NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

JOINT RESERVE UNITS
_A Revolution in (Reserve) Military Affairs?_

By
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Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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5 May 1997

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As the Armed Forces search for ways to respond to the triple pressures of widening non-traditional commitments, shrinking resources, and congressional pressure for efficiency, the Services and Unified Commanders are relying more upon both joint operations and their reserve components. One logical outgrowth of this search for innovation is the exploratory use of Joint Reserve Units. These units, where organized, are formed of those individuals and units of service reserve components identified as available upon mobilization to unified commands, with some form of full-time support to manage the unit and its employment. Each Combatant Command has taken a slightly different approach to the administration of reserve assets, but it generally is the case that a coherent, centralized, and focused approach to the organization of these individuals and units into a Joint Reserve Unit offers advantages to the commander. There are significant implications for Reserve Component organization and manpower and training policies in the expanding use of reserves in the joint environment, which may augur the beginning of a revolution in (reserve) military affairs.

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As the Armed Forces search for ways to respond to the triple pressures of widening non-traditional commitments, shrinking resources, and congressional pressure for efficiency, the Services and Unified Commanders are relying more upon both joint operations and their reserve components. One logical outgrowth of this search for innovation is the exploratory use of Joint Reserve Units. These units, where organized, are formed of those individuals and units of service reserve components identified as available upon mobilization to unified commands, with some form of full-time support to manage the unit and its employment. Each Combatant Command has taken a slightly different approach to the administration of reserve assets, but it generally is the case that a coherent, centralized, and focused approach to the organization of these individuals and units into a Joint Reserve Unit offers advantages to the commander. There are significant implications for Reserve Component organization and manpower and training policies in the expanding use of reserves in the joint environment, which may augur the beginning of a revolution in (reserve) military affairs.
PREFACE

The concept of Joint Reserve Units is not particularly new, but no doctrine, policy guidance, or research on the topic currently exists in military professional literature. The subject is contentious, impinging explicitly as it does upon Service Component Commanders' prerogatives as to organizing, training, and equipping the forces which they are tasked to provide to the Combatant Commanders.

However, since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it has become clear that reservists will be used early and extensively on the staffs of unified commanders and joint task forces during both major conflicts and the drawn-out operations other than war which seem to be the future of the U.S. military. In response, Unified Command staffs have individually searched for the optimum approach to organizing and managing the considerable resources available to them.

This paper is the first attempt of which the author is aware to compile and compare different approaches to Joint Reserve Units, examine their relative merits, and reflect upon the implications for the Service Components of the widespread utilization of reservists in the joint arena.
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B United States Atlantic Command Joint Reserve Unit Command Brief Dated March 1997

C Norfolk Virginian Pilot news article dated March 24, 1997 entitled “Reservists take on real-world responsibilities in Atlantic Command”

D United States European Command Directorate of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs brief entitled “Reserve Components in USEUCOM” dated 5 April 1997
Joint Reserve Units - A Revolution in (Reserve) Military Affairs?

A new phenomenon is unfolding in the United States Armed Forces which portends a different way of thinking about the Reserve Components. As military leaders continue to respond to the triple challenges of an ever-widening number and array of non-traditional commitments, shrinking resources, and congressional pressure to find efficiencies, they are coming to rely increasingly on the capabilities and economies afforded by both joint operations and increased use of reservists. The coincidence of these two ideas has given impetus to the formation of Joint Reserve Units - not a radically new concept, but one whose time appears to have arrived. The significance of the appearance of these units is not immediately obvious, but their successful employment has the potential to drive substantial changes in Reserve Component personnel assignment policies, professional development, mission areas and even basic organization structures. The implications of joint training, joint command and control, and direct assignment of reserves to combatant commanders have real potential for changing a number of U.S. military paradigms, and may in fact stimulate a revolution in (reserve) military affairs!  

Joint Operations + Reserve Components = Maximum Value!

The concepts of 'coherent jointness' and 'seamless integration of the Total Force' have taken hold, as the real value added of each has become apparent. A myriad of military operations during and since Desert Shield/Desert Storm have convincingly demonstrated the wisdom of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which required that commanders plan for and execute military operations in a joint environment. Concurrently, the impressive contributions of reservists from every service have validated their worth both to their
respective services and to the nation as a whole. There is widespread acknowledgement by political and military leaders that both this nation’s wars and its military operations other than war must be conducted with joint forces, and that neither can be conducted without the Reserve Components. The logical outgrowth of this reality is that the commanders charged with planning and executing military missions directed by the National Command Authority must be able to realistically integrate Reserve Component capabilities of each service into their plans and operations at every level of command. New approaches to and new paradigms of reserve organization, management, integration and training are emerging as these commands begin to recognize and demand the benefits which accrue to their organizations by making use of this previously little-tapped resource.

One such noticeable innovation is the emergence of the Joint Reserve Unit at the Unified Command\(^5\) level. In 1991, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command established a Joint Transportation Reserve Unit to assist in meeting strategic mobility mission requirements in the face of dwindling resources. In 1993, the U.S. Atlantic Command was created to assume (among other responsibilities) the mission of joint force integration and training of the majority of the nation’s combat forces; a Joint Reserve Unit was formed shortly thereafter to assist in joint planning, exercises, and crisis action response. U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command continue to use assigned Individual Mobilization Augmentees and service reserve units, referring to them collectively as Joint Reserve Units. The U.S. Pacific Command appended all reserve billets to its official manning document; the U.S. European Command created a whole staff directorate to manage reserve component issues in the theater campaign plan. Each organization represents a different approach to the employment of reserves in the joint environment, but all have as
their goal and intention the greatest degree of accessibility to a manpower resource suddenly in considerable and increasing demand.

The fact is that, regardless of how the joint reserve "unit" is organized, the unified commander gains greater visibility on and access to the time and talent of trained reservists to meet challenges in the joint theater. As those commanders come to rely more upon the contributions of this additional resource, service components will experience greater pressure to provide more people, better joint training, and expanded joint professional military education to reservists serving in joint assignments. Just as the active component has begun in earnest to assimilate the spirit as well as the letter of Goldwater-Nichols, so will the reserve components need to reform their policies, and possibly their organizations, to provide reservists who can function effectively in the joint arena.

The First

The Concept and Implementation Plan to Establish of the United States Transportation Command Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (Appendix A) was submitted to the Director of the Joint Staff in 1991. The following paragraphs explain the rationale for the initiative.

The concept development was predicated upon the performance of the existing Naval Reserve unit's support of the crisis action team operations. The command's ability to rapidly update these previously trained Naval Reservists, and the reservists' full integration into DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM deployment management operations, has proven the viability of utilizing reserve personnel to enhance USTRANSCOM operation.

To further capitalize on the demonstrated professional teamwork of the Naval Reserve Unit, [Deputy USCINCRTRANS] directed establishment of a joint reserve unit that would mirror mission and structural characteristics of the unified command environment; e.g.: joint chain of command, joint operations, and balanced Service representation. In consonance, the unit's objective was subsequently identified to
train jointly in peacetime to maintain readiness for meeting wartime contingency, exercise, and surge operational requirements...

...[The] Chiefs of Army and Air Force Reserve also confirmed their personal support for the JTRU concept...they provided enhanced interim funding for Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) drills to begin reserve unit billet recruiting and joint unit integration. All assigned reserve elements will be integrated into the JTRU, and there will no longer be assigned IMAs. Specific unit identification codes (UICs) will be identified with each reserve element. UICs will be assigned to each element, with USTRANSCOM as the gaining command.

Long-range benefits of establishing the JTRU will result from training as a joint unit in a joint environment. Joint training and utilization of individual reservists and service reserve units by unified commands is not a new phenomenon. The JTRU represents the departure from pseudo-unit arrangements to a recognition and appreciation for cohesive, command-focused application of reserve assets (emphasis added). Accordingly, the JTRU attempts to fulfill the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 19986, wherein reserve components are to be trained as a part of the active force joint environment. Establishment of a joint reserve unit provides the means to accomplish joint integration in the fullest sense, for operations, personnel management, and performance accountability. Further, the joint unit concept affords the opportunity to provide training in content and quality comparable to that received by active duty counterparts, through on-the-job experience and formalized training programs....

The relationship of the JTRU to the headquarters staff and the internal organization of the unit are shown at pages A-B-1 and A-B-2 of Appendix A. The JTRU Commander advises the Commander in Chief on matters relating to planning, readiness, training, and use of reservists within the unified and subordinate transportation component commands, as well as issues relating to mobilization-driven civilian/industrial bases. Within each service element, its senior line officer provides guidance for service-specific reserve administrative matters and exercises Article 15 authority over enlisted personnel of the respective component. However, the JTRU Commander, not the senior service element officer, is the reporting senior/senior rater for JTRU personnel. This change from previous practice,
wherein performance evaluations were signed by a senior officer of each reservists’ own service, serves to “jointize” the unit as much as does any other single issue.

