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TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION: REVISITING THE CAPTAINS TO EUROPE PROGRAM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENNETH H. NEWTON
United States Army National Guard

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Colonel Michael R. Gonzales
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kenneth H. Newton (LTC), ARNG

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Prior-service experience is one of the most important factors in maintaining an Army National Guard (ARNG) prepared to execute its mobilization mission. An ARNG officer with active duty experience provides the ARNG with a leader skilled in his profession and cognizant of the Army's organizational behaviors. This type of experience is necessary for the ARNG to execute its wartime missions consistent with the Active Component (AC). After the Gulf War in 1991, Congress concluded that AC experience was a critical factor in Reserve Component (RC) unit preparedness for mobilization; so much so, that in 1993, Congress established prior-service experience objectives for the ARNG in a major piece of legislation concerning ARNG readiness. Prior-service experience provides the essential skills and the institutional knowledge critical for the ARNG to mirror the traits, behaviors and organizational patterns of the AC. This paper examines a program conducted in the 1980s, known as "ARNG Captains to Europe," that provided a group of ARNG officers with such experience.
PROLOGUE

The “son of DESERT STORM” occurs in January 2002. The United States military is taxed to its limit by deployments to every region in the world. American soldiers are still conducting peacekeeping missions in Bosnia. Two United Nations-sanctioned humanitarian operations led by US military units are underway in Africa and Madagascar. US forces are on alert in Korea where apparently North Korea did not comply with the United Nation’s nuclear non-proliferation guidelines. The Panama Canal experiment did not succeed and the canal is back under US control. US military forces are stretched to their breaking point. Now, at absolutely the worst time possible, Saddam Hussein, the eccentric “idiot of all idiots,” once again attempts to seize Iraq’s historical homeland of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.

US forces mobilize and deploy to Saudi Arabia. Parts of the XVIII Airborne Corps quickly appear on the scene. The 3rd Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions fall in on prepositioned equipment in Kuwait. The 1st Cavalry Division prepares for deployment. Twelve Army National Guard (ARNG) Enhanced Infantry Brigades and hundreds of ARNG combat support units report to their mobilization stations.

In visiting the ARNG units, officers by the score are observed carrying out their duties with the calm confidence of someone who had been there before. A review of their personnel records during the mobilization process uncovers an unusual fact. Many of the field grade officers had a three-year tour of duty in the Regular Army when they were Captains. How could this be? Normally, an ARNG officer with active component (AC)
experience acquires that experience from his initial service obligation as an ROTC or Service Academy graduate.

The ARNG must have made a deal with the devil to increase AC experience within its ranks, or perhaps the ARNG simply took actions to meet the prior service requirements specified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Further investigation reveals that, in 1997, the Army and the National Guard Bureau revived the old “ARNG Captains to Europe” Program to infuse that active-duty experience into the ARNG.

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Prior-service experience provides the essential skills and the institutional knowledge critical for the ARNG to mirror the traits, behaviors and organizational patterns of the AC. This paper examines a program conducted in the 1980s, known as “ARNG Captains to Europe,” that provided a group of ARNG officers with such experience.

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“ARNG Captains to Europe” was a program designed to infuse AC experience into the ARNG officer corps and ease a shortage of Captains in the AC. Program participants volunteered for a three year active-duty tour in Europe with the Regular Army. Upon completion of their tour, program guidelines required the officer to return to service in the ARNG.

“Captains to Europe” benefited both the officer and the ARNG. Primarily, it gave ARNG officers an opportunity to gain invaluable AC experience and build professional confidence by performing an extended tour of duty in an AC troop unit. “Captains to Europe” produced AC seasoned officers for follow-on assignments in their home state or in the NGB workforce. This program’s legacy is evident today in ARNG senior leadership circles. Many officers that participated in “Captains to Europe” now hold key leadership and staff positions at NGB and in state ARNG units.

This paper further details the benefit derived from the “Captains to Europe” Program and examines possible revisions to that program for re-implementation. Current Army readiness training enhancements provide assistance, but not experience. Initiating a program similar to the “Captains to Europe” Program conducted in the 1980’s, would complement other ARNG initiatives seeking to complete the integration of the AC with the ARNG.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The ARNG is the Army’s primary provider of RC combat and combat support units. As a part-time, mirror image of the AC, the ARNG reflects the unit organization and
While under state authority, the ARNG provides wide-ranging capabilities for a state to utilize during civil emergencies and natural disasters. Uniquely organized and equipped, the ARNG gives the Governor of each state a responsive force that can supplement existing law enforcement and emergency relief organizations. Additionally, the ARNG can provide broad-based community support in a variety of other ways.\textsuperscript{2}

