03 Sept 97

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DOD ORGANIZATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
Requirement

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
March 1995
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: DoD Organization in the 21st Century

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Continuous efforts have been made to eliminate the adverse effect of Service parochialism and improve overall efficiency since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. During this time, minor organizational changes have been made but a much larger change is called for based on:

- The blurring of Service distinctions based on new hi-tech weapons systems,
- The continuing negative effects of parochialism,
- The apparent insatiable bureaucratic growth in both size and complexity of the Department, and
- The inefficiency of the current Department of Defense organization to efficiently address missions of the future.

In addition to detailing the reasons change are necessary, this paper reviews restructuring efforts by several large organizations that have faced similar challenges--the Canadian and British armed forces and Sears, Roebuck and Company. Each of these organizations dramatically reduced or eliminated duplication, complexity and size, while refocusing on their primary mission. However, acceptance of the changes they initiated were greatly effected by the source of change and how well the reasons for change were articulated to employees.

Using lessons learned from this historical review of the Department's creation, needs for change, and experiences of other large organizations, a proposal is made on how the Department could be restructured to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. In particular this restructuring proposal reduces duplication by recommending
elimination of the Service secretariats and staffs, and transferring responsibilities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and, most importantly, the Unified Commands.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Steven F. Maurmann has been interested in organization structure and development since his undergraduate days at the University of Oregon in 1976. He has served at nearly every level in the Air Force, with unit level tours in Air Force Logistics Command and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), a major air command tour at Headquarters USAFE, four years at the Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), and a short tour on the Air Staff. During part of his tour at the AFMPC he managed the assignments of personnel to joint and Departmental positions worldwide and helped build the initial cadres for the US Space Command and US Central Command. His last four years before attending Air War College was with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

True preparedness now means preparedness not alone in armaments and numbers of men, but preparedness in organization also. It means establishing in peacetime the kind of military organization which will be able to meet the test of sudden attack quickly and without having to improvise radical readjustment in structure and habits.

President Harry Truman
December 19, 1945

It has been nearly fifty years since the current organizational structure of the Department of Defense was formed. Since that time, we have seen dramatic changes in our technological capabilities, in how we fight, and in the broad challenges that we must address. Some of these changes have been accommodated by changes in our organizational structure that have resulted in increased efficiency, but most have been accommodated through additive organizations that have merely increased bureaucratic layering and complexity.

The recent push by the public and Congress for a "peace dividend" and greater efficiency, has not fallen on deaf ears. Each of the Services has worked hard to eliminate duplication and layers, but this should only be the start. The Department as a whole needs to critically assess its organizational needs in a constantly changing, resource constrained, future that will demand the military take on an expanded and far more diverse role.

This paper conducts just such an organizational assessment for the Department. It begins by reviewing the history of how the organization was formed and how it has evolved into its present structure. Next, it evaluates why change is necessary and
examines the experiences of other military and civilian organizations that have changed to accommodate new demands. Finally, it outlines a proposed structure for the Department that could efficiently address the challenges of the future.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY 1945 - Present

During World War II both military and political leaders recognized the organizational shortcomings of having a separate Department of War (consisting of the Army and Army Air Corps) and a Department of Navy (consisting of the Navy and Marine Corps). Each department operated independently with separate lines of command, budget authority and access to the President and Congress. What held the two departments together during the War was a group of committees organized under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These committees addressed joint operations issues and functioned as the conduit for resolving service disagreements. However, with separate departments and chains of command, there were continuing concerns over the services operating effectively together. Although this was not a significant issue in Europe where the Navy's role was primarily focused on submarine warfare and required little joint interface with the Army, divided command lines were cited as one of the primary weaknesses in the military response to the attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{2}

At the close of World War II the military, along with the executive and legislative branches of government, focused on how best to efficiently reorganize the armed forces. Early agreement was reached among military leaders that unified command in the theater of operations was required and that the JCS should be retained. The key sticking point was on what organizational structure would be used to accommodate these key points of agreement. The Army and Army Air Corps supported centralized control by a civilian secretary of
war, with operational control exercised through a single military chief of staff who would be supported by a general staff. The Navy on the other hand favored decentralized operational control by separate military departments, with policy control coming from a national security council. Planning and coordination among the separate military departments was to be effected through the committee system of the JCS, as was done during the war.

The Navy’s proposal was driven by several concerns. First, they feared that a military chief of staff, if not a naval officer, would not give adequate consideration to seapower. Secondly, they were greatly concerned about the potential creation of an autonomous Air Force that might incorporate the Navy’s air arm. In fact, the Army and Army Air Corps spent most of 1946 attempting to convince the Navy that they had no interest in taking away their air arm and that they would retain their current roles and missions.

Between 1944 and 1946, four major reorganization proposals were developed and carefully considered, but none of them was totally acceptable to key military leaders. President Truman was becoming frustrated with this indecision, yet he was convinced that this issue was important enough that the final decision must be made via statutory enactment, rather than executive order. Because of this, he continued to allow the issue to be debated. In late 1946, however, President Truman did take action via executive order to create the unified commands.
National Security Act of 1947...

