PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: THE VECTOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE:

THE VECTOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the origins, evolution, and future of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Partnership for Peace was created by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enhance political and military cooperation between NATO and the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. NATO enlargement, Russian concerns, PfP Partner needs, and other forces will not allow PfP to remain static. With President Bill Clinton's declaration that NATO should announce the first tranche of enlargement at the July 1997 Summit, NATO faces a self-imposed deadline to adapt PfP to this new environment.

After an extensive review of available literature and the conduct of over 80 interviews with key United States, NATO, and Partner nation policymakers, and academicians, we propose that NATO create a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This Council will be a regularly meeting body of representatives of the Alliance and interested Partner countries, supported by dedicated NATO staff.

The pillared structure within the EAPC will be based on three distinct areas: military issues, political consultation and civil-military cooperation. This proposal encompasses the United States proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council but takes it a step further in organization and development as a NATO structure. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership can serve as the vector for a broadened approach to security which includes not only NATO's Allies but any and all nations who share its belief in democracy and cooperation.
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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE:
THE VECTOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union greatly altered the political and military landscape of Europe. This event created new security opportunities for former members, and created a dilemma for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since NATO had consistently encouraged Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations to move toward democracy, it now needed to take concrete steps toward strengthening relations with these nations. The Alliance was reluctant to offer full membership to the CEE nations at that time, yet realized the importance of tangibly supporting these countries' efforts in moving toward democratization and free market economies.

A partial solution to this dilemma was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. This Council within the NATO structure provided a forum for deliberation on pertinent security issues; however, it lacked an operational connection that would allow member countries to substantively interact with NATO on common security issues. In 1994, Partnership for Peace ( PfP) was created to enhance practical political cooperation and to establish military operational links.

While the creation of NACC and PfP provided a temporary and partial answer to these dynamics, such fundamental issues as NATO enlargement and the Russian relationship with NATO remain. NACC has not provided an effective multilateral forum for meaningful political interaction between Allies and Partners. NATO's position within the European security
architecture continues to be challenged by strident Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. With President Bill Clinton’s declaration that NATO should announce the first tranche of enlargement at the July 1997 Summit, NATO faces a self-imposed deadline to adapt PfP to this new environment.

The decisions that will be made at the July 1997 NATO Summit will be crucial in maintaining the momentum of close cooperation between NATO Allies and PfP Partners. The Partnership has strengthened the bonds between NATO and the newly emerging democracies of Europe and Eurasia. PfP’s strategic value to European security will be greatly diminished if these bonds are weakened after enlargement. Failure to restructure or enhance PfP prior to enlargement may result in the alienation or discouragement of those Partners not offered NATO membership in the first round. NATO’s implementation of the recommendations contained in this paper will enable Partnership for Peace to become the vector for European security.

THE PROPOSAL: EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

After an extensive review of available literature and the conduct of over 80 interviews with key U.S., NATO, and Partner nation policymakers, and academicians, we propose that NATO create a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This Council will be a regularly meeting body of representatives of the Alliance and interested Partner countries, supported by dedicated NATO staff. The EAPC will provide Partners with a greater opportunity to interact with the Allies and other Partners on a multilateral basis, giving each member a voice in the actions and recommendations of the EAPC. This proposal encompasses the United States proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council but takes it a step further in organization and development as a NATO structure. It will not interfere with the concept of self-differentiation but
will allow Partners to grow through closer, more frequent and defined interaction and consultation with NATO representatives and staff. The purpose of the EAPC will be:

To maintain an open dialogue between the nations of Europe, the United States and Canada, who are ready and willing to accept a security architecture which includes a commitment to a democratic way of life, with transparency to its citizens and to the Council, and development of a military supported by the nation’s populace which stands ready and prepared to accept missions that enhance the security of Europe.

This Council can meet at many levels, to include ambassadorial; however, it would normally meet with Ally and Partner representatives currently serving on Mission staff or as PfP representatives to NATO. The EAPC will oversee all programs developed to bring Allies and Partners closer together in thought, democratic functioning and military cooperation. Development of the EAPC will involve innovative action that will demand a change of thinking for those who object to formalizing the PfP process and those fearful of losing the positive aspects of the NACC. The basic concepts of the EAPC are summarized below:

- Combine the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace under one umbrella.
- Provide a dedicated NATO Staff Cell to manage and oversee the activities of the EAPC, to be directly responsible to the North Atlantic Council.
- Provide leadership through three pillars: Military, Political and Civil-Military Cooperation.
- Establish a Combined Joint Task Force cell within the EAPC.

The EAPC will dissolve NACC’s link to the Cold War by allowing full membership of all Partners, including neutrals, in a multilateral political Council. Combining the NACC and the PfP will eliminate areas of overlap and consolidate functional areas, rebuilding them into a three pillar format that will serve to retain the critical functionality of both activities. This unification is necessary to offer the Partners the maximum benefits of consultation, integration and operational
consideration, while streamlining programs. Partners can interact with Allies and other Partners in a multilateral forum of equals. The end result is a voluntary body, functionally oriented, that discusses and focuses issues that fall under its purview, with the ability to affect change through operational programs.

The pillared structure within the EAPC will be based on three distinct areas: military issues, political consultation and civil-military cooperation. This configuration will facilitate the proper balance of the Council’s deliberations. The Military Pillar will conduct discussions and consultations, leading to recommendations on all matters relating to military operations and activities in which Partners are involved. The Political Pillar will be responsible for all political consultations made available to Partners under PfP, except for those conducted under Article Eight of the Framework Document. It would also oversee political bilateral and multilateral activities in which Partners are involved. The Civil-Military Cooperation Pillar will address civil emergency planning and operations, Partner transparency issues, economic and global issues, and information management.

The EAPC will be a forum for discussion, interaction, and planning of all Partnership programs. This Council provides a mechanism for balancing military and political programs offered by NATO. EAPC recommendations forwarded to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or NATO committees will be based on majority vote. The percentage of the vote will be disclosed in the recommendation to allow the NAC (or committee) to place the proper weight on the EAPC’s input before making its decision on issues involving Partners.

The EAPC proposal would be a bold, innovative action that would provide concrete evidence of NATO’s long-term commitment to all Partners. NATO must solidify its relationship with the Partners prior to the 1997 Summit to minimize the effects of an enlargement that will not
include all Partners who have applied for full membership. Simply enhancing PfP by changing some of the programs will not be enough for Partners not selected in the first tranche, and may give the “consolation prize” mentality greater credibility. Most Partners are minimally represented at NATO Headquarters and the expectation that they would be able to participate and be prepared to provide input to over 200 NATO committees is unrealistic. A forum is needed that will allow discussion and an opportunity for input on a broad array of topics, while not eliminating nations with limited manpower.

We strongly believe that the formation of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council with increased opportunities for consultation, a formalized voice in the decision process, and membership on a new Council of Allies and Partners will demonstrate NATO’s long-term commitment to all Partners. The EAPC is the logical next step for long-term European security as it builds on the cooperation achievements of NACC and PfP. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership can serve as the vector for a broadened approach to security which includes not only NATO’s Allies but any and all nations who share its belief in democracy and cooperation.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE:

THE VECTOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

The Partnership for Peace is becoming a passage to
democracy and marked reform as well as a passage to
security cooperation with the West....In short, by creating
Partnership for Peace, NATO has done much more than
just build a basis for enlargement. It has, in fact, created
a new zone of security and stability in Europe.

--Secretary of Defense William Perry
February 28, 1996

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AT A CROSSROADS

The changing political and military landscape in Europe during the early 1990s demanded
fundamental changes in that region's security architecture. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
Soviet Union created new security opportunities for their former members, leading the majority of
these nations to seek security links with the West. This radically altered European security
landscape created a dilemma for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since NATO
had consistently encouraged these nations to move toward democracy, it now needed to take
concrete steps toward strengthening relations with the newly liberated Central and Eastern
European (CEE) nations. The Alliance was reluctant to offer full membership to these nations at
that time, yet realized the importance of tangibly supporting these countries' efforts in moving
toward democratization and free market economies. Overlaying this issue was the question of
NATO's relationship with an emerging "democratic" Russia.

A partial solution to this dilemma was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) in 1991, a Council within the NATO structure that provided a forum for
deliberation on pertinent security issues. The NACC was developed to broaden NATO’s relationship and cooperation with the CEE nations and the Soviet Union. This Council, however, excluded European neutral states, like Sweden, Austria, and Finland, but included states devolved from the former Soviet Union, like Tajikistan, that could by no stretch of the imagination be considered part of Europe. Thus NACC embraced areas beyond Europe, while excluding important states within it. As a multilateral consultative forum, the NACC lacked an operational connection that would allow member countries to substantively interact with NATO on common security issues. In 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was created to enhance practical political cooperation and to establish military operational links.

The dynamics of the early 1990’s that led to the establishment of PfP have not changed significantly today. NACC has not provided an effective multilateral forum for meaningful interaction between Allies and Partners. While the creation of PfP provided a temporary and partial answer to these dynamics, such fundamental issues as NATO enlargement and the Russian relationship with NATO remain. NATO’s position within the European security architecture continues to be challenged by strident Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. The Russian Federation has championed entities such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in hopes that this pan-European multilateral group, not NATO, would become the preeminent organization in shaping European security.

Calls by European allies for the development of a European Security and Defense Identity, coupled with NATO’s ongoing internal and external adaptation, will result in a fundamental reorganization of the Alliance. Partner nations are demanding a greater role in the planning and development of PfP activities. NATO has recognized that these dynamics will not allow PfP to remain static. With President Bill Clinton’s declaration that NATO should announce the first
tranche of enlargement at the July 1997 Summit, NATO faces a self-imposed deadline to adapt PfP to this new environment. Failure to restructure or enhance PfP prior to enlargement may result in the alienation or discouragement of those Partners not offered NATO membership in the first wave.

NATO cannot be satisfied with a cosmetic enhancement of PfP that does not address the current dynamics of European security. It is imperative that NATO closely examines PfP’s future role in addressing these crucial questions: How will PfP evolve and remain relevant after NATO enlargement? Can PfP meet the Framework Document objectives in its current composition? How can the political and civil-military aspects of PfP be strengthened? The Alliance must address these questions in the near-term. The NATO Ministerial meetings in December 1996 determined that PfP should be strengthened by enhancing PfP’s political dimension, expanding PfP’s fields of military missions, increasing Partner political dialogue and participation in decision-making, and studying the concept of an Atlantic Partnership Council.

