A RWANDAN RETROSPECTIVE -- DEVELOPING AN INTERVENTION OPTION

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A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

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A Rwandan Retrospective -- Defining an Intervention Option

ABSTRACT

Major General Romeo Dallaire, (Canada), the Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda in 1994, made the comment that with 5,000 troops and the right mandate he could have saved thousands who died in the genocide that spring and summer. The Carnegie commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the US Army, sponsored a conference that brought together senior international military leaders with operational experience in multinational peacekeeping operations to assess the validity of Major General Dallaire's statement. This paper recounts the conference: 1) Major General Dallaire's proposed operational concept and force, 2) conference participants' discussion and validation of his basic premise, and 3) the conference participants' discussion of the type of force that could be used and the parameters constraining its generation and employment. The paper then outlines a force that could be employed, and assesses the outlook for generating a such a force under regional, global, and lead country auspices.
Report by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

A Rwandan Retrospective -- Developing An Intervention Option

_Responding to the situation that confronted him at the time, Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, (UNAMIR), commented that with 5,000 troops and the right mandate, he could have prevented most of the killing._

On April 6, 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed when their aircraft was shot down as it approached Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Within hours violence broke out in the city and the surrounding communities. Initially assumed by some observers to be random acts by people taking advantage of a momentary lapse in law and order, many on the ground knew better, and their worst fears were soon confirmed. Road blocks were set up by army units, (including the Presidential Guard), militia, and mobs. These groups, composed of extremists from the Hutu ethnic group, targeted moderate Hutus and members of the Tutsi ethnic minority for execution. Local political leaders, police, and soldiers went from house to house with lists identifying those to be killed. The Prime Minister and 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR, sent to secure her, were murdered. A battalion of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front, (RPF), stationed in the capital pursuant to the Arusha Peace Accords to protect opposition leaders during the transition to a new government, broke out of its compound and began to engage members of the Presidential Guard. Other RPF forces left assembly areas near the demilitarized zone in the north of the country and advanced on the capital, engaging Rwandan Government Forces, (RGF). The RPF refused to cease operations until the violence targeting moderate Hutu and the Tutsi ended. The RGF argued that it was making every attempt to halt the mass killings, but could not restrain the rampaging extremists because most of its forces were defending against the RPF advance.

Repeated attempts by the Commander of UNAMIR (General Dallaire) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General to bring the parties back to the peace process met with failure. The situation spun out of control, as UNAMIR was repeatedly weakened, first by the withdrawal of the Belgians, (who openly advocated a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR)\(^3\), followed by the timid response of participating national capitals (with the notable exception of Ghana), who instructed their contingents within UNAMIR to protect themselves at all costs, even if that meant standing by while lightly armed, drunken thugs hacked women and children to death. (Those who could produce cash could buy a quick death by firearm, those who couldn’t received a less costly, and less sophisticated execution by machete, stoning, or burning).\(^4\) The United Nations, stung by Somalia, fearful of another mission of ambiguous intent, participation, and support, and hampered by the sovereignty issues raised by member states, did not take decisive action to intervene. Individual member states also delayed unilateral action. Within three months, UNAMIR was reduced to 450 personnel,\(^5\) between 500,000 and 800,000
Rwandese, mostly Tutsi, were dead, 500,000 Rwandese were displaced within the country, and over two million Rwandese had fled to surrounding countries. More human tragedy was compressed into three months in Rwanda than occurred in four years in the former Yugoslavia.

Much of the violence wracking the world since 1989 has been attributed initially to ethnic causes, rooted in immutable history, or the unavoidable release or redress of grievances held too long in check by the last vestiges of colonialism or the bi-polar international structure. Two aspects of that analysis bear further scrutiny if the true nature of the violence is to be understood and if effective actions are to be developed to prevent mass violence. First, the initial reports were often wrong or overstated, and second, the description, even if accurate, does not mean that such violence is unavoidable. While the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as examples, do have ethnic, historical, and broad social components, they also have, at least initially, a strong immediate political component. In these cases, the precipitate motivation for conflict stemmed from actions designed to achieve political goals. Leaders within factions then steered the conflict toward violence, tapping into long-standing and deep-rooted ethnic tension as an accelerator. Later, those historical and ethnic forces may have surged out of control, fed by momentum, suffering and acts of retribution. In many cases, that is what the initiators may have wanted. But if the proximate causal factors were political, then the violence began as the result of choice, and choice can be influenced.

With that in mind, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in concert with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and the United States Army, undertook to see whether the introduction of international military force into the situation in Rwanda in 1994 could have had any effect, and what the nature of such an intervention might be. Specifically, an international panel of distinguished senior military leaders, (see participant list at Appendix A), assessed Major General Dallaire’s thesis and addressed the following questions: What actions could a military force have taken to forestall violence? How large a military force would have been needed and how should such a force have been organized, trained, and equipped? When was the most appropriate time for inserting a military force and what is the relationship between the timing of interventions and kind of force required?

Based on the presentations at the panel and complementary research, the author believes that a modern force of 5,000 troops, drawn primarily from a single contributing country, and inserted sometime between April 7th and 21st, could have significantly altered the outcome. While the organized combatant factions in Rwanda were fairly capable light infantry, and such an operation would entail significant risk, the introduction of sufficient combat force required to simultaneously seize key objectives all over the country would have, in the words of one senior officer, “thrown a wet blanket over an emerging fire.” Appropriately trained, equipped, and led forces, introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war between the RPF and RGF. The actual history of the international involvement in Rwanda is instructive.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, (UNAMIR), had been established by the Secretary General and the Security Council in the fall of 1993 to
oversee what many hoped would be an end to a four year long civil war. In the name of a “democratic” majority, the Hutu dominated government in Rwanda had repeatedly reduced the rights of the Tutsi minority and their role in the society. Systematic corruption and looting of the public purse prevented economic gain for all but a favored faction of the Hutu majority. Rather than creating serious cleavages within the Hutu group, the leaders of the country deftly directed frustration toward the Tutsi minority. Periodic outbursts of ethnic violence had punctuated the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi, increasing in frequency after independence from Belgium in the early 1960s. (See Appendices C and E). Many Tutsi fled the country during these periodic outbursts, and settled in surrounding countries. Tutsi expatriates had assisted the victors in a Ugandan civil war, and in 1990 began to attack the Rwandan government from bases in that country. Proceeding in optimistic incremental stages, the UN had supported, but not led, a long regional process designed to get the Hutu dominated government to deal with the Tutsi expatriates and the moderate factions within Rwanda.

The UN had attempted to support negotiations through an early presence in the region with the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda, (UNOMUR). (UNOMUR’s objective was to monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border from the Ugandan side and assist in the reduction of weapons traffic and violent incidents. However, disagreements between the UN and Uganda over the status of forces delayed UNOMUR’s deployment and the mission’s operational effectiveness was overtaken by events and the deployment of UNAMIR). Prodded by the UN, the OAU, and surrounding countries, a long negotiating process finally culminated in a settlement at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1993, which gave its name to the accords. The parties to the Arusha Accords pledged a cessation of hostilities, repatriation of refugees, installation of a new “Broad Based Transitional Government” (BBTG), and called for an expanded UN presence to support implementation of the Arusha framework. Provisions were made for the demobilization of many of the military forces involved, the integration of the remainder into a new Army, and the re-entry of the Tutsi minority into a legitimate government. The UN therefore established the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, (UNAMIR) and assigned the Canadian officer previously commanding UNOMUR to lead the mission. UNOMUR was integrated into the emerging structure of the peacekeeping force and follow-on forces, (primarily Belgian, Ghanian, and Bangladeshi), deployed through late 1993 and early 1994. The force eventually reached a strength of about 2,500.9 National contingents were deployed in the capital, establishing a weapons free area; in the demilitarized zone in the north, where demobilization of the combatants and training of the new army would take place; and with the field forces of the RPF and RGF, to observe and report on any movements.10

However, the peace process continued to stumble. On 28 December a battalion of the RPF arrived in Kigali to provide security for members of the opposition as they took their place in the government. On 5 January, the President was sworn in, but from that point on, obstacles to progress mounted. Every subsequent interim milestone was missed due to violent incidents that occurred throughout the country, usually just as a deadline for achieving a concrete measure of progress approached. These incidents served as a pretext for both parties to balk at implementation steps, to verbally question the sincerity of their opposite number, and to strengthen their factions for continued violent struggle.
Adding to the pressure to implement the framework while simultaneously destabilizing the situation, Tutsi rebels in the neighboring country of Burundi staged an abortive coup in October 1993, killing the elected Hutu president. The ensuing violence forced 500,000 refugees from Burundi into southern Rwanda during a drought, adding a significant issue to the number of already outstanding crises in the making.

UNAMIR had accomplished its deployment operations during the period leading up to the death of the President, and, despite the continuing instability, had accomplished several intermediate objectives. They had established the Kigali Weapons Secure Area, (KWSA), (secured by the Belgian and Bangladeshi battalions), deployed United Nations Military Observers to monitor RPF and RGF elements along the DMZ, and the Ghanaian battalion had taken up a position between the belligerents. Steps to demobilize the combatants and to reorganize the army in the field were to commence three months after the BBTG was established. However, the command was consumed by daily logistics issues concerning sustainment of the force itself and the RPF battalion in the capital, and by the series of crises, (like the coup in Burundi and the resultant refugee crisis), that pushed detailed planning and implementation activities into the background. Most importantly, there was a notable lack of capability to conduct thorough intelligence analysis. The small contingent provided by the Belgians could not discern the degree of political organization or sophistication of those opposed to the peace process, nor could it assess the capabilities of the interahamwe ("Those who stand together," the irregular militia organized, trained and equipped by units of the RGF and led often by local political leaders), or the degree of support that factions within Rwanda were receiving from outside the country.

UNAMIR’s supply and sustainment situation never progressed beyond the critical point. There were no stocks of water, food, ammunition, fuels and lubricants, repair parts, or the skilled mechanics and logisticians required to support the force in the field. Civilian contractors provided communications support consisting of a variety of equipment, including hand held non-secure radios and local telephones. While national and UN bureaucracies negotiated reimbursement rates, UNAMIR’s logistics arrangements severely constrained its ability to conduct extensive operations in support of the peace process. Even had the command been able to develop adequate warning of impending violence and to develop plans to anticipate and head off violence, there is no guarantee that they had the capability to act in a preemptive manner or to sustain effective operations.

General Dallaire’s appreciation of the situation in April of 1994 is substantiated by subsequent scholarship; the rapid spread of violence following so closely on the death of the President was primarily a “political decapitation” of Hutu moderates and Tutsi located in and around the capital. The killings were directed by extremists within the deceased President’s own party, and were designed to permanently disrupt the peace process. The perpetrators carried out their attacks by direct assault on opposition targets and then by uprooting the entire population and “straining” the refugees through a system of intermittently established roadblocks. To get the Hutu moderates and the Tutsis to leave their local communities the state controlled radio broadcast clearly inflammatory messages over a period of months leading up to April 6, demanding the expulsion of the Tutsis, and exhorting the Hutu majority to fill the rivers of the country with Tutsi dead,
(referred to as inyenzi, or cockroaches). Interestingly, the inflammatory broadcasts were made in the native language, while much more tempered and conciliatory broadcasts and statements were made in French, obviously for foreign consumption. These broadcasts continued throughout the crisis. To add a physical impetus, the perpetrators intensified a series of attacks on local moderate political leaders, even within the president’s own party. Extremists within the government had obtained lists of opposition party membership, provided as one of the steps toward determining proportional representation in the new legislature. Throughout the winter and spring of 1994, apparently random attacks became more focused, and reports of training, arming, and targeting by the Hutu interahamwe, continued. The population, primed for flight by the radio broadcasts, began to move as village leaders and politicians from moderate opposition parties were slain and police, neighbors, and even clergy participated in the murders. When the RPF began its offensive the panicked Tutsi on the roads were joined by thousands of Hutus who feared reprisals. This population upheaval benefited the extremist leaders, who subsequently seized control of the refugee camps in Zaire. They were supported, (unintentionally, but not unknowingly), with aid from humanitarian agencies, and began to train forces and plan for a counter-offensive to regain the country. The humanitarian disaster which followed dwarfed the resources of aid agencies and created a festering situation in the refugee camps that was only recently resolved.\textsuperscript{13}

A Proposed Mandate and Intervention Force\textsuperscript{14}

The UNAMIR Commander sought unsuccessfully to reverse the defensive orientation of his national contingents, gain reinforcements, stop the genocide, and bring the parties back to the peace process. This section describes the mandate and force General Dallaire thought sufficient to quell the violence in the country at the time and return the participants to the Arusha process, and outlines the operational plan he would have undertaken had the force been provided in April 1994. In subsequent sections an alternative plan based on comments from the conference participants is presented. The characteristics of a generic force are then described, and finally, there is a discussion of how such a force could be generated and by whom.