Finally in late 1947, Congress passed a negotiated proposal submitted by the military departments called the National Security Act of 1947 that created the three separate departments and four services we know today. Unfortunately, however, the implementing Executive Order had wording that was slightly different from what was contained in the Act. This difference led to a restart of disagreements between the services that was focused on airpower functions in the Air Force and Navy and disagreements over the size and purpose of the Marine Corps.

Key West Agreement...

Secretary of Defense Forrestal was forced to call a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in Key West during 1948 to resolve these differences between the services. As a lead-in to the meeting, he stated that if the Service Chiefs could not come to an agreement on the issues during the meeting, he would unilaterally make the decision for them. With this encouragement, the Chiefs came to the following agreements known as the Key West Agreements that would set the stage for greater service overlap:  

The Navy and Marines would “organize, train and equip...forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea and for air and land operations incident thereto...including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components.” The Marines would include “such aviation as may be organic therein.”

The Marine Corps would also “provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined Arms...for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.”
The Army would "organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land," but would include "...such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein."

The Air Force would focus on "prompt and sustained combat operations in the air." In addition, the Air Force had "land based air defense" as a primary function, and the "interdiction of seapower," "antisubmarine warfare," and "minelaying" as collateral functions.

Early reviews and changes to the organization...

The National Security Act of 1947, along with the Key West Agreements reached by the Service Chiefs in 1948, still serve as the foundation for our current Department of Defense organizational structure. However, this does not mean that the Department's overall structure has not been reviewed and changed slightly over the years.

In 1948, Congress established the Hoover Commission to study the organization of the executive branch of government in an effort to identify potential savings. Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, who had been involved in studying the military department's possible organization before 1947, served as the Chairman of the Committee on the National Security Organization. In his study of the Department of Defense, Mr. Eberstadt found that the National Security Act was already not working well due to service parochialism and that "one of the greatest needs is to elevate military thinking to a plane above individual service aims and ambitions." As a result of the Commission's report, changes were made to the defense organization in 1949 that attempted to limit service influence by indirectly strengthening the power of the unified commanders.
As our forces drew down in size after the Korean War, Senator Symington led committee hearings on US airpower, with one of its main focuses being the Department's organization and its overlapping roles and missions.

Senator Symington's hearings, along with an independent study conducted by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., found that the individual Services had become competitive rather than complementary. In fact, the Rockefeller Report recommended the service chiefs and the department secretaries only be responsible for support "in matters of recruitment, training, research, procurement, and supply for the combatant unified commands" and that "all operational forces...be organized into unified commands to perform functional missions based on strategic requirements."  

As a result of both the hearings and the Rockefeller study, legislation was passed in 1958 that removed the service secretaries from the role of executive agent for the Secretary of Defense in directing the Unified Commands. Rather, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were placed in the command line between the Secretary of Defense and Unified Commander, relegating the Services back to their role as supporting components to the Unified Commanders.  

Recent actions...

In June 1983, Senators John Tower and Scoop Jackson directed the staff of the Committee of the Armed Services "to prepare a comprehensive study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense." The basis of the study is clearly indicated in the testimony of former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:
...in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.  

The result of this study effort was the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act. The primary purpose of this legislation was to increase the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and importance of joint duty. In addition, it directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a triennial review to "periodically recommend such changes (or roles and missions) as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces." Basically, the Congress was looking for recommendations from the senior US military warfighter on how to better organize his forces to meet current and future challenges. While many minor changes were made as a result of these triennial reviews, most of the significant recommendations never came to fruition (i.e., combining US Space Command and US Strategic Command, creating a Joint Depot Maintenance Command and closing nearly one-third of existing depots, etc.).

By 1992, Congress was becoming extremely frustrated by what they saw as the Department’s slow transition to a more efficient and effective organization, especially in light of the new multipolar world that existed. This frustration is reflected in a floor speech by Senator Sam Nunn on July 2, 1992, in which he argued that DoD reform was required based on what was good for America, rather than the parochial views of the Services.

As a final attempt to address growing Congressional concern, Secretary of Defense Aspin initiated a Bottom-Up Review of the Department in March 1993. In the
beginning, this review was aimed at determining how to structure the armed forces for the future and how much defense was necessary in the post-Cold War era. In the end, however, the review focused more on the shift in US strategy from a Soviet threat to a regional focus, the emphasis that the US will remain involved around the world, and that America's military will be the best-trained, equipped, and prepared fighting force in the world. To accomplish these goals, the review recommended continued modernization, cutting existing force levels somewhat, but again, no changes in the roles, missions, functions or structure of the Department.

Congress perceived this latest report as just another attempt to avoid tackling the difficult issues, including the possibility of significant reorganization, Because of this, Congress took responsibility out of the Department's hands by directing the establishment of a Roles and Missions Commission (contained in the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act). This seven member Commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, is charged with reviewing and making recommendations on service roles, missions and functions in an effort to save money. The Commission is currently underway and is due to report to Congress in May 1995.

Lessons learned...

