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IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGE MANDATED BY "...FROM THE SEA"

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Implications of the Change Mandated by "...From the Sea"
by
Commander William D. Treadway

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ABSTRACT

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The publication of the White Paper "From The Sea" in 1992 and its update in 1994 represent one of the most important changes in United States naval strategic thinking this century. The vision contained in these documents for a new operational concept focused on operations in the littoral areas of the world in order to influence events on land represents a significant departure from the basic tenets of open ocean sea control that formed the basis for the Navy's maritime strategy during the Cold War. This paper analyzes the implications of "From the Sea" for the naval services and for the future of joint littoral operations. Implementing the White Paper's concepts requires changes that will make the Navy an effective combat force in joint littoral operations. An attempt will be made to determine if the necessary changes have taken place to achieve the visionary goals of "From the Sea" as well as identifying additional opportunities to develop a synergistic joint littoral warfare capability. The conclusion addresses the risks involved with such change and the prospects for its success.
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The global security environment has undergone dramatic and turbulent change since 1990. The key feature of this change is the disappearance of the global threat to United States national security and survival represented by the Soviet Union. This change combined with the economic reality of diminishing defense budgets to force the armed forces to restructure while changing doctrinal and operational concepts, and organizational structures. The changes across service lines have been profound, but in the case of the United States Navy, they have the potential to be revolutionary in nature.

The event precipitating the recent revolution in Navy strategic thought and doctrinal development was the publication of the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper "From the Sea" in 1992. It is one of the most important changes in naval strategic thought in the United States since the late nineteenth century. "From the Sea," and the update that followed in 1994 - "Forward...From the Sea", provide a vision for the naval services, the Navy and Marine Corps, which is the basis for an operational concept focused on joint littoral operations in order to influence events on land. In many ways this vision represents a return to the operational proficiency in integrated power projection and littoral warfare that was achieved by the naval services during World War II but abandoned during the Cold War. The rediscovery and implementation of this concept in the post Cold War era has been accompanied by significant changes in the organizational structure and perhaps even the culture of the Navy. The nature of these changes will potentially affect every aspect of the Navy.

The scope of the change in strategic thought is best understood by tracing the development of American naval strategic thought from the late nineteenth century
through the end of the Cold War and its impact on the Navy’s operational concepts. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writing at the turn of the century on the nature of sea power has had a pervasive and enduring impact on strategic thinking and operational doctrine. The extent of this impact is epitomized by the Maritime Strategy published by the Navy in 1986. It was based on Mahan’s belief that the United States was inescapably a strategic maritime power that had a clear imperative to achieve and maintain global naval supremacy. The Maritime Strategy identified the need to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Navy to critical global sea lines of communication. The distinct focus on the Soviet threat undermined the basis for the Maritime Strategy when that threat disappeared in 1990.

The unpredicted loss of the threat basis for the Maritime Strategy set the stage for development of the revolutionary new concepts found in “From the Sea” and the 1994 follow-on White Paper “Forward From the Sea.” The revolutionary concepts center on shifting emphasis from open ocean sea control to influencing and enabling operations ashore. This profound and fundamental change in focus changed the concept of where, who, and how the Navy will fight and impacts virtually every aspect of the Navy, but perhaps most significantly it’s approach to joint operations.

This paper analyzes the implications of “From the Sea” for the naval services and for the future of joint littoral operations. Implementing the White Paper’s concepts requires fundamental and profound change that will make the Navy an effective combat force in joint littoral operations. An attempt will be made to determine if the necessary changes have taken place to achieve the visionary goals of “From the Sea” as well as
identifying additional opportunities for developing a synergistic joint littoral warfare
capability. The conclusion will address the risks involved with such fundamental and
profound change as well the prospects for success while reaffirming the saliency of
Mahan's principles of sea power.

MAHAN'S THEORY OF MARITIME POWER

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries are clearly the most enduring source of naval strategic thought
in the United States. His concepts of sea power, sea control, sea lines of communication
and the use of them to deny an enemy vital commerce provided the intellectual basis for
Navy doctrine and strategic thought. His argument that the United States was destined by
strategic geography to be a maritime power created an omnipotent and enduring role for
that premise in naval strategic thinking.

