FROM MADRID TO BRUSSELS: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement

Edited by
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FOREWORD

NATO's enlargement will be perhaps the most important defense and foreign policy issue of 1997. Certainly, its impact will exert a decisive influence on the future evolution of European security and the institutions that comprise it. This process raises a host of serious issues concerning Europe, not the least being the questions of what can or will be done for those states who are not members of NATO or will not be able to enter in the first round of enlargement. Other issues include the impact of enlargement on NATO as an alliance system, on U.S. foreign and defense policy, and on the European neutrals.

With these questions in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a roundtable in Washington on January 27, 1997. The chapters in this report originally were presented at that roundtable. In publishing these papers SSI and CSIS offer the substantive contributions of six expert authors to the growing public debate over NATO enlargement. We hope that their thoughtful work stimulates debate, and even action among our readers as they grapple with this profound and complex question.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
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OVERVIEW

Stephen J. Blank

When we think about European security, no question is more basic or more complex than that of NATO enlargement. In July 1997, members of NATO will convene in Madrid and decide to invite a number of Central and/or East European states to begin accession talks with NATO, leading to their full membership in 1999. While it is not certain who the invited states will be, there are good grounds for listing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as reasonable certainties. Slovenia and Romania are also increasingly mentioned as possibilities. NATO's decision in Madrid will have immense repercussions for Europe, not just for NATO's current members, or for the new candidates, but also for the states not invited. Those presumably include Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Albania, the states emerging out of the former Yugoslavia, and the European neutrals: Finland, Sweden, and Austria, and the Baltic states. (See Figure 1.)

Few have even thought about the consequences of the Madrid decision for these states. Rather, the debate, such as it has been, remains confined to an increasingly sterile discussion of the pros and cons of enlargement, especially with reference to supposed U.S. or Russian interests. Most of the public U.S. statements, apart from those of the Clinton administration, have been negative, as has been the almost unanimous Russian reaction. While the debate has the virtue of forcing both sides to state openly the premises of their policies; it also has led to a great deal of polemics by partisans of both sides in the debate. Few of those opposing NATO enlargement seem interested in discovering and then analyzing what Russia wants in terms of European security or what European states, either neutrals or aspirant members, want from Western Europe and the United States. Likewise, much of the discussion among those favoring enlargement remains restricted to a discussion of NATO as a force for democratic consolidation rather than
an alliance for common defense. That focus obscures many of the realities of international affairs in today’s Europe and tends to obscure the hard questions of strategy and defense.

In order to explore the second and third order effects that enlargement will have on European and North Atlantic security, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a roundtable in Washington, DC, on January 27,
1997. SSI and CSIS invited analysts from several European states and American experts on Central and Eastern Europe to analyze how enlargement will affect U.S. policy, the face of European security, and the future of the states that are likely not to be invited to join NATO in the near future. This volume is a representative selection of the papers presented at that roundtable.

Stephen Cambone demonstrates how the arguments in favor of NATO’s enlargement and their hidden premise that enlargement will so stabilize Europe as to lessen demands on the United States to be a security provider and to maintain a daily presence in Central and East European affairs are misplaced. While Cambone strongly favors enlargement, he rightly notes that its logical next step is much greater and more detailed U.S. involvement, at least politically, if not militarily, in Central and Eastern Europe’s new and expanded security agenda. As it is, Washington is busy devising Baltic security programs, trying to lead Bosnia’s reconstruction, guaranteeing Ukraine’s integrity, and leading the negotiations with Moscow on all issues of European security. The notion that enlargement means that collective security has dawned in Europe and that the United States can relax overlooks the fact that Washington, in order to maintain and reaffirm its central position in Europe and to prevent a renationalization of European security agendas, must become more involved in these and other questions that are sure to arise after enlargement begins.

One area where the United States and NATO must become more involved with Central and Eastern European candidates for NATO is civil-military relations. As Jeffrey Simon indicates, NATO has made democratization in this sphere a condition of membership, and it will have to spend time and money to ensure that genuine reforms are carried out and that new members and their militaries can effectively take part in NATO’s integrated military and political planning. If they can do so then NATO benefits, as well. But there is no magic wand for this issue, and it will be a prominent part of whatever bill is presented to those
states and to Western taxpayers precisely because we have made democratization the preeminent purpose of NATO in our public rhetoric.

However, Russia neither believes that this is the main point nor is it willing to accept any true improvement in Central Europe's capacity for military defense. This is evident from the current negotiations over a NATO-Russian charter, but it also emerges from Leon Goure's discussion of Russian reactions to NATO expansion. As Goure observes, Russian spokesmen view expansion—they call it this and not enlargement—as essentially a sign of NATO's betrayal of past accords and desire to shut Russia out of European politics and its most effective security institution. Russia views NATO as a hostile and unchanged military alliance that is now moving up to Russia's borders. The problem with this approach, as he rightly points out, is that it is only partly true or one-sided.

As Goure demonstrates, Russia in 1997 offers little that is positive for European security except for reproaches, which, however justified, do nothing to enhance security and which, if heeded, would substantially reverse the progress made for everyone, including Russia, since 1989. This posture, if carried to extremes, can create a lot of trouble in the neighborhood.

The key state in that neighborhood is, of course, Ukraine. As Sherman Garnett points out, Ukraine has always felt itself under the shadow of a Russian threat, and these fears, dating back to Ukraine's inception as a state, are not unjustified. Accordingly, Ukraine has sought Western support and has gradually come to support NATO enlargement for other states as a way of increasing its own security vis-a-vis Russia. Nevertheless, the real challenges to Ukraine, which have not yet been met, are internal. Its economy makes Russia's look strong, and its government has persistently been unable to overcome corruption and opposition to further reforms. The reign of the Nomenklatura (former Soviet elites) continues unchecked in Kyiv (formerly Kiev) and creates a huge obstacle to progress, reform, and security. If Ukraine cannot overcome
its internal problems, which make it more dependent on the Russian economy than is healthy for it and could well exacerbate its problems with its Russian minority, nothing NATO does for it or around it will make Ukraine more secure. While Kyiv undoubtedly faces a security problem from Russia, its real threats are homegrown ones.

Both the Russian and Ukrainian cases indicate that failure to achieve democracy and meaningful political-economic reform add to security problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly this is true as well for Slovakia. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently observed, the United States has serious concerns about Slovakia’s democratic progress. And as the paper by Ambassador Theodore Russell demonstrates, these concerns also affect other European states’ perceptions of Bratislava’s fitness for NATO. Indeed, Slovakia has more than flirted with a pro-Russian approach or an attempt to seek membership and support Russian views on Europe’s future security organization. This uneven course has impressed no one in the West with Bratislava’s fidelity to democratization and willingness to solve its problems with its Hungarian minority. Thus it is highly unlikely that Slovakia will soon join NATO. Whatever the merits of its nationality policy may be in fact, in practice that approach and general government policy are perceived as being contrary to what NATO wants to see. But the power to reverse this negative course rests with Slovakia, and in time it can rejoin the processes of European integration.

As Austrian Brigadier General Christian Clausen reminds us, for the neutral states like Austria, the process of achieving security through European integration is broader than mere membership in NATO. It also includes the European Union (EU), to which all these states also aspire. Nor will there be “a big bang” when new members join either organization. The costs will be high, and public opinion in all these states must rally round the project for it to succeed. Thus we may expect a long and gradual transformation which will not take place in neatly separate but converging compartments. Rather, there will be
overlapping structures and functions in European security, even as we move towards the long-hoped-for pacification of the entire continent. Austria as a neutral state will not soon join NATO, but as a member of EU, it is fully participating in the Partnership for Peace and the EU’s initiatives for a Common Foreign and Security Policy that should greatly contribute to European security.

These diverse views on European security and NATO’s transformation remind us that enlargement is in no way a simple issue, but not only for us. It contains both great promise and great complexities for Europe which must be realized through the medium of individual governments by political means. Those are rarely straightforward, and frequently consequences are not what were originally envisioned. Nonetheless, NATO has been an indispensable element in the integration of a Transatlantic security community, and, if it can realize a new vision through a successful enlargement, it will continue to play that role for many years.
CHAPTER 1

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Stephen A. Cambone

Introduction.

The upcoming NATO summit at Madrid in July 1997 will mark the conclusion of a process to reform and enlarge NATO begun at the Brussels summit in 1994. There, President Clinton led the Alliance to a commitment to streamline its command structure, establish a European pillar within NATO, and agree to provide the European members of the Alliance with access to NATO staff and assets and create Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The 1994 summit also gave life to the Partnership for Peace ( PfP). As originally cast, the PfP was designed to encourage closer relations between NATO members and the other states of the Europe which was now defined as stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This package fit well with the overarching purposes of the Clinton administration foreign and defense policy of the “Europeanization” of NATO. By this policy, the administration sought to increase the relative burden carried for Europe’s security by allies and, with the creation of the CJTF, make it possible for the United States to “opt out” of Alliance operations that Washington did not think it could justify at home, while allowing it to put pressure on the allies to act on their own behalf. Put another way, the “Europeanization” of NATO would allow the United States to affirm its “Article V” commitments to NATO while leaving the day-to-day responsibility for European security with the allies.

With respect to the PfP, despite official protests from Washington, it was viewed initially as a way to satisfy the demands of Central European states for a security
relationship with NATO while aiding them in their efforts at internal reform without actually opening the Alliance up to new members. Washington’s aversion to new members was driven less by concern about the difficulties associated with incorporating them into the Alliance than with the view of the Clinton administration at the time that political and economic reform in Russia, and not NATO enlargement, was key to the success of the Clinton security policy. Absent “backsliding” in Russia or the development of a “red-brown” coalition, senior administration officials were of the view that a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia was possible, and that it, in turn, could give life to a new European architecture that would include all states and would not result in new lines being drawn in Europe.

This view was castigated for placing “Russia first,” ahead of the Central European states, in the definition of U.S. interests and policy in Europe. But given the orientation of the administration’s security policy, it was a logically necessary view. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin put it most succinctly when he observed that a strategic partnership with Russia made it possible to both reduce the defense budget and improve the nation’s economic security.¹ Given the central importance of the relationship with Russia, the administration was loath to strain it unnecessarily by moving to incorporate new states into NATO without first exploring the possibility that a new security architecture could be constructed in Europe with Russia as a full partner in that construction. Consequently, it chose to temporize on the issues associated with membership by Central European states.

That temporizing took two forms. The first was to avoid casting the issue of NATO’s relations with Central Europe in terms of traditional security concerns. Instead, the administration stressed that the PfP was designed as a way to reinforce the trends toward political and economic reform, enhance stability in the region, and build a collective security community among European states. Classic formulations of the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of states and alliances were studiously avoided in discussing
the future character and content of the emerging European security space. The Alliance played up its newly stated commitment to stress its role as a political stabilizer and peacekeeper in Europe (vice its traditional role of territorial defense). The combination of a new NATO, the PfP, the growth and enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the increased influence of the U.N. and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would create, together with a new U.S. relationship with Russia, a zone of peace in which the thought of war among its constituent states would be unthinkable.

The second form of temporizing flowed from the first. After having resisted for as long as possible giving a clear indication of its commitment to expand the Alliance, the administration then waited as long as possible to begin the process of enlargement. The PfP, after all, was a response to the efforts of Europeans, most prominently German Foreign Minister Volker Ruhe, to open the Alliance to new members. As noted, the PfP received formal sanction at the Brussels summit of January 1994. While it is the case that the President declared later that month in Prague that NATO enlargement was a matter of when it would happen, not whether it would occur, the administration refused to agree to extend formal invitations for nearly 3 years, until December 1996. This temporizing can be attributed to a number of causes, but the course of U.S.-Russian relations is the most obvious. In the December 1993 Duma elections, President Yeltsin’s faction was dealt a blow from which it has yet to recover as nationalists and other less reform-minded factions gained the majority. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, Yeltsin was fighting to hold onto the reform process. At the May 1995 U.S.-Russian summit, it was agreed to delay NATO enlargement until after the Russian and U.S. elections of 1996.

That the United States could not temporize past 1996 was signaled by the appearance of an August 1995 article entitled, “Why NATO Should Grow” by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the architect of the “Russia first” policy. Increased domestic pressure for enlargement,
brought on by Democrats worried about creeping U.S. isolationism and a new Republican congressional majority worried about the faltering progress of Russian reform, combined with the inexorable strains created by the enlargement process itself, accounts for the commitment to explicit steps toward NATO enlargement rather than any fundamental shift in the orientation of U.S. security policy. This conclusion can be gleaned from the fact that the rationale for enlargement has not altered significantly since January 1994. Russia's role in the process of building the new European architecture still dominates thinking on the subject, and the Alliance is apparently prepared to accept conditions on the roles to be played by the Alliance and its new members in European security affairs—conditions being negotiated with Russia.

This short history brings us to the moment when the Alliance will decide on enlargement. Whatever the rationale offered to date, enlargement will have significant geostrategic and geopolitical implications. This paper highlights those implications. It begins with a brief discussion of the administration's rationale for enlargement and the most telling critique of it. The paper then discusses the implications of enlargement for U.S. policy in Europe, concluding that despite administration desires, NATO enlargement will require a sustained and relatively deep American involvement in the day-to-day security affairs of Europe. It then addresses the question of Russian interests in light of these implications. It concludes with a set of strategic criteria by which to judge the purpose and value of NATO enlargement.

The Case for Enlargement.

The administration's case for enlargement has been of a piece with its overall orientation on foreign and defense policy. President Clinton, himself, gave the best expression of the argument in his campaign speech in Detroit, Michigan, on October 22, 1996. In it, he blended the themes of domestic prosperity and security with those of foreign and defense policy that he had been developing since before his
first presidential campaign. He replayed the theme that democracy and free markets are the best base on which to build both domestic prosperity and security and international peace and cooperation. He drew the image of a collection of like-minded democratic states working together to create an environment for the next century,

in which the blocks and barriers that defined the world for previous generations will continue to give way to greater freedom, faster change, greater communications and commerce across national borders, and more profound innovation than ever before; [it will be] a century in which more people than ever will have the chance to share in humanity's genius for progress.

The President elaborated the point as follows:

Our prosperity as individuals, communities, and a nation depends upon our economic policies at home and abroad . . . Our well-being as individuals, communities, and a nation depends on our environmental policies at home and abroad. Our security as individuals, communities, and a nation depends upon our policies to fight terrorism, crime, and drugs at home and abroad. We reduce the threats to people here in America by reducing threats beyond our borders. We advance our interests at home by advancing the common good abroad.

In times past one might have expected the President to illustrate the last two lines with stories about our support for freedom fighters opposing tyranny or the need for the United States to stand firmly against the diminution of human rights in repressive regimes. Instead, he immediately made reference to the success of his trade policies in creating 10.5 million new jobs in America, half of which were in high wage categories. This success was due, among other things, to trade policies vis-à-vis Japan. As a result of such policies, "real wages for the typical working family have started to rise again for the first time in a decade."

From this the President concluded the following: "I say that [the prior description of the results of trade policy] to make the point that our economic policies at home and
abroad affect the well-being of America’s families.” But this linkage is not confined to economic policy. Setting up his rationale for American leadership in the world, the President went on to say: “And in a world that is increasingly interconnected, we have to just sort of take down that artificial wall in our mind that this [i.e., a particular issue] is completely a foreign policy issue and this is completely a domestic issue because, increasingly, they impact on one another.” Knowing this to be the case, he argued, it is incumbent on the United States to take the leadership role in international affairs. According to Clinton, that leadership must be expressed in two ways:

first, by meeting the immediate challenge to our interests from rogue regimes, from sudden explosions of ethnic, racial and religious and tribal hatreds from short-term crises; and second, by making long-term investments in security, prosperity, peace and freedom that can prevent these problems from arising in the first place, and that will help all of us to fully seize the opportunities of the 21st century. 10

Policy toward Europe, and NATO enlargement in particular, is very much in keeping with this prescription for leadership. “I came to office convinced,” the President declared,

... that NATO can do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish. That’s why the United States has taken the lead in a three-part effort to build a new NATO for a new era: first, by adapting it with new capabilities for new missions; second, by opening its doors to Europe’s emerging democracies; third, by building a strong and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. 11

The remainder of the speech was given over to describing the new capabilities, declaring the new members should be in the Alliance by 1999 and hoping that the Russians would understand that “NATO enlargement is not directed at anyone” and would agree to enter into an agreement with NATO that assured them of their own security. 12
Reduced to its essentials, the President’s case is less about the need for expanding NATO than it is about the salutary effect that a peaceful and prosperous Europe will have on affairs in the United States. On this point there can be no argument. What is not obvious from the President’s discussion is why NATO enlargement is the best vehicle for creating the desired peace and prosperity.

This point has not been lost on commentators. *The New York Times* put it this way in a lead editorial:

The Administration has dressed up its plans with rhetoric about consolidating democracy and free markets in the lands of the former Soviet empire, but has yet to make a good case why a cold-war military alliance, rather than the European Union, is the best way to secure those aims.

The more credible case for enlargement rests on more practical principles, namely, maintaining a strong American leadership role in Europe and preserving an alliance that could defend against an aggressive and militarily resurgent Russia in the future.

But if *The New York Times* editorial board finds this a more credible case, it is not a view that has persuaded a significant segment of American opinion. Michael Mandelbaum, a professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, touched off the latest round of discussion on the issues with a fierce debate on NATO enlargement and its merits with Richard Holbrooke, the putative father of NATO enlargement policy in the United States, before the New York Council on Foreign Relations. Mandelbaum’s critique of enlargement is straightforward and most telling: democracy needs protection not in Central Europe but in Russia and Ukraine; if the purpose of NATO enlargement is to reinforce democracy, why aren’t these two nations the leading candidates for membership? On the present scheme, “the countries that need NATO,” Mandelbaum argues, “won’t get it, and the countries that get it, don’t need it.” If this were all that NATO enlargement entailed, it might be a foolish but not harmful affair. But the “potential costs of
pushing ahead,” in Mandelbaum’s view, “dwarf the discomfort of changing course.” He warns that:

bitterness over NATO enlargement could turn Russia, over the long term, against the entire post-Cold-War settlement. That settlement, including the liberation of Eastern Europe, the end of the Soviet Union and the dramatic reduction in military force, is extraordinarily favorable to the West. Russians respect it because they agreed to every part of it. NATO enlargement would be the first step in changing the security arrangements of Europe taken against Russia’s wishes.16

With this critique, we come to face fully the real issue at the bottom of NATO enlargement. Enlarging NATO is not about increasing the family of democratic nations—although that could be a benefit if it is properly conducted. Nor is it about directly increasing the domestic well-being of Americans—increasing exports and creating high-paying jobs. It is first and foremost about completing the settlement of post-Cold War security issues in Europe. And that means it is about establishing the basis for relations among states with vital interests in the region—irrespective of the form of their domestic affairs—so that their competing and in some cases contradictory interests do not give rise to crises and war. Mandelbaum’s warning about Russia’s attitude is critical to appreciating the strategic implications of NATO enlargement. He reminds us that whatever a nation’s attitude toward political and economic reform, including ardent support for both, its national security within the international system is not synonymous with the creation of the conditions for advancing domestic security among the constituent members of the system.