Threats to the intervening force could be expected from both belligerents as well as armed members of the civilian population. The mass violence in Rwanda was a planned, encouraged, and systematic genocide, largely conducted by lightly armed militia and civilians occasionally assisted by members of the Gendarmerie and Army. This violence preceded, and then continued to occur simultaneously with, the resumption of more conventional combat operations conducted by the RPF and RGF.

Other factors which required consideration because of their impact on the military component of operations were the role of the political parties, the refugee/displaced person crisis, the security of the humanitarian operations on-going in the area, and the eventual resumption of the Arusha Peace process.

It should be noted that in this formulation, the military component, while receiving the most attention due to the nature of the crisis, is but one aspect of a comprehensive political, diplomatic, and humanitarian approach to resolve the situation.
Here the conference participants noted the significant differences between the situations in Rwanda and Yugoslavia with respect to the strategic environment and the respective directions given UNAMIR and IFOR (the Dayton Accord Implementation Force). In Rwanda the military operation was established in an ad hoc fashion to support a previously designed political framework. UN military forces preceded UN political staff (including the Special Representative of the Secretary General) into Rwanda by several months. In contrast, the military component of the peace settlement in Yugoslavia was conceived as an integrated part of a comprehensive approach to resolving the conflict. Despite the difficulties faced by civilian agencies in meeting the timetable in the former Yugoslavia, the relationships between the military, diplomatic and economic components of the framework were addressed in concept.\textsuperscript{15}

In General Dallaire’s proposal, the strategic directive envisioned for a successful intervening force would be adopted under Chapter 7, rather than Chapter 6\textsuperscript{15}, of the UN Charter and would comprise five “decisive” or critical elements. The force would have to 1) stop the genocide, 2) conduct a peace enforcement mission, 3) assist in the return of refugees and displaced persons, 4) ensure the successful delivery of humanitarian aid, and 5) assist in a cessation of hostilities. To coordinate the political, diplomatic, and economic components of the strategy, the directive would have encompassed the following measures of success:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. Bring a halt to the genocide
  \item b. Ensure the routine safe delivery of humanitarian aid
  \item c. Permit the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes
  \item d. Establish a cease fire
  \item e. Facilitate a return of the responsible parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement
\end{itemize}

and process

\begin{itemize}
  \item f. Provide a secure environment for establishment of the Broad Based Transitional Government, (BBTG)
\end{itemize}

With that strategic directive, and those measures of success delineated by competent political authority, General Dallaire proposed the following mission statement for the force intervening in Rwanda:

“The Intervention Force will conduct operations in Rwanda under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter to reestablish peace and security, thereby facilitating a return to the Peace Process of the Arusha Accords and assisting in the establishment of a Broad Based Transitional Government.”

While the measures of success are broad, General Dallaire envisioned that failure in any one of the following four critical tasks would have resulted in a continuation of the killing and/or a humanitarian disaster:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Prevent Genocide
  \item Protect the populace in support of their movement to their homes
  \item Provide security so that humanitarian aid could continue to flow
  \item Provide a secure environment facilitating the cessation of conventional hostilities.
\end{enumerate}

In order to accomplish these critical tasks, several subordinate, supporting tasks would fall to the military force. Rules of Engagement would have to permit the force to
take offensive action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent continued genocidal killing. In concert with the application of force where necessary, all the rear area non-combatants would have to be disarmed and their weapons collected and controlled by the intervening force. The force would have to begin gathering information and securing witnesses as a prelude to the prosecution of the perpetrators, (in concert with a growing UN police support detachment). The exact uses to which this information would be put would have to be addressed as part of the political settlement and the arrangements made for reconciliation and judicial redress of criminal acts.

Security would have to be provided at specific sites for those citizens threatened by violence. This would probably have resulted in the establishment of separate sites for the ethnic groups, as retribution and retaliation could be expected. An essential element in providing security for the population would have to be stabilizing the movement of refugees and displaced persons, as the movement of the target population gave the killers the opportunity to select victims as they passed through roadblocks.

A major consideration in planning for such an intervention is the design of tactics and measures appropriate to the situation. The intervening force must not adopt convenient concepts which carry current political weight or public recognition, but which would not contribute to success. Each intervention situation is unique in the details, and therefore requires discrete analysis and innovation to achieve success. As an example, (according to General Dallaire), in contrast to the situation in Bosnia, where there were ethnic concentrations, the situation in Rwanda was much more homogenous. Both ethnic groups were evenly distributed throughout the country. Therefore the concept of "safe havens," probably was not as appropriate for the Rwandan situation as for the Bosnian. Safe havens, as the term was used in Bosnia, connotes an already pre-existing concentration of a targeted population within a geographic area. Provision of security for the concentrated population affords the outlying members of the ethnic group a destination toward which they can move, thereby obtaining protection. The greater numbers are protected while those at most risk move to that area. In Rwanda, with a thoroughly mixed population, the attackers could not target certain villages or wide swaths of terrain. Killing the ethnic minority required more detailed personal knowledge and a more discretionary application of force. This led to the tactic described wherein whole villages would be displaced, and as the moving population encountered roadblocks and checkpoints, or gathered at large, central buildings such as churches, those marked for death would be separated and killed. Under these circumstances, keeping the population from leaving their villages would be extremely important -- "safe sites" -- smaller and more easily defended community groupings would be the best way to stabilize and secure the population.

Such a concept could be successful. Even the greatly reduced UNAMIR force of 450 personnel provided significant security for thousands of displaced persons in the capital area. The French in Operation Turquoise were able to significantly stabilize the situation in the southwest portion of the country in late June. Though that intervention was not without its difficulties and detractors, thousands were saved without the loss of any French lives.17

The force would have to provide protection for refugees and displaced persons returning to their homes and provide security for the receipt, storage, transport, and
distribution of humanitarian assistance. Convoy escort, patrolling, and security of distribution centers would have to be accomplished as the fighting drew to a close.

Following the establishment of general order and security in the rear areas where the majority of the killing was taking place, the force would have to conduct a transition to a more traditional role for peace operations, that is, taking action with respect to the conventional belligerent forces, the RPF and RGF. In his operational plan, General Dallaire viewed the cessation of the genocidal violence as a necessary and sufficient precondition to the end of the civil war and a resumption of the Arusha timetable. In his estimation, the RPF would have no incentive or rationale to continue conventional hostilities once the mass violence had ended. Therefore, the intervening force must act to stop the mass killings, and then establish for itself a role as a "conduit" for negotiations between the military forces. This was especially important as the two sides were much more willing to talk to military personnel than to diplomats and politicians. As a "conduit" for negotiations, the intervening force would have to provide a secure neutral environment for the re-establishment of the peace process, and security for the establishment of the Broad Based Transitional Government. As the ethnic violence decreased, the force would have to be prepared to delineate a new cease fire line, establish a new demilitarized zone, and interpose itself between the belligerents.

Having determined the functions and steps necessary for success, the anticipated response in Rwanda from the warring factions must be considered. The intervening force could expect to meet resistance from one or more quarters upon deployment into the country. One of the belligerents, at least, would have been opposed to the intervention, and both may have seen the introduction of a robust force by third parties determined to end the violence quickly as an obstacle to achieving their ultimate goal. The intervening force could expect the population and the belligerents to respond to the force in one of four ways. Either the RPF, the RGF, or both could oppose the intervention force with all of their military capability. A second possibility would be that factions or subordinate units of either the RPF or RGF would oppose the intervention or block intervening forces at certain times or places as the intervening force attempted to carry out the mission. A third possibility was that the force would encounter only sporadic opposition by local relatively unorganized groups. Finally, of course, the force could meet with no opposition.

In the first instance, that of full opposition, General Dallaire thought that the intervening force would have to be led by a self-contained national contingent, with augmentation from other countries. The force would have to make a forced entry by air, be prepared for offensive combat operations, and be supported by an air bridge to Kigali Airport. He felt that only the United States could mount such an operation, but although potentially highly dangerous, he also considered the possibility of full opposition very remote. The political situation in the country and the estimation of the capabilities of the RPF and RGF, (they were fairly astute at estimating their own relative capabilities) reduced the probability of full opposition in the field.

The second possible level of opposition, (blocking movement, small unit attacks and intrusions), would be aimed at influencing negotiations or preventing the intervention force from entering certain enclaves. In such a case, a multinational force under UN direction, entering by air or land, could have turned the situation. This force would have
to be capable of combat, but not have to make a forced entry. It could be supported by national logistic capability, complemented by the US and UN contractor capability once it was established on the ground.

In the third possibility, the original UNAMIR force, backed by broad-based and public political commitment and reinforced by units capable of defensive action to protect population and facilities would have met the requirements and been able to achieve the force objectives. Sporadic local opposition by small ad hoc, uncoordinated bands could have been overcome by a reinforced original UNAMIR. With no opposition to the force, the original UNAMIR forces with slight enhancement of certain capabilities in light weapons and mobility would have sufficed.

Given the nature of the belligerents and the type of fighting that was occurring in the country in early April, the most likely opposition would have been periodic blocking and interference by small organized units from either the RPF or RGF. The UNAMIR Commander's assessment is based on the capabilities of the two forces, their situation in the country at the time, and the examples of the evacuation forces that entered Kigali in April to extract expatriates and the French experience in Operation Turquoise. (These forces, operating with full weaponry and known to the belligerents to brook no interference, were not opposed). The operation, therefore, could have been orchestrated around a multinational force, operating in a phased combat operation to remove the pretext for violence and return the parties to the Arusha Accord timetable. The force employment under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is described below, requiring five battalions of infantry and associated support, (including a small number of armored personnel carriers for mobility, security and "intimidation" value). (See Maps 1, 2, 3\(^8\))

In Phase I of the operation, two battalions would have airdropped in Kigali and secured the capital and the Kigali Weapons Secure Area, (KWSA). Signals intelligence units and special forces teams would have located and silenced the extremist radio stations and repeaters. A third battalion would have moved from Uganda down the eastern side of the country from Gabiro toward Kibungo. These forces would have the objectives of stopping all violence in the capital, returning the RGF and RPF forces as far as possible toward those positions held prior to the 6th of April, and reinforcing the Demilitarized Zone (or establishing a revised DMZ) to ensure separation of the conventional forces.

In Phase II of the operation, two additional battalions would move to secure the northwest portion of the country. One would move south from Uganda through Ruhengeri, focusing on the RGF forces and preventing the spread of violence outward from the capital. The fifth battalion would airdrop in Kigali and move out from the capital to the west in the direction of Gitarama and Kibuye with the same objective. The battalion that secured the eastern part of the country would move into Kigali as the force reserve. This would total five battalions in country, two securing Kigali and the KWSA, two moving to secure the northwest and west, and one in reserve and ready to move by air to reinforce any engaged force or take on other missions. Three battalions would have airdropped, two would have moved into Rwanda from Uganda. Aviation assets would be in position at Kigali airport and associated logistics, engineer, and support staff would have begun to coordinate the security functions for the resumption of the peace process and support of the humanitarian relief effort.
Phase I
Secure Kigali
Secure Weapons Area
Secure East

Map 1
Phase II

Secure West

Map 2
Phase III
Assume Sectors
Secure Southwest

Phase IV, V, and VI
Begin Demobilization
Provide Security
Transition to BBTG
Transition to Chap 6 Force

Map 3
In Phase III, the battalions moving west and south would continue toward Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Butare. With Kigali relatively secure and the force headquarters established, the other three battalions would move out to assume duties as sector headquarters. Battalions would be located with the RPF, the RGF, in a newly established DMZ, and in the vicinity of the refugee camps. One battalion in the vicinity of Kigali would be designated as a reserve. In Phase IV, the priority would shift to control of refugee movement and support of humanitarian aid effort. With the end of genocidal killings and mass violence, the conditions would be set for the implementation of a cease fire and the force headquarters could serve as a main conduit between the military factions involved. The disarmament, demobilization and integration training plans would be revised and implemented. In Phase V, the force would revert to Chapter 6, traditional peacekeeping operations, but would maintain its ability to respond to acts which threaten to disrupt the process or the harm the population, including positioning between the belligerents. In Phase VI, the force would hand over responsibility to a peacekeeping force with a more limited mandate.19

A Different Operational Method20

Some members of the panel took exception to the sequential nature of the plan outlined above. Their objections concerned 1) inability of the force to discriminate genocidal violence from conventional civil war violence in such a situation, 2) the perceptions of support to the RPF that such a sequential plan would create, and 3) the time it would take for the RPF to observe that the genocide was stopped and the question of whether halting the genocide would actually cause the RPF to stop a successful military offensive. Their conceptual objection was that the plan left too much initiative with the belligerents. In their view, leaving political or operational maneuver room to the objective parties in a Chapter 7 peace enforcement scenario posed unnecessary risks to the intervening force itself and placed success in the hands of those who had already demonstrated a disregard for the process.

