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A MONOGRAPH
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Leonardo V. Flor
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School of Advanced Military Studies
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Operations with NGOs, The “International Army of the Future”

A Monograph
by
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1996-1997

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONS WITH NGOs, THE "INTERNATIONAL ARMY OF THE FUTURE"
by LTC Leonardo V. Flor, USA, 74 pages.

This monograph asserts that, contrary to what current doctrine implies and in order to enhance unity of effort at execution, strategic and operational level commanders and planners must plan Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance using deliberate planning procedures and in coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other agencies. This paper also urges a holistic view of complex humanitarian crises so that commanders and planners can better see how a limited military response functionally relates to the broader response of NGOs and other agencies.

The monograph first explores the nature of NGOs and complex humanitarian crises. It then reviews joint doctrine to determine what doctrine prescribes/describes with respect to planning for and operating with NGOs during Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. Lastly, the monograph reviews four post Cold War operations other than war for pertinent lessons learned.

The monograph concludes that the Armed Forces can indeed leverage NGO capabilities as long as they adopt a holistic view of complex humanitarian crises: one that recognizes the many factors that contribute to a degenerative process that occurs over time; one that portrays how the finite capabilities of many different organizations, some of which are NGOs, can be complimentary and lead to the resolution of an otherwise infinite problem; and one that encourages anticipatory planning and inter-agency preparation.
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Section I. Introduction

...[NGOs are] the international army of the future. They put up with far worse conditions, and in many cases more physical danger, than do increasingly pampered Western troops... Robert Kaplan

The Problem

Robert Kaplan overstates his case; but, he underscores an area of growing concern and increasing relevance as the Nation’s civilian leaders become ever more willing to commit the military in support of operations other than war. Every major US Military Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operation in this decade involved a significant presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Invariably, these organizations arrived in the problem areas long before any US military involvement, and departed long after the last US military personnel had departed. Yet, current military planning and training doctrine seem to regard NGOs as part of the environment rather than as active, capable players: thus, beyond the obligatory rhetoric, campaign planning and execution inadvertently minimize the impact NGOs’ have, instead of making full use of their unique capabilities.

Moreover, complex humanitarian crises cry out for holistic solutions that deal, not only with immediate famine, starvation, disease and death, but also with the political, social and cultural causes behind the crises. This implies a long term commitment and engagement over time that the Armed Forces may not be able to devote, time that the impatient American public and Congress may not be willing to provide. Does this mean that the US Military should not engage in peace operations and humanitarian relief? Probably not—the fact is that there are components of response to humanitarian crises
that only the US Armed Forces, with their sophisticated equipment and expertise, can
deal with: quick, massive movement of supplies to remote areas; separation of armed
partisans; security of humanitarian relief organizations; protection of indigenous
population from violent, well armed militias; and on and on. To the indignation of some
and to the applause of most, the Nation’s civilian leadership will continue to commit the
Armed Forces in support of peace and humanitarian assistance operations because, in the
long run, such operations promote US security, political, and economic interests.⁵

Yes, the Armed Forces have gotten smaller, and will probably get even smaller as
the Nation becomes ever more confident that no other state can match her military
strength in the foreseeable future. Paradoxically, the same condition that brings about this
confidence also allows the US to take more notice of, and act upon, the plights of other
nations. So, instead of just US vital interests being the predominant impetus for US
military intervention, less than vital and “primarily humanitarian interests”⁶ have become
the more frequent reasons behind US military operations. Consequently, the shrinking
US Armed Forces find themselves saddled with a growing commitment to humanitarian
assistance and peace operations.

How does the US leadership deal with this paradox? They can look to the UN to do
its job in getting the rest of the world to do more. Indeed, some declare the UN very
capable and, perhaps, the only entity able to mount impartial and legitimate humanitarian
interventions.⁷ On the other hand, others see the UN inherently incapable of managing
any military operations beyond simple peacekeeping and observation missions.⁸ There is
also the question of whether other nations are willing and capable of providing
substantial effort in the absence of US leadership and example.⁹
Another approach to this paradox would be for the Nation’s leaders to explore yet another facet of the very criteria espoused in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*: “Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success?”10 This question refers to the other elements of national power, and the US Government agencies responsible for them. If all potential actors take part, the effort might match the requirement without unduly burdening any one actor. If one considers the totality of possible responses to a given crisis over time, one might begin to realize the synergy that results from holistic solutions.

Yet another approach to the paradox would be to leverage efforts of the many NGOs that seem to appear from nowhere whenever complex humanitarian crises occur. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Presidents Bush’s and Clinton’s special envoy to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, suggests as much; in enumerating the core competencies the US Armed Forces must possess, he lists, “Operate in conjunction with ... non-government organizations.”11 It is this subject that the monograph addresses. Specifically, this paper asserts that, contrary to what current doctrine implies, strategic and operational level commanders and planners must plan Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance using deliberate planning procedures and in coordination with NGOs and other agencies in order to enhance unity of effort at execution. This paper also offers a holistic framework commanders and planners can use to understand complex humanitarian crises and how a limited military response functionally relates to broad NGO efforts.
The Process

Who are these NGOs and what motivates them? How does current doctrine and training enhance or detract from the US military's ability to work with NGOs in peace and humanitarian assistance operations? What changes, if any, to unified level joint doctrine on training and planning need be made to better take advantage of the increasingly significant involvement of NGOs in peace and humanitarian assistance operations?

The first question, the subject of the next section, seeks order out of chaos. In analyzing available literature written by both NGO insiders and outsiders, one gleans organizational factors (size, sub-organizations, source of funds, external affiliations, geographic reach, stated goals, etc.) along which the thousands of NGOs can be ordered into a finite number of groups. More importantly, the answer to the first question provides a level of comprehension required to constructively engage an otherwise enigmatic NGO culture.

The second question, covered in Section III, deals with doctrine on unified command level planning and training as it pertains to peace operations and humanitarian assistance. The second question also demands a review of the major post Cold War peace and humanitarian assistance operations, in as much as these operations shed light upon the effectiveness, or inadequacy, of existing doctrine on how to deal with NGOs. Section IV covers this review of operations.

The last question, the subject of the final section, entails synthesis. Given the analysis in the previous three sections, Section V describes an approach unified command level planners and trainers can take to enhance the ability of the US Armed
Forces to integrate the capabilities and effort of the many NGOs they will encounter in peace and humanitarian assistance operations.

The Limitations

It is necessary to establish boundaries to this otherwise broad topic. First, this paper focuses only on what the military can do in an effort to engender a symbiotic relationship with NGOs. No attempts are made to prescribe what other government agencies or NGOs can do towards the same end. This is a reflection of the intended audience (military commanders, trainers and planners, primarily at the unified command level) and the author’s own area of expertise, rather than a suggestion of inflexibility or inability to change on the part of other government agencies or the NGO community.

Second, the paper explores only those strategic and operational-level measures normally employed by unified commands. One pleasant discovery of the research is the pro-activeness with which the US military tries to capture lessons, and applies these lessons to subsequent operations; however, for the most part, these measures address tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) pertinent to unit level coordination and execution of assigned tasks. The paper discusses some of these TTPs, but only when they shed light upon unified command level training and planning techniques of longer term and higher level implications.

Third, this paper deliberately avoids the question of force structure changes. A basic assumption is that the Armed Forces will continue to man and equip their force in order to win the Nation’s wars. Formation of special units, whose primary mission is to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies, is beyond the purview of this paper. In
fact, an underlying challenge of this study is how to make an organization ostensibly designed to operate in war succeed equally in peace.

Fourth, out of practical necessity, the paper discusses mostly Western-based, transnational NGOs. Otherwise, the study would have to include the millions of grassroots NGOs with strictly, local or national geographic scope. The paper further limits the study of NGOs to only those that are actively involved in planning and field operations in complex humanitarian emergencies. After all, these are the NGOs whose capabilities and activities are of consequence to military efforts in Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance.

Finally, only operations conducted outside the limits of the US are considered. Whereas NGOs do operate within the US, and the US Armed Forces do participate in disaster relief within the US, they do so under established and well planned procedures of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They also do so without the rancor attendant in debates over legitimacy of interventions. As such, domestic operations do not approach the chaos and potential for conflict inherent in intervention in overseas complex humanitarian emergencies.

And now, for The Answers...
Section II. The Complex NGO-World

But instead of being a quest for the ultimate particles, it would be about flux, change, and the forming and dissolving of patterns.... Instead of being about simplicity, it would be about—well, complexity.

M. Mitchell Waldrop

The Challenge

Global politics used to be much simpler. States reigned supreme, their borders inviolable. But times are changing. Technology has made previously impenetrable walls of state sovereignty, sheer curtains at best. National privacy is a thing of the past, and citizens hear, see and smell the goings on in other states. Ironically, this greater sense of awareness for the affairs of others has also brought on an acute sense of awareness for one’s own affairs, and an equally acute desire to improve one’s lot and those of others. The number of issues, and the desire to resolve these issues, generated by this engine of awareness has easily overwhelmed the capacity and capability of governments to resolve them: undaunted, citizens are taking matters into their hands, forming or supporting nongovernmental organizations, often banding across national borders, in order to resolve issues governments cannot, are unwilling to, or are too slow to resolve. So, to the number of actors in global politics, once the domain only of nations and a few intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational corporations, must be added thousands of NGOs, some of which have more constituents then the smaller member-nations of the UN.\textsuperscript{13}

The rise in the level of influence, at least in certain global issues, has indeed been dramatic. NGOs such as Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, and Pax Romana have been "the engine for virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the field of human rights since its founding."\textsuperscript{15} With operations in scores of countries, worldwide membership in the millions, and annual budgets in the hundreds of
millions, NGOs such as *Greenpeace, Worldwide Fund for Nature, and Friends of the Earth International* have the legitimacy and resources to influence the environmental policies of nations, transnational corporations and IGOs.\textsuperscript{16} Relief agencies like *CARE* and *Save the Children* had a great deal to do with galvanizing the international community into intervening in the complex humanitarian emergencies in Northern Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992 and 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 to 1994, and Rwanda in 1994. More significantly, NGOs have spearheaded the international response to these emergencies. As this paper is being written, the NGO community is yet again spearheading an international relief effort, this time in the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Clearly, to say that NGOs are important in global polity is an understatement—they have become actors, rivaling nations in significance, and, in cases of complex humanitarian emergencies, even leading the international community effort.