This reminder opens the opportunity for us to view NATO enlargement in a way different from that which has been advanced by the Clinton administration (and by extension the other members of the Alliance). It allows us to view the issue from the perspective of international relations rather than domestic security and to assess whether NATO enlargement, on balance, is more favorable to American interests than its alternative. It also allows us
to be far more straightforward in describing the implications of NATO enlargement for the United States.

**Strategic Implications of NATO Enlargement.**

The enlargement of NATO will have five strategically significant implications:

- First, because enlargement can take place only with the support of the United States, an enlargement imposes a responsibility on the United States to assure its success. This means that it will have an interest in providing long-term support and guidance to the newest members of the Alliance in matters related to their security, to include their foreign and defense policy.

- Second, it places NATO—and the United States—firmly in the heart of Europe between Berlin and Moscow. This ought to have the effect of assuring Germany that it will not be compelled to take on responsibilities for European security that it is not yet ready to assume nor that its neighbors—east or west—are willing to grant. At the same time, it should assure Moscow that local or regional instabilities will not be exported to Russia.

- Third, it would lend credibility to Western statements of concern regarding the integrity and political independence of Ukraine. Though the United States and others might wish to see Ukraine remain independent, if it chooses to establish closer ties to Russia, that is the business of the Ukrainian people. At the same time, however, enlargement provides the Alliance with a propinquity it would not otherwise have, allowing it to serve as a deterrent to Russian pressure on Ukraine and a restraint on Ukrainian practices.

- Fourth, it provides a base for developing security arrangements for the Balkans and the Baltics while
the issue of their inclusion in the Alliance is considered in the future. As in the case of Ukraine, enlargement assures the Alliance of direct strategic access to these regions in times of crisis.

- Fifth, by accomplishing the foregoing, enlargement can relieve pressure on the EU enlargement process. The EU has a considerable agenda today, including implementing the proposals of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), addressing issues associated with the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), and beginning the negotiations on its own enlargement. In light of these issues, it is unrealistic to expect the EU to establish and conduct simultaneously a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of a character and magnitude that it could manage the full range of security issues in Central and Eastern Europe. This is not to suggest that NATO enlargement should be seen as a substitute for EU enlargement or that the EU should not be encouraged to proceed with its own enlargement in an expeditious matter. It is to suggest only that NATO enlargement allows the EU to move with deliberate speed rather than with haste with its own enlargement and, even more important to U.S. interests, with the formulation of its CFSP.

These five implications suggest that enlargement will alter substantially the context of security policy in Europe. NATO enlargement will succeed in making the United States what it has resisted becoming for its entire history: a European power. The involvement of the United States in the affairs of both new members and those still outside but bordering on the enlarged Alliance (e.g., the Baltic states and Ukraine) will be far more detailed and deeper than merely encouraging foreign investment or negotiating basing rights for peacekeeping exercises. The fiscal and monetary policies of these states, their domestic legal systems, the size of their defense budgets and the structure and posture of their military forces, and their negotiation positions vis-à-vis one another and Russia on economic,
territorial, political, cultural, and ecological issues will be matters of far greater interest to the United States than they have been in the past. The era of benign American interest and "self-selection" among states that marked the PfP for these nations will give way to one of much closer partnership, with the United States holding a far larger stake in the decisions by governments in these regions.

This interest is only deepened by the fact that, by virtue of enlargement, the United States will be the lead Central European state. Toward it will flow—no matter how much it might protest that other paths should be followed—the many issues between West and East and related to the Baltics and Balkans, Ukraine and Belarus. The United States will be expected to mediate trade and territorial disputes and to manage political and cultural differences. Unlike Vienna, Budapest, Istanbul, Moscow, and Berlin in the past, the United States in the future will need to manage affairs in the cockpit of Central Europe—including, on occasion, the employment of military forces—with an eye to maintaining a strategic equilibrium in the region, not seeking to balance one power against another. This is an infinitely more difficult task made necessary by the evident desire to create a special relationship with Russia while defending the sovereign rights and political interests of the Central European states.

In taking on this role, the United States inevitably will put itself at odds with the ambitions of the European Union. While it is true that NATO enlargement might relieve some pressure on the EU, it will nevertheless call into question among EU states either the need for their own CFSP or the propriety of American leadership in Europe on issues that are of vital interest to Europeans. We have had a foretaste of how sharp such a debate on the issue could become in the case of NATO's Southern Command. The United States and France have taken nearly irreconcilable positions on the question of whether it should remain in U.S. hands or be placed in those of a member of the "European pillar" of the Alliance. Thus, the United States must add Brussels, and
more importantly Paris, to the list of capitals to which it must pay attention.

NATO enlargement will bring a substantial increase in demands on the United States in political terms and potentially in economic and military terms even if it is well handled. Viewed from this more realistic perspective of strategic implications, one is compelled to ask why the United States should invite these demands.

The answer begins with the recognition of a truism: no post-Cold War settlement and new international system in Europe is possible without the active participation of the United States. Europe is not unique in this regard. The same can be said with respect to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. We take it for granted that it is true for North and South America. There is some debate whether it is true for Central and South Asia and for sub-Saharan Africa.

But to say this is only to admit the essential role of American power—political and economic as well as military—in the calculations of states in these regions relative to their own interests. The United States hardly has a need to go about the world seeking allies and friends. Apart from those who have an ideologically-based hostility to the United States and those who view us as direct competitors, most nations of the world freely seek U.S. favor as a means of promoting their domestic situation, their regional prospects, and their international influence. For its part, the United States welcomes and appreciates the contributions made by its allies and friends to the promotion of an international system in which the United States can prosper both at home and abroad.

If America's role in Europe is not unique, Europe is a region whose stability and security is nevertheless essential to any hope American statesmen might have for creating and maintaining a strategically viable and politically acceptable (at home and abroad) global international system. The reasons are as simple as they are profound. American political and economic interests in Europe, the
political and economic interests of our European allies and friends in America, and those of America and Europe elsewhere in the world have become inextricably intertwined over nearly a century of close cooperation. But it is not the relative closeness of interests that is so critical as the fact that, in combination, the United States and Europe generate irresistible power—political, economic and military—on the world scene.

This power can be dissipated by instability on the European continent. It has taken nearly 50 years for the continent to regenerate its power after the end of World War II. During those 50 years the United States managed, at a cost that increased over time, to sustain a reasonably stable, bipolar international system while promoting and protecting Europe's recovery. Now that the continent has recovered and the international system is becoming increasingly complex, the United States has an interest in seeing that instability does not recur in Europe. But this interest is rooted in more than a determination to discourage the diversion or dissipation of Europe's power in the belief that it can be harnessed more broadly to America's interests. More fundamental is the fact that insecurity and instability on the continent will inevitably threaten U.S. vital interests.\(^9\)

The American interest in Europe is two-fold. The first is to encourage the further development and protection of Europe's power. To repeat, this power is not only economic and military, but political as well. The United States can promote the development of European power in the confidence that it will be wielded by nations that share a commitment to the policies and politics of modern liberal states. Hence, while European economic power may compete with American business and financial interests, its liberal states, irrespective of their military power, pose no threat to U.S. well-being. The second American interest in Europe follows from the first: to deter the rise of a hegemonic power on the continent. A European hegemon can arise only in opposition to the liberal policies and politics of its neighbors; policies and politics to which all states in the
region, including Russia, are attempting to adapt and institutionalize. In short, it would need to be a revolutionary or revisionist state. Hostility to the principles of equality and freedom would render that state, by its own definition, an ideological enemy of the United States. And, undoubtedly possessed of the economic and military means of waging modern warfare, such a hegemon would be capable of physically destroying the United States. These two interests come together in NATO; an enlargement of NATO advances both interests proportionately.

Why NATO Enlargement?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been and will continue to be the institution through which the United States can best pursue its interests in Europe. The reason for this is not surprising. NATO is the only intergovernmental organization in Europe in which the United States is recognized as the lead nation. The United States is not a member of the EU or the Western European Union (WEU). It is one of many in the OSCE and Council of Europe. The G-7 has a broader portfolio and is, in any case, becoming increasingly less relevant. Likewise, the World Trade Organization has a wider mandate. NATO is the only organization in which the political and military dimensions of European power—and to a lesser though not insubstantial degree its economic power—come together in a way that they can be combined with that of the United States. To repeat, that power when combined is irresistible. Hence, from an American perspective, NATO should be the institution in the forefront of the creation of a new security system in Europe.

At present, no other institution in Europe is prepared to take the lead in creating a post-Cold War settlement. This is not a matter of will among the European allies, as some Americans might argue, but one of timing and scale. In the case of the European institution most frequently cited as the preferred alternative to NATO, the EU, it needs to be recalled that the Maastricht treaty, creating the EU, was signed only 5 years ago (1992). Europe is still organizing
itself. A CFSP, supported by a well-organized political and economic structure capable of reflecting and pursuing the interests of the EU, is more than a decade away. A competent military organization to support a CFSP is at least as distant. The members of the EU, and most importantly France and Germany, are only now beginning to redesign and equip their armed forces to bring them up to 21st century standards. In short, the EU will not be in a position to assume fully the responsibility for Europe’s day-to-day security for a decade, perhaps as many as two.

In the meanwhile, Russia will do what it can to muster the resources of the nation and bring them to bear on European politics. If history is any guide in the matter, this will be no mean effort. In the absence of offsetting political and military power, it is difficult to imagine that Russia would voluntarily constrain its interests. This observation is not driven by any abiding suspicion of Russian motives or the character of its people. It is merely a recognition of the enormous stake Russia has in assuring that its interests are satisfied. Three times in this century alone, Russia has recovered from the ravages of war or domestic revolution and internal repression (1917-21; 1937-39; 1945) and each time proved itself more than capable of pursuing its interests and influencing events on the continent. There is no reason to believe that Russia’s people will be content to consign their country to the status of a second ranking power in Europe when they are as able as we are to read and appreciate their own history and potential.

Hence, what we can reasonably expect—that it will take Europe more than a decade to establish itself and during that time Russia is likely to assert its interests in Europe—leads to the conclusion that security and stability will be established in Europe only with active U.S. involvement. The difficulty rests less with the desire that Russia should be part of the new system, but with the inability of the EU to successfully create that system in the region. That is, if methods are to be found to recognize Russian interests in Europe and to make a place for it in Europe’s security architecture, the United States must
continue to play an active role in the day-to-day security affairs of the continent. Europe cannot handle Russia alone. American power is essential to the equation. Its power is needed not in a traditional “balance of power” sense—putting in just enough to bring European power up to Russian standards or to encourage Russian development to offset European ambitions. American power is needed as an essential element in the creation of a strategic equilibrium in the new security system.

Viewed from this perspective, the case for the United States taking on an active role in European security affairs is compelling. The argument rests on a simple strategic calculation. Today and into the future, the United States faces increased requirements to deploy and employ its political, economic and military resources outside of Europe. In comparative terms, these requirements—from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the sub-continent and on to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia—are driven by conditions far more intractable than those facing the United States and its allies in Europe. It makes eminent good sense for the United States to work hard now to establish an equilibrium in Europe while such an endeavor might prove easiest, rather than to wait for a future time.

Time is only going to see additional difficulties develop elsewhere for the United States. As the President’s spring 1996 trip to Asia demonstrated, and as subsequent events have indicated, the United States has a long-term strategic challenge vis-à-vis China. Quite apart from the political and economic challenge presented by China, in the aftermath of the Taiwan contretemps the United States must now take seriously the military dimension as well. In Southeast Asia, the reemergence of Vietnam and the determination of Indonesia to enter the ranks as an emerging regional power changes the strategic landscape considerably. As a result, the United States has already undertaken, among other measures, to rework its alliance with Japan and to update its relations with Australia. In South Asia, the competition between Pakistan and India will not end any time soon. A
new “great game” is afoot in Central Asia. The Middle East peace remains fragile.

The United States has no alternative but to address these and other issues in these regions. Its economic future depends on it; its political credibility requires it. And in so doing, it contributes indirectly to stability in Europe. For there is no question that events abroad affect affairs in Europe. The Chinese Foreign Minister’s efforts to play the “Euro-card” during his spring 1996 negotiations with the United States on trade and Taiwan is one example; the crisis in the Middle East the same spring (prior to the Israeli elections) when U.S. and European statesmen tripped over each other seeking a cease-fire in southern Lebanon is another. The effort of the United States to conduct its dual containment policy of Iran and Iraq is another example, as is U.S. policy toward Cuba.

From the perspective of its broad strategic interests, the United States could conserve its resources for application elsewhere if it were to help design and maintain an enduring political system in Europe, even if that system were to require a continued day-to-day commitment to European security through an enlarged NATO. Creating a new European security system via NATO expansion directly raises Mandelbaum’s point that Russia must be a founding member of the new European security system. The current approach to NATO enlargement never directly meets the point. The argument, oft-made in the United States but repeatedly rejected by Moscow that NATO enlargement is in the interest of all the states of Europe except Russia, fails Mandelbaum’s test. Russia has put forward its own formulation on European security. It maintains that security in Europe cannot be assured until its interests in Europe are formally recognized by NATO and individual allies via a legally binding agreement.21

The Russian case needs to be considered before its objections can be met. The centerpiece of Russia’s interest is political rather than military or territorial. Russia’s position amounts to an insistence that it be accorded the status of a member of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
while retaining its position as an independent strategic actor on the Eurasian landmass. There is nothing extraordinary in this ambition and nothing illegitimate, in principle, with the Russian interest. It is after all, when stated so baldly, not much different than the American interest outlined above.

But the issue for the United States and its allies is not the legitimacy of Russian interest. The issue is the level of confidence they can have in the purposes to which such status would be put and the objectives Moscow would pursue on the Eurasian landmass. The question is particularly keen because for the moment, at least, the allies have it within their power to advance or retard Moscow's ambitions and interests. Thus, for the Alliance, the issue reduces itself to a question: Will recognizing Russia—in the sense described by Moscow—render Russia more or less likely to be a congenial partner in a post-Cold War European security system?

The earlier discussion might lead to the conclusion that the risks associated with admitting Russia as a founding member would be more than off-set by the deeper commitment to European security made by the United States as a result of enlargement. But unlike the arguments for equilibrium outlined above, this less sophisticated form of “balancing” is as likely to create new lines in Europe as would a decision not to grant Russian demands. The difference is that by admitting Russia to the NAC, lines would appear around the table of the NAC rather than on a map. Of the two possible ways the lines might be drawn, the former is the more dangerous for the Alliance. Substantial differences on policy or operations could transform the Alliance from an engine of reform and stability into a moribund organization as Moscow exercised an actual or virtual veto. To be sure, tension between the Alliance and a Russia that is outside the NAC could create internal tensions as well. But at the limit, the difference is that in such cases Moscow would not have direct means of preventing Alliance action and therefore influencing the formulation of its policy.
These concerns, however, have merit only if there is substantial reason to lack confidence in Russia’s purposes and objectives. On this point, it is hard to credit the case that Russia has committed itself to the principles guiding NATO enlargement as they apply either to internal governance or to the conduct of international relations. Beginning with the assault on the Russian White House in October 1993 and the purge of reformers from the government in early 1994, the Russian government has become progressively less cooperative in its policies in an effort to retain its authority and to preserve its status vis-à-vis the Duma on the domestic front. While economic reform continues, there is still little evidence that the economy has been put on a sound footing, that the looting of functioning industries by managers and government overseers has ended, or that credible measures have been taken to provide workers in state industries with their back pay.

Alexander Lebed’s showing in the first round of the 1996 election, his subsequent deal with President Yeltsin to withdraw from the second round in return for the post of security advisor, and, finally, his dismissal suggest that the electoral process is anything but regular. But as troubling as that may be, of greater concern is what it suggests about the internal instability among political elites concerning the direction of the country in both policy and programmatic terms. While the communist party may have been eliminated as a viable contender for the public’s support, no other party or policy direction has emerged with even modest evidence of public approval. The increasingly public display of dissatisfaction and disaffection with President Yeltsin could set up an opportunity for the Russian people to return to the polls in the near future to give a more clearly defined mandate for government. But the potential for such an outcome, or that the mandate will give life and direction to a substantial reform movement, must be weighed against the manner of President Yeltsin’s passing—by political or natural causes—and the extent to which those responsible for the current state of affairs will be able to control the electoral process to their own benefit.
The seriousness of internal disarray in Russia can be appreciated through many examples. One of the most telling, however, is the case of the Russian contribution to the international space station. Collaboration on the space station is the centerpiece of U.S.-Russian cooperation not only in space, but in science and in the preservation of high technology research, development, and industry in Russia. The effort is overseen by Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. The former is the lead voice in the United States on science and space; the latter is the functional head of Russia and arguably its most powerful factional leader. Neither the prestige of the first nor the power of the second has been sufficient to keep Russia's participation on schedule. The recent U.S. decision to substitute U.S. components for those Russia has failed to provide is a serious blow to Russia. It is in no sense a fatal blow, but it does demonstrate that the Russian system is bordering on collapse if it cannot deliver on one of its highest prestige projects in the sector of science and industry, an area in which it was once a world leader.

Despite its evident difficulties, Russia continues to pursue a foreign policy that belies its internal weakness. This includes unceasing efforts to use the forum and agreements of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to reintegrate the political and economic forces of the old USSR under Moscow's control. Russia has reinserted itself into the politics of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Southwest Asia. It continues to take a proprietary interest in Central Asia. And it is attempting to forge a rapprochement with China, built around border agreements, non-aggression pacts, military cooperation, and trade pacts. From a U.S. and NATO point of view, there is nothing sinister in these efforts, per se. What is uncertain is how far Russian objectives in these regions coincide with those of the allies, and particularly those of the United States. On recent evidence, this does not appear to be the case. Foreign Minister Primakov has sought to balance U.S. influence in the Middle East peace process and asserted an interest by Moscow in restoring historic relations with both Iraq and Iran. In Central Asia, Russia has done all that it
can to assure that states there depend on it for the exportation and transportation of their natural resources to Western markets. Russian spokesmen are straightforward in their warning that if their interests are not met in Europe, they will have no choice but to forge closer ties with China in an effort to isolate the United States from the rest of the continent outside Europe.