This research will analyze the existing dynamics and proposals influencing Partnership for Peace enhancement, and provide a recommendation for the future direction of PfP. Our methodology is based on primary research and a comprehensive review of the available literature. We conducted over 80 interviews with key U.S., NATO, and Partner nation policymakers, and academicians. (Appendix A) After reviewing the origins and evolution of PfP, we will address the crucial decisions NATO faces in regard to PfP’s future. We will recommend the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), building on the notional Atlantic Partnership Council. The EAPC will evolve from a three pillar structure centered on the political, military, and civil-military arenas. This paper provides NATO a course of action which will project the Partnership for Peace into the 21st Century.
CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

THE CONCEPT

By the time the new administration of President Clinton assumed office in 1993, it was becoming evident on both sides of the Atlantic that NATO's response to the rapidly changing European political situation was inadequate. The demand for a stronger response coincided with NATO's internal debate about its future direction. At the same time, there was a growing debate in the United States that questioned the need for NATO in a post cold war Europe.\(^1\)

While NATO's future relations with the Central and Eastern European, and former Soviet states was being debated throughout Europe, no clear consensus had emerged. By early 1993, this issue was being addressed in the United States through the Interagency Process, with the National Security Council (NSC), State Department (State) and Defense Department (DoD) as the key players.\(^2\) In the early stages of discussion, there was a general consensus that any final policy must address the question of NATO enlargement and provide a military link to the CEE and former Soviet states.\(^3\)

Initially, NSC and State wanted to enhance the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Their approach envisioned a strengthened and "operationalized" NACC that moved away from its purely "talking-shop" role.\(^4\) The NSC believed that European uncertainty required an inherently flexible policy that did not create new political lines or affect NATO's military efficacy, but which
bolstered democratic reform and allowed Western influence on Russian interaction with its former republics. On the other hand, the NATO Policy Office in Regional Security Affairs (RSA), within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), favored replacing NACC with a completely new structure. RSA wanted a structure that would, by definition, include traditional neutral European countries that were not included under the original NACC charter.

As a strategic consensus began to evolve, OSD Regional Security Affairs personnel, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas. Freeman, circulated internal documents to the Interagency Group, the Joint Staff, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) outlining a course of action that eventually became Partnership for Peace. OSD preferred a process within NATO, but outside of the NACC, in which the CEE and other non-NATO countries (i.e., Sweden, Finland, etc.) could individually define themselves in relationship to Europe and, through NATO, Europe could define itself in relation to them. Even though OSD wanted a mechanism other than the NACC, it concluded that only NATO was powerful enough to provide a structure for the integration of a resurgent, united Germany, and of a volatile, uncertain Russia into the European security architecture. Therefore, whatever European security architecture emerged must have NATO and the United States as its center, with NATO continuing to be the tent pole from which everything else was suspended.

During this same period, General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at SHAPE, recognized the need for concrete mechanisms for cooperation with the CEE and former Soviet states that went far beyond symbolic gestures and high-level visits. He realized there was a lot more to cooperation than “having vodka and caviar with the occasional picture of 300 US [soldiers] and 300 Russians jumping out of the same plane together.” There was also a recognition of the need for a decisive evolution of NATO relations with the CEE
nations. They believed the evolution would have to go beyond the “undifferentiated approach” of the NACC process, a process which was already seen to have “run its course” in fostering understanding. The most obvious common ground NATO shared with these countries lay in the area of peace operations, particularly in light of the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia. General Shalikashvili and certain key staff members concentrated on ways of establishing military interoperability links in such areas as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian relief. Many of General Shalikashvili’s ideas on peacekeeping, interoperability, and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, were sent to the Interagency Group and substantially influenced the ongoing debate.

The United States continued to develop its policy along separate and parallel tracks—tracks which ultimately merged through the Interagency Process and became in January 1994 the official PfP program. One track earlier outlined was the NSC’s and State Department’s advocacy for framing engagement within an enhanced NACC charter. State was particularly concerned about the inclusive nature of the CEE nations within the NATO structure, but like DoD, also wanted a structure which would include the traditional neutral European countries. A second important track involved an internal State Department debate on the question of NATO enlargement and how that issue would relate to any new process. A third track evolved from OSD’s consistent position that any new program should provide an effective and practical means to increase military cooperation with the CEE and neutral nations as an end to itself, and not necessarily be tied to NATO enlargement. These tracks began to merge and by September of 1993, the basic elements of the program began to take shape within the Interagency discussions. The key players recognized that discussion of immediate enlargement was premature, at least in terms of the January 1994 Summit.
In September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin attended a conference in Brussels with some of the US principals from NATO and OSD to discuss the upcoming NATO Ministerial meetings. During Secretary Aspin’s visit, the US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, hosted a meeting at his residence, a gathering which included Secretary Aspin, General Shalikashvili, General John Galvin (former SACEUR), Assistant Secretary Chas. Freeman, Joe Nye (Chairman, National Intelligence Council), Joe Kruzel (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy) and Clarence Juhl (Office Director for NATO Policy, OSD) among others. It was here that General Shalikashvili’s idea of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was linked to a program of expanded cooperation with the CEE nations and former Soviet states. The CJTF concept allowed the United States for the first time to envisage a non-US led task force within the NATO Structure, establishing a mechanism in which a European force could be “separable but not separate” from NATO. Assistant Secretary Freeman observed that “[w]e could imagine a circumstance in which the NATO and Russians would have a common interest which they wish to pursue, and the PfP plus CJTF would provide the mechanism for such cooperation....So the two concepts together took PfP from a theoretical training ground for NATO membership...and operationalized it for peacekeeping purposes.”

Clarence Juhl believes the gathering at Ambassador Hunter’s residence was the key meeting which

“...brought together the idea of the CJTF and the Peace Partners [with PfP]...We had Partnership for Peace already by then, but that’s where we melded these concepts together....and that was where the birth of the Partnership really came together.....Then we went to Travemunde and presented it to the Allies, who were relieved that we would have something good to put before the Summit.”
THE SUMMIT

On January 10, 1994, President Clinton announced the Partnership for Peace Program at the Brussels Summit. He stated that "...Partnership for Peace sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO..." adding, "[t]his must not be just a gesture--it is not just a forum. This Partnership for Peace is also a military and security initiative, consistent with what NATO was established to achieve."\(^{15}\) In the Summit declaration, NACC members and other Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries were formally invited by NATO to join a "real partnership" which would extend beyond dialogue and cooperation. The PfP Invitation Document (Appendix B) also affirmed that NATO remained open to membership by other European states and that active participation in the Partnership for Peace would play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The European security community core values of transparency in defense matters, democratically controlled defense forces, and regional defense cooperation provided the intellectual foundation of the PfP Framework Document (Appendix C), the document upon which the Partnership was built.\(^{16}\) No country could participate in the PfP process until it signed the Framework Document, which commits Partners to significant political and military objectives. The most important language in the document is found in Article Three and Article Eight. Article Three summaries the basic political and military objectives of PfP, focusing on the core values outlined above. Article Eight provides the consultative security process offered to PfP participants and sets out the tangible security link between the Alliance and its Partners. While not committing NATO to any specific defense guarantee, the language of Article Eight drove many Partners to join the program.\(^{17}\) The Framework Document also provides important milestones for the activities and programs contained within PfP.
NATO further defined PfP as an activity or process "within the framework of the NACC," rather than as a sub-organization under it. This idea of PfP as an activity, and not a formal body was an important distinction as it allowed Partner states to determine their own level of participation, a concept commonly described as *self-differentiation*. In practical terms, PfP provided a means for the CEE and former Soviet nations to determine their level of association and participation with NATO, while enabling traditional European neutral states to develop military interoperability with NATO.

**FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY**

A period of uncertainty followed the Summit as details of the program had not been developed fully. As a result, there was initial confusion about the goals of the program. Reaction to PfP was mixed, as some states (particularly the Visegrad States) viewed PfP either as a delaying tactic to defer the issue of NATO enlargement or as a compromise to occupy those CEE states that wanted closer security links to the West. The coincidental timing of President Boris Yeltsin's September 1993 letters warning against NATO enlargement, coupled with Secretary Aspin's October PfP proposal, made it appear that PfP had been conceived as a last minute "weak compromise" to placate the Russians. Several Eastern European governments expressed concern that NATO, by allowing Russia into PfP, had established a "soft Yalta," in which Moscow could influence their future. Conversely, the Russians suspected that PfP was a vehicle designed for NATO expansion. Unlike the multilateral forum of the OSCE in which Russia could effectively block any action it opposed, the voluntary, bilateral nature of the PfP program effectively sidestepped a possible Russian veto.

Even though PfP did not appear to provide long-term solutions, NATO was relieved it had addressed the membership question and had provided tangible support for democratic reform in
the CEE and former Soviet states without completely alienating Russia. Despite the mixed reaction to PfP, the CEE nations, former Soviet states and traditional European neutrals were eager to join this new program. With 26 nations joining in less than two years, PfP obviously met a European security need. 22 The addition of the Ukraine and Russia within PfP was symbolically important in that it enabled NATO to demonstrate the inclusive nature of the process. Russian membership, in many ways, was predicated on the decision of Sweden and Finland to join PfP. When these nations joined, though they made it clear that they had no intention of seeking NATO membership, they set a precedent that Russia quickly followed. Moreover, the “Russians were already concerned that their buddies in the former Warsaw Pact might be learning something they were not,” according to Ambassador Vernon Penner. 23 The Partnership was now a reality with a framework and members; the difficult task of implementation remained.

**EVOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**

Although the Framework Document provided the foundation for Partnership for Peace, significant work remained to implement the program. Much of this work was left to the NATO and SHAPE staffs, who received only very broad guidance from Alliance leaders. As a result of their efforts, PfP has evolved from a bare concept to an active association of military and defense institutions that train, exercise and work with NATO countries. To understand the prescriptions presented later in this paper for the effective evolution of Partnership for Peace, one must understand the current process.

*Integrating Partners into the Program*

After signing the Framework Document, each Partner prepares and submits to NATO an individual Presentation Document which outlines the Partner’s planned scope, pace and level of participation in PfP activities. 24 It also identifies Partner assets that are available for PfP activities,
while outlining steps the Partner plans to take to achieve PfP's political and military goals. NATO and Partners work closely to establish realistic goals and objectives for Presentation Documents. Partners examine the Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, and the Partnership Work Programme (PWP), documents which outline NATO and national cooperative activities, then develop an Individual Partnership Programme.\textsuperscript{25}

The Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) is the primary tool for establishing and monitoring an individual Partner's participation in the PfP process. This document establishes a commitment of resources and details cooperation between the Partner and NATO. Depending on Partner requirements, IPP topics can be as broad as "Defense planning and budgeting," or as narrow as "training on radio frequency management."\textsuperscript{26} The diversity and self-differentiation within the IPPs provide a basis for NATO to monitor Partner participation and growth in the military and political arenas.

