Training for Operations Other Than War (Stability Operations): Front End Analysis

Margaret S. Salter
U.S. Army Research Institute

December 1996

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Training for Operations Other Than War (Stability Operations): Front End Analyses

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An Army Research Institute Infantry Forces Research Unit work program on "Improving Light Forces Low Intensity Conflict Training for Operations Other Than War" was planned as research on Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations but expanded to address the gamut of stability and security operations. This report documents a Front End Analysis and literature review. The literature review, the majority of this report, examined the doctrinal manuals and other Governmental publications, including articles from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Government Accounting Office, military magazines and professional papers. The literature review was supplemented by observations and interviews.

Doctrine indicates that a unit trained for war is considered to be trained for other than war operations. Leaders who know the prevailing rules of engagement can adapt unit warfighting skills to meet the requirements of the mission. Popular literature increasingly discusses the area, and soldiers involved in recent deployments are eager to share the unique lessons learned. Stability operations may be more complex than first apparent. The bibliography and some summary reports on stability operations show that information on stability operations goes beyond specific tasks, in preparing leaders for rapidly changing, always challenging, and often difficult missions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In addition to the gratitude expressed to the individual soldiers who spoke candidly about requirements for stability operations, the author wishes to thank Dr. Alma Steinberg for her careful review and thoughtful comments.
Training for Operations Other Than War (Stability Operations): Front End Analysis

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Education and Training

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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) Infantry Forces Research Unit work program entitled "Improving Light Forces Low Intensity Conflict Training for Operations Other Than War (OOTW)" included a Front End Analysis (FEA) on training for stability and security operations. This report documents the FEA, primarily a literature review supplemented by observations and interviews.

Interest and involvement in stability, security, and peacekeeping has increased in recent years. As a result, a wide variety of material addressing such actions has become available. Doctrinal materials conclude that units that are trained for war will be ready to accomplish the various missions encompassed under stability operations; generally speaking, this is true. However, the many lessons that have been learned in recent peace operations need to be shared with units preparing for such deployments.

Information from this analysis has been shared with personnel from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, the Combat Training Centers, and with the U.S. Army Infantry School for use in training support packages. The amount and timing of training needed for peacekeeping and stability operations depends on the mission.

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TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (STABILITY OPERATIONS):
FRONT END ANALYSIS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

Interest in stability, security, and peacekeeping has increased dramatically since
the demise of the Cold War. As a result, considerable information is available. As an
outgrowth of prior research sponsored by the Combined Arms Center and the Combat
Training Centers, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences (ARI) Infantry Forces Research Unit began a work program entitled
"Improving Light Forces Low Intensity Conflict Training for Operations Other Than War
(OOTW)." Originally planned as research on Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) requirements, the work expanded to address the full gamut of
stability and security operations.

Procedure:

This report documents the Front End Analysis (FEA) and literature review on the
requirements for training for stability operations. The literature review, the majority of
this report, consisted of a systematic examination of the doctrinal manuals and other
formal governmental publications. Documents included articles from the Center for
Army Lessons Learned, the Government Accounting Office, and several military
magazines. Professional papers and materials from other sources were also reviewed.
The literature review was supplemented by observations and interviews at two Combat
Training Centers and with personnel from other military installations.

Findings:

Doctrine indicates that a unit trained for war is considered to be trained for other
than war operations. When leaders know the prevailing rules of engagement they can
adapt unit warfighting skills to meet the requirements of the mission. In contrast, the
popular literature increasingly discusses the area, first called "low intensity conflict,"
then "operations other than war", and finally, "stability and security (or support)
operations." Soldiers who have been involved in recent deployments are eager to share
the unique lessons learned. Stability operations encompass many missions and
environments and are more complex than may be first apparent.

Utilization of Findings:

This paper provides a bibliography and some summary reports on stability
operations. Given the proliferation of lessons learned, personnel who are responsible
for training may wish to prepackage materials for small unit leaders to use at home
station prior to being tasked for deployment. Training for stability operations should include issues that go beyond specific tasks required to prepare leaders for these rapidly changing, always challenging, and often difficult missions. Information from this analysis has been shared with personnel from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Training Centers, and with the U.S. Army Infantry School.
# TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (STABILITY OPERATIONS): FRONT END ANALYSIS

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Training for Operations Other Than War (Stability Operations): Front End Analysis

Introduction

The Army Research Institute (ARI) Infantry Forces Research Unit work program "Improving Light Forces Low Intensity Conflict Training for Operations Other Than War (OOTW)" included a Front End Analysis (FEA) on training for stability operations. U.S. Army involvement in stability, security, and peacekeeping has increased dramatically in the years since the demise of the Cold War. As a result, a wide variety of information was available for research purposes.

In 1994, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, and Secretary of the Army, Mr. Togo D. West, in describing America's Force Projection Army, wrote, "The world recognizes that the presence of American soldiers, on the ground, is the strongest and most emphatic demonstration of moral and physical strength and determination that the United States can make in the international community" (Sullivan & West, 1994, p. 10). This presence, however, increasingly includes non-combat operations.

Training for Stability Operations

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, cautions that training for stability operations must not be allowed to detract from the soldiers' primary mission -- fighting and winning in combat. "The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills" (Department of the Army (DA), 1994f, p.86). With the caveat that peacekeepers must first be warfighters, FM 100-23 expresses the current philosophy on how much and when in training for operations other than war: "just enough" and "just in time" (DA, 1994f, p. 86, emphasis in original). The amount and timing of such training depends on the mission.

However, as Sullivan and West noted, "the Army does not get to pick its missions -- the nation demands an Army that can respond to calls for humanitarian assistance across diverse geographical or cultural circumstances and an Army that can fight and win against large regional armies" (Sullivan & West, 1994, p. 16). Additionally, as observed by Abizaid and Wood, "there is no standard peacekeeping mission" (1994, p. 20).