With respect to Europe itself, the Foreign Minister's statements that the borders of the states created since the fall of the Soviet Union are not guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements 25 gives rise to concern not only for the states of the Baltic region, but also for the status of Belarus and Ukraine as seen from Moscow. 26 Demands that any agreement reached with NATO be ratified not only by Alliance members and Moscow, but by the states of the CIS suggest that Russia is seeking to establish a balance of legally constituted entities with legally established rights and privileges vis-à-vis one another. In this light, demands for a renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), for NATO assurances that Alliance forces not be stationed on the territory of new members, and for the sides to affirm their nonaggressive attitude and status can be interpreted as an effort by Moscow to render moot the potential of NATO enlargement. Put another way, it would effectively relegate new members to second-class status in the Alliance, able to participate in the NAC and even, perhaps, in the Military Committee and integrated command, but without the freedom to develop their defense relations with the Alliance—and the Alliance with them—in ways best calculated to deter Russian policy and to defend themselves in times of crisis.

Russia's willingness to play the nuclear card in its effort to gain its objectives is a sign of both its relative weakness and its determination. Of the two, the latter is more important. Moscow's willingness to talk openly of relying more heavily on its strategic rocket forces and its tactical nuclear arms to offset Western power, its decision to make further reductions in offensive forces under the START II agreement an element of its negotiating strategy, and its
hints of cooperation in nuclear matters with China and possibly North Korea suggest that this is a very high-stakes matter from Russia's point of view. Nuclear diplomacy was thought to have been laid to rest in 1991 when Presidents Bush and Yeltsin embarked on unilateral reductions and concluded START I and II. To revive it now, especially after the United States has made the denuclearization of its own military policy and of international diplomacy one of the hallmarks of its defense and foreign policy is to risk a return to the conditions that led to the collapse of the USSR.27

On balance, then, U.S. and allied leaders have to consider whether or not the safety and security of the European system is better served with Moscow as a fully participating member from the beginning. To decide in the negative is not to decide to isolate or ignore Russia—neither is possible in any case. But a negative decision means that if a charter is forged between NATO and Moscow, it must not grant prerogatives to Moscow that effectively undermine the purposes of enlargement. The broader the agenda of issues on which Brussels grants Russia a right to coordinate decisions and actions, the closer Moscow comes to achieving its objectives and the less likely it becomes that enlargement will serve American interests.

It would seem that the significance of a charter agreement with Russia would encourage the Alliance to apply to Russia the same criteria it applies to new members—commitments to economic and political reform, transparency in military affairs, an end to border disputes, etc. Russia would not pass for membership on these criteria; any recognition accorded its interests by NATO via a charter should take this into account. Enlargement seeks to assure that no hegemon will arise in the future to threaten Europe and the United States. Russia remains the only state in Europe able to achieve that status and the only one with domestic and international policies that give concern to other European powers. A charter should not substitute for membership in either figurative or literal terms.
Conclusion and Summary.

The thesis being put forward is that the accession of states in Central Europe to NATO, complemented by the development of security arrangements affiliated with NATO through the PfP or WEU and followed as appropriate by EU enlargement is the best approach to establishing a post-Cold War security system in Europe and for creating a strategic equilibrium that includes Russia.

The reasons for this derive from the purpose behind an American commitment to equilibrium in Europe: to assure that all states have the opportunity to prosper and in which a recourse to aggression and war would require a revolutionary change in an aspiring hegemon and serve as a catalyst for uniting the remaining states in opposition. The rationale for the enlargement of the Alliance outlined here meets each of these criteria in turn.

With respect to the opportunity of states to prosper, the approach outlined here is aimed at taking nearer-term pressure off the EU to provide security assistance to the Central and Eastern Europeans. This should permit the EU to concentrate on getting its internal house in order. This includes not only the implementation of recommendations from the IGC, but a process for developing and implementing a CFSP. At the same time, NATO enlargement allows the Alliance to counsel its newest members and PfP participants as they rationalize their own economies and budgets. It is in Europe's interest to encourage them to emphasize butter over guns when considering both the absolute ratios between these two and where to spend the marginal dollar. NATO enlargement will make these states more receptive to this encouragement.

As for setting conditions that would require revolutionary change in an aspiring hegemon before it embarked on aggression, NATO enlargement provides assurance to both Russia and the allies. For Russia, enlargement creates an interest in the Alliance as a whole to restrain the practices of its members and itself corporately such that neither individual members nor
NATO's broad policy gives rise to activities that can be interpreted in Russia as being aggressive. For the allies, it codifies the principles of national sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity as the basis for peace and stability in Europe. It gives strength to the principles first articulated in Helsinki.

These principles are essential components of the foundation of a modern, liberal state. As such, they are important to Russia. Apart from an appeal to force or prerogative, they provide the only basis on which Russia can hope to successfully press its security interests in Europe with the other powers on the continent. For Russia to accept NATO enlargement would not be an act of humiliation, but an indication that it has taken a further step in the long process of liberalizing its regime and establishing normal relations with its neighbors.

Finally, NATO enlargement satisfies the last criterion: setting the conditions for others to react if an aspiring hegemon should emerge, clearly. This is consistent with the liberal principles of sovereignty, independence and integrity, supported by the right of self-defense. No arrangement for Central and Eastern Europe can be a lasting one if it leaves this last principle in doubt.

The "Europeanization" of Europe's security is a long-term goal. Its possibility rests on the establishment of a stable security system in Europe. This system depends on the creation of a strategic equilibrium. That equilibrium, in turn, depends on the presence and active participation of the United States in the day-to-day security affairs in Europe. A nearer-term American investment in an enlarged NATO will not only assure that U.S. vital interests are protected in Europe, but provide the United States with the strategic flexibility it will need to secure its interests, vital or otherwise, elsewhere in the world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. The implications for the "Russia First" policy extended to other features of security policy. For example, the nuclear policy review and
the associated arms control agenda of the administration were keyed to the creation of a new relationship between the United States and Russia.


7. Remarks by President Clinton, October 22, 1996.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


CHAPTER 2

POST-ENLARGEMENT NATO: DANGERS OF "FAILED SUITORS" AND NEED FOR A STRATEGY

Jeffrey Simon

NATO has been grappling with the issue of enlargement since the Central and East European (CEE) Revolutions of 1989-90 when newly-emerging post-communist states declared their desire to "return to Europe." This meant joining NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO’s initial response at the July 1990 London Summit was to extend a "hand of friendship" and invite members of the Warsaw Pact to send liaison ambassadors to NATO. As a result of the September 12, 1990, Four-plus-Two agreement, the former German Democratic Republic unified with Germany on October 1 and, as such, became a member of NATO and assumed the protection of Article 5.

During 1991-93, CEE pressures to join NATO increased as the situation in Europe began to change and become more complex. Change was evident as military forces from the former Soviet Union continued to withdraw from Germany, and on July 1, 1991, the last Soviet forces departed Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. In November 1991 at the Rome Summit, NATO responded by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a framework for dialogue on security issues among Alliance members and CEE. As of January 1992, the situation became more complex in Europe when more than 20 new states were created after the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated. The NACC, which originally had been envisioned to have six members, immediately accepted all former Soviet Union states, so that by the spring of 1992 there were 23 NACC participants, which effectively limited its utility.
Despite some public utterances in Prague, Bratislava, and Warsaw in August 1993 implying support for NATO enlargement, President Boris Yeltsin expressed alarm in a so-called “secret letter” in September, making it quite clear that Russia had come to view NATO enlargement to the East as a threat to Russian security interests. In what many Central Europeans saw at the time as a “Policy For Postponement,” the January 10-11, 1994, Brussels NATO Summit initiated “Partnership For Peace” ( PfP) and declared that NATO was committed to future enlargement.

The Tightening Enlargement Decision Schedule.

Continued Central and East European pressure on the Alliance led to the December 1, 1994, North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial decision to commission a study on the “how” and “why” of enlargement. The April 1995 Noordwijk NAC ministerial reviewed the study draft and in September the Study On NATO Enlargement was briefed to partners.

The December 1995 NAC ministerial launched enhanced 16+1 dialogues with those partners who were interested in joining the Alliance. Initially, 15 (of 27) partners expressed interest in commencing 16+1 discussions. In the end, though, two partners—Ukraine and Azerbaijan—never participated. Two other partners—Finland and Bulgaria—who participated in the dialogues, concluded that they would “not seek immediate membership.” Eleven partners, who participated in the three rounds of intensified dialogues between April and October 1996, expressed interest in joining the Alliance “immediately.” The pool of potential “failed suitors” comes from the diverse group of 11 partners—Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia; Romania and Slovenia; Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)—who are not offered invitations in July 1997.

While the June 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial received a report on the ongoing consultations and addressed enhanced cooperation with partners, the December 1996
NAC ministerial—in addition to European “visibility” and post-Implementation Force (IFOR)—built on Secretary General Javier Solana’s assessments of the 16+1 dialogues, and announced that the Alliance would actually invite new members at the July 1997 Madrid Summit.11

Planning for managing NATO enlargement will become priority business during 1997 in the buildup to the Madrid Summit. In what is likely to become a tightening enlargement decision schedule, during the winter and spring 1997 NATO will need to determine “whom” to invite and, although the 50th anniversary of NATO has been mentioned by President Clinton, “when” they should join.

Managing NATO’s enlargement process—particularly in defining the criteria so as to justify the choice of new members, to prevent destabilizing the “failed suitors,” and to keep them engaged in PfP—will be a major challenge! In other words, NATO faces the danger of creating “failed suitors” and derailing the PfP process. In addition, defining and managing NATO’s relationship with Russia and Ukraine will be demanding.

**Partnership for Peace: From January 1994 to Post-Enlargement.**

Since PfP’s inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO has reoriented its outreach programs and developed new institutions to manage the partnership program. Despite initial reservations on the part of many CEE states, who had hoped for an early enlargement decision, and the fact that initially PfP was only an embryonic concept, PfP has become a very popular and successful program. Open to all Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members, in just 3 years a widely diverse 27 countries—from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, and neutrals—have adopted PfP.

After signing PfP Framework Documents outlining broad policy goals and objectives, 22 partners developed presentation documents, which identified their PfP
objectives (e.g., whether they seek NATO membership or only cooperation). Individual partnership programs (IPPs) were developed to help the partner meet its specific presentation document objectives. In addition, NATO developed a Partnership Work Program (PWP) listing NATO activities that partners could use to fulfill their own IPPs, and has now initiated a 3-year planning cycle for IPPs.

As the partnership program evolved, a Planning and Review Process (PARP) was also established to help (now 15) partners adopt NATO-compatible methods and procedures and develop interoperability for peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance operations. To prepare partners for deploying the IFOR, the December 1995 NAC broadened the January 1994 Brussels Summit terms of reference to include “peace enforcement measures.” Presently, the PARP includes 20 interoperability objectives (I.O.s) and might be viewed as a mini-defense planning questionnaire (DPQ) that current NATO members must provide to NATO.

NATO’s new institutions to implement PfP on a day-to-day basis have gone far beyond the NACC initially created in 1991. In 1994, NATO created a Political-military Steering Committee (PMSC) to manage PfP programs and develop the PWP and IPPs. A separate Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) was established at Mons, near SHAPE headquarters, to coordinate military activities of (now 21) partners with NATO. The PCC helps partners identify and fulfill military training and exercise requirements to develop interoperability with NATO. Efforts have been occurring through numerous PfP and “in the spirit of PfP” exercises that have expanded since 1994 and with the deployment of the IFOR since December 1995.

Though the PfP program and activities have been remarkably successful, we have reached a new stage where its activities need to be carefully evaluated and substantially improved in order to accelerate partner reforms and preparation for membership. To date, PfP military exercises have been judged successful just because they occurred. It is now time, though, to realistically assess
partner capacities in PfP exercises. We need to honestly address partner deficiencies in NATO procedures as well as in general performance standards. We cannot continue to gloss over these out of concern for embarrassing partners. They know deficiencies exist, and we know they exist. By glossing them over, we discourage partners’ internal reforms. The same applies for their IFOR participation. This means that NATO needs to establish training and performance standards and to critically evaluate them.

In sum, PfP has been remarkably successful, but the time has arrived for developing rigorous criteria for partners’ political compatibility and military interoperability to encourage needed reforms and to prepare partners for accession to the Alliance. In the buildup to July 1997, the criteria will be needed to justify NATO’s decision to the “failed suitors” in order to keep them engaged in PfP.

From Uncertain Criteria to Military Interoperability Objectives.

Partners and NATO have sought to establish a foundation for linking force goal planning and operational interoperability as a precondition for full NATO membership. In essence, operational interoperability simply means assessing the partner’s ability to carry out operations with NATO and participate in NATO’s command and control structure. First, a partner’s ability to carry out operations with NATO can be measured by comparing a partner’s ground, sea, and air training with NATO’s standards. Of the approximately 1,500 NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGS), about 700 have been released for use by the partners.

Second, a partner’s ability to operate within NATO’s command and control structure requires several necessary conditions. First, it requires adequate language training. Second, it requires education and training of specific “target groups.” Each partner needs an adequate number of staff and liaison officers and functional area officers to work in a NATO multinational headquarters, and trained com-
manders and staffs of partner units that will operate within a NATO multinational formation. Third, partners need a minimal technical interoperability in communications and command and control.

Considerable progress was registered in 1994-95 through implementation of three approaches: (1) the PfP planning and review process which promised a high degree of transparency in defense planning and budgeting; (2) the IPP which stated the individual partner’s requirements; and (3) the PWP which outlined what NATO and the specific allies had to offer for partner participation. All three processes are intended to establish a dialogue on force requirements and planning.

Unfortunately, the PWP and IPPs initially evolved into “activities-oriented” rather than “objectives-oriented” mechanisms. As one commentator noted, PWP and IPP seek essentially to “fill the basket” with guesses as to what are likely to prove appropriate partner “activity.”14 In part, because of uncertain criteria, NATO guidance has been minimal, with NATO inquiring of partners through the IPP “what do you want to do” and the latter responding via the PWP “what do you have to offer?”

Despite these early deficiencies, during 1996 the PfP program made very substantial progress in defining I.O.s. However, the program remains at a plateau where partner nations badly need in-depth guidance on interoperability and force planning. Many partners find that they are at a disadvantage given their limited access to classified NATO documents; those few made available offer little guidance on priorities and conceptual approaches relevant to partner planning needs. NATO’s attempts to provide needed guidance have yielded 20 approved I.O.s which are too generalized, and thus offer little promise of significant progress in meeting NATO’s 44 I.O.s.

On balance, many partners increasingly find existing mechanisms and channels of available information disconnected, bureaucratically burdensome, and problematic as to the provision of meaningful criteria by which to
measure their progress. However, there is some expectation of progress with development of a Bi-MNC Directive for Peace Support Operations which provides a foundation for the development of education, training, and military exercise activities. Within the same framework, interoperability requirements and tasks are being developed for air, land, and maritime forces. Also within NATO, recognition is growing that the PARP should provide the basis for achieving political compatibility in light of potential enlargement.

In establishing criteria to measure interoperability progress, two efforts currently underway will have a significant impact. NATO/PfP military exercises have achieved measurable momentum. Three PfP exercises took place in 1994, 8 in 1995, and 24 in 1996. Held at the brigade-level over the past year, the first joint corps-level exercise is planned for 1997. I.O.s are now being incorporated in exercise specifications and final exercise reports are to be included in the PARP. A significant obstacle, however, could revolve around resource limitations and financial constraints in expanding the number of such military exercises and in developing serious evaluations of partner performance.

“Lessons learned” from IFOR operations in Bosnia will be of considerable importance to both NATO and partners. Sixteen non-NATO nations participated in IFOR; of these, 13 are partners who contributed 5,200 personnel of the 51,300 total, and 12 participate in the PARP. There is general recognition in NATO of the need to be prudent in drawing conclusions from IFOR. For example, future NATO participation in peace operations may require only limited force involvement and therefore should neither be confused with, nor detract from the goal of general purpose (Article 5) force planning and joint training. In addition, some IFOR partner participants experienced significant distortions and stresses on their defense budgets.

Partners, on the other hand, have been tempted to view participation in IFOR as a short cut for admission to NATO, particularly as the operation proved successful. NATO must
also consider the following factors: (1) the extent to which partner military establishments have consulted civilian authorities prior to joining IFOR; (2) the extent IFOR participation has delayed other necessary internal reforms; and (3) the degree to which budgetary distortions have occurred in partner economic plans. Finally to be kept in mind is the amount of pressure felt to "join the willing"; the sense among some partners that IFOR participation was a necessary criterion for serious consideration for NATO membership.

At the heart of internal NATO concern when weighing new membership is the changing multipurpose nature of the Alliance. NATO is not only now concerned with peace operations, humanitarian assistance, sea rescue, and peace enforcement operations as mandated by the NAC, but the Alliance is also faced with drastically reduced force levels and greater budgetary constraints. As a result, NATO may have to reexamine and possibly lower the threshold between Article 4 capabilities and the Article 5 (nuclear) planning level. Within NATO some worry that the organization may be moving in directions for which there has been little preparation, and PfP applications for membership add to existing doubts and uncertainties.

These appear to be the principal reasons why political and military criteria for new members remain undefined. But, as decision time approaches, their definition will become increasingly essential if NATO is to have credibility with those PfP participants excluded.

**NATO’s Political “Principles” as Enlargement Objectives.**

NATO’s great historic success might be described as having formed the reconciliation between two former adversaries—Germany and France. The institutionalization of transparent defense budgeting and force planning, common defense resource management practices, and communications, command, and interoperability standards have also contributed to building confidence and developing
security among European allies. Smaller NATO members, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway, today feel more secure in the shadow of their large German neighbor because of the practices that have been institutionalized in NATO.

Over the past half century, the development of confidence, security, and stability in the Western half of Europe has been NATO's greatest singular achievement. NATO's great challenge for the opening of the 21st century is to now expand that institutionalized zone of confidence, security, and stability to Europe's Eastern half through enlargement and to facilitate these countries' "return to Europe." This remains NATO's challenge and historic mission and is the reason why enlargement should occur.

The Alliance began developing general principles for enlargement with the creation of the NACC at the 1991 Rome Summit, in the PfP program launched in January 1994, and in the Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995. Also during this period, President William Clinton's speeches and Secretary of Defense William Perry's "five principles" emphasized that new members should conform to basic political principles such as democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; demonstrate a commitment to economic liberty and free market; adhere to OSCE norms and principles involving treatment of ethnic minorities and social justice; resolve territorial disputes by establishing good neighbor relations; and establish democratic control of the military.

