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A STRATEGY FOR MIGRATING THE ARMY TO A JOINT MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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The Uniformed Services are not able to provide critical information (i.e., timely and accurate data on deployment, mobilization, and theater assets) to Warfighting Commander In Chiefs (CINCs). Accordingly OSD, with Defense Science Board (DSB) validation, mandated Service migration to a single all Service and all component, fully integrated personnel and pay system to solve these problems by the year 2001.

All Services have programs in effect to improve their personnel information management systems and are making progress. However, the strategic vision that drives these programs is Service-oriented rather than joint. Developing a shared strategic vision among the Services is the essential first step for successful migration to JMPMS. This strategic vision should incorporate a view of the future environment and the role each Service will or should play in that world. It should also include the “joint” goal, objective, or endstate for personnel information management in the year 2001. Each Service can then develop a comprehensive transition strategy to achieve the vision.

This paper focuses on the Army’s JMPMS migration requirements. Specifically, it will provide background on OSD personnel information management requirements, outline the Army’s personnel information management problems, and develop a blueprint to facilitate development of the Army’s JMPMS strategic vision.
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INTRODUCTION

We are drowning in information. We have generated more data, statistics, words, formulas, images, documents, and declarations than we can possibly absorb. And rather than create new ways to understand and assimilate the information we already have, we simply create more information and at an increasingly rapid pace.¹

Vice President Al Gore

This statement illustrates the information management dilemma faced by society today. Prior to the creation of the computer, society developed and operated many large, paper-based information management systems. A visit to a records section operated by either civilian or military personnel organizations of the pre-automation era would reveal hundreds of thousands of cubic feet dedicated to paper record storage. As Information Technology matures, these manual systems and paper records are disappearing at an ever increasing rate. As society becomes more information literate, it seeks more information to make better decisions.

To meet these ever-increasing demands for information, society created automated systems that collect more information than the manual-based predecessor. Vice President Gore's quotation suggests that many organizations fail to interface or integrate this information, both internally and externally, with other organizations. As a result, these organizations fail to fully understand the information nor use it efficiently.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) personnel managers have identified similar problems within the Uniformed Services. Currently, the Services are not able to provide critical information (i.e., timely and accurate data on deployment, mobilization, and theater assets) to Warfighting Commander In Chiefs (CINC)s. Accordingly OSD, with Defense Science Board (DSB) validation, mandated Service migration to a single all
Service and all component, fully integrated personnel and pay system to solve these problems. The new system will feature common core software built on a Commercial Off The Shelf human resources software application base, with an Initial Operating Capability of 2001 or earlier. This Joint Military Personnel Management System (JMPMS) will integrate active and reserve components, track individuals during deployment and while in theater, efficiently exchange personnel and pay information, standardize data and meet the Services' operational requirements.²

All Services have programs in effect to improve their personnel information management systems and are making progress. The strategic vision that drives these programs however is Service-oriented rather than joint. Developing a shared strategic vision among the Services is the essential first step for successful migration to JMPMS. Using Glenda Nogami's strategic vision model (1994), this strategic vision should incorporate a view of the future environment and the role each Service will or should play in that world.³ It should also include the “joint” goal, objective, or endstate for personnel information management in the year 2001. Once this is accomplished, each Service can develop a comprehensive transition strategy to achieve the vision.

This paper focuses on the Army's JMPMS migration requirements. Specifically, it will provide background on OSD personnel information management requirements, outline the Army's personnel information management problems, and develop a blueprint to facilitate development of the Army's JMPMS strategic vision.
OSD MILITARY PERSONNEL AND READINESS INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

JMPMS’ roots extend back to 1989 with the initiation of the Defense Information
Management Program. Renamed the Military Personnel and Readiness Information
Management Program (MPRIMP) in 1992, the program’s major goals are to support
CINC’s by solving operational problems, eliminating or reducing data collection burdens,
conserving resources, improving delivery of Services, and enhancing readiness.⁴

MPRIMP proponents noted military personnel management and pay system
deficiencies both during and after Operation JUST CAUSE and the Persian Gulf War that
indicated MPRIMP goals were not being met.⁵ In fact, proponents characterized the
military personnel management environment as “…Service and component personnel
systems that support component-specific policies and business practices and use
component-specific data elements.”⁶ This means that there is no core set of standard data
elements which makes it difficult for OSD managers and the CINC’s to effectively
integrate information from the individual Services.⁷

Services and components were unable to resolve these personnel system problems
because of funding constraints, lack of core standard data elements, functional
requirements that only support non-integrated or interfaced automated personnel systems,
incompatible hardware and software systems, and congressionally mandated systems
such as the United States Army Reserve’s Reserve Component Administration System.