Sociologists David and Mady Segal, significant contributors to the literature of peacekeeping, note growing interest in the subject. In the 1980s when they started research for a peacekeeping book, "there was little interest in the United States in peacekeeping operations except among a small circle of scholars. The
visibility of such operations and the recognition of their importance has grown markedly in the past decade" (Segal & Segal, 1993, p. vii).

Problem

The doctrinal position is that a unit trained for war is also trained for non-war, but during the course of this research, a question recurred. Is additional training required for stability and security operations in view of the wide scope of these operations and the varying conditions under which they are conducted?

Given the nature of stability operations, there is no guarantee that there will be time to provide a unit with the "just enough" training required for a non-traditional deployment. From many reports, there is barely time to provide training for expected and traditional deployments and training events.

The research was conducted to look for answers to several general questions. Is training for warfighter tasks sufficient to prepare soldiers and units for stability and security operations? Do soldiers need special training, and if so, what, how much, and when? The phrase "stability and security operations" (formerly "low intensity conflict" and "operations other than war") has increasingly surfaced in doctrinal and training literature and in the popular press. If these operations are a normal part of a warfighter's tasks, why is so much being written about them?

Front End Analysis

The 1982 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-7 defined a FEA as "the systematic process of collecting, examining and synthesizing data concerning collective and individual performance requirements" (DA, 1982c, p. 47). TRADOC Regulation 350-70, (DA, 1995a) defined the needs analysis process as one "used to identify valid non-training solutions to performance deficiency, training solutions to identified unit and individual performance deficiencies [and] training development requirements" (DA, 1995a, Glossary, pp. 19-20).

FEA includes mission-by-echelon task lists which identify critical collective tasks. The regulation states that these tasks must be clearly defined, performance oriented, observable and measurable, and describe exact performance. FEAs end with a "list of critical tasks and performance measures, and with either a provisional recommendation about training site selection or initiation of job performance and analysis" (DA, 1982c, p.47).

However, stability and security operations are fluid and unpredictable, and although tasks may stay the same, conditions may change frequently. Task criticality may change, as a situation disintegrates from relative calm to
emergency or combat conditions. Tasks may be performed often — or never. As noted by Furr (1987, p. v.), "low intensity conflict defies the simple application of traditional military thought."

Another way of looking at stability operations is shown by Harless (1985a, b) who defines the FEA as "the process of gathering and analyzing data in order to describe desired performance, [and to] determine deficiencies in performance" (1985a, p.15). For effective problem solving, one specifies the performance desired, and the tasks, conditions and standards to be performed. According to Harless, it is important to identify variations in motivational and environmental factors as well as the skills and knowledge required of successful performers.

Harless (1985a, b), notes that usually environmental impacts on job performance are predictable, the time available can be specified, and distracting items and motivational factors are known. Stability operation environments are different, and do not fit the traditional means of analysis. They are stressful, changeable, and unpredictable. Indeed, as Gallagher states, "peacekeeping forces operate in alternating conditions of tension and boredom. Personnel must develop the capacity for great patience" (1992, p.112). Similar observations are made by, for example, Ayers, 1989; Applewhite, 1994; Bartone & Adler, 1994; Cartwright, 1994; Segal, 1995; and FM 22-51, The Leaders Manual for Combat Stress Control (DA, 1994d).

The Harless approach, looking well beyond task lists, allows for a fuller picture of the requirements of stability and security operations missions. As suggested by Abizaied and Wood, "peacekeeping is less a specific type of military mission and more an operation conducted in a unique environment. It is an environment, just like mountain, jungle, or desert, that leaders must understand and train for" (Abizaied & Wood, 1994, p. 14-15).

For the research reported here, to accommodate the need to define tasks and conditions for stability operations, multiple sources were used to gather information. The primary focus was on the published documents on stability and support operations — the sheer volume provides insight. This literature included both military and civilian references, from manuals and training circulars to professional papers and articles in magazines and newspapers. Additional information was gleaned from soldier interviews and first hand observations of low intensity conflict training at two Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Interviews were conducted with CTC observer/controllers, and with personnel on return from stability operation deployments. Information was grouped by source, then summarized in discussion of pertinent issues.
Literature Review

Some sources of information on stability operations will be discussed in detail later as they offer considerable insight into the issues. Included are doctrinal material and articles. First, however, general bibliographies, summaries, and four specific books will be described as background and to indicate the recent proliferation of material. As Metz, (1988, p. 6) observes, “the literature of LIC [Low Intensity Conflict], like the subject itself, is irregular, inconsistent and variegated.”

Bibliographies and Books

Several overall summary bibliographies on stability operations are available, as shown in Table 1, but most are generally now out of date, to include even Shope’s “selected bibliography” from 1995. Most overviews were developed for specific purposes and are limited in scope. The broadest and most comprehensive listing of documents is that found in Sturgill’s 1993 book.

Table 1

Stability Operations Bibliographies

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<td>1993</td>
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<td>Defense Technical Information</td>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center, 1993</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Defense Technical Information</td>
<td>PSYOP, peacekeeping, civil military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center, 1994</td>
<td>Peace operations training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense, 1994a</td>
<td>Source book &amp; program evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense, 1994b</td>
<td>LIC book &amp; extensive bibliography</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sturgill, 1993</td>
<td>Peacekeeping bibliography</td>
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<td>Shope, 1995</td>
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Several recent books cover non-traditional deployments. J. J. Gallagher described tactics, techniques and procedures in *Low-Intensity Conflict* (1992). His handbook, based on over 40 years of experience in and around military operations, provided diagrams, photos, and definitions and “how to” in separate chapters devoted to command, control, communication and intelligence; insurgency/counter-insurgency; combating terrorism; peacekeeping operations; peacetime contingency operations; counternarcotics; combat support; and combat service support. Gallagher described training considerations and skills, and observed overall that “peacekeeping requires a different attitude than warfighting” (1992, p. 112).