The Study on NATO Enlargement further stipulated the following necessary conditions: (1) it defined what constitutes "effective" democratic control of the military—to include defense management reforms in areas such as transparent defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation, and parliamentary and public accountability; and (2) it declared that some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability was necessary.
In addition to active participation in PfP, new members would have to ensure that adequate resources are available to assume the added and considerable financial obligations of joining, and to develop necessary interoperability—to include minimal standards in collective defense planning to pave the way for more detailed operational planning with the Alliance. Finally, new members should not “close the door” to future candidate members.\textsuperscript{16}

These principles and the incentives of NATO enlargement have planted the seeds for reform in Europe’s “Eastern” half. Indeed, many have germinated to form the building blocks for developing “real” confidence and security in this region.

Similar to the historic Franco-German reconciliation, we are witnessing the beginning of a just as significant historic reconciliation between Poland and Germany. This has been embedded in treaty, which recognizes borders, and in combined military activities and cooperation. Similarly, Poland has expanded the zone of confidence-building and security to Lithuania and Ukraine. A few other examples nurtured by the incentives of NATO enlargement include the recently concluded basic treaties between Hungary and Slovakia, and Romania and Hungary. Such treaties not only recognize existing borders, but also establish principles for the treatment of ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{17}

Second, NATO has planted the seeds of military and political cooperation and confidence-building not only in the Partnership Coordination Center at Mons, but in the planning and review process at NATO Headquarters. The PARP forms the institutional basis for transparent force planning and developing real confidence in Europe’s Eastern half.

Third, what will all of this confidence and security nurtured by NATO enlargement cost? Though some initial estimates vary considerably and appear expensive,\textsuperscript{18} the reality is probably not very much. Poland, a large aspiring NATO member of 38 million, recently completed its “Estimated Cost of NATO Enlargement: A Contribution To
the Debate" which concluded that NATO accession will cost Poland $1.5 billion over a 15-year period; and that Poland could absorb most of that burden from its defense budget.\textsuperscript{19} Yes, enlargement will cost everyone something, but the burden will be manageable.

To conclude, NATO's enlargement represents a further extension of NATO's historic achievements to the half of Europe that has been denied the benefits enjoyed by the West and facilitates its "return to Europe." By creating incentives through enlargement, NATO has created, at bargain basement cost, the building blocks for developing real confidence, stability, and security in Europe. This will be NATO's 21st century challenge and historic mission.

The Need for a NATO Strategy.

The Alliance has been addressing one issue at a time when there is a pressing need for a broad strategic approach, preferably before the July 1997 Summit when partners anticipate announcement of the first tranche of candidates for NATO admission. In particular, partners expect that specific political, economic, social, and military criteria will be made clear. President Clinton's speeches, Secretary of Defense Perry's "five principles," and the Study on NATO Enlargement provide a useful starting point. But the NAC will soon be required to design links in three critical areas:

- The processes by which political compatibility between NATO and PfP partners should evolve (from NACC to an Atlantic Partnership Council–APC);

- The ways in which NATO should strengthen ties with EU and Western European Union (WEU);

- Defining how military interoperability is to be achieved in light of the limited economic and financial resources available to PfP partners.

Also NATO needs to answer a number of ancillary questions: Notably how do we ensure the integrity of Alliance consensus once membership is opened? How do we
ensure that enriched PfP costs do not “come out of NATO’s hide.”

The NATO outreach program to excluded partners could become stymied by other factors. Some partners not included in first tranche admission could well conclude that NATO has no intention of proceeding to a second or third stage, thus raising doubts about the advantages of reorganizing and modernizing their military at considerable cost if NATO membership is a chimera. In short, the Alliance must address not only criteria, but also how to deal with a “failed suitor” syndrome on the part of disappointed applicants.

**What Needs To Be Done?**

First, it is clear that the partnership needs a strengthened political component to address and offset the imbalance between the well-developed military and the under-developed political components of PfP. A major step would be to establish a permanent partnership staff element at NATO Headquarters in Brussels as a political counterpart to the military PCC at SHAPE in Mons. The International Partnership Staff (IPS) would be equivalent to the NATO International Staff (IS) which reports to the NAC and the International Military Staff (IMS) which serves the Military Committee. The IPS would provide the necessary political balance for PfP and would focus and coordinate partnership activities.

A primary task of the IPS would be to support an expanded political partnership forum in Brussels; what the December 1996 NAC ministerial has proposed as “a single new cooperative mechanism” called the APC. But the IPS should also promote and support a greater (and self-funded) role in the numerous NATO committees. Partner states need to gain more influence in all aspects of political planning and decisionmaking which affect the PfP process.

What the APC’s relationship to the NACC will become remains unclear, in part because its concept is as embryonic as was the PfP concept in January 1994. But if the APC were
to become a really effective political body (as PfP has become), it should be more selective than the NACC in its membership. Indeed, one of the reasons for the NACC remaining moribund has been the fact that the decision to include all successor states from the former Soviet Union diluted its political utility from inception.

Despite the NACC's well-recognized limitations, it should continue to exist as NATO's umbrella for an inclusive, undivided Europe. The APC, though, should be more exclusive and act as a political training institution for aspiring NATO members. Therefore, as a result of partner self-selection, the APC might be limited only to those PARP partners who aspire “immediate” NATO membership. Hence, if Bulgaria were to change its policy and decide that it wanted to join NATO, Bulgaria could join the APC.

The APC, in marked contrast to the NACC, would be the institutional forum in which the political integration of PARP participants would occur. The APC could meet monthly in consultation with the NAC (as do WEU associate partners and associate members with the Council). Political integration of potential new members could be furthered and improved by expanding their access to NATO STANAGS and I.O.s to further develop their force planning processes.

Second, NATO needs to develop deeper ties to the EU. An initial step linking NATO and the WEU (and by extension EU) was the decision taken at the June 1996 Berlin NAC by the 16 NATO foreign ministers, making it possible for European members to organize military operations “without the U.S. in the lead.” Conceptually, political decisions on launching European-led NATO operations will be taken by the WEU, a 10-member organization with no substantial military resources of its own. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) emanating from NATO are expected to partially enhance WEU crisis management capabilities.

This new initiative could serve as a launch pad for tying NATO and PfP partners more closely together with EU,
particularly in establishing economic planning and internal order criteria. Enhancement of ties with EU could help overcome the existing political and economic compatibility shortfalls in NATO’s criteria dialogues with PfP partners, helping to establish recognized standards for full membership in both institutions. Compatibility of interests already exists in that the Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1991 and the EU Maastricht treaty were actually worked out side-by-side.

Little, if any, planning has occurred to date within NATO on the establishment of a constructive relationship with the EU. The EU can provide helpful guidance to PfP not only in establishing economic planning priorities, but also on an important program area outside NATO’s purview regarding security–police operations dealing with organized crime and corruption, and the maintenance of internal order. The potential of the EU in both fields is reflected in the fact that it has a more extensive formal relationship with Moscow than does NATO.

The EU has also outpaced NATO in seeking to broaden ties with Central and Eastern European countries. For example, it has offered the Central European “democracies” full membership in principle while concluding association agreements in the interim. These agreements permit 10 associate partners and 3 associate members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) to participate in WEU institutions. Since 9 of the 11 PfP partners aspiring NATO membership are also WEU associate partners (Albania and FYROM are the two excluded), the EU and WEU can be effective in “softening” the blow of NATO exclusion for many of the “failed suitors.”

Efforts should be made to encourage convergence of the EU and WEU and full membership for Central European “democracies” at an early date, thereby providing an interim solution to their security needs while awaiting NATO admission. (This would be particularly important for the three Baltic states.)22 This approach would facilitate linkage of so-called European and Atlantic security pillars. The most pressing need is to establish interlocking (economic and
political) criteria with more clearly defined interoperability (political-military and military) criteria in order to provide PfP members a clearly delineated chart by which to measure qualifications for full membership in both institutions.

Third, NATO political restructuring is necessary. To draw the various levels together in a viable whole, NATO might create an Assistant Secretary General (ASG)-level position for PfP to oversee external coordination with the EU/WEU and internal IPS activities. Precedent for this has already been established on NATO’s military side, when the Berlin NAC ministerial in June 1996 established a deputy SACEUR to act as liaison with the WEU.

The viability of such a position would depend on the willingness of NATO members to support internal realignment of functions and responsibilities, as well as support for the ASG to serve as NATO’s primary point of contact with the EU. Part of the ASG’s responsibility should be to enhance partner understanding of NATO-WEU strategic thinking and to integrate NATO interoperability criteria with a partner’s force planning. Most particularly, the ASG for PfP would require an individual prepared to discuss realistically with the EU and WEU how to establish a common standard for the assessment of a partner’s progress. In addition, the PfP ASG must make clear that an invitation to join NATO does not grant automatic admission. Programs of objectives and clear time lines should be negotiated with partners.

Fourth, political and military principles, viewed as necessary but not sufficient conditions for NATO membership and which have evolved over time, must be made clear so as to justify NATO’s decision of “who” NATO actually invites, and to credibly explain why certain partners have been temporarily excluded. Political and military principles also will be necessary to keep partners engaged in their reform programs.

Fifth, if the NATO Madrid Summit “invitation strategy” was to ask three partners—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary—to commence accession talks immediately, NATO
might also announce that it would look forward to starting accession talks with Slovenia and Romania in 12-18 months after the summit upon their completion of specified (but varying) objectives. Romania and Slovenia could each use the added time to proceed with and consolidate their reforms and to build their military institutions respectively. Correspondingly, as NATO begins to develop consensus among its 16 members, the Madrid Summit might decide to slip Poland and/or Hungary into the delayed group pending completion of their respective democratic control of the military reforms and demonstration of progress in building an adequate defense consensus and defense budget.

The invitation "formula" is likely to be the result of a bargaining process within the Alliance as it attempts to develop consensus on "who" to invite. The opening salvo in NATO's "bargaining" process has been advanced by France's support for Romania in the first tranche and by Italy's support for Slovenia. In addition, Turkey has further complicated the process by holding its admission to the EU as its price for supporting NATO enlargement.

If NATO were to extend an invitation to these "five" partners, NATO programs would need to be established for the six "failed suitors" to keep them engaged in their internal reforms and involved in deepening cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Enhanced PfP packages and APC participation will be necessary and helpful, but may prove inadequate. In this regard, if NATO had an IPS and ASG for PfP and institutional and cooperative links with the EU (and WEU), stabilizing Slovakia and the three Baltic states would be made easier and their "landing" after the summit would be softened.

Dealing with Albania and FYROM will be more difficult because of the absence of an EU-"safety-net." Hence, NATO policy and allied bilateral policies will become more important and essential as tools to keep these two "failed suitors" engaged. Bulgaria does not qualify as a "failed suitor" because NATO membership is not a goal on its immediate horizon, but it is tied to the EU and is an
associate partner in the WEU. Therefore, these additional tools are available to engage and stabilize Bulgaria.

NATO's post-enlargement summit relations with Russia and Ukraine might also be improved. In addition to what evolves in NATO's strategic relationship with each of these two states through charters and/or treaties, Russia and Ukraine also might participate in the monthly NAC/APC sessions to further develop confidence and advance their understanding of NATO affairs.

In summary, a coordinated NATO-EU enlargement strategy would help NATO to establish Article 4 and Article 5 compatibility and interoperability criteria to facilitate real partner reform. It would help NATO overcome the “failed-suitors” syndrome that would likely result from those partners excluded from a first NATO enlargement tranche. It would provide the catalyst for needed internal NATO structural reform—an ASG for PfP, IPS, and APC—to enhance partner political cooperation and integration. Finally, it would provide partners with realistic goals (of what they need to do and to assess costs) so each partner government can turn to its respective society to choose which among its economic/political (EU) or defense and security (NATO) priorities should take precedence in the nation's agenda to “return to Europe.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. On January 25-26, 1990, Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel visited Hungary and Poland and called on all three countries to coordinate their “return to Europe.”


4. The Western Group of Soviet Forces would complete their withdrawal from Germany by September 1994, as would the Northern Group of Soviet Forces from Poland.

6. For the full text of Yeltsin's secret letter on NATO expansion, see *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, Prague, December 2, 1993, p. 6.


12. These were the terms of reference adopted at the January 1994 Brussels Summit.


18. Richard Kugler has posed estimates of $10 to $50 billion varying with assumptions. See Richard Kugler, "Defense Program


23. For a more thorough discussion, see Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk, "Romania and NATO," Strategic Forum, No. 101, February 1997.

24. For a more complete discussion of the problems in Poland's democratic control of the military and in Hungary's low defense expenditures and weak consensus, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996, esp. Chapters IV and V.
CHAPTER 3

NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA: HOW WILL THEIR RELATIONS CHANGE?

Leon Goure

INTRODUCTION

At this time, Russian-NATO relations are still in an early negotiation stage, given that preceding attempts, such as Washington's efforts to draw Russia into the Partnership for Peace program, have yielded little results. At the same time, Russia has failed to persuade the West to adopt a new security system based on the Organization for Security and Coopertion in Europe (OSCE) which would have largely neutralized NATO by giving Russia a say over its actions. Moscow is still voicing strong criticism of NATO's enlargement, warnings (although by and large in vague terms) of dire consequences if it is implemented, and demanding a voice in NATO's decisionmaking and actions. All of this suggests that for now Moscow is holding to its maximum bargaining position and demands despite the various schemes and concessions proposed by NATO and the United States to deal with Russia's complaints.

Despite Russia's obviously weak position, it has already achieved significant successes by its so-called "uncompromising" negative stance on NATO's enlargement, unceasing complaints, and threats. True, occasionally some Russian officials appear to hint at possible compromises, but this seems more intended to keep the dialogue alive and NATO's concessions coming, even though Moscow is, in fact, apparently resigned to the inevitability of NATO's enlargement. Russian officials and analysts, including Foreign Minister Evgeniy Primakov, are convinced that their constant complaining pays off and say so publicly. This implies that, at this time, Moscow has little incentive to change its strategy, all the more so as it gives it the
opportunity to try to exploit differences between views among NATO’s senior members. It is suggested that this strategy generally could be pursued until 1999 when the enlargement would actually be put into practice. Indeed, Russia is in the enviable position of being able to hold to its negative position while leaving the burden of offering new initiatives in the dialogue and negotiations to NATO and especially the United States. To quote a Russian analyst: “NATO representatives are running around trying to settle all Russian issues by the time of the Madrid summit (in July 1997). Russia’s task is simpler—it has nowhere to run.”1 Of course, there is a risk that, by making public Russia’s maximum demands, President Yeltsin and Primakov may find themselves locked in by domestic political pressures and unable to make concessions of their own to reach an agreement with NATO. But this would likely be more damaging to Russia’s than to NATO’s interests. In any event, the outcome of Russian-NATO negotiations is uncertain, given that at this time it is not known how far NATO will go in its attempts to placate Moscow.

Of course, future Russian-NATO relations will not depend solely on the outcome of the negotiation process concerning NATO’s enlargement. Other major uncertainties or variables can greatly influence and shape these relations. The most immediate one is the political instability of the ruling Russian regime and how the political character of the Russian states will evolve in the near term. The political effects of Yeltsin’s illness and the evidence of active struggle for power among various pretenders to the presidency and factions among the elite illustrate this problem. Russia is as yet neither a full-fledged democracy with strong democratic traditions nor does it have a real free-market system. In fact, Russia’s economy has been characterized as “nomenklatura capitalism.” It is uncertain how leadership succession will actually work. Another uncertainty concerns the continued stability and cohesion of Russia and the Center’s effective control of the regions. Still a further uncertainty is Russia’s future relations with other member republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which could strongly
influence NATO’s views on partnership with Russia and perceptions of a potential Russian threat to NATO. Furthermore, Russian-NATO relations are likely to be strongly influenced by how Moscow cooperates with the United States and NATO on issues of arms control and the implementation of arms control agreements. Finally, these relations will be sensitive to the conduct of Russian foreign policy elsewhere in the world, especially in areas believed to be unstable and of special interest to Western Europe and the United States.

Yet, while these uncertainties can significantly influence the views of NATO’s member states on Russia, it still remains that Moscow’s options and freedom of action in response to NATO’s enlargement are quite limited in the foreseeable future. In fact, despite all their complaints, warnings, and hints at “countermeasures,” Russians by and large discuss the consequences of NATO’s enlargement in noticeably less dire terms as far as future Russian relations with the West are concerned than do various Western critics of the enlargement. There is a possibility, therefore, that NATO may come to suffer from greater self-induced fears than are reasonable, given a realistic appraisal of what Moscow can actually do and what of its priorities and vital interests are most likely to remain. Given the gravity of Russia’s domestic economic, political, social, and ethnic problems and the potential threat they pose to the country’s stability and Yeltsin’s regime, the Russian anti-NATO enlargement campaign has, to some extent, the characteristics of an attempted diversion from Russia’s domestic troubles in the traditional Russian manner of reacting to problems by first looking for someone to blame them on, preferably foreigners.

Still, there are what many in the West are willing to recognize as legitimate Russian security concerns about the enlargement which need to be dealt with. In Moscow, the greatest fear appears to be that Russia may find itself isolated or relegated to the periphery of European affairs. Publicly, however, much attention is given to military security questions, especially to the claim that the
enlargement would introduce major unfavorable changes into the Russian-NATO military balance, and that this may pose a threat to Russia's security in the future if the West were to decide to adopt anti-Russian policies. However, many Russian officials, analysts, and commentators claim that the issue of NATO's enlargement is for Russia a fundamentally psychological one, in that it would be a blow to Russian pride and self-image as a "great power," bring home the fact that it is the loser in the Cold War and is "rejected" by the West, and painfully underscore its weakness—some say "helplessness"—vis-à-vis the West. Even so, how much the enlargement might become the critical cause of worsening trends in Russian relations with NATO and the United States in the longer term is debatable.

THE QUESTION OF POTENTIAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA

There have been and continue to be warnings from various sources that NATO's enlargement may have dire political consequences for Russia, consequences which may have highly undesirable effects on Russian-Western relations. One of these is that it may adversely affect Russia's democratization process, indeed, that it may reverse it, even though the U.S. Government has maintained that Russia's democratization is "irreversible." Another consequence would be a reinforcement of Russian xenophobia and especially the already evident Russian hostility to the United States.

Russia's Democratization Question.

Several facts provide a context to this question and to an examination of the validity of concerns about possibly significant adverse effects on Russia's democratization process. First, it should be noted that, as is generally acknowledged, foreign policy issues—and this includes the threat of NATO's enlargement—played no significant role in Russia's presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1996. Despite the fact that it has agitated the politically active
elite and been widely debated by the mass media, the
general Russian public has been pretty much indifferent to
it. The main driving factor in Russian democratic policies is
economics, that is, the question of how to achieve economic
growth, pay off arrears in wages and debts, reverse the
decline of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (6 percent in
1996) and in industrial and agricultural production. The
biggest political threat to the Yeltsin regime comes from its
failure to solve Russia’s economic mess and retain the
population’s confidence. Even though Yeltsin won the
presidential election in 1996, many Russians are looking for
a “strong hand” or even “fist” to bring order to the country,
clean up corruption and criminality, and improve the
population’s lot; hence General Lebed’s continued high
popularity. From the standpoint of many Russians,
democracy has failed because it has simply become the tool
and plaything of power hungry politicians, the “new
Russian” plutocrats, and of the “Mafia,” leaving little room
for the general population to participate in and benefit from
the democratic process. The way the presidential elections
were run could be said to cast serious doubts on the depth
of Russian politicians’ acceptance and practice of democratic
principles.

