combat service support units. The heaviest indirect fire weapons were 81 mm mortars and several weeks later the commander brought his 105mm ashore. Off shore, Marine combat support would be provided by the 6th Fleet.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 92.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 40.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 76.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 78.


\textsuperscript{14} Hammel, 216.

\textsuperscript{15} Hallenbeck, 84.

\textsuperscript{16} Frank, 89.

\textsuperscript{17} Hallenbeck, 164.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 111.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 124.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 166.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 128.

\textsuperscript{22} The DOD report (the Long Commission report) focused entirely on the 23 October terrorist bombing of the Marines at the BIA. The Commission focused on actions of the military force evading the core problem of a failure to provide coherent objectives and policies. The Commission found fault with virtually every level of USEUCOM chain-of-command and especially with the lowest levels of USMNF authority. It concluded that "there was a series of circumstances beyond the control of these commanders that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to the security of the USMNF." Further, the report found that security measures in December 83 were still inadequate to prevent continuing attrition of the force. The House Armed Services Sub Committee
Notes

mounted its own investigation on the terrorist bombing of 23 October and came to the same conclusion as the Long Commission. Administration critics quickly labeled these reports a "cover-up." President Reagan short-circuited the entire affair by announcing that he would personally accept the blame for any faults revealed in the report. US Congress, House Committee on Armed Forces, Investigations Sub Committee Report on Terrorist Bombing at BIA, 1983.

23 Hallenbeck, 148.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 144.
27 Ibid., 148.
Chapter 5

Somalia: UNITAF and UNOSOM II

How could United States participation in what the Bush administration proclaimed as humanitarian relief operations in Somalia have been both a success and a failure? If the interest of the United States in Somalia was humanitarian, why were American soldiers killed in battle? If the policy of the United States was limited to providing sufficient forces to secure relief distributions sites and routes for a short duration, how did the United States become involved in disarming the Somali population, apprehension of a Somali clan leader, and nation building? The intent of this case study is to examine whether United States policy makers viewed participation in Somalia as compellence or deterrence, and whether the policy maker’s vision of the operation impacted on the success or failure of the mission. Some important questions are: (1) Did United States interest change? (2) Did United States policy change? (3) Did a change in United States interest or policy have an impact on military operations? (4) Finally, was the use of force effective in Somalia?

In December 1992, the United States provided Joint Task Force Somalia, later renamed UNITAF,\(^1\) as a United States-led coalition effort under American command to: (1) secure relief distribution sites and transportation network for the distribution of relief supplies, (2) and to bring enough stability to the region to transition to a United Nations
commanded peacekeeping force. The United States' final involvement in Somalia was the participation of American forces in the United Nations nation building effort, UNOSOM II.²

Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, pressure mounted for the United Nations to become involved in a growing number of countries that were experiencing internal civil strife. Somalia is the paradigm case. Somalia's devastation was the result of drought, famine, civil war, and the collapse of the state government. Thousands of Somali people died, and twice that many became refugees in need of humanitarian relief.

Somalia had been involved in civil war since 1988. The warring factions were some 14 tribal clans which made up Somali society. After the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991 the political situation deteriorated even more. International relief agencies in Somalia did their best to distribute relief to the Somali people and refugees in the camps. Due to the absence of control of the population, humanitarian relief efforts were stymied and unsuccessful.


Unable to negotiate a cease fire agreement the United Nations secretary-general followed standard United Nations peacekeeping guidelines of not committing troops without the consent of the warring parties. The United Nations decision not to dispatch peacekeepers to Somalia resulted in the continuation of civil war. This decision led to
continued fighting and pillaging of humanitarian assistance. Somali gangs controlled the countryside and freely attacked United Nations relief distribution facilities and convoys with little or no resistance.³

The United Nations Security Council reacted to the crisis by introducing a United Nations peacekeeping force. Initially, the United Nations dispatched 50 peacekeepers to render assistance to the relief agencies and monitor clan activities. The force, however, was too small to meet the demanding task. The situation finally deteriorated to the point where the United Nations was compelled to introduce a 500 person Pakistani peacekeeping force (UNOSOM I) to assist with the distribution of relief supplies. The United States Marines landed the peacekeeping force at the Mogadishu airport in October 1992. This peacekeeping force was also inadequate in size, arms, and conviction to accomplish a mission of such magnitude. The United Nations made numerous attempts at political reconciliation, aid delivery, and traditional peacekeeping, but all endeavors failed. General Aideed, who controlled the Mogadishu region, rejected the introduction of peacekeepers and employed his forces to contain the peacekeeping force in Mogadishu. General Aideed succeeded in preventing the peacekeepers from supporting the humanitarian relief agencies delivery of relief supplies.

The situation in Somalia became a media magnet. Public opinion and conviction that human suffering is unacceptable led President Bush to declare United States interest in the situation, and establish a policy for a more active United States role in ending the suffering of the Somali people. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia was seen as a challenge in which the United States could rapidly make a significant and tangible difference.
Previous opposition by the Pentagon to use the armed forces had been replaced by quiet internal contingency planning to determine what realistically and effectively could be done. A definable, achievable mission emerged, along with the feeling that no other country could or would undertake it.  

