Can Peacekeeping and Security Assistance Co-Exist?
A Bosnia Case Study

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Abstract:** The United States' objectives in Bosnia are to end the fighting, to sustain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified sovereign state, and to promote stability in the region. Two critical components of the US strategy are the deployment of US troops with a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia and an effort to rectify the military imbalance in Bosnia through a US-led MOOTW security assistance program to train and equip the Bosnian Federation's armed forces.

This paper examines these two components of the US strategy through the prism of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) as articulated in joint and service doctrine. This paper argues that the train and equip program weakens the legitimacy of NATO peacekeepers in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs; increases the potential risks to their security; detracts from the multinational unity of efforts by undermining other aspects of the peace effort and putting the US at odds with its NATO allies; potentially threatens the achievement of US strategic objectives in Bosnia by providing the aggrieved party with the means to resume fighting; and suggests a limit to US perseverance by setting unrealistic deadlines for achieving success.

In planning future peacekeeping operations, the NCA and regional CINCs should carefully weigh the impact of simultaneously implementing a security assistance program against the immediate potential for increasing risks to the peacekeeping force; the impact it might have on the unity of effort in a multilateral setting; and any long-term potential for sparking or exacerbating the effects of a future conflict in the country or region in question. The principles of MOOTW can provide an initial "sanity check" for this calculation.
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The Case of Bosnia

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The United States' objectives in Bosnia are to end the fighting, to sustain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified sovereign state, and to promote stability in the region. Two critical components of the US strategy are the deployment of US troops with a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia and an effort to rectify the military imbalance in Bosnia through a US-led effort to train and equip the Bosnian Federation's armed forces.

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I. Introduction

"This policy has red, white, and blue stamped all over it. This policy paints each American soldier with a bulls'-eye target. Bosnia is a snake pit of anger, hatred, and vengeance. We are putting our troops in a snake pit while we are angering half the snakes." (Ike Skelton, Member of Congress, 4 December 1995.)

On 20 December, 1995, a 60,000 man NATO force, which included 20,000 Americans, assumed responsibility for peace operations in Bosnia from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). On the same day, the U.S. Administration announced the formation of a State Department task force to coordinate a separate, international effort to train and equip the armed forces of the Bosnian Federation--comprising two of the three former belligerents--in an effort to create a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitate the peaceful departure of NATO troops by December 1996.

The ultimate success or failure of these two components of the U.S. strategy for Bosnia may not be known for some time. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) accomplished the specific tasks spelled out in the Dayton peace agreement with minimal opposition and relatively few complications; however, lingering instability led the U.S. and NATO governments last December to commit to leaving a successor to IFOR, a smaller NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), in Bosnia until June 1998.¹ The U.S.-led train and equip (T&E) program, meanwhile, has not yet achieved its primary objective of creating a stable military balance in Bosnia.

This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the T&E program complicates the participation by U.S. forces in an "even-handed" peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Bosnia and potentially threatens the achievement of U.S. operational and strategic objectives there. This will be done by examining these two key components of America's strategy through the prism of the principles of military operations other than
war (MOOTW) as articulated in joint and service doctrine. Finally, the paper will briefly list considerations for future situations where security assistance programs are contemplated in conjunction with U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

II. U.S. Objectives and Strategy for Bosnia

In November, 1995 the warring factions of Bosnia finally came to the negotiating table at Dayton, Ohio. The Clinton Administration at that time renewed its previous offer to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO implementation force that would give the warring parties "the confidence and support they need to implement their peace plan."2 The Muslims, Croats, and Serbs accepted the offer and concluded a peace agreement (the Dayton agreement) which created a single Bosnia - Herzegovina consisting of two entities: the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The Administration's strategic objectives then and now are to end to the fighting, to sustain Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified sovereign state within its internationally recognized borders, and to maintain stability in the region. The U.S. military and its partners in NATO were given a critical role in achieving those objectives. At U.S. insistence,3 the warring parties gave IFOR broad authority to monitor and help ensure compliance with the Dayton agreement's military aspects and to use force as necessary to carry out its mission. They also gave IFOR unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection.4 IFOR's operational mission--monitoring the separation of forces and maintaining the cease fire--was to be carried out over the course of about one year, a goal that also was written into the Dayton agreement.
The Dayton agreement stipulated that civilian organizations would take charge of nation-building, including those economic and political rebuilding programs that are "essential to making the peace endure." IFOR's (and now SFOR's) main contribution to this effort is "helping to create a secure environment for Bosnians to return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives."  