\textit{Monitoring the Partnership}

As Partner participation in PfP programs varies, NATO has developed specific structures to monitor, develop and implement PfP activities. The Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) is the primary NATO Committee responsible for overseeing PfP activities. It manages PfP programs and processes, and provides a forum for discussion of civil-military relations. Through the PMSC Plus, Allies and Partners have input into the Partnership Work Programme and can address issues related to the Partnership Program.\textsuperscript{27}

The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) serves as the liaison between NATO and individual Partner countries for PfP military activities. Although co-located with SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, the PCC is headed by a non-SHAPE Director whose mission is to coordinate implementation of PfP's military activities.\textsuperscript{28} The PCC has contributed significantly to PfP's
military success by providing a centralized coordinating agency bringing together NATO and Partner nations, the commands, and a permanent supporting staff in one location with one mission. It is the only organization in NATO where Partner staff officers work side-by-side with NATO officers on a daily basis.²⁹

**Closer Relations with Partners**

Just as Partner integration into PfP has evolved since its inception, the relationship between Partners and NATO states has changed over time. As Partnership for Peace has matured, Partners have sought additional activities to bring them closer to the Alliance. NATO's response was the development of the "Planning and Review Process," and "Intensified Dialogue."

The first and most important NATO effort, the Planning and Review Process (PARP), is based on NATO's Defence Planning Process. It is a voluntary activity that currently has 18 Partner participants.³⁰ Participants exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and identify areas in which they agree to work toward improving interoperability between their military forces and NATO. Based on Partner feedback to a NATO survey addressing PfP interoperability, NATO staff produces a Planning and Review Assessment for each participant in conjunction with a list of "Interoperability Objectives" (IO) developed by NATO military authorities. Participating Partners then meet with various NATO staff and agree on specific IO packages that assist in building their Individual Partnership Programmes.

The PARP has enabled participating Partners to better understand how NATO conducts its Defence Planning Process and has provided Allies with a better appreciation of the challenges facing PfP Partners.³¹ However, some Partners expressed concern that the PARP could be used as a tool to evaluate them rather than a means to help their integration into PfP. Some Allies have
expressed a concern that the PARP is "too much too soon," believing that Partners should be given more time to adjust and build their own programs.32

Better synchronization between crucial PfP processes would increase the PARP’s effectiveness. The PARP is on a proposed two-year cycle, the Individual Partnership Programme is on a three-year cycle, and the Partnership Work Programme is reviewed and approved annually. These differing cycles significantly increase the complexity of these processes.

Intensified Dialogue is a process of individualized dialogue between the Alliance members and Partner nations who are interested in acceding to NATO as full members. Intended to help interested Partners learn more specifics about NATO membership, it also provides the Alliance with information to identify potential Partner contributions to NATO. It does not, however, represent a guarantee that participants will be invited to join NATO.33 Rather, the process involves an exchange between willing Partners and Alliance members with regard to both the status of the five Framework Document objectives and NATO’s effort to improve PfP programs.

**Partnership for Peace Military Programme**

Of the Partnership’s central objectives, the goal of militarily linking Alliance members to Partner states has been the most successful. Indeed, the results of the Military Programme have far exceeded expectations and have significantly improved the Partners’ interoperability with NATO. The Partnership’s primary military areas of concentration (peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue) have been addressed primarily through three major activities: High Level Visits; Education and Training; and Exercise and Supporting Activities.

High Level Visits foster personal contacts between NATO commanders and their Partner counterparts, thus helping to monitor and guide the progress of PfP. The Education and Training Programme familiarizes Partners with basic NATO military structure, principles, organization, and
working practices. This program provides regular, standardized and institutionalized education and training in order to build knowledge and expertise among Partner military forces. The process of involving the Alliance in training was a change; prior to PfP, NATO viewed training as a matter left to individual nations.

The Exercise and Supporting Activities programme has three purposes: training and familiarization of Partner Armed Forces with NATO practices; assessment of Partner forces to determine future education, training and exercise program requirements; and training of multinational NATO/non-NATO assets. PfP has increased the quantity and complexity of its military exercises each year. (Appendix D) The exercise program served as the catalyst for PfP military activities, and in the view of many, "jump started the program." Over 600 PfP military and defense-related activities are planned for 1997.

PfP and “in the spirit of” PfP activities have been instrumental in advancing military interoperability and moving Partners closer to the Framework objectives. PfP activities are funded by NATO, open to all Partners; and generally focused on military interoperability. “In the spirit of” PfP activities are bilateral in nature, involve individual NATO members, and one or more Partners, and may include military, political or civil-military activities. While NATO-sponsored PfP activities are based on programs available through the Partnership Work Programme, the bilateral nature of “in the spirit of” activities allows greater focus on the specific requirements of the Partners involved. As the planning and funding for “in the spirit of” PfP activities are primarily bilateral, NATO has experienced difficulty monitoring these activities. Recently, NATO members instituted semiannual, informal “clearinghouse” meetings to share information on their national initiatives in support of PfP. Monitoring and coordinating “in the
spirit of" activities would be improved through more frequent exchanges of information in a forum that includes both Allies and Partners.

Creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia was accomplished with greater ease and efficiency because of previous PfP Military Programme activities.\(^{40}\) PfP military activities stress the principle of multinationality, an issue that was addressed daily in IFOR. A primary example was the IFOR Multinational Division (North), which contained elements of a United States Division, a Turkish brigade and a Nordic/Polish brigade. The Nordic/Polish brigade had a Swedish commander, a brigade staff from five nations, and a Danish battalion with platoons from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. For this type of multinational military unit to be effective, the principles of interoperability had to be learned and rehearsed. The operational interoperability learned through PfP played a significant role in the military success of IFOR.

Currently, NATO offers a menu of activities from which the Partners choose, then monitors the Partners' participation. Partners accepted this arrangement at first, because they were like "...sponges, looking to absorb anything offered."\(^{41}\) However, the Partners' involvement in PfP training and exercises has heightened their expectations. Now is the time for NATO and the Partners to share a structure which is designed to integrate fully the Partners in all phases of PfP activities.

*Partnership for Peace Political Programme*

While NATO and Partner nations appear to be racing toward PfP's military goals, they have been less quick to achieve PfP's political objectives. Implementation of an effective PfP program that moves the Partners toward attainment of the Framework's political objectives has proven to be a great challenge to the Allies. PfP has been described as a bird with two wings: one large wing (military) and one small wing (political).\(^{42}\) While military interoperability objectives
generally lend themselves to quantifiable goals, political objectives are difficult to quantify. To the extent that political objectives are advanced by military activities, PfP has enjoyed some success.

Institution of effective civilian control of armed forces in democracies involves many facets, including personnel and defense resource management, education and training for civilian and military personnel, and establishing legal elements of civilian oversight. Each NATO nation is sharing its own experiences and traditions in these areas with Partners through workshops, seminars and education programs. Activities such as those covered by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee allow for PfP participation in areas that are not defense oriented but have great value to PfP countries. Civil emergency planning and emergency management are comfortable areas for full inclusion of Partners as these areas are outside the collective defense mission, and generally do not involve any classified military information.

While the political aspect has been the "little wing" of PfP, Partners are gaining exposure to the democratic process through other means. One of the more productive avenues of involvement has been through the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), the inter-parliamentary forum of the 16 member countries of the Alliance. This assembly brings together European and North American legislators to debate and discuss issues of common interest and concern. The NAA has opened its doors to the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe through the Rose-Roth initiative, launched by US Congressman Charlie Rose, then President of the Assembly, and US Senator Bill Roth. Partner nations accepted as "associate delegates" can attend plenary sessions, and some committees in a non-voting status. Associate delegates may attend special conferences and training sessions which are developed specifically in consideration of the PfP Framework Document objectives. The NAA has also placed NATO information cells in various
participating Partner parliaments, while providing NAA staff members to various Partner parliamentary conferences.

The Assembly’s outreach to Partner parliamentarians exemplifies the potential of PfP political activities. These fragile democracies require support and expertise from the Alliance to establish the foundation of long-term political stability. It will be of little consolation to NATO if a Partner’s military is interoperable with the Alliance but their democracy fails. As NATO charts the future course of PfP, the success of the NAA should be carefully considered and capitalized upon as it is imperative that PfP’s political and military aspects achieve a more equitable balance.

PfP’s political goals were intended to complement those of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; however, NACC in its current composition contributes little to political interaction between NATO and its Partners.44 Thus there is currently no effective multilateral forum in which Allies and Partners can discuss ongoing political issues. A balance between the political and military objectives of the NACC Charter and PfP Framework Document could be achieved if a single structure that included NACC and PfP existed at NATO.

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2 The Interagency Process is used by the US government to address issues that fall under the purview of more than one Department. The Interagency Group assigned to an issue works together to make a policy recommendation. Some of the key players in this Interagency Group included Jenonne Walker, Hans Binnendijk, Walter Slocombe, General Barry McCaffrey, Joe Kruzel and others.
3 Charles Dale, Head of Defence Partnership and Cooperation Section, International Staff, personal interview, 12 November 1996.
6 Within OSD the name International Security Affairs (ISA) was changed to Regional Security Affairs (RSA) under Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. After Dr. William Perry became Secretary of Defense, the name reverted back to ISA.
7 Ambassador Chas. Freeman, personal interview, 3 October 1996.
8 Dr. Donald Herr, Assistant for NATO Plans and Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, personal interview, 14 January 1997.
9 Ambassador Vernon Penner, former Political Advisor to the SACEUR, personal interview, 14 January 1997.
11 There were many talented officers working under General Shalikashvili at SHAPE who contributed greatly to PIP, to include Colonel Jim Holcomb, Colonel Joel Williamson, Colonel Bruce Bach, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred Schwein among others.
12 Dr. Hans Binnendijk, at the time the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans at the State Department and an active participant in the Interagency Group debates, believes “a lot of the good ideas” for PIP that were eventually adopted by the Interagency Group came from General Shalikashvili and his staff. Dr. Hans Binnendijk, personal interview, 14 January 1997.
13 Freeman interview.
17 Various interviews with Partner representatives. See Appendix A for a complete list of interviews.
18 Gorka 14.
19 Ruhle and Williams 67.
21 Gorka 14.
22 There are now 27 nations of PIP. Recently Malta dropped out and Switzerland joined. Partner nations include Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYR), Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
23 Penner interview.
25 NATO Basic Fact Sheet no. 9 4.
27 When Partners are invited to attend PMSC meetings, these meetings are referred to PMSC Plus. The same terminology is used for Partner attendance at other NATO Committee meetings.
28 Lieutenant Colonel Fred Schwein, US Liaison Officer to the PCC, personal interview, 12 November 1996.
29 Colonel James Holcomb, Chief of the Permanent Staff Element, PCC, personal interview, 12 November 1996.
30 Current PARP participants include Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine.
32 Lieutenant Colonel Fredrich Zweiner, German Permanent Delegation to NATO, personal interview, 19 November 1996.
33 Gebhardt Von Moltke, address, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 13 November 1996.
34 The NATO school in Oberammergau, Germany has 16 of its 44 courses open to Partner nations; approximately 800 Partner nation personnel will attend courses this year. The Logistics School in Hamburg and the Communications/Information Systems School at Latina have two courses per year for Partners. The NATO Defense College also runs a senior level course open to Partners.
35 Holcomb interview.
36 Holcomb interview.
37 The NATO document “PWP Specific Activities for 1997-1999” provides a detailed list of the proposed activities.
38 Countries approach their bilateral, “in the spirit of” programs in various ways. The United States has many programs; one of the most visible is the National Guard sponsored State to State Partnership Program. This program establishes broad ties between US State Governors and their National Guard forces with the Defense Ministries of Partner nations and all levels of government. The Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), a joint Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian peacekeeping force, has received training, equipment and exercise support from a number of NATO and Partner countries. Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom and Norway formed the BALTBAT Group to support the Baltic effort. The Central Asian Battalion, composed of personnel from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, has an exercise with US, German, Danish, Turkish, Baltic, Ukrainian,
Georgian, and Russian troops in September 1997. BALTBAT has already provided tangible benefits, as Estonian and Lithuanian servicemen have served with a Danish battalion in Croatia.