Even the Rwandese killers had to check identification cards to select their victims and panelists were first concerned that in a highly fluid situation, with troops who could not distinguish any particular side in the conflict and with perpetrators armed with everything from machetes to automatic weapons, the members of the force would only be able to judge victim and perpetrator. Qualification of violence and attribution of motive would be out of their capability, and taking time to establish such factors would slow the mission and endanger the victim and members of the force. If the mission was to stop violence, then all violence had to be targeted by the intervening force. The situation in Rwanda called not for action by large formations of centrally directed troops, but for small, independent units to impose "routine and habitual compliance" with specified requirements for behavior. This complex task requires individual assessment, decision, and response; simple, yet comprehensive Rules of Engagement; and practice in applying the ROE.

Additionally, since the great preponderance of the killing was taking place behind the RGF lines, and since the targeted population was composed of Tutsi and moderate Hutu, (the groups from whom the RPF received support), action to intervene against only
the genocide would have been directed primarily at the government forces and militia, creating the appearance of support for the RPF. Many panelists felt that the only way to achieve objectivity and facilitate long term success was to impartially stop all violent acts, and to control movement of any faction or group, including the advance of the RPF. They were especially sensitive to the paradox the intervening force would face. The government forces stated they were trying to stop the killing, but that the diversion of troops to defend against the advancing RPF prevented them from stopping the genocide themselves. The RPF was reluctant at the time to have any outside force intervene because they were winning and saw no reason to settle for a less satisfactory negotiated settlement with the perpetrators when they had a chance to gain the entire country and bring the killers to victors' justice. Thus, in some panelists' views, there was no guarantee that the cessation of genocide would necessarily lead to the cessation of the civil war and the rebel offensive. The intervening force, if directed in its operations to only stop the genocide, could have run into the unenviable position of having its efforts viewed by the government forces as assisting the rebels, and by the rebel forces as enabling the government to devote more troops to the civil war. For all of these reasons, many panelists argued, not necessarily for a more robust force, but for a more aggressive employment concept.

The concerns raised by the panelists are cogent arguments for the force to be deployed into country simultaneously, most preferably by air, with a mandate to completely shut down any acts of violence occurring in the country. (See Map 42). Policy makers would have to announce that forces were coming into country with the express purpose of 1) interposing themselves between the two conventional combatants, and 2) securing the capital and countryside by imposing a set of behavioral standards on all elements of the population. This would put a premium on the air mobility of such a force, making US participation essential and calling probably for a more mobile core of infantry and helicopters. The total number of 5,000 would still be about right, but the mix of units would be different. The additional risk that the force might face because of its publicly stated mission was addressed by one panel member who had been in Rwanda and observed the reaction to the evacuation forces in early April and to the French in Operation Turquoise in June and July. It was clear to him that a determined, modern force that advertised its mission and its robust rules of engagement had no difficulty in controlling the level of violence. It was only when the extremist perpetrators sensed that the world was not going to react and that UNAMIR's contingents were in a self-protection mode that the genocide began in earnest.

Several senior officers stressed the value introducing the intervening force with a simultaneous seizure of critical physical and functional points (terrain, communications sites, politically significant buildings and people), with overwhelming force to "shock" the participants and seize the initiative. Their professional judgment was that there exists an inverse relationship between the timing and capability of the force and the numbers required. Fewer numbers might be required initially under such a concept, but the participants also generally agreed that the intervening force provides a secure environment for the establishment of political settlement that is perishable, and that delays in achieving political stability will drive force requirements higher over time.
Simultaneous Plan

Assault to Secure Kigali
Block Movement of RGF/RPF
Control/Prevent Spread of Violence in Rear Areas

Map 4
Identifying the Force Requirements

Given that the force would most likely meet blocking operations conducted by factions from among the fighting groups, and that the actions of the force would require units to conduct large scale operations initially, followed by small scale, unit patrolling and security operations, the intervention force would have to have the following capabilities and characteristics.\textsuperscript{22}

The most critical aspect for such a force is the state of its training.\textsuperscript{23} Facing initial opposition, forces must be able to use sophisticated tactics and modern equipment to overcome a dangerous, yet ambiguous and unpredictable threat. In more conventional operations, the threat is generally known, and the adversaries’ plan, tactics, and goals form part of a comprehensive environment that makes military operations more understandable. Units maneuver, engage, assess, and modify their actions based on outcomes related to the two adversaries. In the situation in Rwanda, that may only be the case at the beginning of operations or in one geographic area. Occurring simultaneously with this conventional conflict would be a more difficult set of actions requiring protection of the populace where the intervening force is really a third player. Such situations call for clear understanding of the overall situation, the ability to discern subtle changes in behavior which might be the preliminaries to violence and the disciplined, confident state of mind that can impose order out of chaos. Training for these situations is more challenging, as lower ranking military personnel are asked to make judgments and take actions which may have consequences far beyond what the soldier’s normal day-to-day responsibilities may entail. It requires a knowledge of the situation and the ability to shift mental gears between full scale large unit military operations and small unit, even individual monitoring, intervening, and assistance roles that many military organizations do not provide. The United States and some of its allies have only begun within the last few years to incorporate this type of training into standard unit schedules. It is labor and resource intensive to set up such scenarios, and requires the diversion of resources from traditional training that many consider more critical and more relevant to the military role.

Equally important, the properly trained troops must be supported by a staff that can integrate functions with the political directing authority and the interested countries supporting the peace agreements, (in this case the UN and the Arusha Accords). Planning for such an operation, and commanding and controlling the disparate and complex functions occurring simultaneously poses unique complexities not found in traditional large scale conventional military operations. Staffs must have an appreciation not only of the normal elements that go into military planning, but also of the significant differences which may lie in the criteria for success, the number and goals of the parties, the peculiar methods being used to further their goals, different concepts of strengths and weaknesses, etc. Most importantly, the planning for such an operation must take into account that the increased relative importance of day-to-day political direction. In these types of operations, the policy maker will never turn it over to the military with the admonition to “win it and we’ll sort it out later.” The decentralized actions of small units and individual soldiers may have consequences seemingly out of proportion to their immediate and narrowly defined military effects. The force must expect additional oversight, scrutiny,
and visibility. Planning must include the multinational nature of such operations; rarely will peacekeeping or peace enforcement be conducted by a nation acting alone and/or under its own authority. The necessity for international political sanction will almost certainly include some sort of international organization participation and/or supervision. Therefore planning must incorporate not only the diverse interests of policy makers who have a hand in determining the mission and resources, but must be able to address the diversity in the forces which may be provided. In such a complex operation, communication becomes a critical element to the success of the mission, not only in terms of hardware capabilities, but in terms of ensuring that all members of the mission, (and those observing it), must be clear about the goals, means, and methods to be used, and the linkages between them.24

Therefore robust communications capability, Civil-Military Operations personnel, Psychological Operations staff, interpreters, and an augmented intelligence analysis and distribution cell are paramount. Clearly, the communications capabilities include secure, compatible systems to allow the commanders and staffs to talk with subordinate units, and to speak with UN Headquarters in New York. UNAMIR itself depended on contract and civilian staff for much of its communications. When all but four of those civilians departed, the force was left only with a few Motorola radios and one reliable secure communications system with which to communicate to UN headquarters.

Fire support operations would include normal coordination of close air support, attack helicopters, and artillery and mortars. Clearance of all fires would be an especially difficult task, and terrain management, (positive identification of who is occupying what ground) would be an essential task requiring additional manpower and communications. Units could deploy with organic mortars, however, the employment of any indirect fire weapons in the most densely populated country in Africa would be an extremely sensitive issue.

Limited air defense assets might be required, but suppression of opposition air defense capability would be essential to retain force mobility with its aviation assets and to secure the air bridge to Kigali.

Engineer capability would focus on mobility operations at the tactical level, with a combat engineer unit working in each battalion sector. This tactical capability would be complemented by a construction unit at the force headquarters to undertake critical projects necessary to legitimize the presence of the force and the re-establishment of the peace process. Mobility of the tactical forces and preservation of what little infrastructure existed would be essential in ensuring that the population remains stable and close to its sources of food and security. Explosive ordnance disposal and demining surveys would have to commence immediately.

Reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities would be essential for forces engaged with the opposition as well as for the security of the fixed support sites. If the force were successful in restraining population movement, then the extremist perpetrators would have to move through the countryside and villages in order to find their targets. Dismounted observation coupled with patrolling and presence would play a large part in establishing patterns of movement. Obviously, this gets close to police work, so the need for a substantial link between civilian agencies and the military is crucial.
Aviation would also play a significant role in gathering information, as the terrain and the mission require a significant mobility edge over the perpetrators. Reconnaissance, command and liaison, transport, and attack helicopters would all be essential capabilities for the force.

Since radio played such a crucial part in inciting the violence, the intervening force must have all the electronic support, countermeasures, and signals intelligence capability that it would expect to use in combat. Monitoring broadcasts, locating rogue stations and repeaters, and maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications for the force would be high priorities. In logistics, the units should be self-contained. Rwanda is a substantially landlocked country. Food, fuel, ammunition, maintenance, medical support, and movements control sections would have to be provided. The force could be supported from Entebbe in Uganda or similar sites initially, then as the situation matures, overland transportation could be used for some items. In the case of movement control and medical support, divisions between force sustainment and refugee/humanitarian support functions would require a large commitment and a division of labor for specific units. All personnel should be capable of chemical defense and decontamination, while the use of non-lethal chemicals for crowd control or to subdue isolated small opposition elements would have to receive serious consideration. Here the panelists were very divided. Not only is the use of non-lethal chemicals a legally and morally murky area, given the status of current treaty negotiations, but it also poses operational problems and considerations. The use of non-lethal chemicals such as tear gas may generate rumors and resentment, and would certainly cause counterproductive feeling and misunderstanding among the population.

The sum of these capabilities, inherent in and supporting a modern force of five infantry battalions, results in a force that looks like a modern infantry brigade. A typical brigade would have to be reinforced with additional infantry to achieve the five battalion strength, and significant aviation, staff, and logistics support would need to be added to meet the unique requirements of the situation. However, reinforced infantry brigades with their normal complement of combat support and service support could provide these capabilities. The differences in employment between General Dallaire’s plan and the concepts offered by other panelists result in some variations in the force mix and would of course require different rules of engagement.

As a force structure example, at Table 1 is a depiction of the Division Ready Brigade of the American 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault). This ready force is a capable, potent combat force that possesses a high degree of mobility and is accustomed to conducting and linking small unit operations over a large geographical area. It possesses the firepower, staff capability, and combat, combat support and logistics functions required in either the operational concept outlined by Major General Dallaire or by the other conference participants. The additional infantry battalions required could be added to the force in place of the 105mm artillery and the air defense weapons, (Stinger and Avenger crews), and perhaps the chemical defense company, (although that unit possesses capabilities that could be modified for other tasks). Depending on the assessment by the operational commander, the number of anti-tank missile weapons and crewmen could be adjusted. There would also be space available under the 5,000 troop cap for the additional intelligence, special operations forces, and Civil Military
Division Ready Brigade
4060 Troops

Headquarters

Air Assault
Infantry Bn

Attack Helo
Bn

Assault Helo
Task Force

Artillery
Bn

Fwd Supt Bn
(Logistics)

Air Defense
Battery

Intelligence
Company

Engineer
Company

Communications
Company

Chemical Defense
Company

Military Police
Company

Anti-Tank Missiles 114
Mortars 30
Howitzers 18
Air Defense Missile Tms 24
Attack Helicopters (AH-64) 24
Tactical Lift Helicopters (UH-60) 33
Transport Helicopters (CH-47) 16

Note: For the proposed Rwanda intervention, two more infantry battalions would be added, and the artillery battalion and air defense battery would be deleted. Additional medical, military intelligence, civil-military operations staff, and communications personnel would be added. Special Operations Forces would be required for initial operations.

Table 1
Operations Center staff that would be required. The Division Ready Brigade as currently configured deploys routinely for training from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Fort Polk, Louisiana with their own aviation support, establishing the Brigade in a 24 hour period over a distance of about 450 miles. This operational capability would suffice for deployments to Kigali and the surrounding area from a staging base such as Entebbe, Uganda. Such a force would require approximately 90 to 110 cargo and passenger strategic aircraft sorties to deploy to theater. The CH-47s would have to self-deploy.26

Generating the Force

The window of opportunity offering the best chance for success in Rwanda in 1994 was a small one regardless of employment concept. The conference participants were in general agreement that any action after the last week in April of 1994 would have required massive amounts of force because the situation had progressed to the countryside. Yet this fleeting opportunity was not seized. Throughout the spring and summer of 1994 there was a notable lack of consensus on just what had to be done in Rwanda and how best to go about it. The rapid introduction of force presupposes some definable end to be achieved, and the will to achieve that end in a reasonable amount of time. The participants thought that mandates, without a commitment of resources, are more expressions of moral outrage than political will. Several considerations in the Spring of 1994 combined to prevent generation of either individual or collective political will.