In reviewing the organizational history of the Department, several key themes arise time-and-time again. First, is concern over the overlap between the individual services in their roles, missions and functions as a result of the National Security Act of 1947 and Key West Agreements. Secondly, is concern over the influence and parochialism of the services to the detriment of jointness, resulting in legislation to
strengthen the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and efforts to straighten command lines for Unified Commanders. Finally, an underlying theme is one of ensuring adequate civilian control of the military. These three historical themes will serve as guides in recommending possible changes to the Department's structure later in this paper.
CHAPTER III
WHY CHANGE IS NECESSARY

...the greatest organizational shortcoming of the Department of Defense always has been dominance by the Services at the expense of truly joint military preparation and planning. That difficulty has been papered over...by building a large OSD staff around the secretary of defense to do things that the parochial Services cannot be trusted to do. The underlying defect has never been cured.

John G. Kester
Do We Need the Service Secretary? 

Even considering the increasing Congressional pressure to reorganize, many are still arguing that our current Department of Defense structure has worked well over the last fifty years and should not be changed. However, a critical evaluation indicates that there are significant problems with the Department’s current structure. First, the rationale for maintaining four separate Services with huge headquarters and secretariat functions may no longer be appropriate based on new technology and the negative aspects of parochialism. Second, the Department has become bloated and duplicative, in part, due to expanding overlap between the Services, but also due to bureaucratic creep in an effort to adapt to increasing oversight and new challenges. Finally, careful evaluation indicates our current structure is not ideal for efficiently addressing the challenges of the future. Let’s take a look at some of these arguments:
The Services may no longer be appropriate:

Technology has blurred Service distinctions...

In 1947, when the current Department of Defense structure was formed, a separate Service was created for each medium of warfare—air, land and sea. Yet today’s technology has blurred this traditional thinking. Naval forces are not only capable of controlling the sea, but are capable of strategic nuclear retaliation through the use of sea launched ballistic missiles, of precision conventional attacks against strategic enemy targets far from sea via sea launched cruise missiles, of interdiction and close air support through the use of fighter/bombers launched from aircraft carriers, and of heavy ground maneuver through the use of Marines equipped with M-1 tanks. Each of the other services have similar overlapping capabilities. The point is, that new technology has so blurred service distinctions related to operation in a particular medium of warfare that retention of huge separate service staffs and secretariats is called into question. Perhaps a different organizational structure would be more appropriate, effective, and efficient based on these new technologies.

Service parochialism hurts effectiveness...

As Senator Sam Nunn has argued, we need reform based on what is good for America, rather than the parochial views of the Services. Unfortunately, service parochialism is difficult to avoid. People don’t just enter the military, they enter a particular Service. Over the years they develop a strong loyalty to it. Even when assigned to the joint arena, by their Service, they retain this strong loyalty since their future promotions, professional development and assignments are all controlled by their Service.
Component commanders are similarly influenced, but have the added influence of being totally dependent on their Service for personnel, operations and maintenance funding, and equipment. These influences make it nearly impossible for a Unified Commander to control the development of force capabilities within his command and set the stage for negatively influencing many other aspects of the Department's operations. Let's take a look at just a few of these.

First, because the services advocate their own forms of warfare, they often focus only on strategies and weapons systems that support their particular views. Such an approach may not lead to the best strategy or weapon systems development for the country, but what is best for a particular medium of warfare. This has resulted in operational strategies that sometimes employ forces more to ensure all the services have a role in an operation, rather than selecting only those forces that are anticipated to be the most effective in accomplishing the mission. This same service parochialism led to the fielding of Navy radios that cannot communicate with Army radios, Air Tasking Orders built by the Air Force that cannot be electronically transmitted to the Navy, aerial refueling equipment that is not compatible between Air Force and Navy aircraft, and chaff and flares that can be used by Navy aircraft, but not Air Force aircraft. Although the recently established Joint Requirements Oversight Committee is aimed at solving these interoperability problems, this new organization is just a means of treating the symptoms and not the disease. This was clearly shown in a statement by General McPeak after he publicly suggested the Army cancel its deep-attack missile system because it was not needed. After making this statement, he acknowledged that
he had "just violated one of the cardinal rules of civil discourse within the Pentagon by questioning the need for a system being fielded by another Service."

Secondly, parochialism inefficiently drives the division of the DoD budget. Historically, the DoD budget has been divided up among the Services in rough parity to each Services overall size, ensuring each gets its "fair share." When the DoD budget is large, this process works fairly well. However, as the budget shrinks, this process results in some higher priority DoD needs not being funded because to do so would require allocating more than an individual service's fair share.

Finally, a 1985 Staff Report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services argued that "inter-service logrolling" has resulted in a "lessening of civilian control," has denied "the opportunity of effective decision making," and has precluded "the degree of cooperation and coordination necessary to provide efficient and integrated fighting teams." According to the Staff Report, inter-service rivalry before 1961 allowed OSD to pick and choose between options because the Services vocally argued the pros and cons of competing systems. Since 1961, OSD has gained sufficient expertise to challenge service positions on its own. As a result, the burden of challenging major programs and policies has shifted to OSD, and the Services have reverted to submerging differences on important issues for mutual gain. This is well illustrated by the comments noted earlier by General McPeak regarding cancellation of the Army's deep-attack missile system. The following testimony by General David C. Jones before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1982 adds further credence to this argument:

"...interactions among the Services usually result in 'negotiated treaties' which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to Service interests. Such a 'truce' has its good points, for it is counterproductive for the
Services to attack each other. But the lack of adequate questioning by military professionals results in gaps and unwarranted duplications in our defense capabilities. 19

The Department has become bloated:

By growing service overlap...