In this model, service elements are not uniformly placed under the peacetime command and control of the combatant commander, and personnel administration is provided by service component organizations since there is no joint organic headquarters section to service all unit members. It does accomplish several significant things, however. It creates a sense of unity among the reserves of different services augmenting the headquarters; provides a vehicle for promoting joint operations precepts in the reserve components; and provides visibility to the commander on all reserve assets available to the headquarters. It also established a precedent that is leading to related initiatives at other unified commands.

The Latest

The U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) is organized somewhat differently, as shown in Appendix B. Its stated mission is to “provide trained Reserve Component personnel and fully integrate into USACOM’s staff, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis, and wartime requirements on a timely basis.” As at USTRANSCOM, all reservists regardless of service are assigned to the unit. The primary organizational difference between the USTRANSCOM and USACOM units is the addition at USACOM of a JRU Chief of Staff and subordinate headquarters staff which provides “one-stop shopping” for reservists of all services. Administration (check-in, database records, finance/personnel/medical processing), training (security and joint training), and requirements (personnel assignment, funding, and liaison
with directorates) are organic to the JRU and consolidate into a single staff the overhead performed by three service reserve component staffs at USTRANSCOM. Within the directorates, both active and reserve component points of contact are assigned to manage drills, annual training, directorate-specific training, contingency tasking, performance evaluations, and mobilization requirements for assigned reservists. Over six hundred reservists work directly for the directorates on mutually agreed-upon drill schedules with little or no interference or supervision from the headquarters staff, and their performance evaluations are signed by active duty Directorate Heads. They are, however, afforded the benefit of uniform administrative policies, and again, a sense of a joint identity which is fundamentally different from that of "service slice" augmentees.

USACOM also established a Reserve Component General Officer Steering Committee, with representation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and subordinate component commanders as well as the Atlantic Command headquarters staff. The Committee is charged with integrating the Reserve Component forces into the Joint Team; providing a broad array of force capability to support USACOM's military strategies; promoting effectiveness through service compatibilities and creating a seamless [reserve component] information system; and adding value to USACOM and the Service Components. As the Joint Reserve Unit matures, the Steering Committee will be a valuable vehicle for sharing lessons learned in its employment with other commands seeking efficiencies in reserve management.

A real innovation at USACOM is the degree of integration of reservists into the daily work of the staff. A daily newspaper in Norfolk, Virginia recently printed a story (included as Appendix C) which highlighted the remarkable degree to which assigned reservists meld
with the active duty staff on a daily basis - not just on scheduled weekends - to accomplish real ongoing work at the command. This departure from the paradigm of reserve training-oriented drill weekends and rigidly scheduled annual training is attracting considerable attention from gaining commands whose workload continues to increase despite continuing reductions in manpower. It would not be surprising to see active service components to begin to seek similar degrees of integration of their reserve units into normal daily operations. The spread of this practice throughout the country may necessitate changes in service reserve component training and administration policies, and possibly in component management structure organizations as well, as the mission of Reserve Components is expanded to include peacetime support as well as mobilization capability.¹¹

U.S. Southern Command will stand up a Joint Reserve Unit when the Headquarters moves from Quarry Heights, Panama to Miami, Florida in September 1997. This unit will be organized much like the one at the Atlantic Command, in part because of the transfer of military responsibility for the scheduled to occur on June 1, 1997. The commander felt that the theater transition would be better served if those reserve organizations and individuals moved from the Atlantic to the Southern Command for the Caribbean mission were transferred to a similar organization.¹² Full-time support billets have been authorized on the Joint Manning Document to support the unit, and as at the Atlantic Command, a headquarters element will provide ‘one-stop shopping’ in administration, training, and operations for reserves of all services.
Tradition by any other name...

U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command each manage traditional service Individual Mobilization Augmentee and Naval Reserve Unit programs. The reserve component members are referred to collectively as a Joint Reserve Unit, although they are not managed as a unit as the term is understood in this context. Each service funds and administers its reservists who report directly to their respective staff directorates for assignment, scheduling, training and evaluation. Not having any of the administrative overhead associated with running a unit allows reservists to devote all their time to training with the command. However, the administrative workload is absorbed by a full time support staff in the Manpower and Personnel Directorate, which deals with reserve issues and coordinates actions between the service elements, the command, and individual reserves. Both of these headquarters staffs are considering the relative merits of alternative models as experience is gained at other commands.

Already there?

The U.S. Pacific Command has taken quite a different approach to reserve integration than those discussed above. All reserve component billets, both full time support and selected reserves, are placed through coordination by the Manpower staff across the directorates on the JCS-approved Joint Training and Mobilization Document, and are authorized and funded by the individual services. Reserve personnel administration is handled by service component, and a small Reserve Forces Division manages mobilization and other reserve-specific non-manpower issues for the commander. The commander's position and that of his staff at present is that reserve component integration at headquarters
is already seamless, and that no additional infrastructure for reserve management is either required or desired. The Army Reserve has proposed the creation of a Joint Reserve Unit with an Army/National Guard leadership element under which all reserve assets would be placed, but there is at present little movement toward adoption of this initiative.\textsuperscript{14}

The Pacific Command approach is appealing in its simplicity and the transparency of reserve administration to the staff. It is not clear, however, that it offers the commander a clear idea of what is available in the event of a need for significant rapid reserve augmentation in depth, nor does it provide for uniformity across services of training, education, management and administration of reserve assets.

**The Next Iteration**

The U.S. European Command does not yet have a Joint Reserve Unit, although the concept is under study. The headquarters manages, through its Manpower and Personnel Directorate, a combination of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps individuals and Naval Reserve units, which augment the headquarters staff. This approach may not afford optimum efficiency, given that manpower pools do not necessarily provide the right mix of trained, available, and sustainable augmentation.\textsuperscript{15} Particularly since events in the European Theater are driving an unprecedented reliance upon reserve augmentation from all the services, various resourcing approaches are being studied. Also, the overseas location of this headquarters and long commuting distances for its assigned reserves pose different challenges for joint reserve unit integration and management than for its domestic counterparts.
An interesting organization unique to the European Command is the Directorate of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs (ECRA), the only stand-alone staff directorate devoted to reserve affairs within any joint command. ECRA manages the EUCOM Reserve Component Campaign Plan (Appendix D), which supports the Commander’s strategy of engagement and preparedness and his theater objectives. Specifically, the RCCP is intended to “…fully involve the National Guard and Reserve in the implementation of this strategy and its strategic concepts: engage in peacetime, respond to crisis, and fight to win.” The relationship between the newly established ECRA and the existing Reserve Programs Branch is still evolving, and may eventually produce a new and quite different joint reserve management structure.

U.S. Space Command is also examining different joint reserve utilization models with emphasis on developing an organization that would provide ready access to reservists, during peacetime, under active duty command and control. To that end, the Commander’s staff is participating in a Joint Working Group chaired by the U.S. Air Force Reserve which is expected to produce a major report in June 1997 on recommendations regarding appropriate joint reserve augmentation structures for the command.

Senior Staff Perspectives

The Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel Policy directorate is observing, rather than advocating, the development of joint reserve units. As one staff officer stated, the Unified Commanders are best situated to determine their needs in this regard, and the Joint Staff is inclined to support their recommendations rather than drive initiatives which may not suit the commanders’ requirements or preferences. Individual commanders should be allowed to
establish the parameters for the formation of affiliated units - why, when, and how to do what they need. Senior staffs agree that while it may be worthwhile to develop a format for the submission of concept and implementation plans, it would not be advisable to drive the particulars of JRU organization and employment.20 Also, Unified Command staffs do not have identical internal staff structures and therefore any directed organization of joint reserve augmentation structure might be inappropriate for a given command. One size may not fit all.