A solution for an end to the crisis in Somalia became a priority topic of discussion in the United States Government. The National Security Council deputy committee developed three options to resolve the situation: (1) increase support of United Nations peacekeeping efforts, (2) create a United States organized coalition without participation by American ground troops, or (3) assemble a multinational military coalition in which United States troops would take the leading role, as in Operation Desert Storm.  

The Pentagon expressed strong reservations about using ground forces. CINCCENTCOM, after conducting his mission analysis, recommended that it not be a military effort. The Pentagon continued resisting such proposals from the State Department and the National Security Council staff. Finally, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah, stated, “If you think United States forces are needed, we can do the job.”  

President Bush met with his senior advisors in late November 1992. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who was certain in his own mind that the dispatch of a sizable ground force was necessary, but wanted to be sure that the pitfalls were clearly identified—questioned whether the conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth hand-off to a United Nations peacekeeping force after a relatively brief deployment of United States troops. President Bush, after in-depth discussions with his advisors, decided that if the United Nations Security Council concurred, and other nations
agreed to join in the effort, the United States would lead an international force to stop the famine in Somalia. On November 25, 1992, President Bush approved the plan, limited in scope and duration, provided the United Nations secretary-general agreed.

Then acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleberger presented the proposal of an American-led limited operation in mandate, time, and geographical scope to the United Nations Secretary-General. United States forces would deploy on a finite mission to end clan fighting and protect humanitarian operations in the famine belt of southern Somalia. The United States would deploy up to 30,000 troops (including forces from other nations) to secure key ports, airports, roads, and aid distribution centers in central and southern Somalia. The mission was to stabilize the situation, then turn the operation over to the United Nations in three to four months. The United States would conduct the mission peacefully, but would deploy the force necessary to prevent interference with its objectives.

President Bush wrote to the secretary-general:

I want to emphasize that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the United Nations Peacekeeping force. The president also wrote that the United States objective can, and should, be met in the near term. As soon as they are, the coalition force will depart from Somalia, transferring its security function to your United Nations peacekeeping force.

On December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adapted resolution 794 reflecting Eagleberger’s proposal. The United States position was clear in the President’s letter and the Security Council’s resolution reinforced the President’s objectives. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, along with General Powell, echoed that the United States-led operation would be limited in duration as well as mission. Secretary Cheney said “We
believe it is necessary to send in United States forces and to provide United States leadership to get the situation stabilized and return it to a state where United Nations peacekeepers can deal with the circumstances." There was no consideration of disarming Somali factions, conducting operations in northern Somalia, and no consideration of nation building.\(^9\)

The Secretary-General sent a letter to President Bush stating he wanted coalition forces to expand their responsibilities to disarming all of the Somali factions, defusing all mines, establishing a civil administration in the north, and training a civilian police. President Bush resisted all attempts by the United Nations to get the United States involved in designing the political landscape of Somalia. He was determined that the mission remain limited to establishing a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies and transitioning the mission to a United Nations peacekeeping force. The Bush administration’s position was the United States was not expanding its mandate in either scope or time.

On December 4, 1992, President Bush ordered United States troops to Somalia in what would prove to be a landmark in nontraditional military operations—Operation Restore Hope. The forces assigned to Restore Hope were tasked to provide a safe environment for humanitarian operations while operating under United Nations mandate.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia began on December 9, 1992, with the arrival of United States Marines on the beaches near Mogadishu. Soon thereafter, the initial force was augmented by the United States Army. By March 1993, the American force under United States command reached a peak of 25,000 United States military. Another 13,000 troops came from contingents sent by 20 other nations.\(^10\)
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) provided support to the operation. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force commanded a joint and combined task force composed of Air Force, Navy, Marine, Army and Special Operations Forces, in addition to forces provided by other counties supporting the United States-led combined coalition. USCENTCOM guided a complex military operation in support of an international relief effort while addressing unique challenges that come from operating under a United Nations mandate.

The most critical task for USCENTCOM was defining the mission. The command was required to produce a mission statement which contained measurable results in a short period of time, per the president’s guidance. USCENTCOM defined the mission as:

When directed by the National Command Authority, CINCENT will conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia, to secure major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and assisting United Nations or Non-Governmental Organizations in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices.\textsuperscript{11}

Omitted from the mission statement were other tasks that could only be achieved over an extended period that offered no measurement criteria, and were inappropriate for military forces operating in support of a host-nation government. Although considered, tasks that diluted the command’s focus for ensuring that relief supplies could be moved and distributed to the at-risk population were not included.\textsuperscript{12} In the end, United States policy makers limited military operations to those tasks required to achieve the near term objectives of security and assistance of relief distribution sites and supplies.\textsuperscript{13}

Operation Restore Hope, UNITAF, was conducted in four phases. Each phase was objective and time driven with an identifiable end state. The tasks to be accomplished
were traditional military missions. Although initially titled humanitarian assistance the mission met the criteria of peace enforcement. The four phases of Operation Restore Hope were:

- The objective of Phase I was to establish a base of operations and logistics in Mogadishu: to gain control over the flow of humanitarian relief supplies into and through the city; and introduce other United Nations forces throughout the country. Phase I would be considered complete when the security of Mogadishu was sufficient to permit unimpeded JTF operations and the United States Marines had assumed the interior relief distribution site security of Baidoa.