Second, it is important to note that warnings that some
actions by the West could adversely influence Russia’s
democratic process have been played by Yeltsin, pretty
much up to his election victory in July 1996. Starting with
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, there have been many warnings
echoed by Western leaders and politicians that Yeltsin and
his reform policies were the best hope for bringing about a
democratic Russia, as against the threat of a resurgent
Communist Party, and that criticism merely served to open
the way to power by nondemocratic forces. The exploitation
of this theme by Russian officials and politicians largely
ceased after the elections. Only occasionally is it mentioned
that NATO’s enlargement may be used by reactionary and,
military elements to arouse “mass hysteria” and, presumably, threaten the Yeltsin regime. But such a
popular reaction is assumed to occur from a concentrated
campaign by the mass media to this end. This is doubtful

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for several reasons. First, the major part of the media, especially television, is controlled by the government or its allies in big business, and it is unlikely that the opposition would find all that many outlets. This was already illustrated during the presidential elections by the way the media treated Communist Party leader and candidate Zyuganov and also Lebed. True, the enlargement might also be used in principle by some elements to attempt a coup d'état. But again, the real motivation for this most probably would be economic, such as the desperate state of the armed forces and industrial workers because of arrears in the payments of wages, inadequate budgets, growing unemployment, and so on.

Another point to be taken into account is that Yeltsin and his government are on record as “uncompromisingly” opposing NATO’s enlargement and actively campaigning against it in the West. There is, therefore, less ground for attacking them when the enlargement takes place. At the same time, Yeltsin and the government insist that they will continue reforms and have not tied this question to the NATO enlargement issue, instead asserting that such a policy will lead to improvements in the population’s standard of living. In fact, many Russian politicians and analysts emphasize that Russia must become a “civilized” state, with “civilized” foreign relations or, in other words, become more like the great Western powers.

Russian Anti-Americanism.

It is true that there has been growing anti-Americanism in Russia, mainly voiced by politicians, the military, and the mass media. This trend predates the question of NATO’s enlargement. It began not long after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and has accelerated after the end of what Russians characterize as the “romantic” and “excessively” pro-Western and pro-American phase of Russian foreign policy said to have been practiced by Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev. Indeed, this largely uncritical period of Russian views of the United States was based on various highly unrealistic expectations of massive U.S.
economic assistance, global power-sharing and special partnerships, and so on. There has been growing disappointment with the U.S. and Western policies in this respect, even though Western consumer goods and technologies have and continue to be very much in demand, and there is still much popular admiration for U.S. "culture," such as films, music, clothing and hair styles.

Russians emphasize that the appointment of Evgeniy Primakov to the post of Foreign Minister has brought about a reorientation of the Russian government’s views to a more balanced and realistic approach to the West in general and the United States in particular, resulting in a more active defense and pursuit of Russia’s national interests. This has led to disputes with Washington as Russia has “toughened” its positions. More and more the observation is made by Russian officials and analysts that Russia and the United States are unlikely to become close and true strategic partners because their interests all too often conflict.

As Russia tries to assert what it claims to be its global interest and to regain its external influence, it sees itself increasingly as a competitor rather than partner of the United States and the West. Foreign Minister Primakov is especially active in demanding recognition that Russia is a “great power” and in promoting the concept of a global transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world. According to him, Russia will be a separate “power pole” in this world. He demands, therefore, that the United States abandons its pretensions to “world leadership” and “global hegemony.” There are also Western observers who warn of deteriorating Russian-U.S. relations, but they tend to attribute more responsibility for it to the NATO enlargement issue than appears to be justified by the record of Russian world outlook.

It is important to note, however, that Yeltsin and Primakov insist that East-West disagreements and conflicts of interest must not be allowed to slide into confrontation and a new Cold War. Obviously, given Russia’s economic difficulties, Moscow cannot afford to wage confrontational policies with the United States or NATO. Furthermore,
there are powerful influential forces, in particular the business and banking oligarchy which controls 50 percent or more of Russia’s economy and is directly represented in the Russian government, which would strongly oppose any real break in Russia’s relations with Western Europe or the United States. The primary motivation of these influential elements is making money, which is obtained largely from foreign commercial relations. NATO’s enlargement is less likely to threaten the interests of these elements than Moscow’s overreaction to it, which may lead to Russia’s isolation. It is clear to most Russians that their country’s economic recovery is impossible without foreign trade, investments, and technology. According to U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, if Russia is to attain only Spain’s per capita GDP level by the year 2020, its economy would have to grow by 6 percent per year.\(^7\) Unfortunately, so far Russia’s GDP has continued to decline (by 6 percent in 1996, while industrial production declined by 5 percent). Thus, there is little incentive to continue to push anti-Americanism too far and risk further deterioration of Russia’s economic situation.

**RUSSIAN THREATS OF COUNTERMEASURES AND REALISTIC OPTIONS**

Most Russian threats to resort to countermeasures in the event of NATO’s enlargement have been vague and of an unofficial character. In fact, Yeltsin is reported to have directed Primakov on January 6, 1997, to devise a flexible “action plan” dealing with a range of measures which Russia might consider in the event that NATO’s enlargement is implemented, and Primakov gives every indication of not wanting to burn any bridges to the West.\(^8\) As far as any official and unofficial public discussions of possible Russian countermeasures are concerned, they include the following areas:

- organizing countervailing alliances to NATO;
- altering the arms control regime;
• military responses; and,

• foreign policy mischief-making.

Countervailing Alliances.

There have been various threats that NATO’s enlargement would force Russia to look for allies and to try to form a countervailing alliance. Mention was made of the CIS being organized into a military defense alliance, and of a search for other allies opposed to NATO’s expansion and the threat of U.S. hegemony. Among the more promising potential allies is said to be the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but mention is also made of the possibility of forming alliances with India, Iran, Iraq, and even Cuba.9 It is sometimes suggested that allies may also be found among European states excluded from NATO membership. It is less clear, however, why any of the mentioned alliances would constitute a significant counterweight to NATO.

The CIS. Organizing the CIS as a real defensive alliance has made little or no progress despite Moscow’s efforts. Russian proposals for a new European security system which would include the CIS alliance as an equal to NATO have also gotten nowhere. Among the difficulties facing Moscow are:

• The refusal of most key CIS members to participate in such an alliance. Indeed, Ukraine hints that it might want to eventually become a member of NATO.

• The military weakness of the CIS non-Russian republics. When this is coupled with the dramatic deterioration of the Russian armed forces, their chronic underfunding, and their disastrous performance in Chechnya, Moscow is unlikely to have the means to militarily build a CIS alliance into even the semblance of an effective defensive force.

Actually, only Belarus wants to be reintegrated with Russia and appears willing to form a military alliance with it, and to serve as a forward glacis to it facing Poland and
the Baltic States. Some of the more militant Russian nationalists have called this “the only real step to counter NATO” which may be taken by the Russian leadership.\textsuperscript{10} There is, however, considerable opposition in Russia to reunification with Belarus. Tadjikistan also depends on Russian troops to prevent it from being overrun by rebel forces from Afghanistan. In any case, the idea of the CIS becoming a meaningful countervailing alliance to NATO in the foreseeable future is a non-starter. It also appears unlikely that Russia would be willing to accept the costs and risks of trying to bring recalcitrant CIS members into an alliance by force.

Alliance with the PRC. Yeltsin and other Russian officials, as well as PRC leaders, have been enthusiastically talking about a “strategic partnership.” This is said to include expanding trade, Russian transfer of technologies and arms sales to the PRC, settlement of border disputes, and so on. It is also said to signal cooperation in opposing alleged U.S. global hegemony and attempts to impose a mono-polar political and power system in the world.\textsuperscript{11} But while Russo-PRC relations are said to be moving toward a “strategic partnership,” neither Moscow nor Beijing claims that it would or could become a military alliance or even a real political alliance. For example, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Karasin has declared that: “the current Russian-Chinese partnership and their 21st Century strategic interaction should not be seen as attempts aimed at forging some new alliance or pact.”\textsuperscript{12} The partnership, Russian officials insist, is not directed against anyone. Moscow seems happy, however, that while it criticizes U.S. policy in Taiwan and in the Far East, Beijing reciprocates by criticizing NATO’s enlargement.

In fact, however, the interests and objectives of the two powers for the most part differ fundamentally, and their partnership, while it has a potential for regional destabilization in some areas, is not a countervailing alliance to NATO. Furthermore, some Russians, and especially the military, are uneasy about Russian arms sales to the PRC. In a speech to CIS defense ministries in
December 1996, Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov mentioned the PRC among potential threats to Russia, although naturally the United States and NATO were in first place.\textsuperscript{13}

One thing Russia and the PRC have in common is an interest in American investments and in trade with the United States. Thus an alliance between the two countries would be likely to threaten the economic benefits of their relations with the United States. It is argued, therefore, that "a political alliance between Moscow and Beijing in the near future is not possible."\textsuperscript{14} Another matter is that Russia is likely to continue to sell to the PRC advanced weapon systems and help modernize the PRC's armed forces. But the motivation for this is mainly Russia's desire to expand arms exports to earn hard currency and keep its defense industries alive.

Alliances with other states, in particular those Washington considers rogue states, are highly unlikely. The political and economic costs for Moscow would be too high and the benefits too low. In fact, Russia may have thrown in the towel on this countermeasure. Thus, Rodionov has declared that Russia has no plans for a new military alliance to counter NATO, which apparently applies to the CIS as well as the PRC and other states.\textsuperscript{15}

**Arms Control.**

A frequently voiced warning by Russian officials, politicians, and commentators is that NATO's enlargement will spell the end of various arms control agreements. In particular, it is claimed that it will ensure that START II will remain unratified, and that the existing Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty will have to be amended, agreements on CW and BW also may not be ratified by the state Duma, and negotiations on other arms control agreements will become more difficult, if not impossible.

*The START II Ratification Problem.* It is important to note that the Duma's opposition to ratification of START II
precedes by a considerable length of time the debate over NATO enlargement. The treaty was submitted to the Duma for ratification only in the summer of 1995, but the campaign against it by communists, nationalists, and various defense experts and retired military has been waged since soon after the treaty’s signing. The issue is as much or more political than military because it is used by the opposition to attack and criticize Yeltsin and his policies. Given that the Duma is essentially dominated by the opposition, it has been easy for it to resist the government’s calls for ratification.

Ratification has been urged by Yeltsin personally as well as by his foreign ministers and, most significantly, by top military leaders. In the view of the military leaders and their experts, START II is almost “manna from heaven” because it brings U.S. nuclear forces closer in line with those Russia can afford to maintain. The point is that without the treaty, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will continue to fall further behind those of the United States because a growing percentage of Russian weapons are becoming obsolete and have to be withdrawn from service, while funds for replacement weapons are insufficient to make up the difference. It is asserted, therefore, that:

An important START II provision, the military think, is the fact that, in the number of warheads, the Treaty brings U.S. nuclear forces down to a level which Russia is objectively capable of maintaining.

Others want guarantees that the United States will not break the ABM Treaty and deploy ABM systems on its territory. Critics insist, however, that START II gives the United States an advantage while it forces Russia to destroy its most effective strategic nuclear deterrence weapons, such as the SS-18 ICBMs, and to invest large funds in the elimination of MIRVed missiles and their replacement by missiles with a single warhead, such as the Topol-M. It is argued, therefore, that there is a need to renegotiate START II or put it aside while negotiating a START III Treaty. A particular problem from the Russian viewpoint is the need to extend the time of implementation of START II and for
more help in funding it. Presumably, this is a matter for negotiation with the United States.

Thus, while as a countermeasure to NATO’s enlargement Russia may persist in not ratifying START II and may delay the dismantling of SS-18s as some urge, this appears to be a losing tactic if Washington does not panic. As Chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin argues:

At present and for a lengthy period of time, Russia is not capable of sustaining more warheads than set by the treaty. It simply does not have the financial possibility for this.\(^{19}\)

In other words, Moscow may scream and rant, but it does not have the means to maintain its current nuclear forces operational beyond the next decade or so, and it certainly cannot go back on START I or on the reductions already implemented under START II. The effectiveness of this threatened countermeasure thus depends on how much the United States feels pressured because of security and domestic political considerations, given that it has a large political investment in the START program. It also appears likely that Moscow will use NATO’s enlargement to demand compensation in negotiations for the revisions of START II or a new START III Treaty. There is little reason to expect, however, that the Duma will be mollified by a U.S. promise to proceed to negotiation of a START III Treaty after the ratification of START II, and thus drop this presumed leverage on NATO’s enlargement.\(^{20}\)

*The CFE Revision Issue.* Russia’s calls for revision of the CFE Treaty, especially its flank limitations, have also preceded the NATO enlargement issue, although calls for revision have been exacerbated by the latter. Moscow has been unhappy with the treaty ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union which radically altered Russia’s geostrategic position. Given this new situation, Russian leaders claimed that the treaty limitations, especially regarding flanks, were no longer realistic nor did they meet Russia’s security requirements. The problem became acute as a consequence of the war in Chechnya and Moscow’s announcement in
November 1995 that it would not abide by the treaty provisions in the North Caucasus. The then Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev demanded that Russia be free to deploy as many heavy weapons on its flanks as it deemed necessary for its security. In fact, Moscow has demanded that the Caucasus be removed from CFE limitations altogether.

The United States and most of NATO have been sympathetic to Russia’s demands to renegotiate the CFE Treaty, but Russia has rejected linkage between this and greater Russian accommodation to NATO’s enlargement. The latter threat has increased Russia’s demands for the right to concentrate more forces and heavier weapons in the Kaliningrad Oblast and the Leningrad Military District than is allowed under the CFE Treaty. But the CFE revision issue has only recently been tied by Moscow to NATO’s enlargement. Primakov now appears to make the question of NATO’s willingness to accept Russia’s demands as a test claiming that this “will serve as the main indicator of our partners’ serious intentions,” that is, NATO’s claimed readiness to meet Moscow’s security concerns. Primakov added that “Both Russia and NATO members can agree on the most reliable, e.g., practical, guarantees pertaining to mutual European security concerns along precisely this channel.”

It is important to note that Primakov, and presumably Yeltsin, want a negotiated settlement, and are not proposing unilateral Russian actions in violation of the CFE Treaty, even though they did violate it in the North Caucasus. As Yuri Baturin, secretary of the Presidential Defense Council and Yeltsin’s security advisor, recently said, if NATO expands, “the basis for this treaty [CFE] will collapse and it will have to be revised, but revised jointly with its participants.” Agreements on this question may or may not demonstrate NATO’s sincerity in trying to meet Russian security concerns, but it appears unlikely that it would reconcile Moscow to NATO’s enlargement, more for political than for security reasons. Besides, the issue of
revision of the CFE Treaty is likely to result in disputes and strain within NATO, and Moscow hopes to profit from them.

Military Countermeasures.

There has been talk among Russian nationalists and the military about military countermeasures to NATO's enlargement other than revisions of START II and the CFE Treaty. Naturally, the military see in this a possibility of improving defense funding and regaining some prestige by having an identified opponent. Most of the discussion, however, revolves around the enhancement of Russia's nuclear deterrence capability, since most people recognize that Russia is in no condition in the foreseeable future to fund conventional forces matching NATO's capabilities. Consequently, it is suggested that Russia might retain its MIRVed SS-18 ICBMs as long as possible. Another proposal is to retarget ICBMs on the capitals of the new NATO members as a deterrent threat. Still another is to deploy tactical and intermediate range nuclear armed missiles along the western border and preferably in the Kaliningrad Oblast and in Belarus, to be employed preemptively against NATO targets if there is a threat of an attack on Russia. The preemptive strike strategy and posture is said to be justified by Russia's weakness in conventional forces. The problem is that a safe preemptive posture requires good intelligence and reliable early warning. Russia's early warning and surveillance capabilities, however, are said to be deteriorating. Whether NATO would be interested in assisting Russia in this area as a confidence-building measure is another matter. But to the extent that this is a problem for Russia, a show of U.S. or NATO willingness to assist in improving Russia's early warning and surveillance capabilities might steal some of the thunder from Russian critics who warn that NATO's expansion eastward could eventually lead to an attack on Russia.

The obvious problem with a Russian nuclear countermeasure option to NATO's enlargement is that it would probably result in forcing NATO to do precisely what Russia wants to avoid, such as deploying nuclear weapons and
delivery systems on the territories of new NATO members, improving the military infrastructure there, and so on. It would probably also torpedo negotiations on the revision of START II and on START III, worsen the military balance from the Russian standpoint, and sharply reduce Western economic assistance to Russia. Of course, as Russians observe, NATO assurances that no nuclear weapons would be stationed on the territory of new NATO members is something that can be easily reversed after the enlargement is implemented. Moscow, therefore, wants legally binding guarantees. But no guarantee is likely to survive a Russian redeployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to its western border and Belarus.

In any event, given the state of Russia's economy, Russia, as Sergey Shakhray, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President declares, could not afford to be drawn into a new arms race with NATO. The Defense Ministry’s plans for a possible start of modernization of the Russian armed forces expect it to be around, or even later than, 2007, assuming a significant economic recovery by that time, and the survival of defense R&D and industrial capabilities.

**Russian Foreign Policy or Mischief-Making.**

The record of Russian foreign policy, especially since Primakov became Russia's Foreign Minister, has shown that Moscow has a considerable capacity for mischief-making. While this has preceded the rise of the NATO enlargement issue, it is also possible that within limits the latter may to some extent aggravate this behavior.

Russia's position, as expounded by Primakov and endorsed by Yeltsin, is that Russia is a "great power" and that its role in the world must reflect that status. Primakov insists that Russia "must pursue the foreign policy of a great power," and that this policy "must be active and must be conducted in all directions"; that is, Russia must claim an influential place in global affairs. Primakov and other Russian officials believe that this foreign policy line is facilitated by the trend towards multiplicity in world
policies, thus allowing Russia to diversify its foreign relations ties and abandon its former "excessive leaning" towards the West.\textsuperscript{33} Such an approach hardly signals a commitment to real or close partnership with the United States or with NATO.