When federalized, the ARNG comes under the command and control of the AC. As a part-time or reserve military element, the ARNG must prepare for its mobilization mission in a fraction of the time available to the AC. Its primary focus is preparing for its mobilization mission. The ARNG exists to perform combat, combat service and combat service support missions consistent with its organization and structure in a situation requiring the capabilities of the US Army.\textsuperscript{3}

Situations requiring ARNG mobilizations in the past include both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Haiti and most recently, the Bosnia peace operation. ARNG mobilization levels reflect the seriousness of the crisis that requires US Army presence. Logically, the largest ARNG mobilization occurred in World War II. The latest extensive ARNG mobilization occurred for Desert Storm. Generally, past ARNG mobilizations have been successful and fulfilled their purpose of providing operational depth for the Army.\textsuperscript{4}

In spite of its successful contributions to national security, criticisms of ARNG leadership and unit readiness appear in reviews of World War II and Desert Storm ARNG mobilizations. In some cases, units and leaders were depicted as not being fully prepared to execute their mobilization mission. ARNG leadership was described as either too old or too inexperienced to lead their units on a level equal to the full-time professional officer.
Unfortunately, these criticisms appear to outweigh the contributions actually made by those citizen soldiers in both conflicts.

Perceptions exist from World War II that ARNG officers in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above lacked the necessary experience to lead large Army units into combat situations. A look back at these officers' experiences and training between World War I and World War II tends to support that assumption. Reports of ARNG soldiers drilling with broomsticks as rifles and other simulated equipment abounded. ARNG training opportunities and training repetitions did not equal that of the AC. Interestingly, out of the 18 ARNG and 14 AC Army division commanders at the start of World War II, the only two that actually commanded their divisions in combat during World War II were Guardsmen. Two other ARNG brigadier generals rose to command other Army divisions in combat, and one of those eventually commanded the XIX Corps in the European Theater. Overall, however, ARNG training and operations prior to World War II suffered from a lack of equipment and leader experience.

ARNG unit preparedness for mobilization was scrutinized upon completion of the Gulf War. Driving this issue was the fact that the ARNG Roundout Brigades did not mobilize and deploy with their designated Divisions, even though other ARNG artillery units and combat support units mobilized and performed capably. “Active Army assessments of Roundout Brigade officers’ proficiency stated that there were leadership deficiencies throughout all ranks.” Problems included tactical and technical competence, understanding and setting of standards, and enforcing discipline. “The Army Inspector General’s report on the Gulf War mobilization concluded that, of all the weaknesses
identified in the brigades, leadership problems—particularly in the noncommissioned officer and field officer ranks—were the most debilitating.\textsuperscript{9}

Generally stated, those leadership problems cannot be linked to a construct that all ARNG leaders are poor leaders. What is the difference between an AC officer and a ARNG officer? Talent? Physical fitness? Dedication? Probably not. When you subtract common factors out of both sets of officers' backgrounds, like formal military education, the answer jumps out: Active-Duty Experience.

**ACTIVE-DUTY EXPERIENCE**

Active-duty experience is the single, most-significant difference between ARNG and AC officers. On a pure day-to-day comparison, the duty experience that an ARNG officer acquires during an average RC training year pales beside the experience gained during a typical duty year by an AC officer. On the average, ARNG members have only about 39 days each year to dedicate to training, although many devote considerably more time.\textsuperscript{10} Even then, some of those scheduled training days are consumed by administrative and non-training matters. A typical, combat arms AC officer, on the other hand, has in the neighborhood of 225 duty days available for training.

\textquotedblleft... assume 225 days—a normal working year after taking into account vacation, sick leave, and holidays—as representing the realistic portion of the year available for active training. If we assume that reservists have 38 days of training opportunity, the difference between the active 'year' is quite large—an active year has almost six times as much training opportunity as a reserve year.	extsuperscript{11}

Experience enhances proficiency and in some situations certifies skill qualification.

It is generally accepted that experience-based learning is one of the most efficient modes of
learning. Experience is the base element of the adult-learning model that is considered to be the foundation of skill proficiency and refinement. If the best learning technique is by doing, then experience is the result of learning by doing. The Army acknowledges the value of experience in granting skill qualification certification known as “On-the-Job-Training (OJT).” At the most basic level, skill proficiency comes from experience.

