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UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

WHERE ARE WE?
WHERE ARE WE GOING?

by
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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: United States Support for United Nations Peace Operations: Where are We? Where are We Going?

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The United States is now the only true super power and finds itself wrestling with its new leadership role. One area that the United States is searching for clear policy guidance is in peace operations--specifically national and military strategy and doctrine as it pertains to supporting United Nations peace operations. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are two vitally different roles requiring different forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively.


The United States military is making an attempt to establish peace operations doctrine in Joint Publication 3-07.3 and Army Field Manual 100-23. America cannot police every Third World skirmish, but it must ensure that when it commits troops they are used intelligently, with the correct doctrine, with clear military objectives, and with the proper training and equipment.
BIODIFFERENTIAL SKETCH

Colonel Michael A. Collings (MBA, Sul Ross State University) has been interested in the United States support of United Nations peacekeeping operations since he was stationed in the Republic of South Korea in 1984, flying F-16 aircraft. Col Collings has followed U.S. involvement in peace operations throughout his career and instructed tactical air operations in low intensity conflict at the United States Air Force Fighter Weapons School. His command experiences include command of two different squadrons from 1988-1991 and most recently as commander of the 325th Logistics Group, Tyndall AFB FL. The Colonel just completed an overseas trip, studying operations other than war to include operations Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and United Nation’s Protection Forces in the Balkans. He is a graduate of USAF Squadron Officers School, Air Command and Staff College, and National Security Management, National Defense University.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The end of the cold war brought about many changes in the world. No longer does the United States face the centralized threat of the Soviet Union. The United States is now the only true super power and finds itself wrestling with its new leadership role. Suddenly the United States is thrust into a "new world order" where the Third World has become the centerpiece of American national security strategy (18:1). The strategy of "Soviets first" dominated American national security interests and policy for over 40 years. Today, America's economic and security issues with Europe and Japan remain important, but the thorniest and most time consuming security issues are Third World problems. These problems range from humanitarian relief to proliferation of nuclear weapons. These regional Third World conflicts have become the basic conceptual building block of United States military strategy (2:3-4). Specifically this paper will address the United States national and military strategy and policy as it pertains to peace operations in support of the United Nations. I will accomplish this by defining the three peace operations, and discussing potential problems with United Nations interpretations. Next I will review the current United States national and military strategy and doctrine as it applies to peace operations. Lastly, I will use the United States' current strategy and assess future requirements—a need for change or status quo.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The notion of peacekeeping operations conjures up many different images and different types of missions. The United Nations under its 1945 Charter has the power to prevent and stop aggression. Article 42 of the United Nations' Charter provides for the Security Council to take "such action by air, sea, and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". Throughout the history of the United Nations over 550,000 United Nations' troops have been deployed to stop the spread of conflict (11:23). Now, instead of stopping the spread of conflict, we use the term peacekeeping--the politically correct term. The term peacekeeping was first used in 1956 in conjunction with disengagement of forces after the Suez Canal conflict. The United Nations force was used to supervise the withdrawal (14:2). A situation very similar to the United States' role in the protection of United Nation's peacekeeping forces withdrawing from Somalia. So what is really meant by the term peacekeeping? Until United Nation's Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to expand the United Nations' peacekeeping role into the peace enforcement business, United Nations' peacekeeping operations had two broad tasks. These tasks were to supervise the implementation of an agreed upon peace settlement or cease fire and/or to prevent/contain hostilities, clearing the way for a negotiated peace settlement (11:24).
The United States has supported peacekeeping operations since shortly after World War II. Some activities have been in support of both United Nations and non-United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, passed by the United States Congress, is the public law that governs the United States Peacekeeping participation. The United Nation's Act also limits the United States military personnel to 1000. This limit has never been repealed (14:1). The Secretary General has added a new twist to the traditional and accepted definition of peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace" (4:204). A close look at Boutros-Ghali's definition reveals that he expands the traditional definition of peacekeeping. The implication is that peacekeeping forces can now be inserted into an environment where they will be required to perform peace enforcement operations. However, Boutros-Ghali does not address the term peace enforcement anywhere in his 17 June 1992 report "An Agenda for Peace". This is not an oversight by the Secretary General but rather a conscious decision to delegate all peace operations into the category of peacekeeping. The danger is that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are two vitally different roles requiring different forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Because
of these recent changes to the definition of United Nations' peace operations, it is imperative that the United States fully understand which type of operation it is supporting.