Rear Admiral John Paddock, Chairman of the National Naval Reserve Policy Board and a member of the European Command Reserve Affairs Directorate, reiterated the sensitivity of this issue. The geography and politics of each unified command differ greatly, as do the service culture- and personality-driven preferences of individual theater commanders, and each should be able to exercise the prerogative of organizing and employing his or her assigned forces as he or she sees fit.21

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is more engaged in the issue, serving as it does as the policy maker for all Reserve Components. The Deputy Secretary, Air Force Major General Jeffrey Kliver, expressed a particular interest in joint information warfare and C4I-related reserve units, wherein highly specialized technologists from civilian industry might be encouraged apply their skills to military applications via the reserves. Network technology certainly will enable new paradigms of reserve participation. The Reserve Intelligence community is a leader in this initiative; its members are connected via computer systems to national intelligence commands, and contribute real-time to intelligence analysis workloads from widely dispersed locations. Job-sharing between active and reserve personnel via networks could conceivably lead to the creation of an entirely new
category of reservist who would work part time for his or her civilian employer and part time for the military gaining command. This idea has tremendous potential for revolutionizing the organization and management structure of every reserve component, and the implications for expanded Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve are enormous. 22

A related issue is appropriate professional military education for reserve officers. The desirability of establishing a joint career path and joint subspecialty qualification for reserves is under study. The services already send reserve officers to their War Colleges and schools of Command and Staff, the completion of which satisfies the first phase of Joint Professional Military Education. It would be appropriate for services to complete this joint education with follow-on assignment to the Armed Forces Staff College and obligatory service at joint or unified commands, in order to create a nucleus of joint expertise in the reserves to serve as both an operational and training resource. This personnel management issue will become more important as joint reserve units become more widespread and more centrally managed. At the very least, it would be desirable to develop a means to capture in personnel systems all unified command and joint task force experience acquired by reservists of all components.

Advocacy of joint reserve units is not necessarily unqualified, nor is it unanimous. It is possible to argue, for instance, that such a unit produces reservists who are too parochial to individual theater commanders and are not easily transferable to other theaters, or that a JRU represents nothing more than a manpower pool for staff assignment. 23 The most obvious advantage of a JRU is focused visibility upon and rapid access to specially trained individuals with recent theater-specific joint experience on short notice. Once the principal driver for the formation of headquarters units, accessibility to reserve assets of any service is
no longer the difficult and contentious issue it used to be. According to the one spokesman, approval of a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup\(^4\) is now achievable within 48 hours.\(^5\) The recall is still managed through service components, however, and it is probable that assigning reserves directly to joint units will streamline the accession process even further.

**The Wave of the Future?**

Clearly there is a groundswell of interest in organized joint reserve augmentation at the unified command headquarters level. Commands want trained and experienced reserve augmentation with minimum administrative exertion. Reservists, who have always preferred actively contributing to the missions of their gaining commands to merely conducting mobilization training, are aggressively competing for assignment to the new joint units. And aside from the fact that reservists bring considerable expertise and perform substantial quantities of real work for their joint gaining commands, Goldwater-Nichols specifically directed that “…The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the Active duty list….“\(^6\) It is therefore not only desirable, but directed, that reserve officers (who make up the majority of joint reserve billet authorizations) gain experience in joint staff and operations experience. If the staffs of combatant commands are to train as they will fight, the desirability of this course of action is a blinding flash of the obvious.

However, different models may be appropriate to the missions and theater realities of geographic and functional unified command organizations, and driven by personal preferences of their commanders. This is reasonable and manageable; policy guidance and doctrine need not be so inflexible as to preclude different approaches to similar (but not
identical) requirements. Enough contemporary experience with contingency planning and execution has been gained for commanders to determine with a high degree of accuracy where joint staff augmentation is likely to be required in their theaters, particularly in military operations other than war, and to permit them to organize and train accordingly.

There may be commands at which formation of a joint reserve unit is neither necessary nor desirable, but that is becoming increasingly unlikely. Reserve augmentation at unified commands in joint task forces has been, and continues to be, used with great success during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, Turkey, and Bosnia. Organizing reserves into joint headquarters units gives the commander the opportunity to train, observe, and access these people as known quantities when they are needed. And increasingly, as reserves become a valuable source of manpower for routine work where billet reductions render the staffs unable to deal effectively with their workloads, effective management by Joint Reserve Unit leadership can supplement manpower requirements on joint staffs and improve joint education and training for reservists.

It might be argued that a Joint Reserve Unit is an artificiality that is unnecessary if service reserve components are providing trained people to unified commands. But the synergy among people who work and train together in a joint environment is certainly what Goldwater-Nichols sought to encourage, and is not achieved as easily — if at all— where reservists are assigned and administered as service contributions to individual directorates rather than members of joint commands. One major advantage of having joint reserve units is that they provide an efficient mechanism for accomplishing joint training through and/or at the joint command, relieving somewhat the pressure on individual services to provide joint training to people assigned to joint commands.
A recent Department of Defense directive\textsuperscript{28} specifically defines Training Readiness Oversight responsibilities of commanders of combatant command to include the specific authority to:

- Provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs;
- Comment on Service component program recommendations and budget requests;
- Coordinate and approve participation by assigned [reserve component] forces in joint exercises and other joint training;
- Obtain and review readiness and inspection reports on assigned [reserve component] forces; and
- Coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training and activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned [reserve component] forces.

This expansion of authority and responsibility for reserve component training and readiness on the part of the Unified Commanders will undoubtedly result in their increased interest and participation in reserve component issues.

The entire issue of integration of reserves into the joint arena represents a significant step toward actual seamless integration of the Total Force. Joint Reserve Units certainly lead to improved mutual training and interoperability between members of the active and reserve components, facilitating joint operations at the unified command level. In this regard, they provide a valuable vehicle for moving toward a real Total Force - the achievement of which truly \textit{would} represent a revolution in (reserve) military affairs.
Notes

1 The author wishes to acknowledge that the subtitle phrase "A Revolution in (Reserve) Military Affairs" was inspired by the USACOM JRU Command Brief entitled "Revolution in Reserve Military Affairs."

2 The evolution of joint operations as described by General Sheehan, CINCUSACOM, is as follows: Specialized joint denotes multi-service, multi-dimensional, multi-functional operations driven by a common operational objective. Synergistic joint denotes common doctrine, mutually supporting, orchestrated for a common tactical objective. Coherent joint denotes common tactical and operational objectives within services' natural rhythms and cycles. See JFO Autumn 96 p. 42.

3 The concept of 'seamless integration of the Total Force' is driving numerous initiatives at every level of military administration. The RAND Corporation produced a study for the Commission on Roles and Missions dated 20 June 1996 entitled "Greater Integration and Cooperation is Required Between Active and Reserve Components" which makes numerous recommendations on changes, both cosmetic and substantive, which will undoubtedly surface in Reserve Component policy over the next decade.


5 As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, a Unified Command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also referred to as Unified Combatant Commands or Combatant Commands. There are five geographic Unified Commands (the Atlantic, Pacific, European, Central and Southern Commands) and four functional commands (Transportation, Special Operations, Strategic and Space Command.)

Service Components consist of the Service Component Commander and all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command.

The Reserve Component refers collectively to individuals, units and organizations assigned to the reserve forces of all the service components unless specified as belonging to a single service reserve component.

6 U.S. Transportation Command, Memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff, "Concept and Implementation Plan to Establish of the United States Transportation Command, Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU)", 19 March 1991.

7 Ibid. Appendix C.

8 Air Force and Marine Corps reservists transfer to the commander's operational control only during wartime, contingencies, and exercises. Army Reserve Troop Program Unit and Naval Reserve Unit personnel are assigned directly to USTRANSCOM. An administrative section in the JTRU is manned by a combination of active duty and drilling reservists to manage unit files, libraries, archives, and reserve-related supplies. Personnel support to service elements is provided by service reserve components.

9 USACOM Command Brief dated 03-97.

10 This mission statement is paraphrased from the USACOM Command Brief cited above.

11 The Secretary of the Navy recently issued a new instruction (1001.37A dated 8 April 1997) which explicitly included peacetime contributory support to the missions of the Naval Reserve, in recognition of the shift in reserve utilization since the end of the Cold War.


13 Reserve forces administrative terminology is not common between the services, one adjustment among many which will need to be made in service management before "coherent" jointness can be achieved. Naval Reserve units are not equivalent to Army Troop Program Units, and a Joint Reserve Unit is not the same entity as either of the two aforementioned organizations.


16 Briefing dated entitled “Reserve Components in USEUCOM,” Directorate of Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs, dated 5 Apr 97.


20 Interview with Mr. Daniel Kohner, Manpower Requirements and Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), Washington, D.C: March 17, 1997.

21 Interviews with Rear Admiral John Paddock, John, U.S. Naval Reserve Chairman, National Naval Reserve Force Policy Board, Newport, RI. April 7-8, 1997.


24 A Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) is the authority vested in the president by 10 USC 12302 to involuntarily recall up to 200,000 reservists to active duty for not more than 270 days. See Joint Pub 4-05 Appendix A, paragraph 2.c.

25 Interview with Colonel Angelo (see note 19.)

26 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act (see note 4.)