Active-duty experience is difficult to simulate, duplicate or replace. The basic familiarity of missions, tasks and skills is ingrained in a soldier through repetition. Combat experience, with all its violence and trauma is simulated, but not equaled. NTC, JRTC and CMTC rotations provide unique experiences that cannot be entirely replicated. One has to be there and go through that experience to actually know what those situations require. Most ARNG officers do not have a frame of operational reference based on extended deployments, repetitive training rotations and a single-focused livelihood. Three years of training with an AC unit is hard to replicate with home study programs and weekend execution. It simply does not provide the time nor repetitions required to become proficient on every critical task. Active duty experience serves as an ARNG training multiplier.

“... completion of an active term of service provides a screening or ‘credentialing’ effect that improves the chances for more-rapid skill proficiency and successful completion of reserve skill training...”

That is why such a premium is placed on an ARNG officer’s AC duty experience.

ARNG officers face an uphill battle toward gaining duty experience commensurate with their AC peers. They compete for limited additional training days from today’s reduced training budgets. Even with the intensity of preparing for a combat training center (CTC) rotation, ARNG officers would be lucky to perform 75 military duty days in their
operational assignment. If the training days were available, ARNG officers would then have to coordinate the extra duty time with their employers and families. Balancing civilian occupations with ARNG requirements calls for extreme dedication from the officer, willing cooperation from employers and even stronger cooperation from the officer’s family.

AC experience alone will not guarantee that an AC experienced ARNG officer will exceed all expectations or perform in an outstanding manner. Quality is subjective in many ways and cannot be derived solely from AC experience, but AC experience does help to ingrain military discipline, military leadership styles and extended operations.

**TITLE XI, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT for FISCAL YEAR 1993**

At the end of 1992, Congress included AC experience requirements for ARNG officers and enlisted soldiers in legislation designed to improve ARNG readiness. Congress initiated sweeping legislative changes effecting RC readiness with the passage of Public Law 102-484, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Congress had determined that, in review of ARNG readiness for the Gulf War and in light of an increased reliance upon the ARNG for national security matters, additional measures were necessary to boost the ARNG’s readiness posture.

Prior to passage of Public Law 102-484, various congressional and DOD sponsored studies following Operations Desert Shield/Storm determined it was time to mandate deployability enhancements, National Guard assessment criteria, and ARNG and Active Army compatibility and integration requirements. A recommendation from these studies supporting this endstate was a determination that readiness could be improved by
increasing the numbers of RC soldiers who have extended periods of active-duty military experience.

Title XI, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 established measures intended to initiate ARNG combat readiness reform. A title in congressional legislation is comparable to a chapter in a book and breaks the legislation into broad categories. Title XI, entitled Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative, is commonly known and referred to as Title XI. Title XI delineates the AC’s responsibilities in assisting and supporting ARNG readiness. Primarily it mandated the Army to provide training in support of ARNG training through deployability enhancements, compatibility enhancements and with manpower assigned as trainers in high priority RC units.

Title XI, Section 1111 established overall membership goals in the ARNG for prior active-duty personnel. Section 1111, entitled “Minimum Percentage of Prior Active-Duty Personnel,” set the objective for ARNG officers at 65% and enlisted soldiers at 50% by 1997. Subsequent clarification in Section 1111 set two years or more as the desired amount of prior active-duty experience to meet this requirement. This section reflected Congress’ intent to place a high premium on prior active-duty experience and their belief that AC experienced soldiers would enhance ARNG deployability and readiness. Title XI was viewed by the Army as highly supportive to Total Force Integration and important toward infusing Army culture into the RC.

The prior active-service objectives set by Congress in Title XI have not been met. Since the Department of the Army was charged with raising the AC experience level in the ARNG, the closest they have come to attaining the officer goal of 65% was at the end of
Fiscal Year 1993 with 57.57%. In Fiscal Year 94 the percentage fell to 54%. The lowest year was Fiscal Year 95 with 49.8%.

**TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION**

Total Force Integration is also referred to as the “One Army” concept. Integrating all components of the Army into its current and future operations helps to leverage the capabilities of all units and personnel within the total Army structure. An obvious and important method of this integration is the cross-fertilization of leadership from AC to RC and vice-versa. Separation or the lack of integration between components tends to create interoperability problems and incompatible operating procedures. Total integration of AC soldiers and RC soldiers within each other’s culture is a desired endstate for the Army. Part of the Total Force Integration concept is building AC experience in the ARNG.