Mahan viewed control of the sea as a previously unconsidered factor in
determining the outcome of wars. Based heavily on historical analysis, he found Britain
to be the best example of the use of maritime predominance and naval domination to
positively influence the outcome of conflicts. He also asserted that the oceans are
strategic highways and vital to the economic survival of all nations that have access to
them. Control of the oceans through the use of naval forces allowed a nation to prevent
an adversary the commerce needed to support warfare.¹

In order to create a scientific approach to the study of naval strategy, Mahan
recognized the need to establish universal principles. Since these principles were not
provided in previous professional naval literature, he turned to the significant body of literature available concerning land warfare. Writing in Naval Strategy in 1911, he explained that:

...land warfare has a much more extensive narrative development, because there has been very much more land fighting than sea; and also, perhaps because of this larger amount of material, much more effort has been made to elicit the underlying principles by formal analysis.²

Mahan found the principles and analysis he sought in the writings of Henri Jomini. He determined that Jomini’s principles of concentration, the strategic value of central position and interior lines, and the relationship between logistics and combat were applicable to the study of naval warfare.³ He developed a theory of naval power constructed around the importance of maritime lines of communication or movement that were global in scale and critical to commerce and military operations. When conflict arose over these lines of communication, war resulted. This necessitated that any nation dependent on global maritime communications maintain a large and powerful navy. He used this logic to correct what he felt was the misguided view that America needed a small Navy of small ships for coastal defense and commerce raiding. He argued that a maritime nation required a large naval force consisting of capital ships, battleships in his day, in order to drive the enemy from the sea.⁴

Mahan’s theory did not include power projection from the sea in support of land battles. He held that navies operated independently and were neither concerned nor affected by the outcome of land battles. The only conceivable reason a naval force would engage a shore target, either by bombardment or infantry assault, would be to seize
a base to support sea control operations or destroy an enemy facility that threatened the
sea control mission. His theory gained wide acceptance at home and abroad and had an
enduring impact on military strategy, naval doctrine, operations, and shipbuilding
throughout the twentieth century.

**MAHAN’S INFLUENCE ON WORLD WAR II AND COLD WAR STRATEGY**

**World War II:**

Mahan’s principles of denying the enemy access to critical maritime lines of
communication to destroy his ability to wage war formed the basis for United States
military strategy in the Pacific during World War II. Planning prior to the war focused
on war with Japan and Plan Orange was produced to deal with that contingency. The
plan’s objective was economic strangulation of Japan and it relied heavily on the
presence of forward bases to support the sea control operations necessary to do that. In
keeping with Mahan’s belief that naval power projection ashore was relevant when it
supported sea control, the Marine Corps amphibious doctrine developed in the inter-war
period due to the need to seize bases in the Pacific in support of the sea control operations
in Plan Orange. The success of the Pacific campaign during the war served to validate
Mahan’s theory regarding the role of sea power in warfare and the Marine Corps’
amphibious doctrine, but at the same time, the success and key role of large-scale
integrated naval power projection operations appeared to undermine Mahan’s tenet that
navies were never concerned nor affected by the outcome of land battles.
The Cold War Maritime Strategy:

The Cold War brought technological changes, such as ballistic missile submarines and nuclear weapons delivered by carrier based aircraft, that further undermined Mahan's assumptions about the role of sea based power projection against land targets. Strategic strike became an important mission for the Navy and, contrary to Mahan's writings, the targets had little or no impact on sea control. As the Cold War continued however, the practical reality became clear that deterring or controlling low intensity conflict on the rim of Eurasia was the primary operational focus of the Navy and not global nuclear warfare. This was an important premise of first Cold War maritime strategy to emerge in the 1950's. It was not linked to the other services and emphasized the flexibility and mobility inherent in naval forces and their efficacy in operating independently to control small-scale non-nuclear conflicts.7