- The objective of Phase II was the expansion of JTF operations to provide security at the major interior relief distribution sites to include Gialalassi, Bardera, Belet Uen, Oddur, and others as required. ... Phase II was considered complete when desired interior relief distribution sites were secure from interference and the JTF forces were ready to perform convoy security operations.

- The objective of Phase III was the expansion of JTF operations to additional ports and airfields, the expansion of interior relief security through relief convoy security operations and possibly the creation of additional interior relief distribution sites. ... Phase III would be considered complete when sufficient control over the relief distribution network has been established to allow for the delivery of enough food to arrest the famine, to break the cycle of looting, and UNOSOM forces are ready to relieve JTF forces in zone.

- The objective of Phase IV was to transition from a United States-led to a United Nations controlled effort. ... Phase IV would be considered complete when United States forces were relieved of responsibility.

Phases I through III were accomplished with success and on time. Although Phase IV had been projected for completion in April 1992, the change of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was accomplished on May 4, 1992.

After deployment of the initial forces the United Nations began making demands to expand the mission. The United Nations pressed for expanding the area of operations to northern Somalia, disarming the clans, establishing a national police, and repatriation of Somali refugees.

The Bush administration supported United States intervention by committing American military forces to assist in providing humanitarian relief. The President's
objectives, end state, and exit strategy were clear as outlined in his communications with the United Nations secretary-general. Once the specific tasks were accomplished, the United States forces would turn the mission over to forces from the United Nations, and the United States would depart.

The missions conducted by UNITAF were a success. United States and coalition military forces secured airfields, ports, and routes for the arrival and distribution of relief supplies. The objectives set forth by the President were obtainable, the end state was clear, and actions taken within the interest of the United States. The composition of the force was correct for the operation and tasks performed were clearly within the doctrinal application of military forces. The following comments are from several participants and observers who reinforce the success of UNITAF in Operation Restore Hope.

Major General S. L. Arnold, USA, commander of Army Forces in Somalia, states:

Tactical operations were, for the most part, the UNITAF's mission-essential tasks and battle tasks. These tasks included air-assaults, cordon and searches, patrolling, tactical motor marches, military operations in urban terrain, security operations, road construction and repair, psychological operations (PSYOP) and many others." He further stated that operations ranged from brigade-size combat operations to squad-size patrolling operations. General Arnold expresses the conclusion that although there were many lessons learned, that the force mix was right for the mission they were given.20

Major General Waldo D. Freeman, USA, DCoS, USCENTCOM, Captain Robert B. Lambert, USN, and Lieutenant Colonel Jason D. Mimms state:

*Restore Hope* demonstrated the ability of the United States and its partners to achieve military objectives in support of an international relief effort and respond to the various politico-military issues inherent with such operations. . . . *Restore Hope* has become the prototype for humanitarian assistance interventions. . . .21
Robert B. Oakley, President Bush’s Special Envoy to Somalia concludes of Operation

Restore Hope and UNITAF:

The traditional distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in largely internal conflicts (humanitarian peacekeeping) is being eroded. The concept of peacekeeping operations as minimal in terms of personnel and armament—requesting permission from local authorities before taking action pursuant to the mission, and using force only in response to direct threat or attack—is coming to be recognized as often inviting failure, . . . United States doctrine of overwhelming force from the outset is increasingly understood as the best means in certain situations of achieving a peacekeeping mission and minimizing confrontation and casualties on all sides...The political, military, and humanitarian elements of many peacekeeping operations cannot be logically disjoined. Peacekeeping operations are essentially political operations carried out by military means.... The leverage of political efforts to broker peace agreements is bolstered by sufficient military strength; Somalia had adequate strength.\(^{22}\)

Kenneth Allard states:

Another basic insight coming out of the Somalia experience is that the new emphasis on peace operations has not rescinded the fundamentals of military operations. . . . Peace operations such as those in Somalia show how the training and professionalism of the men and women of our Armed Forces are as important in adapting to the requirements of new, nontraditional missions as they are in carrying out the demands of the more traditional scenarios.... There is, however, an important sense in which the most basic qualification of our Armed Forces to act as peacekeepers rest upon their credibility as warfighters.\(^{23}\)

David J. Zvijac and Katherine A. W. McGrady state:

The JTF’s ability to handle the uncertainties of a one-of-a-kind operation is an indication of Restore Hopes success. In addition, the JTF accomplished the military objectives far ahead of schedule and with minimal casualties. But, most important, Restore Hope was a success because the military forces satisfied the requirements of providing assistance to the Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs).\(^{24}\)

Although the endeavor set forth by the Bush administration was humanitarian assistance it was actually deterrence. By providing overwhelming forces and tasking
them to prevent the Somali clans from interfering with the relief agency operations, the clans were deterred. When the administrations changed, so did the mission.

As the Clinton administration took office, it continued to push for the rapid handover of the operation to the United Nations to begin UNOSOM II. On March 26, 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 814. This resolution called for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia. United States Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright stated, “With this resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.” At the same time the United Nations began deploying members of the UNOSOM II command and staff.