AC experience is important for the ARNG. Congress set ARNG prior service goals for the Secretary of the Army to meet. Commissioned studies indicated that prior active-duty experience would help to improve and maintain ARNG readiness. Congressional oversight was established to monitor progress in attaining the prior service goals. A logical and obvious conclusion for a better prepared ARNG would be to have a high percentage of AC experienced soldiers in its ranks. The difficulty lies in creating that pool of experience in the ARNG. Mandates and milestones are easy to set and monitor, but formulating a strategy of programs and procedures designed to meet those goals is critical for success.

There are only two ways for an ARNG officer to acquire AC experience. The first method would be where they begin their career in the AC, then join the ARNG. The other
course would be where the officer began his career in the ARNG, leaves the ARNG for an AC tour and then returns to the ARNG. There are no other ways, short of an extended mobilization, for an ARNG officer to earn AC experience. From the ARNG’s viewpoint, either method is acceptable because each provides an officer to their ranks with a first-hand knowledge of Army operations. The bottom line is that the officer has an extended tour of AC duty to assimilate Army culture, habits, operating procedures and discipline.

Of the two ways to acquire AC experience, the more unique approach is where the ARNG officer begins his career in the ARNG, applies for an AC tour and then returns to the ARNG upon completion of the AC tour. Army Regulations provide procedures for an ARNG officer to apply for an AC tour; however, in today’s world of budget cuts and force reductions, those applications are seldom approved. Without an established program in place to facilitate such tours, today’s ARNG officers have few chances to expand their active-duty experience base. This approach, however, has been tried before and worked very well.

“ARNG CAPTAINS TO EUROPE”

“ARNG Captains to Europe” was a combined AC/ARNG officer personnel venture conducted during the 1980’s. Its intent was to provide the Army with additional company grade officers and ARNG officers a way to gain two to three years AC experience. This program afforded branch qualified ARNG Captains and promotable 1st Lieutenants the opportunity to apply for a three-year assignment to a unit vacancy in US Army Europe (USAREUR). Later, as the program matured, assignments to Korea and Panama were also made available. The “ARNG Captains to Europe” Program began in Fiscal Year 1981 and
ended in Fiscal Year 1986. Throughout the program’s existence, approximately 215 ARNG officers performed tours of duty in either USAREUR, Korea or Panama.24

Several factors contributed to initiating the “Captains to Europe” Program. The AC needed company grade officers and the ARNG welcomed a chance for their junior officers to gain AC experience. Opportunities for ARNG officers to gain AC experience were viewed as invaluable and highly sought. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the AC faced a shortage of company grade officers in TOE units. It is generally accepted that there was a shortcoming in officer procurement during this period. HQDA saw this program as a great opportunity to fill officer vacancies without threatening the promotion potential of their own career officers. Another factor contributing to this program’s development was that many of the unit vacancies were in USAREUR, which was also the principal mobilization destination for the majority of ARNG units.

There were three stated goals for the “Captains to Europe” Program:

(1) Provide the active army with 200 ARNG Captains on extended active duty on a continuing basis.

(2) Provide the ARNG Captains with limited active army experience the opportunity to gain extensive experience in the Active Army environment.

(3) Provide ARNG Captains the experience of serving in the European Theater of Operations, this being the scenario for which the majority of ARNG units are scheduled in the event of mobilization.25

These goals supported the program’s intent of filling AC company grade vacancies and providing a way for ARNG Captains to acquire active-duty experience.

Both components appeared to benefit from attainment of these goals. The ARNG officer gained AC experience and the AC filled company grade vacancies without
increasing its competitive pool of officers. The experience factor alone tended to produce an officer more skilled and professionally confident in his career field, not to mention an awareness of the AC culture.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) believed the benefits gained from sending ARNG Captains to USAREUR for three years outweighed any disadvantages created by their absence from the state. The experience derived from operational deployments, exposure to AC culture and training programs would, in effect, produce a better ARNG officer. NGB acknowledged that the ARNG officer's AC duty should assist mobilization training upon their return and instill a higher degree of professional confidence in the participant.26

There is no better way to learn and meet Army standards than to live them for three years. Common sense tells us that if the ARNG is to mirror the AC, then the ARNG has to intimately know, understand and experience that culture to create that reflection. Reading and discussing only puts an officer in the right direction. Performing the duty provides the behaviors necessary to emulate AC officer characteristics and traits.