27 No PSRC has ever been terminated because each provides ready access to crucial manpower needed both on staffs and in the post-hostilities phases of Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, as well as other on-going operations which did not result in PSRC.

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Personal Interviews


Interview with Mr. Daniel Kohner, Manpower Requirements and Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel), Washington, D.C: March 17, 1997.


Interviews with Rear Admiral John Paddock, John, U.S. Naval Reserve Chairman, National Naval Reserve Force Policy Board, Newport, RI. April 7-8, 1997.

Telephone Conversations

Telephone conversation with Captain Bill Castle, U.S. Naval Reserve, USACOM J8, Norfolk, Virginia. April 15, 1997.


Telephone conversation with Captain Carl Smith, U.S. Naval Reserve, U.S. Transportation Command Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, St. Louis, Missouri, 9 April 1997.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Concept and Implementation Plan to Establish the United States Transportation Command, Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU)

1. In accordance with DJSM 238-9 of 25 Feb 91, the attached concept and implementation plan is submitted.

2. A precedent-setting initiative, the JTRU is a significant milestone in Total Force Management envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. We appreciate your continued support in this important venture and look forward to a reserve forces partnership in the unified command environment.

3. Request approval to stand-up JTRU.

P. D. BUTCHER
VADM, USN
Deputy Commander in Chief

1 Atch
JTRU Concept and Implementation Plan
CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
JOINT TRANSPORTATION RESERVE UNIT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) stand up is projected for October 1991. The concept was agreed to in principle by Director, Joint Staff, and serves as the authority for the enclosed plan. The plan provides details on command organization and relationships, resource and training requirements, and lessons learned in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

2. The mission of the JTRU, similar to that of HQ USTRANSCOM, is to augment active component forces (HQ) to provide global air, land, and sea transportation to meet national security objectives. The operational chain of command flows through USCINTRANS. The unit commander will be a reserve Major General/Rear Admiral (upper half), and assignment will be rotational. Structurally, it will include Air Force Reserve, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps (MC) Reserve, and Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) billets. Current projected unit strength is 97 Category A billets with a balanced service mix—32 Air Force, 32 Army, and 32 Navy (includes 3 MC and 3 MMR). Category A designation will require a training commitment of 48 drill periods and 2 weeks annual training (AT) per year to be performed on-site at HQ USTRANSCOM. Each service, except MC, will have the senior officer eligible for command serve collateral duty as the Service Element Administrator. The Service Element Administrator will be an advisor to the JTRU Commander and responsible for service-related personnel and administrative matters. The JTRU Command Section will be administratively supported by the 932d Aeromedical Airlift Group, Scott AFB, Illinois, the 102d Army Reserve Command, St Louis, Missouri, and Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, St Louis, Missouri.


4. The achievable benefits of establishing a joint reserve unit are evident in the lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Additionally, since its establishment in 1988, USTRANSCOM has relied upon reserve support for exercises and contingency efforts. That DESERT SHIELD/STORM has been successful may be attributed, in part, to the early and dedicated reserve forces support. Ultimate value is in the critical role trained reservists will play in future response scenarios. Accordingly, application of JTRU procedures brings to maturity the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, wherein the reserve assets are to be trained as a part of the active force joint environment. Establishment of the JTRU provides the means to accomplish joint integration in the fullest sense; for operations, personnel management, and performance accountability.
JTRU IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. General. The Director, Joint Staff (JS), concurred conceptually with USTRANSCOM’s proposal to establish the JTRU unit to support the command.

2. Background.

   a. Deputy USCINCNTRANS (TCDC) directed that the concept of the JTRU be developed and USTRANSCOM seek approval of DEPOPSDEPS.

   b. The concept development was predicated upon the performance of the existing naval reserve unit’s support of the crisis action team (CAT) operations. The command’s ability to rapidly train these Naval Reservists, and the reservists’ full integration into DESERT SHIELD/STORM deployment management operations, has proven viability of utilizing reserve personnel to enhance USTRANSCOM operations.

   c. To further capitalize on the performance demonstrated by the naval reserve unit, TCDC directed establishment of a joint reserve unit that would mirror mission and structural characteristics of Unified Command; e.g.: chain of command and Service representation. The unit’s objective is to train jointly in peacetime with active component assets to meet wartime, contingency, exercise, and surge operational requirements.

   d. The basic concept was initially presented to the JS at the working group level 31 Oct 90 and again 9 Nov 90 during the JS sponsored unified command J1 conference. A DEPOPSDEPS decision brief was not required, as the JS conveyed support in principle for establishing a joint reserve unit to support USTRANSCOM. Further, the Director stated the concept may serve as a basis for similar organizations elsewhere, but that thorough analysis and consideration were required prior to implementation.

   e. Chiefs of Army and Air Force Reserve also confirmed their personal support for the JTRU. To facilitate JTRU stand up, they provided enhanced IMA interim drill period funding to begin reserve unit billet recruiting and joint unit integration. All assigned reserve elements will be integrated into JIRU, ultimately.

   f. Long range benefits of establishing the JTRU become evident in enhanced training as a joint unit in a joint environment. Utilization of reservists by unified commands is not a new phenomenon. The JTRU represents the departure from pseudo-unit arrangements to a recognition and appreciation for cohesive, command-focused application of reserve assets. Accordingly, application of JTRU procedures brings to maturity the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, wherein the reserve assets are to be trained as a part of active force joint environment. Establishment of a joint reserve unit provides the means to accomplish joint integration in the fullest sense, for operations, personnel management, and performance accountability.
3. Concept. The basic concept for the JTRU is detailed below.
   
a. **Mission.** To augment active component headquarters and provide rapid joint capability and operational depth in response to global air, land and sea transportation during wartime, contingency, exercise and surge operational requirements to meet national security objectives.

b. **Command and Organization.**
   
   (1) The JTRU is a joint reserve unit structured to enhance the capability of crisis action center, functional directorates, and special staffs within USTRANSCOM. It is comprised of United States Air Force Reserve, United States Army Reserve, United States Naval Reserve (to include United States Marine Corps and Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR)) as noted in Appendix B.

   (2) The Commander of the unit will be a reserve major general/rear admiral (upper half) from one of the Service components. Assignment will be rotational from Service to Service.

   (3) See Appendices A and B for details of command functions and organization relationships.

c. **Responsibilities and Forces.**

   (1) The JTRU is responsible for:

   (a) Providing USTRANSCOM crisis action center, directorates, and special staffs with capability to meet surge requirements in support of worldwide strategic mobility planning (both deliberate and execution), deployment related automatic data processing (ADP) systems, and integrated and centralized wartime traffic management.

   (b) Providing a resource base upon mobilization to meet expanding contingency/wartime requirements.

   (2) Description of command functions is at Appendix A, Annex A.

   (3) To accomplish its mission, the JTRU will be assigned manpower as set forth in the Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution (JTMD) (Appendix B). Selected positions will be designated as minimum tour billets to ensure the command receives a reasonable return for training invested in reserve personnel.

d. **Command Relationships.**

   (1) The JTRU Commander receives operational direction from USCINICTRANS.

   (2) The JTRU receives administrative support from 102d Army Reserve Command, St Louis, Missouri, the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, St Louis, Missouri, and the 932d Aeromedical Airlift Group, Scott AFB, Illinois.
(3) Personnel assignment, performance evaluations, drill scheduling, service ancillary training, and other areas will be addressed in memoranda of agreement with the parent service.

e. **JTRU Drilling Site and Training Functions.**

(1) The JTRU drilling site will be located as a part of HQ USTRANSCOM, Scott AFB, Illinois.

(2) The JTRU will have a command section administratively supported by 102d Army Reserve Command, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, and the 932d Aeromedical Airlift Group.

(3) JTRU training will be accomplished with scheduled drills appropriate for Category A Unit Programs. Members will be trained as a unit, in a joint environment, to function within directorates/special staffs to which assigned.

(4) JTRU will become fully operational through a phased process. Phasing will be a function of billet funding, recruiting, and training requirements. Appendix D provides milestones for JTRU to become fully operational.

f. **Amplifying Instructions.**

(1) Reservists will be recalled to active duty, if and when needed, to support USTRANSCOM HQ, in accordance with service procedures to fill mobilization billets authorized in JTMD.

(2) A rating scheme consistent with Service personnel policies will be established to effect performance reporting of Reserve members. The JTRU commander will serve as reporting senior/reviewer in accordance with Service policies.

(3) Each Service will have appointed within the JTRU, the senior officer, eligible for command, as the Service Element Administrator. The Service Element Administrator responsibilities include:

   (a) Recruiting reservists in coordination with and approved by the JTRU Commander.