Without a doubt, the US Armed Forces, with their worldwide reach, global charter, and likely continuing role in complex humanitarian emergencies, must reach a level of understanding for NGOs to the detail they reserve for potential allies and adversaries. Unfortunately, for the military planner trying to grasp a quick understanding of what an NGO is, “There is no such thing as a typical NGO.”\textsuperscript{17} Every cause seems to have attracted proponents and most of these proponents have organized and gone international.\textsuperscript{18} The numbers can be overwhelming. If one counts every grassroots, community-level NGO, the number can be in the millions.\textsuperscript{19} If one narrows the definition to include only those with at least a national-level impact, the number would exceed
20,000.\textsuperscript{20} If one excludes all but those with international base and impact, as evidenced by having achieved UN recognition, the number would still exceed 1000.\textsuperscript{21}

Indeed, making sense out of this milieu is a challenge; but, to the US Armed Forces, it is a necessary one. It is this section's task to provide the unified command planners and trainers a wieldy framework with which to decipher an otherwise enigmatic NGO community.

**NGO Defined**

As mentioned in Section 1, this paper uses the term NGO to refer to both nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations (PVO). But this begs the question of what precisely NGOs and PVOs are; the meaning of these terms, even within the military community, is far from universal. So, a review of various definitions from pertinent sources is necessary toward a common understanding of the terms as used in this paper.

The use of "nongovernmental organization" as a classificatory term seems to originate from its use in Article 71 of the UN Charter,\textsuperscript{22}

The Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.\textsuperscript{23}

Unfortunately, the Charter does not precisely define "non-governmental organizations." It does imply that NGOs can be national or international in reach, but cannot be agencies of the UN or its member nations. Article 71 also establishes the notion of a consultation status with ECOSOC, which is key to some contemporary definitions of NGO.
The Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms narrowly defines NGOs as only those “transnational organizations of private citizens” with consultative status with the UN ECOSOC, organizations that have “interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief).” It also emphasizes that only non-US NGOs use the term and that US-based NGOs refer to themselves as PVOs. However, Joint Pub 1-02 drops the ECOSOC status qualifier when it defines PVOs, but retains the other elements it ascribes to NGOs.

Not surprisingly, the US Army’s latest doctrinal manual on peace operations, FM 100-23, casts a wider net by dropping the consultative status qualifier and by including all groups, even business groups, “with an interest in improving the quality of life of people.” FM 100-23 does not define the term PVO. On the other hand, in its draft manual on operational terms, FM 101-5-1, the Army adopts the Joint Pub 1-02’s definitions for NGO and PVO almost word for word.

Academicians, with their penchant for unified theories, tend to have very broad definitions that encompass all possibilities, or intricate definitions that explain every possible wrinkle. Peter Willetts, Reader in International Relations at London’s City University, exemplifies a negative methodology to these academic propensities. He examines alternate terms and finds reasons why these terms are unsatisfactory: “interest group” implies too much about economic clout; “pressure group” is too political; PVO connotes too much of charitable activity; “new social movements” promotes only liberalism; “transnational actor” too often means transnational corporations. He implies that NGO is the term the diplomatic world accepts because it is neutral in its broadness—
it accommodates organizations that are big or small, national or international, centralized or decentralized, simple or complex.  

Willetts postulates, from observation, four things an organization cannot be to gain recognition as an NGO: it cannot be commercial in nature; it cannot be in support of violence as a legitimate means for change; it cannot be a political party seeking a change in an existing government, even if such a change were through legitimate and peaceful means; and it cannot be opposed, at least not openly, to the goals and activities of the organization whose recognition it seeks. In the end, he settles on a dual definition: "An NGO is any non-profit-making, non-violent, organized group of people who are not seeking government office. An international NGO ... can be any non-violent, organized group of individuals or organizations from more than one country."  

Notice that, in these definitions, Willetts avoids the issue of what makes NGOs "non-governmental" because reality makes such speculations moot. Instead, he postulates that there is a spectrum of organizations, with purely governmental organizations at one extreme and purely non-governmental organizations at the other extreme. Where in this spectrum an organization belongs depends upon the nature of its financial source, the affiliations of its constituents, the nature of the issues with which it deals, and the extent to which it works with governments in dealing with issues. Using his criteria, Willetts rationalizes the existence of at least eight categories of international organizations, three of which are predominantly NGO in nature and composition, but two of which are more hybrid in nature and include organizations one would traditionally classify as an NGO, e.g., the International Red Cross. The point is that there is more to being "non-
governmental” than a group of private citizens banding together towards a common cause.

Gordenker and Weiss use a more positive variant to the academic approach. In the opening essay to the 1995 *Third World Quarterly* special issue on NGOs and the UN, they hypothesize that NGOs are “durable, bounded, voluntary relationships among individuals to produce a particular product, using specific techniques.” Left at this, the definition would encompass every NGO ever established, to include the political parties and guerrilla movements Willetts seeks to exclude. It would also include groups clearly not NGOs, e.g., Jesse James and his merry band of bank robbers. Broad as this definition is, it does confirm the notion of a private, extra-governmental entity and introduces a notion of structural formality (durable vs. ad hoc) not covered in any of the definitions previously discussed.

And, to be fair, there is a method in the seeming absurdity of the definition. Gordenker and Weiss use it only as foundation for a more focused and useful description that includes, aside from the two already mentioned, the notions of social aims, non-profit making motives, and transnational scope. They also take two unique steps in their method. First, they insist that “nongovernmental” implies not only that NGOs are for the most part private and self-governing, but also without the “ability to direct societies or to require support from them.” Second, they establish three subcategories of NGOs, acknowledging that there are other entities which may look like NGOs, but upon closer scrutiny, do not smell or feel exactly like NGOs. Thus, there are GONGOs (government-organized NGOs), QUANGOs, (quasi-NGOs), and DONGOs (donor-organized NGOs).
Beyond those suggested by their label, it matters not at this point what features make these organizations distinct. What is important, at least for the purpose of this paper, is the concept that there are different types of NGOs. More importantly, Gordenker and Weiss’ analysis, contrary to that made by Willetts, provides a basis for the idea that some types of NGOs lose relevance as the issue in question changes. In fact, an analysis of which NGOs matter, in the issues the US Armed Forces are likely to get involved in, is central to this paper’s thesis.

The NGO community itself prefers to dwell upon the exclusivity of their work when pondering the definition of the term NGO. An example is the definition used by InterAction, an alliance of over 150 US-based NGOs, which emphasizes three elements that must be true for an organization to be an NGO. First, it cannot be part of government, though it may work in partnerships with governments. Second, it cannot be in business for profit, though it may use commercial methods to raise funds for its programs. Lastly, it has to be a private entity “involved in humanitarian issues—from disaster relief and child nutrition to literacy and agricultural programs.”34 InterAction also states that PVO is but another term, in vogue primarily in the US, for NGO. This definition is definitely more restrictive than that of Willetts or Gordenker and Weiss. It is even more restrictive than FM 100-23 in that it specifically excludes business groups. However, it is more inclusive than the Joint Pub 1-02 notion in that it drops the ECOSOC consultative status requirement.

Andrew Natsios, Vice President of World Vision, perhaps reflecting his multifaceted background as a former functionary of the US Agency for International Development and as a retired USAR lieutenant colonel, Civil Affairs officer and veteran of Operation

13
Desert Storm, presents a definition applicable primarily in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency:

What we in the United States call a private voluntary organization (PVO) is known in Europe and the rest of the world as a non-governmental organization (NGO) ... the term PVO describes private, non-profit organizations which specialize in humanitarian relief and development work in the Third World and increasingly in former communist countries.35

Natsios presents two new notions. First, he implies that context matters—what organizations do (humanitarian relief and development) and where they work (Third World) matters as to whether or not they are NGOs. Second, one which he more directly states in another essay,36 he implies that NGOs are primarily Western-based organizations.

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<td>Primarily Western-Based</td>
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<td>Can't Direct or Require Support from Society</td>
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**Figure 1: Summary of Notions and Source**
The notions about the nature of NGOs, introduced by the six definitions discussed, are summarized in Figure 1. At least two conclusions should come to mind in the review of these notions. First, not all of the notions complement each other, which suggest that one just cannot meld all notions together to come up with a “universal” understanding of what an NGO is. Second, as Natsios implies, context does matter—what an NGO is may depend upon the circumstance at hand. Therefore, it is hardly efficacious to be eclectic: hammering out a “better” definition by incorporating the best of the notions is not necessarily the wise thing to do. What is called for is a review of context; and complex humanitarian crisis is the context at hand.

Complex Humanitarian Crises (or Emergencies) and NGOs

Natsios is not advocating a very narrow definition of what NGOs are. As the ensuing discussion shows, Natsios is stating that, in the context of complex humanitarian crises, the NGOs that seem most relevant are transnational NGOs (most of which are based in the West) that do humanitarian relief, developmental, and human rights advocacy work, and the local community NGOs that assist these transnational NGOs.

At the people level, the term ‘humanitarian crises’ implies “situations in which people cannot sustain life by their own efforts.”37 By extension, at the state level, the term implies a condition of human suffering of such magnitude that the means of mitigation normally available to the state are inadequate. The devastation produced by a 100-year hurricane upon the City of Galveston, Texas could lead to a humanitarian crisis should the emergency response system normally provided by local, state and federal agencies fail to provide assistance in a timely manner. It is doubtful, however, that it would lead to a ‘complex’ humanitarian crisis, even if the magnitude of the suffering
incurred required a massive humanitarian assistance. Although ‘complex’ is often associated with the magnitude of the response, it is really the complexity of the cause(s) that makes for a complex humanitarian crisis.