Russia's pretensions to be recognized as a "great power" with global interests and an influential voice in global affairs exceed by far its capabilities to make such a claim credible. As a result, Moscow has suffered frustrations and humiliations when it has been ignored by the United States, NATO, or other states where it sought to play a role. In turn, this has fueled Russian anti-Americanism, Russia's pursuit of ties with states which are considered to be sources of destabilization by the West, and has produced a considerable amount of Russian mischief-making as a show of independence at low cost. This kind of attempt at conducting a "champagne foreign policy on a beer budget" inevitably threatens to become an irritant to the United States and the West. This is all the more so as Moscow claims to be attempting to block U.S. efforts to gain hegemony or leadership over the world.

Russian foreign policy in recent years appears to have been, to a considerable extent, an imitation, if a pale one, of Soviet foreign policy: closer ties with the PRC and Serbia; reentry into the Middle East politics on the back of previous special ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria; special relations with India; and so on. To do some of this, Moscow has openly criticized and opposed U.S. and NATO policies, as in the case of the trade embargo of Serbia, Iraq, or Libya, or U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Moscow has ignored Western criticism of Russian military actions in Chechnya and has opposed U.S. oil interests in Azerbaijan. One particular demonstration of Russian pursuit of an independent foreign policy and of economic profit has been the sale of advanced weapon systems to foreign countries, even at the risk that such sales could destabilize various regions, as in the case of arms sales to the PRC, Iran, India, Syria, and, more recently, Cyprus and Peru, and so on. In each of these cases,
as a Russian commentator notes, "Moscow and Washington are on different sides of the front line."  

Moscow has been careful, however, not to allow its actions to escalate into a confrontation with the United States or NATO. An analysis of what has been dubbed the "Primakov Doctrine" shows that it allows Russia to pursue a low cost and relatively low risk strategy of trying to claim a place in world politics and bolstering its influence without losing the benefits from its relations with the United States or the West in general. Moscow fears, however, that this low risk or cost policy phase may be coming to an end. It is concerned that after the July 1996 presidential election, Washington will no longer be constrained by the necessity of bolstering Yeltsin. Furthermore, the Republicans still dominate Congress and the appointment of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State, dramatized in the Russian press as "The Iron Lady" of U.S. foreign policy, is interpreted as signaling a likely tougher U.S. foreign policy line toward Russia. Whether this would necessarily motivate Moscow to be more cautious in its actions is uncertain, because Primakov and other officials believe that the trend toward a multipolar world and greater "Eurocentrism" may allow it to find greater support for its policy base.

There is no indication, however, that in retaliation for NATO's enlargement Russia would burn its bridges to NATO and the West. In fact, it may have the opposite effect of accelerating Russia's efforts to push for a new European security system and to have a "responsible and dignified role" in it. Precisely because Russia fears being isolated and marginalized as a result of NATO's enlargement, it has no reason to help bring this about by its own actions in its relations with NATO, either directly or as a result of its foreign policy elsewhere in the world.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

Lately, as NATO and Washington have offered various reassurances and concessions to Moscow, these have been claimed by it as proof of the success of the current Russian
government’s intransigent stand on NATO’s enlargement and of the Russian foreign policy line in the West in general. As Primakov puts it: “As far as global implications are concerned, Russia has obviously strengthened its positions inside the Big Eight.” True, Moscow knows that it is unlikely to prevent the implementation of the first phase of NATO’s enlargement. Consequently, a skeptical view of Russian foreign policy “successes” points out that:

The joy over the shifts in the relations with NATO [i.e., NATO’s concessions] can be compared only to the joy of a team hopelessly losing a match and repulsing a series of attacks at its goal minutes before the end of the match.40

All indications, however, are that by maintaining its uncompromising stand, Moscow can expect to wring more concessions from NATO.41 Indeed, NATO’s desire to formalize Russian-NATO relations—be it in a new charter, a treaty, or some consultation arrangement—by July 1997 cannot be seen by Russian leaders as other than further proof of the correctness of their policy. The pay-off for Moscow, therefore, is that it can expect to gain by this strategy more advantageous terms in its relations in the NATO summit. In fact, one should anticipate that this issue will continue to provide Russia, as the "injured party," with a convenient club to hold over NATO to be used to demand more concessions and compensations, not only specifically in connection with the enlargements or in a new European security system, but also elsewhere in the world. Naturally, the success of this strategy will depend on how far NATO members will be willing to go to placate Russia’s complaints and concerns.

It is worth noting that there is a Russian view that NATO’s enlargement will put great political and economic strains on NATO and that this might even lead to an abandonment of this policy and to an erosion of U.S. influence in Europe. General Aleksandr Lebed, for example, said in January 1997 in Germany that he believed that the first phase of the enlargement will be its last because “internal tensions” will wrack the Alliance.42 Others argue that the high cost of the enlargement will stimulate growing
opposition to it among Western European taxpayers. In this view, U.S. policy pushing for the enlargement will fail, which will intensify Europe’s push to become more independent of Washington’s leadership and, consequently, will enhance Russia’s role in Europe’s security.

In sum, it is doubtful that realistically, in the nearer future, Russia will neatly take its place in the European political and security system as a cooperative, full-fledged democracy, sharing Western values. Indeed, it is pointed out that “the Clinton Administration over the past four years never achieved the main objective of its Russian policy; namely, to turn Russia into a friendly and reliably non-hostile state.” Western concessions or assistance are highly unlikely to buy such a convenient development and, short of giving Moscow control over NATO’s actions, they will not bring about Moscow’s official acquiescence to NATO’s enlargement. Russia’s interests and pretensions to “great power” status and ambitions to play this role in the world will continue to produce actions conflicting with the policies, objectives, and interests of the United States and other NATO members.

It is fairly evident that, realistically, Russia has no responses to NATO’s enlargement that NATO needs to seriously worry about. At the same time, however, Russia’s relations with NATO are likely to fluctuate between angry denunciations and pursuit of dialogue, or even cooperation, as Moscow hopes to gain a major voice in European affairs and NATO actions regardless of Russia’s weakness. In fact, given its instabilities as well as economic and military weakness, Russia has nowhere to go in the next decade or two. But, even so, differences between NATO allies may give it an opportunity to improve its position. Whether NATO needs to buy Russian tolerance of NATO’s enlargement by offering concessions which undermine the security value of the enlargement and NATO’s guarantees is debatable. One can also confidently predict that other issues will soon arise which most likely will come to overshadow the enlargement issue in Russian-NATO relations. This does not mean that there are no areas of common interest between Moscow and
the West or that there is no need to consider the construct of a new European security system. But it would seem prudent for NATO, and especially the United States, not to be overcome by optimism and to recognize that, in the foreseeable future, Russia will most likely remain a political, strategic and even economic competitor rather than a reliable partner.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3


10. Aman Tuleyev, CIS Affairs Minister, on Moscow NTV Television, OMRI, Daily Digest, January 14, 1997.

11. Li Peng visit to Moscow, Reuters (Beijing), December 29, 1996.


14. Gornostayev, “Moscow Aims to Develop Strategic Partnership With Beijing.”


18. Koretskiy.


23. Primakov, “Evgeniy Primakov Talks About Russia’s Foreign Policy.”

24. Garkin.


32. Evgeniy Primakov, quoted by ITAR-TASS in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 17, 1996.

33. “Evgeniy Primakov Talks About Russia’s Foreign Policy.”

34. Gornostayev, “Moscow and Washington Facing Yet Another Crisis.”

35. Garkin.


37. Primakov, “Multi-Polar World on Horizon.”


39. “Evgeniy Primakov Talks About Russia’s Foreign Policy.”

40. Gornostayev, “The First Year of Primakov’s Diplomacy.”


CHAPTER 4

REFORM, RUSSIA AND EUROPE: 
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
OF UKRAINE’S NATO POLICY

Sherman Garnett

When NATO leaders meet in July 1997 to decide which states will be invited to join the Alliance, Ukraine will not be under active consideration. Yet Ukraine will not be a failed suitor. It has not sought NATO membership, nor has any western country seriously proposed Ukraine be considered for it. At this juncture, Ukraine is plainly unready for NATO or the European Union, Europe's core economic and security institutions. For the next decade, Ukraine's core strategic challenges will have little to do with whether it can get into NATO or even the kind of partnership it fashions with the Alliance. Ukraine has serious political and economic work to do to consolidate itself as a part of Europe. It also has to find a way to normalize relations with Russia. There is a danger in the coming months of focusing too intensely on the details of the Ukrainian-NATO partnership, to the neglect of the role NATO and the West might play in helping Ukraine address these core strategic challenges and weathering the inevitable shockwaves that expansion will bring to Eastern and Central Europe.

Ukraine occupies a crucial, if often unacknowledged, place in Europe which is the result of obvious geopolitical factors, such as its size and central location between Russia and the West. It is also the result of the impact on Russia, the region and Europe as a whole of Ukrainian success or failure in consolidating itself internally and fashioning a normal state-to-state relationship with Russia. NATO's stake in these issues is obvious. One need only imagine a weak and failing Ukraine or a Ukrainian-Russian relationship defined by conflict or re-subordination to understand the potential Ukraine has for becoming a center
of instability in the new Europe. A strong NATO-Ukrainian relationship is an important matter in and of itself, but its real value will depend upon whether it is the beginning of a broad Western recognition of Ukraine’s strategic significance and of policies designed to support that recognition. Thus the purpose of this essay is to place the Ukrainian-NATO relationship and the whole question of NATO expansion in the broad strategic context that must preoccupy the Ukrainian leadership. Only then can we turn to Ukraine’s overall western policy and its NATO policy in particular. This manner of proceeding is not the one dictated by the press of summit preparations, but it is the one that will yield a genuine understanding of Ukraine’s strategic dilemma and the roots of its NATO policy.

Ukraine’s Strategic Dilemma.

For Ukraine, the most pressing tasks are internal, particularly the consolidation of state institutions and the creation of a prosperous market economy. The most pressing external task is the normalization of relations with Russia. At present, the external environment, despite the large unfinished agenda with Russia, is extraordinarily favorable, perhaps the most favorable for state-building that Ukraine has ever seen. Ukraine wants to preserve this external situation, improving if it can ties with Russia. Kiev wants to devote scarce resources to internal challenges, not fending off external foes or dealing with the spill-over from a regional crisis. Ukrainian foreign policy must focus on the preservation and extension of the current “breathing space.” Though Ukraine is potentially a medium power, it is currently a weak state. It does not have the means to oppose or appease its enemies or entice its friends. Western states and institutions are important sources for material and political support to Ukraine as they address both internal and external challenges.

The Internal Challenges. Despite the progress made to date on political and economic reform, Ukraine is still a state in the making. Moreover, the consolidation of this state is taking place on the basis of a history of statelessness and a
great abundance of regional and ethnic diversity. Many analysts feared that both factors, combined with poor economic performance and a dispute with Russia and the United States over nuclear weapons, would prevent Ukraine from consolidating as a state at all.

However, the question is not whether Ukraine will become a state, but what kind. Ukraine is less likely to disappear than become a weak and incoherent state spreading instability throughout the region. Despite successful parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994 and a new constitution in 1996, the Ukrainian political system is still a closed one. It concentrates power in a small number of hands. Civil society exercises little control over—or indeed possesses little knowledge of—the government. The press and media have not yet become a genuine fourth estate. Political life in Ukraine is defined by the tension between the reforming impulse carried forward by the president and a small group of advisors and the desire for gain on the part of the vast majority of senior officials who have managed to enrich themselves by links with key energy, banking, media, and industrial sectors. Corruption and lack of statesmanship at the top of society is a drag on progress, a distraction from measures needed to modernize and stabilize Ukraine.

Ukraine's weak economy is also a concern. President Kuchma's 1994 reforms have brought the economy back from the verge of collapse in 1993. This reform package included a sweeping set of measures designed to produce financial stabilization, privatization, and price liberalization. Despite serious internal opposition, at times extending to the executive branch itself, and occasional lapses in the form of credit emissions, the package has begun to bear fruit. There are as yet no signs of economic growth, but the rates of decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and industrial production are slowing. These official statistics do not capture the still unmeasured dynamism of the "informal sector" of the economy, estimated by one study to provide the "main source of income for 2.5 million people, including up to 40 percent of youth in urban and border
regions. One of the most impressive aspects of the reform package has been its dramatic reduction of inflation, from a high of over 10,000 percent to approximately 80 percent for 1996.

Serious problems, however, continue to slow reform. Privatization is not moving forward as swiftly or as comprehensively as it should. The state remains the majority or largest shareholder in many cases. The lack of a clear legal base, weak courts, and bureaucratic corruption scare off most foreigners. Opposition to privatization, particularly in the communist and socialist-dominated stronghold in the eastern part of the country, remains strong. The reform process remains vulnerable to reversal, but the more likely danger is of a slow and uncertain reform that widens the gap between Ukraine and Poland or other emerging post-communist economies. This gap already exists and makes serious economic cooperation, let alone integration, difficult.

These internal challenges to stability are serious and require the bulk of Ukraine's scarce resources and energy to address. They are the number one political and national security priority, not ties with NATO. Ukraine's approach to the outside world, particularly to the West, is shaped by the requirement to address this very large internal agenda.

**Ukrainian-Russian Relations.** Ukraine's greatest external challenge is the normalization of its relations with Russia. Normal and friendly relations between these states would be a substantial contribution to European stability, as they have the greatest military potentials of any of non-NATO Europe. Conflict between them over Crimea or other issues would have an immediate and chilling effect on European stability. More extreme scenarios, such as the subordination of Ukraine to Russia, would make credible the long-term military and political potential of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There is another aspect to Russian-Ukrainian relations that has European-wide significance. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship reveals much about Russia itself, particularly whether Russia is reconciled to its current borders and to
exerting its influence in a way that is compatible with the stability and independence of its new neighbors. Key issues of Russia's long-term evolution are bound up in its relations with Ukraine. Ukraine is perhaps the greatest single external factor in Russia's definition of itself as a state and international actor.

Despite mutual suspicions and a conflicting sense of where the relationship ought to be headed, both sides to date have shown a high degree of moderation and pragmatism when it counted. These qualities coexist with real disagreements, as well as symbolic gestures and hard rhetoric that periodically suggest the relationship is on the verge of a great crisis. The several Yeltsin-Kravchuk summits and the successor meetings between Yeltsin and Kuchma remain prime examples of how the two sides have found ways to steer the relationship through rough waters. The leaders regularly announce agreements on issues such as the Black Sea Fleet or the Friendship Treaty that never materialize or are soon broken in follow-up technical negotiations. They probably knew these agreements would not hold up and intended to use them to reduce the pressures of the moment and restore a sense of normalcy, not obtain a long-term resolution of the issues.

In the long run, however, a resolution is needed to define a new basis for Russian-Ukrainian relations. This resolution would require that Russia and Ukraine resolve existing ambiguities about the future. Russia is reluctant to put the relationship once and for all on a true state-to-state footing, hoping that, over time, the two sides return to something more intimate than that, something Yeltsin Advisor Dmitriy Riurikov described as a "fraternal Slavic compromise."³ Russia does not want to thwart this possible future by a settlement that strengthens Ukraine's independence. Russia's policy remains in large measure what a leading Russian analyst described in 1992 as a strategy "to keep the Ukrainian problem within certain limits and to prevent it from getting out of control."⁴ Whether or not it chooses integration in the future, Ukraine would like an unambiguous state-to-state relationship, but
it is too weak and internally divided to impose such a relationship on Russia. Thus, Russian-Ukrainian relations are likely to remain a classic example of “muddling through” for some time.

This pattern has been stable so far, but this stability rests on the exhaustion and preoccupations of both sides. Russia is simply too burdened by its own internal problems; its basic institutions are too chaotic and fragmented to provide the basis for a sustained assertive policy. In this condition, Russia could not manage a serious crisis within Ukraine, let alone carry out interventionist policies. However, there are real dangers in assuming that the current stability can endure indefinitely, as though a state of nature. Russian consolidation of its political and economic system over time will increase its capacity to conduct a more ambitious Ukrainian policy. The key is not in Russia’s size or strength, but the size of the gap between it and Ukraine. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has moved away from the old patterns of psychology, history, and Soviet inheritance to contemplate their partner in the light of the new Europe-to-come. For both sides, but especially in Russia, relations with the other is more habit than strategy. As Ukraine moves more dynamically toward ties with the West and Russia turns to its own agenda in the south and east, old habits of interaction or even a dangerous drift and neglect could emerge. Russians who now complain loudly about the failure to fashion genuine engagement with Poland and other states of Central Europe may yet complain that a similar failure has occurred in Ukraine. Neither state really understands the benefits of normal cooperation or the necessity of placing their bilateral relationship on a broader and more internationally accepted basis. The current and future problem of managing relations with Russia is thus a second factor shaping Ukraine’s approach to the West and especially to NATO. Many in Kiev doubt that the future of this key bilateral relationship can be successfully negotiated without outside support for a stable outcome.
Ukraine's Westpolitik.

If the preceding is an accurate sketch both of Ukraine's major domestic and foreign policy preoccupations and of the issues that give Ukraine a central role in the emerging security environment of Europe, then the role the West plays for Ukraine in addressing these issues is much larger than that encompassed by the debate over NATO expansion. The preceding demonstrates that Ukraine faces a long period where it must concentrate on its internal challenges. These challenges essentially disqualify Ukraine from near-term membership in the key western security and economic institutions. It faces major hurdles in political and economic reform. Externally, Ukraine's key challenge is to create stable relations with Russia.

The West is an obvious source of support for sustaining political and economic reforms. It is also a potential prop for Ukrainian independence and the normalization of relations with Russia. Western influence, both directly and indirectly through the prospect of NATO and European Union membership, already have a positive influence on Romanian-Ukrainian disputes. Thus the West appears, first and foremost, as a potential source of support for Ukraine. But NATO expansion potentially complicates this paradigm by introducing a major shift in the geopolitics of the region. The Ukrainian leadership fears that the unforeseen effects of expansion and countermeasures by Russia could threaten Ukraine's existing breathing space. It is a mixture of public hopes and private fears about the future impact of the West on Ukraine's core challenges that animates Ukraine's western policy in general and its approach to NATO in particular.

Ukraine's overall western policy has greatly expanded, especially since mid-1995. Ukraine could not have had serious western interlocutors until the resolution of the nuclear issue. The securing of the Soviet nuclear arsenal under single Russian command and control was a western strategic priority. Until Ukrainian nuclear intentions were clarified, a process that lasted until at least 1994, there were
few takers in the West for a policy of engagement, though there were important voices, especially in Poland and the United States, arguing for deepening ties with Kiev in parallel with nuclear disarmament. The January 1994 Trilateral Agreement, Kuchma’s economic reform package, and Ukraine’s adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty later that same year generated the momentum needed to sustain serious ties between Kiev and western nations and institutions.