39 Holcomb interview.
340 Schwein interview.
41 Holcomb interview.
42 Chris Donnelly, Special Advisor to the NATO Secretary General, personal interview, 20 November 1996.
43 The Parliaments of Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine are associate delegations of the North Atlantic Assembly.
44 This analysis of NACC was expressed throughout all interviews conducted.
CHAPTER II

FORCES DRIVING PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

ENHANCEMENT

THE ENVIRONMENT

Partnership for Peace has exceeded expectations and provided stability in an evolving European security landscape. Yet many forces are driving PfP to move beyond its current status. NATO enlargement, Russian concerns, and Partner expectations, among many other issues, are compelling NATO to reexamine the Partnership. Indeed, several powerful forces unrelated to PfP are also pushing Partnership for Peace to change. The debate about PfP enhancement, then, is framed by these forces.

NATO Enlargement

Perhaps the most important factor driving PfP enhancement is the prospect of NATO enlargement. Every discussion of enhancement in some way turns to the topic of enlargement and its effect on PfP, as Allies and Partners debate the requirements for membership, the qualifications of individual Partners, and the long-term effects of expansion. Advocacy for increased NATO membership has taken many forms. British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind has stated that Ukraine's eventual admission to NATO is crucial to overcoming the USSR's legacy in Europe and that NATO should eventually enlarge all the way to "Ukraine's eastern border." The Hungarian government has indicated that if Romania is not admitted to NATO at the same time as Hungary, the stabilization recently achieved between these two countries will be undermined.
Estonian President Lennart Meri has argued against the current approach of NATO enlargement "which now means admitting countries that don't face any threat" ahead of countries in real need of security guarantees.³

Although enlargement should have a positive impact on the Alliance, the majority of the 12 Partners that have applied for membership will not be invited to join NATO in the first tranche. NATO will select those Partners most qualified for membership; the "less qualified" Partners will remain in PfP. Thus there is a critical need for an enhanced Partnership structure that maintains a strong link between NATO and the remaining Partners. Without such a structure, non-selection of a Partner for NATO membership could lead a Partner to question the West's commitment to its security.

*European Security and Defence Identity*

The concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) lends impetus to an enhanced PfP. The push to develop a "European" security identity has gradually grown and received acceptance over the past six years. Initially proposed by the French to shift the emphasis of Europe's military affairs away from the United States, members of the Alliance have since adopted this concept as an avenue for Europeans to take more responsibility and leadership in European-specific defense issues.⁴

The drive by several countries of the European Union (EU) to establish a security framework based solely on the nations of Europe led to a proposed modification of the nature of the Western European Union (WEU). This initiative, if fully implemented, would essentially make the WEU the military arm of the EU.⁵ This arrangement would provide Europeans with the ability to implement operations through a WEU-led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). In NATO's view, this task force would be a deployable, multinational, multi-service, formation
tailored for specific contingency operations. In those circumstances, the United States and Canada would agree to the use of NATO assets but decline to participate in the actual operations.

The emphasis on an ESDI pressures NATO to expand relationships with Partner nations in two areas. First, as Partners have been training for the type of operations proposed for the CJTF, a significant amount of training in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations will be viewed as wasted if the Partners are not included in those operations. Secondly, several other initiatives now under consideration advance the concept of involving Partner member nations in the various command structures of the Alliance. This increasingly close relationship will make it difficult to exclude Partners from operations, particularly if the mission has a pan-European focus.

**Economics**

Arguably, economics are at least as strong as security concerns in driving countries toward PfP and eventual NATO membership. The more stable and secure a country becomes, the more foreign capital it is able to attract. The developing economies of Eastern Europe desperately need the infusion of capital from Western Europe and the United States to rebuild their economies. While the ultimate guarantee of security is actual NATO membership, the closer a country is to the Alliance, the more likely it is to be recognized as a safe investment. Low-cost capital is needed as many of the Partner countries shift from a command to a free-market economy. NATO membership evokes a status that the member country has arrived on the world stage; the closer PfP members can get to this status, the better for that nation’s economy.

**Internal Conflict within Partner States**

Another force driving enhancement is the growing imbalance in civil-military authority in some Partner states. As PfP’s military successes have overshadowed its political achievements, it has presented a public picture of achievement that is heavily weighted toward the military. The
perception of the disproportionate success of the military arm has led to friction in several countries between the civilian and military leadership. In some instances, the military has used its success to enhance its political power, sabotaging the PfP goal of civilian control of the military. Disproportionate military success may embarrass politicians within the Partner states and could make achieving civilian control of the military difficult.

*Fear of Russia*

A critical factor that overshadows PfP enhancement, particularly from the Partners' view, is the fear of a resurgent Russia. Partners who will not be in the first *tranche* of NATO enlargement wish to draw closer to the Alliance to forestall a potential Russian threat. Russia has sought reintegration with the former Soviet states. President Yeltsin's recent address to the Council of Heads of States of the Commonwealth of Independent States called for a restoration of the former single economic space through "integration" with Russia in opposition to the West. His address referred to the "post-Soviet space" as a unit and to its "fraternal peoples." This issue is particularly relevant to Partners such as the Baltic states. Their proximity to Russia and large Russian minority populations make these states fearful of possible future Russian aggression. Therefore, their desire for security guarantees is strong; they believe that any level of security given by NATO through PfP is crucial.

Several senior officials from small Partner states have made public their fear of a Russian resurgence and their desire for European protection. During NATO Secretary Solano's February 1997 visit, Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze each proposed that NATO extend security guarantees to small or neutral states. Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Ilves argued that NATO enlargement must not damage the security of countries not admitted in the first *tranche*, "... lest the [1997 NATO] Madrid [agreements] add to
the series that began with Munich and continued with the Yalta [agreements].” Such concerns are not limited to the smaller states. Senior Ukrainian officials have stated that their country may be forced to seek protection within a [NATO] security system. NATO must address these security concerns, particularly if these Partners are not offered membership.

THE PLAYERS

While the factors previously discussed are crucial in pushing PfP enhancement, the perspectives of three key groups concerned about European security are at least as critical in defining PfP’s future. The Partners, Russia, and NATO all have a major stake in enhancement. The Partner states have the highest stake in enhancement and consequently are the most interested. Russia, while not specifically concerned about PfP enhancement, is intensely interested in NATO’s structure and its relationship with NATO after enlargement. NATO’s final decision on PfP enhancement must address the concerns of the Partners and Russia, while also satisfying the concerns of its own members. Exploration of the views of these key players provides insight into the complexity of the PfP enhancement process.

Partner Views

The group most enthusiastic about PfP enhancement, and least able to affect it, is the Partner states. Most Partners view NATO offices in Partner countries, Partner liaisons on NATO staffs, and additional consultation as important components of PfP enhancement. During interviews, many Partner representatives expressed a desire for more comprehensive and inclusive dialogue with NATO. This theme was almost universal, whether the country was seeking eventual membership in the Alliance or was satisfied with its status as a Partner. Countries aspiring to NATO membership view the enhancement of PfP as moving them closer to the Alliance, and increasing their chances of eventual membership. Countries not seeking membership
have a somewhat different motivation. These countries see the PfP process as part of a larger security architecture for Europe and believe its enhancement would strengthen the stability of the region by providing an important avenue for dialogue between countries. Sweden, in particular, views PfP as complementary to its foreign policy regarding peacekeeping, and an important aspect in establishing a European security identity.¹⁵ Regardless of future aspirations, attitudes toward enhancement are nearly universal -- an enhancement of the Partnership is in the best interest of all Partner nations.

Partners’ proposals for PfP enhancement are as broad as the membership itself. One group, made up mainly of the developed Central European states, seeks immediate entry into NATO. These states believe the Partnership should resemble NATO in all aspects with the exception of Article Five of the Washington Treaty. This group asserts that Partners should be included at all levels of command where applicable, and should be as involved in the policy and planning processes of PfP activities as any of the NATO nations. These Partners argue that if their militaries are involved in operations undertaken by the Alliance, they should have equal input into the commitment and uses of their forces. In this proposal, Partners would have the opportunity to participate in most NATO committees and programs that focus on non-military issues such as economic and cultural development.

Another group, including Sweden and Finland, believes enhancement should proceed at a more measured pace. Concerned about budgetary and political issues, these states believe the Partnership should build on its accomplishments and not attempt any major restructuring or re-focus. Sweden, for example, is eager to achieve greater military interaction at all staff levels, but is not as interested in the other aspects of NATO membership.¹⁶
Though Partners’ views on future enhancement packages varied, they agreed that self-differentiation is important and must be continued. It is also clear that all the desires of the Partners are not achievable. Political reality will prevent, at least in the near term, as close a relationship as many of the Partners wish.

**Russian View**

One of the most significant factors influencing PfP enhancement is the consistent opposition of Russia to any proposal it perceives as facilitating NATO enlargement. Russia has continually opposed any effort that appears to threaten its security status or diminish its influence, including the formation of PfP itself.\(^{17}\) While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the subject of NATO enlargement, it is important to understand the Russian perspective on the enlargement process, and PfP enhancement.