The original Department of Defense structure and Key West Agreement resulted in extensive duplication and overlap among the Services in 1947. Each Service had its own planning, operations, intelligence, communications, logistics, acquisition and support functions. Each had, or could develop, its own air arm. This duplication has grown significantly with each Service now also having its own special operations forces, close air support (for ground forces), air defense, and space functions.

It has long been argued that there are advantages to having some mission overlap and duplication among the Services, in that it limits the chance of not being able to address a new enemy threat and provides additional options to senior decision-makers in a crisis. However, current budget constraints no longer allow us to retain this level of duplication. Rather, it is time to critically reevaluate how we accomplish our mission and eliminate or greatly reduce low value-added capabilities and duplication.

In addition, there is a great deal of functional duplication among the Services and within the Department as a whole on the support side. Just one example of this is in the command, control and communications (C³) arena. Within the Air Staff, there is a Deputy Chief of Staff function for Command, Control, Communications and Computers headed by a major general. Within the Secretariat of the Air Force there is a Deputy Assistant Secretariat for Communications, Computers and Logistics, along with a Command, Communication & Control office headed by a brigadier general. Each of the
other Services Secretariats and Staffs have similar layered offices, along with related offices within the major commands. The duplication and bloat does not stop there however. Above Service level, a vice admiral heads up the Joint Staff J-6, Directorate for Command, Control, Communications and Computers function (each of the nine CINC's also has a J-6 function). Also, OSD has an entire Assistant Secretariat dedicated to Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, along with the Defense Information Systems Agency led by a lieutenant general.²⁰

Although we have seen some recent consolidation of support functions, such as increased joint initial training, the Defense Finance and Accounting System, and others, there are still many inefficiencies that need to be tackled.

By building bureaucracy to respond to oversight and general bureaucratic creep...

In 1949 there were 1,530 civilians assigned to functions other than the Services (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] and subordinate functions), for a force size of nearly 2.5 million military personnel. In 1990, there were over 98,000 civilians in such functions for a military force size that was only 500,000 larger.²¹ Similar growth in the number of military officers on the Joint Staff has also occurred. In 1947 the Joint Staff was Congressionally limited to 100 officers.²² In the early 1950's this limit was raised to 210.²³ By 1959 the limit had been raised to 400, and during 1985 the Department attempted to eliminate the limit altogether.²⁴ In 1986 the Department successfully convinced Congress to raise the limit up to 1,627 military and civilian personnel.²⁵ What has caused this significant overhead growth? Part is due to increased laws,
regulations, and oversight. For example, between 1970 and 1985 there was a 1,172 percent increase in the number of Congressionally requested studies and reports, a 1,022 percent increase in other mandated actions for DoD, and a 233 percent increase in the number of general provisions in law aimed at DoD. But looking closer, it appears that much more of the increase is based strictly on the ever expanding bureaucracy of the Department.

Looking just at OSD, we find that in 1963 there were only three Defense Agencies aligned under it—Defense Communications, Defense Supply, and Defense Intelligence. Today, there are 15 Defense Agencies and 7 DoD Field Activities that have functions ranging from management of commissaries and DoD dependent schools, to providing advice on economic adjustment programs.

With the new emphasis on reinventing government and reducing restrictive oversight, the time appears ripe to reassess the need for all the existing laws and reports initiated by Congress. In addition, OSD needs to reassess whether all Agencies and Activities are necessary to accomplish their assigned functions of “policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation.”

The Department can no longer efficiently address the challenges of the future:

Although domestic pressure to reduce military spending and size will likely continue, we can expect the US to stay engaged in world affairs due to the increasing interdependency of economies and nation-states. In addition, we can expect the military to be an important aspect of this engagement strategy. However, in many cases
the military is not efficiently organized to address these future challenges, as outlined below.

**Nuclear Deterrence...**

The threat of nuclear attack against the US has greatly reduced since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean the threat has gone away. Today, 12 countries either have or are attempting to obtain nuclear weapons—25 either have or are attempting to obtain associated delivery systems. We can expect these numbers to climb in the future.

Organizationally, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), with its component strategic missiles, submarines, and bombers, is charged with responding to any nuclear attack upon the United States. In addition, USSTRATCOM is supported by an extensive ground and space based warning and notification system. As discussed earlier, the chance of operationally utilizing either our nuclear weapon systems or our warning and notification net in response to an attack against the United States are extremely low. Based on this, it appears appropriate that we re-look the current organization and responsibilities of this command.

**Major Regional Contingencies...**

With the demise of our bi-polar world, regional powers feel less inhibited to take military action to resolve disputes. This emerging trend, combined with increasing global interdependence, will likely result in increased US military intervention. In many cases we can expect the US to serve much like a marshal, quickly gathering an
interested multinational posse to help resolve the conflict. Because of this, US military
commands and their forces must be flexible, able to deploy quickly, and capable of both
joint and multinational operations. Our current system of tasking regionally focused
unified commands to respond to such crisis appears appropriate. However, we still find
several problems.

During Operations Desert Shield/Storm the appropriate unified command (US
Central Command) was tasked to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A Joint Task
Force (JTF) staff was quickly assembled using personnel from the unified and
component command staffs. This regionally-oriented staff was responsible for
developing plans to address the crisis, and once approved, ensuring they were carried
out. Unfortunately, this is where the organizational structure broke down.