Advertising the “Captains to Europe” Program was handled by NGB and respective state ARNG Headquarters. Program implementation guidance included a request for maximum publicity by each state. Program details were to be publicized in the National Guard Magazine, the On Guard newspaper and in the Army Times.27 A follow-up article appeared in Soldiers magazine in April 1985.28 Most of the applicants found out about the program through distribution of program announcements down to unit level and by word of mouth. One officer even found out from the ARNG Advisor to USAREUR while performing annual training with his unit in Germany. Program publicity, however, did not
appear to be targeted and focused down to the unit level where the target population trained.29

The application and approval process for an officer volunteering for the program began with the individual officer and ended with a screening board at the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). Interested officers were required to submit their applications through the state ARNG Headquarters for screening and nomination by the state Adjutant General. The State Headquarters would review the applicants' qualifications before forwarding the application to NGB for review. NGB’s screening board reviewed the applications and OMPFs to insure that the officer met the program prerequisites. Approved packets went to MILPERCEN for HQDA approval. MILPERCEN notified officers of their selection, passed the information to USAREUR for pinpoint unit assignments and finalized reporting dates with the officer. The first board conducted in October 1980 selected 20 officers.30

The base tour length for “Captains to Europe” participants was 30 months; however, there were variations and modifications to that length during the programs life span. In the beginning stages of program implementation, tour length was advertised as:

- 30 months in country for accompanied officers with dependents
- 20 months in country for unaccompanied officers
- 30 months in country for unaccompanied bachelor officers

As the program developed, the 30 month tour evolved into an actual total tour length of 36 months. Most officers' orders directed a total of 3 years inclusive of a 20 day CONUS preparation period. Tour length for Korea was 12 months that was consistent with the Army’s short tour policy and the tour length for Panama was 24 months.31
Participants were precluded from extending or continuing on duty with the AC. Program policy limited the ARNG officer to a single tour without an option to effect a permanent transfer to the AC. This provision was necessary to support the Program’s intent: provide ARNG Captains valuable active component experience in a real “Army” scenario for an extended period of time and return that experience back to the ARNG. Exceptions were granted during the program’s latter stages to allow for completion of company command time. Participants then returned back to their home ARNG states to infuse their newly gained AC experience into their respective ARNG units. This provision gave the AC an excellent short-term fix to its company grade shortages without adding officers to its competitive promotion ranks.\textsuperscript{32}

ARNG response to the “Captains to Europe” Program was very favorable. By January 1983, 126 ARNG officers had applied for the program. Of these applicants, selection board screenings and application withdrawals reduced that number to 104 officers. Sixteen officers were non-selected and 6 withdrew their applications after being selected.\textsuperscript{33} The program peaked in 1984 with 153 officers participating in the program and assigned to units in USAREUR.\textsuperscript{34} The program met its total goal of 200 Captains by Fiscal Year 1985 and eventually finished with 215 total participants. There was no evidence to support any program intent to assess 200 officers per year for an indefinite number of years. It appeared that the program’s purpose was strictly to assess 200 officers, but with its initial success, optimism for more ran high.\textsuperscript{35}

Career field limitations existed in the early days of the “Captains to Europe” Program. Initially, the primary career fields targeted for fill were the following unit related specialties: Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Military
Intelligence, Signal, Adjutant General and Quartermaster. Within a year of program implementation, career field limitations expanded to include non-combat arms related specialties such as Foreign Area Officers, Chemical, Procurement, Transportation, and Maintenance Management. The Engineer career field proved to be one of the most popular as all of its available positions filled by June 1981, and ten or fewer vacancies existed in Infantry, Armor and Signal Corps positions.

"Captains to Europe" participants were injected into the AC system without any identification of their ARNG background. Usually they were assigned to the 1st Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in USAREUR for assignment to a TOE unit vacancy in Europe. There were no special identification markings attached to these officers records that would distinguish them from any other AC captain. Once 1st PERSCOM received the officer's personnel packet, they would assign them to a unit in USAREUR transparent to their being an ARNG officer. Each officer served a 30 to 36 month tour within the assigned unit's command jurisdiction, i.e., brigade, division, just like their AC counterparts. Once the officer reached his unit of assignment, he served in that position until one of two things occurred: reassignment to another Captain position based on his performance, i.e., company command, battalion S-4, or release from active duty at the end of the officer's tour. Reassignment options existed within the assigned unit's structure. The officer could go anywhere from company level command to corps staff officer positions. The only area of assignment for this program was USAREUR and to its various units. Participants held positions in units from Corps headquarters down to company commands and battalion staff assignments.
The “Captains to Europe” Program lasted for nine years. Beginning with the program’s initial announcement in July 1980, the first officers were boarded, approved and assessed by the AC beginning in September 1980. Solicitation for program volunteers ended in FY 86 with the last officer being released from active duty in 1989.40

A variety of reasons contributed to ending the “Captains to Europe” Program in 1986. The number of applicants had dwindled to 19 in FY 85 and approximately nine in FY 86. The program’s goal of 200 was met in 1985 and there was no apparent AC/ARNG agreement to extend the program beyond that initial goal.41 Fewer AC vacancies and an abundance of Captains reduced the need for the AC to pursue program continuation.