Military historian Claude Sturgill’s book (1993) described several examples of U.S. involvement in LIC operations, and provided examples of insurgency/counter-insurgency and terrorism/counterterrorism. He reviewed the history and use of Special Operations Forces (Rangers, Green Berets) and commented on such areas as psychological operations, and the role of the media. He speculated on areas, primarily in Latin America, with potential for future LIC deployments. Additionally, Sturgill’s bibliography is both varied and extensive. It provides an excellent resource in many areas.

Daniel and Hayes (1995) included a complication of history and case studies in *Beyond Peacekeeping*. Their primary thrust was on the United Nations (U.N.) to include U.S. involvement in U.N. missions. Various authors described specific operations in, for example, the Congo, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. The authors overall support U.N. involvement, and encourages the U.N. to further define its role in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

In their peacekeeping book, *Peacekeepers and their Wives*, Segal and Segal (1993) focused on soldier issues. The book is primarily a longitudinal study focusing on the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. Papers covered attitudes, families, and the peacekeeper’s sense of isolation as well as historical decisions on suitable forces for such missions. (See related work, Segal, 1994, 1995.)

**Doctrinal Publications: Operations and Peace Operations Manuals**

Department of the Army Field Manuals, pamphlets, regulations and other doctrinal publications cover stability operations and related areas. Many have been written and rewritten recently. Their message is consistent.

FM 100-5, *Operations* (DA, 1993f) devotes an entire chapter to operations other than war while the previous edition (DA, 1982b) had only three pages on the subject. The chapter begins with the reminder that the primary focus of the Army is to fight and win wars, even if some environments may not actually
involve combat. Principles of war (objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security) are then defined as applied to OOTW.

FM 100-5 covers key activities: non-combatant evacuation orders (NEO), arms control, support to domestic and civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counter insurgencies, and attacks and raids. Each area is described.

The final paragraph of the section reiterates the message of the first: “The Army organizes, trains and equips to fight and win the nation’s wars. This remains its primary mission. The leadership, organization, equipment, discipline, and skills gained in training for war are also of use to the government in operations other than war” (DA, 1993f, p.13-8).

FM 100-23, Peace Operations (DA, 1994f) covers the doctrinal framework of peace operations and provides historical examples of and perspectives on peace operations, and definitions of terms. It also discusses such operational variables as degrees of consent, force and impartiality. The tenets of war from FM 100-5 are repeated.

The peace operations manual covers coordination and liaison, the U.S. role in relation to others, including multinational operations, with and without U.N. sponsorship. A planning chapter discusses mission analysis, use of force, rules of engagement (ROE) and force protection. A short paragraph on training states that “the most important training for peace operations remains training of essential combat and basic soldier skills” (DA, 1994f, p. 38). The overall foundation for stability operations is leader development and pre-deployment training -- mobile training teams, support packages, and the Combat Training Centers (CTCs).

Roles of maneuver elements, special operations forces (special forces, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), and military police are described, along with implications for public affairs, legal considerations, and logistics. The FM describes operations of the U.N., and other organizations (e.g., National Security Council, Departments of State and Justice, U.S. Agency for International Development, World Health Organization, the International Red Cross).

The three-page training appendix to FM 100-23 offers guidance on pre-deployment training (intelligence, observation and reporting), and unit training for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Leader development, and individual training (negotiations, patience, professionalism, impartiality) are briefly mentioned. The manual states that sustainment training conducted during
stability operations should include, if possible, the unit's normal mission training. Post operations training will require a change in focus, and redevelopment of wartime skills and readiness. Throughout the manual, the intent is to convey the idea that a unit ready to fulfill its wartime mission is ready for an other than war mission.

Other Doctrinal Publications

Other field manuals and circulars focus on stability operations and low intensity conflict. Several are updates of older manuals. Field Circular 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (DA, 1986) from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, was issued in 1990 as a Joint Army Air Force publication, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) (DA and Air Force, 1990). Operational issues are highlighted.

Preliminary volumes on stability operations and low intensity conflict were published by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC. Other post-Vietnam manuals dealt with prisoners of war, civilians and early CA/PSYOP issues. The 1990s brought both new and updated manuals. Some highlight the special needs of OOTW, and caution on the frustrations and lack of clarity of these operations. Table 2 provides a representative listing.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pub and Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>FM 19-15, 1975</td>
<td>Civil disturbances</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 19-40, 1976a</td>
<td>Prisoners of war, internees</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST 31-184, 1976b</td>
<td>Special Forces SOPs</td>
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<td>ST 31-201, 1978</td>
<td>Special Forces Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST 41-10, 1982a</td>
<td>Civil affairs operations</td>
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<td>FC 31-3, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c</td>
<td>Unconventional warfare principles, orders &amp; planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 90-2, 1988a</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM 22-9, 1991</td>
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<td>FM 100-17, 1992c</td>
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<td>FM 34-7, 1993c</td>
<td>Intel/electronic warfare</td>
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<td>FM 22-51, 1994d</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 90-29, 1994e</td>
<td>Non-combatant evacuations</td>
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Updated materials have appeared recently for certain functional areas considered an integral part of stability operations. For PSYOP, for example, the joint Army & Marine Corps Manual FM 33-1/FMFM 3-53 Psychological Operations (DA, 1993) and FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (DA, 1993, j) were issued in 1993. In 1993, the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg distributed both a capabilities handbook and staff officers guide (DA, 1993 a, i) and the 9th PSYOP Battalion published a guide to tactical PSYOP (DA, 1993b). Information dissemination is increasingly widespread. The Sinai area handbook, (DA, 1988b) is one of many available for reference for that peacekeeping mission.