When Russia signed the PfP Framework document in 1994, it expressed support for PfP’s political and military goals, while opposing linking PfP to NATO enlargement. From a Russian perspective, closer cooperation between the militaries of the West and the former Warsaw Pact was advantageous, as was the opportunity to train and operate with Western military forces. Russia believed the goals of PfP were worthy enough to be recognized on their own without complicating the process by tying it to NATO enlargement. However, Russia now views the PfP process as a masquerade for the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe.\(^{18}\) Russia contends that enlargement changes the nature of PfP, making it more an avenue of expansion for NATO rather than a program to increase interaction between the respective militaries.\(^{19}\)

Although Russia has expressed its support for the PfP process, it has only minimally participated within the PfP framework. It signed the Framework Document only when it recognized that PfP was about to go forward without it and it faced being marginalized by the
process. The Russians have failed to come to agreement on an updated Individual Partnership Programme, despite their membership for over two years. Several Partner representatives related that while Russia is a member of PfP, it has only minimal participation. This is further illustrated by the lack of a permanent Russian representative at the PCC, and infrequent staffing of the Russian Partner office at NATO Headquarters.

The only major initiative that Russia has advanced as an alternative to PfP, and NATO enlargement is an enhancement of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While the OSCE provides an important forum for discussion and airing of grievances among the member states, its consensus-based format makes controversial decisions difficult to make. Like the United Nations, the OSCE has no operational arm, therefore implementation is left to the member states without any threat of censure.

Regardless of the validity of Russian concerns, the question of NATO’s relationship with Russia must be addressed. NATO and Russia are currently negotiating a charter that will define their relationship. NATO faces the delicate task of negotiating a charter with Russia that satisfies Russian concerns without appearing to acquiesce to Russian demands to delay or halt enlargement. Definition of this relationship will not only help NATO and Russia but will also allow Partners to strengthen their relationship with NATO. The positive impact of PfP enhancement will be diminished if NATO’s relationship with Russia has not been defined. Many Partners, particularly the former Soviet Republics, are reluctant to move closer to NATO for fear of Russian political or economic retaliation. As one Partner representative remarked, “The more settled Russia is in the world of today, the more comfortable we sleep at night.” Development of a NATO-Russia charter has significant risks; however, with no defined agreement, many Partners may be constrained in their relationships with the Alliance.
NATO View

Members of the Alliance have varied views on PfP enhancement. The United States seeks to strengthen the Partnership in many areas, particularly in the political arena. The most significant aspect of the current US proposal is the creation of an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC). According to US advocates of the APC, such a Council would enhance the political role of the Partners by expanding political interaction with the Alliance, and giving increased emphasis to those programs the Partners view as particularly important. The APC would continue the important aspect of self-differentiation, changing the nature of the NACC to achieve a more focused, result-oriented process. This proposal is a significant departure from the current process, and concerns those NATO countries who may view inclusion of the Partners in the NATO political realm as a dilution of their power. NATO has already accepted some form of the APC since it was included in the proposed agenda for the July Summit. The APC concept is in the developmental stage and is currently being refined by the NATO staff.

Although the Allies have supported PfP with enthusiasm, their support for enhancement, and, in particular, for the US proposal of the Atlantic Partnership Council is not unanimous. Traditional US supporters, such as the United Kingdom and Norway, actively support the APC. Others, such as France and Germany, worry about how the proposal would affect NACC and other security organizations in Europe. Some of the Allies' permanent staffs commented that this proposal would further stretch limited staff at NATO Headquarters. Many of the Allies interviewed voiced concern that Partners would not be able to support an expanded PfP program due to similar staffing shortfalls. In addition, some of the smaller NATO Allies are uneasy with narrowing the difference between Partners and Allies since they believe this could potentially lessen their influence in North Atlantic Council consensus.
NATO MINISTERS' PROPOSALS

Given all the factors working toward enhancement, and the complicated views of the key players, NATO Ministers had a difficult assignment during their December 1996 meeting in working out an agreement on the next step in PIP's evolution. The resultant Communiqué (Appendix E) is significant, particularly with regard to Partner participation and the Atlantic Partnership Council. Under the Ministers' directive, Partners would participate in all aspects of the planning and execution of PIP activities, while broadening the agreed fields of mission to include peace support operations. The Atlantic Partnership Council would further integrate the Partner nations into the NATO and European political framework, giving those countries who do not wish to join NATO a forum and a structure for consultation.20

NATO must build on the Communiqué initiatives to move the Partnership into a structure that meets the needs of its members and strengthens security in Europe. Each initiative is an improvement over the current program, but these initiatives represent a political compromise necessary to gain approval from the members of the Alliance. They do not go far enough toward addressing the overall needs of the Partners and do not significantly strengthen the political relationship between NATO and the Partners. The Partnership for Peace must be transformed from a process which simply enhances countries' military-to-military relationships to a comprehensive organization that will make a lasting contribution to the overall security of Europe. Through implementation of our recommendation for an Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO can achieve such a transformation.

1 Obtained from article attributed to the Associated Press, 10 March 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
3 Obtained from articles attributed to BNS, 17 Feb 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
7 General Gheorghe Rotaru, Romanian Defense Advisor, Romanian Liaison Mission to NATO, personal interview, 14 November 1996.
9 Chris Donnelley, personal interview, 20 November 1996.
10 Obtained from articles attributed to Itar-Tass, 28 March 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
11 Obtained from articles attributed to Basapress, Flux; 10-11 February 1997 and Inprinda, Interfax, 11-12 February 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
12 Obtained from article attributed to DPA, 17 February 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
13 Obtained from article attributed to Interfax-Ukraine, 11-12 March 1997, online, Jamestown Foundation.
14 Various Partner interviews. See Appendix A for complete list of interviews.
15 Ulla Gundmunson, Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy of Sweden, personal interview, 15 November 1996.
16 Gundmunson interview.
19 Senior Russian Diplomat, personal interview, 15 November 1996.
CHAPTER III:

MOVING PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

INTO THE FUTURE

Change for Partnership for Peace is inevitable. The PfP enhancement package announced at the December 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting represents NATO’s initial response, not the final plan.¹ The decisions that will be made prior to the Summit will be crucial in maintaining the momentum of close cooperation between NATO Allies and PfP Partners. The Partnership has strengthened the bonds between NATO and the newly emerging democracies of Europe and Eurasia. PfP’s strategic value to European security will be diminished greatly if these bonds are weakened after enlargement. NATO’s implementation of the recommendations outlined in this chapter will enable Partnership for Peace to become the vector for European security.

The course of action contained in this chapter addresses the major issues driving enhancement and rests on two major assumptions. The first is that NATO will announce the first tranche of enlargement at the July 1997 Summit, and it will not include all 12 Partner nations that have applied for membership. The second assumption is that NATO and Russia will continue to pursue a formal agreement which will serve to develop a “strong, stable and enduring security partnership.”² Without such an agreement, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics may be stifled in their relationship with NATO. Enlargement and the NATO-Russia relationship will have a profound effect on the Partners. Effective enhancement of PfP will ensure the link between NATO and these emerging democracies remains strong
Throughout the course of over 80 interviews\(^3\), our research focused on the future of PfP.\(^4\) The variations in response to this issue were limited only by the number of interviews conducted; however, six key points consistently surfaced:

- The Allies are concerned with the rapid growth of PfP and its proliferation into NATO institutions, seemingly without direction.
- Partners are concerned about the lack of adequate feedback from NATO as to their progression in meeting the objectives of PfP.
- Ally and Partner officials are interested in quality over quantity in all PfP programs, particularly in military exercises.
- Partners and Allies are concerned about information exchange, information transparency and consultation configurations.
- Military achievements far outweigh the political attainments.
- There is a need for a special relationship with Russia.

Important issues outside the purview of this paper arose during our interviews. Appendix F discusses these issues and provides specific recommendations.\(^5\)

The current enhancement proposals address the majority of these issues by acknowledging the importance of increasingly engaging partners, balancing the program to meet the goals of the PfP Framework Document, and recognizing PfP as more than a transitional program aimed at enlargement. Assessments that view PfP solely as an enlargement tool "overlook the innovative features of PfP which make it a genuine contribution to military and defense related cooperation in Europe, irrespective of NATO enlargement."\(^6\) The need to formalize PfP was recognized by Charles Kupchan as early as the Fall of 1994 when he prophetically wrote, "…as the PfP matures, it cannot remain a mere addendum to NATO; if NATO expects the new democracies to take PfP seriously it must give them a stake in shaping its activities and evolution. Its further institutionalization, probably at the expense of NATO’s autonomy, will be required."\(^7\)

The course of action we propose adds a structural element to manage partner activities and offers opportunity for increased interface with NATO staff and the Allies. As we approach
the NATO Summit of 1997, the enhancement package that will be presented to the Heads of State must include methods to consolidate, streamline, and improve the efficiency of PfP with renewed emphasis on the political objectives sought by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It must also address the expected impacts of PfP evolution in the ongoing internal and external adaptation of NATO. Finding the proper balance between the needs of PfP Partners, in particular Russia, and NATO members requires an altogether different approach than the ones presented thus far.

**THE PROPOSAL: EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL**

We propose that NATO create a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) composed of Ally and Partner representatives. This Council will provide Partners with a greater opportunity to interact with the Allies and other Partners on a multilateral basis, giving each member a voice in the actions and recommendations of the EAPC. The EAPC (Table 1) encompasses the United States proposal for an Atlantic Partnership Council but takes it a step further in organization and development as a NATO structure. It will not interfere with the concept of self-differentiation but will allow Partners to grow through closer, more frequent and defined interaction and consultation with NATO representatives and staff. The purpose of the EAPC will be:

To maintain an open dialogue between the nations of Europe, the United States and Canada, who are ready and willing to accept a security architecture which includes a commitment to a democratic way of life, with transparency to its citizens and to the Council, and development of a military supported by the nation's populace which stands ready and prepared to accept missions that enhance the security of Europe.
The name, “Euro-Atlantic”, reflects a Council that strengthens the trans-Atlantic link, while clearly describing the membership of the Council. Several interviewees indicated that the term “Atlantic Partnership Council” was too limiting as the majority of the Partners are not Atlantic nations.
The EAPC will be a regularly meeting body of representatives of the Alliance and interested Partner countries, supported by dedicated NATO staff. This Council can meet at many levels, to include ambassadorial; however, it would normally meet with Ally and Partner representatives currently serving on Mission staff or as PfP representatives to NATO. The EAPC will oversee all programs developed to bring Allies and Partners closer together in thought, democratic functioning and military cooperation. Development of the EAPC will involve innovative action that will demand a change of thinking for those who object to formalizing the PfP process and those fearful of losing the positive aspects of the NACC. The basic concepts of the EAPC will be addressed in the following paragraphs but are summarized below:

- Combine the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace under one umbrella.
- Provide a dedicated NATO Staff Cell to manage and oversee the activities of the EAPC, to be directly responsible to the North Atlantic Council.
- Provide leadership through three pillars: Military, Political and Civil-Military Cooperation.
- Establish a Combined Joint Task Force cell within the EAPC.