The Administration's strategy for addressing the longer-term military stability of the region is a combination of regional arms control and a program of security assistance for the Federation. President Clinton described the rationale for the strategy in a letter to Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole on the eve of the NATO deployment in December 1995:

"The Bosnian Serb advantage in heavy weapons relative to the defense capability of the Bosnian Federation has been a major reason for the fighting in Bosnia and remains a potential source of instability. We believe that establishing a stable military balance within Bosnia by the time IFOR leaves is important to preventing the war from resuming and to facilitate IFOR's departure.

The Dayton Agreement has strong arms control provisions which provide for a build-down of forces. We intend to pursue these vigorously. An arms restraint regime obviously can help contribute to a stable balance.

Even with arms control, we anticipate there will be a deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly, we have made a commitment to the Bosnian Federation that we will coordinate an international effort to ensure that the Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves."  

The Dayton Agreement assigned responsibility for overseeing the regional arms control effort to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). IFOR was not tasked with disarming the warring factions or with forcibly collecting and controlling weapons, and U.S. officials made clear that IFOR would not do so.
The decision to provide security assistance to the Bosnian Federation was a bilateral American commitment that was not a part of the Dayton agreement. While T&E is officially an international program, it is being coordinated by a State Department Task Force, and the U.S. is the biggest single donor. It is run by a private American firm on contract to the Bosnian Federation with minimal involvement by active duty U.S. military officers. By design, NATO peacekeepers have no involvement in it, except to monitor any weapons coming into the country. (See Appendix A for details of this security assistance program.)

III. Peacekeeping and Security Assistance in Bosnia: An Uneasy Co-existence

*PKOs require an impartial, even-handed approach....An even-handed and humanitarian approach to all sides of the conflict can improve the prospects for lasting peace and security....Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a PKO to a PEO situation by crossing the consent divide.*" (Army Manual FM 100-23)

Do the two key military components of the U.S. strategy for restoring peace and stability in Bosnia--a peacekeeping operation and a security assistance program for one of the parties--complement or contradict each other? (See Appendix A for a discussion of how the two are defined by joint doctrine and the National Military Strategy.) Taken individually, participation in a multilateral PKO or implementing a security assistance program designed to redress a destabilizing military imbalance appears to be sound means of promoting U.S. interests in a troubled region. But the combination of the two in Bosnia seems to hold potential for problems and possible failure over the long term; together, they can be shown to violate most of the principles of MOOTW--legitimacy, security, unity of effort, objective, and perseverance--as elucidated in Joint and Service publications.
Legitimacy: In PKO, the impartiality of peacekeepers and the sponsoring state, states, or international organization is critical to success and the legitimacy of the operation. It must be demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances...." (Army FM 100-23)

The train and equip program undermines the legitimacy of NATO peace operations in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, potentially jeopardizing U.S. and NATO troops and the accomplishment of their mission. Numerous Serb officials and commentaries in the Serb media make clear that the T&E program reinforces the Serb perception that the U.S., and even IFOR, are helping their enemies, much as the U.S., NATO, and UNPROFOR were perceived to be doing so during the war.⁹ This is confirmed by officials involved in the peace effort. For example, Germany's Ambassador to Bosnia has said: "The 'equip and train' program arouses suspicions on the Serb side that the international community is one-sided and helps the other side get stronger."*⁸