Somalia in 1992-1993 was a humanitarian crisis because the indigenous instruments of response could not provide adequate and timely assistance to prevent thousands of people from starving to death. However, what made the humanitarian crises complex were the combined effects of a break down in government control, internecine tribal warfare, mass refugee movement, decaying national infrastructure, and famine. It is this multi-causal nature that makes the Somalia crisis different from the hypothetical Galveston crisis. In the Somalia crisis, the varied and interwoven factors made an otherwise straightforward response of providing food and shelter, by scores of very willing and well financed relief NGOs, grossly inadequate in alleviating the suffering. An adequate response for the Somalia crisis had to have sustained political, social, economic, military and humanitarian dimensions to it—a complex response generated by a complex cause.38

Unfortunately, NGOs can only provide the humanitarian relief portion of the total package, or so the ‘traditionalists’ think. Traditional humanitarians choose not to go beyond the relief portion of the response to any complex humanitarian crisis because to do more could be interpreted as taking sides; such an interpretation of lacking neutrality may cause parties in conflict to deny the organization access to those in need. So, these relief-oriented NGOs insist on neutrality so that they may preserve their access and their capability to “stop the dying.” This is humanitarianism in the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) tradition, "emergency assistance and protection activities carried out devoid of extraneous agendas--political, religious, or otherwise."\(^{39}\)

There are numerous NGOs who view this traditional concept of humanitarianism as too narrow. Some object on the basis that humanitarian relief is more than just provision of food, medicine and shelter, it also encompasses the protection of basic human rights.\(^{40}\) Indeed there are human rights NGOs which specialize in rooting out and publicizing human rights violations in order to pressure violators and mobilize international action into ending the violations.\(^{41}\) Others object to the traditionalist's insistence that humanitarian assistance must be apolitical and neutral in the belief that even the simple act of feeding victims of conflict is inherently political and that denying this makes one more vulnerable to those who will use food as a weapon to further their political agendas.\(^{42}\) Yet a third objection to traditional ICRC-type humanitarianism asserts that such an approach is doomed to failure because it does not address root causes and the long term implications of humanitarian assistance, "Those who would save lives should assume responsibility for the long-term impacts of their help."\(^{43}\)

There are also those who ascribe to the idea that prevention, not relief, is the real solution. Realizing that the causes are complex, the real inroad is to be made before the resulting conditions reach emergency proportions. The advocates of preventive response argue that, by engaging states with potential for human disasters, they are dealing with the root causes while the problem is still manageable and are developing indigenous structures and expertise for dealing with future problems. These developmental NGOs spurn relief operations in the belief that such curative measures, as currently practiced, lead to the atrophy of the host nation's structure to deal with emergencies in the long run.
At the same time, they insist that, if one is indeed too late to prevent and has to respond to a humanitarian crisis, relief should be done through indigenous NGOs since doing so will at least develop the state’s internal capacity to deal with future crises.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of NGOs (Example)</th>
<th>Objective/Product</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Geographic Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional (Medecins sans Frontieres)</td>
<td>Food, Medical, Shelter, &quot;Stop the Dying&quot;</td>
<td>Neutral, Apolitical Immediate Relief</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian-Developmental (CARE)</td>
<td>Same as Traditional + Social Svc, Infrastructure Repair</td>
<td>Impartial, Immediate Relief + Root Cause Remediation</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental (OXFAM)</td>
<td>Infrastructure Development</td>
<td>Root Cause Remediation</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grass Roots (Amnesty Intern’l)</td>
<td>Local Agency and Expertise for sponsor transnatl NGOs</td>
<td>Sponsor transnational NGO methods</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights (Amnesty Intern’l)</td>
<td>Advice, Information, Global Awareness</td>
<td>Advocacy, Media Involvement</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: NGOs Pertinent in Complex Humanitarian Crises**

So far, in this examination of the context of complex humanitarian crisis, it should be evident that there are different types of NGOs, at least five of which are important in the context of complex humanitarian crisis: traditional humanitarian relief, humanitarian-developmental, developmental, grassroots, and human rights NGOs. Note that these types are delineated in three ways: by their objective or product, by their methods, and by geographic scope. Figure 2 summarizes how the different types are delineated by objective, method, and geographic scope.

There are at least two other aspects in this exploration of context that require examination. First, NGOs are but one of many actors involved in complex humanitarian
crises and their capabilities only contribute to part of the international response mechanism. This paper includes a cursory discussion of some of the more significant actors in complex humanitarian crisis response; a more comprehensive discussion is in *Joint Publication 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Second, complex humanitarian emergencies develop over time. The fact is that different NGOs get engaged for different reasons at different times. A discussion of the time dimension is therefore key to the understanding of NGOs.

**Complex Humanitarian Crises and Time**

Complex humanitarian crises do not develop overnight. As the previous discussion implies, a mechanism, where conflict and a weakening of government control eventually leads to decay of national infrastructure, famine, and mass refugee movement, is what distinguishes complex humanitarian crises from other humanitarian crises. This mechanism, unlike devastating natural disasters and other punctuated events, occur over a period of months and years. True, punctuated events can precipitate complex humanitarian crises, but they do so only in an existing milieu of conflict, weak government, and rotting national infrastructure—all traits that evolve over time.

When a cyclone hit Bangladesh in late April 1991 and killed 150,000 people, it precipitated a humanitarian crisis, but not a complex one. Although the cyclone devastated the nation’s road and communication networks, neither a conflict nor a weak government existed. Humanitarian aid, delivered by NGOs and the US Marine Corps, quickly mitigated the devastation from the cyclone. By 13 June, less than seven weeks after the cyclone, the crisis was over and the Bangladeshi government was fully capable of handling the remaining problems with its own internal resources.45
In contrast, when a plane crash killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994, it precipitated a complex humanitarian crisis in Rwanda: but, it did so only because of the decades old conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis, a plan hatched by the Hutu government to massacre political opponents and Tutsis to strengthen its disintegrating control of the nation, the blooming rebellion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and a decrepit national infrastructure unimproved since its colonial days.46

The point is that there is often ample time to detect and recognize a complex humanitarian crisis in the making. Crises, such as that of Rwanda, can be superimposed over a simple timeline that shows three periods: a lengthy pre-crisis period, a comparatively short crisis-proper period, and a post-crisis period that may very well be the pre-crisis period for a follow-on crisis. The pre-crisis period can occur over a period of months and even years and is characterized by conflict, the weakening of government control, and the deterioration of government-provided services and maintenance of national infrastructures. Other traits of a pre-crisis period can include repression of political process and human rights, increasing incidents of violence and other crimes, precipitous decline in national productivity, dramatic increase in unemployment and inflation, and localized but increasingly frequent lack of food, medical care and other basic necessities among a growing marginalized sector of the population.

In the Rwanda crisis, one can make the case that the pre-crisis period dated back to 1962, when the country gained its independence from Belgium. More directly, the pre-crisis period can be traced back to no later than October 1990, when the RPF first crossed into Rwanda from Uganda to challenge the faltering government of General Juvenal Habyarima. At this point, the Rwandese economy had already been severely weakened by
drought and the worldwide collapse of the price of coffee, Rwanda’s main source of foreign exchange.

The Habyarima regime, faced with a burgeoning political opposition and domestic unrest, became increasingly repressive and willing to blame the Tutsis for the country’s misfortune. Almost immediately, human rights NGOs, both local and transnational, began reporting numerous violations. By November 1992, four human rights associations organized a formal investigation of human rights conditions in Rwanda. Soon, a steady flow of well documented reports of repression and massacres, to include photographs of mass graves, had prompted other NGOs—local, church-based, humanitarian and developmental—to issue declarations against the Habyarima regime. By February 1993, with a renewed offensive from the RPF, the conflict had produced 350,000 refugees, prompting the ICRC to declare a disaster in the making. Although Habyarima signed the Arusha Accords allowing a truce with the RPF in August 1993, his motives were immediately transparent; the agreement was just a ploy to avoid economic sanctions and to gain time to organize what eventually became the Interahamwe (militia) massacres. From December 1993 up until the plane crash in April, NGOs continually issued pleas for an international effort to stop an impending disaster.47

Rwanda was clearly headed for a complex humanitarian crisis. The pre-crisis conditions of conflict, weakening of government control, deterioration of government provided services and national infrastructures, repression of political process and human rights, increasing incidents of violence and other crimes, precipitous decline in national productivity, dramatic increase in unemployment and inflation, and localized but
increasingly frequent lack of food, medical care and other basic necessities among a
growing marginalized sector of the population, were clearly in evidence.

When deteriorating conditions result in the inability of existing internal coping
mechanisms to stem mass starvation and death, or when a precipitous event shatters
internal coping mechanisms already made brittle by pre-crisis conditions, a period of
complex humanitarian crisis occurs. This crisis-proper period is characterized by mass
starvation and death, widespread violence and conflict, and mass movement of refugees
escaping conflict and seeking food and shelter. In the absence of external assistance,
these conditions can quickly feed on each other, creating a vicious cycle of greater
conflict and more death from violence and mass starvation, forcing even greater masses
of refugees to seek food, shelter and security. This is what happened in Rwanda from
April to July 1994.

First came the Interahamwe-led massacres of Tutsis, "...in one hundred days up to
one million people were hacked, shot, strangled and burned to death."28 Second came the
refugee problem. On April 8, the RPF responded to the genocide and attacked with vigor.
The resulting war caused the exodus of mostly Hutu refugees fearing reprisals for the
massacres: 580,000 refugees ended up in Tanzanian camps in April and May while
1,200,000 ended up in eastern Zaire in July, mostly in camps around Goma. By the time
the RPF captured Kigali and gained control of Rwanda in July, over two million
Rwandans had fled their country.29 Third, famine and disease pervaded the entire country
and the refugee camps. It was in fact malnutrition and a cholera epidemic in the refugee
camps that finally jarred the attention of the international community to the fact that
what was happening in Rwanda was not just another case of African tribal warfare but a complex humanitarian crisis in full bloom.

When external assistance shores-up internal coping mechanisms to at least stem mass starvation and deaths, and conflict stops to allow unimpeded external assistance and the nation to lift itself up by its bootstraps, then the recovery that characterizes the post-crisis period begins. The government, new or old, reestablishes order and security, allowing refugees to shed their fears and gain confidence to go back home and resume the production of food, goods and services a nation needs to sustain itself. The extent to which people and circumstances allow this return to normalcy, and to the extent that nature herself cooperates, determines whether the post-crisis is a prelude to lasting prosperity or just another period of pre-crisis.

In the case of Rwanda, the question is yet to be answered. Practically all refugees from Tanzanian camps and over a million refugees from Zairian camps have returned; however, there are still over two hundred thousand refugees in Zaire, most of whom are caught in the middle of Zaire’s own civil war, short of food and medicine. Although the RPF is firmly in control of Rwanda, the former Rwandese Army and the Interahamwe still exist in force, and have even mounted some raids into Rwanda. Meanwhile, violence against some returning refugees, specially those returning from Tanzania, have been reported; however, given the massive number of returnees, the number of incidents does not indicate the new government’s complicity in the violence. In fact, the new government has made great efforts to settle land and home disputes in favor of returning refugees. To their credit, the RPF has done a lot to reassure Rwandese Hutus by appointing Hutu moderates to high government offices. The Prime Minister, the Minister
of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice are all Hutus.

Unfortunately, it will take more than goodwill and reconciliation to repair an economy in ruins and a social fabric in tatters from four decades of conflict.\textsuperscript{53}

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3: Time, NGOs and Complex Humanitarian Crises**

The intent of this discussion of the Rwanda crisis of 1994 is to illustrate that complex humanitarian crises can be superimposed over a timeline of months, and even years, in duration. This timeline can be shown to have three periods: a lengthy pre-crisis period, a comparatively short crisis-proper period, and a post-crisis period that may very well be the pre-crisis period to the next crisis. Although the transition from one period to the next may not be as apparent as implied in the discussion, each period is indeed unique from the others. The extended nature of the timeline and the distinct traits of each period offer contingency planning opportunities to unified command planners. When one superimposes the different NGOs involved over time, as illustrated in Figure 4, hints
of a useful strategic and operational planning framework, for understanding NGOs and their pertinence to peace and humanitarian operations, begin to emerge.