Not only did the Clinton administration endorse Resolution 814, it contemplated leaving 8,000 logistical troops and 1000 quick reaction forces—a concept contrary to the original concept of a complete withdrawal. The Clinton administration’s support of the resolution began “mission creep” for the forces on the ground. On May 4, 1992, UNITAF finally transitioned to UNOSOM II. The United States withdrew its combat forces leaving a 1,200-man reaction force and 4000 support personnel as the United States’ contribution to UNOSOM II. Based on the success of UNITAF the United Nations Security Council decided to empower UNOSOM II with the military powers, rules of engagement and command and control, while failing to recognize the international communities dependence on the United States for leadership and overwhelming combat power.
Although United States policy was expanding, there was no indication of the expansion of United States interest beyond that stated by the Bush administration. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, in support of the Clinton administration policy, said:

We went there to save a people and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those same people rebuild their nation. President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia.29

Secretary Aspin’s statement reinforces the success of UNITAF. But, it also ventures far beyond original strategy and end state. The Clinton administration was to “stay the course” of a redefined mission.

In June 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 837, authorizing the arrest of General Aideed after forces, believed to be his, attacked and killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers. United States combat forces were dispatched to strike positions believed to be held by Aideed followers.30 This action was contrary to the neutrality of a peacekeeping force and led to further confrontations with the Somali clans.

Resolutions 814 and 837, coming early in the Clinton administration marked a shift in American policy. Reinforcing its commitment to the redefinition of the mission the Clinton administration pushed the Security Council to adopt Resolution 865 in September 1993. Resolution 865 locked in a United Nations nation building presence in Somalia until 1995. Three days after passing Resolution 865, a United States Army helicopter was shot down and three American soldiers were killed. In October, American soldiers were involved in a fierce firefight in Mogadishu. Seventeen soldiers were killed and more wounded. It was later revealed that the ground commander previously requested additional armor to support potential ground force operations, but the request was
rejected by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of the tragedies in Somalia, the administration decided to expand the size of the American force on the ground and offshore, and announced that United States forces would withdraw by March 1994, exactly one year later than the original plan of the Bush administration.\(^\text{31}\)

What President Bush originally decided and what the Clinton administration later committed to represents a divergence in the original intent for United States and drastically altered the end state. The Bush administration sent United States troops into Somalia to clear relief channels to avert mass starvation while resisting United Nations attempts to expand the mission.

The original limited mission proposed by the Bush administration was redefined by the Clinton administration and the United Nations. The Clinton administration, driven by the new requirements set forth by the United Nations, envisioned the United Nations role in Somalia as one of nation building. The interest of the United States to create conditions enhancing relief efforts and providing a secure environment for a United Nations peacekeeping forces did not expand. The interest of the secretary-general of the United Nations became the interest of the Clinton administration. By changing the mission from humanitarian assistance to nation building the Clinton administration and the United Nations changed the function of the forces from deterrence to compellence while failing to provide adequate forces to accomplish the mission.

UNITAF clearly supports the hypothesis that policy makers must view peace operations as deterrence or compellence. The Bush administration recognized the operation in Somalia as one of deterrence. To accomplish the mission he committed a force of overwhelming firepower and strength to deter the Somali clans from interdicting
relief convoys, attacking relief distribution sites, and creating a secure environment for a mission hand-off to United Nations peacekeepers. He limited the mission in scope and duration, balancing benefit with risk. Had President Bush not deployed such a credible force the events that occurred in UNOSOM II may have happened much earlier.

The Clinton administration’s support for the United Nations expansion of the mission lost sight of peace operations as compellence or deterrence thus UNOSOM II was a failure. The administration failed to recognize that expanding the mission increased risk, and thus, failed to complete a new cost-benefit analysis. The Clinton administration and the United Nations perceived the mere presence of forces as deterrence and compellence in itself. This misperception resulted in dead soldiers and the withdrawal from Somalia without achieving a better state of peace.

UNITAF was a success because it had a clearly defined, mission, end state, and exit strategy that evolved out of a clear cost-benefit analysis. UNOSOM II, however, attempted nation building, a new mission, without a new cost-benefit analysis. The result was an unclear end state and an improper military mission with mismatched resources. The violence and embarrassment that ultimately ensued is directly attributable to the decision makers failure to see UNOSOM II as a compellent mission.\(^2\)

Notes

\(^1\) Initially United States forces participating in Operation Restore Hope were Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. With the introduction of coalition forces Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Somalia was renamed to Unified Task Force (UNITAF).

\(^2\) United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). UNOSOM II was the transition of the mission of UNITAF to a United Nations peacekeeping force on 4 May 1993.