By turning to private contractors to implement the T&E effort, senior U.S. officials and military leaders seemed to acknowledge the potential negative impact that a traditional U.S. security assistance program might have on the legitimacy of NATO's PKO in Bosnia. (See Appendix B for a brief review of the Washington decision making process on this issue.) A senior U.S. military officer involved with IFOR at the operational level claims that all parties in Bosnia, most importantly the Bosnian Serb leadership, understand and accept that IFOR itself has no involvement in the T&E program."¹¹ Nonetheless, the Administration has broadly publicized U.S. leadership of and contributions to the program, and even has informed the Bosnian Serbs of its progress."¹² Washington also has publicly solicited contributions from other governments that have forces in Bosnia. The concern of most NATO allies that T&E will taint their own forces seems borne out by the Serbs' public accusations that Turkish IFOR troops provided weapons to the Bosniacs; not surprisingly, Turkey is the one
NATO ally that has eagerly participated in the T&E program. As representatives of their governments, U.S. and NATO troops could easily be considered guilty by association.

Security: Security requires more than physical protective measures. A force’s security is significantly enhanced by its perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built up between the force and the other parties involved in the peace operation, and the force’s credibility in the international arena. (Army FM 100-23)

By undermining the legitimacy of U.S. and NATO forces in Bosnia, T&E increases the potential for physical harm to them. U.S. experiences in Lebanon and Somalia demonstrate the security risks that come with a loss of impartiality. It must be conceded here that to date the Serbs’ dissatisfaction with this perceived bias has not resulted in organized acts of violence against U.S. forces or IFOR itself. This could logically be attributed, however, to IFOR’s capability, rules of engagement, elaborate force protection measures, and demonstrated intent to respond with overwhelming force to any such action. A less formidable NATO force--SFOR, for example, is about half the size of IFOR and getting smaller--conceivably could face some of the same violent harassment and open resistance that UNPROFOR endured following NATO bombing missions against the Serbs in 1994 and 1995.

Unity of Effort: Unity of effort emphasizes the need for directing all means to a common purpose. (Joint Pub 3-07)

While normally applied to questions of command, the principle of unity of effort also implies that all political, military, and diplomatic efforts should be directed toward a common goal. The train and equip program undermines the other multilateral efforts to bring stability to Bosnia by contributing to the Serbs’ perception that the U.S. and others are committed to giving Federation forces a military advantage over them. This fear undoubtedly has contributed to the Bosnian Serbs’ disregard for their arms control
obligations and appears to be leading to an qualitative, if not quantitative, arms race in Bosnia. Western officials say the Serbs have hidden more than 1,000 heavy weapons and have failed to meet their weapons reduction obligations. The Serbs' recent efforts to acquire modern heavy weapons from Russia and their plans to double the size of their police force to 50,000 officers--another violation of the Dayton agreement--probably also can be attributed to their concern about a forthcoming change in the military balance.15

The Serbs' concern is underpinned by at least three salient facts: that numerically superior Federation forces (with support from Croatian heavy weapons like those the Federation is now acquiring) recaptured more than 1,300 square miles of territory in the last weeks of the war; that the Dayton agreement allows the Federation twice as many heavy weapons as the Bosnian Serbs; and that Bosnian Muslim leaders continue to predict that Federation forces will move to forcibly unify Bosnia when NATO forces depart.16 This concern is shared even by senior officials within the Federation. "War is a great danger if the program goes on," Vladimir Soljic, the defense minister of the Muslim-Croat federation, said last year. "It is open to question whether [equip-and-train] is the right road.... The Serbs misused the Yugoslav People's Army to begin the war; the Muslims could do the same thing, too."17

The train and equip program also detracts from NATO's unity of effort in Bosnia by putting the U.S. at odds with the NATO governments that are supplying troops for IFOR and providing funds for reconstruction.18 Most European governments--many of which have had troops in Bosnia since 1992--fear an increased threat to NATO peacekeepers from resentful Serbs or the resumption of conflict by emboldened Federation forces. Moreover, while allied governments share the desire to create a
military balance in the interests of long-term stability, they believe implementation of
the Dayton arms control provisions is the best means of doing so. A senior European
diplomat described the differences, "The Europeans think that if you are madly
stamping out the fire, then the last thing you should do is put more fuel on it. The
Americans believe that if a big guy is beating up on a little guy, they should give the
little guy a bigger stick. These two views of the world could not be further apart."