For example, air war planning was not conducted by the "regionally expert" JTF
staff in Saudi Arabia, but by personnel assigned to Headquarters Air Force in the
Pentagon, thousands of miles away. The same circumvention took place regarding
battle damage assessment. In part, these actions took place because of the quality and
availability of intelligence information in Washington DC. But had the organizational
structure not been circumvented by the influences of Service parochialism, needed
intelligence information could have been fed to the JTF Headquarters in a timely
manner, rather than to the Air Staff.

Secondly, responsibility for readiness of unified command forces, as we
discussed earlier, rests with the Services who are charged under Title X to
"organize, train and equip" their personnel. As the military is directed to carry out
more and more joint and multinational operations, the unified commanders "principal
purpose will be to ensure their [forces] joint training and joint readiness. With this will come an increase in the overlap of responsibility, between the Services and unified commanders.

**Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)***

The military mission of countering WMD will likely grow as an increasing number of Third World powers develop these weapons because they are inexpensive, easy to make and have a high threat value. So far, the Department has not identified an organization responsible for developing systems to counter this increasing threat. So in response, all the Services are in the process of developing systems to counter it. According to the Congressional Budget Office there are no less than 11 different theater ballistic missile defense systems being simultaneously developed by the various Services, with the Department planning to spend $50 billion (in 1995 dollars) through 2010 on the development and acquisition of these systems alone. Clearly, a more integrated research and development/acquisition system would help limit the number of individual research programs underway.

**Support of Peacekeeping, Peacemaking & Nation Building***

Futurist Marvin Cetron and others have argued that the dramatic increase in peacekeeping, peacemaking and nation building operations conducted unilaterally by the US will likely decline as more of this responsibility shifts to the United Nations and other multinational organizations that are working toward development of permanent peace-enforcement units. This argument seems plausible based on the belief of the American public that military operations should only take place if vital US interests are
at stake and only when they are completed in a quick and decisive manner. Clearly this belief does not match the requirements for peacekeeping, peacemaking or nation building that are often carried out in small third world countries over long periods of time. This was certainly illustrated by our quick removal of US ground forces from Somalia after losing 18 soldiers in an operation that the American public did not see as vital to our national interests and by recent congressional actions aimed at limiting “deployments to those in which US interests were directly involved.” In addition, the necessary requirement for peacemaking forces to be “neutral” is impossible for a superpower whose very participation in an operation sends strong signals of support for one side or the other. Because of this, we can expect the US to limit its participation in such future operations to support roles—providing lift, logistics support, intelligence information, and communications, with other nations providing ground forces.

If US involvement in these operations is limited to support, the current call to establish a quickly deployable ground force appears inappropriate.

Information Warfare...

As the world sprints toward the information age we can expect information warfare to be the weapon of choice of many Third World countries and terrorist groups whose enemy is an industrialized country. Like WMD, information warfare is inexpensive, relatively easy to carry out, and extremely coercive. It also has some unique advantages over WMD. First, it can be carried out from nearly any location on the globe. Second, the technology required to carry it out is not restricted by treaties or trade agreements. Finally, information warfare will likely not carry the negative stigma
associated with the use of WMD since it will not take human lives. As industrialized nations become more dependent on information for banking, economics and everyday life, this form of warfare will become even more attractive.

Currently, the military has very few resources dedicated to combating this threat. Rather, US information security is being left up to private firms and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to address. Closer ties must be developed between the military and other federal agencies involved in fighting this new threat, especially in the intelligence arena.

Counterterrorism...

We can expect terrorism to grow as a larger number of nationalistic, religious, and ethnic groups attempt to gain recognition and power. With the proliferation of high-tech weapons, including WMD, we can expect these groups to be better equipped and more deadly than ever before. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created specifically to combat this threat. Based on its extensive use by National Command Authorities, it appears to be doing a good job. Like USSTRATCOM, USOCOM brings together all Service forces to address a functional problem. However, what makes this Unified Command so unique is that the Commander in Chief (CINC) has two roles--that of Service Chief and CINC. He is responsible for organizing, training and equipping special operations personnel, as well maintaining operational control. Such an organizational structure has ensured that personnel are organized and trained the way they are employed, and special operations equipment that is purchased is interoperable among the three participating Services.
Domestic support...

If President Clinton's National Service program gets underway, we can expect the military to be called on less and less to provide ground manpower in support of domestic humanitarian missions. Instead, we can expect National Service personnel to do much of the ground labor, with the military providing support similar to what will be provided to the UN—lifl, logistics expertise, communications support, nation building support and, in this case, leadership. In addition, recent disaster relief experiences at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida and at other locations in the US indicates that a closer interface is required between the military and other federal disaster relief organizations—most notably the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Better coordination will ensure the strengths of the military (such as airlift capacity, mobile communications, etc.) will be fully utilized.

Lessons learned...

This review indicates there are a number of reasons why change to our current organizational structure is warranted. First, the division of our forces by medium of warfare and the negative effects parochialism injects into day-to-day operations calls into question the appropriateness of distinct Services. Second, our current bureaucratic organizational structure has grown large and unwieldy, with much overlap and duplication. Finally, there are many emerging challenges that the Department is not structured to address efficiently. The question now becomes, how should the Department be changed? By reviewing the efforts of other large organizations who are adapting to the future, perhaps we can gain some insight.
CHAPTER IV

CHANGING STRUCTURES TO MEET FUTURE CHALLENGES--EXAMPLES

Canadian Forces...

