AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR MOBILITY--PIVOTAL NON-LETHAL CAPABILITY

Where are we going with Peacekeeping?

by

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ABSTRACT

United Nations (UN)-sponsored peacekeeping is on the rise since the end of the Cold War. The character of peacekeeping has changed, expanding to include intruding into internal state elections, policing, human rights review, and other traditionally sovereign institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, America is the sole remaining superpower, and the world looks to the US to continue its leadership role. Our new national strategy of engagement and enlargement recognizes the benefit of global stability and clearly identifies peacekeeping as not the centerpiece, but nonetheless, an important tool in implementing our national security strategy.

Various constraints limit direct American involvement in UN-sponsored peacekeeping. One area where the US has contributed significantly is in transporting peacekeeping forces to and from the conflict area. These transport missions provide both a national strategic bargaining chip and some of the best peacetime operational training opportunities available. A significant, but largely unrecognized by-product, is the international credibility derived for the "Global Reach" leg of US Air Force military strategy. The paper concludes the US should continue to provide air mobility assets in moderation to UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations.
BIOPGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER .............................................................................................................. ii
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ........................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... v
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
PEACEKEEPING: GROWTH INDUSTRY OF THE NINETIES ............................... 2
THE AIR MOBILITY CONNECTION ......................................................................... 9
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS ............................................................................. 12
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE ........................................................................ 21
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 24
TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................................. 26
   Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations ............................................................. 26
   Table 2. Airlift Assets of Some Major Air Forces ......................................... 28
   Figure 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations .......................................................... 29
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 30
INTRODUCTION

Recent American involvement in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti has focused attention on American post-Cold War foreign policy intentions. What is our role? Should we promote, participate in, or eschew United Nations peacekeeping efforts? The Republicans in Congress have made this issue part of their "Contract with America."¹ In light of declining US military budgets, the answer has programmatic implications. Virtually all US military activities, roles, and missions are being "scrubbed," a euphemism for downsizing. The American resource allocation system tends to reward mission areas perceived as "cost effective" and, conversely, remove funding from mission areas perceived as too expensive. Although mobility programs are currently considered critical, outside influences such as the proposed balanced budget amendment and inaccurate budget estimation could refocus budgetary attention.² Our growing involvement in peacekeeping is not universally perceived as necessary, and thus programs that support it could be cut. This paper reviews the American concept of peacekeeping, examines the recent changes to UN-sponsored peacekeeping, analyzes the contribution and impact of Air Mobility Command to these efforts, and forecasts consequences.

Peacekeeping is not new. International peacekeeping as it is now practiced traces its roots to the Suez crisis in 1956. Since World War II, the United Nations (UN) has sponsored many large and small peacekeeping operations (see Table 1 and Figure 1). What is new since the end of the Cold War is the explosion in such peacekeeping operations. Table 1 shows that, since 1988, the UN Security Council established 15 new peacekeeping operations, as compared to 12 in the previous 40 years. The thaw in the Cold War also thawed the UN’s reticence to conduct such peacekeeping.

The American public is disturbed by the increasing indistinctness in the nature of the peacekeeping role. Traditional peacekeeping was easy to define: "a third party act[ing] in the capacity of an impartial referee to assist in the settlement of a dispute between two or more other parties." [emphasis in original] Usually the parties were international state governments or recognized as an equivalent. UN peacekeeping operations before 1980 followed this model with one exception: the Korean War. This traditional nobility of purpose, combined with limited activity, made US involvement acceptable to the American public prior to 1988. Acceptance is more limited today, as shown recently in the American withdrawal from Somalia.