The EAPC will dissolve NACC’s link to the Cold War by allowing full membership of all Partners, including neutrals, in a multilateral political Council. Combining the NACC and PfP will eliminate areas of overlap and consolidate functional areas, rebuilding them into a three pillar format that will serve to retain the critical functionality of both activities. This unification is necessary to offer the Partners the maximum benefits of consultation, integration and operational consideration, while streamlining programs. Partners can interact with Allies and other Partners in a multilateral forum of equals. The end result is a voluntary body, functionally oriented, that discusses and focuses issues that fall under its purview; with the ability to affect change through operational programs.
A full time international NATO Staff should be assigned to coordinate all EAPC activities. This staff should be supervised by a division chief level employee, with all other EAPC staff below that level. In addition to support activities, the EAPC staff would receive taskings from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the EAPC itself, and would in turn task individual or groups of Partners and Allies within the EAPC to develop recommendations for the NAC or its committees. This staff would coordinate activities of the enhancement package approved at the 1997 NATO Summit. For maximum efficiency, this staff should be collocated with the Partners to encourage open communications and develop a relationship of compatibility, as has proven effective at the Partnership Coordination Cell.

Establishment of a full time staff addresses the Allies’ concern about rapid growth and proliferation of PfP into NATO operations. This proposal consolidates PfP expertise and makes it readily available to Missions’ staffs and Partner Representatives. Collocating this expertise with the Partners assists them in finding the ‘right’ person with whom to discuss issues and obtain information.

**EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL STRUCTURE**

The pillared structure within the EAPC will be based on three distinct areas: military issues, political consultation and civil-military cooperation. This configuration will facilitate the proper balance of the Council’s deliberations. The EAPC will provide a forum for discussion, interaction, and planning of all Partnership programs. EAPC recommendations forwarded to the NAC or NATO committees will be based on majority vote. The percentage of the vote will be disclosed in the recommendation to allow the NAC (or committee) to place the proper weight on the EAPC’s input before making its decision on issues involving Partners.
The EAPC Military Pillar

The Military Pillar will provide consultation and operational continuity. It will assume responsibility for Military Cooperation and Defence Support issues from the NACC, Objectives 3-5 of the PfP Framework Document, and consultations with Partners on Individual Partnership Programme goals and Interoperability Objectives. This pillar will also provide a forum for meaningful discussion, at the staff level, on military issues that may be broad or narrow in scope. The EAPC Military Pillar could discuss, for example, the release of NATO Standardization Agreements, and make recommendations as to which are most critical for release to Partners. If this recommendation was then considered and approved by the NAC, it would then be referred to the appropriate NATO Directorate or committee for action. These tasks will be accomplished through close work and coordination with the NATO Military Committee, the Political-Military Steering Committee, Partnership Coordination Cell, and others as appropriate. Input from the EAPC will help to eliminate overlap and focus PfP and "in the spirit of" PfP military activities on training for current PfP missions, as well as the new "PfP operations" defined at the December 1996 Ministerial meetings.

The advantage of a separate Military Pillar is that it provides the multilateral, NATO-led operational capability missing in the NACC structure. The EAPC would have extensive knowledge of the commitment and capabilities of Allies and, more importantly, of Partners. It will use this knowledge to help the Alliance determine if it can realistically use Partners to support operations requested by the United Nations or OSCE. It would also have the capability, under bilateral agreements of PfP, to conduct "PfP operations" in which NATO is currently constrained.

Since the EAPC would not be bound by Article V, developing scenarios in new democracies could be openly discussed without inferring NATO involvement. The Albanian
situation of early 1997 could have been discussed in the EAPC, allowing NATO an avenue for important deliberations without committing itself to specific action. According to a US government official, there was "a lot of head scratching" within the Alliance on how to respond to the Albanian situation as "... no obvious solutions [stood] out. Do we take a bilateral approach or respond collectively? No one has the right answer." With no effective multilateral forum for political discussions outside the North Atlantic Council, NATO's options were limited. Similar situations are likely to occur in the future, and John Roper of London's Royal Institute of International Affairs observed that "... if NATO countries are to adhere to the principle of good governance, then they'll have to tackle this issue - if not now then in the future." As serious issues develop, the EAPC can make an informed recommendation to the NAC as it deliberates possible NATO action.

This EAPC structure also places a Combined Joint Task Force cell under the Military Pillar. This cell will provide information and input from the Partners to the NAC and the National Military Authorities as they progress toward realizing the CJTF concept as directed by the Ministerials. Once the CJTF is fully implemented under the ongoing NATO adaptation, this cell can utilize its internal, institutional knowledge of multilateral capabilities to assist in contingency planning. For example, after the Alliance makes the decision to provide support for a military mission, it could then task the EAPC-CJTF Cell to work with SHAPE and the Regional Command nuclei and provide information necessary to implement the contingency plan. As this concept evolves, input from the EAPC will also be beneficial to operational planners of WEU-led missions. The EAPC would provide a coordinated link between NATO, the PCC military liaisons, and operational staffs of on-going operations. Operational problems uncovered in on-
going missions could be addressed by the EAPC Military Pillar and possible solutions proposed, even as the operation continues.

By moving CJTF away from NATO's defense planners, and restructuring it as a force committed to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian support, the Alliance can successfully separate the two modalities and maintain its defense posture without implying an Alliance change of primary mission. It should be kept in mind, however, that the missions mentioned above represent a recent shift in roles and missions for even the most established militaries. An advantage of placing a CJTF cell in the EAPC is that continual discussion on the expanded NATO missions for both Allies and Partners can take place under an umbrella where planning and implementation responsibilities can be shared more equally. IFOR has taught that all voices need to be heard and that no one nation has sole expertise on these present day operations.

The EAPC Political Pillar

All political consultation, with the exception of that which is specified in Article Eight of the PfP Framework Document, will be placed in this pillar. Preliminary work on assessment of Individual Partnership Programmes and consultations on political and security issues where immediate or direct threat is not involved could be conducted in this forum, with advancement of issues to the North Atlantic Council if so warranted. Partners will continue to have the privilege of requesting consultation with the NAC; however, the EAPC could serve as a clearinghouse for issues that may not require consultation at that level but are individual or shared concerns of the Partners. By placing political consultation here in the EAPC, the definition of consultation under Article Eight is more clear. It places consultation in the presence of sovereignty threat at a level above all other forms of consultation and reserves it as a function of the NAC.\textsuperscript{12}
In this area of the EAPC, Partners would work out details that involve the Alliance in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This should not be allowed to interfere with nations conducting bilateral cooperative programs, but where the Alliance is involved, this would be a starting point for addressing issues and preparing them for submission to the Permanent Representatives, Political-Military Steering Committee or other committees.

The EAPC Civil-Military Cooperation Pillar

This pillar was developed to ensure that issues which are not purely military or political are properly addressed. Areas of responsibility addressed within this pillar are outlined below:

- Transparency in National Defense Planning and Budgeting
- Civil-Military Relations
- Challenges of Modern Society issues
- Environmental issues
- Economic issues
- Air Space Coordination
- Civil Emergency Planning
- Civil Emergency Operations
- Information Management and Exchange

Placing economic development issues and transparency issues in the same forum allows for maximum integration of these two inextricably linked components of a growing democracy. The EAPC, as the overseer of Partnership activities, will provide the proper emphasis to these programs.

This pillar also provides an example of how self-differentiation would prosper under the EAPC. Review of the participation of Partners in previous years shows that some Partners are more interested in civil emergency planning and its implementation than other PfP activities. Nations interested in developing these procedures could choose activities from this pillar to fulfill their primary goals. However, close consultation with the EAPC over a period of planning years would not allow these nations to stagnate in this pillar.
Information management and exchange would also be addressed under this pillar. An overarching concern of Allies and Partners alike was that information needs to be better managed. Several interviewees commented that Allies as well as Partners need to have access to after-action reports and lessons learned from exercises, whether or not they participated in the exercise. This pillar would work with the NATO Information Distribution System to ensure that appropriate, timely information is available to both Partners and Allies. The Civil-Military Pillar, being familiar with the needs of Partners, could serve as a liaison between the Partners and NATO information managers.

**EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL ADVANTAGES**

The EAPC will be an umbrella organization consisting of representatives from the Alliance and Partner nations, supported by a dedicated international NATO Staff, with the responsibility of meeting regularly with its members, who participate in groups formed around a three-pillar structure. The Military Pillar will conduct discussions and consultations, leading to recommendations on all matters relating to military operations and exercises in which Partners are involved. The Political Pillar will be responsible for all political consultations made available to Partners under PfP, except for those conducted under Article Eight of the Framework Document. It would also oversee bilateral and multilateral political activities in which Partners are involved. The Civil-Military Cooperation Pillar will address Partner transparency issues, economic and global issues, civil emergency planning, and information management. EAPC recommendations would then be considered by the North Atlantic Council for consensus and action.

**EAPC Addresses Ally and Partner Concerns**

During interviews with Partners, one prominent issue concerned access to NATO committees and staff. The Partner Representatives felt a close link with NATO and appreciated
having an opportunity to be present in the Headquarters, but often felt isolated. There is often only one Partner representative, and the level of expertise may not match that of the more experienced Alliance mission and military staffs. Equally important is the Partners’ comfort factor with NATO staff. Over time this comfort will develop, but Partners generally do not feel they can consult freely with NATO staff. There have been instances where minor details or problems needed to be addressed but the Partner representative became frustrated trying to reach the one expert who could address this concern. The EAPC staff will alleviate this problem by becoming the Partners’ primary point of contact, providing requested information or referring the Partners to the appropriate NATO staff member. This staff will have access to and experience with NATO staff and committees, serving as liaisons on the Partners’ behalf.

The oversight responsibility of the EAPC staff will address the issues of unbalanced programs, quality over quantity and rapid growth. The increased consultation and participation opportunities will multiply the amount of feedback and direct staff contact presently afforded to Partners.

Mission staffs expressed concern over the continual increase in activities that required their attention. An advantage to the three pillar structure is that nations can be represented on the EAPC by different ‘experts’ in each forum. This may not always be necessary or possible; however, the structure allows for this flexibility. The EAPC would allow for staff dedicated to PfP issues as well as issues currently addressed by the NACC. The benefits attained by consolidating staff effort must be weighed against the sacrifice that may occur in creating a newly designated staff.
EAPC Streamlines the Processes

As the Partnership has grown, the complexity of administering and monitoring the program has increased significantly. Limited NATO and Partner staffs must cope with increased demands on their time and expertise. The Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, a plan that offers a menu of political, economic, and scientific activities was developed by the NACC and is updated approximately every two years. The Political-Military Steering Committee coordinates a NATO Partnership Work Programme which incorporates military activities not included in the NACC Work Plan; this plan is updated biennially for generic topics and annually for military topics. The Individual Partnership Programmes, developed by the Partners under PMSC guidance, are reviewed every third year. The Planning and Review Process is expected to be conducted every two years.