   (b) Advising the JTRU Commander as to appropriateness of individual performance/evaluation reports.

   (c) Exercising Article 15 authority over enlisted personnel.

   (d) Represent the reserve service component in meeting ancillary training requirements.

   (e) Providing guidance for all other reserve administrative matters.
APPENDIX A

COMMAND, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING RELATIONSHIPS

ANNEX A

COMMAND FUNCTIONS

1. Mission Statement: To augment USTRANSCOM HQ to provide rapid, joint surge capability in response to wartime, contingency, exercise, and surge operational requirements of USTRANSCOM in support of its mission.

2. JTRU Commander: Will be an O-8 General Officer/Flag Officer mobilization assistant who will be responsible for all reserve matters relating to planning, readiness, training, and use of Reservists within USTRANSCOM. Specifically:

   a. Serve as Mobilization Assistant to USCINCTRANS.

   b. Advise on use of reserves for exercise support, contingencies, and recall/mobilization.

      (1) Establish training goals and objectives.

      (2) Develop and emphasize reserve policy relating to USTRANSCOM and transportation component commands (TCCs).

      (3) Develop command policy for JTRU.

      (4) Require plan of action and milestones from units for coordinating training plans and goals.

      (5) Establish goals and standards for recruiting and retention.

   c. Direct and implement training.

      (1) Establish plan and coordinate augmentee participation in exercises.

      (2) Evaluate training accomplishment.

      (3) Conduct inspections and operational readiness evaluations (OREs).

      (4) Cross-train through TCCs; coordinate as required.

   d. Implement reserve force planning to augment Headquarters and TCCs with reservists, using USTRANSCOM's CAT augmentation plan and JTMD.

   e. Advise on matters related to the necessarily broader base of issues and requirements resulting from the mobilization-driven civilian/industrial bases.

      (1) Advise USCINCTRANS on progressive mobilization of reservists augmenting HQ USTRANSCOM and TCCs.
(2) Upon activation of reservists, orient and train to meet mobilization requirements of longer duration than contingency-driven requirements.

(3) Resolve personnel issues (e.g., PCS, finance, dependents, family support, evaluation/promotion, hardship, employer relationships) due to mobilization.

f. Command representation.

(1) Conduct liaison within HQ USTRANSCOM, TCCs, unified commands, and Services relating to reserves/mobilization.

(2) Ceremonies.

g. Develop and implement policy based on lessons learned from exercises, contingencies, or war.

3. Element Administrator: Serves as the principal advisor to the JTRU Commander for all matters pertaining to the reserve component from which assigned. The Element Administrator will be a collateral duty position and normally be the senior-most officer from the respective reserve component, eligible for command. The focus will be to coordinate the reserve component’s assets to expedite and optimize personnel assignments, training, and administrative support of the JTRU billets made available from the reserve component. Specific responsibility is identified for ensuring compliance with Service-required ancillary training, fitness/evaluation reporting, readiness reporting, drill participation reporting, and annual training (AT) scheduling, and other appropriate areas. The Element Administrator will be sourced, and regarded by the reserve service component for administrative purposes, as though the Administrator were the Commander/Commanding Officer of the particular element.

'With regards to command-related responsibilities, the Element Administrator should be an 0-6. The senior-most Element Administrator will be dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander JTRU. In the absence of the Commander, the Deputy acts in matters affecting the command. Additionally, the Element Administrator from each reserve component will have Article 15 authority for the respective Reserve service enlisted component.

4. Administrative Section: The Administrative Section is staffed by active duty, and/or inactive duty drillers. The Administrative Section processes all official incoming and outgoing mail and command correspondence; provides research, coordination, and processing support as required; maintains correspondence files, technical libraries, and archives; formats command-generated correspondence as appropriate, whether joint staff, USTRANSCOM, or Service. The Administrative Section receives, from USTRANSCOM, sufficient working spaces, equipment, telephone, supplies, and postage, and receives from respective reserve service components appropriate reserve-related supplies, postage, and publications. Personnel administration will be accomplished by TCJ1-J.
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:
U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

- USTRANSCOM (Unified Command)
  - JTRU
    - 932 AAG
    - 102D ARCOM
    - NAVMARCORESCEN

- MTMC
- MSC
- MAC

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CINC
DCINC/COS

JTRU COMMANDER

- J1 Manpower & Personnel
- J2 Intelligence
- J3/14 Operations & Logistics
- J5 Plans & Programs
- J6 C4S

USTRANSCOM STAFF ORGANIZATION

---

- Operational
- Administrative

A-B-1
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
JOINT TRANSPORTATION RESERVE UNIT

RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF / CHIEF OF STAFF
(1 - Flag/General Officer
0-8 Grade/Presently USNR)

SURGEON
(1 ARMY)
(1 AIR FORCE)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
(1 ARMY)
(1 MARINE CORPS)

CHIEF COUNSEL
(1 NAVY)
(1 ARMY)

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE
(2 ARMY)
(1 AIR FORCE)
(1 MARINE CORPS)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
(5 NAVY)
(7 ARMY)
(5 AIR FORCE)
(1 MARINE CORPS)

OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE
(23 NAVY)
(12 ARMY)
(15 AIR FORCE)

PLANS AND RESOURCES DIRECTORATE
(2 ARMY)
(2 AIR FORCE)

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE (C4S)
(6 ARMY)
(8 AIR FORCE)
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS
COMMAND GROUP

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
(0001)

DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF /
CHIEF OF STAFF
(1 0-8)
(Presently USNR)
(0002)

NOTE: Reservists by Service and number, as well as JTMD paragraph numbers, are identified for each staff level.

A-B-3
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE
(TCII)
(0100)

MANPOWER MGT DIVISION
(2 ARMY)
(0110)

JOINT PERSONNEL DIVISION
(1 AIR FORCE)
(1 NAVY)
(0120)
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS

OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE

(0300) (TCJ3/J4)

JOINT OPERATIONS DIVISION

(0320)

OPERATIONAL READINESS DIVISION

(0330)

EXERCISE BRANCH

(0331)

(4 ARMY)

(4 AIR FORCE)

CURRENT OPS BRANCH

(0332)

(1 ARMY)

(2 AIR FORCE)

(1 MARINE CORPS)

WARGAMING BRANCH

(0332)

OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DIVISION

(0340)

OPERATIONAL SYS REQTS & SPT BR

(0341)

(3 NAVY)

(4 ARMY)

(3 AIR FORCE)

JOPES TRAINING ORGANIZATION

(0342)

(1 AIR FORCE)

COMMAND CENTER

(0321)

(20 NAVY)

(2 ARMY)

(5 AIR FORCE)

(1 MARINE CORPS)

*Includes 3 MMR officers

WEATHER BRANCH

(0323)

REPORTS BRANCH

(0324)
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE (C4S)

(C4S OPERATIONS DIVISION)

C4S CONTINGENCY EXERCISE BRANCH
(1 AIR FORCE)

C4S MANAGEMENT BRANCH
(6 ARMY)
(7 AIR FORCE)

COMPUTER OPERATIONS BRANCH
(0620)
(0621)
(0622)
(0623)

A-B-9
1. Overview
   a. "JOINTNESS"
      (1) USTRANSCOM unified command structure, characteristics, and standards.
      (2) Joint command structure, procedures, staffing.
   b. Joint management and operations skills.
      (1) Systems (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Transportation Component Command (TCC), interfaces, requirements, allocations).
      (2) Operations (port activity, air/sealift, logistics).
      (3) Planning & analysis (requirements vs capabilities).
      (4) Issues (Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) Validation, TCC Roles, Priorities).
      (5) Community interaction (TCC, Industry, Department of State/Allies).
   c. Functional requirements by directorate/special staff.
      (1) J1 - Personnel/manpower support and management.
      (2) J2 - Indications and warning, production, threat assessment.
      (3) J3/J4 - Systems/deployment management operations.
      (4) J5 - Deliberate/crisis action planning.
      (5) J6 - C4S (operations, development, contingency plans).
      (6) Special Staff - Public Affairs, Chief Counsel, Surgeon.
   d. Service required ancillary training.
   e. Time requirements: Minimum of 12 months at 48 drills and 2 weeks AT plus additional active duty for special work as required.
2. Requirements by training category

TRAINING CATEGORIES

- Service Required Ancillary Training 1 MO
- JTRU Joint Deployment Management Operations Course 4 MOs
- Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI), Joint Planning and Execution Course (JPEC), Proficiency on WWMCCS on WATCH (PO WOW) 3 MOs
- CAT CELL Functions 1 MO
- CAT Exercise (Active Duty + Reservists) 2 MOs
- Exercise/Operation 2 Wks (AT)
- Directorate/Special Staff OJT As Required OJT