Notes

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, CINC USCENTCOM in his article "A CINC's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 2. Autumn 1993, 58, states "Great care was taken to develop an approved, well defined mission with attainable, measurable objective prior to the operation commencing. Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations."
13 Freeman, 64.
14 Joint Publication 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations. Defines Peace Enforcement as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace Enforcement Operations include intervention Peace Enforcement is defined as: "The application of military force, or operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce and cease-fire."
16 Ibid., 45.
17 Ibid., 50.
18 Ibid., 59.
21 Freeman, 72.
22 Oakley, 54.
24 Zvijac, 2-4.
Notes

25 Bolton, 62.
26 Ibid., 63.
27 Mission Creep was the expansion of tasks beyond the limited tasks defined in the original objectives. Mission Creep in UNOSOM II was the expansion of the AOR, disarming of militia factions, re-establishment of the national police and assisting in the repatriation of Somali refugees.
28 Oakley, 54.
29 Bolton, 64.
30 Ibid., 63.
31 Ibid., 66.
32 Ibid., 64.
Chapter 6

Bosnia

It is difficult and intellectually dangerous to try to forecast long-lasting lessons or principles from an on-going operation. This is as true for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia as with any other operation in progress. The difficulty lies in the fact that conditions may change so swiftly that what was true today may not be true tomorrow. This phenomenon makes it difficult to draw lasting conclusions about cause and effect, training, force structure, etc. It is possible, however, to make some observations about the policy making process at the National Command Authority level and to examine the military strategy that flowed from that process. This chapter examines the stated interests of the United States in Bosnia, the national policy that these interests engender, the end state pursued, the military strategy in terms of forces committed and Rules of Engagement, and lastly, an analysis of whether the strategy pursued to this point is consistent with the political objectives that drives it.

It is useful to first provide a brief background of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The region known as the Balkans has been torn by nationalist and ethnic strife for centuries. It represents the European fault-line of the Christian, Orthodox and Islamic empires of the past. During the opening decades of the twentieth century this region was in a constant state of conflict highlighted by the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand
in August 1914 in Sarajevo that set Europe on the path to World War I. The independent
country of Yugoslavia was created as result of the Versailles agreement following World
War I. After World War II it became the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, held
together primarily by the strong-arm tactics of the socialist dictator Josef Tito. After his
death in 1980 and the collapse of communism throughout Eastern and Central Europe in
1989, Yugoslavia began to unravel.

In 1990 elections held in Bosnia resulted in a governing coalition of Bosnian
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. In January 1992 Bosnia declared its independence from
Yugoslavia and Serbia. This independence was recognized by the United States in April
1992. The Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia immediately rejected this separation from Serbia
and violence broke out. "Serbian paramilitary forces, reinforced by the Serbian-
dominated Yugoslav national army, began a campaign of terror in eastern Bosnia." In
response to the violence that had escalated since the declaration of independence in
January, the United Nations established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) on 21

Despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force, the imposition of no-
fly zones, and an arms embargo on all involved parties the violence continued to escalate
from 1992-1995. Bosnian Serb forces, backed by Serbian forces, continued to occupy
territories in eastern Bosnia, driving out or killing the resident Muslims in a process that
became known internationally as "ethnic cleansing." The United Nations’ efforts at
peacekeeping proved ineffective, with the peacekeepers themselves becoming targets.
Over 100 were killed and many were taken prisoner, being used as human shields to
protect Serbian locations from air attack. In addition, so called UN "safe zones" such as
Srebenica, Zepa and Gorazde were attacked and occupied by the Serbs in the summer in 1995. This led to an increased tempo of NATO air strikes that arguably inspired the parties to the conflict to come to terms at Dayton, Ohio in November 1995.

Before examining US interests in Bosnia it is useful to define the terminology in terms of peace operations used by leading policy makers. Bosnia is not being termed a peacekeeping operation by President Clinton or Secretary of Defense Perry. Instead, the President, in his address to the nation on 27 November 1995 defined the mission as "peace implementation." Secretary Perry was adamant about the fact that this was not a peacekeeping mission but rather, a peace enforcement one. It is irrelevant how the mission is termed but it does present some difficulty for writers of doctrine in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as new terms are introduced (peace implementation). This reflects the difficulty of following the use of euphemism in politics with the development of military doctrine to support the euphemism.

On 27 November 1995 President Clinton addressed the nation to explain his decision to commit 20,000 American troops as part of a NATO force to support the Dayton Peace Agreement (eventually signed by all parties on 30 November 1995). The president set out to explain America's interest in stopping the conflict in Bosnia. He stated, "Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and Europe's stability are vital to our own national security. That is why we fought two world wars in Europe. That's why we launched the Marshall Plan to restore Europe. That's why we created NATO and waged the Cold War. And that's why we must help the nations of Europe end their worst nightmare since World War II—now." Clearly, the President was taking a different approach then had been used in cases such as Somalia. The primary reason for US
involvement would not be humanitarian concerns, but geo-strategic interests. This certainly reflects a shift from the idealist approach to international politics, so popular in the post-Cold War world, to the realist approach. The President, however, clouded the issue a bit by enunciating humanitarian interests later in his speech, “If we’re not there, NATO will not be there. The peace will collapse. The war will re-ignite. The slaughter of innocents will begin again.” If the President’s statement of national interest was a mixed message then Secretary Perry’s was very clear. He has stated,

I believe there is a set of propositions that create an “iron logic” as to why we should commit ground forces to Bosnia as part of the NATO implementation force: The United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe. The war in Bosnia threatens these interests. We now have an opportunity—the first real opportunity in four years—to end this war. To seize this opportunity, a NATO force is required to implement the peace. The United States is the only one that can lead that force to success.