When choosing to support a United Nations' peace operation, the United States must correctly identify and define the proper operation and its requirements and then choose the correct tool. There are three basic tools of peace operations--peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement. Matching the wrong tool to the correctly identified situation or vice versa could be devastating. Therefore, it is critically important to understand the difference between these tools.
CHAPTER III

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH UNITED NATION’S DEFINITIONS OF
PEACEMAKING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, PEACEKEEPING

The accepted United Nations definition of peacemaking is a
diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to agreement. The
process may occur while fighting is ongoing and will include
actions such as investigations into fighting activities, making
suggestions on cease-fire arrangements, demilitarized zones, and
so forth. Peacemaking will also consist of mediation such as that
conducted by former United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
in Bosnia and Croatia in January 1992 (13:16). Peacemaking may
also occur prior to hostilities as a preventive measure.
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has said that preventive diplomacy
is separate from peacemaking and occurs before conflicting parties
come to blows (13:15). This idea creates another category of
peace operations which may not be productive. Peacemaking can
occur before or after hostilities, but it is diplomatic action
only and does not use military force. The use of military force
to create a cease fire is peace enforcement.

What separates peace enforcement from peacemaking is the use
of military force. What separates peacekeeping from peace
enforcement is that peace has previously been reestablished.
These two basic concepts are fundamental. In peace enforcement,
combat between two or more parties is ongoing. The peace
enforcer's mission is to cause the combat to cease. Another
characteristic of peace enforcement is that one or more of the combatants desire combat to continue (13:22). If this were not the case, then there would be an absence of war. The peace enforcer is not unanimously invited by all involved parties, which means that the peace enforcer is not welcomed by all and may be opposed by all. Because the peace enforcer's mission is to end combat, the status quo will be altered; and the peace enforcer's actions will not be viewed as neutral. As a peace enforcer, you will lose your neutrality (13:25). Lastly, the force composition for peace enforcement will be different than the traditional peacekeeping missions. The troops will be combat troops equipped with an offensive firepower orientation and will be able to conduct offensive and defensive operations. There will be a requirement for a greater number of troops, requiring a larger logistical tail. As a result, peace enforcement operations will be the most costly of the three tools, which is probably why it is unlikely to be undertaken strictly as a United Nations operation (13:26).

Peace enforcement is also more difficult to execute. Many peace enforcers will find their job to be analogous to insurgency-counterinsurgency missions (13:25). Therefore, realistic training scenarios are a prerequisite for any peace enforcement force. To sum up peace enforcement, according to Frank G. Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, it is armed intervention, involving all necessary measures to compel compliance with United

According to Dr. Donald Snow of the United States Army Strategic Studies Institute, the basic premises of peacekeeping are: fighting has stopped and both or all parties desire the presence of the peacekeeping force—the peacekeepers are essentially invited guests. Consent of the parties is crucial to the peacekeeping mission. The warring factions have agreed that the absence of combat is preferable to the continuation of hostilities. The combatants are receptive to the peacekeepers primary mission—facilitation of a peace process by keeping them apart. The peacekeeper is a nonpartisan force, neutral and fair to both or all sides. To act another way would prejudice their mission and result in their being disinvited by the party perceiving the unfairness. The peacekeeping mission is relatively straightforward and simple. Force requirements are rather small, lightly armed and defensive in nature. Logistical support is usually passive and not burdensome. What this equates to is an inexpensive, low-risk operation that is very attractive to the underfinanced United Nations (13:25-26). On July 14, 1993, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner told the Senate Armed Service Committee, "Peacekeeping actions are generally noncombat military operations to monitor an existing agreement, undertaken with consent of all major belligerent parties and conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations' Charter" (17:1). There is, however, a major threat to a peacekeeping operation.
If a peacekeeping force is mobilized to a true peacekeeping situation, its mission is reasonably straightforward, simple and easy to accomplish. But when peacekeepers are mistakenly put into a peace enforcing situation or a peacekeeping situation that has regressed back to hostilities, a very dangerous and often untenable situation arises. Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacekeeping, referenced earlier, expands the concept. Traditional peacekeeping adhered to the preconditions of no fighting and a unanimous invitation. Boutros-Ghali expands peacekeeping thinking into the realm of peace enforcement. The thought that peace enforcement is a linear extension of peacekeeping will confuse roles and forces and result in non-mission accomplishment and the loss of lives. Nowhere is this misalignment of mission more apparent that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers in a war zone in Bosnia. They are in a peace enforcement role and have not performed up to the task committed before them. UNPROFOR was destined to fail because the United Nations inserted them into a situation where they were not manned, trained, equipped, or organized to succeed.
CHAPTER IV

CURRENT UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY
AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

National Strategy

Assume that the current Administration has a working knowledge of the tools of peace operations. Where then, does the United States stand on supporting Boutros-Ghali’s expanded view of United Nations peace operations? What is the United States national and military policy and doctrine?