One of the most studied military reorganizations of recent times has been the experience of the Canadians. The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act of 1966 resulted in the elimination of separate Services in the Canadian military, and created new field commands (later to be called operational commands) under Canadian Forces (CF) Headquarters. The rationale for this significant change in organization was based on the blurring of Service differences caused by the "rapid development of defense technology," the growing "administrative tail" common to all the Services, and overlap in operational responsibilities among the three Services.  

Today, the CF are still unified, with the Department head being an elected Minister of National Defense who is also a member of the Canadian Cabinet. Management of daily Department activities is shared between the Deputy Minister, a civilian appointee, and the Chief of the Defense Staff, who is a four-star general. Operational command authority, however, runs through the Chief of the Defense Staff, with staffing provided by a Joint Staff of dual-hatted operational commanders. The CF currently has seven operational commands--Maritime Command, Land Forces Command, Air Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Canadian Forces Northern Area, Canadian Forces Communications Command, and Canadian Forces Training System. 

While the CF does not have separate Services, these Services exist somewhat in the form of operational commands (Maritime Command=Navy, Land Forces
Command=Army, etc.). However, the huge administrative overhead of having individual Services has been eliminated and the once powerful parochial views have been reduced. In addition, they have integrated many support functions and skills so that these personnel now serve throughout the CF, rather than within a single Service.

However, not everything related to the reorganization has gone well. Because these revolutionary changes were forced upon the military by the Canadian Parliament, CF leaders were not unanimously behind them. Additionally, the basis for change was not well explained to CF personnel, especially regarding the need to eliminate the Services, leaving many with a lack of mission identity and entrenched against further change. To help improve the identity problem, the Canadian military has reverted back to environmentally unique uniforms (army, navy and air forces) from the unified green uniform adopted in the late 1960's. This change has helped not only operations personnel, but just as importantly the support personnel who had begun identifying more with their specialty than their unit of assignment. This was creating a serious "rift between the supporters and the operators." This change, along with many others have been successful in resolving most of the initial concerns with the new CF organization.

Today, the Canadians have a stable, unified organizational structure that appears well suited for effectively and efficiently addressing the challenges of the future.

**British Forces...**

In 1984, the British military went through a major reorganization to improve
integrated operations as a result of an internal study based on their experience in the Falklands Campaign and in an effort to "achieve the best possible value in defense terms from the resources devoted to defense." To accomplish these objectives they created a unified staff at the national level from manpower obtained by eliminating the individual Service Vice Chiefs of Staff positions and the majority of the Service staffs. This new Defense Staff took on many of the responsibilities previously handled by the individual Service staffs and the Joint Staff. Although the individual military Services were not eliminated, they were greatly reduced in both size and power.

As a result, each Service now has a Service Board that is headed by their Chief (Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff and Chief of the Air Staff). These small (less than one hundred personnel) Service Boards serve as proponents for their own medium of warfare, although their involvement in both the budget and acquisition process is much more limited than the US Military Departments.

Although the changes are not as significant as the Canadians, the British have eliminated much of the duplication among the individual Service staffs and produced a more unified Ministry of Defense that can better meet both operational and public demands for increased effectiveness and efficiency.

US Corporations...

Large corporations, just like military organizations, are facing an expanding and ever-changing "battlefield" in which they must "fight" for market share, while at the same time increase their efficiency. To meet these challenges, corporations are introducing new quality, virtual, and matrix approaches that espouse worker
participation programs, cross-functional task forces, parallel organizations, and expanded information technologies. All of these are breaking down previously closed organizational boundaries and undermining the pillars of bureaucracy, forcing a revolutionary change to much more flexible organizational structures.  

Unfortunately, these structural revolutions normally do not take place until the very survival of the organization is threatened. Instead, organizations make small incremental changes to adapt to their newly emerging demands until change is forced upon them. Then dramatic change is undertaken in an effort to save the organization. Non-value added functions are cut, the number of employees drastically reduced, and the entire organization restructured to make it more responsive to its new environment. This approach has happened over and over again. In fact, between 1987 and 1991 over 85 percent of Fortune 1,000 firms downsized their white-collar force and reorganized.

One of the largest of these restructuring efforts in American history was completed by Sears, Roebuck and Company in 1993. In early 1990, Sears began efforts to reduce operating expenses to become more competitive and improve return on its equity. To accomplish this, each of the Sears businesses (Sears Merchandise Group, Allstate Insurance Group, Dean Witter Financial Services Group, Coldwell Banker Real Estate Group and Sears Mortgage Banking operations) initiated internal actions to cut costs. For example, the Merchandise Group reorganized its field reporting structure, eliminating 600 jobs and closing and consolidating several offices, and cut nearly 7,000 sales positions by introducing new point-of-sale technology. By late 1992, however, Sears realized that these small chances were insufficient to
overcome declining revenues and increasing debt. If the company was to survive, it had to initiate a dramatic restructuring program and refocus on its core retail and insurance businesses.