Training Packages

A difference in approach to training for stability operations can be seen in the level of detail presented in three related training documents. The Infantry School publications describe overall missions, the TRADOC Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Guide brings greater specificity, and the task oriented 7th Army Training Center (ATC) published materials are quite comprehensive. As the target audience for 7th ATC training expanded increasingly beyond U.S. units, personnel from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) called for a full peacekeeping mission training plan (MTP) to provide trainers with the doctrinal support needed to train peacekeeping tasks (Cornell-D’Echert, 1994). Responding, CMTC developed a detailed MTP for European nation peacekeepers (DA, 1995b).

**U.S. Army Infantry School.** The U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) wrote a "White Paper" on peace enforcement at brigade and battalion level (1993), followed by the Battalion and Brigade Training Support Package (TSP) for Stability Operations (USAIS, 1995 and 1996). The White Paper was an initial effort to address peacekeeping tasks and training requirements. The TSP, several years in development, describes with varying emphasis each activity of OOTW. Core lessons within the TSP include, for example, Principles and Activities, Domestic and International Organizations, Application of ROE, Convoy Operations, Media Strategy, and Anti-Terrorism. Lessons are suggested class outlines, instructor notes, and frequently include viewgraph slides. Some common lessons are appropriate to several (more than one) missions (e.g., Cordon and Search, Negotiation, Checkpoints). Others are linked to particular missions (e.g., Close Quarters Combat). Leaders select as needed from the appropriate lessons to tailor their training to accommodate specific contingency missions. For some (but not all) tasks there are Training and Evaluation Outlines and Situational Training Exercises (STXs) for use in unit training.

**TRADOC Planner’s Guide.** The 1993 TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-56, Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) Planner’s Guide (DA, 1993e) has
the stated purpose to “assist planners at all levels in identifying the critical factors that must be considered in order to successfully accomplish all operations within the operational categories of military operations other than war” (p. 1).

Five operational categories are defined, with examples of each. Similar to other lists, they are: contingency operations (e.g., disaster relief, show of force, NEO); combating terrorism (intelligence, security); support to insurgency/counterinsurgency (training assistance, intelligence support); peacekeeping (cease fire, withdrawal, prisoners of war); and support to counterdrug operations. Categories are crosswalked with 26 functional areas which include, for example, command, control and communication; intelligence; force protection/sustainment; liaison. Some tasks are common to all MOOTW operational categories — assess the situation; review/ revise plans; direct, lead and control; provide liaison for military and non-military agencies.

The MOOTW Planner’s Guide contains a quick-reference task by operational category matrix that shows which tasks are applicable under what conditions, regardless of the specific scenario. Anyone preparing for MOOTW can use the matrix to help with planning — although no real training guidance is provided beyond the task listings.

7th Army Training Command. The 7th Army Training Command (ATC), providing instruction for U.S. and allied personnel at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, focused on traditional peacekeeping missions. They published a training support package for peacekeeping (1993), followed by a White Paper Platoon, Company/Team, Battalion/Task Force Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations (DA, 1995b and DA, 1993h) which included MTP tasks. Widely circulated, it was based on doctrine plus “added insight gained from our training at CMTC, observations from trips to allied peace operations schools, and experiences from actual peacekeepers in the field” (Figure I.B.15, DA, 1995b). It cited, for example, the two volume Nordic tactical manuals (Hederstedt, Hee, Orum, Saari & Viljaranta, 1992a, b) and was planned for use with personnel from many European nations.

Collective peacekeeping tasks cited in the CMTC White Paper, some also found in USAIS lessons, include Establish/Operate a Lodgment, Conduct Route Security and Convoy Escort, Maintain a Zone of Separation, Secure an Area of Operation, a Border, and an Urban Area. Within these tasks are specific company and platoon tasks (e.g., Conduct Patrols, Establish and Operate Observation Posts, Conduct Liaison/Negotiate). There are critical tasks for the battalion task force — Employ a Quick Reaction Force, Negotiate with Belligerents, Conduct Liaison with Local Authorities, etc. Each echelon has critical peacekeeping tasks, additional supporting MOOTW tasks, STXs, a comprehensive task matrix and references. Sample U.N. mandates, ROE, and an area study are included.
Center For Army Lessons Learned

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), part of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, is an excellent resource for information designed for wide dissemination. CALL provides timely feedback, lessons learned, trends, and frequently, tactics, techniques and procedures on diverse subjects. Increasingly, however, CALL’s quarterly CTC bulletins, trends, techniques and procedures, and the newspaper-like “News From the Front”, have referred to non-traditional operations, civilians on the battlefield, and stability operations in general. Lessons learned have been offered from a variety of operations. Table 3 provides an overview of titles of recent examples of CALL bulletins and newsletters on stability operations. Despite the number of recent articles, CALL echoes others and states that “training for peace operations should have minimal impact on a unit’s primary mission of fighting and winning in combat” (CALL, 1993d, Foreword).

Table 3

CALL Newsletters on Stability Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Number and Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91-4 Counterdrug operations 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92-6 OOTW Vol. I Humanitarian assistance 1992b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92-7 In the spotlight: Media &amp; the tactical commander 1992a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-1 Somalia 1993e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-5 Counterdrug operations II 1993a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-6 OOTW Vol. II Disaster assistance 1993b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-7 OOTW Vol. III Civil disturbance 1993c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-8 OOTW Vol. IV Peace operations 1993d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94-4 Handbook for the soldier in OOTW 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95-2 Peace operations vignettes with possible solutions 1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Newsletter (95-2), Peace Operations Training Vignettes (with Possible Solutions) (CALL, 1995) was entirely comprised of material the 25th Infantry Division (Light) used in preparation for deployment to Haiti. This newsletter, and the Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other than War (CALL, 1994), come closest to providing useable training plans and checklists for deploying units. The OOTW Handbook provides definitions and specific techniques, in a topic-discussion-lesson format.
General Accounting Office

The General Accounting Office (GAO) issues periodic reports and many of these have covered selected aspects of stability operations. Examples are in Table 4. A particularly comprehensive report was Peace Operations: the Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability (GAO, 1995b). A principal finding confirms the variance in opinion on training for peace operations — what and when. The article suggests that just enough and just in time depends on the situation and on the commander, specifically commenting that “commanders of ground units likely to participate in peace operations differ on when special training should be provided” (GAO, 1995b, p. 4). It also notes that because most evidence is anecdotal, it is difficult to determine the effects on actual mission performance of a unit's having received or having not received peace operations training in advance.