President Clinton addressed his administration’s strategy on peace operations in the White Houses document “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”, dated July 1994. In this document the President states that the nation must be prepared not only for major regional contingencies but also for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution. This support will be primarily composed of United States capabilities such as lift, intelligence, and global communications. The strategy document goes on to say that “in some cases their [combat units] use will be necessary or desirable and justified by United States national interests.” Peace operations are an important part of the United States National Security Strategy. The strategy document states that peace operations, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, are the best way to prevent, contain, and resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly. The President’s strategy also calls for the United States to use its influence on the United Nations and other member states
to ensure that the United Nations undertakes only peace operations that make political and military sense (15:13). The inference is that the United States will only lend its capabilities to United Nations Peace Operations when it is in the best interest of the United States to do so.

The current administration is also changing its policy toward the amount of the United Nations budget that will be borne by the United States. Currently the United States pays 31.7 percent of the United Nations peacekeeping costs (7:1). The July 1994 version of "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" states that the United States is committed to working with the United Nations to pay all of its bills in full. The caveat in the July 1994 strategy is that the United States is also committed to reducing their proportional assessment for peace operation missions (15:13). The latest edition of the Clinton Administration's strategy of engagement and enlargement, February 1995, contradicts the July 1994 document by stating "The United States will reduce our peacekeeping payments to 25 percent while working to ensure that other nations pay their fair share" (16:16). On 16 February, 1995, the United States House of Representatives approved a bill to further cut United States payments for United Nations peacekeeping efforts from 25 percent to 20 percent. This bill is also seen as an effort to bolster the military and fight the growing influence of the United Nations over America's troops and budget (12:1).
Continued analysis of the July 1994 and the February 1995 Administration's national security strategy documents reveals a change in policy with regard to the blueprint guiding consultations with Congress. The 1995 document no longer lists the command and control of United States forces as an area open for consultation with the United States Congress. The 1995 document adds, however, a policy stating that Congress is critical to the "resolution of funding issues which have an impact on military readiness" (17:17).

In 1993, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of the United States' peacekeeping policies and programs. The policy review culminated with a Presidential Decision Directive entitled "The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." The President’s policy addressed six major issues of reform:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support.


3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in United Nations peace operations.

4. Reforming and improving the United Nations capability to manage peace operations.

5. Improving the way the United States government manages and funds peace operations.

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress, and the American public on peace operations (5:1-3).
The President's policy is not in conflict with the basic military strategy of winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously as was established in the Bottom Up Review. The policy states very clearly that improving the United States' capabilities for peace operations will not weaken other tools for achieving United States objectives. The policy also states that the United States does not support a standing United Nations Army or identifying specific United States military units for participation in United Nation's peace operations (5:3).

In the area of command and control, the President's policy retains and will never allow command authority over United States forces. There are times, however, when the President will consider placing United States forces under the operational control of another United Nations military commander. This Presidential Decision Directive emphasizes that there is "nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of United States forces" (5:9). Also, the introduction to this Presidential Decision Directive states that as a result of a policy review, a comprehensive policy framework was developed. There is nothing comprehensive about this policy directive. In the January 1994 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, President Clinton is quoted in an address to the United Nations saying "If the American people are to say yes to United Nations peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no" (2:65). This policy statement puts decision making in the hands of the United Nations. The United Nation's track record is not
particularly great when it comes to picking areas of involvement. To assure future success the United States must take the lead, which in turn dictates that the administration must lay down some clear, unambiguous policy guidance.

**Military Doctrine**

There are only two Department of Defense organizations that have addressed peacekeeping operations at any length. They are the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publication 3-07.3 and the United States Department of the Army in *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* and *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations*. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, United States doctrine has defined peacekeeping as "military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement" (21:1-1). Joint Publication 3-07.3 also says that United States peacekeeping operations will follow diplomatic negotiations and agreements among the belligerents, the sponsoring organization, and any nation contributing forces concerning who will provide peacekeeping forces as well as the make up of those forces. There are three broad roles the United States may perform in peacekeeping operations. They are providing financial and logistic support, providing individual observers, or staff
personnel, and providing peacekeeping forces (21:I-2). Of the three United States roles, only providing peacekeeping forces will be discussed.