The Maritime Strategy, released in 1986, portrayed a new role for the Navy in deterring or waging general war with the Soviet Union that required operations in forward areas close to the enemy and allies. The plainly stated reason for this was to deter the Soviets or in the event of war to be in position to threaten the Soviet homeland while simultaneously destroying the Soviet Navy. The United States' sea based threat was designed to influence the land battle on the northern European plain which would be the Soviet's main effort. Forward deployed aircraft carrier battlegroups and amphibious groups would threaten the Soviet homeland and therefore limit the Soviet's ability to redeploy forces. Aircraft carriers would also conduct open ocean sea control operations ensuring that reinforcement and resupply of allied forces in Europe.8
The release of the Maritime Strategy coincided with the passage of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) mandating increased inter-operability and joint operations. Not surprisingly, the Maritime Strategy strongly emphasized the Navy’s role in joint warfare by providing details of memoranda of understanding with the Air Force and Army identifying areas of increased cooperation. In spite of this rhetoric, the Maritime Strategy was criticized as a retreat by the Navy from increased integration with the other services. This criticism was based on the conclusion that the Maritime Strategy was a model for the Navy to operate in isolation from the Army and Air Force.\(^9\)

The Maritime Strategy has an interesting passage regarding change and tradition in the Navy. It points out the important role of tradition in the Navy and the impact it has on change and reform. The strategy represents as a continuation of the traditions of Mahan in that it attempts to grasp global realities and then relate means and resources to national objectives based on those realities. It is portrayed as a catalyst for reform by providing rationalized and disciplined procurement planning and program development driven by a clearly stated strategy. It also brought strategic thinking back into the organizational culture after a long hiatus.\(^10\)

The Maritime Strategy supported Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s procurement goal of a 600 ship Navy. It was a very effective tool in this respect both in the Congress and with the public. It also functioned as a unifying concept for the Navy to provide a common language for programmers, budgeteers and operating forces.\(^11\)
"FROM THE SEA" - A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE NAVY

Desert Storm, the End of the Cold War and "From the Sea":

The momentous events surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union and the circumstances of Operation Desert Storm combined to bring the validity of the Maritime Strategy into question. The greatly decreased naval threat removed the need for an operational focus dominated by open ocean sea control, the basic premise of the Maritime Strategy. The assessment of no serious challenge to United States naval power emerging in the predictable future made the relevancy of the Maritime Strategy suspect. This unquestioned naval supremacy and new emphasis on joint operations necessitated a re-examination of the appropriate operational focus for the Navy in the future. As a result, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps abandoned plans in 1990 to update the existing Maritime Strategy and Amphibious Warfare Strategy. Instead they directed the development of a new concept built around an integrated Navy - Marine Corps team committed to joint littoral operations. The Navy’s experience in the Persian Gulf War reinforced the logic of this decision. The challenges presented by large-scale naval operations in the Persian Gulf littoral disabused the Cold War assumption that concentration on open ocean warfare would prepare the Navy for operations in any environment. Additionally, the Persian Gulf War served to validate the air-land battle and strategic bombing concepts of the Army and Air Force while it had the opposite effect on the Maritime Strategy by demonstrating that the concepts designed for open ocean sea control did not transfer easily to the littoral environment.13
This combination of events led to a Marine Corps zero based capabilities study to determine needs in the new security environment. This study expanded into the Navy and Marine Corps Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort. The group's task was to frame the future operational environment, determine the capabilities required for it, and the force structure needed to achieve those capabilities. The group's analysis was the basis for a series of war games that were reviewed by flag and general officers with the end result of the process being “From the Sea.”  

New Direction -- Power Projection and Joint Integration:

“From the Sea” presented a vision of the role and purpose of naval forces in the future. The focal point was a fundamental shift in emphasis from a global naval threat to regional joint and combined operations in littoral areas. This was complicated by shrinking budgets requiring simultaneous downsizing while re-shaping the force. This required a re-prioritization of warfare areas to produce a new more flexible and powerful force that was re-sized and re-structured for littoral operations.

An unmistakably the key aspect of the new concept is the littoral environment and the challenges of operating there. The littoral is the area from the ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support land operations and the area inland that can be supported directly from the sea. It is confined and congested with concentrated and layered enemy defenses creating a technically and tactically challenging operating environment. The White Paper points out that mastery of the littoral cannot be assumed nor is it a spin-off of open ocean sea control.
The new direction also requires re-discovery and probably re-learning the lessons learned during World War II regarding the employment of naval forces as part of an integrated joint sea-air-land team. The traditional expeditionary nature of naval forces has resurfaced as the basis for integrating the Navy and Marine Corps into forward deployed naval expeditionary forces that are inter-operative with the Army and Air Force. Forward deployed expeditionary naval forces are portrayed as ideally suited to deter regional conflict, control a crisis, or act as an enabling force for joint operations ashore in the event of conflict.\(^\text{17}\)

In addition to reaffirming the relevance of traditional operational capabilities such as forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift; "From the Sea" identifies four key operational capabilities critical for successful realization of the new vision and direction.\(^\text{18}\)


2. Battlespace dominance through the application of decisive force against threats on and under the sea, on land and in the air.