REQUIREMENTS BY BILLET CATEGORY

<table>
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<tr>
<th>RESERVIST BILLET CATEGORY</th>
<th>JTMD PARA</th>
<th>TRAINING CATEGORIES</th>
<th>12 MOs FOR COMPLETION</th>
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<td>0623</td>
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<td>6 MOs + 6 OJT + AT</td>
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</table>
a. SERVICE REQUIRED ANCILLARY TRAINING

AIR FORCE:

* Supervisor Safety (Company Grade Officer/Enlisted)
* UCMJ
* Human Relations, Drug Alcohol
* Security (Mission, OPSEC, COMSEC, Computer Security, Tempest, HUMINT Threat, Terrorism)
* Base Populace (Disaster Preparedness)
  Awareness Training:
* Physical Readiness Training (PRT)

ARMY:

* UCMJ
  Nuclear Biological and Chemical Proficiency Exam
  Common Soldier Testing
  Individual Weapons Qualification
* Espionage/Subversion Threat
* PRT (Army Physical Fitness Test - AFPT)

NAVY:

* First Aid/Basic Life Support (CPR)
  In-Rate Training
  Navy Rights and Responsibilities (*UCMJ)
* PRT

* Consolidated Training for All Service Elements
b. JTRU JOINT DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS COURSE

CLASSROOM

LESSON 1  Security. (policy, procedures, spaces, systems)

LESSON 2  JPEC organization and joint planning. (unified commands, deliberate planning, crisis action)

LESSON 3  Deployment Process (JOPES and crisis action procedures).

LESSON 4  Plans/analysis/allocation (e.g., depictions of deployment - movement profile, carrier summary, required vs scheduled, earliest arrival date/latest arrival date window).

LESSON 5  Products and reports (e.g., data elements and terms - TPFDD, channels, movements required/scheduled).

LESSON 6  Scheduling and movement process (roles and responsibilities, management considerations, rules and conventions, situations - legs, validation, push/pull, scheduling flags, auto manifest/demmanifest, deployment systems for TCCs).

LESSON 7  Scheduling and Movement Subsystem (carriers, change, create, schedule, manifest, channelizer, schedule flow analysis, port thruput, deployment summary).

LESSON 8  Requirements (forces, unit equipment, non-unit cargo/personnel).

LESSON 9  Unit Information (ID, subordinate info, deployment status, tasking, plan compare).

LESSON 10  User specified retrievals (JOPES, F6 Subsystem).

LESSON 11  JOPES Interfaces (TCCs and Services).

LESSON 12  Functional data base management (FDBM) (initialization, networking, permissions, synchronization, deletions, push/pull, manifesting, teleconferencing, telnet).

SELF INSTRUCTION

LESSON 1  Intro to WWMCCS and the Joint Planning Process.
LESSON 2  Joint Operation Planning/Deliberate Planning.
LESSON 3  JOPES
LESSON 4  MAC
LESSON 5  MTMC
LESSON 6  MSC
LESSON 7  FDBM

EXAM
c. CAI, JPEC, POWOW

(1) Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI) is designed to provide the student hands-on experience to learn JOPES data base material without relying on mainframe support. CAI is a replication of JOPES data which can be installed on a PC in an unclassified environment. The training is a first basic step into the system which, unless presented as simply as possible initially, can cause lingering confusion. CAI overcomes this potential learning problem.

(2) The Joint Planning and Execution Course (JPEC) is the next logical step toward system familiarization, leading to expertise for those required to develop skills within specific areas of JOPES operations. JPEC uses an unclassified training plan, but on the WWMCCS. Consequently, the trainee learns a sense of how time sharing works on the actual system. Further, the degree of detail is compounded as compared to that presented in CAI.

(3) Proficiency on WWMCCS on Watch (POWOW) is sponsored by Chief Naval Operations (OP-04) to develop expertise in the use of JOPES and teleconference capabilities among Navy personnel. The program was initiated and implemented during 1989-90. POWOW utilizes its own teleconference among WWMCCS users to invite responses to basic crisis action planning situations among a community of network respondents. The program's uniqueness is in its applicability for other-than-exercise timeframes. POWOW is, therefore, ideally suited to the reservists' weekend drilling environment.

(4) With the use of CAI, JPEC, and POWOW, the trainee can be expeditiously introduced to JOPES and its subsystems. For managers who need only to understand how JOPES functions, the JTRU training package is ideal. For trainees who must learn to operate the subsystems of JOPES, the training package is also an ideal entry level. Expertise can be developed within the specific directorates by OJT.

d. CAT CELL FUNCTIONS

(1) Crisis Action Team (CAT) functions have been defined during DESERT SHIELD/STORM and designed into the CAT. CAT cells functions receive, process, and generate information used for briefings to general/flag officers for deployment management decisions. Further, CAT cells functions interact with other CAT cells functions through action officers within the deployment community.

(2) Cell chiefs and members of CAT cells who have had experience during exercises and/or operations are in the best position to be instructors to convey the functions of each cell as well as their interrelationships. Training within cells, and then among cells, using a hypothetical deployment situation, is a viable training method.

e. CRISIS ACTION TEAM EXERCISE (CATEX)

(1) The CATEX is designed to bring together active duty and reservist personnel into one training environment. Active duty personnel, due to commitments to staff work outside of deployment operations, will require CAT training just as will reservists.
(2) CATEX activity will therefore bring together all participants who would be expected to staff the CAT, as well as incorporate CAT support functions (Public Affairs (PA), Surgeon (SG), Chief Counsel (JA), J1, J2, J3/J4, J5, J6)) to assist and respond to CATEX-generated actions. The activity is intended to orchestrate actions only insofar as to infuse understanding as to function, position, timing, and degree of participation. CATEX is not designed to develop operational expertise. Enhancement of skills which lead to expertise would take place in a follow-on training evolution, a joint exercise, or an operation.

f. EXERCISE/OPERATION

(1) The exercise/operation environment provides sufficient time and commitment of resources within USTRANSCOM as well as from within the deployment community to generate sufficient level of activity to simulate an actual operation. No sense of deployment operations can be experienced without the events to build up to decision-making situations which test management expertise and which illicit fast response, pressure-driven actions from CAT and CAT support personnel.

(2) Active duty personnel would assume CAT positions as staff duties and rotation policy allow. Reservists from all the services would participate during AT to see how the joint environment works as an entity.

g. DIRECTORATE OJT

J1 - Personnel and manpower issues.

J2 - Indications and warning, production, threat assessment. CAT briefing support.

J3/J4 - Systems/deployment management operations (JOPES, port activity, air/sealift, logistics, plans and analysis).

J5 - Deliberate/crisis action planning; requirements, plans and analysis.

J6 - Contingency planning, Communications frequency control, C4S support (programming, machine operations, data clerk processing).

SPECIAL STAFF (Taskings can change as result of Unified Command Plan and Functional Review)

- PA

Advise CINC/DCINC on public community and internal relations. Direct media relations and provide guidance and direction to components.
- JA


- SG

Conduct management of planning, operations, and intelligence functions for medical casualty and aeromedical evacuation movements using common user lift. Apply planning and deployment procedures, using JOPES and USTRANSCOM crisis action management procedures.
APPENDIX B

PROPOSED JOINT TABLE OF MOBILIZATION DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>SVC</th>
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APPENDIX C

Lessons Learned from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

OBSERVATION: For USTRANSCOM Headquarters, augmentation was required from unit reservists, volunteer Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and recalled retired personnel, to meet rapidly expanding and extended CAT operations and ancillary support.