**Objective:** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective. (Joint Pub 3-07)

As discussed above, T&E could stimulate an arms race in Bosnia and contribute to a
resumption of hostilities; this would clearly obviate the U.S. strategic objective of
peace and regional stability. On an operational scale, T&E’s primary objectives of
creating a military balance and facilitating IFOR’s departure have been blurred by
efforts to use the program as leverage to achieve other, less important goals. T&E
has been touted as serving “multiple, reinforcing purposes”, including providing
impetus for establishing a Federation Defense Ministry and Joint Command, orienting
Federation forces on a Western model, reducing destabilizing foreign influences—read
Iran—in the Federation, and providing leverage for continued compliance with the
Dayton agreement. While laudable goals, they might have been better pursued
through diplomatic or economic pressure. The Federation’s procrastination in
complying with the conditions placed on it has delayed important milestones in the
T&E program: completion of the primary training contract was held up until June 1996,
and the first shipment of heavy weapons was held up until November 1996, just one
month before IFOR was supposed to depart Bosnia. In May of this year an American
official acknowledged that “there is a ways to go before the Bosniacs have a real self-
defense capability.”

8
Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. (Joint Pub 3-07)

Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or decisive resolution. Commanders need to assess actions against their contribution to long-term, strategic objectives. (Army FM 100-23)

Neither the IFOR deployment nor the T&E program were designed for the long-haul. Publicly setting a time limit to the IFOR deployment, while politically expedient at home, probably was counter-productive; by creating an expectation of IFOR's quick departure it may have encouraged the Bosnian factions to drag their feet on contentious issues such as arms control, returning refugees, and turning over war criminals. Twelve months also clearly was an inadequate amount of time to provide IFOR's protection for the complex process of economic reconstruction and political reconciliation.

Given its purported role in supporting IFOR's twelve month exit strategy, T&E clearly had an overly ambitious timeframe for achieving an "adequate military balance." The U.S. Administration has implicitly admitted the inadequacy of its short-term outlook: while contending that IFOR fulfilled its original mandate, it says that some U.S. and NATO forces must remain in Bosnia until mid-1998. In making that announcement last November, President Clinton acknowledged that a stable military balance had not been created and that the resumption of hostilities remained a distinct possibility.

Finally, no mention has been made as to the expected length of U.S. involvement in the T&E program, or whether the U.S. will continue to exert a direct moderating influence on the Federation armed forces after U.S. or NATO forces depart Bosnia. European governments have long worried that Washington will build up the
Federation forces and then withdraw its troops from Bosnia—perhaps under prodding from an impatient Congress; this would leave the Europeans to deal with what they believe to be the inevitable resumption of the conflict. "These arms are a recipe for more war," a West European ambassador claims. "Maybe not this year or the next, but one day American-made tanks will be rolling across Bosnia's plains, and what will Washington do then?" This concern has led the Europeans to assert that their troops will leave Bosnia when U.S. troops do, which could result in political pressure for the U.S. to keep forces there long-term or require the U.S. to hand over peace operations in Bosnia to a much less effective non-NATO force.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

Analysis of the Bosnian case provides several pitfalls and warning indicators that should be considered in similar situations. In considering future participation in a PKO, the NCA and regional CINCs should weigh the impact of simultaneously implementing a security assistance program for one of the sides against: the potential for increasing risks to the peacekeeping force, the impact it might have on the unity of effort in a multilateral setting, and any long-term potential for sparking or exacerbating the effects of future conflict in a particular area. The principles of MOOTW can provide an initial "sanity check" in making this calculation.