The typical United States peacekeeping force will be a combat unit in a peacekeeping role supported by logistics and communications units. The United States may also provide combat support, and combat service support units. Troops may be deployed in a team, individually to serve on a multi-national staff, or as a unit. Ground forces may not be the only type of force committed. Other forces may include air, space, or maritime, or a combination of all forces (21:I-4). Before deployment of the peacekeeping force, Joint Publication 03-7.3 lists some conditions that must be present. These conditions are:

a. Consent, cooperation, and support of the authorities of the parties in the conflict.

b. Political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most of, if not the entire, international community.

c. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission, with specified and understood rules of engagement.

d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force and observers to carry out their responsibilities.

e. An effective command, control, communications, and computer (C4) system.

f. Well-trained, balanced, and impartial forces.

g. An effective and responsive all-source intelligence gathering capability.

h. An effective and responsive logistic support system.
Another caution is that peacekeeping operations differ fundamentally from internal security. A peacekeeping force is impartial, and once it loses its reputation for impartiality, it is no longer useful (21:II-6). The force structure of a peacekeeping force depends on many things such as the size of the area, number of forces mandated, terrain, threat, and logistic requirements. The peacekeeping infantry battalion would normally be armed with only small arms and light machine guns with light and medium mortars for illumination. Inclusion of any other type of weapon would require prior coordination and approval to ensure compliance with the mandate (21:IV-5).

Clearly, Joint Publication 03-7.3 addresses United States military strategy and doctrine in a peacekeeping operation. And just as clearly, the publication does not address peace enforcement. The danger here lies in the recent trend in expanding the roles of peace operation into peace enforcement under the guise of peacekeeping. United Nations Secretary General, as mentioned earlier, dangerously expanded his definition of peacekeeping to include the peace enforcement role. The United States' Joint peace operations doctrine must be expanded to include the role of peace enforcement or avoid United Nations operations altogether.

The peace enforcement role can be included in the Joint Publication 3-07.3. The publication will require some major modifications to some of its pre-conditions and framework. But other sections like command and control, training, and supporting
functions will only require minor additions. If United Nations operations are to be endorsed, it is imperative that the United States military joint peace operations doctrine get in line with the United States administration's policy which is to support the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Referring again to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy address to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Department of Defense is fully involved...getting peacekeeping right is one of the most challenging and critical tasks facing our defense effort...peacekeeping doctrine is in full evolution". The current situation in Bosnia is an excellent example of peacekeeping forces deployed to peace enforce (17:1).

The United States Army addresses briefly both peacekeeping and peace enforcement as an activity under Operations other than War in Field Manual 100-5. Doctrinally, the Army includes operations other than war under their broad umbrella of doctrine for war. The Army has slightly modified its principles of war to apply to both combat and operations other than war. Thus, the Army concludes that "operations other than war are not new" (19:13-10). Joint Publication 03-07.3 recognizes that peace operations in today's environment require special training and skills, and that leadership and personal qualities are uniquely different from the traditional combat soldier (21:VI-1). The Army recognizes the distinct differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement but fails to follow through with distinctively separate doctrine. For operations other than war that involve
forces in combat, the Army purports "the principles of war apply." In noncombat operations, "some principles...apply equally...others require modification" (19:13-3).

The United States Army's new peace operations manual, FM 100-23, dated December 1994, was just received in the field this Spring. In the preface it states that the manual provides "guidance for the full range of peace operations, to include support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping and peace enforcement (20:iii). Chapter one of FM 100-23 is dedicated to providing the doctrinal framework for peace operations. Since this paper is concerned only with peacekeeping and peace enforcement, I will not address support to diplomacy.

According to FM 100-23, peacekeeping involves military or para-military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, is the application of military force or the threat of military force to compel compliance with specified resolutions or sanctions (20:4,6). The missions that require either peacekeeping or peace enforcement differ greatly also. Peacekeeping activities include the observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and the supervision of truces. The Army draws a clear delineation between peacekeeping activities and peace enforcement missions. Peace enforcement missions include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability, the protection of humanitarian assistance, the guarantee and denial of movement, the enforcement of
sanctions, the establishment and supervision of protected zones, and the forcible separation of belligerent parties (20:7-11). As stated earlier, it is imperative to understand the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. FM 100-23 has also made this distinction an important issue.