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The first difficulty in discussing peacekeeping is defining it. The UN charter does not include the term. Many authors use "peacekeeping" to include peace making, military enforcement, and other activities clearly outside the original scope. The International Peace Institute defined traditional peacekeeping as:

the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.\(^4\)

Two important consequences derive from this definition of traditional peacekeeping. First, the US generally played a minor, supporting role. Because peacekeeping required clearly impartial forces, the US could not play a major role during the Cold War. The US national security policy of containment from 1949 through 1988 with its commensurate US-Soviet confrontation effectively made the US a minor player. The referee must be viewed by all players as impartial to be effective. This is the historical context behind the current 31 percent US financial-cost-share while only 1 percent of the blue-helmeted peacekeepers are American. With the previously noted Korean exception, this proportion has held from the start of UN-sponsored peacekeeping. We supported the concept, but couldn’t directly enforce the peace.\(^6\)


\(^5\) Rikhye:11

\(^6\) Rikhye:215-218
Second, traditional peacekeeping was relatively non-hazardous:

In classical peacekeeping situations, disciplined national armed forces of the former belligerents, usually sovereign states, generally could be expected to respect both the negotiated truce and the peacekeeping forces sent to monitor compliance with it. Moreover, these national armed forces usually could be separated, returned to their national territories, and enjoined to remain within certain demarcation lines, often national boundaries.\(^7\)

The role of the peacekeepers was more symbolic than enforcement through coercion. Their mission was peaceful intervention, using diplomacy, negotiation, and presence to control the situation. Implicit in this understanding is the agreement of all parties to comply with the peacekeeper’s role. The UN must gain and maintain an international consensus from both the external actors and the direct parties to the conflict for peacekeeping to be viable. The actual peacekeeping forces are much too small to enforce the peace if any of the belligerents do not want peace. Although periodically under fire, peacekeepers continue to wear bright blue helmets and drive white painted, clearly marked combat vehicles. Their success can only be achieved if the belligerents observe the truce.\(^8\)

Peacekeepers rarely succeed if they must themselves use force. The UN Congo operation in the early 1960s is a rare example in which forceful action by peacekeepers was effective, succeeding only because the opponent was a weak, isolated actor. The Multinational Force in Beirut in 1982-83 illustrates the more common fate of peacekeepers who try to use force: they come to be

\(^7\) Jockel:4
\(^8\) Rikhye:11
perceived as belligerent, and become targets of the side they appear to oppose.

Modern peacekeeping bears only a small resemblance to the traditional peacekeeping described above, leading to growing concerns by the American public. Marrack Goulding, the former UN Under Secretary General For Peacekeeping, identified the differences:

1. (N)ew operations usually have a large civilian component;
2. they often involve elections--their organization and conduct;
3. they usually involve an important information component, especially concerning democratic institutions;
4. they often involve a police component;
5. they often involve a human rights dimension, going beyond the supervision of police by intruding deeply into the judicial and penal systems;
6. they are time-limited--most new operations have a timetable for implementation, which has been good for the troop-contributing countries; and
7. more often than not, the new operations are dealing with internal conflicts.

Perhaps because of our own revolutionary past and our recent unsatisfactory experiences in Vietnam, Americans are particularly troubled by the last change listed above--the insertion of peacekeeping forces, including Americans, into internal conflicts. Although we are widely considered the world's strongest military, we balk at being the world's policeman. This national concern has manifested peacekeeping as a national agenda item: explicit consideration and inclusion in the Clinton administration's

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9 Kaufman:1
10 Jockel:3
11 Hearing:5

So where does this leave us? Clearly, regional security is directly important to the global economy which directly impacts the US economy, so it follows we should support peaceful resolution of conflict globally. President Clinton identified our strategy:

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.13

However, Americans vividly remember seeing dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets in Somalia, the tragedy of the Beirut Marine barracks bombing, and Americans killed in periodic Korean border incidents. Direct involvement by the American military in peacekeeping increases the risk of American casualties, which in turn risks an American public demand to unilaterally withdraw at an inopportune time, abandoning the prior investment bought with blood. With the exception of election

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12Hearing:15, Lake Brief:1-4, Clinton:16
monitoring, contemporary peacekeeping is not usually a quick, decisive activity.