All of these processes were initiated with the same purpose: to provide Partners with a guide for closer integration with the Alliance. However, as these processes were developed independently, there has not always been an explicit linkage between them. To enhance this linkage, NATO should first integrate Interoperability Objectives into the military portion of the Partnership Work Programme. Simultaneously, the EAPC will develop the political, economic and scientific portion of the PWP. The EAPC would then assist the Partners in prioritizing their selections from the PWP for their Individual Partnership Programme, based on the Partner’s goals and capabilities. The Partners then present their IPP to the Political-Military Steering Committee for approval. Taking these steps will enable Partners to develop more realistic IPPs, and linking IOs to the Partnership Work Programme (and consequently to the IPPs) will better prepare the Partners for the Planning and Review Process.
To further synchronize these cycles, we recommend that NATO publish the military portion of the Partnership Work Programme with integrated IOs by January 1998. The EAPC should publish the political, economic, and scientific portion of the PWP at the same time, thus providing a synchronized, consolidated PWP for the Partners. Any IPPs that are due for update prior to January 1998 should be delayed until after publication of this consolidated PWP. The next Planning and Review Process cycle would begin after IPPs reflecting the consolidated PWP had been approved.

**EAPC Balances the Military and Political Programs**

The EAPC will provide a mechanism for balancing military and political programs offered by NATO. In some Partner nations, military activities with NATO have caused governments to seek greater political involvement with the Alliance. While in these cases military success has strengthened the political aspect, PfP’s emphasis on military activities has not been as positive for other Partners. This situation worries some Partner countries, as “... PfP’s emphasis on military interoperability has strengthened the hand of the military and inadvertently undermined the ability of many Partners to establish democratic control over their armed forces.” In some cases, military success has actually damaged internal civil-military relations. When PfP proves to be a great success for the Partner’s military and not for its politicians, this success becomes an embarrassment to the politicians, causing conflict within the governing bodies of the state.

The EAPC could balance this equation with guidance through consultation to help Partners achieve reasonable expectations in both the military and political arenas. Although military readiness and compatibility are crucial factors in military operations, political and public support are equally important. It is not to NATO’s advantage to provide military training if a
nation cannot muster political support for the use of forces when that training must come to fruition.

**EAPC Consolidates Expertise**

Currently PfP experts are spread throughout the NATO staff, most with responsibilities reaching far beyond PfP. In order to move PfP forward, it is necessary to provide a staff that is dedicated to working PfP issues with Partners and Allies as its sole function. The staff of the EAPC will be responsible for maintaining a balance in programs to ensure that both military and political areas are resourced adequately, and providing a much needed day to day contact for Partners. The EAPC, while working closely with the PMSC, the Military Committee, and the PCC, will be directly responsible to the NAC for reporting on all PfP and Partner activity.

**CONCLUSION**

Important trends have become evident in the time period between January 1994 and January 1997. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics have demonstrated their desire to be connected to the West, rather than maintaining the Soviet tradition. NATO's traditional mission of collective defense has proven that it could be supplemented by crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian support. The Allies learned that it is possible to successfully involve non-NATO countries in the planning and implementation of actual operations, giving NATO new confidence in its ability to train non-NATO forces to interoperability standards. Although the military assimilation of new nations has met with success, the political requirements of Western culture are not so aptly obtained. The Alliance has learned that while structured military objectives are often within reach, more abstract goals such as transparency will take much longer to achieve.
NATO still struggles to define itself within the security architecture of Europe. Part of that struggle is the difficult task of changing not only doctrine but mind-set. NATO has learned that in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Russia continues to hold hostage the ability of its former republics to comfortably take their place in European security organizations. Losing the scars of the Cold War has not been easy and continues to slow progress on much needed relations with Russia. The great nations of the world have revisited their own painful histories as they watch nations emerge from the dust of tyranny.

 PfP has influenced much of NATO’s change and development since 1994. Even though the former Soviet Republics and the countries of Eastern Europe were offered membership in NACC in 1991, their true commitment to becoming part of Europe was not clear until the Partnership allowed them direct access to NATO in 1994. Although NATO had developed plans to undertake missions other than collective defense, it was not until IFOR that the Alliance had the opportunity to test these plans. Without PfP, non-NATO nations probably would not have been involved in this initial step outside the pure collective defense arena.

The Partnership for Peace has proven itself to be capable of leading, assisting, training and adapting new nations in their efforts to build military forces which enhance the security of Europe. It is through PfP that strides have been made in assisting nations in building a solid, transparent government, supported by its people. Recently Bulgaria held its second election since it became a democracy, marking the first peaceful transition of power from one elected leader to another in its history. This success story is only one of many amongst Partner nations since 1994.

NATO and PfP are at a crossroads. Actions taken this year will have a profound effect on the future of European security. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council proposal would be a bold, innovative action that would significantly strengthen the link between Allies and Partners.
NATO must solidify its relationship with the Partners prior to the 1997 Summit to minimize the effects of an enlargement that will not include all Partners who have applied for full membership. Simply enhancing PnP by changing some of the programs will be insufficient for Partners not selected in the first tranche, and may give the “consolation prize” mentality greater credibility. Most Partners are minimally represented at NATO Headquarters and the expectation that they would be able to participate and be prepared to provide input to over 200 NATO committees is unrealistic. A forum is needed that will allow discussion and an opportunity for input on a broad array of topics, while not eliminating nations with limited manpower.

We strongly believe that the formation of an EAPC with increased opportunities for consultation, a formalized voice in the decision process, and membership on a new Council of Allies and Partners will demonstrate NATO’s long-term commitment to all Partners. As we look to the future of Europe, the vector becomes clear. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership can serve as the vehicle for a broadened approach to security which includes not only NATO Allies but any and all nations who share its belief in democracy and cooperation.

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2 Ministerial Meeting Press Communiqué.
3 List of all interviews conducted is in Appendix A.
4 A standard list of questions was used by members of the research team in order to validate information received.
5 These issues are the NATO Strategic Concept, information transparency, resourcing the Partnership and training alternatives.
8 Ministerial Meeting Press Communiqué.
10 Tigner 68.
11 Ministerial Meeting Press Communiqué.
12 According to personnel involved in drafting the Framework Document, the wording of Article 8 is deliberately vague. When the Framework Document was initially presented, NATO was unsure of what commitment should be extended to the Partners. However, when specific questions were asked, Partners and Allies agree that this Article
is one of the most important portions of the Framework Document and requires clarification. This proposal elevates this clause without changing its intent.

13 As NATO was the Cold War nemesis, it has often been the militaries who had to be persuaded first to overcome years of hostility and cooperate with NATO. Ukraine and the Central Asian states are examples of this. Elizabeth Sherwood, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, personal interview, 2 May 1997.

14 Simon 2.

15 Chris Donnelly, Special Advisor to the NATO Secretary General, personal interview, 20 November 1996.

APPENDIX A

RESEARCH INTERVIEW LIST

The following list is a compilation of contacts and interviews conducted at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, at the Partnership Coordination Cell, Mons, Belgium, at various Embassies and offices in Brussels and in the United States.

All of the interviews were conducted by the following research group members: Debra Cook, Mark Daniels, Michael Fleming, John Hawkins and Eric Reffett.

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AT THE PARTNERSHIP COORDINATION CELL, MONS, BELGIUM

Colonel James Holcomb
Lieutenant Colonel Fred Schwein
Colonel Jaroslav Skopek and Major Jan Vana

Colonel Marin Chiotea
Captain Peter Lans
Captain Samo Zanoskar
Colonel Waldemar Czarnecki
Major Christopher Salamone
Major Nikolay Dotzev

Chief of the Permanent Staff Element, PCC
US National Military Representative, PCC
Czech Republic Permanent Liaison Mission to NATO
Senior Romanian Liaison Officer, PCC
Estonian Liaison Officer, PCC
Slovenian Partner Liaison Officer, PCC
Senior Polish Liaison Officer, PCC
US NATO Liaison Officer to the PCC
Bulgarian Liaison Officer, PCC

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AT BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Ambassador Robert Hunter
Robert Pearson
Clarence Juhl
Lieutenant General Thomas M. Montgomery

Stuart Brown
Chris Ellis

Simon Lunn
Colonel Bruce Bach

U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO
Defense Advisor, US Mission, NATO
United States Military Representative to NATO Military Committee
Counselor, United States Mission to NATO
Second Secretary, Political Committee
Deputy, US Mission, NATO
Deputy Secretary General,
North Atlantic Assembly
Executive Officer, US Military Rep, NATO
Colonel Anthony A. Aldwell
Colonel Leif Sponseck
Paul Krueger
Hoyt Yee
Chris Donnelly
Chris Cole
Johanna Mohring
Charlie Dale
Brenton Fischmann

Colonel Kurt Schiebold, GEAR

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Puckett
Brigadier General Gheorghe Rotaru
Colonel Gabriel Kopecky
Colonel Dr. Kazimierz Sikorski
Esxter Sandorfi

Serguey Tassev
Colonel Gunter Hofler

Ulla Gudmundson

Alexander Alexeev

Istvan Sxabo

Kamil Khassiev
Igor Syrets
Toivo Klaar
Kaha Imanadze
Eitvydas Bajarunas
Colonel V. Gontar
Ulubek Ishankhodjaev
Nils Jansons
Murat Karagoz
Tom Norring
Paul Huynen

Strategy/Policy Planner, United States Delegation to NATO Military Committee
Conventional Plans Officer, U.S. Mission
US Representative, Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
Deputy Director, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO (Former NATO Coordinator, US State Department)
Special Advisor to the Secretary General, Central & Eastern European Affairs Staff, Office of Special Advisor, C&E Affairs Staff, Office of Special Advisor, C&E Affairs Head, Defence Partnership & Cooperation Section, International Staff
Special Advisor for NACC/PfP Programmes, Defense Support Division, International Staff
Cooperation & Regional Security Division, International Military Staff International Staff, SHAPE
Defence Advisor, Romanian Liaison, NATO Slovak Republic Liaison Mission, NATO Polish Liaison Mission, NATO
Second Secretary, Hungarian Liaison Mission to NATO and WEU
Bulgarian Liaison Mission, NATO
Austrian Military Mission in Brussels, Liaison Office, NATO
Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy of Sweden
Minister Counselor, Russian Liaison Mission, NATO
Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of the Hungarian Liaison Office
Azerbaijan Liaison Officer to NATO First Secretary, Embassy of Belarus
Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Estonia
Second Secretary, Embassy of Georgia
Counsellor, Embassy of Lithuania
Defense Attaché, Embassy of Ukraine
Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Uzbekistan
Second Secretary, Latvian Liaison
Second Secretary, Turkish Delegation
Counsellor, Danish Delegation
Counselor D’Ambassador, Belgium
Dimitris Karabalis  
Colonel Jean Claude Beyer  
Lieutenant Colonel Fredrich Zwiener  
Stefano Starace  
Leif Ulland  
Manuel de la Camare  
Eduardo Lopez  
Andrew Mathewson  
Secretarie D’Ambassador, Greece  
Military Counselor, France  
Military Affairs, Germany  
Minister Counsellor, Italy  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Norway  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Spain  
Defense Planning Counsellor, Spain  
First Secretary to Defence Counsellor  
United Kingdom