3. Power projection from the littoral by generating intense, precise offensive power.

4. Force sustainment based on sealift, secure sea lanes, forward logistics bases and prepositioned equipment.

The White Paper was criticized for ignoring or minimizing vital tasks required to maintain sea control in the open ocean environment in favor of a futile attempt to fight
the land battle. Moreover, critics contended that the Navy did not have the capability or equipment to operate effectively in the near shore environment.19 Although not a direct response to the criticism, the follow-up White Paper, “Forward...From the Sea” was released in 1994. It addressed the criticism and also expanded on the earlier concepts by presenting five fundamental and enduring roles of naval forces: power projection, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, sealift, and forward presence.20 These roles reinforced many of the ideas presented in “From the Sea,” specifically the importance of joint littoral operations with a regional focus, while recognizing the continued importance of the traditional mission of sea control. Reminiscent of Mahan, “Forward...From the Sea” acknowledges America’s role as a maritime nation with a “strategic imperative” for a transoceanic security strategy focused on sea lanes or as “lines of strategic approach” that remain open and secure to support American trade and military operations.21

CHANGE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW CONCEPTS

The concepts in the White Papers augur profound changes for the Navy in many ways. The renewed emphasis on power projection to influence events ashore, increased integration with the Marine Corps in expeditionary warfare, and commitment to joint operations require significant doctrinal and organizational changes to be successfully implemented. Perhaps the most important of these deals with the Navy’s historical approach to joint operations.
Synergism versus Specialization in Joint Operations:

Admiral William A. Owens’ description of specialization and synergism as two contrasting approaches to joint operations provides insights to understanding the Navy’s traditional attitude toward integration and joint operations as well as the changes needed if the Navy is to truly become part of an integrated joint team.22

Admiral Owens describes specialization as an approach based on the premise that the best qualified service for a particular mission should have sole responsibility for it. Therefore, increased combat effectiveness in joint operations is best achieved by letting each service operate independently to accomplish the missions for which it is trained and equipped. Specialization reflects the Maritime Strategy philosophy and can be summarized as - leave the Navy alone because it knows what to do and how to do it and independent operations allow it to optimize combat capability in order to influence events at the operational level of war. This attitude created the paradox of the Navy collectively professing commitment to joint operations, while the operational concepts in the Maritime Strategy described a model for the employment of naval forces separate from the Army and Air Force.23 The Gulf War made it clear that the universal endorsement of joint operations throughout the Navy was not accompanied by an adequate understanding of what they were or how to conduct them.

Specialization is not exclusive to the Navy. It is the logic historically used by each service to justify procurement of unique aircraft, communications, and logistic systems. The result is a myriad of legacy systems narrowly tailored to specific missions that significantly hamper inter-operability and joint integration.24
The synergistic approach to joint operations advocates the integration and combination of capabilities across service lines to blend combat capability to produce an enhanced, or possibly even a new form of combat power. “From the Sea,” with its emphasis on integration not only within the naval services but with the Army and Air Force as well, clearly identified the Navy as a proponent of the synergistic approach. It is interesting to compare the Navy’s approach to that of the other services, most notably the Air Force. The Air Force’s 1990 vision statement “The Air Force and United States National Strategy: Global Reach Global Power” discussed joint operations in terms of opportunities for “complementary Air Force and naval operations” in such areas as air defense, coordinated strikes using carrier based aircraft and B-52’s, and B-52’s conducting sea mining and anti-ship missile attacks. This vision statement suggested that synergism was the Air Force’s approach to joint operations. However, the 1992 follow-up version of the Air Force White Paper does not address joint Navy/Air Force complementary operations, suggesting that in the aftermath of Desert Storm the Air Force concluded that specialization was the preferred approach to the employment of air power in joint operations.