Secretary Perry went further to underscore the point that the mission was being conducted in support of national security interests and not humanitarian ones, “there is certainly a moral imperative to stop the bloodshed and violence in Bosnia, but it is the danger of a wider war that is the most significant threat to US interests.”

Having determined that peace in Bosnia was a vital national interest to the United States there should be a weighing of risk and cost and a willingness to accept losses in pursuit of those vital interests. President Clinton addressed this point to some degree when he stated, “no deployment of American troops is risk free, and this one may well involve casualties. There may be accidents in the field or incidents with people who have not given up their hatred. I will take every measure possible to minimize these risks, but we must be prepared for that possibility.” It is not clear from this statement what level
of cost the President is willing to accept, highlighting the possible loss to accidents or isolated incidents, but it does indicate a willingness to prepare the American people for losses. It also is a step in building the necessary will that must be communicated to potential aggressors in order to bolster the deterrent effect of the force deployed.

After determining that the situation in Bosnia impacted on vital national interests and accepting that there might be a cost in blood which would have to be accepted there should next be a declaration of a desired end state that reflects these beliefs. The President has declared that the end state will occur in twelve months. An end state is usually expressed in terms of a condition sought: political, military, economic, or any combination of the three. Contrary to this, the President has established twelve months as the end state to make the mission more acceptable to the American people. It does not, however, reflect a congruent end state to a mission said to be a vital interest. The President supports the twelve-month deadline by stating,

The mission will be well-defined, with clear, realistic goals that can be achieved in a definite period of time. Our troops will make sure each side withdraws its forces behind the front lines and keeps them there. They will maintain the cease-fire to prevent the war from accidentally starting again. These effects, in turn, will help create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return to their homes, vote in free elections and begin to rebuild their lives. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should—and will—take about one year.10

It is not at all clear that free elections and stable lives can be achieved in a year in a region where warfare has been the norm, rather than the exception, for years. This one year deadline may also have the undesirable effect of convincing potential aggressors to merely bide their time, re-supply, re-arm and wait out the year until the Americans leave.
Thus, time-related end states may erode deterrence. Of course it is impossible to predict the future, but this end state does not reflect a pursuit of a vital interest.

It is necessary to now examine the mission given to the military which must be achieved in one year. As stated in an Operation Joint Endeavor fact sheet released by the Pentagon, US forces will:

- Protect the force by ensuring self-defense and freedom of movement for IFOR.
- Enforce required withdrawal of forces to respective territories.
- Establish and man a zone of separation.
- Enforce the cessation of hostilities.
- Provide a secure environment which permits conduct of civil peace implementation functions.\(^{11}\)

These missions are meant to be discrete and achievable in twelve months. In order to support the time aspect, Secretary Perry has been adamant in his declaration that US forces would not be involved in “nation-building” functions. He has stated that US forces “will not act as a police force . . . that is a civilian function . . . will not be involved in reconstruction, humanitarian relief, political reform, or human rights efforts.”\(^{12}\) The avoidance of “mission creep” may be unavoidable, however. US and NATO forces have been involved in the effort by the International War Crimes Tribunal to investigate war crimes. On 8 March 1996, NATO announced that IFOR troops would now act as “police officers, road construction crews, engineers and security guards.”\(^{13}\) Additionally, there has been pressure by the International Tribunal to have IFOR serve warrants to those indicted of war crimes. While NATO denies this constitutes mission creep, it does make a twelve-month deadline more problematic.

The strategy and force structure devised by the military to carry out its assigned mission in Bosnia reflects a determination to avoid the mistakes of Somalia.
Overwhelming force is being introduced to carry out the mission. The United States has sent 20,000 troops as part of the 60,000 strong NATO force. The backbone of the US force is the First Armored Division. It is deployed with all its combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. The First Armored Division is an impressive combat force with battalions of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, and self-propelled artillery. Clearly, the US military means to achieve its assigned tasks while deterring potential aggressors with the threat of overwhelming force. This is a distinct shift from the strategy in Somalia and reflects a thinking of peacekeeping similar to the use of force in international politics described in the introduction of this paper. This is the thinking reflected in President Clinton’s remarks about the US force in Bosnia,

They will be heavily armed and thoroughly trained. By making an overwhelming show of force, they will lessen the need to use force. But unlike the UN forces, they will have the authority to respond immediately—and the training and equipment to respond with overwhelming force—to any threat to their own safety or any violation of the military provisions of the peace agreement.\textsuperscript{14}

President Clinton’s remarks sound very much like the classic uses of force in international politics—deterrence and compellence—as outlined in the introduction. It also reflects a shift toward a realist approach to the operation in Bosnia that has been lacking in other “peace operations.” Another element of President Clinton’s statement is that the mission in Bosnia will not be hindered by the difficulties inherent in a United Nations command structure. Instead, it will be controlled by the command structure of NATO, one designed to engage in the classical use of force in international politics.
Secretary Perry, more so than President Clinton, has been clear in his belief that the operation in Bosnia is reliant on the deterrent and compellent capability of US forces. He believes that it was compellence that brought the Serbs to the negotiating table. He argues that a primary reason an agreement was reached “was that the warring parties were impressed and awed at the military capability of the United States and NATO. They got a sample of that during the bombing raids.”¹⁵ This reflects the use of force envisioned by Thomas Shelling in his theory of “coercive diplomacy” which argues that compellence can be achieved by the use of military force to achieve political ends.¹⁶ A classic use of military force, not one that needs to be manipulated in a doctrinal shift under the heading of OOTW.