Section Summary

As stated at the start, the goal of this section is to allow the reader to be able to wade through the complexity that is the NGO world. Toward this end, the section presents three ways to view NGOs. First, as summarized in Figure 1, is an explanation of the different notions useful in determining the pertinence of different NGOs. Second, as summarized in Figure 2, is a determination of NGO-types pertinent in the context of complex humanitarian crises. Finally, as illustrated in Figure 3, is a chronological way of viewing NGO pertinence in the context of complex humanitarian crises.

Figure 3 also offers a foundation for the development of a useful strategic and operational planning framework for peace and humanitarian operations; but, this is the task of subsequent sections.
Section III. The (In)Adequacy of Doctrine

I shall try to demonstrate that on the contrary the theory contained in those maxims is far too insubstantial to enable one even to begin organizing the pressing problems in the field, that the bare core of theory which they do embody is capable of and demands meaningful elaboration, and that that elaboration and the mastery of it by military practitioners must require intensive, rigorous, and therefore prolonged intellectual application.

Bernard Brodie

As stated in Section I, this paper's central theme revolves around strategic and operational measures available for unified commanders' use to enhance unity of effort with NGOs during Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. This theme implies three steps. First, it is necessary to review the levels of war; 'strategic' and 'operational' mean different things to different people. Second, it is necessary to explain the focus on just Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, and not on other types of operations. Third, it is necessary to review doctrine, specifically joint doctrine, to establish what measures doctrine already establishes. Only after these steps can one begin to see what else doctrine needs, if any.

Levels of War

Strategy, operations and tactics, as the three levels of war, is common knowledge to US military officers. What may not be common is a uniform understanding of what these levels mean, and whether these same three levels exist in operations other than war.

In the most general of terms, strategy is simply the “Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)” National strategy (or grand strategy) can thus be defined as how (Ways) a nation intends to achieve its national objectives (Ends) using its political,
economic, psychological, and military powers (Means), in peace or in war. National security strategy, a subset of national strategy, is how a nation intends to achieve those objectives that contribute to its security through the coordinated application of its diplomatic, economic, informational and military instruments of national power.\textsuperscript{57}

The US National Security Strategy is formulated by the President’s National Security Council. The National Military Strategy, developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is that subset of the National Security Strategy that elaborates on the employment of the Nation’s military instrument of power in achieving national objectives in peace or war.\textsuperscript{58}

The neatness of the nested pattern, as one goes from the highest levels down, starts to unravel as one gets further from the level of formulation, and closer to the level of execution. From its doctrinal definition, theater strategy is more than just a nested subset of the National Military Strategy, it is also directly a subset of both the Grand Strategy and the National Security Strategy—it entails the development of ways to attain "... the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater."\textsuperscript{59} Theater strategy then, specially in peace, enfalds the employment of the military instrument of power in support of diplomatic, economic, and psychological ways to achieve national objectives, even those that do not directly support security objectives; it also entails enhancing the employment of available theater forces by leveraging existing diplomatic, economic and psychological ways and means.

The objectives expressed in grand strategies, national security strategies and theater strategies\textsuperscript{60} are often too broad, complicated or intangible for a straightforward
translation to tactical objectives of single military actions. Strategic objectives have to be boiled down to more focused and tangible sub-objectives, operational objectives if you will, that are achievable within a theater. Each operational objective can then be more readily reduced to a set of tactical objectives, achievable through sequential and or simultaneous military actions, and supported by or in support of diplomatic, economic and psychological actions. This purposeful combination of sequenced and simultaneous tactical actions to achieve operational or strategic objectives results in a campaign or major operation.61

Figure 4: Joint Operations Planning and Plans (from Fig 1-5, JP 5-0)

The design of campaigns and major operations entail systematic planning processes; those pertinent to the paper are campaign planning, deliberate planning and crisis action planning (see Figure 4). For Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, these
processes must consider the potential for unique NGO-capabilities to advance theater strategy and operational objectives.

Given this discussion, the definitions for strategic, operational and tactical levels of war given in Joint Pub 1-02 should be clearer. Still, it is necessary to reiterate two points made in Joint Pub 3-0 about levels of war. First, the levels of war are “doctrinal perspectives” that bridge the conceptual gap between strategic objectives and tactical actions; as such, one must not impute an actual division among the three since each is inexorably interrelated with the others. Second, if strategic objectives exist in war and in peace, and if military actions support strategic objectives in war and in peace, then the levels of war are also pertinent in peace.62

Military Operations Other Than War

Why just Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, and not other types of operations? On the contrary, the interest is not just in Peace Operations or Humanitarian Assistance, but in any operations where unique NGO-capabilities are materially significant to the overall success of the military effort. NGOs do operate in war; and their effort in war can certainly be noteworthy. War planning should give thought to NGO-related considerations. But the nature of war is such that NGO effort, however noteworthy, does not spell military victory or defeat (as evidenced by the number of wars won or lost by NGOs).

On the other hand, it is not as easy to dismiss the significance of NGO effort to military success in military operations other than war. Reproduced in Figure 5 is the range of military operations other than war described in Joint Pub 3-07.63 The discussion in Section II illustrates that NGO-effort often is the decisive element in the resolution of
complex humanitarian crises; accordingly, NGO-effort can indeed have decisive impact on military success in Humanitarian Assistance operations. Because Peace Operations (peacekeeping, peacemaking enforcement, peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, and peace building) often involves Humanitarian Assistance as well, NGO effort can also be decisive to military success in Peace Operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Operations Other Than War</th>
<th>Potential NGO Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Decisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Spt to Counterdrug Operations</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Support to Civil Authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of Sanctions/ Maritime Intercept Ops</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing Exclusion Zone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Show of Force Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strikes and Raids</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of Shipping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: NGO Impact on Military Success in Operations Other Than War

Lower down the spectrum of operations laid out in Figure 5, NGO-effort, although possibly still substantial and significant, becomes less of a determinant to military success. Military effort in Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations, Noncombatant Evacuation, and Recovery Operations may benefit substantially from NGO-assistance, specially in terms of information gathering; but, under reasonable circumstances, such assistance rarely determine military success.
Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency operations are primarily, military-to-military in nature with little to do with NGOs.64 Military Support to Civil Authorities are domestic operations, well planned for by FEMA, and devoid of the rancor found in foreign interventions.

Military success in the remaining types of operations, because of where they usually occur or because of their highly technical military nature, are least likely to be affected by any NGO-effort. Again, this is not to say that one need not consider NGOs when planning for these operations; it is always prudent to consider as many factors as time allows. Fortunately, the ability to plan for and integrate NGO-unique capabilities, vital for success in Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, will bode one well in planning other operations, where NGO-capabilities may be less of a factor.

Military Doctrine on NGOs

The architecture of joint doctrine publications is systematically laid out and easy to understand. An examination of Joint Pub 1-01.165 quickly reveals those joint publications pertinent to the papers theme. These are shown in Figure 6. Not surprisingly, of the base joint doctrinal manuals reviewed (those inside the shaded area), only Joint Pub 3-07 and 3-08 contain any direct references to NGOs. Joint Pubs 3-07.6, 3-57 and the JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations all discuss NGOs in varying detail. Surprisingly, neither Joint Pubs 3-07.3 nor CJCSM 3500.04 contain any direct references to NGOs.
Figure 6: Reference Manuals for Doctrinal Review

*Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* has three main thrusts in discussing NGOs. First, it recognizes the legitimate and essential role of NGOs and acknowledges that NGOs may have values and concerns different from those of the military. Along this line, it cautions the military not to compromise the NGOs’ standing as neutral, non-military parties. Second, it mentions the benefits that NGO-presence may accrue to military forces, primarily as a source in “information gathering.” Lastly, it recognizes the need for coordination with NGOs and advocates the use of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the structure for doing so; it also emphasizes the role of Civil Affairs (CA) as subject matter experts on, and liaison to.
NGOs. Beyond these three general entreaties, *Joint Pub 3-05* does not offer much of
direct impact to the paper's thesis.

In contrast, *Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*
discusses NGOs extensively. To begin with, it accords NGOs a status similar to that of
national and international agencies. For example, the manual's Figure 1-1 (Comparison of
Agency Organizational Structure)\(^6^6\) compares the US Armed Forces to five other
categories of organizations: departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, state and
local government, regional alliances like NATO, the UN, and NGOs and PVOs.

Consequently, and in contrast to *Joint Pub 3-05*'s view of the NGO-community as a
planning factor to consider, *Joint Pub 3-08* views NGOs as legitimate actors in military
operations other than war.

As actors, not just factors, NGOs can become objects of action, not just subjects of
thought. This leads *Joint Pub 3-08* to talk about the nature of NGOs extensively and even
devote a 90-page annex to provide details about several of the more significant NGOs.

More importantly, *Joint Pub 3-08* is able to make recommendations on specific actions
the military can take towards achieving unity of effort with NGOs (see Figure 7: *Joint
Pub 3-08* Measures Towards Mutual Military-NGO Success)\(^6^7\).
Towards a Successful Military-NGO Relationship

**PRINCIPLES TO ABIDE BY**
- Understand and accept NGO legitimate presence and role.
- Respect NGO need to stay neutral or impartial.
- Represent NGO interests at all levels of command.
- Be transparent and share info; but remember OPSEC.
- Facilitate full use of NGO resources; Aim to support, not to replace.
- Coordinate to avoid duplication; mass resources where needed.
- Encourage realistic NGO expectation of military capability.
- Keep in mind that as things improve, motivation to cooperate may lessen.
- Transition operations is key; plan and share it with NGOs

**Enabling Steps**
- Understand and value the relationship:
  - Partnership, not a support relationship
  - Different culture and long term aims
  - Similar short term aims
  - Vital to military success
  - Give them credit for successes
- Reach a Common Goal:
  - Mutual needs/Interdependence
  - Long term and short term goals
- Involve in plan development from start:
  - Mission Analysis input
  - Feasibility checks of COAs
  - Shared transition plans
  - Reps in survey teams
- Coordinate at all levels

**Organizing For Success**
- Strategic Level
  - NSC/Interagency Boards
  - Joint Training Exercises
- Theater Strategic/Operational Level
  - Ambassador’s Country Team
  - Humanitarian Asst Survey Team (HAST)
  - Humanitarian Asst Coordination Center (HACC)
- In-Country Coordination
  - Host Nation/UN Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)
  - CJTF Executive Steering Group
  - Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) at all execution levels

Figure 7: JP 3-08 Measures Towards Mutual Military-NGO Success

On the negative side, and of significance to the purpose of this paper, *Joint Pub 3-08* fails to answer its own key question. "How does the combatant commander develop and execute a campaign plan... in which the military element of national power is often the least dominant?" *Joint Pub 3-08* provides principles, actions, and even organizational structures, but not concepts to help link the actions to strategic and operational ends.