In January 1993, Sears totally restructured its Merchandise Group, discontinuing its “catalog operations, closing 113 unprofitable stores, and offering an early retirement program.” Later in the year, Sears would sell 20 percent of Allstate Insurance Group, and all of Dean Witter Financial Services Group, Coldwell Banker Real Estate Group and Sears Mortgage Banking operations. By early 1995, Sears would initiate action to sell the remainder of Allstate insurance, allowing the company to fully focus on its primary “mission” of retail sales. More importantly, Sears, like other successfully restructured companies clearly communicated its reduction plan to its employees and carried it out quickly so that uncertainty was not prolonged. The net results for 1993 were a record earnings of $2.37 billion, compared to a 1992 loss of nearly $4 billion.  

Lessens learned...

In reviewing the restructuring efforts of these three organizations the following lessons can be learned.

First, while reorganization of the Canadian and British armed forces were totally different in their approaches, the means of obtaining increased efficiency were the same—reducing Service power and influence, while eliminating organizational duplication. Second, how the change is initiated and carried out greatly affects employee acceptance of change. In the case of the Canadian Forces reorganization, for example, change was forced upon it by players outside the military. Because of this,
CF leaders were not fully committed to the changed organizational structure, resulting in continuing problems nearly 30 years later. On the other hand, the reorganizations of both the British military and Sears were internally generated, having the full support of senior leaders and, most importantly, the need for change was well articulated to the rest of the organization.

Based on these lessons learned, we can take the next step of recommending a possible reorganization for the US Department of Defense.
CHAPTER V

CHANGING THE DOD STRUCTURE

First, separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
State of the Union Address
January 9, 1958

The following provides just one of many possible reorganizations schemes for the DoD. It focuses on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the US military in meeting the challenges of the future, using the lessons learned in the preceding chapters as a guide.

Eliminate the Military Departments...

Both the Service Secretariats and Service Staffs would be eliminated with some of their functions transferred to OSD, the Joint Staff or the Unified Commands—many others would be eliminated. This change would eliminate the continuing inter-service rivalry and its negative effects, while eliminating two huge duplicative layers in DoD (the Service Secretariats and Staffs).

It is important to note that service (medium) unique uniforms should continue to be worn. Although not a structural issue, the importance of this was evident in the efforts of the Canadians to fully integrate into a single Canadian Forces. In addition,
people entering the US Armed Forces would enter and remain in a particular medium, with much of their career being served in only one or two unified commands.

**Change the Joint Chiefs of Staff...**

The current Joint Chiefs of Staff, as we know it, would disappear. In its place would be a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consisting of a Chairman and a four-star flag officer representing each of the Unified Commands. Normally these officers would have just completed their tour as Commander in Chief (CINC) and would be on their final assignment prior to retirement. In addition, CINC selection would attempt to ensure these positions are filled so as to ensure a balance of the three mediums of warfare—sea, land, and aerospace. Because JCS membership would have no dual-hat responsibility of running a Service or Unified Command, members would play a much greater role in both the budget and acquisition processes.

**Refocus the Joint Staff...**

The Joint Staff would focus on supporting the Chairman and his staff, along with the Unified Commanders. To accomplish this, the Joint Staff would take over many of the budgetary and acquisition prioritization responsibilities currently managed by the Services, using inputs from the Unified Commands or other "J" functions on the Staff. Final military approval of the budget and large acquisition programs would be accomplished by the CJCS. Such an approach would help ensure the distribution of money and development of new weapon systems was based on war fighter needs and not on parochially driven Service needs.
Also, offices would be established that are focused on the future exploitation of the three mediums of warfare. These offices would be manned with high caliber medium “experts,” who would have multifaceted responsibilities. First, they would be responsible for the development of joint doctrine in their medium. Second, they would serve as futurists, playing a key role in development of leading edge technology and supporting new weapon systems within their medium. Finally, they would serve as a surge staff for Unified Command staffs during a crisis—bringing additional medium expertise, along with a familiarity with emerging weapons systems, doctrines, and strategies that would help ensure the optimum employment of forces related to the medium.

Finally, those operationally-oriented defense and DoD field agencies that are deemed necessary would be realigned under the Joint Staff, while required policy-oriented agencies would remain under OSD. Functions such as recruiting, along with entry and initial training, would be realigned under the Joint Staff. Regionally or functionally unique training would be the responsibility of the individual CINCs.

Adjust the Unified Commands...

In all cases, the Unified Commands would function much like US Special Operations Command currently operates with their own budget and forces assigned to them. They would pick up much of the “organize, train and equip” responsibilities once held by the Services, but would receive extensive help from the Joint Staff. In this way, the focus would be on organizing, training, and equipping to fight a contingency in the CINCs Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Several changes could also be made in the current Unified Command Plan in order to enhance efficiency. For example, regionally oriented CINCs could be reduced from the present five to three-US Eastern Command, US Western Command and US Americas Command. Responsibilities currently managed by US European Command and US Central Command could be accomplished by a much smaller sub-unified command staff under US Western Command if deemed necessary. Functional CINCs could also be changed slightly to adapt to future challenges to include US Transportation Command, US Information Command, US Special Operations Command and US Missile Command. The following expands upon the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) and responsibilities of the individual CINCs:


US Western Command - AOR would match closely with that currently managed by US Pacific Command to include all sea and land west of the Americas, up to and including China and Pakistan.