The National Security Strategy clarifies US peacekeeping policy:

The United States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response. U.S. support capabilities such as airlift, intelligence, and global communications, have often contributed to the success of multilateral peace operations, and they will continue to do so. U.S. combat units are less likely to be used for most peace operations, but in some cases their use will be necessary or desirable and justified . . . [emphasis added]14

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a rise in UN-sponsored peacekeeping. The character of peacekeeping also changed, expanding to include intrusion into internal state elections, policing, monitoring human rights conduct, and providing other traditionally sovereign institutions. The end of the Cold War also left the US as the sole remaining superpower. Our new national strategy of engagement and enlargement recognizes the benefit of global stability and clearly identifies peacekeeping, while not the centerpiece, is nonetheless an important tool in implementing our national security strategy.15

The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice. It is also true that if we move early in dealing with these

13 Clinton: 2
14 Clinton: 16
15 Clinton: 1-2, 16
conflicts, and if we have an effective method for carrying our international peace enforcement, especially in a preventative way, we have a new tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations that could well offset our national interests and our future.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16}Pickering, Thomas R. Ambassador, Remarks to an NDU Conference, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations:EX-1
THE AIR MOBILITY CONNECTION

This increase in peacekeeping operations has directly impacted Air Mobility Command (AMC). Most UN member nations do not have a significant strategic mobility capability. The United States Air Force, as a by-product of its “Global Reach, Global Power” military strategy, maintains the largest standing capability to deploy and redeploy peacekeeping forces in the world, as illustrated in Table 2. In many cases, AMC is the most visible contributor to America’s implementation of its national security strategy. As outlined above, UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations have mushroomed since 1988. Each of these operations requires moving men and equipment from all the contributing nations to the trouble spot and back. Although many nations have long range passenger aircraft, few have long range cargo aircraft. Frequently, the peacekeeping location is not completely peaceful, so commercial airlines are reluctant to participate because their insurance does not cover operation into hostile areas. The US, with the world’s largest fleet of long range military transports, usually moves most peacekeeping forces to and from the operation.

A common television news backdrop includes a close-up of a US military airlift aircraft. Relief supplies are being delivered, or US troops are deploying to some new trouble spot, or, sadly, caskets are flying home to military honors. The image is so pervasive that one hardly considers the expense or singular capability represented. The United States has developed the
world's foremost ability to project military power quickly. Even the Soviet Union (before its collapse) could not compare. This capability is expensive: just the active duty Air Mobility Command's FY 1993 annual operating budget was $5.7 billion, with total assets of roughly $36.0 billion. In comparison with the private sector, this was equivalent to the number seven position on the Fortune 500, with more assets than Boeing ($15.8B) and McDonnell Douglas ($14.8B) combined.\textsuperscript{17}

With the large expense of maintaining an organic airlift capability goes the continual questioning as to mission requirement. Does the US need to maintain this ability? During the Cold War, combat and support equipment were maintained in a high readiness condition in Europe ready to be married up with arriving US troops from the states. Despite the seemingly exorbitant cost of purchasing and maintaining two sets of equipment for the soldiers (one in the states for training and one in Europe for combat), this prepositioning made military and economic sense. If one accepted the NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict projections, these stateside divisions needed to be in position and ready to fight within ten days, or the conflict would be lost by default. Conversely, we could not afford the airlift infrastructure (additional aircraft, crews, flying hours, etc.) to feasibly move the stateside combat equipment in the required timeframe. The key elements were time-criticality and relatively known location for the conflict. Two fundamental changes since

\textsuperscript{17}Milton: 3
the end of the Cold War have changed the mobility triad balance between airlift, sealift, and prepositioned assets. First, very large scale conventional conflicts are much less likely, and second, the location of the next hot spot cannot be forecast as reliably. US strategy has shifted to returning a large proportion of our military forces to the states, downsizing the active force, and placing more capability in the reserve component and civilian sector.\textsuperscript{18} As a consequence, our prepositioned assets are more useful when positioned aboard ships, and mobility forces have become more important relative to combat forces in the continuing budget allocation of resources. Air mobility forces can move the smaller, lighter forces anticipated in the regional conflicts of the future.\textsuperscript{19} The focus of the US air mobility forces has changed significantly from moving known large forces quickly to predicted locations in Europe to meet a Soviet attack to moving smaller, unspecified combat forces anywhere in the world. Onload and offload locations and force lists are not known for today's contingencies almost until execution.