What of the exhortation to consider the other elements of national power? What are the concepts that link organizational action to the national and theater objectives? Simply, *Joint Pub 3-08* fails to deliver real substance because the ‘ways’ in the ‘ends-ways-means-risk’ formula it promises is missing.
Perhaps, part of the problem is that the manual's view of campaign planning is primarily at the crisis action planning end. Structurally, it advocates a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center as the focus for combatant commander planning. This is fine during crisis action planning because the HACC, essentially an ad-hoc organization, is activated shortly before, or when crisis begins; but, what about the deliberate planning process—what structure exists to institutionalize consideration of NGOs and other agencies by the combatant commander's staff for JSCP-directed planning?

In the first two chapters, Joint Pub 3-07.6: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations summarizes what Joint Pub 3-08 has to say about NGOs. In this sense, it is more succinct. For example, it provides the information reflected in Figure 7, which is from several places in Joint Pub 3-08, in one paragraph. At the same time, it lacks substantial details on NGOs, e.g., Joint Pub 3-07.6 has no organizational information about different NGOs that one can find in the Joint Pub 3-08 appendices. Joint Pub 3-07.6 coverage of NGOs is also markedly different in two other respects—its context is Humanitarian Assistance and its level of emphasis is tactical. Thus, it gives a more detailed description of how the CMOC should work.

Joint Pub 3-07.6's discussions about planning is consistent with its discussions about NGOs—the first two chapters also summarize Joint Pub 3-08, the focus is humanitarian assistance, and the planning emphasis is at the tactical level. However, Joint Pub 3-07.6 provides details that may be a way out of Joint Pub 3-08's 'ways' dilemma. It enumerates a list of missions "common in HA operations:" "Relief Missions," "Dislocated Civilian Support Missions," "Security Missions," and "Technical Services
and Assistance. It provides a description of operational environments in HA operations: permissive, uncertain or hostile. It discusses Mission Transition and Termination in detail. Lastly, it provides details about the five phases of Operation Support Hope.

I. Stop the Dying
II. Move the Refugees back to Rwanda
III. Stabilize Refugee Situation and Begin Reconstruction in Rwanda
IV. Turnover Operations to the UNHCR
V. Redeploy the Force.

Can these be the basis for envisioning operational concepts to link tactical actions to strategic objectives? More on this in the last section.

Suffice it to say that Joint Pub 3-07.6 has the same shortcoming in its planning discussion that Joint Pub 3-08 has. Notwithstanding, Joint Pub 3-07.6 is an excellent manual for tactical-level planners and operators because it provides details about field operations and tactical-level planning that are obviously derived from recent field experience; it contains many vignettes illustrative of vital tactics, techniques and procedures.

Joint Pub 3-57’s discussion on NGOs is as general as that in Joint Pub 3-07. It’s discussion about planning is primarily oriented on considerations regarding employment of Civil Affairs units and contains no procedural detail of use to this paper. It does have a detailed organizational and functional description of the CMOC.

The Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, is an excellent “checklist” for the newly assigned JTF commander—it quickly covers the myriad of things to consider in Peace Operations, but only in a broad way. This handbook
does not reveal anything new about NGOs or planning not covered in the manuals previously discussed.

Likewise, with the exception of Field Manual 100-23-1, HA: Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, the “other publications” shown in Figure 6 do not contain any more than already covered in the manuals previously discussed.

Figure 8: Operational Environment in Complex Humanitarian Crises

FM 100-23-1, in its discussion of operational environment, employs a sketch which, when added to the complex humanitarian crises timeline developed in Section II, results in Figure 8. The manual also has a detailed discussion about “Transitions and Terminations” that includes indicators to signal more clearly when the desired transition or termination state has been achieved. Both of these concepts should prove helpful in Section V.

Two other features found in FM 100-23-1 are of more immediate use. In its Appendix A, the manual goes through a cursory review of twelve HA operations the US Armed Forces participated in between 1983 and 1993. In its Appendix J, the manual
presents a detailed summary of lessons learned from Provide Comfort, Restore Hope and the UN Humanitarian Operations in Bosnia.

Section Summary

Three conclusions come to mind from this review of joint doctrine. First, doctrine reflects an awareness of NGO-significance and an intent to try and integrate NGO-unique capabilities in the conduct of Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. Second, the preponderance of doctrine about NGOs and about the integration of NGO-unique capabilities is at the tactical level. Third, what doctrine exists at the strategic and operational level focuses on actions during and after crisis action planning. In relation to this third point, although most of the manuals profess to a more proactive consideration of NGOs, all fall short, perhaps because of the difficulty imposed by a war-oriented campaign planning paradigm in an environment where Clausewitzian and Jominian terms may have little significance. Also, not a single doctrinal publication describes how one might perform JOPES-driven deliberate planning, where a truly proactive consideration of NGO capabilities can occur, for Peace Operations or Humanitarian Assistance.
Section IV. Learning By Doing

Generative Learning cannot be sustained in an organization where event thinking predominates. It requires a conceptual framework of “structural” or systemic thinking, the ability to discover structural causes of behavior. Enthusiasm for “creating the future” is not enough.

Peter M. Senge

“Military doctrine ... guide[s] the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience....” If so, then doctrine should reflect, as well as drive, experience; and a review of recent experience should bear it so. But the point of this review is not to bare what is not so, but to search for what is yet to be. Specifically, is there anything about recent field experience with NGOs—their nature and the planning for the integration of their unique capabilities—that is not now considered but should be? The ensuing review will encompass four US operations of the 90s: PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT commenced on 7 April 1991 with airdrops of much needed food and other supplies to hundreds of thousands of starving Kurds in the Turkish mountains bordering Northern Iraq. The original intent was a short-duration operation of “maybe ten days,” one “audibled” to the forces of JTF Proven Force, a just-concluded Air Force and Army Special Forces operation based in Turkey in support of Desert Storm.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was an unforeseen requirement. It started without any benefit from deliberate planning or, arguably, from crisis action planning—it was a plan that evolved as the operation progressed. In the words of General Jamerson,
commander of JTF Proven Force and subsequent deputy commander of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT:

... 10 days was the number that was batted around. That quickly turned into one of a larger effort for survival, maybe 30 days worth, which then quickly became one of returning those people. ... Then it became one of returning them to where they had come from... And then, over all that, we had to provide security so they could go home... [to] their original domicile.85

Almost 100 days after it began, by the time NGOs took over the operation under the auspices of the UN, and by the time the CTF PROVIDE COMFORT withdrew from Northern Iraq on 15 July,88 the anticipated 10 days of airdrop had become much more. First, ground troops (Task Force Alpha) had to go into the Turkish mountains to establish a secure environment and to support efforts to “stop the dying.” Almost simultaneously, a much stronger force (Task Force Bravo) went into Northern Iraq initially to establish a small exclusion zone, cleared of Iraqi forces, so that transit camps could be constructed; Task Force Bravo then expanded this exclusion zone to include most of the towns and cities from which the refugee came. Having a secure environment to return to, and having been nursed back to health from the outstanding effort of numerous NGOs, the Kurds willingly went back to their villages in Northern Iraq.89

The military force involved was much greater than the few cargo planes originally envisioned. By the end of May, barely fifty days after the airdrops began, there were over 21,000 military personnel from 11 different nations involved in the operations.90 The Combined Air Force operating from Turkey eventually included several wings of fighters, cargo planes, AWACS, tankers, and helicopters. Task Force Alpha included a 3-battalion Special Forces group and a Special Forces wing. The core of Task Force Bravo
was a Marine Expeditionary Unit. In support of these combat forces were several
engineer, MP, Signal, maintenance and hospital units. A US Navy carrier battle group
and an amphibious group supported from the Mediterranean. It was a large joint and
combined force, all under the command of General Shalikashvili.91

Lack of prior planning not withstanding, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was as
successful as it was big. In less than a hundred days, the combined task force had
alleviated the suffering of close to three-quarters of a million Kurds,92 facilitated their
voluntary return to their villages, and transferred the operation to the UN. Is prior
planning then not a prerequisite for success in Peace Operation and Humanitarian
Assistance?

Certainly not! In the first place, lack of strategic planning may have triggered the
events that led to the crisis. The Kurds, just like the Shiites in Basra, may have revolted
in March 1991 against Sadam Hussein's Iraq because of successful US efforts to
encourage such revolts. If so, then the Kurds' quick defeat and subsequent exodus into
the mountains of Turkey in April, was certainly an unintended consequence of successful
US policy.93 Could the US have mitigated and even prevented the crises had contingency
planning followed through a sequel predicated on successful US policy?

Fortunately, what deliberation did not provide, chance did, leading to success despite
the lack of premeditation. Prompt action was one. The Kurds fled into Turkey as a result
of the 29 March defeat at the hands of Iraq's superior Republican Guard and the
subsequent offensive into Kurdish territory.94 Only a week later, the US started
PROVIDE COMFORT. By 22 April, Task Force Bravo had established a secure foothold
in Northern Iraq; a month later, it had secured most of the villages from where the
refugees came from.95 Not bad for an operation whose strategic ends did not emerge until mid-April.96 This fast, decisive action quickly contained starvation and disease to a manageable level; it also kept the Iraqis off-balanced, unable to mount significant opposition against the coalition forces.

It was not just prompt military action, it was an equally prompt, decisive civilian action that mitigated the lack of any strategic forethought. Except, perhaps, for any grassroots organizations,97 there were no non-military organizations in the area before the arrival of the coalition forces. Nonetheless, by 11 April, a Disaster Assessment and Response Team (DART) from the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) had arrived. Experts on disaster assistance, experienced in dealing with NGOs, and empowered to commit US funds, the DART Team quickly laid out the structure and strategy for humanitarian action as well as facilitated the interaction between the military and the NGOs. Right behind the DART came the myriad of NGOs that performed the actual day-by-day care for the refugees. It was also the DART that laid out the transition of the operation to the UNHCR.98

Most fortuitous and decisive were the choices for the strategic and operational leaders, both military and civilian, to carry out the operation. General Galvin as CINCEUCOM was directly responsible to the National Command Authority (NCA) for the accomplishment of the mission; no other CINC would have done a better job conceptualizing theater strategic ends in the absence of clear political guidance. He quickly realized that the mission entailed more than just “stopping the dying.” He surmised the need to get the refugees out of Turkey as soon as possible, realizing the sensitivities of an ally whose support was key to the success of the operation. He also saw
the requirement to quickly transition the operation to a UN entity, knowing that a complete solution was beyond the military resources he had or the time the impatient American polity would allow.99

Galvin’s choice of LTG Shalikashvili to lead the combined task force was equally fortuitous. His personal and military background made Shalikashvili particularly adept in running a coalition force.100 His patient but firm diplomacy kept the operation from becoming a shooting war, thus keeping humanitarian objectives at the forefront. This in turn had much to do with the unprecedented military-NGO cooperation.