U.S.-Ukraine ties have steadily improved since the signing of the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994. President Kravchuk came to Washington within weeks of the signing of this agreement, leading to new agreements of economic and other assistance that have since made Ukraine the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. In May 1995, President Clinton visited Kiev. Senior ministerial and deputy ministerial visits have been common. During one of these visits, Foreign Minister Udovenko’s meetings in Washington in October 1996, the two sides publicly declared their relationship a full-fledged strategic partnership. The United States has also supported Ukraine’s efforts to expand its ties with other western nations and institutions. The United States, for example, was the driving force behind the language in the December NATO Ministerial communiqué stating the Alliance’s support for Ukrainian political and economic reform and acknowledging that “the maintenance of Ukraine’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for stability and security in Europe.”

Though ties with the United States have always been the cornerstone of Ukraine’s western policy, in mid-1995 the Ukrainian leadership embarked on a policy designed to expand its links with other western nations and key institutions. In September 1995, Foreign Minister Udovenko led a high level delegation to NATO to begin to define a special relationship between Ukraine and the Alliance. In October 1995, with Poland’s strong support, Ukraine became a member of the Council of Europe. In April 1996, addressing the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly in Strasbourg, President Kuchma announced Ukraine’s strategic intention to become a full-fledged member of the European Union in the future. Poland was also crucial to Ukraine’s invitation to join the Central European initiative in June 1996. In that same month, a Warsaw summit between Polish and Ukrainian presidents produced strong statements of mutual support, with Kuchma giving a ringing endorsement of Poland’s desire to join NATO. In September 1996, German Chancellor Kohl visited Kiev, as did the Secretary General of the Western European Union, Jose Cutileiro. Cutileiro and Kuchma agreed that, for membership purposes, Ukraine would be treated like the six former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and three Baltic states. Ukraine would not have to wait for associate status in the European Union, but could apply after ratification by all parties of the June 1994 cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.6

Yet despite the undoubted successes of Ukraine’s western policy, particularly in relations with Washington, Warsaw, and Europe’s key institution, Ukraine has still not succeeded in convincing the majority of its European neighbors that it wants or deserves a place in Europe. Many of the key states, including France and the United Kingdom, have yet to recognize its strategic importance or to act in a manner befitting this insight. In the chancelleries of Europe, except for Chernobyl, little thought is given to Ukraine. Ukraine’s internal problems and historic ties to Russia are taken as justification of this neglect. Many of these states believe that the crucial task after NATO expansion will be to rebuild ties with Russia, not expand them with other states Russia regards as crucial to its own security. There is thus a fragility to Ukrainian-Western ties. The gains of Kiev could be easily reversed by its own internal problems, its failure to make economic progress, or simply western anxiety about Russia. Measured against the core challenges facing Ukraine outlined at the beginning of this essay, Ukrainian-Western ties still have a very long way to go before they give Kiev real assistance. Kiev’s approach to
NATO expansion has to be seen within this larger strategic picture.

Ukraine's NATO Policy.

Ukraine's policy toward NATO expansion is based on public hopes and private fears. The public hopes are to see a more stable Europe in which NATO expansion to some countries runs in parallel with stronger strategic cooperation with the rest. Ukrainian officials also understand the value of the NATO Alliance and its role in European security. They support NATO as a counterweight to Russian power. In this guise, it helps to preserve the breathing space and permits Ukraine to consolidate its independence. Senior Ukrainian officials also see the value of anchoring Poland in the West, believing such a move would project stability beyond Poland. NATO membership for Romania would also greatly reduce any potential danger from Bucharest, as the Alliance would exert pressure on Romania both before and after accession to resolve outstanding territorial and other questions with Ukraine.

The private fears are of new dividing lines in Europe. Kiev fears such lines, precisely because it is likely to find itself on the wrong side of them. The Ukrainian leadership's strategic nightmare is that expansion will spur renewed competition between the West and Russia that will threaten Ukraine's benign external environment and exacerbate Ukraine's internal divisions at exactly the time when political and economic reforms are working to close them. For a weak state, managing the consequences of this post-expansion environment will be difficult enough. However, if Russia takes more active measures to ensure that NATO expansion does not intrude on its strategic space, Ukraine could find itself fending off a whole series of Russian challenges to its neutrality at precisely the moment the West has plenty of reasons to remain aloof. NATO will have to absorb new members and repair relations with Russia. The western debate over whether and how to respond to Russia will take place before Ukraine has made enough progress at home and in the minds of western
diplomats and publics to be seen unequivocally as part of Europe or at least as crucial to Europe's future security and prosperity.

To maximize the potential benefits of NATO expansion and mitigate its costs, Ukraine has adopted its current policy toward expansion. This policy has four basic tenets:

1. **NATO has a legitimate right to expand and the states of Europe outside of Europe have a legitimate right to seek membership in the Alliance.** Ukraine has consciously taken a friendlier approach to expansion than Russia, precisely because it recognizes the right of the Alliance to seek new members. The Ukrainian government has never publicly—or to my knowledge privately—opposed NATO expansion. On the contrary, though Ukraine has made many suggestions about the pace of expansion and the structure of NATO forces in Central Europe, President Kuchma and other senior officials have publicly underlined the positive contribution NATO makes to the security of Europe. During his June 1996 visit to Warsaw, Kuchma described NATO as "the only real guarantor of security on the continent." Ukrainian officials have little trouble understanding why Poland wants to join the Alliance or seeing the benefits Poland will derive from being inside Europe's greatest security Alliance. But another key to Ukraine's strong expression of support for the legitimacy of expansion is its interest in upholding the notion that "each state has the right to decide itself on participation in any international organization or bloc." Ukraine's interest in noninterference by outside states in basic security decisions is obvious.

2. **NATO expansion must not erode the security benefits of the past decade.** Ukraine wants to preserve its favorable external environment. One of the most important ingredients in that environment is the low level of military forces. There is simply no country in the region, including Russia, that possesses a military capable of large scale offensive action. The Russian military is not currently capable of even regional power projection to a demanding theater like Ukraine. Ukraine wants to extend the current low levels of military force, of course, but it also wants to
preserve a security environment that encourages future defense reform and modernization decisions in Russia and elsewhere to respect the current conditions so favorable to stability at low levels of military forces. Ukraine has been a leader in speaking out against militarizing the NATO expansion debate. In April 1996, Kuchma put forward a plan at the Moscow Nuclear Summit for the creation of a Central European Nuclear Weapons Free Zone as a way of ensuring that NATO expansion would not radically alter existing military realities. Ukrainian officials understand the formal acceptance of a zone of this type is probably not in the cards, but they continue to press for explicit assurances that a de facto zone of this type will emerge in the region. Ukraine has also spoken out in favor of adapting and modernizing the Treaty on Conventional Forces as a way of securing its continued relevance. Ukraine does not want to see the deployment of active combat units in the new NATO member states (or in Belarus). It also urges the Alliance to go slow even on what it understands are the legitimate tasks of integration and military cooperation.

3. An expanded NATO and Europe as a whole has to reach a fair accommodation with Russia, just as Russia must come to a fair accommodation with NATO. Ukraine has often taken the role on Russia's behalf that many in the West hope Russia would take for itself, advocating a negotiated compromise that permits both NATO expansion and a greater Russian role in Europe. As Kuchma stated in the run-up to his June 1996 visit to Warsaw, "[Y]ou cannot build a security system in Europe without Russia. Cooperation with Russia is currently the largest challenge for Europe and the world." Kuchma has spoken of the need to take "considerable time" in the process of expansion so as to take into "consideration Russia's views." Ukrainian officials are much less suspicious than their Polish, Hungarian, and Czech counterparts of a NATO-Russian Treaty or other agreement, though they do not want a document that gives Russia the right to restrict Ukrainian-NATO ties. They also have warned Moscow that they regard the whole arsenal of military and economic countermeasures in response to NATO expansion currently
under discussion as unnecessary and illegitimate. Ukraine does not view an expanded NATO as a military threat. It will not participate in Russian or CIS countermeasures or new military blocs. Ukraine's statements are part of its larger strategic aim of seeking normalization with Russia and delegitimizing the threat or use of military and economic intimidation in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. Kiev desperately wants the West to see and understand the connection between NATO expansion and its bilateral relationship with Moscow.

4. NATO and Ukraine must fashion their own special relationship, including significant security cooperation. Ukraine enthusiastically welcomed NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1993, recognizing that such a program was ideally suited for a country like Ukraine, which was neither in line for membership nor demanding a special status that would differentiate it from the other countries in Europe. Ukraine was the first CIS country to seek participation in the program, and senior officials of the ministries of defense and foreign affairs worked hard to prepare an acceptable work plan. However, in mid-1995, the Ukrainian leadership endorsed a policy of seeking a new level of cooperation with the Alliance. Foreign Minister Udovenko led a delegation of senior Ukrainian officials to Brussels in September. A senior foreign ministry official defined Ukraine's aim on the eve of this visit as trying to obtain "everything short of Article V," i.e., everything short of an explicit security guarantee. The Ukrainian delegation laid out ambitious plans for cooperation with NATO during that trip. Ukraine set aside what is for its military a large sum of money—$10 million—to finance its 1996 participation in the Partnership for Peace program. It agreed to take part in special joint exercises under the auspices of the NATO program and to allocate certain military assets (mainly those already taking part in the Bosnia peacekeeping mission) for future cooperative work with the Alliance. Kiev has upgraded its representation in Brussels, sending First Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasiuk to Brussels in 1995 as ambassador and former Defense Minister Konstantyn Morozov in 1996 as a special military
representative. Ukraine's ambitions for cooperation, however, cannot be financed on its own. How far Ukraine gets in implementing a more active relationship with NATO will depend on Ukraine finding the budgetary resources for such a relationship and on the Western Alliance and its members recognizing the importance of this new relationship and lending a helping hand. The United States, Poland, and other countries have helped to support part of Ukraine's agenda financially, but there are genuine fiscal and even internal political constraints on large expenditures for such cooperation.

Taken together, the elements of Ukraine's NATO policy are quite friendly to the Alliance and its plans. Ukraine's proposals for restraint or changes to NATO assume a successful expansion. Kuchma's proposals for a nuclear free zone for Central Europe differ in legal form, but not in intent, from the Alliance's own plans. Ukraine has expressed its anxieties about the potential costs of expansion, both for the region as a whole and for Ukraine itself, privately. Expansion will complicate regional security at a time when Ukraine is least able to manage any complications at all. A good NATO-Ukrainian relationship, however robust its provisions, could well give Ukraine little with which to address the key internal challenges and be of little practical significance in the quest to normalize ties with Moscow (especially if NATO countries make no effort at all to encourage the sides toward normalization of ties). A Ukrainian-NATO special partnership will not automatically end much of Europe's nonrecognition of Ukraine and its strategic significance. In fact, for some European countries, NATO-Ukrainian ties might well serve as justification for not expanding bilateral cooperation. Ukraine, in this view, will have been adequately dealt with by NATO alone.

So what does Ukraine expect to gain from its NATO policy? Quite frankly, the Ukrainian leadership wants two things. The first is that the policy advances the notion, particularly among the most skeptical European states, of Ukraine as a part of Europe, a contributor and not an
obstacle to the expansion of key European institutions. The second is more concrete. Ukraine wants the expansion of the informal links that now define the U.S.-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-NATO relationship and an increasing demonstration of their impact upon the most pressing issues facing Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership has resigned itself to the absence of treaties or other legally binding documents. It knows that the United States is under no legal obligation to come to its defense or even to intervene in Ukrainian-Russian problems. It does want to create informal incentives for such an intervention or even the sense of commitment and obligation. In other words, it wants to be able to turn the promises, good wishes and communiqué language it has received as an active instrument of its policy. The benefit of the current ambiguity is also its weakness. Ukraine intends to stretch the meaning of this ambiguity in the direction of greater commitment; the United States, NATO, and other of Ukraine’s future partners are likely to stretch it in the opposite direction. There is more than a little chance for misunderstanding or surprise should a crisis emerge that requires countries to take concrete action on the basis of these ambiguous statements of support.

Conclusion.

There is not much that can be done in the immediate future to resolve Ukraine’s ambiguous status. Most of that work has to be done by the Ukrainians themselves. They have to transform their political and economic institutions to reduce, not widen, the gap that now exists between Ukraine and the rest of Europe. They have to resolve their outstanding difficulties with Russia. The best that can be hoped for is that Western leaders come to understand Ukraine’s strategic significance for the Europe-to-come and take corresponding steps to make sure that Ukraine remains free to choose its own future, including a future of closer ties to Europe.

For Ukraine, the main foreign policy priority is not its relation with NATO. That relationship is part of a set of
strategic demands that encompass both internal and external challenges. To address these challenges, Ukraine needs to broaden its western policy, not concentrate it on NATO. Neither the West nor Ukraine should place too much weight on the details of the Ukrainian-NATO partnership or the language of the July communique. These things matter, of course, but their real worth will only be determined in the coming years. From this future perspective, we will know whether they were part of a strategy that deepened western engagement with Ukraine or were nothing but hot air.

In the coming months, the West will be distracted by the preparations for the July Summit and the completion and ratification of the necessary agreements afterward. But, for an expanded NATO, the real work of securing a stable and prosperous Europe will have only begun. Most of the work that matters will take place in the new borderlands of an expanded Alliance, particularly Ukraine. NATO expansion implies expanded engagement in these borderlands, not a period of withdrawal or focus on internal Alliance issues. At a time when both new and old members will want to celebrate the Alliance’s accomplishments, the pressing issue will be precisely to minimize the tension between the broad expansion of the western space, understood as its manner of doing business, and the more geographically limited expansion of key western institutions.

The distinction between NATO members and non-members will never be a trivial one, but it should not be allowed to become the dominant security fact in Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine will be looking for more than reassurance in the months following expansion, particularly if Russia chooses to respond to NATO expansion by putting renewed pressure on Belarus and Ukraine itself for closer economic and security ties. What the West can offer in response is a broad-based policy that begins with ensuring that the post-expansion processes within NATO are transparent, communicated to nonmember states and supportive of the current low levels of military force in the region. Kiev will also want to see NATO continue its
dialogue with Russia, especially if no agreement with Moscow is reached before the July Summit. However, that dialogue has to include both enticements for greater Russian cooperation and firmness in the face of Russian attempts to demarcate a sphere of its own.

The specifics of a NATO-Ukrainian agreement must include serious defense policy and planning matters. Ukraine faces serious military reform hurdles in the coming years, and needs help in designing an effective military that is trained and deployed in a manner that builds upon the current low levels of military confrontation in the region, especially with Russia. The NATO-Ukrainian relationship has to be real work for the western side, bringing into it a broad segment of the NATO bureaucracy. In this way, it gives a large number of NATO diplomats understanding of Ukraine’s strategic significance and key challenges. It also becomes a useful model for the Ukrainian policy of individual member states and other European institutions.

The most important sign of a successful post-expansion Ukrainian policy will be found outside of NATO. There should be a general post-expansion broadening of European interest in the new borderlands, particularly Ukraine. Europe needs to expand its role in internal Ukrainian political and economic reforms, and should become an active supporter of Russian-Ukrainian normalization. The U.S. and NATO may currently be leading the way in Eastern and Central Europe, but it is time for individual European states and other institutions to catch up.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4


8. See statement by President Kuchma, reported in *ITAR-TASS*, October 4, 1995.


11. Speaking in a newspaper interview in October 1995, Kuchma rejected the notion that a new CIS military bloc was needed:

   The problem of creating new military blocs, including the CIS, is for me a problem of determining the functions of those blocs. While old military blocs often exist under their own momentum, in creating new ones you must always have a clear answer to the following questions: Why do you need to create them? Against whom do you want to create them? . . . And whom does Ukraine confront today? As of today, I do not see any global threat, challenge of aggression that would require the creation of a CIS military bloc. Naturally, there exist local tension spots in various regions of the Commonwealth, but neutralizing local threats requires local agreements.


CHAPTER 5

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SLOVAKIA

Ambassador Theodore E. Russell

This is a case study of a country where integration into NATO and other Western organizations is heavily influenced by the status of its democratic transformation process.

Drawing on my three previous tours of duty in the area, but on a purely personal basis, I want to share with you some thoughts about how NATO countries can help Slovakia qualify for membership, how Slovakia can best qualify itself, assuming it wishes to do so, and the policy we should take towards Slovakia in the event it is not among the first countries invited by the NATO summit in Madrid to begin negotiations for accession to the Alliance.

In this analysis, I make several basic assumptions: The first is that NATO enlargement, to include Central European countries like Slovakia, is in our interest and is part of the long-term, historic process of integrating Central European countries into the Euro-Atlantic community. Since the days of the Marshall Plan, the United States has been a strong supporter of European integration. Countries seeking NATO membership, or even closer partnership with NATO, have an incentive to move forward with democratic and economic reforms and improve relations with their neighbors. This incentive is particularly important in a region like Central Europe, historically torn by ethnic and territorial disputes. For example, interest in NATO membership clearly encouraged Hungary and Slovakia and Hungary and Romania to sign historic treaties guaranteeing respect for borders and individual human rights. I believe the same can be said for the recent Czech-German reconciliation accord.

Second, I am assuming that, as the December North Atlantic Council meeting decided, the door to NATO
enlargement will remain open after one or more countries are invited at the July summit to begin accession negotiations. The first new members will not be the last. The Alliance will remain open to the accession of future members and will pursue consultations with those nations seeking NATO membership. The projected Atlantic Partnership Council will be a further means of keeping up and enhancing a cooperative relationship with applicants who may enter at a later date.

And finally, the third assumption is that Slovakia's prospects for more or less rapid integration into Western organizations like NATO depend largely on the government of Slovakia. Will it choose to institutionalize Western democratic practices and values and continue economic reform? The United States wants independent Slovakia to succeed in these efforts and will continue to encourage and help it to do so.

In her January 8, 1997, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that “what NATO must and will do is keep open the door to membership to every European nation that can shoulder Alliance responsibilities and contribute to its goals, while building a strong and enduring partnership with all of Europe's democracies.”

Only 3 years ago, Slovakia seemed as likely as other members of the Visegrad group, including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, to be among the first Central European countries invited to join NATO. Prime Minister Meciar had moved away from ideas he had expressed earlier that Slovakia might follow a “third way” between East and West, and appeared to believe that NATO was the only viable security option for Slovakia in post-Cold War Central Europe. A productive January 1994 summit meeting in Prague with President Clinton and other Central European leaders appeared to convince Prime Minister Meciar that the price for NATO admission would not include recognition of so-called “collective rights” for Slovakia's large Hungarian ethnic minority, although it would require improved relations with Hungary and respect for individual
rights of members of ethnic minorities. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, in which all Central European countries had equal standing, perfectly suited the Slovak aim of seeking group entry for the Visegrad states into NATO at a measured pace designed not to offend the Russians. Prime Minister Meciar’s reaction to PfP was enthusiastic, and he led Slovakia into the program in February 1994.