Power Projection, Integration and Expeditionary Warfare

The Navy’s new emphasis represents a significant change from the employment concept of the Cold War. In the absence of any current or projected naval threat to the United States’ naval supremacy, the Navy’s role has expanded beyond the Cold War emphasis on open ocean sea control to include acting as the key enabling agent for operations by land based forces. This lies at the heart of the expeditionary warfare
concept and is central to the role of naval forces role in joint operations to seize and defend key installations ashore to enable the deployment of Army and Air Forces.²⁶

The Navy now also focuses on supporting the other components in every phase of joint littoral operations. A good example of this is the potential for an expanded Navy role in the Army’s concept of expeditionary warfare. The Army concept focuses on the sequential and rapid build-up of heavy land forces. The Navy’s traditional role of providing sealift should expand to include air and missile defense for the initial land forces in ports of debarkation and tactical assembly areas. This would allow the Army to dedicate more critical lift space to offensive capability during the early stages of deployment by relieving the Army of the need to deploy air defense assets for force protection.²⁷ Similar support to land based forces is possible in such areas as; intelligence preparation of the battlespace, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, offensive counter-air and interdiction strikes to support strategic bombing.

The renewed emphasis on expeditionary warfare has redefined the relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps. This redefined relationship is once again reminiscent of the pre-Cold War integrated force model that was replaced by the coordinated force found in the Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Strategy, and its corollary Amphibious Strategy, focused on independent operations by carriers and amphibious task groups that were coordinated in a broad sense. Operations were not directly related and that mitigated against integration of two of the most potent conventional power projection elements of the naval service. The current emphasis on controlling and influencing events ashore has rekindled the historic integration of Marine
amphibious assault and Navy carrier air forces to create a more potent naval power projection force. The essence of expeditionary warfare now is to integrate the unique capabilities of amphibious forces and carrier battlegroups to create a more flexible, mobile, and potent force to project power ashore. This requires a level of integration exceeding the traditional Navy roles of amphibious lift and naval gunfire support. It requires an increased Navy role in air and missile defense, command, control and communications, close air support, and intelligence operations in direct support of Marine forces ashore.  

In addition to a more integrated naval force, opportunities exist to integrate Marine Corps and Army expeditionary warfare concepts by combining the capabilities of Army Preposition Afloat (APA) material with forward deployed naval forces. The combination of these complementary capabilities is representative of synergism in joint operations. The first step in capitalizing on this opportunity must be universal acceptance of APA and Marine Corps prepositioned or forward deployed forces as complementary and not competitive capabilities. In short, the Army does not have the training, equipment, experience, or desire to assume the mission of amphibious assault that is the statutory responsibility of the Marine Corps. APA provides critical logistical sustainment, armor and antiarmor capabilities that if combined with Marine forces could form a more powerful land combat element available very quickly in selected regions. The APA material allows an Army heavy brigade to close and become operational within fifteen days after the order to initiate movement. This offers the possibility of a joint Army/Marine Corps ground combat element ashore and operational early in a crisis or
conflict, with ships offshore providing key support such as air/missile defense, close air support, battlefield interdiction, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and command, control and communications.\textsuperscript{30} The blending naval forces and Army capabilities provides the option of inserting a substantial and well supported ground force to control a crisis or conflict while additional forces deploy. The presence of this force may preclude the need to deploy the additional forces.

In short, the new goal of the Navy is to enable the application of joint power in littoral areas. The examples presented are not only a valid argument for increased integration between the Navy and Marine Corps, but for increased awareness of Army and Air Force operational and doctrinal concepts as well. This increased awareness of the way land battles are fought must be reinforced by increased operational links between the services that extend beyond the current regime of joint exercises that only partially fulfill that role. An effective way to do this is to make joint operations the norm instead of the exception. If every mission and operation undertaken by naval forces included active participation by the other services or was conducted within the context of the contribution it makes to the capabilities of the other services - a truly joint perspective to naval planning and operations would develop.