Given that peacekeeping is an important element of our national security strategy and the US has the world's preeminent air mobility system, connecting the two appears to be a good match. Transporting men and equipment to and from the peacekeeping operation is obviously required, relatively low risk, and good training.

\textsuperscript{18}Clinton:1-7
\textsuperscript{19}Grier:32, Grier:27)
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS

The accountants easily tally up the "cost" of each of these peacekeeping missions. Because Congress does not fund contingency projections as part of the normal budget process, DOD identifies contingency costs separately in supplemental budget requests. As Congress deliberates on the supplementals, costs are paid from existing operations and maintenance accounts, frequently degrading DOD's other plans and programs, as well as readiness.²⁰

But the significant question remains, "Is it worth it?" Is the US taxpayer getting value from these operations? Here the answer is much less precise. Purists, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, argue that the core function of the military is to "fight and win the nation's wars." They argue that any other mission, currently referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), is an additional burden and distraction from the core military function. From this military-only perspective, peacekeeping is not worth it as it interferes with the core peacetime requirement to organize, train, and equip for combat. This perspective clearly applies to combat forces, but should not be extended to mobility forces without further analysis. The peacetime training requirements for combat and mobility forces differ, as discussed in a following section.

Accountants phrase the question differently: "Is it cost effective?" A precise, quantitative answer is not possible.

²⁰Hearing: 13
National security requires some level of defense spending both in peace and war. This level rises during conflict periods and decreases during periods when conflict is not perceived as imminent. Peacetime deterrence is designed to avoid conflict by convincing the opponent that his goals cannot be achieved by aggression, that the penalty will outweigh the benefit, or simply that the opponent will not survive the response. To quantitatively analyze the effectiveness of peacekeeping, one must first assess the total cost of the conflict that the peacekeeping effort is holding at bay, and second, the cost of the peacekeeping effort.

The second is relatively easy to evaluate; the first requires assumptions that will not be universally accepted. Another complicating factor is the value of peace. The total cost of a potential conflict should include both the direct costs in lives and materiel, and also the indirect costs to the nation’s and the world’s economy. The evolving global economy requires global markets to grow. As an example, Japanese VCR sales are probably down in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the Bosnian conflict was resolved, presumably Japanese VCR sales in the region would increase, adding to the total gross global product. The counter to this argument is that worldwide munitions and weapon sales would probably decrease, possibly overbalancing the growth due to regional stability effects. To avoid belaboring the point, quantitative analysis of “Is peacekeeping cost effective?” is not useful. Too
many assumptions are required and both yes and no answers can be credibly supported.

If quantitative analysis reveals no answers, qualitative reasoning must suffice. Deterrence of regional conflict is generally considered a good outcome. Most financiers require stability as a prerequisite for investment. Potential conflict could physically destroy or seize any investment before a profit is returned. This is one of the reasons the world business community is reluctant to invest in troubled areas such as Cyprus or Lebanon. Lack of investment dampens growth, and neither the regional gross domestic product nor the average global standard of living grows as fast as potentially possible.

If deterrence fails, presumably the US would get involved at some level in the resulting conflict. To not get involved would clearly show the prior American position as a bluff, bringing all US foreign policy and commitment into question. The probable US involvement would be either unilateral or in coalition with poorer nations, burdening the US with either full or disproportionate share of the cost.

If deterrence succeeds, the US avoids the cost of this potentially expensive response. Economic growth in the trouble area, and indirectly the world, is feasible because of the resulting stability. Casualties are avoided. Direct peacekeeping costs are shared with other UN members. This has led some observers to conclude that the US receives a full dollar of
collective security value for 31 cents expenditure, our agreed-upon cost-share for UN peacekeeping.