Legitimacy: The NCA and responsible CINCs should consider whether providing assistance to one party—even indirectly—will undermine the credibility of the PKO by altering the parties' perception of the peacekeepers' or their sponsoring governments' impartiality. The Bosnian example suggests that the answer is likely to be affirmative. While the NCA judged an overt U.S. "leadership role" in T&E to be politically necessary in the case of Bosnia (see Appendix B), a more prudent approach might be
for the U.S. to have interested third parties not involved in the PKO provide the assistance. Another option would be to provide all the factions with varying degrees of military assistance as a mutually agreed adjunct to the peace process. Something like this approach, albeit under different circumstances, is used in the Middle East, where the U.S. has peacekeepers in the Sinai and provides substantial military assistance to both Israel and Egypt.

**Security:** If there is a reasonable chance that one of the parties will take exception to a U.S. program to provide security assistance to the other, the NCA or theater CINCs should seek the understanding or consent of all parties for that course of action, perhaps as part of a peace settlement. If this proves impossible, they should at a minimum negotiate with the parties the broadest possible latitude in ROE and force protection capabilities for the peacekeeping force. In Bosnia, the warring parties accepted in the Dayton agreement IFOR/SFOR’s peace enforcement-type ROE, capabilities, and force protection measures.

**Unity of Effort:** The NCA and theater CINC should determine whether a security assistance program has the potential to undermine more critical elements of a peace effort. Will it create strong disincentives for one party to violate or disregard the terms of the peace agreement, complicating the mission of the peacekeepers? What is the potential for the other side to acquire additional weapons, thus countering the effects of the U.S. program and leading to an arms race? Would applying the resources to support other aspects of the peace effort, such as reconstruction or enforcement of arms control agreements, prove more beneficial in the long term? In Bosnia, there are few means of compelling the Bosnian Serbs to “accept” a military balance by reducing their stockpiles and foregoing acquisition of new weapons.
Planners also should consider whether a U.S. decision to provide security assistance to one side during a peacekeeping operation will complicate relations with potential partners in the peacekeeping effort. In the case of Bosnia, most NATO governments had a compelling interest in seeing an end to a conflict in their neighborhood; they acquiesced to the U.S. plan largely because they recognized that America's participation in the PKO was essential to its success. In future scenarios where allies' or potential coalition partners' interests are not deeply engaged the U.S. may be forced to "go it alone" or to forego a PKO altogether.

Objective: The objectives of a security assistance program should constantly be reassessed in relation to the progress toward the strategic objective of the peace effort. If security assistance is intended merely as an adjunct to other efforts deemed more critical to achieving strategic objectives, it might have to be discontinued if it is found to undermine them. For example, if the indications that the Bosniacs intend to forcibly regain lost territory can be verified by intelligence or other means, this should be a red flag for the T&E program. If altering an existing military situation is considered critical to the success of a peacekeeping effort, a security assistance program probably should not be used as leverage to change conditions that might be more amenable to diplomatic or political means.

Perseverance: Planners should consider whether a security assistance program can achieve the objectives set for it in time to make a difference to the PKO and broader peace effort. NATO planned to pull IFOR out of Bosnia in a year; in hindsight, there was little prospect that T&E could significantly bolster the Federation forces within that time. Planners also should consider the long-term implications of providing
arms to parties whose grievances clearly remain unsettled. Will the U.S. be willing to maintain forces in the PKO if the security assistance contributes to the resumption of hostilities? Does the U.S. intend to remain involved with the recipient party over the long term to prevent misuse of the assistance?