Table 4

Peacekeeping Reports from the General Accounting Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Report</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993, December</td>
<td>U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994, June</td>
<td>Peace operations: Withdrawal from Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995a, April</td>
<td>Peace operations: Costs FY94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995c, May</td>
<td>Peace operations: Costs FY95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995e, May</td>
<td>Peace operations: Update on former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995f, August</td>
<td>Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. in MFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995b, October</td>
<td>Peace operations: Effect of training, equipment on unit capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous Government Publications

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) located at Fort Monroe, VA, has recently issued a number of publications which include information on peace operations and leadership. Several provide comments from individually named
soldiers who are quoted on their lessons learned. Designed to be easily portable, these pamphlets come in the form of pocket-sized booklets. New pamphlets are shown in Table 5.

Table 5

TRADOC Pamphlets including OOTW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADOC Pam Number &amp; Date</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-100-1 DA, 1992b</td>
<td>Leadership &amp; command: Operations JUST CAUSE/STORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-100-2 DA, 1993d</td>
<td>Leadership &amp; command: Battalion &amp; company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-100-4 DA, 1994c</td>
<td>Leadership &amp; command: Non-commissioned officer corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-100-6 DA, 1993g</td>
<td>Operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-56   DA, 1993e</td>
<td>Military operations: Planners' guide for OOTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam 525-34   DA, 1994g</td>
<td>Operational concept for special operations forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Government agencies also have addressed stability operations. MacDill Air Force Base produced a publication on a joint special operations awareness program (Kapos, Associates, 1993). The Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Battlelab wrote and distributed a pamphlet entitled Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other than War (1994, draft). It offered suggestions, techniques and checklists for commanders.

Center for Low Intensity Conflict

Some of the earliest recent articles on stability operations were written for the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley Air Force Base, VA. CLIC papers cover many aspects of LIC -- history, doctrine, strategy and opinions. Although the overall thrust of stability operations has gone from LIC to the broader area which includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, CLIC papers are useful. Zelms (1988) documented then current LIC training for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, specifying locations and overall contents. He defined the four areas of LIC: insurgency/counter-insurgency, peacetime contingency operations, combating terrorism, and peacekeeping.
Furr discussed the strategic changes required by LIC in articles in 1987 and 1989. He highlighted the emerging need for "a reorientation of military thought based on the following imperatives for success: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy and patience" (1987, p. v). Dixon's 1989 presentation entitled "Low intensity conflict: Does America have a choice?" seems almost prophetic. Table 6 highlights some of the many other CLIC papers available.

Table 6

Papers from the Center for Low Intensity Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s) and Date</th>
<th>Content Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayers, 1989</td>
<td>Peacekeeping tactics, techniques &amp; procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayers, et al 1987</td>
<td>LIC operational considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes, 1989</td>
<td>Liberation - Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers, 1988</td>
<td>Technology &amp; the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers, 1989</td>
<td>Reservists in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon, 1989</td>
<td>LIC overview, definitions, concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon &amp; Ayers, 1987</td>
<td>Operational art in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glynn, 1987</td>
<td>Security assistance officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey, 1988</td>
<td>CA in Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang, 1988</td>
<td>PSYOP strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic Studies Institute

Another useful resource for articles on stability and security operations is the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. In his article on changing military operations, Jablonsky provided an overall caution on the future of the military when he observed that "in the age of CNN, future wars and OOTW will occur in real time for the American people and their policy makers" (1994, p. 31). Johnson, 1994, echoing Jablonsky, showed that the role of the ubiquitous media must not be underestimated (1994).

In addition to a bibliography on LIC (1988), Metz provided views on the evolution of military operations "short of war" (Metz & Kievit, 1994). He wrote of the future of the U.S./U.N. partnership (1993 and Doll & Metz, 1993) and America's options (1994), and with Tilford, provided a strategic overview (1994). In a widely quoted article, Snow (1993) discussed third world operations and U.S. strategies and roles in multinational peace operations, delineating the sometimes forgotten differences between peace making, peace keeping, and peace enforcement.
SSI articles also cover lessons learned from activities in Panama (Fishel, 1992) and Haiti (Marcella, 1994) and America’s efforts in the cooperative ventures, the so-called “partnership for peace” (Johnsen and Young, 1994). Perhaps not entirely without merit, Heller (1993) offered a suggestion for the 21st century force -- a militia and an army. Hoffman (1994) dealt with the threat of terrorism.

**Special Warfare**

The professional bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, NC, *Special Warfare*, highlights special operations forces interests. Most of the selections are written by officers who have participated in stability operations, and are familiar with critical issues.

Considerable attention is given to civil affairs (CA), or civil-military operations. One entire issue (1991, Vol. 4, No. 1) was filled with CA information, and another issue focused on PSYOP (1992, Vol. 5, No. 2). Barnes (1991), Timmes (1994) and Sandler (1991 & 1992), provided historical overviews of these two areas, and Wayne (1991) and Summe (1992b) discussed changes in force structure. PSYOP equipment (Bailey, 1992) and training (Martinez, 1992) and new courses (Parker, 1992) were highlighted.