In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.N. Permanent Representative Madeleine Albright describes increasing United Nations peacekeeping cost as a 'good investment' consistent with American values and even cheap because, she asserts, the United States would have to take identical actions unilaterally if the U.N. did not. She further states U.N. peacekeeping assessments (which exceed 31.4 percent of the peacekeeping budget) are insignificant because they are small when divided by our population or into the defense budget.\textsuperscript{21}

When we refine the qualitative analysis to look at the question of air mobility force application to peacekeeping, a different picture emerges. The relevant question is, "What are the peacetime training goals and does supporting UN peacekeeping efforts enhance or degrade these goals?" The previous, "Is it worth it?" discussion focused at the strategic national interest level. This question is more operational: how should airlift forces prepare in peacetime for their wartime roles? Tankers, the new leg in the mobility process, frequently fulfill a direct airlift role and increasingly refuel the dedicated airlifters, forming a tanker bridge allowing long, quick single-sortie flight from onload to offload anywhere in the world. The following peacetime military airlift goals have withstood both internal Air Force and Congressional scrutiny:

1) Create and maintain a global capability to quickly open and sustain a militarily significant air mobility flow into remote, underdeveloped destinations,

\textsuperscript{21} Hearing: 7
2) Create and maintain a self-sustaining, experienced personnel force,

3) Provide outsize and oversize common user airlift to DOD customers,

4) Provide efficient allocation of the airlift byproduct through an industrial fund approach,

5) Prepare other elements of the DOD community for deployment and employment, and

6) Identify and resolve air transportability issues prior to combat.\textsuperscript{22}

US peacekeeping participation directly contributes to goals one and two. The second goal establishes the size of the peacetime flying hour program. The mobility training paradigm is evolving. On the airlift side, pilot training is the traditionally controlling factor. For example, if the pilots receive enough varied world wide flight experience, the other personnel elements will be trained. Phrased differently, the loadmasters will see enough different loads, the maintenance community will see enough malfunctions both at home station and downrange, the supply community will push repair parts forward to repair aircraft broken in the system, and the aerial port system will load and unload passengers and cargo at a large enough rate to sustain normal force training and turnover.

On the tanker side, transition from the Cold War nuclear deterrent Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) as the primary
role to tactical and mobility force enhancement has not settled yet. The tanker force is routinely deploying worldwide at a higher rate than Cold War levels. The old flying hour models which ensured crew proficiency and a credible SIOP launch response are slowly expanding to cover the increased distances to get to and from these new strategic mobility and tactical deployment sites. In addition, the KC-135 fleet is expanding into the airlift role. Each wing regularly flies small channel cargo missions, using specially configured 463L cargo pallets, extra C-5 ramp rollers attached to the floor, and a multitude of loading straps. The KC-10 fleet was purchased for and has always supported the dual airlift/tanker role. The tanker mission has evolved into a global mobility role since the end of the Cold War. Supporting peacekeeping operations provides intense, real world credibility to this new global mobility role, and, ironically, allows the tanker community to continue to fulfill the Cold War “Peace is our Profession” motto.

Supporting UN peacekeeping operations during peacetime directly improves US mobility readiness. US personnel receive valuable experience in dealing with coalition partners and their equipment. Destination airfields may come under hostile fire, encouraging all personnel to follow their combat procedures. Destination airfields frequently are remote and antiquated, exercising and validating our ability to operate into austere conditions. Finally, UN peacekeeping support demonstrates to

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22Airlift Hearing: 4, 11, 20, 30, 539
potential adversaries American capability to project power, thus deterring conflict which could result from false assumptions.