Every potential military operation other than war presents U.S. leaders with unique challenges, and one cannot simply conclude from the above analysis that security assistance and peacekeeping cannot co-exist under any circumstances. There has been no significant fighting in Bosnia since NATO troops arrived, NATO troops have not been directly targeted by any of the factions, and economic reconstruction and political reconciliation have begun--albeit slowly. Nonetheless, the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives is not assured. Few observers are willing to predict long-term success in Bosnia, in part because the main parties to the conflict retain the means and the motives to resume hostilities.
Appendix A: Peacekeeping and Security Assistance in Bosnia

Peacekeeping Operations differ fundamentally from internal security because a peacekeeping force does not act in support of a government—it is entirely neutral. Once a peacekeeping force loses its reputation for impartiality, its usefulness is destroyed. (Joint Pub 3-07.3)

Even though NATO forces in Bosnia are operating under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the UN Charter, Operation Joint Endeavor and its successor should be considered a peacekeeping mission. Joint Pub 3-07 defines a peacekeeping operation (PKO) as "a military operation undertaken with the consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement." The Dayton agreement certainly qualifies as such an agreement and clearly provides the consent of all concerned parties for IFOR's role. And while IFOR has the authority to use force to "ensure" compliance with the agreement, senior U.S. and NATO officials have stated that NATO forces will not remain in Bosnia in the face of wholesale violations, a resumption of major fighting, or collapse of the peace agreement, which would imply a de facto loss of consent.

More importantly to this discussion, U.S. and NATO officials have asserted that a hallmark of the NATO mission in Bosnia is its impartiality. As then-Secretary of Defense Perry put it when testifying before Congress in late November, 1995, "We have said clearly, loudly, publicly, that we the United States, we NATO, will be evenhanded in our execution of this peace enforcement. We have also had an opportunity to say it personally to various Bosnian Serb leaders. I think it is clear now to them that we mean that."
Train and Equip. For the purposes of this paper's analysis, the train and equip program for Bosnia can be described as a security assistance program, even though the U.S. military was not directly involved in planning or implementing it and it is not overseen by a theater CINC or administered in-country by a security assistance office. The 1995 National Military Strategy notes that "security assistance involves the selective use of cooperative programs with allied and friendly armed forces that furnish these countries with the means to defend themselves from aggression....Security assistance also deters aggression in unstable regions and provides a cost-effective alternative to maintaining larger U.S. forces in the region." T&E also might qualify as a foreign internal defense program (as defined by Joint Pub 3-07), in the sense that U.S. officials say that its intent is to allow the Federation to defend itself only against an "internal enemy"--i.e., the Bosnian Serbs.

While T&E is an international program, the U.S. is the single biggest donor to date: it has contributed or pledged well over $100 million in defense articles and services--most of which was authorized by Congress under drawdown authority in the FY 96 Foreign Operations appropriation--as well as $200,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds in FY 96 and a further $500,000 for FY 1997. The equipment already provided includes 45 M-60 battle tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, 15 UH-1H helicopters, MILES training systems, 45,000 assault rifles, and 400 reconditioned trucks and tank transporters. In May of this year, the Administration announced that it also would send 116 155 mm artillery pieces to the Federation. The U.S. also has coordinated the donation by other countries of some $140 million and additional heavy weapons, including 60 howitzers, 42 AMX-30 tanks, 44 AML-90 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and 18 air-defense guns.
Appendix B: When Politics and MOOTW Principles Collide

"In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. (Joint Pub 3-07, pp. I-1, I-2)

The full participation of Congress is essential to the success of our continuing engagement, and I will consult with members of Congress at every step as we formulate and implement American foreign policy. (President William Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. iv)

The T&E program as finally implemented became a part of the U.S. strategy for Bosnia through a combination of perceived political necessity and a sincere desire to create a military balance in Bosnia. Information available to the author suggests that senior U.S. military officers, including the CJCS and CINCEUR, supported the goals of using security assistance to create a military balance in Bosnia, and thought that the potential complications for IFOR could be mitigated by turning the job over to a private contractor.* As noted in President Clinton's letter, T&E was seen by many in the U.S. military as a cornerstone of the exit strategy for IFOR. The program also proved attractive on a number of other grounds. Its use as leverage to ensure Bosnian compliance with the Dayton agreement's prohibition on foreign forces would help limit radical Iranian influence on the Bosnians and reduce the terrorist threat to IFOR. Making the program conditional on the creation of a joint Federation defense ministry and joint military command was intended to make the Federation as an institution a more stable and viable partner in the peace process.