First, any peacekeeping force would have depended on sophisticated transportation and logistics capabilities -- maintained by few nations in the world. The participants thought that for this operation, the participation of the United States was critical.27 However, the United States and several other countries were trying to absorb the lessons of the UN action in Somalia.28 There, casualties, a subsequent change in operations, and political pressure prompted eventual US withdrawal. Additionally in 1993 and 1994, the UN, regional organizations, and interested parties were trying to devise a solution to the on-going wars in the former Yugoslavia. The strategic situation (some called it fatigue, caution, or fear of “stretch”), mitigated against the formation of political will to do anything in Rwanda in the spring of 1994.29

The participants lamented the role of the UN in this case in particular and in peacekeeping/peacemaking in general. One assessed the problems with the UN on both conceptual and practical dimensions. The United Nations, formed at the end of World War II, developed two major aims, 1) to end colonialism and 2) to prevent direct confrontation between the superpowers. In these two areas, the UN has been markedly successful in its role. Sovereignty was a key, inviolable concept, at the UN and deliberation became its institutional hallmark. The UN has operated most effectively to slow the actions of member states, (especially those with the most capability), forestalling a precipitous deterioration in a crisis. Today, however, even in the eyes of UN officials, territorial and political integrity are not the impediment to action that they once were. Indeed, the UN finds itself primarily engaged in disputes within countries. This shift in conceptual framework reflects new demands on the institution and requires structural adjustment, because the UN, in the post-Cold War world, is not equipped to make or
implement rapid decisions that require establishing a physical presence on the ground in a crisis. The political machinery and the logistical and financial structure does not exist to make things happen quickly. The Directorate for Peacekeeping Operations may not even begin contingency planning with regard to a deteriorating situation without Security Council approval.30

Transportation, communications, sustainment, and integration functions are contracted through a laborious competitive system. Crisis staffing is ad hoc and draws from standing organizations, operating on a volunteer or differentially compensated basis.31

The problem faced by current UN policy makers is how to bridge the gap between Chapter 6 missions, (classical peacekeeping within an agreed upon framework), and Chapter 7 missions, (peacemaking or enforcement). The UN lacks a capability to respond when Chapter 6 missions deteriorate into situations requiring Chapter 7 actions and forces. The best solution may be a “force-in-being,” acting at the direction of political decision making machinery that can develop will and devote resources in anticipation of a crisis and which can direct the actions of the force with flexibility required in a dynamic situation. However, the best may not be achievable, and developing the right forces for peacemaking is an exercise in determining the possible, which in the post Cold War world demands consideration of a wider range of options.

As an innovative, (some would say radical) option, the United Nations has been mentioned as an appropriate institution to develop a standing force for peace operations. Generating a force in being has traditionally been the province of sovereign states, and is not an activity that countries view as an ad hoc exercise. They devote considerable intellectual and physical resources to the creation and controlled use of military forces. It is doubtful that in the current strategic setting the UN can achieve the command over resources necessary to establish a standing military force. The sovereign concerns of member states and the current structural capabilities of the UN preclude development of a standing UN force.32

There may, however, be opportunities to link the United Nations staff with standing forces provided by either regional organizations or individual countries. The advantages of this arrangement entail visibility and international political “cover” for the force provider while leaving the burden of raising and equipping the force and its day to day operation in the hands of the provider. Such an arrangement is a plausible compromise that builds on an existing structure and contains sufficient safeguards (rooted in sovereignty) for the forces of the contributing organization or state. Critics might argue that the very safeguards of sovereignty are themselves the main impediments to effective use of international force.

Contributor states or organizations, having developed and fielded forces to accommodate national defense requirements, are reluctant to “a priori” designation or dedication of forces to a supra-national body without adequate guarantees concerning their use. These guarantees often focus on estimates of national interest and/or finances. While some countries may be accused of possessing military capability in excess of national requirements, few, if any, are willing to decrement the forces they have created to defend national interests for a more diffuse, ambiguous use pursuing a supra-national agenda. In a manifestation of this reluctance, it is plausible to assume that countries
which created additional forces, or dedicated or earmarked forces for the UN or other organizations would expect compensation. Compensation and “burden sharing” return the question to one of interest and the ability to mobilize support within a global organization for intervention in local crises with ill-defined interests for the members.

Regional forces such as NATO could provide a feasible solution to the UN connection. The most obvious advantages are inherent in “closeness” — a closer relationship with the parties most likely to have a stake in a successful peacekeeping or peacemaking outcome, better defined interests, more obvious justification for creation and use, less incentive to build excess or inapplicable capabilities. Regional forces possess inherent knowledge of local problems and languages, have fewer problems in acclimatization or culture, and can exploit the synergy that comes from working with allies bound by shared economics, culture, and interests. Secondary benefits include training, interoperability, and confidence building measures enjoyed by all the participants in the force. There are significant obstacles, however. The very stake in the outcome that regional participants have in a conflict may lead to misuse of the force for other agendas, or hindrances to its effective use. Disinterested parties from distant countries are sometimes better peace enforcers or peacekeepers. Secondly, building and training such a force is a costly undertaking. Confidence building and interoperability take significant effort to achieve -- NATO is a fifty year work in progress that requires constant maintenance and still, as in the case of Yugoslavia, is subject to significant internal strains. Third, few regions have the military capability to deploy or sustain such a peacekeeping or peacemaking force for the significant period of time it takes to achieve indigenous momentum toward stability. Finally, such an effort may be viewed by some as an excuse by the developed world to wash its hands of problems, (many of which had partial origin in colonial practices), in the less developed regions. The final paradox, pointed out by one panelist, is that the very regions where a force may be required are composed of countries in dire financial, social, and political straits, who would be hard pressed to participate without assistance.

One solution to the problems facing establishment of regional peacekeeping forces is to create a “regional plus” force. The African Crisis Response Force is an emerging case in point. Indigenous regional forces can be trained in peacekeeping and combat skills. The capabilities they lack are transportation, intelligence, logistics, and communications, which could be furnished by another nation. Thus the “on-the-ground” resources would be provided by those who stand the most to gain from regional stability, while technical support is furnished from other countries, (some of whom may be ex-colonial powers) who can maintain a discrete distance from any hostilities.

Yet the “regional plus” option contains its own set of difficulties. Countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where such forces are proposed, may perceive “regional plus” as a way for the developed world to 1) shift the risk of casualties to poor countries or 2) maintain a de facto veto over the use of regional force through the retention of certain key capabilities. Evidence of an analogous perception is growing at the UN where, for lack of resources, developing countries cannot maintain personnel in New York to work on the UN military staff. The staff is populated by western and northern officers, and may lack the perspective of the regions where it is most likely to implement
its plans. Clearly, there is a greater opportunity for resistance to intervention if there is a perception that it is designed and run without some regional input.

The paradox is that sometimes a single nation with credibility can be as effective, or more so, than an international organization. Much depends on the situation and the history of the conflict. Ultimately, a force such as was required in Rwanda may be the purview of a “lead country.” If questions of operational goals, force generation, deployment, employment and engagement require a unitary actor to answer them in sufficient time to make a difference, then countries like the United States, France, Britain, and a few others must recognize that their services will be in demand. This is not to say that only western democracies can, should, or will perform the bulk of future operations like the one in Rwanda, but their capabilities are indispensable. To be sure, intervention forces that incorporate wide participation send a strong message to their intended audience that the world community has a stake in successful outcomes. But incorporation of wider diversity in the intervening force as a criteria carries a set of disadvantages, as discussed, which must be balanced against the advantages. In the final analysis, to be effective, “somebody’s got to be in charge,” and those who would call the shots generally have to put up a large percentage of the resources. This represents the history of many UN military operations, and the “sanctioning,” “licensing,” or underwriting of a major power to execute UN missions is a situation which is comfortable for many nations and offers a good chances for success. The difficulty is that this system does not move the conceptual framework for peace operations very far forward and it leaves cases like Rwanda in an orphaned status unless and until the UN or other parties can persuade potential lead countries to get involved.

Conference Conclusions

In conclusion, the panel made the following observations:

1) A force such as the one outlined by Major General Dallaire could have made a significant difference in Rwanda in 1994. The force would have had at least 5,000 personnel, depending on the method of employment, armed with all the required equipment and capabilities to employ and sustain a Brigade in combat. Intervening forces require strategic direction allowing the commander the latitude to increase or decrease the degree of force used to contain the spread of violence. Rules of Engagement must be flexible and understood to permit the intervening force to instantly respond to or preempt violent acts. “...[R]ather than really using deadly force, the most important point is to be able to do it.” “Dr. Perry’s comment.” [referring to the Dayton Accord Implementation Force, or IFOR], “about the ‘toughest, meanest dog’ was right on the mark.”

2) There was a window of opportunity for the employment of such a force, from about 7 April to 21 April 1994. During this time, the political leaders of the violence were still susceptible to international influence. A rapid introduction of robust combat forces, authorized to take decisive combat action to simultaneously seize critical points throughout the country would have changed the political calculations of the participants. The opportunity existed to prevent the killing, interpose a force between the conventional combatants and reestablish the DMZ, and get the negotiations back on track. Additional
forces may have been required to solidify the initial success and maintain order. Consequences and the commitment to see the action through must have been a consideration.

3) Generation of a force with the necessary capabilities requires participation of a modern, sophisticated national military force -- in this case US participation was essential -- to lead the generation of resources, provide critical functions, and achieve mission goals.

4) For the foreseeable future, "lead countries" will provide the best arrangement for achieving peacekeeping mission goals. These lead countries should operate under the mandate of a UN Security Council Resolution, but with executive authority to determine intermediate goals, objectives, and methods.

5) The roles of the UN and other international organizations need better definition. Supra-national organizations like the UN, alliances like NATO, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations are now widely involved in preventing or ameliorating conflicts. Operational definitions contained in such standing documents as Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter do not address the "gray areas" where dynamic situations move along a spectrum requiring support to diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping, to peace enforcement capabilities. Functional integration of these participants, and of the capabilities for generating forces, mandates, and political will require study and articulation. If international organizations are going to be involved in crisis situations on an operational basis, their intelligence capabilities, staff planning techniques, and decision making procedures require overhaul. Intelligence capability, critical to the anticipation of events, development of effective options, and the marshaling of resources, is the most glaring deficiency.

6) There is potential in the creation of a standing peacekeeping force and the delineation of capabilities, responsibilities, and parameters surrounding the use of force in such situations. Organizations like the Baltic Battalion and the Nordic Brigade indicate that there is more room for developing standing military organizations at lower levels and training them for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For the present time, however, those types of organizations must be integrated into a larger framework that will still be dependent on the capabilities of a lead country.

7) In such operations, the "uncertainty principle" reigns. "We must always understand that there are 2nd and 3rd order consequences . . . and we must consider potential unintended outcomes and account for them." Troops must go in "as part of a larger concept, with the required 'civilian implementation' resourced, organized, energized, and clearly behind." "A force inserted into this situation can quell the violence . . . and sometimes enable a political [solution] to be found, but it does not guarantee it. A military force can produce stability [for a time], but it cannot produce normalcy."
Appendices (B, C, D, and E were provided to conference participants as background material prior to the session).

A. Conference Participants
B. Geography
C. Population, Culture and Economics
D. Infrastructure and Military
E. Chronology
ENDNOTES


2 UNAMIR Situation Reports and correspondence between the field, UN Hqs, and among UN agencies are archived in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Office, UN Headquarters in New York. The RPF Battalion in Kigali was to secure the opposition leadership during the establishment of the Broad Based Transitional Government, (BBTG). They were not to be demobilized/integrated with the new Army prescribed in the Arusha Accords until well into the transitional period.


5 UNAMIR’s mandate was reduced to 270 personnel but never fell below 450 troops because of the requirement to secure the airport as a logistical terminus and to secure almost 25,000 refugees and internal displaced persons (IDP) at the Kigali stadium, the King Faisal Hospital, major hotels, etc.


8 It is difficult to demonstrate an empirical link between timing of intervention and reduction of the spread of conflict. Success results in a “non-event.” However, practitioners and observers acknowledge an intuitive attraction for the concept. “A timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the international community could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis,” Brian Urquhart, quoted by Senator Carl Levin in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces, Committee on Armed Services, International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, 103rd Cong. 1st sess., July 14, 1993, p. 38. Scholars, observers, and practitioners have differing views on the rate of the spread of violence in the Rwandan situation and the length of any intervention “window.” However, even those who have reservations about how much time was available to intervene do not reject the existence of a window of opportunity for action. The debate about the size of the opportunity has never questioned the existence of the opportunity.