\textbf{The Agents of Change: Staff Reorganization and Joint Force Integration:}

The magnitude of the changes required to implement the concepts in “From the Sea” led the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank Kelso, to reorganize the CNO staff in 1992. He did this to remove a major impediment to change. The reorganization eliminated the three star air, surface, and submarine warfare platform
sponsors on the staff. These admirals had a bureaucratic incentive to protect their respective warfare discipline budget which in turn prevented the restructuring and re-sizing required for littoral warfare.\textsuperscript{31}

The new staff structure is tailored to support the changes called for in the White Papers, and is highlighted by the new position of Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments Directorate (N8). This powerful office establishes future requirements, allocates funds, and then measures the effectiveness of the allocations. A new Joint Mission Area Assessment process requires Navy programs to be of demonstrable importance to joint operations in order to be resourced. The intent was to force staff program officers to be familiar with Army and Air Force programs in order to be able to prove that a Navy program contributed to the capability or mission of other services. This process is a powerful means of internalizing the joint perspective in the planning and programming process. The presence of a Marine Corps major general as the Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the new staff provides concrete evidence of the Navy's commitment to integrated expeditionary warfare with the Marine Corps and relearning the forgotten lessons from World War II.\textsuperscript{32}

Evidence of the new staff's ability to implement dramatic change was the Navy's submission a re-capitalization plan that proposed to reduce force structure 30% more than the base force proposal of the Bush administration. This unprecedented drawdown proposal coming from a service suggested that the Navy was dead serious about the re-sizing, restructuring and modernization needed to accomplish the goals laid out in the
White Papers. The re-sizing and restructuring, as well as reprogramming of prior appropriations, is essential to equip the Navy to fight in the littoral environment.\textsuperscript{33}

The CNO staff reorganization internalized the joint perspective at the strategic level, the Joint Force Integration program, formerly referred to as Adaptive Joint Force Packages, of United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) is the most likely means of internalizing it at the operational and tactical levels.

Adaptive joint force packaging began with the need to augment traditional peacetime rotational forward deployments of naval forces with Army and Air Force assets. The Navy and Marine Corps first experimented with the concept in 1993 by deploying a Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt CVN 71 during a Mediterranean deployment. The SPMAGTF, consisting of a Marine company and 10 helicopters, provided a ground power projection capability to the carrier battlegroup. Later that year USS America CV 66 deployed with a similar SPMAGTF and a platoon of Navy Seals. An F-14 Tomcat squadron and an S-3B Viking anti-submarine warfare squadron were removed from the carrier air wings of each ship to accommodate the Marines. These deployments were controversial and criticized for diluting the effectiveness of both the ground forces and carrier aviation forces by mixing them. Admiral Paul D. Miller, CINCUSACOM, said that the intent was “to blend their force insertion skills with the combat operations of the carrier to provide new capabilities ashore, such as target designation, reconnaissance, surveillance, demolition, and combat search and rescue.”\textsuperscript{34}
The next phase of development was the integration of Army units into a carrier battlegroup. One of these tests consisted of embarking ground and air elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment and 5th Special Forces Group aboard USS George Washington CVN 73 for a field training exercise. The exercise focused on developing C2 procedures to allow Army Special Forces to conduct direct action or reconnaissance missions from a carrier and featured a night raid training mission flown from the carrier with carrier aircraft in support. The aim was to have Army elements and the carrier battlegroup fully trained so that the Army elements could remain in the United States as a surge force if needed during the carrier battlegroup deployment.\textsuperscript{35}

Lessons learned during these tests led to the successful short notice deployment of the aviation brigade (51 helicopters), two light infantry battalions, a brigade headquarters, twenty-five wheeled vehicles, shop sets, and ammunition from the 10th Mountain Division aboard USS Eisenhower CVN 69 for Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1994. In the space of two days during the operation 1800 troops and 200 sling loads of supplies and equipment were moved by helicopter from the carrier to the beach.\textsuperscript{36} Operation Restore Democracy was clearly a successful demonstration of the feasibility of deploying an Army air assault force on a nuclear aircraft carrier for operations other than war in a permissive environment. The unique circumstances of this operation prevented acceptance of this deployment concept as an effective means or model for integrating the power projection capabilities of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier and air assault forces. Criticism of Adaptive Joint Force Packages from various quarters continued.
The apparent success of adaptive force packaging during Operation Restore Democracy had little impact on the cool reception the concept received from the regional CINC’s. They did not like USACOM determining forces to be trained and deployed to their theaters. The individual services were also skeptical of the novel force packages. General John Sheehan, CINCUSACOM, directed the name change to Joint Force Integration in 1995 due to continued negative response to Adaptive Joint Force Packages. The program was broadened to include joint training for all United States based forces while the plan to create trained Air Force and Army surge forces to support forward deployed naval forces was abandoned. In spite of this apparent capitulation to the advocates of specialization, General Sheehan remains committed to synergism as the means to achieve the integrated joint forces required for the future. As such, USACOM continues to advocate Joint Force Integration training to meld combat elements into coherent joint teams prior to deployment. In view of the Navy’s commitment to synergistic joint operations, it should embrace the Joint Force Integration program. Joint Force Integration is an effective way to internalize the joint perspective at the operational and tactical level by facilitating mission and operational planning with active participation by the other services and within the context joint operations.