Secretary Perry’s thinking on the rules of engagement (ROE) for forces deployed to Bosnia reflects an understanding of deterrence as the essential element of peace operations. In fact, in a moment of plain-speaking, Secretary Perry allowed that “the deployment of a large force has advantages from the point of view of deterrence and for planning our deployment.”¹⁷ The rules of engagement operationalize this thinking. As Secretary Perry stated,

They will have robust Rules of Engagement . . . If our forces are attacked, or if hostile intent is demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will permit immediate and effective use of deadly force . . . they have been trained to control the level of violence, but make no mistake, they will have full authority to use deadly force if they believe they have to.¹⁸

Secretary Perry best sums up his intent for US forces to rely on the deterrent nature of their force structure when he argues that aggressors will not challenge IFOR because “we will be the meanest dog on the block.”¹⁹ President Clinton underscored this
approach to operations in Bosnia during his address to the nation. He stated, "Anyone—anyone—who takes on our troops will suffer the consequences. We will fight fire with fire—and then some."

Having examined the national interest of the United States in Bosnia, as presented by the President, the policy adopted, the desired end state and the strategy, in terms of force structure and Rules of Engagement, it is possible to make some general observations about the process and potential areas of strength and weakness. In the area of national interest, President Clinton has described the situation and the need to bring stability to Bosnia as vital to the security, political, and economic interests of the United States. This may be a debatable supposition but by tying the conditions to the broader concept of peace and stability in Europe the President presented an argument that most Americans can understand and accept, given America’s past involvement in Europe’s wars. There are, of course, many other factors that may define United States interests in Bosnia. Humanitarian concerns, domestic political pressures, and presidential politics are all factors that may have some influence in the President’s decision. Without the benefit of time distance, scholarly analysis and the memoirs of key players these other factors and their influence cannot yet be discerned. The interests stated by the President and Secretary Perry must, therefore, be accepted at face value.

Having defined United States interests in Bosnia as being vital, it flows that the United States should be willing to accept significant risk and cost to protect those interests. It is not clear that this is the case. While the President did alert the American people to the possibility of some casualties it was not the "pay any price, bear any burden" announcement which states clearly the resolve and the will necessary for
deterrence to succeed. This point will become moot if there are no significant casualties to test United States' resolve. If, however, that resolve is challenged, the true nature of American interests will become clear. If the United States accepts the cost then the interests can be said to have been truly vital. If the United States quickly pulls out of Bosnia as a result of rising casualties then the interests can be said to have been less than vital. Such a step would also diminish the nature of deterrence in future operations, inviting a challenge of will that one wishes to deter. Only time and events will determine which condition will emerge.

The introduction of a heavily armed force, centered on the First Armored Division, is a logical extension of a policy in pursuit of vital interests. This is evidence of a national policy of deterrence, and if necessary, compellence in Bosnia. Regardless of what the policy is called, peace implementation, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, from the force structure, ROE, and statements of the president and Secretary Perry it is clear that the object is to deter renewed aggression. This underscores the fundamental argument laid out in the theory section of this study.

The critical factor that may prove to be the linchpin of success or failure in Bosnia is the desired end state. President Clinton has defined the end state in terms of a twelve-month period. He defends this time frame by arguing that the tasks given to the military can, as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs, be accomplished in twelve months. Perhaps, but that is not at all clear given the history of prolonged strife in the region. Making the time frame more problematic is the growing number of tasks the military is taking on such as investigation of war crimes and local policing. The critical question is whether the time frame is the most important element of the policy or if task-accomplishment is most
critical. Certainly, the President announced the time limit in the interest of building popular support at home, but in so doing, he may have eroded the support necessary to carry out the tasks defined if they should take longer than twelve months. Another potential difficulty arises from the possibility that those that might renew the war will choose to wait out the twelve month period, re-supplying, and rearming and then renew the war as soon as the United States withdraws.

Notes


5 President Clinton’s Address, 2.

6 Ibid., 3.

7 Secretary Perry’s Testimony, 1.

8 Ibid., 4.

9 President Clinton’s Address, 3.

10 Ibid.


12 Secretary Perry’s Testimony, 4.


14 President Clinton’s Address, 3.

15 Secretary Perry’s Testimony, 2.

16 Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966). In his book Shelling argues that force can be used in support of diplomatic efforts by targeting what an enemy values and putting it at risk. One must display both the
will and capability to use force in order to get the adversary to bend to one’s will. He calls this coercive diplomacy.

17 Secretary Perry’s Testimony, 2.
18 Ibid., 4.
19 Ibid.
20 President Clinton’s Address, 3.
Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper began by arguing that a complete analysis of the military’s role in peace operations is lacking. Although many writings on peace operations exist, most of them start at the bottom—that is, at the execution level. This narrow focus leads the writers to claim that the military is improperly trained, organized, and equipped to successfully perform peace operations. The paper contends that this is a misguided approach. An analysis that begins at the execution level fails to cover the entire spectrum of the peace operation process and thus, is liable to miss true cause and effect. To derive a true causal relationship, the analysis should begin at the decision level and then work down to the actual employment of force. In order to substantiate this point, the paper identified two competing hypotheses, and then tested them on four different cases. Although an ill-trained and ill-equipped military can certainly contribute to mission problems, the paper traces the real problems back to the decision to employ force.