In addition to the benefits that T&E could create for the IFOR operation, the Administration believed these same considerations would help mollify conflicting Congressional criticisms of the IFOR mission and help gain domestic political support for the unpopular deployment of U.S. troops. Members of Congress, like the military
leadership, worried that U.S. forces could be attacked by radical Islamic terrorists. Other Congressmen often complained that the Administration had no realistic strategy for withdrawing IFOR. More importantly, influential Congressmen such as Senator Dole had long pressed the Administration to unilaterally lift the international arms embargo and to build up Bosnian military capabilities.30

Senior Administration officials and the military leadership recognized the possibility of a conflict of interest with the U.S. role in IFOR. They also were aware of the vociferous objections to the program on the part of America’s allies, without whose support there could be no NATO peacekeeping force for Bosnia. For these reasons T&E initially was conceived as a low-profile effort to encourage interested countries to provide the arms and training. Neither the Administration nor the military ever seriously considered using IFOR to implement it, and both sought from the beginning to minimize U.S. military forces' connection to the program.31 Influential Congressional leaders were dissatisfied with this approach, however—in fact, they made clear on the eve of the IFOR deployment that American leadership of the effort to arm the Federation the sine qua non for Senate support for the deployment of U.S. troops.32 Thus, the Administration felt compelled to publicly promise to take a “leadership role” in arming the Federation. Still mindful of a potential conflict with IFOR’s mission, however, President Clinton told Congressional leaders, that “I want to insure the impartiality of IFOR. In the view of my military advisors, this requires minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel....We expect that some individual military officers, for example, working in OSD, DSAA, or other agencies, will be involved in planning this effort.”33
NOTES

1. IFOR’s mandate expired on 20 December 1996. On 10 December 1996, the North Atlantic Council announced that NATO was prepared to organize and lead a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to take the place of IFOR. On 12 December 1996, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1088 authorizing the establishment of SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR for a planned period of 18 months. SFOR was activated on 20 December 1996. Its mission is to deter fresh hostilities and to stabilize peace. SFOR is about half the size of IFOR. NATO Fact Sheet No. 11, “NATO’s Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement”, March 1997, http://www.nato.int.


3. CJCS Shalikashvili told a Senate committee in early December that “I and my staff have been constantly in contact with our negotiators to ensure that the military tasks that were eventually going to be assigned to this implementation force, and by inference to the U.S. military...would be appropriate and...would be executable.” Indeed, the J-5 and several other members of the Joint Staff were full-time members of the U.S. negotiating team in Dayton, and by all accounts key players in developing the critical military annexes to the agreement.

4. Summary of the General Framework Agreement, Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 1995, http://www.state.gov. See also IFOR AFSOUTH Fact sheet, November 6, 1996, http://www.nato.int, which enumerates IFOR’s tasks as follows: to ensure self defense and freedom of movement; to supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the parties; to monitor and – if needed – enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories, and the establishment of Zones of Separation; to assume control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes; to establish Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace Agreement; and to assist with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR. The deployment of the IFOR should also eventually create a secure environment which will facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations and the accomplishment of the non-military aspects of the settlement.


7. At Dayton the Parties agreed to negotiate within 180 days numerical limits on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. If the Parties failed to agree on such limits, the Dayton agreement specified that a ratio of 5:2:2, based on the reduced holdings of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, would come into effect. The allocations for Bosnia and Herzegovina were divided between the two entities on the basis of a ratio of two for the Federation and one for the Republika Srpska. The OSCE was tasked to assist the Parties in the negotiations and the implementation and verification of resulting agreements. Text of the General Framework Agreement, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int.


12 The Administration has flagged virtually every significant milestone or U.S. weapons delivery in the evolution of the program with a press conference by the U.S. Special Representative or a White House Press Release, or both. This ostensibly has been done in the interests of transparency and reassurance to the Bosnian Serbs, but probably also to demonstrate to the Congress that the U.S. is fulfilling its pledge to take a "leading role" in arming the Federation.