United States Presidential Policy Decision on reforming peace operations distinguishes between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but both are classified as peace operations. FM 100-23 states that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not a part of a continuum that allows a unit to flow freely from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. These operations take place under vastly different circumstances, separated by a broad demarcation (20:12). The Army has a good understanding of the definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and in debating their differences. Where the Army begins to falter is in wrapping peacekeeping and peace enforcement with the same old Army doctrinal packaging. Examples of this packaging are requirements to review mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T) after any change in the situation (20:120). Just the word enemy implies that conflict or combat will be required. Peacekeeping is not combat. The mindset of the peacekeeper is as important as the objectives of the mission. Using the same operational doctrine that the Army uses in combat operations and applying it to peace operations will only confuse the issue. The METT-T analysis suggests that the factions requiring peace operations are the enemy. This could be a grievous error
particularly in the case of a peacekeeping scenario where neutrality of the peacekeeping force is the foundation for the success of the mission.

FM 100-23 uses some old familiar Army terms in defining principles and tenets of peace operations. Terms like objective, unity of effort, agility, initiative and synchronization are bulwarks for Army doctrine and the conduct of war. FM 100-23 further states that "the principles of war and doctrine for conduct of war in FM 100-5 must be included in the planning process for all peace operations (20:15). The tendency in FM 100-23 is to take as much of Army doctrine as possible and apply it to peace operations regardless of its applicability.

Despite the dogmatic trend in FM 100-23, there are some bright spots in the Army's attempt to define some variables for peace operations. The variables of level of consent, level of force and degree of impartiality, help to bring together the concept that peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment shaped by many factors that can strongly influence the manner in which the peace operation is conducted (20:12). These variables play an important role in determining the nature of the operation as well as the size and make-up of the force mix. Commanders must be keenly aware of the variables and the direction in which they move. Success in peace operations may hinge on the ability of a commander to influence the variables and achieve situational dominance. Failure is often a result of losing control of one or more of these variables. It is imperative that
a commander avoid inadvertently slipping from one type of peace operation to another (20:13).

The most important variable is the level of consent. In war, the commander is not concerned with the level of consent. But in peace operations, the level of consent determines the fundamental aspects of the entire operation. In a traditional peacekeeping mission, a loss of consent may lead to a change in the basic premise of the operation and an escalation of violence and fighting. Therefore, any decline in consent is a major concern. A change in operations will require a change in force mix, objectives, exit strategy, and policy. That is why the crossing of the consent gap from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is a policy level decision. Commanders should avoid actions that unintentionally change the level and extent of consent (20:13).

A Note of Caution

The Army understands the requirement for changing old doctrine or creating new peace operations doctrine, but will new doctrine solve the problem? Some soldiers are concerned that repeated participation in peacekeeping operations will, over time, erode the ability of the Army to wage mid- and high-intensity combat effectively. Other limitations are thought to be that peacekeeping operations do not lend themselves to the proper use of force because of the difficulty in articulating clear-cut and achievable objectives (19:15). A January 1993 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended
limiting the commitment of United States Troops to United Nations peace operations unless there were significant changes in its structure to manage combat forces (9:26). Lt Col James Baker, Deputy Commander of the 3rd United States Infantry says "Initiative does not thrive in such undertakings (peace operations). Caution and compromise do. This nuanced 'peace focus' is diametrically opposed to the traditional creed of the American Warrior" (3:37). Peacekeeping is closer to police doctrine than military doctrine. The objective of a police force is not the complete annihilation of crime but to hold crime at an acceptable level. The same is true with peacekeeping. Peacekeepers seek to hold the combatants at an acceptable level of compliance to the agreed upon rules, cease fire, or settlement. This is a war of attrition and not decisive victory through overwhelming force (10:38). The United States will only maintain its military superiority if its armed forces continue to concentrate on winning major wars against determined and capable enemies (8:18). If what Under Secretary Wisner says is true "peacekeeping doctrine is in full evolution", what is the future of peace operations for the United States Military?
CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE

The United Nations may not be capable of meeting the requirements of peace operations in the future. It is doubtful that the United Nations can continue to organize an effective fighting force and that some of the contributing nations will be able to meet their assigned tasks (17:2). Therefore, the United States must step up to their leadership role and set some goals and policy guidelines for peace operations. Department of Defense Under Secretary Wisner identified three sets of critical tasks to be accomplished to avoid the dangers created by the United Nations organizational and structural deficiencies. These tasks are:

a. Organize the Department of Defense to effectively participate in decision making about peacekeeping and peace enforcement. (A new assistant secretary's position for peacekeeping was created by Secretary of Defense Aspen but as of this date it remains unfilled).