9 United Nations and Rwanda, pp. 14-36, and UNAMIR Situation Reports.


11 Ibid.


13 “Fear and Food,” Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1996, and “All Aid is Political,” Chester Crocker, New York Times, Nov. 21, 1996. See also Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder,

14 Adapted from a briefing presented by Major General Romeo Dallaire, Canadian Armed Forces, at Georgetown University, January 23, 1997, at a panel discussion concerning military options in Rwanda in the Spring and Summer 1994. Subsequent concepts are reported from conference participants, who participated on a non-attribution basis.

15 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Harm Than Good," SAIS Review, Vol. XVI, No. 1. (Winter/Spring 1996), pp. 221-240 provides a very interesting look at the perceptions and actions taken by the parties and the outside participants in Rwanda. The combination of pressures and the differences in perceived costs and alternatives between the mediators and the extremists contributed to the establishment of measures that went far enough to threaten the ruling elites, but not far enough to preclude their resort to violence to retain their power.

16 Chapter VI of the UN Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," enjoins the parties to an international dispute to "first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means." The UN Security Council can recommend or implement supportive actions, such as the establishment of UONOMUR, or UNAMIR, when one or more of the parties report failure in their peaceful efforts to resolve the dispute. Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," provides a basis for greater action. Article 42 enables the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." For the development of the mandate that authorized UNAMIR see United Nations and Rwanda, Documents 19, (Letter from the Permanent Representative of Tanzania transmitting the Arusha Peace Accords), pp. 169-201, especially the role envisioned for the "Neutral International Force," pp. 193-198; Document 21, pp. 217-220; Document 23, (the Secretary General’s request to establish UNAMIR), pp. 221-231; Document 24, (the Security Council Resolution 872, authorizing UNAMIR), pp. 231-233; and General Romeo Dallaire, "Force Directive No. 01, Rules of Engagement," unpublished draft UNAMIR document dated October 1993. It should be noted that General Dallaire’s Rules of Engagement were submitted in draft to UN Hqs for approval but were never approved.

17 Hon George Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State, “I think the French presence has been extremely critical in helping to arrest the erosion of the situation." in US Senate, Crisis in Central Africa, p. 18.

18 The Academic American Encyclopedia (Electronic Version), copyright 1993 Grolier, Inc., Danbury, CT. The maps are extracted using Microsoft Powerpoint. Military graphics are the author’s, based on General Dallaire’s operational plan.

19 For analysis of military roles, functions and missions in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, see Andrew J. Goodpaster, "When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions," A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington, D.C., 1996.

20 Adapted from conference participants’ comments on Major General Dallaire’s plan.

21 Grolier, op.cit.


25 Provided by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bolger, Operations Officer, (G-3) of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, April 10, 1997. This is intended to demonstrate only the capabilities that can be incorporated into a force of 5,000 troops as a generic example. It is not intended to argue the
this particular Division, the United States Army, or the United States were or are the best or only solution for missions of this nature.

26 Provided by the Air Force element, G-3, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, May 1997.

27 Frank Wisner, Undersecretary for Policy, Department of Defense, “We are, to all serious peacekeeping undertakings in this world, the central element. There is no getting away from that,” in US Senate, International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, p. 13.

28 Senator Feingold, “One of the reasons that we did not act quickly in Rwanda is because of what happened in Somalia, that the people of this country feel that somehow they were burned by showing compassion,” in US Senate, Crisis in Central Africa, p. 39.


30 Conference participant.

31 Conference participant. For the argument that intervention works and that a unitary oversight body operating under a coherent framework is essential, see Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, “Making Peace Settlements Work,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 104, Fall, 1996, pp. 54-71, and Goodpaster, op. cit.

32 Ingvar Carlsson, “The U.N. at 50: A Time for Reform,” and Ruben P. Mendez, “Paying for Peace and Development,” Foreign Policy, No. 100, Fall 1995, pp. 3-18 and 19-32, respectively. For the debate concerning competing interests, values, and the sovereign vs. supra-national issues, see Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” and Tony Smith, “In Defense of Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, November December 1994, pp. 20-33 and 34-46 respectively. In an exchange of letters between Senator Carl Levin and Principal Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocum addressing UN capability to approve NATO airstrikes in Bosnia, Slocum (July 14, 1993) described the request procedures through the various military headquarters and then stated, “We have no way of knowing of course, how long the Secretary General might deliberate before rendering his decision. The UNSYG’s decision-making process, not NATO/UNPROFOR command and control procedures, are the “long pole in the tent.”” in US Senate, International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, pp. 32-33.


35 In July and August 1997, US Special Operations Forces began missions to train contingents from several African countries in preparation for their participation in the force.

36 Conference participant.

37 One conference participant noted that intervention on a global scale requires a type of military culture that few countries have cultivated. Most of the world’s militaries have been constituted with a priority on
territorial defense and political integrity, (with the latter perhaps getting too much attention in certain quarters). Few countries teach their soldiers broad concepts of law, society and interest that provide the basis for disciplined action in far-off, unfamiliar, ambiguous, and dangerous situations like the one in Rwanda. See Moskos, op. cit.

38 Conference participants.
39 Conference participants.
Brigadier General Henry K. Anyidoho
Commander
Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Brigade
Idris Barracks
Kumasi, Ghana

Major General Romeo A. Dallaire
Chief of Staff
Assistant Deputy Minister, Personnel
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Major General (Ret) John Arch MacInnis
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Brigadier General Bruce Scott
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HQDA, ODCSOPS (DAMO-SS)
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Major General Franklin van Kappen
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New York, NY 10017

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P.O. Box 515
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Casimir Yost
Director
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Colonel Scott R. Feil, US Army
Senior Service College Fellow
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1316 36th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20007
Situation Material  
(data appropriate to 1994)

Geography

Rwanda (Map 1) is a landlocked sub-Saharan country about the size of Vermont, (approximately 10,067 square miles or 26,000 square kilometers) The terrain is composed of volcanic rock and soil, with high steep mountains in the west, descending gradually to the east through a central plateau region and then through broken and rolling hills to savannas in the far eastern portions of the country. The population refers to Rwanda as the “land of one thousand hills.” There are numerous small lakes and marshes, especially in the east. The highest peak is Karisimbi, located in the west, at 14,782 feet, (4,507 meters). Kigali, the capital in the center of the country, is at 4,700 feet, and is surrounded by low hills which average 5,576 feet. Lake Kivu is the highest lake in Africa. The country is bounded by Uganda in the north, Lake Kivu and Zaire in the west, Burundi to the south, and Tanzania to the east. Although one of the most deforested countries on the continent, more than 10% of Rwanda has been set aside as park, nature, or game preserve, which are primarily located on the eastern and western borders of the country. The bulk of the population lives on the central plateau. What forest remains is interspersed with communal compounds called rugo and associated agricultural fields scattered throughout the hills.

The high altitudes moderate the equatorial climate. The average annual temperature in Kigali is 19° Celsius and the annual rainfall averages 85 millimeters on the central plateau. The elevation combined with the rainfall patterns contribute to the terrain differences; mountainous equatorial jungle in the west and savanna in the east. The geography and the climatic conditions have had an effect on population distribution as will be seen below. There are two rainy seasons, (October through June) and a short dry season, (July through September). Daily amounts vary, but the rains can be torrential.
II. Population, Culture, and Economics

A. Population. While the national census in 1991 produced a population figure of about 7.5 million, the CIA estimated in 1992 that the population was significantly larger, at 8.2 million. It is the most densely populated country in Africa, (Map 2) with an average of about 271 people per square kilometer. The range of population density (persons per square kilometer), is from 820 in the north (in and around Ruhengeri) to 62 in the southeastern savanna. There are pockets of extremely dense population (over 500 persons per square kilometer), in and around Butare in the south and around Cyangugu and Gisenyi at the southern and northern ends of Lake Kivu, respectively. However, 94.6% of the population lives in rural areas. The various estimates on the ethnic makeup of the population run in the range of 85-90% Hutu, 9-14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. The population speaks the same native language (Kinyarwanda), and French is also spoken. Forty-eight percent of the population is under the age of 15. The literacy rate for the population overall is 56% with fewer women able to read or write than men. While 71% of school age children attended primary school in 1991, only 8% continued into secondary school and less than 1% went on to college or university education. More than 20% of the sexually active adults in the urban areas are infected with HIV. By the year 2,000, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Rwandans will die from AIDS. Other diseases afflict the population, most of which are waterborne and parasitic. Amoebic dysentery, bilharzia and respiratory infections such as tuberculosis are prevalent. In 1992, 1.5 million Rwandans were without any access to health care, 2.6 million were without potable water, and 3.2 million had no sanitation facilities. The life expectancy for Rwandan males is 49 years. These are the following sub-groups related to military age and potential for service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>13-17</th>
<th>18-22</th>
<th>23-32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>459,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>542,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>471,000</td>
<td>387,000</td>
<td>566,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cultural conditions and economic activities of the Tutsi (primarily herdsmen), and Hutu, (farmers) described in detail below, have led to an uneven population distribution. In order to avoid tsetse fly concentrations around the lowlands, thereby preserving the health of their herds, the Tutsi have tended to concentrate on the highlands and central plateau. Conversely, the Hutu farmers and coffee and tea growers have tended to settle in the lowlands where adequate rainfall and relatively steady climate conditions can produce up to three growing seasons a year. However, the rugo or household compounds which dot the hills are intermixed.

B. Culture. Despite common language and shared religious tradition, there are important cultural distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi which have practical political consequences. These cultural distinctions reflect historical, rather than ethnic or genetic
cleavages. Most of these fissures within Rwandan culture can be traced to the bases for wealth, class and status which were apparent when Europeans arrived in the 19th century, and which were institutionalized by colonial masters during the early 20th century. The Twa population sub-group first inhabited the area and are still engaged in hunting and gathering activities. Hutu clans began to migrate into the area around 1,000 AD, and established an agricultural base, exploiting the rich volcanic soil. Around 1500 AD, Tutsi herdsmen began to move into the area in large numbers. This was a relatively peaceful migration, with initial interaction based on comparative advantage and barter. Cattle products and use of land were traded for agricultural products. However, as in much the same way as other large migrations that have occurred in the world, economic interaction was followed by conquest and a stratification of society. Tutsi warlords gradually assimilated Hutu clans, and one Tutsi clan in particular began to unify the diverse small enclaves. Concurrently, Tutsi-established military and organizational capability, coupled with the remote location of Rwanda, tempered some of the exploitation and slave trading that afflicted the more accessible areas of Africa. Local settlements were mixed, with a complex web of patron-client relationships between members of clans and between clans and family groups and political organizations of neighboring _rugro_. These relationships could cross Tutsi-Hutu bounds, with responsibilities for farming, land management, and war and security generally, but not always following the Tutsi-Hutu cleavages. There is evidence that movement was possible between groups, depending on the ability to acquire and hold on to cattle. Thus, Tutsi who lost their herds and reverted to agriculture moved down the social and political scale, and Hutus who acquired cattle could move up. There was and always has been significant intermarriage, and the tracing of ethnic heritage can be arbitrary, especially considering that Rwandans do not normally carry family names. This little known fact will play an important part in subsequent investigations into the 1994 violence. At the time of European discovery and domination in the mid- and late 19th century, the area was governed by the Tutsi minority through a monarch.

When Europeans began to interact with and control the region, they found it convenient to govern through the existing power distribution. The Germans and (after World War I) the Belgians governed Rwanda, in the former case as a colony, and in the latter under a League of Nations mandate, and then as a United Nations trust. The existing divisions became identified, for good or ill, with what some would call a social Darwinist outlook prevalent in the late 19th century. Tutsis, reported at the time, (although this is now under dispute), to be somewhat taller and lighter skinned, and based on their more recent migration to the area from the north, were regarded as related to Ethiopians and more akin to Europeans on the racial scale then in vogue. Hutus, generally shorter, more thickly muscled, and darker, fell lower on this scale. Occupational divisions between cattle raising and agriculture seemed to reinforce the European view of the herdsmen Tutsi as noble and intelligent and the Hutu farmers as deserving peasants. Therefore it was convenient and intellectually consistent to consider the existing distribution of wealth and power in the country as evidence of a just and "inevitable" system. Beginning in the 1890s, the Germans exploited the standing organizational and military capability of the Tutsis and assisted them in integrating the
rest of the country. The northern regions around Ruhengeri, with a substantial Hutu majority, were not incorporated into Rwanda proper until Germans, assisted by Tutsis and some Hutus from the central part of the country, attacked and occupied the area, completing this process just prior to W.W.I. The Hutus there, with a more recent independent past and memory of subjugation by both Tutsi and southern Hutu, identify themselves as a distinct group and bear historical animosity to southern Hutu. This happens to be the home region of President Habyarimana.