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
IN THE UNITED STATES

General (R) John Galvin  
Former SACEUR, Dean of Fletcher School, Tufts University

Franklin Kramer  
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

Brigadier General Robert Osterthaler  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European & NATO Policy

Joseph Nye  
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Dean, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Graham Allison  
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans & Policy, Director, Center for Security & International Affairs, Harvard

Ash Carter  
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy

Jim Townsend  
NATO Policy Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Donald Herr  
Assistant for NATO Plans & Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Joshua Spero  
Politico-Military Planner, The Joint Staff

Major Pete Zwack  
Military Planner, The Joint Staff

Robert Holly  
Division Chief, EUR/RPM, US State Department

Margaret Hawthorne  
Political and Security Affairs Officer, US State Department

Jeffrey Simon  
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Dr. Hans Binnendijk  
Former Deputy Director for Policy & Plans, US State Department, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Ambassador Chas. Freeman
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Regional Security Affairs

Ambassador Vernon Penner
Former Political Advisor to SACEUR

Celeste Wallander
Professor, Harvard University

Kalypso Nicolaidis
Professor, Harvard University

Christopher Jones
Professor, University of Washington

Lioudmila Antonova
CFIA Fellow, Russian Diplomat, Harvard

Dr. Shirley Williams
Member, British House of Lords

Conrad Namienowski
Strategic Analyst, Canadian Security Intelligence

Kori Schake
Former NATO Desk Officer, Joint Staff,
Post Doctoral Scholar, UC San Diego

Elizabeth Sherwood
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia

Letter input has been received from the following Members of Congress:

Senator John McCain

Senator Sam Nunn

Representative Lee Hamilton
APPENDIX B

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
INVITATION

Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels on 10-11 January 1994

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join use in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military
activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
APPENDIX C

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

1. Further to the invitation extended by; the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10-11 January 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfillment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in pursuing the following objectives:

(a) facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;

(b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

(c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

(d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may be subsequently be agreed;

(e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military
and the other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of Partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

--- those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;

--- they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;

--- they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;

--- those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;

--- building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps they have taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure democratic control of armed forces;

--- they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

--- develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.

--- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
### APPENDIX D

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE EXERCISE PROGRAMME

**1994**

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APPENDIX E

EXCERPTS FROM DECEMBER 1996 NATO MINISTERS’ COMMUNIQUÉ

The following Partnership for Peace initiatives were approved by the NATO Ministers at their December 1996 meeting:

- Enhancing the political dimension of the Partnership through increasing opportunities for political consultations.
- Expanding the agreed fields of military missions within PfP to the full range of the Alliance’s new missions, as appropriate, including Peace Support operations over and above the agreed areas.
- Broadening the NATO/PfP exercise program in accordance with the expanded scope of the Partnership.
- Enabling Partner countries to participate in the planning and execution of PfP activities (exercises and operations).
- Involving Partners more substantively and actively in PfP related parts of the regular peacetime work of NATO’s Military Authorities.
- Affording the appropriate opportunity to Partners who join future NATO-led PfP operations to contribute to the provision of political guidance for oversight over such operations, drawing on the experience gained in Operation Joint Endeavor.
- Examining, together with Partners, the possible modalities for the elaboration of a political-military framework for PfP operations, building on the current work of the Political-Military Steering Committee.
- Enhancing Partner participation in decision-making for PfP programs issues.
- Increasing regional cooperation within the Partnership provided it remains open to all Partners and remains an integral part of the overall PfP.
- Expanding the Planning and Review Process.
- As soon as the Brussels Agreement on the Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to NATO comes into force, offering Partners the opportunity to establish diplomatic missions with NATO.
- Strengthening cooperative relations with all our Partners including through an enhanced Partnership for Peace and the initiative to establish an Atlantic Partnership Council.
APPENDIX F

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Through the course of our research, important issues surfaced that were outside the purview of our paper. These issues, however, should be addressed by NATO. The following paragraphs detail these issues and specific recommendations for them.

The NATO Strategic Concept

The NATO Strategic Concept should be reexamined. Although this is outside the PfP purview, the Concept's construction and verbiage make it integral to PfP and all activities of the Alliance. The Strategic Concept, published in 1991, recognized the profound changes that had taken place in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It reflected the movement of Europe and NATO from a cold war environment to an entirely new security landscape.

The changes since 1991 have been nearly as dramatic, therefore the NATO Strategic Concept must be rewritten to reflect these realities. This new document should define NATO's relationship, commitment and intentions toward the OSCE, EU, WEU and the European Security and Defence Identity. It should also reflect the outcome of the internal and external adaptations of NATO and how these will affect the security architecture in Europe. Included in the new Strategic Concept should be a strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as a practical instrument to bridge the gap between the NATO of 1991 and the NATO of the 21st Century. By emphasizing the importance of Partners to NATO, a message will be sent to Partner nations pursuing membership in the future. With eventual closure on a charter to solidify the relationship between NATO and Russia, the Strategic Concept is a document in which to reaffirm
this relationship. A revised Strategic Concept, in sum, would take into account a world free from cold war influences and would give clear definition to NATO’s role in the future of European security.

*Information Transparency*

One of the key objectives stated in the PfP Framework Document is the achievement of information transparency, particularly in defense planning and budgeting. While there is consensus that Partners should have complete transparency in defense matters, there remains a reluctance on NATO’s part to completely embrace Partners within the NATO security structure. Inherent in this transparency issue is what one PCC official described as the “security wall”. As Partners become more involved in planning and participation in exercises and operations under the CJTF concept, NATO must develop a security classification system that provides Partners access to NATO Standardization Agreements and other classified documents that are appropriate to their participation. Although there is a PfP Classification System, we recommend that instead of downgrading documents to NATO Unclassified and passing them, NATO documents should be reclassified into the PfP system, thereby retaining their content and value as much as possible. Currently Partners are involved in planning sessions but are often asked to leave at critical points where classified material is discussed. NATO cannot expect full participation unless Partners are truly “integrated” and not simply “included” in the process.

*Resourcing the Partnership*

Currently NATO funds the PfP activities that it sponsors. However, these NATO-sponsored activities represent only a portion of the total activities offered to Partners. As the recent Political-Military Steering Committee Clearinghouse reports demonstrate, Alliance members are providing a significant level of resources for bilateral and multilateral training as “in
the spirit of PfP activities. After reviewing these sources of funding and through further investigation into United States funding sources, it is clear that as long as the individual Allies remain fully engaged in resourcing bilateral PfP activities the program will remain strong and viable. There is a fear among Partners, however, that between announcement of the first *tranche* and actual ratification of the amended Washington Treaty, PfP funding priorities will significantly shift in favor of the invitees. The NATO Allies must take steps after the Summit to reassure Partners that available funds will not be disproportionately distributed to nations invited to join the Alliance. Such a funding shift would negatively impact the ability of the remaining Partners to maintain their current level of activities.

The EAPC concept formalizes the PfP Program and lifts its status in the NATO Budget. This is a critical point in NATO's long term commitment to the remaining Partners. Partners should continue to fund their own participation to the fullest extent, but Allies need to review their commitment as well to ensure the future of PfP. As all national budgets continue to be scrutinized and adapted to meet the prioritized needs of nations, resourcing for the future must not be taken for granted but rather studied carefully for impacts and trends. As the Alliance grows, member nations must realize that they will be asked to accept more of the burden of the cost of PfP programs. NATO should prepare the Allies for this eventuality in order to maintain PfP as an enduring activity.

*Training Alternatives*

Although the provision of training activities has been a responsibility of the members of the Alliance, there are areas that could be considered for NATO involvement. Contract training is an area that NATO should study for future potential. Through contracting, NATO would not increase its staff but would still provide an important training resource. Contracting can provide
educational programs for Partners and Allies who wish to participate. Some Allies have begun limited contracting scenarios, however, it may be time for NATO itself to become involved in centralizing aspects of this training.

Language training is an excellent example of contracting potential. One of the major problem areas in IFOR is the language barrier. In fact, language challenges have proven to be a major concern in many PfP activities. While there are many language training programs currently provided through PfP, they tend to be time and resource constrained. NATO should take steps to contract, standardize, and consolidate these programs at one location. The advantage of a consolidated language school is development of a standardized curriculum that could be slanted toward military terminology.

Previously in this paper, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) was discussed as an organization that provides parliamentary education and assistance to some Partner countries. The NAA was actively involved with CEE nations prior to the inception of PfP. It has a wealth of background knowledge on legislative functions in specific Partner countries developed through numerous visits and interaction with parliamentarians. The NAA has provided important training, and informational sessions for CEE parliamentarians. Presently not all CEE Partners are participants in the NAA, nor have any of the former neutral nations been invited to join. The NAA, like NATO, is guarded about growing too fast and outgrowing its staff assets. NATO should consider contract training with NAA to reap the benefits of this organization’s extensive work with developing parliaments. Since the NAA already provides an annual program for CEE participants under the Rose-Roth Initiative, NATO could resource an expanded version of the program to be open to all Partners. The contract would be established through NATO and supported by Partner participation.
This NAA scenario is a prime example of consolidation of effort and conservation of resources. Similar benefits could be derived through contracts with other organizations that routinely provide training in their area of expertise. The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency is an example of a governmental organization that could potentially provide a similar service.

1 Lieutenant Colonel Fred Schwein, United States Liaison Officer to the Partnership Coordination Cell, personal interview, 12 November 1996.
2 Reports from Canada, France, the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and other Allies presented at the Clearing House Meeting demonstrate a continual increase in funds provided for PfP activities since 1994. There is also a wide variation in the types of programs offered by each of the Allies.
3 Canada reported on one such activity that was met with enthusiasm by the PfP Clearing House.
4 Schwein interview.
### APPENDIX G

#### ABBREVIATIONS SUMMARY

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