DISCUSSION: Activation of USTC CAT 7 Aug 90 initiated USTRANSCOM direct involvement in deployment operations in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 2 Aug 90. Within 24 hours of activation, it became evident that reserve augmentation was needed in moderate numbers. Trained volunteers from the command’s Naval Reserve unit (NR 118) responded within 12 hours of request. Within two weeks of CAT activation, it became evident that reserve augmentation was needed beyond the assigned strength of the Naval Reserve unit that had trained to support USTC headquarters. Within one month of CAT activation, the Naval Reserve Unit was involuntarily activated. Concomitantly, volunteers were activated from the Army and Naval Reserve, including recall of retired personnel (Air Force personnel policy precluded assignment of reserve assets pending availability determination of active component resources). Most augmentees were utilized principally in the CAT, comprising approximately one-third of its personnel. (NOTE: CAT operations consisted of three watch teams on rotating shifts comprised of USTRANSCOM active duty and reserve assets. Active duty strength averaged 128, which represented approximately 40 percent of the USTRANSCOM active duty staff.) Augmentees also performed in other directorates in CAT related functions, including liaison responsibilities at other commands. The rapid pace in becoming productive, in expertise, and in providing the breadth and depth of support, proved the viability of joint reserve augmentation for the command, as well as for the mandatory requirement for rapid-response reserve augmentation in the face of fast-breaking crises. These reservists were required up front to orchestrate the advance logistics pipeline critical to the successes of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

RECOMMENDATION: That reservists from all Services be assigned in sufficient numbers and well-balanced apportionment; be trained as USTRANSCOM joint reserve unit; and be available for immediate response for recall to active duty, to support fast-breaking deployment operations requirements.
## APPENDIX D

### PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

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Appendix E
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2. Joint Memorandum:  Joint Memorandum DJSM-238-91, 25 Feb 91, USTRANSCOM Joint Reserve Unit Initiative
APPENDIX F
GLOSSARY

ADP          Automatic Data Processing
AT           Annual Training
CAI          Computer Assisted Instruction
CAT          Crisis Action Team
CATEX        Crisis Action Team Exercise
FDBM         Functional Data Base Management
JA           Chief Counsel
JOPES        Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPEC         Joint Planning and Execution Course
JS           Joint Staff
JTMD         Joint Table Mobilization Distribution
JTRU         Joint Transportation Reserve Unit
MAC          Military Airlift Command
MC           Marine Corps
MMR          Merchant Marine Reserve
MSC          Military Sealift Command
MTMC         Military Traffic Management Command
PA           Public Affairs
POWOW        Proficiency on WWMCCS on Watch
PRT          Physical Readiness Training
SG           Surgeon
TCC          Transportation Component Command
TCDC         Deputy USCINTRANS
TPFDD        Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
Command Relationships:
U.S. Atlantic Command

CINCLANTFLEET
ADM. J. P. REASON
USN

CDR., ACC
GEN. R. E. HAWLEY
USAF

CDR., MARFORLANT
LTG. C. E. WILHELM
USMC

C.G., FORSCOM
GEN. D.A. BRAMLETT
USA
USACOM Flag/General Officers

CINC
Gen SHEEHAN
USMC

DCINC
VADM FALLON
USN

COS
RADM FANNING
USNR

DCOS
INTEL
Brig Gen JAEGER
USAF

DCOS
OPS/C3
MG GILE
USA

DCOS
RESOURCES
BG FLOYD II
USA

DCOS
PLANS & POLICY
Maj Gen HOBBS
USAF

DCOS
TRAINING
MajGen DELONG
USMC

VICE
DCOS
RADM POE
USNR

VICE
DCOS
MajGen McCARTHY
USMCR

VICE
DCOS
BrigGen MULDER
USAFR

VICE
DCOS
VACANT
USARNG

VICE
DCOS
VACANT
USAR

JRUCB0397-005
USACOM
Reserve Component
General Officer Steering Committee
MISSION:

INTEGRATE THE RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) FORCES INTO THE JOINT TEAM

♦ TO PROVIDE A BROAD ARRAY OF FORCE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT USACOM’S MILITARY STRATEGIES

♦ PROMOTE EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH SERVICE COMPATIBILITIES AND CREATE A SEAMLESS RC INFORMATION SYSTEM

♦ TO ADD VALUE TO USACOM AND THE SERVICE COMPONENTS.
To be the recognized leaders in developing timely and viable initiatives that enhance the use of Reserve Component assets to meet USACOM’s Joint force warfighting mission requirements.
Provide trained Reserve Component Personnel to augment and fully integrate into USACOM's staff, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis, and wartime requirements on a timely basis.
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Composition of USACOM Headquarters

- Active
- Reserve
- Civilian
AJRU Organization

JRU Commander

OIC USAR Component
OIC USMC Component
OIC USNR Component
OIC USAFR Component

JRU Chief of Staff
- Requirement / Operations
- Training / Security
- Personnel / Administration

J1 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J2 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J3 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J4 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J5 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J6 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J7 SELRES COORD AC COORD
J8 SELRES COORD AC COORD

ADCON
CHAIN OF COMMAND

DIRECTORATE
Focal Point for
Execution / Reporting

Directorate
Specific
Training

OERs / FITREPS

Directorate
Reserve Coordinator

Mobilization
Asset

IDT/AT/ADT/ADSW
Planning
Scheduling
Execution

Directorate
SELRES Coordinator
JOINT RESERVE
UNIT CHALLENGES

Adding true value to USACOM

- Total accountability and responsibility for all R.C. assets
- One stop processing
- Focused on directorate support
- Flexibility in drills
- Flexibility in TDA, T/O
- Scheduling resources against fiscal responsibility
Paradigm Busters

OLD

◆ Unit Scheduled Drills
◆ Service Rating Scheme
◆ 4 Separate Unit Admin Structures-56 People
◆ No Formal In Processing

NEW

◆ J-Code Scheduled Duty
◆ Joint Rating Scheme
◆ Reduced SELRES Overhead-23 People or Fewer
◆ JRU In Process All ACOM RC
  ➔ Badges
  ➔ Security
Paradigm Busters (Cont.)

OLD
- Disjointed Joint Indoctrination Training
- No Coherent Reassignment Policy
- "Ghost" Reservists
- Service Focus to Coordinate J-Code Needs

NEW
- Formalize JBOC & Continuing Education at Strategic Level - War Colleges
- Flexible Reassignment Policy
- Data Base & Annual Conference Quarterly Update Meetings with J-Codes
- 1 Joint Senior SELRES J-Code Coordinator
FUTURE CHALLENGES

- Reserve Tracking Database
- TRO
- Distance Learning
- Joint OERs / FITREPs / OPRs
- Future use of Reserves in a Joint Command
- JSO / JPME
- Expanded Internet capability
Reservists take on real-world responsibilities in Atlantic Command

BY JACK DORSEY, The Virginian-Pilot
Copyright 1997, Landmark Communications Inc.

NORFOLK -- At U.S. Atlantic Command Headquarters here -- perhaps the busiest military organization in the world -- a real estate developer from Pennsylvania serves as chief of staff.

Rear Adm. Timothy O. Fanning, a Navy reservist from West Chester, Pa., takes a $12 room at the Navy Lodge three or four nights a week so that he can help supervise 1.3 million of the nation's military personnel.

At other times he works from home, his laptop computer dialed into ACOM's toll-free telephone line, his work coded to protect the secret information he handles.

Fanning serves not only as the chief operating officer for ACOM's commander in chief -- Marine Corps Gen. John J. Sheehan -- but also as the personification of a major shift in the nation's military thinking.

His command is a leading player in a push to fully integrate reservists with active-duty soldiers and sailors, an effort that promises to thrust "weekend warriors" into the everyday workings of America's military machinery.

Ultimately, the effort may save scads of money, fill personnel holes left by the military drawdown, and better prepare reserve forces for service in national emergencies.

"We are a model, basically, for the defense industry of the future," Fanning said.

Where top-ranking reserve officers once performed mundane administrative duties with their field units -- drilling one weekend a month, plus serving two weeks on active duty annually -- those assigned to ACOM today are coming to work every day of the week, and shouldering real-world responsibilities.

Only their I.D. cards -- pink, rather than green -- separate them from their active-duty counterparts. And because they take a hands-on role in ACOM's regular business, the command winds up with a truly workable backup.

Thus a CIA official, Larry L. Poe, is a naval reserve rear admiral who fills in for Air Force Brig. Gen. James A. Yaeger, an active-duty officer on ACOM's staff who serves as director of intelligence.

Reserve Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Albert C. Harvey, who in civilian life is a senior partner in a Memphis, Tenn., law firm, sits in for the operations directorate, and helps brainstorm ACOM's exercises.

Just three years ago there were 85 reservists attached to the command to assist its 440-member, active-duty staff. Today there are more than 450 reservists assigned, and within a year that number will grow to about 600.

"This is a new breed of cat," said Marine Corps Reserve Col. Andrew "Drew" B. Davis, commanding officer of ACOM's reserve unit.

"Once upon a time, in the '70s and '80s, reservists on drill weekends went into a drill center and trained themselves for the eventuality that one day they may be called upon to support national policy and go to work.

"All of the time they spent training themselves was done segregated from the active component to a large degree."

Davis, like his fellow reservists, holds his ACOM post on top of his civilian duties: He is associate director of the Newspaper Management Center at Northwestern University.

That old system, Davis said, worked pretty well when tested -- particularly when Desert Storm pulled a legion of reservists into action. But afterward, with the drawdown in military forces, wide holes started to appear in the ranks.