Lessons learned for both CA and PSYOP are offered from Operation Just Cause (*Special Warfare*, 1991; Smith, 1991); Guantanamo (Woods, 1993); Haiti (Maddox and Hardy, 1995); the Gulf War (Summe, 1992a; Jones, 1994; Nash, 1994; Cleary, 1995) and Somalia (Borchini and Borstelman, 1994). Dorsey (1995) discussed operations (“not quite war”) in the former Yugoslavia. Bishop, (1995, and personal communication, February, 1994) presented the viewpoint of a CA officer at the JRTC, applying his skills in the training environment.

Other *Special Warfare* articles provide information on specific kinds of missions: foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare (Moulton, 1991; Brady, 1991); counterdrug operations (Ligon, 1991); PSYOP (Kilgore, 1992); and dealing with the media in peacekeeping (Stech, 1992; Adams, 1994). Bynum, Dittler, Pixler and Zich (1993) discussed Marines and humanitarian assistance missions. Adams (1993), Schultz (1994) and Burbank (1994) described different aspects of peace operations and U.N. peacekeeping, and DeAtkine (1992) predicted the next wars -- communal strife.

Abizaid and Wood, in a long and thoughtful *Special Warfare* article based on their experiences, described training for peacekeeping (1994). They cautioned that “precisely because it is ‘not war but like war,’” preparing for peacekeeping is not business as usual” (p. 14). Both individual training (e.g., ROE, ordnance disposal) and collective training (e.g., security, manning checkpoints and
observation posts) are described. The need for staff training is highlighted as “coordination of actions in peacekeeping is especially daunting” (Abizaid & Wood, 1994, p. 18). Similar thoughts are echoed by Shultz who cautions that peacekeeping plans must continue beyond the end of a conflict, lest “peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other peace operations...achieve only a pause in the hostilities” (1994, p.6).

Other Professional Publications

Professional papers and magazines were also included in the literature review, each showing the interests and biases of its primary target audience. As would be expected, Infantry Magazine has frequent articles on stability operations. A provocative anonymous Letter to the Editor entitled “Why not Legitimatize OOTW Training?” was published to stimulate dialogue. Concurring with the need for flexibility and versatility in OOTW, the author noted that planning to train for OOTW might seem to indicate eagerness to be involved in it. His position was that since stability operations are likely, “we owe it to our soldiers to train them for combat, whether that combat is in the form of World War III or a peace enforcement, NEO [noncombatant evacuation order], or counterinsurgency mission in some ‘operation other than war’” (Anonymous, 1994, p. 6).

Cornell-D’Echert (1994) warned that although it is difficult to define an adequate set of performance standards for peacekeeping tasks, it is necessary. He argued for a peacekeeping mission training plan (MTP), in order that a unit actually train for tasks likely to be performed. Others discussing infrequently practiced tasks were Martinez (1994) and Bateman (1992) who described NEO, an infantry mission rarely performed until recent years. Sisemore (1994) and Stanton (1994) covered the cordon and search task, also infrequently used until recently.


Many other professional articles touch on stability operations. An overview at Table 7 shows the variety. Kafkalas posed soldier-related issues in Military Review: “It is as if we assume the light divisions will automatically know how to fight in an unconventional low-intensity environment. This assumption may not be valid, considering the lack of historical perspective in current LIC doctrine and how the light infantry could best be used in a LIC scenario” (1986, p. 24).
Table 7

Articles on Stability Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Topic Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dodd, 1995; Vowels &amp; Witsken, 1994; Williamson; 1994</td>
<td>Cavalry in low intensity operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fowler, 1993; Moulton, 1991; Schnaubelt (1995); Ide (1995)</td>
<td>Training for specific contingency operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harding (1995a, b), Hasenauer (1995)</td>
<td>JRTC training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krohn (1992)</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous Professional Writings

Increasingly, the Army and Naval War Colleges study stability operations. A provocative thesis presented to the Naval War College (Barazini, 1993) was entitled “Military support to law enforcement and posse comitatus: Is the search for non-traditional missions on a collision course with operational readiness?, ” a suggestion echoed by many writers. Other projects have covered specific operations. Bushway, (1993) discussed counter-insurgency and Peterson, (1993) warned of potential stability operations within the U.S. in the form of civil disturbances. For the Army War College, Cronin (1991) surveyed light infantry training from JRTC to Just Cause and Schmader’s 1993 study discussed strategic planning.

In a paper on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the TRADOC Analysis Center at Fort Leavenworth (Mayer, George, Rickert, Drobble and Coy, 1995) included excerpts from interviews with general officers. They stated unequivocally that training to standard on METL tasks is sufficient to accomplish
OOTW missions. However, they also said that negotiation skills and specific rules of engagement (ROE) are critical to success. They advised that personnel with expertise in PSYOP and CA are as important as those with combat skills, and that awareness of culture and language is essential. Taw and Peters (1994) echoed the need for greater familiarity with the cultural aspects of peacekeeping and negotiations, as did Capstick and Last (1994), based on experiences in Cypress. Steinberg (1994) concurred with the impact of OOTW on leader thinking, suggesting that the demands on leadership change significantly in stability operations from those of traditional operations.

Information has come from other nations on their theories on peace operations training. Canada published its training requirements philosophy (National Defense HQ, 1993) and Pinch (1994 a, b) provided longitudinal information on selected Canadian peacekeeping issues. Personnel returning from the former Yugoslavia have shared experiences and offered suggestions as to how other nations might learn from the Canadian experience (D. Drew, personal communication, 3 October, 1995). Lane (1994) described U.S./Russian relationships in peacekeeping missions, while a guide jointly published by the Russian Twenty-seventh Motorized Rifle Division and the U.S. Third Infantry Division (1994) showed how two nations might combine training exercises and share tactics, techniques and procedures.

Other forums have increasingly used stability operations for topics of discussion. A 1995 international technical panel (The Technical Cooperation Program, 1995) focused on preparing and training for peace operations. A 1994 American Defense Preparedness Association Symposium offered papers on OOTW challenges and requirements. Another indication of increasing interest in the area is that several articles have become available on modeling, simulations and games for contingency operations (Computer Services Corporation (1992a, b), Yee (1993) and Pecot (1993)).