Two tasks remain. The first is to summarize the analysis in chapters 3 through 6 and compare the explanatory power of the two competing hypotheses directly. The second is to outline the lessons that policy makers, as well as military leaders, in the United States should draw from these results.
The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates the value of beginning an analysis of peace operations at the decision-making level. For instance, the Lebanon and Somalia cases reveal that failures at the policy maker level dissipated downwards thus causing problems at the execution level. An analysis beginning at the execution level fails to analyze the critical linkage between the decision to use force and its actual application. Such a narrow analysis obviously leads to blaming the military for problems in mission execution. It is only by beginning at the top and analyzing each step is one able to draw true cause and effect. This is an essential point. It might be argued that the problem should be approached at two levels, the policy making level and the execution level. This is, however, a flawed approach. The core of the issue is at the policy making level. Trying to develop doctrine that would achieve success in Somalia or Lebanon is both a waste of time and dangerous. One can not develop a winning doctrine to support a bad policy, regardless of what it is called. This became quite evident in Vietnam.

Knowing how the policy makers conceive the use of force is a key ingredient in analyzing any military mission. Each of the cases supports this point. The Sinai case illustrates that the mission was successful because the policy makers saw the peacekeeping mission in its proper role, as deterrence, and thus planned accordingly. The Lebanon and Somalia cases show the contrary. The policy makers’ failure to realize that the military was performing a deterrent (and later a compellent) mission resulted in non-congruence between the strategic objective and the military mission as well as the resources and necessary will to conduct the mission. In the Bosnia case, the policy makers realize peace operations are about deterrence and compellence. By properly
conceiving the use of force, the operation seems to be working, but whether it will be a lasting success is yet to be determined.

By thinking of the Somalia and Lebanon operations as something other than war, they were not treated as war, but as something other than war. The traditional alarms were not in place, nor were the proper cost-benefit analyses. In both cases, the US went in to accomplish a broad policy objective with insufficient force. In the case of Somalia, the mission changed while the original force was in place but the requisite review of cost-benefit and the increased capability necessary did not occur. One could argue that had the US perceived the Somalia operation as war, then either the armor would have been forthcoming when requested, or the mission statement changed to coincide with the reality of the situation.¹

The same problems apply to Lebanon. The Marine’s mission did not match the strategic objectives. Although President Reagan had an end state in mind, the military was incapable of achieving it given the mission and resources it received. Additionally, too many voices were proclaiming too many different objectives and policies. Again, thinking of the mission as something beyond the traditional use of force—deterrence/compellence—led to a disastrous outcome.

The decision-making process that is evident in the case of Bosnia seems to represent a return to a realist approach to policymaking regarding the use of force. Unlike Somalia and Lebanon there seems to have been a recognition of potential costs and risks and a weighing of those against stated interests. Although termed a peace operation, the President and Secretary of Defense have been quite clear in their statements that they recognize the potential for the outbreak of hostilities and are prepared to respond with
credible force. A sufficiently armed force, based on the nature and armament of the parties in the region, was deployed to enhance deterrence. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the will to use that force was indicated, further strengthening deterrence. Only time and events will determine if this will is real or merely rhetoric.

The idea of combat must be present when military forces are used. Military force serves the purpose of creating an environment where options are available. In order to create these options, the theme around which forces are selected and organized must be combat. The appearance on the ground of a capability to do so is crucial to convincing the warring parties that a peaceful settlement is the preferred alternative. Peace operations are one form of war, different in degree, but not different in type from what has occurred throughout history.

Peace operations is war in a new environment. War being defined as an act of force to compel an adversary to do one's will. Thus, when considering the use of force for any type of operation, one must do so with his mind cleared and ready to accept the fact that what one is really talking about is war. As Clausewitz says, "... whenever armed forces, that is armed individuals are used, the idea of combat must be present."² Using the military and not arming them, does not mean that the potential for combat does not still remain. In fact, the mistake seems to lie in the idea that by not arming the troops, they are not involved in a combat mission. Approaching the use of military force from this perspective leads to the needless loss of life. Viewed from this perspective, the force lacks the political and public will to carry out the mission.

The US policy makers and military must reexamine their outlook on peace operations. Approaching peace operations as completely new uses of force leads to the
perception that the military must re-train, re-equip, and reorganize. This is the wrong path to follow and can only spell disaster for US security. One might argue that there is little danger in developing new doctrine for operations such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace implementation. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. Military doctrine not only serves as a basis for organizing and training the force, it is also used to inform the policy makers. Separate doctrine for peace operations furthers the policy makers’ misconception that these operations do not involve the traditional use of force. Peace operations, just like any other operation that requires armed forces is either about deterrence or compellence, and if the US wants to be successful, the policy makers must realize this when deciding to use the military instrument of power.

Notes


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