Another logical factor leading to the program’s demise was quite possibly budget constraints. Good-to-have programs are often the first to disintegrate when streamlining budgets. Basically, the program had run its course and there was no strong effort made to continue it. In the end though, the numbers dwindled as it was a tough decision for an ARNG officer to volunteer for the program. It was difficult to leave civilian jobs and uproot families to Germany to perform duty that they had been performing only on a part-time basis.

“ARNG Captains to Europe” went through several name changes during its existence. It was titled “ARNG Captains to Europe” by the ARNG on a July 1980 electronic message announcing the program to all the state and territory ARNG Headquarters.42 The program’s name changed to “ARNG Captains to Europe, Panama and Korea” in Fiscal Year 1983 as assignments to Panama and Korea were made available.43 In HQDA circles, “ARNG Captains to Europe” was also known as the “200 Captains to Europe” Program. Korea and Panama expanded the title with their inclusion in the
program. Despite the name changes, this program was, and still is, referred to as the “Captains to Europe” Program.

PARTICIPANT REFLECTIONS

Many program participants view their “Captains to Europe” tour as the key factor in their successful ARNG careers. Generally, they credit the program for providing them the opportunity to build a strong military foundation that was a point of reference throughout their career. Most volunteered for the program to gain active duty experience and become more proficient in their officer skills. From personal accounts, as a whole, these Captains achieved their goals. Many viewed the contacts they made on active duty, building credibility as an officer and learning the Army system as being the most important benefits gained from their tours. Others viewed it as being among the key factors in being selected for battalion command, promotions and growing as a professional Army officer. The “Captains to Europe” experience reflects in their every assignment. It is obvious that they believed “Captains to Europe” to be very instrumental in their career success.

PROGRAM EVALUATION

“Captains to Europe” succeeded in its mission and met its purpose. Its effects are evident today in all levels of ARNG leadership. Many of the officers that participated in this program have now reached the rank of Colonel and are in senior level assignments at both the state and national level. For example, in the US Army War College Class of 1997, three of the 20 attending ARNG students participated in this program as a Captain. At least ten program veterans have attended or have been selected to attend a Senior
Service College. Available records indicate that ten officers are Colonels or promotable Lieutenant Colonels (LTC). Fourteen former program participants are LTCS.

Additionally, two current ARNG USAWC faculty members participated in the “Captains to Europe” program. Considering the success of these officers, an obvious conclusion is that the “Captains to Europe” tour enhanced their professional development and assisted in attaining senior level status. One officer became the first ARNG officer to serve in the, normally AC-only, Chief of Staff position for Fort Knox and the Armor School.46

A strong “Captains to Europe” influence exists today in ARNG senior leadership. Fifteen of the 215 officers currently perform in senior level positions at NGB. Eight of those officers are either Colonels or promotable LTCS. Key positions held by these officers include Chief of Congressional Liaison and Plans Branch, ARNG QDR Integration Officer for the Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and Senior ARNG Advisor for the US Army War College. At the state ARNG level, past participants include a Director of Plans, Operations and Training; Division G-3; Deputy Director of Plans and Training; and numerous battalion commanders.47

Program success was acclaimed by the Director, ARNG during program execution. Commanders at all levels in USAREUR accorded high praise to the performance of ARNG officers. At the same time, returning officers distinguished themselves through professional conduct and technical competence.48

Program expansion to include Korea and Panama did not prove to be very attractive to ARNG captains. There are no records of any ARNG officer performing a tour in Korea even though it was limited to 12 months. Affecting the Korea tour popularity was the fact
that it was an unaccompanied tour. Panama tours were only a little more popular, but, available records indicate that only two officers performed tours in that locale.

Qualification restrictions contributed to that low number, as volunteers had to be at least a Level 3 on the listening and writing portions of the Army’s Spanish Language Proficiency Test. Additionally, the Panama applicants were limited to Special Forces and Latin America Foreign Area officers.

In retrospect, the “Captains to Europe” Program provided an ideal way to infuse AC experience into the ARNG. Compared to other methods to increase the AC experience level, “Captains to Europe” gave the ARNG a way to take one of their own officers, send him away for experience and get back a seasoned junior officer. The three years that the state did not have the officer, he gained an equivalent of 16 ARNG duty years of experience. This was a small sacrifice for such a monumental gain. The opportunity to select or endorse an officer for AC duty gives the state a known entity that would come back to their state a more accomplished and confident professional officer.