The DART brought with it equally capable leadership in Dayton Maxwell and Fred Cuny. Maxwell had the foresight to integrate the DART into the military organization and to insist the Team to always be at the “front,” where the humanitarian action was happening.101 It was Cuny who “operationalized” the strategic ends into a campaign plan—establish transit camps, involve the Kurds to make them feel secure, publicly identify police forces, expand the exclusion zone to include most of the home villages of the refugees, transition control to the UNHCR—that the military pursued so successfully.102

So, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was in fact a lesson on the need for prior planning, albeit indirectly. Since one cannot rely on the fortuitous chain of circumstances, just described, on happening again, one must revert to the best antidote against unintended consequences—contingency planning. At the strategic and operational level, PROVIDE COMFORT underscores the requirement for explicit national and theater strategy that is “operationalized” in an anticipatory contingency plan, one formulated before the onset of crisis as part of an interagency process. If nothing
else, such a process will promote communication among the actors whose cooperation proved so key to the success of the operation.¹⁰³

PROVIDE COMFORT also provides some principles such plans must incorporate. First, security is paramount and a key operational capability the military can provide. Second, Humanitarian Assistance requires an interagency effort, one where the military component may not necessarily be in charge. Third, in fact not being in charge is often the military’s best insurance against “mission creep” and thus the fastest way home.¹⁰⁴

Reflecting back on the “missing ways” mentioned in the discussion of planning doctrine, PROVIDE COMFORT illustrated some key capabilities that allowed “means” to achieve “ends.” Different actors (means) provided unique, but overlapping capabilities to achieve the operational objectives (ends).

The US Armed Forces can quickly create the secure space within which humanitarian relief can occur. The US Armed Forces can also provide the logistics over long distances and to remote places, in the gross tonnage required, to gain control over malnutrition and disease of crisis proportions. However, because they are designed and maintained for other reasons, and because they are subject to the whims of the national polity, the Armed Forces often do not have the political endurance it takes to see a complex humanitarian crisis through a comprehensive solution.

In contrast, NGOs are less subject to the whims of national polity and can sustain their efforts over long periods of time. However, although they bring longevity and sustained effort, NGOs do not often have the resources to act quickly, over long distances and in mass, the way the military can.
USAID/DART brings continuity and experience in dealing with the nuances of disaster relief, NGOs and IGOs; they are therefore able to facilitate military-NGO relationship and the transition of operations to IGOs. USAID/DART also brings funds that are specifically allotted by the US Congress for disaster relief and are therefore easier to commit than those available to the military.

Finally, because complete solutions to complex humanitarian crises usually take a long time, operations must eventually be turned over to IGOs, whether regional or international. Simply, IGOs bring a legitimacy of numbers needed for sustained (and expensive) effort. Unfortunately, the consensus politics upon which IGOs are founded, the source of legitimacy of numbers, is also a source of weakness: IGOs are slow to act and have a low tolerance for adversity. Thus, it often takes the unilateral action or leadership of the stronger member nations, US for example, to act first and to establish the conditions favorable to IGOs.

Speaking of the extended timeline of complex humanitarian crises resolution, it is perhaps more appropriate for the military to use the term "transition strategy" instead of "exit strategy." This point goes beyond semantics, it is a paradigm shift. Transition strategy promotes the primacy of the humanitarian aspect of the mission since it connotes the achievement of certain conditions so that others can begin their part in the resolution of the problem. This approach allowed the coalition force to depart Northern Iraq within a hundred days. On the other hand, exit strategy implies that the objective is to leave; ironically, focusing on departure may detract from achieving the very conditions that will allow a departure. This was a lesson learned, not necessarily in Northern Iraq, but in Somalia.
RESTORE HOPE

Whereas PROVIDE COMFORT was acclaimed a success in all quarters, RESTORE HOPE and the follow-on UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were declared ineffective by some, a failure by most. Why the difference?

One can argue that the difference in scale made Somalia a much tougher problem to resolve. The conditions in Somalia when US Marines, as the lead elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), landed on 9 December 1992 was very much unlike those in Northern Iraq and the mountains of Southern Turkey in April 1991. The Kurds affected numbered less than a million and were in refugee camps located in a relatively small area. In contrast, there were 4 million Somalis at the brink of starvation living throughout the southern half of Somalia.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, UNITAF, at its peak in January 1993, numbered 38,301 troops, about 17,000 more than CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT did at its peak in May 1991.¹⁰⁶ So, scale alone does not adequately explain why CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT succeeded and UNITAF/UNOSOM II failed.

UNITAF had other advantages CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT did not enjoy. To begin with, UNITAF had the experience of CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT to draw from.¹⁰⁷ One of the lessons ought to have been to anticipate and to take advantage of available time. The other should have been that humanitarian relief requires a secure environment in which to operate and that it takes people on the ground to create such an environment.

The problem in Somalia took a long time to develop, certainly a lot longer than the couple weeks it took for the Kurds to go from relative comfort to widespread death from starvation. By the time rebel forces ousted Siad Barre in January 1991, the country had been in the grip of civil war and famine for four years.¹⁰⁸ This should have provided
initial signals for the potential of a complex humanitarian crises in Somalia, arguably an ambiguous one.

In the next 18 months, 300,000 more people would perish from malnutrition, prompting the UN to initiate UNOSOM I in April 1992. This was another warning, this time an unambiguous one. The US followed shortly with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF from Mombassa, Kenya in August 1992. This indicates that someone in the US decision making structure acknowledged the existence of a crisis. From the PROVIDE RELIEF experience with air-only response, planners should have also realized a high probability that ground troops would follow.

As the US presidential elections approached, press releases and pictures from Somalia increased. The press speculated that the flow of aid amounted to only 10% of what was needed. Calls for military intervention increased. These were additional indicators for a likelihood of troop deployments.

To be fair, the plate was full the summer of 1992—the follow-on phase of PROVIDE COMFORT was continuing (as it does today), INTRINSIC ACTION was ongoing in Kuwait, PROVIDE RELIEF and PROVIDE PROMISE were occurring in Eastern Europe. The Armed Forces were also just beginning the onerous task of ‘downswing’. It was with good reasons then that the military resisted any move to “send the cavalry in.” But, to everyone’s surprise at a deputy-level meeting of the National Security Council on 21 November 1992, the Vice CJCS declared that the military could send two divisions, if needed.

On 23 November, CENTCOM started its course-of-action development. The designated JTF began parallel planning on 27 November, only 12 days prior to the
Marines' landing at Mogadishu. Needless to say, planning was done in crisis action mode, without benefit from detailed coordination and analysis possible only in a time-rich deliberate planning procedure.

Signals missed amounted to lost time and the opportunity to plan in detail, but no one was derelict in duty. The CALL's (Center for Army Lessons Learned) analysis of the planning process that occurred had a lot to say about the conduct of the crisis action planning but saw the absence of deliberate planning inevitable:

Deliberate planning can take as long as 18 to 24 months to accomplish. It is highly unlikely that operations other than war will be afforded the time for such deliberate peacetime planning; rather, they will be conducted using crisis action planning (CAP) procedures.113

Realize the faulty premise in this observation. First, the development of full blown OPLANS may take 18-24 months in a deliberate planning procedure mode, but functional plans and CONPLANs, those without TPFDD, should take only a fraction of the time. Second, to imply that operations other than war are not worth the effort, when they seem to be the norm for future operations, does not hold water. On the contrary and in the light of the current policy on training—train to proficiency in wartime METL and do not train for operations other than war until receipt of warning order to prepare for one—deliberate planning and anticipation must take up the slack for the inevitable lack of proficiency in non-wartime tasks.

Moreover, as discussed in earlier sections, a lucid and holistic appreciation for complex humanitarian crisis and a multi-agency approach are prerequisites to success in Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. Deliberate planning, specially when conducted with other agencies, including NGOs, will provide these prerequisites.
One wonders if such a paradigm shift would have railed against an apolitical approach and a time-driven exit strategy. When US forces went into Northern Iraq, the political implications were unclear and unanticipated; yet, no effort was made to deny or suppress them. Although, the humanitarian aspects were constantly upheld as paramount, there was also a realization that political necessities might prolong the mission. Thus, the political tasks, and their ramifications, became a conscious and deliberate part of achieving the secure conditions required for effective humanitarian action and voluntary return of the refugees to their homes.

In Somalia, the mission was explicit in its intent to avoid any tasks with political implications:

... a limited humanitarian mission would be undertaken. ...Determined to prevent 'mission creep,' the United States was unwilling to accept critical but complex complementary tasks... George Bush also sought to limit the duration of the coalition phase... to avoid burdening the incoming administration with a foreign military involvement.\textsuperscript{114}

This was to be a "humanitarian surgical strike."\textsuperscript{115} Go in, do your humanitarian tasks, and get out in less than two months, before the new President was inaugurated.

One wonders if deliberate planning would have resulted in a realization that there was a fundamental difference between the crisis in Northern Iraq and that in Somalia. In Northern Iraq, the crisis was in its early stages and about to get worse. However, prompt intervention quickly reduced the deaths from disease and starvation. In Somalia, the crisis was at a later stage, arguably, even at the post-crisis stage. There were no refugee camps. NGO effort under UN auspices, supported by a concerted effort by the US Military to airlift food and medicine, had nursed the Somalis' through the worse part of the crisis in the previous six months.\textsuperscript{116}
Lack of food was no longer the prime issue, conflict was. The warring clans were using food to finance their army. In this environment, the distribution of food, even for humanitarian purposes, was a political act. Food had become the commodity of power and persuasion the feuding factions were using to build popular support. Much of the food arriving the 'technicals' were hoarding, later to be used to pay those who rallied behind their leader. Supplies that did get through did so under protection of armed guards hired and armed by NGOs. But, blinders imposed by a time-driven exit strategy, conceived in a crisis action planning mode, resulted in the failure to understand the situation for what it was.