US America's Command - Responsible for all land area in the Americas, including the Caribbean and those areas currently managed by USOUTHCOM. Although each of the regionally focused unified commands could serve as the supporting CINC for large contingencies, US America's Command would serve primarily in this capacity for land forces. In addition, it would work closely with FEMA in responding to all domestic crises (natural disaster, etc.).
US Transportation Command - Would continue to serve as a supporting CINC to regional unified commands.

US Information Command - This new command would be responsible for the security of all DoD electronically stored and transmitted information and its distribution to users. It would work closely with other civilian agencies in combating information warfare. In addition, this command would serve as the consolidation point of all military intelligence functions in order to gain synergy from the information gathering capability possessed by the command. As such, much of the manpower currently dedicated to $C^4$ and intelligence would be moved to this command.


US Missile Command - This command would be a combination of the two small unified commands of USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM. Not only would this command retain its responsibility for the Nations strategic arsenal, but it would also be responsible for access to and control of, space and could be charged to lead development efforts toward effective theater missile defense systems. Again, some synergistic effect would be gained by combining these two small commands since much of the lift capability currently being used by USSPACECOM comes from USSTRATCOM.

As is the case today, CINCs may address developing threats or challenges by adapting their organizational structure through creation of new offices, tiger teams or task forces.
Refocus OSD...

The responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense would remain unchanged, including his role in the chain of command between the National Command Authority and CINC. However, what must change is the size of his/her supporting staff. Careful analysis of each function must be made to eliminate and consolidate wherever possible, refocusing on core responsibilities. The call to "reinvent government" should be fully exploited to eliminate low or non-value added functions as a result of executive, legislative, or internally generated requirements.

Other potential changes...

Much of the difficulty in the acquisition process regarding prioritization for funding and interoperability will be resolved with the elimination of the Services. However, a centralized acquisition function is required within the Department, aligned under either OSD or the Joint Staff. The key to this organization is that new systems will managed through a joint matrix organization. As soon as a new requirement is justified, a matrix organization will be formed that includes all the interested parties as members on an ad hoc basis (CINC and medium experts are key).

Consolidation of functions can lead to significant savings in resources and improve operations--consolidation of Army and Air Force pay systems is one example. Further consolidation must be pursued in all support areas including C^4, intelligence, personnel, finance, education and training, administration, legal and chaplaincy, just to name a few.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

There is little doubt that significant organizational change is warranted within the DoD based on the issues examined in this paper. The only question is how much change is needed. The proposed reorganization in this paper may appear to be severe. But is it too severe? Since the beginning of the Cold War in 1947, there have been continuous calls to reorganize the Department in order to eliminate Service parochialism and improve efficiency. In each case, the Department has made only minor adjustments, many times adding more organization to solve the problems. What is different about the calls for change today is that the Cold War is over, Service distinctions have blurred due to new technology, and the threats the military must face have expanded and become more lethal. Many see the Department of Defense fighting to stay bureaucratically large, while not being efficiently organized for the future. If the Department wishes to continue with this paradigm, then the proposal in this paper is too severe. But recent efforts by Congress and examples from other similarly situated organizations indicates that it is only a matter of time before change is forced upon the organization. Then the question becomes, will the Department face up to the challenge of complete reorganization or will it abdicate this challenge to Congress or some legislatively appointed commission.

Clearly, the Canadian experience as contrasted with the experiences of the British armed forces and Sears indicates that it would be in the best interest of the Department and the Nation to take on the reorganization problem internally. By accepting this challenge, top DoD leadership sells itself on the changes they initiate
and makes it possible for these same leaders to honestly sell the changes to subordinates. These are crucial steps that must be taken by any change agent to insure success.⁴⁵

Even if these difficult tasks are accomplished and all civilian and military members are sold on the changes, research has shown it will likely take 5 to 15 years to complete the cultural change that must take place with any significant organizational restructuring.⁴⁶ In the end, however, the US Armed Forces will be much better organized to effectively and efficiently meet the challenges of the future.
NOTES

CHAPTER I (Page 1-2)


CHAPTER II (Pages 3-9)


4 “Chronology of Changes in Key West Agreements April 1948-January 1958,” Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 7, 1958, pgs 1-4.

5 It is important to note that this document was not intended to allow a Service with primary responsibility in a medium to dictate force requirements on other Services, nor to allow it to deny weapons and equipment to accomplish its functions. In addition, a 1952 amendment to the Reorganization Act further specified the functions of the Marine Corps.


10 “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” pg. III.


CHAPTER III (Pages 10-22)


John G. Kester, "Do We Need the Service Secretary?," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1981, 166.


David C. Jones, General, USAF (Ret.), testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 16, 1982, pg 22.

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Richard T. Reynolds, Col, USAF, Heart of the Storm the Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL January 1995), and discussions with participants in the Gulf War.
31 Colin Powell, xi.


CHAPTER IV (Pages 23-28)


40 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 1991 Annual Report, pg. 3.


45 John Baumgarten, MAJ, USA; Richard O’Neill, M.M, USA; and Robert Mountz, MAJ, USA, “Change in the Military,” paper for Business Administration 590 class, Summer 1970, pg. 11-12.

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