Many beneficial second and third order effects resulted from an officer’s participation in “Captains to Europe.” Contacts and relationships made with AC officers were among the most important benefits the individual officer derived from participating in “Captains to Europe.” These contacts have helped to open and enhance communications
between the components as these officers reached senior grades. Other benefits include increased professional competence, added credibility with their AC counterparts, and having a better understanding of AC and RC roles in support of each other.

When compared against an AC officer that leaves active duty for civilian life, the “Captains to Europe” officer has the advantage. Both have AC experience, but the ARNG officer would have the benefit of his ARNG background, component loyalty and familiarity with its culture. He would also have the experience of both components and a better understanding of the AC.

**ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS**

Other Total Force Integration programs exist that focuses on infusing AC experience into the ARNG. One such initiative called the “Seamless Integration Initiative” proposes a method to implement Title XI’s active duty requirement through assigning AC officers to command slots and key staff positions in ARNG units. These personnel would receive a National Guard commission from the state they were assigned in order to perform state duty mission as needed. Assignments would be for a normal 2-3 year tour and then return to the AC. The purpose and intent of this initiative is to inject AC experience into the ARNG at the company through Division level positions. Assignments would be made in conjunction with DA selection boards and with prior agreements by each state’s Adjutant General. MTOE positions for these personnel would build ownership and responsibility into their assignment.\(^{49}\) One of the key drawbacks to this approach is that these personnel would leave and take their experience with them. Therefore it is only a partial solution, as those AC personnel would not stay with that ARNG unit.
Another program conducted by the ARNG to provide key unit personnel with AC experience is the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP). This program provides opportunities for selected personnel to perform a short tour of duty with an AC unit. The intent of this program is to provide opportunity for key personnel with mobilization assignments at higher AC headquarters to perform duty with that unit. Performing this duty created a working relationship and familiarity with their mobilization assignment. I Corps has the only remaining KPUP opportunities funded by the ARNG. Prior to 1996, KPUP covered all AC units worldwide where the ARNG had augmentee positions. In some cases the KPUP tour served as the individuals yearly annual training requirement. While this program provided an opportunity for ARNG soldiers to gain AC experience, the tours were too short and inconsistent to build any lasting skill improvement and working relationships.

The AC Voluntary Early Release Program created in response to the Title XI requirements provides AC officers for the ARNG. AC Lieutenants with 24-36 month's service obligation remaining are eligible to leave the AC early and complete their service obligation in the ARNG. The target for FY 97 is 225 officers. The officers that transition to the ARNG in this program would have at least three years of AC experience comprised mostly of military education and platoon leader time. Some of these officers would be those with less than a bright future in the military and are simply looking for a quick way out of their AC service obligation.

None of the three methods described above would provide an ARNG officer with AC experience commensurate with a three year tour as a Captain. Much of an officer’s time as a Lieutenant is spent just learning their assignments and basic skills. The
Lieutenant offers little usable active-duty experience except as a platoon leader. Duty time as a Captain is usually spread across the spectrum of Army operations at the company level to division level. Those assignments provide the best AC organization learning assignments for an ARNG officer to take back to ARNG units.

Concepts similar to "Captains to Europe" have been discussed by senior AC and ARNG leaders. During April 1993 hearings before the House Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, testimony was delivered on this subject. The acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs indicated that the Army was examining the possibility of rotating ARNG officers through two and three year stints on active duty to meet Title 10 requirements. The ARNG Director also indicated that the ARNG was trying to find a way to assign company grade officers an AC assignment for approximately 2 years.

**ARNG CAPTAINS TO ACTIVE DUTY**

Implementing a modified "Captains to Europe" program would complement current AC/ARNG Total Force Integration initiatives. The new program would require a new name. A possibility is "ARNG Captains to Active Duty." Basic program parameters would stay the same except that the tours could be performed in any AC traditional unit, either in the US or at an overseas post. A yearly goal of 25 would be both realistic and sustainable. Historic totals indicate after the initial application rush, that around 20 per year applied for a tour. The key parameter would be to sustain the program permanently. The probability of performing the tour in the US would be more attractive to some ARNG officers that would balk at an overseas tour. The program would only cost the AC about
20 Captain slots per year and offset the losses due to Title XI compliance. In fact, this program would help the AC meet Title XI requirements at a smaller cost to their structure. At the most expensive stage the costs would not exceed $3,000,000 per year.\textsuperscript{55}

Implementing a revised version of the “Captains to Europe” Program has both short term and long term implications toward ARNG readiness. Short term effects include the loss of valuable officers to the ARNG and a possible lowered readiness rating due to qualified personnel shortages. Long term benefits include those mentioned previously, but the propensity of those participating officers to excel and attain key leadership positions at the national and state level has to be recognized again. Effects on the AC include offsets to Title XI losses, fill vacancies and further integrate the RC into their culture. Common sense and logic indicates that a revised version of this program would again provide officers with a base of military experience that would guide them the rest of their careers.