One wonders if deliberate planning, one involving NGOs, would have avoided so much of the self-defeating friction that resulted between the military and the NGOs. In contrast with PROVIDE COMFORT, NGOs had been on the ground in Somalia for months by the time RESTORE HOPE started. In fact, it was the difficulty the NGOs were having in getting relief materiel to remote villages that prompted the mission. RESTORE HOPE would make the environment more secure so that NGOs can perform their humanitarian functions unimpeded. But reality fell short of expectation as more NGO staff members were killed in the first three months of the mission than in the previous two years. Attacks against the NGOs actually increased not decrease. In this environment, the initial gap between the military and the NGOs, a result of unfamiliarity with each other, quickly degenerated into a chasm filled with misperception about the other's motivations.
To sum-up, RESTORE HOPE underscores the need for deliberate planning in order to fully appreciate the nature of an emergent crisis. In this way can one apply the right solutions to the right problem at the right time, avoid a misplaced reliance on a time-driven exit strategy instead of a condition-driven transition strategy, and establish the conditions to encourage a supportive NGO-military relationship.

SUPPORT HOPE

Much has already been said about the Rwanda crisis of 1994, in Section II. Without further belaboring the magnitude of the tragedy that occurred, suffice it to say that, in terms of the number of deaths and the violence which occurred, Rwanda was a much larger tragedy than Somalia or Northern Iraq. Yet, in terms of both size and charter, the US response to the Rwanda crisis, was much smaller than in the previous two. At its peak in mid-August 1994, there were about 3600 military personnel in JTF SUPPORT HOPE.119

The JTF's charter was also limited and very specific. In essence, the JTF was to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies by establishing water purification and distribution systems, establishing and operating airfields in the vicinity of refugee camps, establishing and managing flow of relief, turning established operations over to the appropriate agencies, and returning home without having sustained any casualties.120 The Somalia experience was evident. The apparent lessons learned were to limit the mission to what is doable, to avoid "mission creep," to clearly define the end state, and to protect the force. Also clearly stated was the military's role as facilitator—not to take charge.

That planning occurred in the crisis action mode is apparent. In fact, so short was the planning time that the JTF began executing based upon a verbal order. The JTF itself
published an operational concept on 26 July 94, six days after its lead elements started deploying.121 This was another PROVIDE COMFORT, develop a plan as you execute.

Just like PROVIDE COMFORT, JTF SUPPORT HOPE succeeded in the absence of significant prior planning because of factors specific to the circumstance. First, JTF SUPPORT HOPE succeeded because its mandate was limited and clearly defined. A clear, well defined mission gave the JTF the ability to resist the efforts of organizations to add to the mandate.122 Also, since it is easier to communicate clear missions to others, NGOs and other agencies did not have room to expect more and to be later disappointed when reality falls short of expectations. Lastly, clear missions result in clear end state conditions, the force knew when their task was done and to transition the operation to another agency.

Second, the JTF commander LTG Schroeder understood the intent, not only of his military superior, GEN Joulwan, but also of the Nation’s leaders. LTG Schroeder took the time to review the speeches and pronouncements made by policy makers. He therefore understood that the military was to assist, in very specific and limited ways, not to take charge.123 He made the effort to cultivate his relationships with all the agencies involved because “his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government/UN/NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure smooth integration of military support to the relief effort.”124

Lastly, the mission succeeded because the mission chosen was realistic and doable. The tasks were primarily logistics and field engineering in nature and the appropriate experts in those tasks came to do them. Although force protection was the top priority, the small force involved prevented force protection considerations to dominate the
energy of the force. Because the tasks were focused and specific, the time for execution
was not open ended. On 29 September, less than 70 days after its reconnaissance party
deployed, JTF SUPPORT HOPE reported mission complete when its last JTF personnel
in-theater departed Entebbe, Uganda.125

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

If SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated that small, limited-objective operations can
succeed even in the absence of prior planning, then UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
demonstrated that large, ambitious operations can succeed with ample, detailed and
deliberate planning.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY commenced on 19 September 1994 when the
10th Mountain Division, as part of JTF 180 (XVIII Airborne Corps), made a
"permissive" air insertion onto the Port-au-Prince International Airport by helicopters
flying from the decks of Navy aircraft carriers.126 What was significant about this event
is not that Army helicopters were flying from a Navy platform; it was that a corps-size
invasion force, which only hours earlier launched the 82d Airborne Division to force an
entry into Haiti, had the agility to switch to a significantly different mission in mid-air.127

This is the flexibility and agility one gets from deliberate and detailed planning.
Although USACOM did not issue the initial guidance for deliberate planning until 17 Jan
94, the XVIII Airborne Corps began looking at concepts around September 1993.128 By
September 1994, the US Forces had three detailed plans. The one eventually executed
assumed a condition of ambiguous threat and fast changing situations. It had been
coordinated with other agencies—an interagency "rehearsal" occurred a week before the
operation. It called for other nations to join the operation, thus the term Multinational
Force (MNF) used to refer to the forces in Haiti before the transfer of operations to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in May 1995. The plan was coordinated with Caribbean Community nations (CARICOM) which would contribute a token force of 295 troops, as well as a significant dose of international legitimacy.\textsuperscript{129}

From the unity of support, derived through detailed and deliberate planning and coordination, also came unity of effort during execution. Aside from the CARICOM nations, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Costa Rica and 15 other nations provided soldiers and a contingent of 665 police to form the International Police Monitors. Humanitarian relief was a significant part of the operation. Just like PROVIDE COMFORT, but unlike RESTORE HOPE, reserve Civil Affairs units were activated early on, creating a robust structure for the management of civil-military operations.\textsuperscript{130} Consequently, transnational and local NGOs worked closely with the MNF, and later, with the UNMIH.\textsuperscript{131}

A third reason for the UPHOLD DEMOCRACY's success was a well laid out transition sequence with each stage having a clearly defined end state.\textsuperscript{132} JTF 180, with the 10th Div and the 82d Airborne was designed to kick the door in so that the legitimate government of Aristide could be reinstated. Aristide returned on 14 October; by 25 October, JTF 180 had transferred operations to JTF 190 and began to redeploy.\textsuperscript{133}

JTF 190 - MNF, with the 25th Infantry Division eventually replacing the 10th Div, was designed and trained for Peace Operations and for establishing the favorable conditions for transfer of operations to the UNMIH. Part of the condition is the training and effective operation of the Haitian Interim Public Security Force and the disarmament of the population, both necessary steps to achieve a secure and safe environment. On 4 January 1995, MG Meade, the MNF commander declared that Haiti had achieved a safe
and secure environment.\textsuperscript{134}

Part of this transition to UNMIH was a reduction of US Forces to the point where they constituted a minority of the forces in country. 21,000 was the cap USACOM was working with. The number of MNF forces peaked at 20,931 (mostly US) on 2 October.\textsuperscript{135} In March, right before transfer of operation to the UN, there were 6,000 US troops in country. Of the 6,000-man UNMIH force that took over on 31 March, only 2,400 were US. Today, there are no US forces with UNMIH, however, there are about 400 engineers in country, performing deployment for training (DFT) missions.\textsuperscript{136}

Again, and to wrap-up this review of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the success of the operation can be traced to three factors. First, planners developed detailed plans, in a time-rich deliberate planning environment. Second, the planning process followed included detailed interagency coordination, resulting in unity of effort during execution. Third, each phase of the operation included transition conditions delineated by clearly-defined end states; troop levels were tied to these events rather than a calendar date.

**Section Summary**

In three of the four operations discussed, deliberate planning procedure was not conducted; but, all four demonstrated the importance of deliberate planning procedure in establishing and achieving the proper objectives and in leveraging NGO-capabilities. PROVIDE COMFORT succeeded despite the lack of prior planning only because of the extraordinary abilities of the military and the civilian theater strategic and operational level leaders. SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated that a focused, limited mission can overcome the disadvantages of not having the opportunity to plan deliberately. RESTORE HOPE demonstrated how the best of intentions can lead to failure in the
absence of deliberate planning. It also amply demonstrated that in a complex humanistian crisis, Humanitarian Assistance must be viewed in the larger context—as an act with political consequences. Lastly, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is evidence of the importance of deliberate planning procedure to the success of complicated operations. It also showed how deliberate planning procedure, when coordinated with other agencies, can lead to unity of effort during execution.
Section V. Conclusion

Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict ... but the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises. 

Joint Pub 1

The premise, and the dilemma, is that the US Armed Forces are increasingly responding to complex humanitarian crises, missions for which they are structurally and temperamentally ill-suited. The thesis suggests that the NGOs have capabilities that can help the Armed Forces work through their dilemma. The conclusion is that the Armed Forces can indeed leverage NGO capabilities as long as they adopt a holistic view of complex humanitarian crises: one that recognizes the many factors that contribute to a degenerative process that occurs over time; one that portrays how the finite capabilities of many different organizations, some of which are NGOs, can be complementary and lead to the resolution of an otherwise infinite problem; and one that encourages anticipatory planning and inter-agency preparation. Figure 9 is a crude model of such a holistic view.

What makes a complex humanitarian crisis complex is the multiplicity of causes, not necessarily the magnitude of the suffering. Viewing complex humanitarian crises solely as events where masses of people die from starvation and disease leads to simplistic solutions—feeding the hungry and curing the sick alone will “stop the dying” only for the time being. Eventually, the dying will start anew unless solutions address root causes: consequently, effective solutions to complex humanitarian crises are only partly humanitarian, to a great extent political, often economic and structural, and sometimes
cultural and military in nature. In essence, there are no purely humanitarian solutions to complex humanitarian crises.

![Illustrative Holistic View](image)

Figure 9: Illustrative Holistic View
Time does matter. Complex humanitarian crises do not occur overnight. The degeneration leading to the crisis-proper develops over time. The earlier in the process the situation is acted upon, the less severe will be the problems, the more permissive will be the conditions for intervention, and the less resource intensive will be the effort to resolve the situation. Unfortunately, the earlier it is in the process, the more subtle and ambiguous are the indicators, and the more difficult it is to generate resolve to act. Though more efficient, “preventive intervention” measures are also less direct and slower acting, often requiring greater patience and understanding than that possessed by all but the most dedicated developmental NGOs.

The fact is that there is not one organization that has all the attributes to single handedly resolve complex humanitarian crises: not NGOs, not the Armed Forces, not USAID, not IGOs. Each element of the international response structure brings its own set of tools and capabilities. With any given set of conditions at any given time, some are more pertinent than others. The strategic and operational planners must understand this fact so that they may envision their organization’s best chance of success. Moreover, they must not only know their organization’s strength and weaknesses, but also those of the other pertinent organizations.

The military strategists and ‘operationalists’ must realize that the role of the Armed Forces is finite in scope and in impact. More importantly, they must realize how this role best fits within the context of what the other organizations can provide and within the overall scheme of crisis resolution, thus the value of a holistic outlook.