Some question the impact of stability operations on soldiers — and on the Army. Articles in the Army Times tend toward controversial viewpoints. Matthews (1994) stated that NCOs do not favor separate peacekeeping forces and Wilson (1994) suggested that a "new breed" of officers might be needed to deal with stability operations. Matthews further stated (1995) that noncombatant operations are so difficult for the military as to "almost bring military to their knees," while Naylor (1994a) pointedly asked if soldiers are even ready for contingency operations. Naylor twice discussed JRTC training for stability operations but noted that "warlike it's not." (1994b, 1995). Peters (1995) discussed Congress’s impact on peacekeeping.
Interviews, Observations and Performance Data

Interviews

In addition to the literature search, the author conducted both formal (structured) and informal interviews with personnel with experience in preparing for and participating in stability operations. Those interviewed served as information clearinghouses, and resources for other sources. They also provided confirmation of many issues and ideas found in the literature.

Some interviews were conducted at the JRTC and the CMTC, in conjunction with observation of performance and training events at those CTCs. CTC Special Operations planners and senior observer/controllers (OCs) were also asked their opinions on stability operations training. Some had roleplayed “civilians on the battlefield,” and all had several years of experience in observing OOTW training. Other interviews were with active and reserve component soldiers participating in the CTC rotations. Other interviews were with personnel who had previously been stationed at those locations as served as observer/controllers.

Opportunistic interviews were conducted with individual soldiers returning from various missions. These included conversations with personnel (including allied officers) returning from deployments to Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Panama. These sources provided everything from informal, anecdotal information and “war stories”, to formal lessons learned as presented in public panels or briefing format (e.g., Unified Task Force-Somalia, 1993; Special Forces lessons from the Gulf War (T. O. Jacobs, personal communication, 1992)). In a post-Sinai interview, for example, a former commander specifically recommended that peace operations commanders be both trained and hand selected (W. Mullen, personal communication, July, 1994). Others interviewed had served as foreign liaison officers or civil-military officers in Europe or South America, and voiced concerns about training for contingency operations.

Additional interviews were conducted with retirees, and with military and civilian doctrine writers and small group instructors from, for example, Fort Benning, Fort Knox and Fort Leavenworth, and with personnel who work with the Army’s leadership programs. Included, too, was the author of the anonymous letter to Infantry Magazine. All of those interviewed, whether formally or informally, spoke candidly about operations other than war, and their perceptions of the Army’s role.

Many recalled the pre-deployment training their units had received (if any), and its strengths or shortfalls. When a unit had advance notice of deployment, area studies were consulted, and training was adapted to conform to the
expected mission. Rules of engagement were developed and disseminated, and the required "just enough" and "just in time" was fulfilled. When deployments were relatively unexpected, or missions deteriorated or changed focus, on the job training became the rule.

Observations and Performance Data

Multiple CTC training observations provided first-hand data as units responded to civilians on the battlefield, including media and “villagers.” In conjunction with its CMTC rotation, one unit was forced to change tempo from the rigor and speed of a high intensity exercise to the unpredictable and slower pace of a three-day exercise in low intensity conflict. Difficulties were evident throughout. For the units observed, dealing with civilians on the battlefield, and movement into towns and cities, presented obstacles. Procedures effective in traditional maneuver proved less useful when platoons were widely dispersed. Junior personnel manning checkpoints or road blocks showed only limited knowledge. Even in dealing with the media, an area for which the ROE are usually clearly defined, there were deficiencies apparent.

Units occasionally share successful tactics, techniques and procedures (e.g., Third Battalion, Fifth Infantry (DA, 1994a)). Additionally, the CTCs also provide feedback. The JRTC Special Operations Division, for example, provides lessons learned bulletins (JRTC, 1991, for example) to assist other OCs in training the units. They cover trends, problem areas, and improvements noticed over time. Articles by OCs (Christie, 1994) and internal memoranda (e.g., K. Christie, 1994, personal communication) reflect attempts to utilize lessons learned in future training events. This information is shared with units who ask for it.

Additional but limited information came from inspection of unit T&EO performance data, after action review briefing slides, and take home packages which were examined for OOTW content. Although stability operations are undertaken as a portion of the overall training event, they create problems in performance measurement and traditional measures do not suffice. Success or effectiveness is subtle, and is often difficult to achieve; there is a time lag between performance and effects. Soft skills are nebulous; failing to do harm may be as important as doing well. The training centers are generally not equipped to document the successful or unsuccessful application of these skills.

Discussion

The FEA examined knowledge and skills required for stability operations and available data, both documented and anecdotal. The overall impressions on training for operations other than war are somewhat contradictory, but doctrine is clear. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (DA, 1994g) states that a unit ready for
warfighting needs only to learn specific ROEs which apply to a non-warfighting mission. The proliferation of articles on stability operations, however, indicates a definite sharing of lessons, many of which have apparently been learned the hard way.

Although specifics vary with an individual’s background, many experienced soldiers tend to concur that in view of the changing world picture, more training for stability operations is needed. They support CTC stability operations training but say that it is also needed at home station — “just enough” and “just in time” is often not sufficient. However, few could recommend what training events should be eliminated to accommodate new demands.

For a commander, maintaining excellence is complicated by a crowded training calendar. Non-traditional operations are often complex and tend to suffer from "mission creep," the tendency for the mission to change or escalate over time. Requirements undergo a change of focus and the changing tactical environment requires “flexibility” from all participants. However, Jablonsky, listing the tenets of agility, initiative, depth and synchronization, suggests that in stability operations, force projection, not as simple as stated, might require a flexibility “far beyond agility” (1994, p. 28).