CONCLUSION

Two critical issues are associated with the course of profound and fundamental change charted by the visionary goals in “From the Sea.” First, what are the associated
risks with implementing the change and second, what are the prospects for success in achieving the goals?

Risk is inherent with all change and the magnitude of the risk is in direct proportion to the scope and nature of the change. The revolutionary nature of the changes required to achieve the goals of "From the Sea" creates a significant level of risk. To frame the issue effectively, one must ask if the Navy is abandoning the Mahan’s concept of sea control and if so, what are the implications of neglecting the associated roles and missions? It is important to bear in mind that departure from the classic principles of sea power and their associated missions may be an unintended second or third order effect of aggressively pursuing the changes required to implement the Navy’s new operational concepts. Adherence to America’s inescapable role as a maritime power may not be consciously abandoned. But in the zeal to develop the competencies necessary to dominate the littoral battlespace the Navy may assume away one of the primary foundations of maritime power...open ocean sea control...by failing to recognize the possibility of a naval peer competitor unexpectedly emerging. The rebuttal of these points is the Navy’s commitment to aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of American naval power through the middle of the next century.

Mahan’s argument that maritime nations require naval forces built around capital ships that can concentrate power at the correct time and place to drive the enemy from the sea remains salient. Today, and into the future, those capital ships are aircraft carriers. The Navy’s plan to maintain America’s maritime and naval supremacy against any possible threat by continuing to build naval power around the potent and flexible
capabilities of nuclear powered aircraft carriers is testimony to the Navy's dedication to protecting and maintaining American maritime and naval supremacy in any environment. A consensus probably exists that carrier battle groups were vital in countering the global naval threat during the Cold War. In its aftermath they are demonstrating the versatility necessary for achieving the ambitious goal of battlespace domination in the challenging littoral environment. However, it would be prudent to recall the erroneous assumption of the Maritime Strategy that held that domination in the open ocean environment guaranteed proficiency in all others. Neglect of the unique human skills, knowledge, abilities and intuition necessary to fight a technically and tactically proficient adversary in the open ocean environment will ensure atrophy with minimal chance for a mechanistic technical quick fix. Therefore, the current emphasis on the near shore and land battle should not allow the denigration of traditional open ocean sea control missions.

The significant changes to the Navy's organizational structure appear to have successfully imbued the joint perspective at the strategic level which is vital for achieving the goals of the White Papers. There remain larger, unanswered, and complex questions concerning changes to the Navy's organizational culture that are required to implement revolutionary change. To frame these questions, it is necessary to comment on the powerful role of tradition in the Navy's culture. The Navy has historically been the most independent service with a culture characterized by unilateral decision making and pride in the fact that it is not dependent on any other service to accomplish its mission. An adjunct of this is the aura of the special authority that accompanies command at sea that makes the idea of officers from another service commanding Navy ships particularly abhorrent. These cultural characteristics may mitigate against achieving the level of
integration with the other services envisioned in “From the Sea.” This best way to preclude this is to aggressively pursue increased operational and tactical links with the services. Increased familiarity will eventually wear away the suspicion with which the services, particularly the Navy, often view each other. This is essential to facilitate the integration and interoperability needed for joint littoral warfare. In pursuit of this goal, the Navy should stay the course charted by the vision in “From The Sea” by continuing to re-size and re-structure the force, increase the scope and pace of joint force integration, and remain dedicated to the synergistic approach to joint operations.
ENDNOTES

3 Paret, 457.
5 Paret, 461.
9 Beaumont, 169.
10 Watkins, 15-16.
14 Heim, 27.
16 Ibid., 5.
17 Ibid., 6.
18 Ibid., 7-10.
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