All the knowledge and understanding about other organizations are of dubious value unless these organizations see the same big picture and understand military organizations,
thus the need for the military strategists and 'operationalists' to engage these other organizations early on. Unfortunately, and as the case studies reveal, there is a propensity not to plan for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance until the advent of crisis. Moreover, joint doctrine institutionalizes this approach by implying that crisis action planning is the process for planning operations other than war. This must change. Campaign planning, even for contingencies dealing with complex humanitarian crises, must commence with deliberate planning to afford the time to include other organizations whose role may be even more pivotal than that of the military, and to provide the opportunity to train with these organizations.

Deliberate planning also provides the opportunity to clarify details about ends, ways and means. Translating national policy and objectives to well defined operational objectives is not a trivial process and takes time. Operational objectives must be relatable to finite transition conditions: improperly done, transition conditions often default to time-based exit strategies. Also, establishing the ways to match the ends and means may be problematic for military planners who must now think of the appropriate analogies for attack, defend, penetrate, turn, etc., in operations other than war. But given time to think the problem through and in consultation with others who by training and experience may not possess the same blind spots, concepts like securing humanitarian space, establishing logistical flow, returning refugees to their home, etc., give meaning to "stop the dying" and become the functional equivalents of more familiar conventional warfare terms.

Lastly, deliberate planning affords the opportunity to minimize two other concerns the military has in operations other than war—unintended consequences and mission creep. The first is primarily a product of hastily formulated plans and decisions. The
second results from unclear missions, false expectations, and being in charge. Except for
the last point, all can be resolve through deliberate planning. However, the desire to
always be in charge can be dampened by seeing the big picture espoused by this paper. A
holistic view promotes the realization that the military’s role is but a supporting, enabling
part of the bigger effort to resolve complex humanitarian crises and that there may be
other organizations better suited to lead.

Yes, the Armed Forces can continue taking on Peace Operations and Humanitarian
Assistance, even in the absence of any drastic reorganization. In order to do so, without
compromising their primary role of winning the Nation’s wars, they must heed the trite
but sage advice to always see the big picture, to always be a team player, and to always
plan and anticipate.
NOTES


2 Section III of this paper better defines these terms. Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purposes of this paper, the term "military humanitarian assistance operation" (or military humanitarian support operations) refers to the use of military units to support national or international effort to ameliorate human suffering (humanitarian crisis) outside the US; and, the term "peace operations" consist of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

3 The final draft dtid 15 Jul 95 of FM 101-5-1: *Operational Terms and Graphics*, provides a distinction between Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) based on nation of origin--NGOs are primarily transnational while PVOs are American. This paper uses the acronym NGO for both NGOs and PVOs. US Southern Command performs several humanitarian assistance of relatively minor proportions that do not have any significant NGO involvement. However, every US military support of complex humanitarian relief also involved substantial NGO presence in the area of operation.


9 Somalia in 1992-93, Haiti in 1994-95, and Bosnia in 1995-present are examples of substantial effort made with US leadership and example. Burundi and Rwanda in 1993-94 is an example of token, indecisive effort by an International community lacking US leadership and example. Events as recent as the Rwanda-Zaire humanitarian crisis in December, 1996-97 demonstrate the inability of others to act decisively in the absence of US commitment of military assets. and, in this case, the US declaration to deploy forces galvanized the two host nations into action, making an international intervention unnecessary for now.

10 The White House, 18-19


12 Peter Uvin, "Scaling up the grassroots and scaling down the summit: the relations between Third World nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations," *Third World Quarterly* 16, no. 3, (September 1995): 496.


18 Spiro, 43.

19 Peter Uvin, 496.


21 Ibid, citing UN doc. E/1994/INF/5 (13 May 1994); and Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "Pluralizing global governance: analytical approaches and dimensions," *Third World Quarterly* 16, no. 3, (September 1995): 362-363, citing UN Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (26 May 1994), p. 18. Actual numbers used by Gordenker and Weiss are: for category I NGOs, 7 in 1948 and 41 in 1991; and for category II NGOs, 32 in 1948 and 354 in 1991 Category I and II are the two levels of consultative status granted by the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). There is a third level of recognition, that of being in the ECOSOC roster of organizations. Willetts gives a single data point number of 969 NGOs achieving ECOSOC status as of December 1993. A check of UN data base on 8 Mar 97 (through the internet, http://www.un.org) showed that as of Sep 95, there were 63 in Cat I, 436 in Cat II, and 563 in the roster, for a total of 1062 NGOs.

22 Gordenker, 358-359.


25 Ibid. 331.


28 Willetts, 2-3.

29 Ibid, 3-5.
30 Ibid, 5-8. Willetts' eight types of international organizations, from the most IGO-like to the most NGO-like and with examples in parentheses, are: IGO's with government members only and with no routine links to NGOs (NATO), IGO's with government only members and routine links with NGOs (UN), hybrid IGO's with government and NGO members but with governments dominant (International Labour Organization), hybrid IGO's with NGO and government members with equal status (International Red Cross), hybrid IGO's with NGO members dominant over government members (Birdlife International). International NGOs with government employee groups as members (International Union of Police Federations), NGOs and confederation of NGOs with government funding welcomed (International Planned Parenthood Federation), and NGOs and confederation of NGOs that do not routinely welcome government funding (Amnesty International).

31 Gordenker, 358. Gordenker is Professor Emeritus of Politics at Princeton University while Weiss is Associate Director of Brown University's Thomas J Watson Jr Institute Of International Studies.

32 Ibid. 360.

33 Ibid, 360-361.


36 "When Operation Restore Hope was deployed to Somalia in December 1992, there were 40 international NGOs working in the country. ... These NGOs were almost entirely based in the Western democracies ... There are perhaps 20 in the USA and another 20 in Europe that work in complex emergencies." Natsios. "NGOs and the UN system in complex humanitarian emergencies: conflict or cooperation?" Third World Quarterly 16, no. 3, (September 1995): 406.


40 Ibid. 21.

41 Gaer, 394.


43 Anderson, 24.


48 Keane, 29.


51 Sellstrom.


53 Sellstrom.


55 See p. 3, in caps to emphasize that these phrases refer specifically to two of eight types of Military Operations Other Than War as defined in *Joint Pub 3-0*.


58 Ibid. 280.

59 Ibid. 421.

60 Note that by definition, a properly crafted theater strategy, although employing ways and means that maybe different in composition and/or scale, has ends identical to, or directly derived from grand strategy, national security strategy, and national military strategy.

61 *Joint Pub 1*, IV-1.


The decade plus Nation Assistance SOUTHCOM activity in Latin America has produced little to indicate significant NGO-impact on military activities.


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Proposed Pub Preliminary Coordination dtd 28 Sep 95), I-6.

These measures do not appear in one single place or figure in *Joint Pub* 3-08. They are the author's attempt to summarize the salient points made in the manual regarding military-NGO relationships. The terms "principle" and "enabler" are the authors own labels, and not necessarily doctrinal terms used in the manual.

*Joint Pub* 3-08, II-15.

Ibid.

Ibid. III-8.

Paragraph 3b: Coordination and Relationships with NGOs, PVOs, and IOs; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations* (Draft Pub dtd 29 Aug 95), II-19 to II-22.

Ibid. III-2 to III-6.

Ibid. I-4 to I-7.

Ibid. I-9 to I-10.

Ibid. I-10 to I-11 and IV-20 to IV-21.

Ibid. IV-6 to IV-7.


FM 100-22-1 is the US Army nomenclature for this manual, which was developed by the Air Land Sea Application Center, Langley Air Force Base; the author used the pre-publication version dtd Oct 94.

Ibid. 1-7.

Ibid. 4-20 to 4-21.

83 Joint Pub 1.1-3.


85 Record of Interview, MG Jamerson, 21 Jun 91, Incirlik AB, Turkey, by Smsgt Raab, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT Historian (Center for Army Lessons Learned data base on-line accessed 2 Jan 97), p. 3.

86 Bolger, 235-236.

87 Record of Interview, MG Jamerson, 3.


89 Bolger, 248-258.

90 Fishel, 57.

91 Bolger, 238-244.

92 Number of refugees based on Record of Interview, GEN Shalikashvili, 24 Jun 91, Incirlik AB, Turkey, by Smsgt Raab, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT Historian (Center for Army Lessons Learned data base on-line accessed 2 Jan 97), p. 133.

93 Fishel, 54 and 51.


95 Ibid, 253-256.

96 It was not until 15 April that GEN Galvin gave his intent to LTG Shalikashvili. President Bush did not announce the strategic objectives until 16 April, Fishel, 52.

97 The author did not uncover any evidence of any civil organizations that may have been present. However, there are references to Turkish presence, primarily military, before the arrival of coalition forces.


99 Bolger, 237-238. Fishel, 52.

100 Bolger, 244-245.

101 Fishel, 54-55.

102 Seiple, 36-37.

103 Ibid, 53-55. Note that joint doctrine includes NGOs as part of the interagency community. It is in this vein that “interagency” is used here.

104 Ibid, 54-56.
105 Seiple, 98.


107 Although, one can make a strong case that CTF PROVIDE COMFORT lessons learned, misapplied in Somalia, contributed to UNITAF/UNOSOM failure.

108 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned Report (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1993), B-1.

109 UNOSOM [I] commenced in April 1992, but without US participation; however, in Operation Provide Relief, which preceded RESTORE HOPE and started in Aug 92, the US began concentrated airlift of food and other supplies with three C-141s and as many as fourteen C-130, from Mombassa, Kenya to different airfields in Somalia, to include Mogadishu. Bolger. 274-279.

110 Seiple, 104.

111 Bolger, 276.

112 Ibid. 280-281.

113 CALL, Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons..., I-10


116 Assertions of famine breaking by Oct 92, and that a comprehensive health program was the assistance really needed found in Seiple. 106. The “phantom famine” was a product of a “distorted, superficial, and media-driven perception...”, Matthew Bryden, “Somalia: The Wages of Failure,” Current History 94, no 591 (April 1995): 148

117 Seiple, 102-104.

118 Bryden, 148.


120 Ibid, 1 and 10.

121 Ibid, 11 and B-1.


123 Seiple, 145.

124 LTG Schroeder in USEUCOM, After Action Review..., 3.
125 Message dated 281955Z Sep 94. Subject: Mission Complete JTF SUPPORT HOPE: in USEUCOM. After Action Review..., Doc 19, App B.


127 David Bentley, "Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti," National Defense University Strategic Forum no. 78 (June 1996): 3. Officers who were part of the 82d Airborne indicated to the author that they were indeed already in enroute to their drop zones when their part of the operation was canceled.


129 Bentley, 2.

130 CALL, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Initial Impressions, Haiti D-20 to D - 40, 191-206.

131 Bentley, 1.


133 CALL, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Initial Impressions, Haiti D-20 to D - 150, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 1995), xi

134 Ibid, ix.

135 CALL, Volume I, xix.

136 Bentley, 2 and 4.

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