The short-lived Moravcik government, which came into power in March 1994, moved energetically to strengthen Slovakia’s credentials for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. It received kudos from Western partners and Japan, as well as from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its reform efforts.

However, the third Meciar government, which came in after the fall 1994 elections, has taken an increasingly ambivalent line on the NATO enlargement issue. Although stating that NATO membership remains a priority, the Prime Minister has been quoted as criticizing unnamed NATO representatives for allegedly calling for Slovakia to “give up (its) declarations to be a bridge between East and West.” He has generally dismissed as inaccurate expressions of concern by prospective Western partners in NATO and the EU about the pace of Slovakia’s democratic reform. His cabinet has approved opening a national debate on NATO membership, and he has raised the idea of holding a popular referendum on the issue in May, even before the July NATO summit. A recent poll showed that a majority of Slovaks who say they would vote in such a referendum would vote in favor of NATO membership, but that a majority in the Prime Minister’s party are opposed.

While making clear that the Slovak government must make its own decisions, the State Department spokesman in early December urged the Slovak cabinet to “commit to a higher degree of internal reform.” Thus, at a time of growing uncertainty about Slovakia’s attitude towards NATO enlargement, there is growing concern being expressed by some of Slovakia’s friends in the West regarding its commitment to the domestic reforms necessary for full
integration into Western security and economic organizations.

Let me now turn to what NATO should do and what Slovakia can do if it so chooses to advance its prospects for NATO membership. The United States and other NATO member countries can take a number of actions which would advance Slovak NATO membership.

We should make clear to the Slovak government and public that the United States and other NATO countries support Slovakia’s stated objective of integration into Western organizations, including NATO and the EU. However, we are concerned that Slovakia has not made as much progress in democratic and market reform as some other countries in the area. We are not trying to tell Slovakia that it must join NATO; Slovakia obviously must make its own decisions. However, we are pointing out that entry into NATO involves demonstrating that an applicant country shares Western democratic values.

We must also make clear that establishing credentials for membership in NATO and other Western organizations like the EU is up to Slovakia. However, we should continue to speak frankly about policies undercutting Slovakia’s reform process which jeopardize its integration into Western democratic organizations. These policies include confrontational government attitudes towards the media and constitutionally established judicial and executive authorities, legislation undermining democratic pluralism, including academic freedom, and lack of opportunity for Parliamentary opposition parties to participate fully in the oversight of sensitive government functions.

In the forthcoming public debate in Slovakia on NATO membership, we should also try to clarify what NATO membership does and does not actually entail. It does not aim to create new divisions in Europe. Rather, Russia is recognized as a fundamental part of a European security system and NATO and Russia are engaged in an active dialogue on what their relationship will be. In addition, as the December North Atlantic Council meeting made clear,
NATO has no intention, plan, or reason to station nuclear forces on the territory of new members.

NATO membership also does not mean that new members must discard their existing military equipment in order to purchase all new Western armaments, although they do need to move towards interoperability with NATO forces. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann, told Slovak news media, for example, that Russian MIG-29 fighters in former Eastern Germany fitted well into NATO integrated defense systems. He emphasized that the priority issues for NATO involve solving problems of language communication, a united command and Western standards and procedures, rather than buying Western tanks or fighters.

We should continue to assist Slovakia with effective military-to-military programs responding to the needs of the Slovak armed forces to modernize communications, manage resources, and upgrade language skills. And we should strengthen political cooperation on a practical, everyday basis between NATO and its PfP partners through the projected Atlantic Partnership Council. We have had excellent relations with the Slovak military and Slovakia has been a cooperative participant in the PfP program.

We should also continue our effective technical assistance programs designed to strengthen democratic pluralism, human rights and market reform. The United States has already provided over $200 million in this effort, including a successful program to strengthen Slovak Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). And, finally, we should remain engaged across the board, looking for areas of common interest in foreign policy, but making clear that compatibility of democratic values is fundamental to NATO membership.

Let me now indicate some actions by the Slovak government that would advance Slovakia’s chances for NATO membership. I believe the first and most essential step would be for the Slovak leadership to determine whether NATO membership is a high priority. Are they are
willing to institutionalize those democratic reforms and practices which will advance Slovakia's integration into Western institutions? The government's attitude now appears unclear. The Prime Minister's partners in the governing coalition have been negative towards NATO in the past.

Government statements in reaction to Western expressions of concern about the pace of Slovakia's internal reforms have typically denied the basis for the criticism and blamed Slovak opposition parties for creating an unfair image of Slovakia abroad. These indicators imply that while the Slovak government does not wish to be left behind its neighbors in entering NATO, it seeks membership only on terms which do not jeopardize its domestic efforts to consolidate power.

I believe the Slovak government's political decisions with respect to Slovakia's democratic transformation and economic reform largely shape its foreign policy options. It is free to choose its own course, just as NATO and EU member states are free to choose their closest partners. The recent stripping of the parliamentary mandate from a duly elected representative of the Prime Minister's HZDS party, after he resigned from the party and criticized the government for not fulfilling electoral promises of democratic reform, raised serious questions among friends of Slovakia about the government's commitment to reform. Similarly, actions such as passage of legislation restricting academic freedom and sharpening the penal code to permit tougher action against critics have provoked criticism in Slovakia and abroad.

Having had occasion to raise some of these issues during my service in Slovakia, I can tell you with confidence that the U.S. position has been clear and consistent. We strongly support the integration of a democratic Slovakia into the full range of Western security and economic organizations for which it qualifies. We will decide when and whether we will support Slovakia's entry into NATO based on when and whether Slovakia demonstrates that it fully shares NATO's democratic values. If NATO membership is an operational
priority, the governing coalition will make clear by its actions that it favors rather than fears democratic pluralism and respects the rights of political and ethnic minorities.

Finally, the question arises: What if Slovakia chooses a course which delays integration into NATO and other Western structures? In this event, the Slovak government should be aware that a policy of delay carries risks that Slovakia will not move as rapidly as its neighbors into the full range of Western economic and security structures. That said, however, it remains in NATO's interest to continue to engage Slovakia in a cooperative dialogue in the hope that, sooner rather than later, its government will adopt a course permitting integration to move forward.

NATO countries have no interest in isolating Slovakia and every interest in its future success as a member of the Western community of nations. NATO should hold the door open for possible future Slovak membership once the government moves ahead convincingly with democratic reform policies and makes clear that Slovakia is willing to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. NATO members should continue programs, including military-to-military and technical assistance efforts, which encourage those who are working to bring Slovakia into the Western community of democratic nations.
CHAPTER 6
NATO EXPANSION
AND THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS:
AUSTRIAN POSITIONS

Christian Clausen

The basic questions posed to the Austrian speaker at this roundtable were:

• What is Austria doing with regard to those states that will not enter NATO in the first tranche?

• What is Austria doing for itself as it ponders the question of NATO membership?

These are two fundamentally different questions, and I will therefore treat them separately.

Austria, not being a member of NATO, has no role to play in the decisions of NATO inviting or not inviting several of Austria’s neighbors to join the Alliance. Austria enjoys however, a special amount of trust and, of course, a historic and geographic neighborhood with the prime candidates for NATO membership; but also, based on the same facts, an equally close relation with some of the countries who might, against their aspirations, be passed over in the first round of invited candidates. I will therefore concentrate on the Central European region in my more specific comments.

In order to assess the situation properly, it might be advantageous to outline the overall scenario in which European security structures will develop in the near future. NATO expansion and European Union (EU) expansion will move generally in somehow parallel steps—the same group of countries which might be the first to get into NATO, will also be the ones with good chances to join the EU as new members. As there is no immediate outside strategic military threat which would force an acceleration of NATO enlargement, most security concerns of the
candidates are obviously more mid-to-long term. This will have not only an impact on the diplomatic deliberations of the whole process, but also on defense expenditures of all concerned—the beneficiaries of a larger NATO, as well as existing members who might be financial "benefactors" of the enlargement.

In a realistic assessment, spending money on NATO integration is probably not, and will not presently be, the first priority in any of the concerned states, both inside and outside the Alliance, as long as there is no threat by an aggressor.

Reluctance of budget increases is one factor influencing popular opinion in Central European countries, but fear of the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory is also played up by parties opposing NATO. This has led, even in a country as progressive in its change as the Czech Republic, to a decrease of popularity for NATO membership: having been well above 50 percent in 1994, polls in December 1996 showed only about 40 percent favor NATO candidacy.

Given the choice to spend budget money on entry requirements to the EU or financing NATO demands, some of the serious pretenders might choose economic and political needs first and security structure spendings second, a pattern not unfamiliar with older members of NATO. We all remember the NATO demand during the 1980s for an annual 3 percent increase in national defense spending, and the results in real figures that were then seen. For most of the NATO candidates, necessary defense budget increases would have to be fairly high to catch up with NATO standards within a few years. If budgets cannot be increased significantly in the new candidate countries, the integration process will take proportionally longer. Hopes that massive financial support from older members of NATO will be forthcoming should be laid to rest, as most of the integration cost, if not all, will have to be raised by the candidates themselves. An example for this time/expenditure relation has recently been published by the Polish government, outlining the assumption that with a cost factor of a 4 percent increase of the defense budget, Poland
would have its defense restructuring finished not earlier than by 2010, at a total cost of the accession estimated at $1.5 billion.¹

Even under the most optimistic conditions and good budget growth, the requirements for new members and the implementation of structural modifications, as required before full “real” membership, might take several years—and might not be completed by 1999, notwithstanding all the changes already undertaken in the “Partnership for Peace” ( PfP). Such needs for adjustments are nothing extraordinary as the history of NATO has shown with most new members’ integration in the past, both in terms of budget and in time needed to implement changes.²

One could almost assume that the intervals between the first and the second round of invitations to join NATO will be shorter than the time it will take the first candidates to achieve full compatibility with the Alliance and take over all the responsibilities and obligations in the legal, financial, infrastructural and logistic fields, from NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGS) to airspace coordination to language proficiency to intelligence restructuring. That might very well enable smaller, wealthier, and more flexible states of a later round of accession to catch up or even pass larger but less adept earlier candidates.

One has the impression that there is now a mood of artificial anxiety connected to this historic first expansion of NATO into the realm of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). But in our pragmatic world of political reality, it will not be a “big bang” situation—one day outside, next day a full and privileged member. That was never the case in the past, either. Presently missing is a calming-down effect on the candidates and an emphasis on the time and money involved in this process. This was highlighted very well in the RAND study on cost of NATO enlargement, and again made clear very recently by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, when he touched on this topic during his Senate hearings in January:
... If this is going to cost the United States money—and it will—it's yet to be determined how much cost will be involved ... that's something that requires ... the approval of the Congress.

As a noncompetitor for NATO membership at the present time, Austria will not only be able to impartially interpret, if asked, many of the factors mentioned above, but, together with the other neutrals in Europe, Austria can also serve as an example of what one might call the "selective approach" to a common European security and Atlantic partnership. Austria has permanent neutrality embedded in the constitution but has considered military activities carried out under the provisions of a U.N. Security Council decision as compatible with this neutrality. This is also the legal basis for military contributions to numerous U.N. missions during the last 40 years.

This experience in international military operations was an excellent starting point for an active contributor role in the PfP and has led to extensive involvement in bilateral training events—several hundred every year—which are undertaken for the benefit of most of our Central/Eastern European neighboring countries, the same group of states now waiting for admission to NATO.

Let us return to the question asked for this seminar: What will Austria do for the countries that will not enter NATO in the first tranche? If asked, Austria will explain its selective approach. Austria will continue to do what we have done in the past few years—work actively in the PfP (e.g., expand in civil emergency planning, a field in which Austria is a main contributor among the PfP countries, as NATO Secretary General Solana stated recently), but Austria will also continue to field a unit for the NATO operation in Bosnia; help to transit in- and out-traffic of NATO troops to Bosnia; and participate in the "cooperative" series of PfP exercises in Europe and the United States.

Austria is looking forward to participating in the future "PfP-plus" but will also carry on with all the multiple military missions in the service of the United Nations. The
The recent forming of a combined Austrian-Hungarian peacekeeping contingent in the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus is an example of how these two fields can be brought together.

Why is all that mentioned here? Because it shows how much countries can do in the spirit of creating collective European security, even if some of them have no aspirations to join NATO at the present time. Most of the activities mentioned can be undertaken by any country that wants to do so, including the states not invited to join the first group of NATO candidates—and they would find themselves in rather good company indeed, because this is generally the profile of all the neutrals of Europe.

A "selective approach," or choosing one’s priorities, has economic integration and security integration as equal priorities, keeping ambitions in line with the budget and with the chances that offer themselves over time. Fortunately, such a priority selection between the two main pillars of Europe’s future development—symbolized by NATO/Western European Union (WEU) on the one hand, and the EU on the other—does not close any doors. Let me again quote Secretary Cohen, who is, without a doubt, a dominant voice in NATO. He commented on the sequence of invitations to join the Atlantic Alliance at his Senate hearings as follows:

... Some country will say we didn’t get invited the first time; therefore, we’re out. But that’s not the case. It should be made clear this is the first time; there will be second and third entries ...

In the years since the end of bipolar confrontation in Europe, Austria has decided that its main priority lies in economic and political integration into the EU and that the defense and military integration would have to evolve thereafter. This does not mean that Austria abstained in any way from a constructive engagement: Vienna has been the seat of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and is now the main arena for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
(OSCE) which evolved from that conference. As a matter of fact, one of the basic agreements for the end of the Cold War, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), was not only negotiated in Vienna, but the first conference for revision of this treaty has started in Austria. This is, as we all know, one of the crucial prerequisites to improve the attitude of Russia toward the expansion of NATO.

The course of action charted by the Austrian government is not a very complicated one and builds on the active contributions made earlier. One of the key fora which will set the stage in European security and in which Austria is fully participating is the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Austria intends to formulate its relations with the WEU in accordance with the final recommendations of the IGC, which will conclude its deliberations in June 1997 in Amsterdam. This will be a guideline for relations with NATO in the next few years. Likewise, it is going to confirm Austria's position in the CFSP—fittingly abbreviated in German with the acronym, "GASP." These steps need to be made before Austria takes its turn at the presidency of the EU in 1998, so there is a rather firm timetable by now for progress towards European security structures.

Neutrality is still an issue which will have to be resolved in a formal procedure. To enable a more harmonious transition from permanent neutrality to future collective commitments, membership in the WEU has a special meaning for the Vienna government. That a good measure of flexibility exists has been shown by military participation in the IFOR and SFOR operations, by the acceptance of the Maastricht principles, and by Austria's readiness to share Petersburg obligations which require military means.

Answers to questions on the future of NATO and on its membership invariably include aspects which have something to do with the EU. The candidates for this structure are mostly the same as the ones for NATO. The EU is increasing its involvement in security policy: the Maastricht Agreement, the IGC, and the debate about the future relationship of WEU and EU in defense matters, just
to name the most important factors of this interrelation. The recent threat of NATO member Turkey to block the NATO admission of Central European candidates into NATO as long as Turkey itself is not admitted into the EU is a most illustrative example of how both sets of admission procedures are becoming related.\textsuperscript{5}

Aspiring candidates for NATO membership who are not sure about their chances to be invited at an early stage should therefore promote their admission with both goals in mind, remembering that progress on one track might almost automatically better the chances for an entry into the other structure as well. This, however, might work both ways: being found ineligible for NATO can possibly have a detrimental effect on EU admission, and \textit{vice versa}.

Although it might appear that NATO and EU are firmly set with clearly defined strategic aims and in their philosophy as homogenous bodies, reality shows that this is not so, and that, as a matter of fact, there have always been “gray zones” in their respective structures. Military participation of France in NATO over the years is one example, and the long and gradual process of integrating Iberian NATO members is another.

In the EU, we can also see this phenomenon of existing possibilities to “opt out”—existing not only in the past, like Great Britain’s refusal to join the social policy part of the Maastricht Treaty, while also approaching the EU in a dramatic way in the near future. With the coming introduction of a common European currency, some members will join right away, but there will be a second group of members who do not want or cannot join in this fundamental step into the future for the time being.

There is as yet no appropriate designator for the pragmatic existence of gray zones or concentric developments, which are more likely to increase in the future rather than to be overcome by clearcut, black-white characteristics in EU and NATO. For the new candidates, this ought to be an element of relief that, if not taken in now, this does not mean that the gate will remain closed forever—even for the
ones who still have not met all of the admission criteria. Most likely this will lead to more differentiated memberships, like “PfP-plus” or de facto associated members of NATO, who have all in common with the Alliance except nuclear guarantees, or members who make it known that they will opt out of NATO operations in certain areas, or participants in combined joint task force operations who have not initiated admission negotiations with NATO. In his opening statement Ambassador David Abshire recalled that, for years during the Cold War, some of the European neutrals were “under the nuclear umbrella” of NATO, although they never desired NATO membership at that time. Gray zones have existed in the past and most probably will always be found in these overlapping structures of NATO and EU.

Threat perceptions for Europe need to be defined for the years to come. There is still a lot to be done to make the picture clearer and to show for what types of threats NATO is supposed to provide defenses in the future. Presently, we can see some contours developing, like the increase in threats from terrorism and illegal immigration, electronic and information warfare scenarios, and, at the same time, a decrease in probability of the historic security threats for Europe, like large-scale armored offensives across Central Europe or massive strategic nuclear missile strikes. But it is not only the Alliance on the whole that must change, the new candidates should also adjust their own particular threat perceptions and assess their “wish lists” for NATO membership accordingly. This will, at the same time, make it easier to define what nations must do to come up with their own share of defense efforts in order to qualify for NATO assistance. Again, the RAND study on the cost of expansion is a good guideline for a start. How much remains to be done in this process of revising old cliches becomes obvious in higher level PfP contacts and in many bilateral staff exercises with neighbors of Austria who aspire to early NATO membership.

In summarizing these observations, we should return to the two questions at the start of our overview:
• What to say to the countries of Central Eastern Europe not in the first tranche of NATO expansion?

• How will Austria itself proceed with its steps toward a common Atlantic and European security?

Nothing could better form a guideline for an answer to both of these two questions than one of the key statements of the European presidency on security policy developments formulated in 1995:

The positive effects on European security . . . Should be brought about by an eventual broad congruence of membership in EU, WEU, and NATO, taking into account the need for flexibility and the differing membership requirements.¹

Or in very simple terms:

Go for a selective approach—take your time, don’t be jealous, and, for Heaven’s sake, don’t panic!

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6


4. Transcript, Cohen Hearing.


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