Air mobility achieves political objectives through the movement of international peacekeeping bodies, the removal of refugees from danger, or the delivery of disaster relief goods and services. The arrival of America's mobility aircraft signals US resolve, restores stability, and warns aggressors to reconsider their actions. The mere capability to rapidly project force is a powerful deterrent to aggression, allowing America to influence world events.23

But this benefit can be overstated. The current high operational tempo of US air mobility forces exceeds the peacetime tempo required to achieve the training goals listed above. A recent speaker at Air War College described the current aircrew and support force as "extremely ready." His tongue-in-cheek description results from the recent constantly repeated non-mobilized, unforecast, large-scale air movements to and from Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and other trouble spots. This high tempo also involves exceeding the approved and planned annual flying hour program. Although many of the recent flying hour program excesses were justified based on humanitarian responses to natural disasters, the fact remains that some flying hours were spent on UN peacekeeping missions and contributed to the further aging of an already old fleet. As aircraft age, two primary considerations become more important: increasing repair frequency and increasing replacement spare parts requirement. The increasing repair frequency makes achieving the estimated wartime utilization rates with existing manpower problematic. Either new, higher

23AMMP: 1-31
maintenance manpower authorizations (and corresponding funding) must be added, or lower achievable wartime daily utilization should be expected. The aircraft spare parts problem is similar, but with another twist. Long lead spares, those requiring more than one year to procure, are bought based on flying hour projections. For example, one C-5 nose gear strut should need replacement every 100,000 fleet flying hours, notionally. If the fleet overflies by 100,000 hours, one C-5 should be hard broke for a nose gear strut that the supply system didn’t order and doesn’t have.

On balance, air mobility support for UN peacekeeping operations appears to make both national strategic and military operational sense. With an American aversion to peacetime casualties, US policy makers are constrained in what they bring to the global negotiating table. To remain an active participant and frequent leader, the US has supported UN peacekeeping with funding, airlift, intelligence, and communication assets. Actual combat troop commitment has been minimal. Thus air mobility forces have supplied a national bargaining chip in the international arena. In moderation, peacetime air mobility support for these operations provides some of the best mobility aircrew and support personnel seasoning available. In addition, UN peacekeeping operations are played on the world stage, allowing potential adversaries to witness American mobility prowess and reducing their inclination to underestimate America’s ability to reach out and touch them. These missions provide an international
credibility that is simply not available from an orchestrated JCS exercise or a Red Flag deployment.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE

President Clinton has shaped our national security strategy to address the following scenario:

Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions.\(^\text{24}\)

The Air Force’s derived strategy focuses on quickness and lethality.\(^\text{25}\) Smaller military forces, in conjunction with coalition partners, will be sent to contain and address regional conflicts. The direct survival of the United States is not at risk from these conflicts as it was in the Cold War. However, the US has a continuing interest in collective security and the resulting increase in the global economy. The primary military role remains to fight and win the nation’s wars. A fundamental change is that these wars may not be vital.

The impact to the air mobility community is clear: with limited funding, the US must provide an agile transportation system to get combat forces to the fight quickly. Where the fight will be is undefined, so flexibility is important. With reduced peacetime forward basing, holding forces are smaller and speed of reinforcement is critical. The airlift deployment flow in a contingency may come under hostile fire.

\(^{\text{24}}\)Clinton: i
Our national military strategy has changed from forward basing to forward presence, while our national security strategy has changed from containment to engagement and enlargement. To be credible, we must balance our combat capability to win the fight with our mobility capability to get to the fight. Therefore a visibly ready air mobility force has deterrent value as the potential opponent witnesses our ability to quickly deploy forces worldwide.

US involvement in UN-sponsored peacekeeping is required if we wish to continue to the shape the world stage as outlined in our national security. Direct US involvement is constrained by our high sensitivity to casualties and our disdain for extended involvements that may contain a conflict but not resolve it.

Air mobility should continue to help bridge the gap, allowing US participation while limiting exposure to casualties. Airlift can support UN-sponsored peacekeeping by transporting and sustaining men and equipment from many nations to and from the operation. The US can be an active participant in the process and therefore eligible to be part of the discussion. Our air mobility assets will clearly demonstrate to any potential aggressor that the US can reach out and touch them. Actually seeing aircraft arrive and download peacekeeping forces from around the world demonstrates the particular conflict is on the world stage and not to be ignored by the world powers.