Awarded custody of Rwanda in the aftermath of World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations, Belgium introduced a series of identity measures and cards which the population were required to carry. Citizens were required to identify themselves as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. The identity cards carrying the ethnic group of the bearer, coupled with clear preferential treatment of Tutsi, tended, over time, to solidify the division of the population and reinforce their identity with a particular sub-group as a primary means of determining life situation and outcomes of interaction. As the country began the slow process of modernization under European tutelage, education, jobs, government training and positions were given to Tutsi. Politics on the continent reflected the politics of the European administration, and thus the Tutsi identified with the Belgians. Belgium continued a substantial relationship with Rwanda, but the identification with the colonial past and Tutsi domination has limited their influence with the Hutu government since independence. Additionally, when war broke out in 1990 between the RGF and RPF, the Belgians were required to withdraw because of constitutional constraints. This vacuum was filled by the French, who have come to be identified with the Hutu majority. Francophone Rwandan Hutus are supported also by Zaire, while the Tutsi led RPF gets much support from Anglophone Uganda. Thus, the cleavages in Rwanda society intertwined with the regional political divisions and reflect some of the surrounding countries’ political interest as well as the local priorities of the Rwandans themselves.

The last cultural comment concerns the consumption of alcohol. Beer brewing is a major economic activity and the consumption of beer carries cultural significance. Beer is sipped through straws from a communal bowl at all ceremonies, and is used to consummate and celebrate everything from betrothals to business deals. Public intoxication is not an occasion for shame, but carries connotations of wealth, power, and manhood. This has significant implications for any person or group attempting to influence or control violent behavior.

C. Economics. Rwanda made significant economic gains during the period 1976 - 1990, when per capita GDP growth gained 12 places on the world scale, while the surrounding countries registered either zero net gain or a net loss of as much as 20 positions. World institutions viewed it as a model developing country with a manageable debt and the capability to integrate and progress with the global market economy. However, only about 4% of Rwandans operate within the modern economic sectors. Over 93% are involved in agriculture, higher than other sub-Saharan countries, and most exist at the subsistence level. The next biggest employer is the government, with 50,000
administrators at the national and local level, and 5,000 or so additional in the active military.

The primary revenue generating activity is cultivation of coffee and tea. There was also a significant tin ore mining operation, but it recently shut down. There is no large scale manufacturing. Small electrical appliances, a few other inexpensive consumer goods, and beer are produced. In 1992 the GDP by sector was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (included in Total Industry)</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the collapse of the coffee market in the late 80’s and continued low prices for the only substantial cash generating activity, Rwanda’s GDP continued to contract during the early 90’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Real Growth Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coupled with a population growth rate of about 3.3%, and the fact that Rwanda grew only about 85% of its required food supply, the country appears to be in the classic pattern of an agriculturally based developing country in a global market economy with no comparative advantage. The country imports food, energy, and capital. Inheritance laws and custom require the division of family land into smaller and smaller plots for sons to cultivate. Social upheaval prior to 1994 displaced farmers, and the collapse of coffee markets forced more and more land into subsistence farming. Population pressure has pushed cultivation upslope, where erosion has created serious environmental problems.

The upshot of these factors has been a decline in the quality of life for most Rwandans. There has been uneven progress and performance in the areas of job creation, nutrition, health care delivery, sanitation, education, etc.

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Infrastructure and Military Forces

A. Infrastructure. Rwanda has no railroads and only eight airstrips. Of the eight airstrips, three are paved, but none is over 3,600 meters in length. Only the airport at Kigali is capable of any large volume of air traffic, and servicing inter-theater airlift. Rwanda has 460 km of paved roads, primarily those connecting Kigali and most of the prefecture capitals. The remaining roads vary from gravel/improved earth (1,725 km), to unimproved earth (2,700 km), to forest tracks. None of the roads will sustain heavy traffic by armored vehicles, and the dirt roads are always susceptible to the rains. In fact, overland transportation is so rudimentary that, coupled with the transit costs through Zaire and Tanzania, much of Rwanda’s trade is transported by air. Previous military and humanitarian missions to the area have been carried out from bases in Uganda, usually Entebbe. Rwanda produces a minimal amount of electricity, (30,000 kW capacity, or 15 Kwh per capita). Construction of buildings is usually local material of bricks, wood, cement, etc., with no dominating structures in any of the towns.

Two AM radio stations (including RTLM, the Hutu extremist station), and one FM station are based in Kigali. The FM station has 7 repeaters. Television is not a communications factor. One Indian Ocean INTELSAT and one SYMPHONIE satellite serve Rwanda.

B. Military Forces. The country has made recent purchases of small arms, mortars, and ammunition from Egypt (March 1992, small arms and ammunition worth $6 million), and South Africa, (October 1992, small arms, ammunition, grenade launchers etc., worth $5.9 million), France has provided a significant amount of financial and other support. The military was organized as follows: (battalion sized units are manned at between 500-800 personnel, companies at between 100-200):

- The Presidential Guard, (battalion size), best equipment, pay, training
- One Commando Battalion
- One Para-Commando Battalion
- One Reconnaissance Battalion
- One Artillery Battalion
- Eight Infantry Companies
- One Engineer Company
The RGF had the following heavy equipment and weapons:

- Reconnaissance vehicles 28 (12 AML-60, 16 UBL M-11)
- Armored Personnel Carriers 16 (M-3)
- 81 mm mortars 8
- 83 mm rocket launchers
- 105mm Howitzers 9

Aviation
- CH-47 helicopters 2
- SA 3-116 helicopters 7
- SA 342 helicopters 6
- Britten-Norman Islander Fixed wing A/C 2
- Counterinsurgency A/C 2
- Civil Aviation A/C available 2
- No armed or attack helicopters

The Rwandan military (Rwandan Government Forces, or RGF), was a minimally capable force, outmanned by and probably not as well trained as the Rwandan Patriotic Front, (RPF, with about 12,000 personnel). Early western estimates put the formal organization of the RGF at about 5,200 personnel, with an additional 1,200 gendarmerie. There was no civil police force, and the gendarmerie, for all intents and purposes, was under the control of the army. (These figures from open sources in the US and UK do not correspond with estimates of the UNAMIR staff and reports to the UN by the RPF and RGF). In the spring of 1994 as part of the peace accords concerning integration and demobilization of forces the RPF and RGF reported their military manpower at 23,000 and 20,000, respectively. During the period leading up to the crisis, the gendarmerie was expanded to between 4,000 and 6,000. The total RGF forces available from all organizations according to the UNAMIR commander was about 28,000 to 30,000. The *interahamwe* also constituted a significant force and a major military concern. In 1991 the government instituted a policy of providing one gun to units of every ten households. These *interahamwe* received some training, many groups maintaining a working relationship with local military units over a period of three years. No precise numbers of these armed “militia” exist, but given the reports of the Rwandan Government as part of the Arusha Accords, and the observations of the UN, NGOs, and others, there were an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 *interahamwe*. They were armed with a variety of weapons, ranging from clubs and machetes through hunting rifles to modern assault rifles and grenades. They appeared to be under no consistent chain of command, sometimes cooperating with the formal military, the RGF, sometimes working at the direction of local political authorities, sometimes reacting to the exhortations of RTLM, the Hutu extremist radio station.

Historically, foreign military support has played a large role in Rwandan conflicts. From independence, Belgium inherited a role as Rwanda’s principle military supporter,
UNAMIR and UNOMUR Deployment as of December 1993

Map 3
### UNAMIR

Deployment schedule and strengths by month - military component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>PHASE 1 Preparatory</th>
<th>PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government</th>
<th>PHASE 3 Demobilization/Integration</th>
<th>PHASE 4 Electoral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-DAY</td>
<td>D-DAY</td>
<td>M-DAY</td>
<td>D-DAY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE HQ</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIGALI SECTOR HQ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIGALI INF BN</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIGALI UNMOS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ SECTOR HQ</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ INF BN</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ PL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ UNMOS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMO GROUP HQ</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR SECTOR</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF SECTOR</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVT. SECTOR</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGR COY</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG COY</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED PL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOV CTL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>2248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with NMOG II and UNOMUR.

**Table 1**
but this role ended in 1990 when the civil war began. Belgium’s constitution prohibits supporting parties to a conflict. The French replaced the Belgians and provided not only financial support and some weapons, but also trained Rwandan units, advised the military leadership, and provided troops. Three hundred French troops were in country in 1990 at the outbreak of the civil war. The French then reduced their forces to 170 during this stage, but Rwanda received additional support from 500 troops sent by Zaire. Zaire withdrew its force after allegations of abuse and lack of discipline. The 170 French soldiers remained the major foreign military presence until the RPF offensive of February 1993 when the French increased their strength in the country to 670. In December of 1993, following the deployment of UNAMIR, all French forces were withdrawn.

C. Rwandan Patriotic Front. In contrast to the RGF the Rwandan Patriotic Front (the rebel force of Tutsis and Hutu moderates) was better trained, experienced, and supported. The RPF had assisted in the revolt that brought Museveni to power in Uganda, and had a broader political and ethnic base than the RGF. Despite the more inclusive nature of the RPF, it operated along more disciplined lines, which can in part be attributed to its goal of taking control of the country through conventional combat. The RGF, by contrast, was poorly disciplined, had less combat experience, and was distracted through the arming and training of loosely organized *interahamwe*.

D. General Military Situation. (Map 3). In the Spring of 1994 the most significant concentration of military forces was in and around Kigali. The RGF’s best troops, the Presidential Guard, the commando and recon battalions, the artillery battalion, and the aviation were stationed in the city, at the airport, and at the Kanombe military base next to the airport. UNAMIR stationed the Belgian battalion in Kigali, along with the UNAMIR HQ and the Special Representative of the Secretary General. (Table 1). A 600 man battalion of RPF troops, one of the best of the rebel force, was in the capital to begin the integration of the Presidential Guard. The rest of the RGF was mostly concentrated around Ruhengeri in the northwest, monitored by a battalion of Bangladeshi troops from UNAMIR. Farther to the east, the Ghanaian battalion of UNAMIR was stationed with the RPF. The UNOMUR observers in Uganda (by then integrated with UNAMIR), were still on station ensuring that no cross border movement went unreported. All these troops were primarily infantry. The armored and mobility equipment on both sides and in UNAMIR was in short supply and maintenance and operator training was poor. Any outbreaks of violence were sure to be small foot-mobile actions, and the response would have to come the same way. This put a premium on intelligence. Although not called for in the Secretary General’s request to establish UNAMIR, and not a specific part of the mandate, the Belgian contingent deployed a small intelligence section as part of its contingent.

A significant consideration for military forces was that a large percentage of the population was constantly on the move due to political violence. At times more than 1 million people were moving to avoid persecution and violence. Based on the political situation, the level of violence in any particular region, and humanitarian assistance, these flows were initiated and then reversed, degrading the economy, providing cover for
violent groups, and exposing the refugees to additional exploitation and violence. Much of the killing that occurred in the Spring and Summer of 1994 took place at road blocks as people tried to avoid the war between the RPF and RGF or the spreading attacks by interahamwe.

In January 1993, 300 people were killed in ethnic violence in the northwest. This prompted the offensive by the RPF to occupy parts of Ruhengeri and Byumba prefectures. As a result almost 1 million people were displaced. The French increased their forces by 300. A cease fire was concluded in mid-March and the French then withdrew their reinforcements. As a result of the cease fire and international efforts, 500,000 displaced people returned to their homes. In mid-October 37 government party (MRND) supporters were killed near Ruhengeri. UN personnel in the area reported the continued operation of armed groups throughout the northwest portion of the country. In November RPF forces attacked, ostensibly to prevent more killing. The cease fire was re-established, but sporadic violence by local armed groups continued up to April 6, 1994, when the President’s aircraft was shot down.

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Chronology¹

1918: Under the Treaty of Versailles, Ruanda-Urundi is made a League of Nations Protectorate governed by Belgium. They are administered separately under two different Tutsi monarchs.

1926: Belgium introduces a system of ethnic identity cards.

1933: Census of Rwandan population is carried out using identity cards that identify the ethnicity of the bearer.

1957: The Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus, (PARMEHUTU) is organized.

1959: The Tutsi king dies, and Hutus use the occasion to rise and kill thousands of Tutsis. Many flee to surrounding countries.

1962: Rwanda gains independence from Belgium. More killing follows independence and more Tutsis flee the country. A Hutu majority government (PARMEHUTU is the controlling party) comes to power.

1963: Further massacres of Tutsis occur, this time in response to military attacks by Tutsi expatriates in Burundi.

1967: Additional massacres of Tutsis occur.