"Empty desks started appearing," Davis said, "but the work didn't diminish."

So instead of training at National Guard or Army Reserve armories, performing purely administrative duties that rarely take advantage of their civilian skills, the reservists now give Sheehan 150 hours of work a year, plus at least two weeks of full-time work, doing real world things, Davis said.

"The active guys can see relief is on the way," he said.

When he reported to the command and appointed its chief of staff, Fanning was given the added task of setting up a steering committee to advise him on reserve matters.

That decision, Fanning said, was Sheehan's way of saying he wanted the reserve component to meld into ACOM's everyday functions, "a statement that they were absolutely serious about integrating reserves in this command."

For years, reservists had pushed for a more complete integration, but they'd tried to do it from the bottom up. It didn't work well, Fanning said: "I, like them, believed integration alone takes place at the top of the organization. Not at the bottom."

Forming Davis's reserve unit was one of the first recommendations of Fanning's steering committee.

Now, instead of an ad hoc reserve force, ACOM will be able to better use its reserve components as parts of the whole of its resources.

"I'm telling you when we did Desert Storm, we sent reservists. But their command elements had never worked with the other command elements. We had a Naval Reserve captain and he headed up the port group. But he had never worked with any command. They just said we need a port security group and all of a sudden he went. Their communications didn't work together."

Establishing the unit didn't finish the task. Fanning also had to be certain that reserve flag officers were up to their new roles.
Few had formal joint service training. In fact, over a decade only seven had attended the Capstone course, considered the peak of joint training opportunities. Nobody could give him a reason for not offering it to reservists.

"We went for it," he said.

This year, 22 reserve flag officers will attend Capstone, and from now on, one in five of those attending will be reservists.

There will be other opportunities for reserve officers to make their marks, too, in 35 newly authorized jobs at unified commands around the world.

"We are going to transfer those people out of administrative billets and into operational billets where they can fill in," Fanning said. "We have, for the first time, a full-balanced approach of all the services."

Army Col. H. Allen Chadwick, chief of staff of ACOM's Joint Reserve Unit, said the reservists attending weekend drills throughout the country are beginning to notice.

"Our phones are ringing off the hook," he said. "This is the place they want to be. This is the center for reserve integration."
DIRECTORATE of MOBILIZATION and RESERVE COMPONENT AFFAIRS

RESERVE COMPONENTS IN USEUCOM

UNCLASSIFIED
AGENDA

- Directorate of Mobilization & Reserve Component Affairs (ECRA)

- USEUCOM Reserve Component Campaign Plan (RCCP)

- Reserve Components contributions in the European Theater

- ECRA Core Competencies - State Partnership Program (SPP) & Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
ECRA - Who We Are

- Special staff directorate that provides CINCEUR with expert advice on Reserve Component (RC) affairs within the European Theater.
- Unique to EUCOM. Only stand-alone Reserve Affairs directorate within any Joint Command.
ECRA - Where We Fit

Headquarters United States European Command

CINCEUR ECCC

CMD SM ECSE

Spec. Asst.
SPSAC

Insp. Gen.
ECIG

NATO USNMR

Political Adv.
ECPLAD

Marshall
Center ECMC

DCINC
ECDC

Chief of Staff
ECCS

Protocol
ECCS-P

Anal/Sim
ECCS-AS

Sec Joint Staff
ECJS

Chaplain
ECCH

Public Affairs
ECPA

Medical
ECMD

Sec. Assistant
ECSM

Log/Security
ECJ4

Man/Pers/Adm
ECJ1

Plans & Policy
ECJ5

Intelligence
ECJ2

Operations
ECJ3

Spec. Ops
ECSO

Liaison Office
Wash DC

Comptroller
ECCM

Legal Adv.
ECLA

ECRA - What We Do

- Support the USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement & Preparedness by:
  - Promoting a Total Force approach to mission accomplishment.
  - Linking theater engagement requirements to RC capabilities.
  - Planning for & facilitating RC participation in operations & exercises.
  - Promoting & enhancing Peacetime Engagement through the State Partnership Program (SPP).
ECRA - How We Are Organized

Directorate of Mobilization & Reserve Component Affairs (ECRA)

Director
IMA 2 Star
Current ARNG MG

General's Secretary

Deputy Director
USNR 06

Executive Officer
USAFR 04
Current USNR (TAR)
YNCS

Operations/Exercises Div.
Chief ARNG 06
Total Manning: 8

Plans/Policy Div.
Chief USAR 06
Total Manning: 7

Resource Management
Chief Selres 05/06
Current USAR 06
Total Manning: 4

Exercises
Operations
Plans
Policy
Budget
Personnel

Note: 14 of 21 positions funded
RESERVE COMPONENT
CAMPAIGN PLAN (RCCP)

- Preparedness Guidance Document used to Implement:

"The CINC's vision, intent, objectives, goals, and measures of progress for the Reserve Component in support of U.S. European Command."

GENERAL GEORGE JOULWAN
9 NOVEMBER 1994
THE RCCP REACHES OUT IN EUROPE THROUGH CINCEUR'S JOINT RESERVE COMPONENT COUNCIL (CRCC)
THE RCCP REACHES OUT TO AMERICA THROUGH ECRA

RCCP ➔ ECRA ➔ NGB ➔ USNR ➔ USMCR ➔ USAFR ➔ OCAR ➔ ASD/RA ➔ NCESGR ➔ NGAUS ➔ ROA ➔ RFPB ➔ FEDERAL CODELS ➔ STATE LEGISLATORS ➔ GOVERNORS ➔ PRIVATE SECTOR
ENGAGE in PEACETIME CONTRIBUTIONS

- Overseas Mission Support (OMS)
- Partnership for Peace Program (PFP)
- Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)
- State Partnership Program (SPP)
- RC Full-time Support (AGR, TAR)
RESPOND to CRISIS CONTRIBUTIONS

- Offset AC OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO
  - Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
  - Unique unit contributions: Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, Military Police, Medical, Finance, Admin., Air Rescue
  - Individual Support via multiple means
  - Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)

- Support Peace Support Operations (NEO, IFOR, SFOR, Humanitarian Ops)

- Support Contingency Operations (CONOPS)
FIGHT to WIN Contributions

- Early Deploy Combat, Combat Support, & Combat Service Support units per the Time Phased Force Deployment Data
- Provide *Individual* Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) to seamlessly integrate into the USEUCOM AOR
- Augment/backfill AC units in the USEUCOM AOR
- Provide other *unique* RC capabilities & skills not available within the AC in the quantity required to Fight to Win
RC CONTRIBUTIONS FY96

- **AREA:**
  - Mission Support
  - Contingency Ops
  - Contributory Support
  - Peacetime Engagement

- **MANDAYS:**
  - 115,704
  - 242,756
  - 178,419
  - 15,606

**TOTAL:** 552,485
RC CONTRIBUTIONS FY96

- **SERVICE:**
  - ANG/AFRES
  - ARNG/USAR
  - USNR
  - USMC

- **MANDAYS:**
  - 265,000
  - 182,789
  - 75,660
  - 29,036
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (SPP)  
"BRIDGE TO AMERICA"

- Aligns U.S. States with foreign nations
- Focuses on democratic ideals
- Provides role model of citizen soldier
- Demonstrates military subordination and support of civilian authority
RC STATE PARTNERSHIP PARTICIPATION FY96

- Over 15,000 Mandays of engagement as follows:
  - Romania: CORNERSTONE
  - Slovakia: COOPERATIVE DRAGON
  - Czech Rep: COOPERATIVE BEST EFFORT
  - Romania: COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION
  - FYrom: MEDCUR 96-2/RESCUER
  - Bulgaria: PEACEFUL EAGLE
  - Estonia: BALTIC CHALLENGE
  - Germany: OLSINA
Mobilization Management

- An ECRA Core Competency
- Assist USEUCOM with RC requirements definition & validation
- Liaise with the Joint Staff
  - with Supporting CINC
  - with RC Service Components
- Facilitate movement in/out of theater
- Resolve obstacles to success
### RC PSRC Contribution to OJE-IFOR & OJG-SFOR

#### Strength Authorizations

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* Approved for 31 October 1996 thru 15 August 1998

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UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF 31 JAN 97

27
SUMMARY

- ECRA is a USEUCOM Special Staff Directorate that implements the CINC's RC vision
- ECRA core competencies are management of the State Partnership Program (SPP) & Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)
- The Reserve Component Campaign Plan (RCCP) is the guiding "vision" document for RC integration within USEUCCOM
- The RC is fully committed to implementing the CINC's Strategy of Engagement & Preparedness
- The RC contributed over 550,000 mandays of theater support in FY96