25 Pogleman: 3-7
The US receives benefits also. Containing and dampening conflict lessens the potential for US combat involvement. Most observers agree that regional peace is preferable to conflict, even if the US cannot clearly identify a vital interest in the area. US airlift forces receive valuable readiness training. To be credible, these forces should demonstrate on a regular basis that they can operate into remote areas where conflicts predominate. This type of training and experience cannot be duplicated in a simulator, flying regular channel cargo routes, or participating in joint military exercises.
CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War, UN-sponsored peacekeeping has changed from a traditional truce observation role to a more active, interventionist role. The number of UN-sponsored peacekeeping activities has mushroomed. The previous Security Council deadlock has eased, allowing UN-sponsored peacekeeping to expand into monitoring internal state elections, policing, human rights treatment, and other traditionally sovereign institutions.\textsuperscript{26}

The US has traditionally supported UN-sponsored peacekeeping with money, airlift, intelligence, and communication assets. Troop involvement was minimal during the Cold War because the peacekeepers had to be perceived as impartial, a difficult image for Americans in that era. Although the current administration is attempting to reduce the financial cost share, the US continues to support UN peacekeeping with airlift, intelligence, and communication assets. Long term, direct US troop deployments remain problematic because the American public remembers recent casualties in Beirut, Somalia, and Korea.

Traditional cost analysis is not helpful when discussing US involvement because it is impossible to agree on a value for peace. Most observers agree that peace is better than conflict, but these observers cannot agree on a dollar value of this benefit.

\textsuperscript{26} Jockel:3
Peacekeeping support directly aids peacetime readiness of air mobility forces. In moderation, US supplied air mobility should continue as a unique American contribution to international peacekeeping. This support leverages our existing investment, provides authentic near-combat seasoning to aircrew and support personnel, and directly translates to required wartime skills. These missions validate the "Global Reach" leg of US Air Force strategy, both internally and to potential adversaries.

[C]ollective security is the very best way to proceed in this uncertain post-Cold War period. It is effective . . . In terms of national defense, for 30 cents on the dollar we get a dollar's worth of national security. But collective security will not work . . . unless the United States is prepared to play a leadership role and sustain that role and keep it very much before the minds of our people.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{27}}\] Hearing: 11
### Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Name</th>
<th>Long Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Begin</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Supervision of General Armistice Agreement in the former Palestine</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>Supervision of cease-fire between India and Pakistan</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP I</td>
<td>First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>Supervision of withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces from Egypt</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>Ensure no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across Lebanese borders</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>Initially, to ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. Modified to include maintaining territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo.</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)</td>
<td>Maintain the peace and security in the territory under the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>Observe and certify the implementation of disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Republic.</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>Prevent recurrence of fighting and contribute to restoration of law and order. Since hostilities in 1974, this has included maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces.</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPO M</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
<td>Supervise the cease-fire along the India/Pakistan border except the states of Jammu and Kashmir where UNMOGIP operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before 5 Aug 65.</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>United Nations Mission</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Start Year</td>
<td>End Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>Second United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>Supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and supervise the redeployment of those forces to man and control the new buffer zones.</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
<td>Supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria; supervise the redeployment of their forces; and establish a buffer zone.</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon</td>
<td>Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Southern Lebanon; assist Government of Lebanon reestablish effective authority in the area.</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group</td>
<td>Supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of forces.</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>Assist in the transition of Namibia from colony to nation.</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia</td>
<td>Monitor the cease-fire and establish a mine awareness program in Cambodia.</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>Facilitate communications, establish mine awareness, and provide transportation and other logistical support.</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR I and II</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Forces I and II</td>
<td>Provide observation patrols, mine clearance, and construction and maintenance of shelters, and help ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia.</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique Supervise the implementation of 1992 agreement between government and rebel forces.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to verify no military assistance reaches Rwanda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Airlift Assets of Some Major Air Forces²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tanker transports</th>
<th>Strategic airlifters</th>
<th>Tactical airlifters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As of 1989
Figure 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations\textsuperscript{3}

![UN Peacekeeping Operations Diagram]

\textsuperscript{1}Jockel: 69-77
\textsuperscript{2}Chapman: 5
\textsuperscript{3}Jockel: 69-77
LIST OF REFERENCES