15 For an official assessment of Serb compliance with arms control agreements, see "Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White Before the House National Security Committee in Connection with Bosnia Post Election Policy", Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, September 25, 1996; White reported that "Currently, the Bosnian Serb Republican is presenting the largest challenge to compliance with the arms control agreement by under-reporting its weapons holdings and seeking to evade its reduction liabilities. We are pressing the Bosnian Serbs to provide accurate information on their current weapons holdings and to implement the entire range of required reductions and the accompanying inspection and monitoring regime. We are also urging our key allies to place concerted pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to comply with all aspects of Article IV." For a Bosnian Serb view of the arms control process and the military balance see "Serb Official on Achieving 'Strategic Balance'," Pale Javnost, FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-96-139, 13 July 1996. See also "General Colic Warnings of Dangers of Arms Deliveries to Muslims," Pale SRNA, FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-96-242, 13 December 1996.

16 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic himself has declared that the war is not over, "We will return to every place they [the Serbs] expelled us from. The fight for Bosnia-Herzegovina will never stop until the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina is free. That fight, with God's help, is continuing." "Would Sending Arms to Bosnians Help Keep Peace? The U.S. Says Yes", The Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1996, p. 1; "Serb Military Leader Stressess Need for Combat Readiness", Pale Srpska Serb Radio, FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-96-225, 19 November 1996.


18 Fourteen other NATO countries have provide contingents for Operation Joint Endeavor. The European Union also is providing the bulk of the funding for reconstruction efforts.

19 "Would Sending Arms to Bosnians Help Keep Peace? The U.S. Says Yes", The Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1996, p. 1. According to a British diplomat in Sarajevo, "We recognize the need for the Bosnian Federation to defend itself and that stability requires a military balance in the region. But we are concerned about the possible results of bringing more weapons into the country in general. Wherever possible, we should try to achieve balance through reductions on one side rather than increases on the other." "Backup Plan in Bosnia: U.S. 'Equip and Train'," The Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 1996, p. 1. This view is shared by numerous European officials, diplomats, and military officers involved with the international effort in Bosnia, according to various press reports.


25 NATO Fact Sheet 11.
26 The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN. The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection. "Summary of the General Framework Agreement", Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 1995, http://www.state.gov.
29 The U.S. Special Representative for military stabilization in the Balkans has asserted that "if Serbia entered into a conflict with the Federation, that's a completely different strategic issue. That would be beyond the scope of this program." "Briefing on Train-and-Equip Program for the Bosnian Federation", 24 July 1996, Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, http://www.state.gov.
32 Confidential telephone interview with member of CINCEUR staff, 28 April 1997. See also footnote 35.
35 In response to President Clinton's request for Congressional support of IFOR's deployment, Senators Dole and McCain sponsored a Senate resolution that would have endorsed the deployment as long as the U.S. promised to "lead" an international T&E effort. They claimed that clarification of this point was "essential... prior to moving forward with Senate consideration" of the deployment. While acknowledging concerns about T&E impinging on IFOR's impartiality, Dole and McCain claimed that "to state that no U.S. military forces will be involved... is a guarantee that such a program will be wholly ineffective and may not even occur. A strict prohibition on all U.S. military involvement outside the territory of Bosnia would severely cripple American efforts to ensure that the Bosnians are provided with the weapons and training they need." U.S. Senate, Congressional Correspondence with the President, 12 December 1995 (from NSC files). See also "Senate Set for Debate on Bosnia: Republican Concerns Addressed by Clinton", The Washington Post, 12 December 1995, p. A27, and "Dole Predicts Split Senate Will Allow Bosnia Mission", The Washington Post, 13 December 1995, p. A35.
36 Much of the information in the preceding paragraphs was acquired while the author was on temporary assignment at the National Security Council in the office of the Senior Director for European Affairs from mid-November through December 1995. The main points were confirmed in a March 1997 interview with a senior military officer also assigned to that office in late 1995.
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