1973: Tutsis are purged from universities and other institutions, coupled with fresh violence against the Tutsi minority. The Chief of Staff of the Army (Juvenal Habyarimana) comes to power with a pledge to restore order. He institutes a policy of ethnic quotas for public service employment, (the largest sector of the economy after agriculture), wherein Tutsis are restricted to 9% of available jobs.

1975: Two years after seizing power, Habyarimana forms another movement, the MRND, (Mouvement republicain national pour la democratie et le developpement) and begins to funnel government largesse to his Hutu homeland in the north, excluding other Hutus and Tutsis. This continues for 20 years, and is used as a wedge between the two disadvantaged groups.

1986: Exiled Rwandan Tutsis assist Museveni in the successful overthrow of Milton Obote in Uganda. They then form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), but include moderate Hutus in the organization.

1989: Coffee prices collapse on the world market, gutting the Rwandan economy and further exacerbating tensions between Hutus and Tutsis.
July 1990: Western aid donors pressure Habyarimana to accept the principle of multi-party democracy.

1 October 1990: RPF invades Rwanda from Uganda. Hundreds of civilian Rwandan Tutsis are subsequently killed in reprisals for the invasion. French and Zairian troops assist the Rwandan government, and push the RPF back to the border area.

26 October 1990: Meeting in Zaire, the two sides agree to a cease-fire, but it is repeatedly violated.

20 November 1990: The government of Rwanda and the RPF confirm the initial cease-fire and agree to the presence of OAU (Organization for African Unity) observers.

1900/1991: The Rwandan army begins to equip and train militias and para-military organizations known as Interahamwe ("Those who stand together.") There is no physical or institutional movement on establishing democracy. The press and opposition are controlled and intimidated, and killings of Tutsis continue in separate incidents around the country.

19 February 1991: The OAU, UNHCR, and governments of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire sign the Dar es Salaam accords which provide for the voluntary repatriation of refugees.

29 March 1991: Rwanda and RPF sign more comprehensive N’sele cease fire agreement.

September 1991: Increasing cease fire violations are addressed with the amendment of previous documents.

November 1991: Hostilities and violence increase between Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis.

March 1992: Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) sign agreement with Egypt for $6 million worth of small arms, mortars, rockets, grenades, and mines. The deal is underwritten by France.

12 July 1992: The parties agree to the deployment of a Neutral Military Observers Group to the areas between the Rwandan Army and the RPF.

October 1992: RGF signs $5.9 million agreement with South Africa for mortars, grenades, and small arms ammunition.


8 February 1993: The RPF launches a new offensive in northern Rwanda. The on-going negotiations are suspended.
21 February 1993: The RPF offensive is stopped outside Kigali, the capital, only with the help of French troops. RPF controls significant territory, and announces a cease fire.

22 February 1993: The Rwanda government announces a cease-fire. Uganda and Rwanda request UN Security Council observers along their border areas.

4 - 19 March 1993: The UN dispatches a good-will mission/fact-finding tour to Rwanda. During this period, the cease-fire is formalized, peace talks resume, and the Security Council passes the request for peacekeepers to the Secretary General.

16 March 1993: Peace talks resume in Arusha, and will continue until June 1993.

18-25 March 1993: The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs conducts a visit to Rwanda and prepares a request for international aid.

2-6 April 1993: The Secretary General dispatches a technical team to assess the conditions and requirements for possible deployment of observers along the Rwanda-Uganda border.

8-18 May 1993: The UN continues to investigate human rights abuses, and prepares the political ground for the deployment of observers.

20 May 1993: The Secretary General proposes the establishment of an observer force along the border, within Uganda, (United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, UNOMUR).

14 June 1993: The Government of Rwanda transmits a request, (signed by the Government and the RPF), to the UN for the stationing of a neutral international force within Rwanda upon the signing of a peace agreement.

22 June 1993: The Security Council passes a resolution establishing UNOMUR for a period of six months.
4 August 1993: The government of Rwanda and the RPF sign the Arusha peace accords which provide for the following:

- Habyarimana agrees to power sharing with the Hutu opposition and the Tutsi minority
- establish a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) within 37 days
- the BBTG will exist for a period of 22 months
- hold elections by the end of 1995
- RPF is to be merged with the Rwanda Army
- Presidential guard is to be merged with Rwandan elite forces and reduced

The agreement calls for the deployment of an international neutral force of 2,500 to maintain peace in Rwanda.

11 August 1993: The UN receives a special report from its mission of 8-17 April detailing widespread human rights violations and possible genocide.

18 August 1993: UNOMURs advance team arrives in Uganda.

19 August - 4 September 1993: The Secretary General sends a team to Rwanda to assess the requirements (mission needs and force size, etc.), for the force called for in the peace accords. The Security Council and the Secretary General urge the combatants to observe the Arusha accords even as deadlines for the establishment of the transitional government slip by without either side taking action. The reconnaissance element spends two weeks on the ground making its assessment, however, the report takes an additional 3-4 weeks to wind its way through the UN channels in New York.

24 August 1993: The Secretary General requests a force be deployed inside Rwanda to observe the implementation of the Arusha accords, (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR), and recommends that UNOMUR eventually be integrated within UNAMIR. The recommended force is to include two infantry battalions of 800 personnel each and total 2500 troops.

30 September 1993: UNOMUR becomes fully operational with 81 personnel. The major contingent is a company of Tunisian troops.

September 1993/March 1994: While no progress is made in implementing the accords, training of the militias continues and radio stations with ties to the government incite Hutus to kill Tutsis. Concurrently, hard-line Hutus within the major political parties isolate and vilify moderates. The hard-liners eventually control the parties, and target former moderate Hutu members (often including President Habyarimana) as subservient to the RPF.

5 October 1993: The Security Council passes a resolution establishing UNAMIR for six months, and provides that its mandate will expire after elections scheduled for October
1995, but no later than December 1995. The Security Council authorizes the Secretary General to deploy only one of the requested infantry battalions.

21 October 1993: A coup d'état takes place in Burundi, and hundreds of thousands of refugees flee into Rwanda.

22 October 1993: UNAMIR Commander arrives in Kigali.

27 October 1993: UNAMIR advance party of 21 personnel arrives in Kigali.

23 November 1993: The Special Representative of the Secretary General arrives in Kigali.

30 November 1993: The Belgian battalion deploys to Kigali with 403 troops. They are assigned to Kigali with the operational name of “KIBAT” (Kigali Battalion).

December 1993: RPF battalion of 600 troops reports to Kigali as part of the force integration under the Arusha Accords. In December the first contingent of troops from Bangladesh (485) arrives.

10 December 1993: The Special Representative convenes a meeting of the Government of Rwanda and the RPF after which the two parties commit themselves to establishing a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) by 31 December 1993.


30 December 1993: The Government and the RPF fail to meet the previously agreed upon deadline for establishing the transitional government. In a progress report to the Security Council, the Secretary General assesses the situation as extremely fragile, and requests authority to deploy the second infantry battalion. The situation is such that any reduction to the planned force level or any change to its planned introduction would signal lack of interest and resolve and deepen the crisis.

5 January 1994: The incumbent head of state, General Habyarimana, is sworn in as President of Rwanda. No further progress is made on the transitional government because of disputes over the composition of assemblies and other organizations and the deteriorating security situation.


January 1994: Throughout the month, the UN applies pressure to adhere to the accords. The Security Council accelerates deployment of UNAMIR forces amid intelligence reports that the Interahamwe are planning mass killings of opposition leaders and Tutsi
citizens. Additional troops (369) from Bangladesh arrive. The Bangladeshis are operationally called the RUTBAT, (positioned in Ruhengeri with RGF). In January and February UNAMIR prevents the delivery of four planeloads of arms for the RGF, and places the weapons under the joint control of the UNAMIR-Rwandan Government. The main road from Kigali to Mulundi (the RPF headquarters) in the north is mined and the mines are only removed after significant pressure is exerted on the government.

11 January 1994. UNAMIR reports to UNHQ intelligence that indicates a plot to kill large numbers of Tutsi in Kigali and the existence of arms caches to carry out this plan.

12 January 1994. The Special Representative of the Secretary General and the UNAMIR Commander inform President Habyarimana that they know of the plot, that this would constitute a serious breach of the peace accords and that the Security Council will be informed if the actions are carried out.

3 February 1994: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations authorizes UNAMIR to assist the Government of Rwanda in the recovery of illegal arms.

7, 10, and 13 February 1994: The Special Representative convenes meetings with the parties after which a new deadline of 14 February is set for the establishment of transitional institutions.

18 February 1994: After the 14 February deadline is missed, and with prodding form the Security Council, a new date of 22 February is set.

21 February 1994: Violence breaks out in Kigali, including the assassination of a government Minister, disrupting efforts to meet the 22 February deadline.

25 February - 25 March 1994: Repeated attempts to get the transitional institutions installed meet with failure. Lists of proposed assembly members fail to meet with approval of all parties concerned.

28 February 1994. By the end of February 800 Ghanaian troops have arrived. They are operationally called the BYUBAT, (Byumba Battalion, monitoring the RPF). UNAMIR is authorized to redeploy 200 troops from the Ghanaian battalion from the DMZ in the north to Kigali to stabilize the situation.

22 March 1994: UNAMIR completes Phase II deployment with a strength of 2,539.

6 April 1994: The Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, returning from another round of talks in Tanzania, are killed when their plane is shot down on final approach to the Kigali airport. Within one hour sporadic killings begin. The airport is sealed and UNAMIR forces are prevented from gaining access to the crash site.
7 April 1994: Organized bands of Hutu extremists conduct house to house searches, setting up road blocks and killing identified Hutu opposition, human rights advocates, and Tutsis. UN troops stand by and follow their “monitoring” mandate. The Prime Minister (Agathe Uwilingiyimana), and ten Belgian troops sent to protect her, are disarmed, tortured and murdered.

8 April: The RPF launches an offensive in the north and moves toward Kigali to link up with the 600 RPF troops that are in the capital as part of the Arusha peace agreement. The stated RPF objective is to stop the killings. UNAMIR attempts to secure a cease fire, protect civilians and UN staff, and provide humanitarian assistance.

8-12 April 1994: An interim government sets up in Kigali but leaves the capital the next day as RPF forces close in. Humanitarian workers are evacuated from Kigali. As a result of the murder of the Prime Minister and the 10 Belgian peacekeepers, on 12 April Belgium announces it will withdraw its battalion, stating that they are exposed to unacceptable risk. The RPF demands that all foreign troops leave the territory of Rwanda.

15 April 1994: The foreign minister of Belgium recommends that UNAMIR be disbanded and withdrawn. The Secretary General proposes three options for adjusting UNAMIR’s mandate to the Security Council. Option 1 (the SG recommendation), is massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and expansion of the mandate under Chapter VII to stop the killings. Option 2 is to reduce UNAMIR to about 250-270, and task the force to serve as an intermediary between the RPF and RGF. Option 3, specifically not recommended by the SG, is the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

21 April 1994: Unable to reach a consensus on a program for action, the UN does not enlarge the UNAMIR mandate. Instead, reflecting the concerns and actions of the member nations on the ground, the Security Council authorizes the reduction in UNAMIR force levels to about 250.

30 April to 17 May 1994: The UN spends six weeks organizing response to the violence. Two sticking points surface. The first, use of the word “genocide,” is sensitive because its use will obligate the UN to intervene. The second is the composition and funding of the force entering the country. On 17 May the Security Council adopts resolution 918, authorizing the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 personnel, renamed UNAMIR II, and mandating it to provide protection to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk, while supporting relief efforts.

22 June 1994: The UN, unable to cobble together and support an appropriate African force, authorizes the French to deploy to southwest Rwanda, (Operation Turquoise). The French, commencing operations with Senegalese troops on 22 June and deploying further into southwest Rwanda on 9 July, meet with mixed success in preventing killings.
June and July 1994. When it becomes clear that the French will not assist the RGF in repelling the advance of the RPF from the east, the RGF makes a decision to withdraw to the northwest toward Goma, Zaire. The government controlled radio continues to inflame the population and spread fear of continued killings by the Hutus, and as the RPF advances, reprisals by the Tutsi and the RPF. The RGF and the interim government conduct this operation, covered by the mass movement of the population, toward the northwest. With the population on the move, there are continued instances of military forces, Interahamwe, and ordinary citizens, setting up roadblocks and checkpoints, separating out targeted groups and killing them.


18 July 1994. The RPF declares a unilateral cease-fire and the civil war aspect of the conflict ends.


July 1994: Hutus continue to flee the country with estimates at Zairian border crossings exceeding 1.5 million in a two week period. Aid agencies are faced with a dilemma of feeding some Hutus who were responsible for the genocide. Many pull out when refugee camps are organized along military lines by de facto Hutu leaders, and training and arming continues in the camps. Killings and reprisals continue in the refugee camps. Two and one half months after the Security Council has authorized a UNAMIR II force level of 5500 troops, no additional troops are on the ground. On 31 July the French begin to withdraw Operation Turquoise forces.