b. Contribute to strengthening the United Nations' capacity for planning and conducting peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. (Options might be providing information, planning, and public affairs staffs, create a command, control, and communications facility, or develop a military training program).

c. Ensure other forces contributing to a peace operation are confident and capable of effective combat. This will reduce the demand for American forces and ensure the highest caliber of forces will be available.

Mr. Wisner also believes the United States should be prepared in addition to providing intelligence, logistics, and lift for United
Nations peace operations, to join with other nations and to provide combat units (17:2). The United States' efforts in peace operations will prove to be the most powerful tool of the future to bring about global peace (1:19).

The creation of a United Nations standing army would provide the United Nations a force to use when something goes awry with peacekeeping. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's plan calls for a 20-member state block that would supply to the United Nations, on a 48-hour notice, 2,000 troops each. These troops would be used in low intensity combat and be maintained by a $50 million revolving fund for emergencies and a $1 billion peace endowment (6:12). Critics of the standing army say that when the United Nations use a combat unit to peace enforce, it forfeits its role as a neutral third party and in turn becomes partisan. The peace operation is then forced to either escalate peace enforcement into a war or pullout without completing the mission (6:2). This scenario is very much like the situation in Bosnia today, where the peacekeepers are faced with withdrawal short of completing their mission.

The United States is currently retraining units returning from peace operations. In today's shrinking budgets and force structure down-sizing, this method is increasingly a luxury. Versatile combat units will provide the required flexibility. But the versatility required for peace operations applies more to individuals than to units. Developing individual versatility in large numbers is impractical (3:37). Specialization could take
the place of versatility and make the costly unit retraining requirement unnecessary. A specially trained and equipped unit could meet all but the most demanding peace enforcement operation requirements. These units would relieve regular army combat divisions from rotational requirements that erode their combat capability and readiness. Peace operations will remain a military task, legitimately assigned to the United States armed forces. Specialization may be the answer to preserve the combat edge of the United States armed forces and meet the requirements of peace operations.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States should proceed with caution and not be overly ambitious in how it handles peace operations. The United Nations is not yet prepared to undertake new peacekeeping operations outlined by Secretary Boutros-Ghali. The United States should not risk its reputation by indiscriminately backing the United Nations simply because it is billed as a world government. The United States must analyze each specific situation and select the correct response—peacemaking, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping. Attainable goals and objectives must be set that are consistent with the training and doctrine of American forces. The American people as well as the international community must be told of the likely costs and duration of the peace operation.

The current Administration's attempt to develop a comprehensive policy for peace operations falls short of its objective. The fact of the matter is that the President was not served well by his staff in the development of the Presidential Decision Directive. There is nothing new in the entire directive. There are some minor administrative changes that delineate cost responsibilities between the State Department and the Department of Defense, and a proposal to reduce the United States costs for United Nations peace operations from the current 31.7 percent to 25 percent by 1 January 1996 (5:1). But most of the directive is rhetoric with not much substance and puts too much decision making
in the hands of the United Nations. The Administration must take the lead in policy guidance and directives. Issues like dedicated peace operation units (force structure), who pays the bill (DoD or State), special and unique training, and multilateral or unilateral operations are examples of areas requiring policy decisions.

The United States also has some doctrinal issues to resolve. Joint Pub 3-07.3 needs to be expanded to cover peace enforcement along with peacekeeping. The fundamental differences between the two must be addressed to avoid sending a peacekeeping force into a potential combat situation with warring factions. The United States Army must establish new doctrine that addresses peace operations. Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations is a solid effort by the Army, however the dogmatic approach for the sake of standardization sends mixed signals to commanders and their troops. Today the United Nations' peacekeeping force in Bosnia is caught in the middle of a war in a situation where they not only can not achieve their mission but also run a great risk of loosing many lives.

Future peace operation forces must be specialized. They need specific training, equipment, and an organizational structure that is functional and not burdensome. The United States must cautiously step up to the increasing demands for peace operations. America can not police every Third World skirmish, but it can ensure that when it commits troops they are used intelligently,
with the correct doctrine, with clear military objectives, and with the proper training and equipment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