The assumption that even a flexible combat-ready unit is equally ready for a contingency mission may be optimistic — the peace operation METL may be considerably different from the wartime METL. The challenge becomes training for these missions without losing the ability to go to war, or to cope with an escalation of the other than war mission. The effort to balance traditional combat skills found in a unit METL with "soft skills" and special tasks found in the OOTW environment is difficult. However, as noted by two officers who have experienced it, “expanding staff training to include peacekeeping scenarios with joint and multinational players is essential” (Abizaid & Wood, 1994, p. 19).

OOTW goes beyond the addition of selected tasks to a training calendar. Broader issues surface (e.g., expanded span of control and increased autonomy for lower level leaders). Information must be disseminated quickly, down to the lowest levels, using non-traditional chains of command and leaders. Both individual tasks (e.g., negotiation, media awareness, enemy identification) and collective tasks (cordon and search, checkpoints and roadblocks) rarely found in a wartime METL, rise to a new level of importance in OOTW — together with an increased likelihood of performance. There are few job aids available — area studies do not cover tasks and subtasks.

There is also the real and ever-present potential for rapid transition from low intensity conflict levels to mid or high intensity in a short period of time. In stability operations the number of tasks required of a unit is a function of the mission, and the ROE may change from day to day or even hour to hour. These
factors may have more impact than the specific individual and collective tasks required. Also critical is unit ability to transition from a contingency mission to a traditional combat environment.

Stability operations incorporate non-traditional agencies and both hostile and friendly civilian and military personnel with known and unknown leadership, prejudices and agendas. Operations may range from the volatility of peace enforcement to disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Gallagher noted that “to prepare for a peacekeeping mission, the force must undergo specific, mission oriented training” (1992, p. 113). He talked about the importance of personal skills – “patience, flexibility, discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, inquisitiveness and tactical skills” (1992, p. 113). A unit must be able to adapt.

Stability operations require interaction with often unfamiliar staff members (e.g., military police and CA personnel), with the U.N., and with non-governmental organizations and personnel, some of whose missions may be at cross purposes with the military mission. Support personnel, frequently first seen when a mission begins, are drawn primarily from the Reserve Component (RC). Like the Active Component, RC soldiers have limited training days, and branch specific skills come first. Basic survival skills often decay, and equipment may be lacking or out of date. PSYOP personnel, for example, typically do not train with maneuver battalion troops as training is usually with other PSYOP personnel. They know their jobs, but not how to apply them in the context of the battalion or brigade. This hinders RC support personnel assimilation into maneuver brigade and battalion staffs.

Stability operations may test cognitive ability requirements. Dispersal of forces gives greater autonomy at low levels. The requirements to interact with foreign nationals, many of whom speak only their own language, bring new challenges. Local dialects are pitfalls. Different customs, climates, and terrain may pose challenges.

The military environment thrives on teamwork. It implies coordination and mutual performance toward a common goal. Monitoring of performance is common, and expected; communication is frequent. However, this may not be the case in OOTW. Individuals and small groups may be isolated from the rest of their unit, given unusual autonomy, or perhaps vague instructions. Uncertainty may become an issue. Fear may be magnified because of isolation. The lack of a clear end state to the mission may also impact.

In OOTW, there is often no clear cut chain of command, and supervision problems may arise, especially in multi-national deployments. Motivation may suffer from lack of clear or timely feedback. The mission (e.g., guard duty or manning a checkpoint) may be boring. The scope of authority for an individual may be changeable, or unclear. Lack of positive consequences for any action,
or absence of any consequence may cause problems. Conflicting directions and priorities of a host nation may cause confusion for the peacekeeper. Repeated deployments may cause problems in morale (Segal, 1995).

In stability operations the focus is on specific tasks — but there may also be consequences from failure to perform a task. Also, there is little positive feedback from, for example, a host nation on how well the individual soldiers conducted the non-combatant evacuation operation — the only feedback is if something goes wrong. “It is almost a cliché that the actions of a soldier on point can have strategic and political results” (Jablonsky, 1994, p. 63). The somewhat transient nature of OOTW missions does not give much opportunity to correct errors — or to make permanent changes. Humanitarian operations can be stressful long beyond the actual mission.

Requirements change, are often unknown, and long deployments with uncertain outcomes, or questions about why the unit is there in the first place, all impact — on morale and perhaps on performance. Jablonsky comments that stability operations are political: “U.S. vital interests will probably not be at stake; political and military objectives will be vague and elusive, as will the meaning of victory” (1994, p. 52). Often overlooked is the effect on individuals and ultimately on the mission of the kinds of activities personnel become involved in during OOTW missions — sometimes heart wrenching, sometimes disgusting. All of these factors impact on the soldier.

Conclusions

Based on the sheer volume of material being written lately on the who, what, where, when and how, and sometimes why of stability operations, a perceived information void is being filled. The information void is almost certainly linked to a training void. Although recent efforts address training for stability operations, maneuver battalions are more likely to devote their limited training time to combat operations. Training is iterative and repetition of a task brings performance to an acceptable level. With regard to training, Abizaid and Wood said it best: “The design of training will vary from mission to mission, depending on the operational environment. What will not change is that pre-deployment training is essential. Leaders must allocate time and resources to prepare soldiers for the unique requirements of peacekeeping” (1994, p. 15).

Those who have served in stability and security operations need to have the means to share and record their "lessons learned" before they move to other assignments, and those about to embark on similar missions should be aware of and privy to these lessons learned. Unit training materials are needed for the lowest level soldier. These might include lessons or job aids, computer-based instruction, videotaped training vignettes, or officer and noncommissioned officer professional development classes. Materials like the CALL handbooks need
continued proliferation. There is a need to determine ways to train and then measure effective performance of "soft skills" used in negotiation or liaison.

In sum, operations other than war, whether called stability operations, peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance, are more difficult and complex than they may first appear. Preparations must be made well in advance to ensure that materials will be available when they are needed, by those for whom such information is critical.
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