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Addendum

Essay on Intervention and Strategy: Implications for the Army

The preceding paper, developed while attending the Senior Service College Fellowship at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, was designed to answer a specific set of research questions dealing with military intervention in a specific intrastate conflict. Those questions did not deal directly with the concept of strategy and the “ways, means, and ends” of foreign policy, but during the supporting conference on the subject it was clear that questions of strategic policy were always on the participants’ minds. During the course of my research and conversations with foreign policy practitioners additional questions which had direct bearing on “ways, means, and ends,” arose. These questions were compounded by my participation in the Strategic Crisis Exercise which was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership from 12-27 March 1997. While Rwanda in 1994 serves as a single data point, from which it is dangerous to draw generalizations, the combination of the comments of the US Army senior leaders at the conference on Rwanda and the performance of my classmates and me at the SCE made a significant impression. I believe there is a mismatch between 1) our national security strategy of engagement, 2) the derivative military strategy of shaping, responding and preparing, (conducting a significant number of operational deployments in less threatening situations), maintaining the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major conflicts, and 3) the paradigm that has emerged as the doctrinal pattern for using US military forces -- particularly the Army. Specifically, I believe that simplistic application of the Weinberger doctrine and the Powell corollary undermine the Army’s ability to meet the demands of the national military strategy on the ground and undermine the ability of the Army to articulate its role as an essential component of US military power.

The US national security strategy and national military strategy are both sound and logically consistent statements of how the country intends to achieve national security goals. The President’s stated policy goals and enjoy the wide support of foreign policy practitioners and scholars from across government and academia. Indeed, while there are constant debates about supporting initiatives, (expansion of NATO, the best way to engage China, etc.), there is little argument with the stated overall objectives. There are however fundamental concerns about the resources devoted to achieving our goals. The Defense Department and the Services are not the only developers/executors of foreign policy that have experienced resource shortfalls since the end of the Cold War. The State Department also suffers from the closure of embassies and missions, reductions in functions and, this year, zero recruiting. There are sections of the world where there are no embassies or official US representatives, and others where established embassies and staff are sometimes accredited to six countries. It is hard to shape, respond, and prepare for crises in areas of the world where one ambassador, staff, and military attaché have to divide their time over six countries.

The national military strategy, with its emphasis on fielding highly trained, deployable, lethal forces with every possible technological advantage is an effort to maximize potential advantages while minimizing the constraints that a small force
imposes. The prospect of encountering “two Major Regional Contingencies” is a rational planning assumption, based on our global interests and the potential adversaries we may face in the near to mid term. It is reasonable to assume that we would have advance warning of a coordinated effort by two of our antagonists to launch simultaneous operations against us in widely dispersed parts of the world, and have time to develop plans and devote resources to a different strategy. It is also reasonable to suppose a more likely scenario would posit that actions by one adversary may precipitate opportunistic action by another. The only argument one may have with the conceptual framework is the amount of time the US military assumes it will have available to reposition forces. (One must also overlook the historical evidence from W.W.II that the US military may suffer a plummet in morale and significant disciplinary difficulties when repositioning forces from one theater to another). The real, everyday subordinate concepts we use to think about deployment, engagement, success, and reuse of military forces are the ones which I think are disconnected from our use of the term strategy and the “ends, means, ways” framework.

In my observations and recordings of the participants in the conference on Rwanda, and in my years dealing with my contemporaries as we came up through the ranks, it is clear that the US military has taken the Weinberger doctrine to heart and adopted his criteria as a way to ensure that we do not experience another debacle such as Vietnam or Lebanon. It seems many of us have committed them to memory. The conference participants and my contemporaries are quick to point out two of the salient features of the Weinberger doctrine; the imperative of public support, and the concept of the end state.

I will stipulate that public support is necessary to the conduct of a successful military mission especially if that mission is expected to continue, or if casualties are imminent. (Can anybody explain the uproar over Somalia, or the lack of note with which the one year IFOR mission was extended into SFOR, without addressing the difference in casualties? Several military and civilian leaders I have spoken with lament the inability of the US to stick things out because of the relative value of American soldiers’ lives compared to others. They perceive that American soldiers are worth more instrumentally to our adversaries, and understandably, worth more intrinsically to us). The military and our civilian masters have come a long way since 1975. We have grown justifiably cautious. But we in the military should be reminded every so often that the “Offices of Political Will Assessment” are located on the north side of the Potomac, not within the walls of the Pentagon. I found it somewhat disturbing that military leaders should be comparing and grading administrations on their capability to mobilize public opinion as a parameter to developing military plans. We should describe options and methods in terms understandable to the civilian and describe risks in clear terms. As was pointed out in the SCE by the mock congressional hearings, our civilian leaders want to know, “What will it take to be successful, how much will it cost, and how long will it take?” Even though our answers may not be comfortable for the Army as an institution, many times we will be told to “move out and draw fire,” sometimes before the polls come in, and sometimes despite what they say. Just as we are on guard against mission creep from our civilian leaders, we in the military must avoid creeping infringement on the legitimate responsibilities of those civilian leaders to assess public will and make policy. One only
has to look at the history of the French military, from the North African situation of Admiral Darlan in W.W.II, through the “wake-up call” of Dien Bien Phu, to DeGaulle’s Algerian crisis, to see a military that learned only too well to be politically sophisticated.

At the same time, we ought to guard against the idea that when we have public support, we have unlimited latitude. Otherwise we will squander our hard learned lessons of Clausewitz’s trinity. We must have constant political oversight. The notion that diplomacy ends when war begins and vice versa is only operable when unconditional surrender is the stated goal. One only has to look at the situation in Northern and Southern Iraq today and wonder about the fact that General Schwarzkopf left his Department of State Political Advisor at headquarters when he flew to Safwan. (In fairness to General Schwarzkopf, the National Command Authority was less than forthcoming with guidance about how to handle the politically significant negotiations that he conducted). “Political will” must be a necessary condition for successful military operations, but the services must use caution in assessing, developing, and incorporating political will in designing military options for the policy maker.

This leads to the second of the oft-repeated platitudes of Secretary Weinberger’s framework, i.e. the emphasis on “end-state.” Unfortunately, this has become a prostituted short hand for “timeline,” often used when the task of developing a true end state in strategic or policy terms is in the “too hard box.” This is not solely a military strategy problem, but it reflects a tug of war between the policy maker and the military professional. In recent policy discussions about employment of military forces, the civilian leaders ask the military, “What can you do for me?” and the military, much to the frustration of the civilian, responds, “Anything you want me to do.” This thrust and parry reflects their respective responsibilities and their upbringing. The decision maker wants the military to come with in with some options which can be weighed and assessed in a comprehensive approach to problem solving, (although some would say too often as a stand alone expedient measure). The military wants to be told what the goals and objectives are, and then to be able to work up the best possible option to fit the situation. Both use respectable ways to approach their responsibilities but they talk at cross purposes. The senior policy official would be happy to be given three square pegs from which he would select one and then massage it into a round hole. The military advisor thinks that is destructive of the force and prefers to hand the “heavy thinking” back to the civilian. And so the best that they can agree on, and one that is easy to articulate, is the “end state” as “end date.” This is almost always a compromise between strategic or policy requirements, and what is possible in the absence of a strategic/political consensus. So the end state as end date is almost always too short to get the job done. Hence we have missions renamed, headquarters changed, flags raised and lowered, and the same troops doing the same job. This is an unnecessary obfuscation, required only because of the inability to mobilize public support around a defined objective.

The preoccupation with fragile public will, (or the inability to mobilize it or keep it mobilized), and the end state, has led to the Powell corollary, which is the doctrine of winning quickly, with maximum force, to minimize the cost both to the force and the public. This is a perfectly plausible, and rational goal. It fits the American way of war and the situation in which we find ourselves as a military and a body politic at the end of the 20th century. It is not a strategy.
Strategies link ends, ways, and means. When the means, or resources, do not exist to achieve all of the desired ends, then ways must be devised, modified, or redirected to achieve the goals. Without this step, the unpleasant alternatives are to give up some of the desired ends or devote additional resources to the achievement of the ends. The "two MRC" way is an attempt to achieve ends, (our security in a world likely to experience two widely separated, yet nearly simultaneous threats to that security), with limited means, (our current force structure and doctrinal approach to conflict). However, the conventional thinking among many military officers has taken this framework and, through their experiences of Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, etc., reduced it to a series of convenient platitudes.

The upshot of the convenient shorthand is an Army that may present "sandbag" policy options to civilian leaders in the guise of strategic contribution. In the case of Rwanda (and Yugoslavia), the conventional wisdom held that ethnic conflicts are unpredictable, intractable, and that only massive force can prevail. Yet an examination of the evidence demonstrates that there was ample warning, as in other situations, that Rwanda was about to fail. Certainly during the Cold War, we kept our attention riveted on the internal political conditions in every country in the world. Examination of the cases of ethnic violence also demonstrates that there is always a window of opportunity to influence leaders, sometimes with force and sometimes with other policy options. Yet the military policy offered is often one of "you can't use this level of force because you haven't made the case to the people." Of course, as the policy maker goes through the persuasion wickets, the situation worsens and the amount of force required always rises. At some point the level of force required to salvage the situation outweighs the original interest at stake, and so the reluctant factions within the policy making machinery win by default. In the case of Rwanda, we didn't prevent the slaughter of half a million, but we went in and swept up the pieces. In Yugoslavia, we participated in the establishment of a comprehensive, yet fragile peace after most of the damage has been done. (Some argue that the final moves in ethnic cleansing are being conducted under IFOR/SFOR noses, due to the "freedom of movement" clause. But at least they are doing it without violence). To paraphrase Senator Kerry, we are faced with the choice of gunboat, or lifeboat, diplomacy, because we can't seem to act in the middle range. Situations must either be so bad that we launch the entire military in a clearly prescribed manner to overwhelm the problem, or it is described as being too ambiguous, and therefore we can do nothing.

This inability to measure force against interest was most clear in the Strategic Crisis Exercise. Here I can only speak from my personal observations in an unclassified manner. Suffice to say that the first MRC to break was in an area of relative secondary importance and in which we had an ample alliance framework to handle the situation. Yet, guns were sounding, and like all good tactical troops, we marched to the sounds of the guns. They marched so well that the ground forces left in the United States to respond to any other contingency amounted to four heavy brigades. When the second contingency broke, in an area vital to the United States, the decision makers were faced with difficult disengagement operations, (both politically and operationally) in the first theater, so they could marshal the forces for the second contingency. The overwhelming force applied in the first contingency was well in excess of that called for in contingency
plans. While these contingency plans, by design, did not address the exact situation presented to the students, they could have been modified easily, and left adequate forces in CONUS and elsewhere to respond to the second contingency. In fairness to the students, and as an example of how the assumptions inherent in the Weinberger/Powell doctrines influence and reinforce our strategic thought, the simulations we use to train our tacticians, operators and strategists, including the one used for SCE, place a premium on the employment of overwhelming force. Little credit is given by a computer for innovation, initiative, or imagination, but they are great at comparing force ratios and executing loss programs.

This atmosphere of avoiding the middle ground and the middle conflicts makes choice somewhat easy, but not always of service to either the Army or to the nation. I strongly support the concept that ground troops are America's decisive capability. But, as one Rwanda conference participant noted, "These missions eat up force structure." I am concerned that our 18th century concerns with expenditure of an expensive, well trained, premium force will lead us down a path where our Army will be sorely stressed and perhaps broken. If we continue down the path that we are on now, the best that we can hope for is that we will be outsold and outbid by our sister services in the resource battles. While they can be rightly criticized for overselling their capabilities, (and using military contractors to make their case), the view from other branches of government is that the Air Force and Navy are offering a "can do" attitude while the Army is always the operationally reluctant partner. Of much more concern is that we will become the mincing, reluctant army of the 21st century. When we come up against an adversary who is willing to shed the blood of his soldiers for his goals, we may not be an institution tough enough to prevail. We are an institution that teaches the exploitation of success, yet we seem reluctant to embrace these difficult middle ground missions for fear of what they may do to the force.

To conclude, I want the Army to succeed and be recognized for its contributions. Successful organizations get additional work and get additional resources. My concern is that while we have received the additional work, which we have performed superbly, our public ruminations about appropriate missions and our underlying assumptions about strategy and the use of forces are in need of adjustment. I believe that our warfighting focus is appropriate, but our recognition of utility at lower levels of conflict and measured applications of force is still not what it ought to be for the 21st century.

1 This Addendum addresses questions of strategic interest to the US Army and is submitted as part of this paper in fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the US Army War College. It is not intended for distribution with the original paper, published by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.