Another reason to consider another program of this type lies with a smaller AC. Further force reductions in the Army will automatically decrease the number of active duty officers moving to the RC. Fewer officers coming from the AC would result in a significantly less experienced reserve officer corps.\textsuperscript{56} The potential decline in the availability of prior service officers could be countered to some extent by implementing a “Captains to Europe” like program.

A 1994 Rand study concluded that reserve readiness may well depend on the availability of individuals with prior active experience. Smaller active force sizes combined with stable or slightly smaller reserve force sizes might significantly lower the proportion of reservists with prior active experience. If these experienced reservists are
important to reserve component readiness, this would mean that reserve readiness could decline.\textsuperscript{57}

**CONCLUSION**

The readiness of the ARNG depends on the actions and experience of their key leaders. These leaders must rely upon their own talents and experiences to lead the ARNG in accordance with Army Regulations and standards. But a ARNG without any AC experienced leaders places an incredible burden upon the Army’s formal schooling process to build daily operational expertise into ARNG personnel and units. ARNG units, without key leaders operating from an AC experience base, are forced to rely solely upon their traditional “reserve” intensity, tempo and operational pace to meet their readiness standards.

A closer look at the “Captains to Europe” Program shows that, while far from furnishing the entire ARNG with experienced officers, it provided a steady stream of seasoned Captains back to ARNG units. These officers return to their state ARNG organization infused their experience into their units for a longer period than the 2-3 years suggested by the “seamless integration” initiative. Many of these Captains would have served at the company command level and at the all important battalion staff positions. Those varying assignments and the accompanying experiences undoubtedly increased their technical and tactical competence in the manner that comes only with repetition.

One sure method to infuse this critically important AC experience in the ARNG is to re-generate a new version of the old “Captains to Europe” Program. The name would change and its geographic scope would increase to include the entire US Army abroad and
CONUS, but its intent would be the same: infuse the ARNG with AC experienced ARNG officers. The experience gained would not only benefit the officer in his professional development but also would act as a readiness multiplier, both for the ARNG and for the "Total Army" of the 21st Century.
END NOTES


3 Ibid., 2,51.


5 Bruce Jacobs, “Tensions between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army,” Military Review, October 1993, 12.

6 Ibid., 14.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid., 10.


13 Grissmer, xxiii.


16 Ibid., 2537.


21 Stredwick, 6.


23 Department of the Army, Order to Active Duty as Individuals for Other Than a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, Partial or Full Mobilization, Army Regulation 135-210 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 December 1996), 1.

24 Dates and totals indicated in this paragraph are derived from data found in the Annual Reviews of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Years 1983 - 1986.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


29 Interviews with Captains to Europe Participants, “Captains to Europe’ Questionnaire,” Compiled by author, Completion dates December 1996 - March 1997, Carlisle, PA.


32 Ibid.


38 Departments of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, NGB-ARP-O, “Army National Guard Captains to Europe,” Electronic message (TWX) from NGB WASHDC to AIG 7300, Washington, 051350Z June 1981.

39 Interviews with Captains to Europe Participants.

40 Ibid.

41 Departments of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Bureau, 1985 Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1985), 23.


44 Trahan, _____ (MAJ), "200 National Guard and Reserve Officers to Europe, Panama and Korea Program (Formerly the 200 Captains to Europe Program)," Information Paper, DAPC-OPP-P, Washington, 15 August 1985.

45 Interviews with Captains to Europe Participants.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 MG Herbert R. Temple, Director, Army National Guard, "Army National Guard Captains to Europe, Panama, and Korea, Memorandum for The Adjutant Generals of all States, the Virgin Islands, Guam and the District of Columbia, Washington, 6 October 1983.

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50 Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau, *Army National Guard Key Personnel Upgrade Program*, National Guard Regulation 350-xx, (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 27 January 1993), 4-10.


53 Ibid., 178.


55 Cost totals are based on 60 Captains at $50,000 per officer during the third year of program implementation. $50,000 is based on an O3 with 10 years service and full pay and allowances.
56 Grissmer, iii.

57 Ibid., xv.
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