MILITARY PERSONNEL FUNCTIONAL & TECHNICAL STUDIES

OSD personnel managers initiated a study of the military personnel functional
area in 1992 to gain a better understanding of the scope and complexity of military
personnel management problems in the Uniformed Services. Output from the project included a high-level military personnel functional model and identification of the following major functional requirements: effectively passing information between active and reserve components within Services, tracking individuals during deployment and in theater, ensuring that correct personnel information feeds pay, improving inter-agency data exchanges, reducing and eliminating multiple data collection, and supporting operational requirements.

The follow-on question was “How do we build an information management system with the desired capability?” The answer came from a two-year functional and technical analysis of existing Service personnel information systems. The mission was to determine if any of these systems qualified as the migration system for core military personnel functions. The analysis concluded that, “...since the Service systems are interdependent within each component (i.e., support component-specific policies and business practices and use component-specific data elements), the abrupt adoption of a standard core military personnel system would break the connections both within and between functional areas throughout the military personnel arena. This would degrade the ability of the Services to provide personnel Services, to mobilize, and to support policies and directives.” The bottom line was that none of the existing personnel information systems could meet the complex data and interface requirements of the other Services nor support the current personnel practices of the other Services. This answer guided OSD personnel managers to the conclusion that JMPMS was necessary to incorporate all desired capabilities and requirements.
A subsequent Military Personnel Joint Requirements Study reinforced OSD’s JMPMS conclusion by using joint Subject Matter Expert Workshops to demonstrate that the Services could develop common functional requirements to support a JMPMS prototype system.

Concurrent with the Military Personnel Joint Requirements Study, OSD initiated a project to validate the JMPMS concept. The next section discusses the DSB study.

DSB MILITARY PERSONNEL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The DSB Military Personnel Information Management Task Force’s purpose was to advise the Secretary of Defense on the best automation strategy to support military personnel and pay functions for the Uniformed Services. Convened by OSD for a six month period, the Task Force’s membership consisted of leaders from private industry, academia, and retired military Lieutenant Generals with expertise in either personnel, finance, or information management disciplines. Additionally, each Service provided active duty military advisors to support the DSB.

The Task Force’s mission was to: “assess the Department’s military personnel information management requirements, determine the most feasible and cost effective automation solution, evaluate current and proposed military personnel strategies of OSD and the Services, and prevent the interruption of current military personnel operations and support while the proposed automation solution is implemented.”

The Task Force agreed with OSD’s JMPMS concept and unanimously concluded that OSD should move to a single all-Service and all-component, fully integrated personnel and pay system, with common core software built on a Commercial Off The
Shelf human resources software application base, with an Initial Operating Capability of 2001 or earlier.\textsuperscript{11} The recommended integrated system consists of three sets of modules: "...truly common modules which are used by all Services (and all components) for those personnel and pay functions that can be identical; multi-Service modules which have a common core of functionality, but include limited variant processes for each of the Services as necessary and appropriate, to be used by all Services for those personnel and pay functions which are very similar but not identical; and Service-unique modules for those personnel and pay functions which require unique processes for any or all of the Services."\textsuperscript{12} Figure 1 below graphically displays this concept.

**Figure 1. JMPMS Module Concept**

For each Service, the fielded system would include all of the common modules, all (or most) of the multi-Service modules, and its subset of the Service-unique modules.
The common and multi-Service modules together should comprise in excess of 80 percent of the fielded system with the Service-unique module being a relatively small component.13

**ARMY PERSONNEL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

The DSB’s recommendations send a clear signal that the Services must modify their business practices to meet the information management requirements of the 21st Century. How does the Army respond to this challenge? How much change is necessary? Who is responsible for the transition strategy and how will it be implemented?

In responding to the challenge, the Army should take its cue from a quotation by Russ Ackoff, noted systems theorist who says, “You cannot solve a problem using the same thinking that created it.”14

The thinking that conceived the current Army Personnel Information Management System architecture is Industrial Age based. Pre-1980s manual processes drive many of these systems. Other systems such as the Army Recruiting and Accession Data System (ARADS), Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS), Reception Battalion Automated Support System (RECBASS), and Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS) were developed subsequent to 1980 to meet activity-specific requirements.15 In many instances, no consideration was given to integrating these systems into the Army’s Personnel Information System Architecture. When integration was considered, lack of a common operating environment and open system architecture within the Army prevented effective integration from occurring. The
bottomline was that the Army created many automated personnel systems that did not "talk" to each other. This dilemma resulted in redundant data entry and data edits, non-standard data definitions, inconsistent information, and varying degrees of data accuracy and timeliness.

While problems such as these are never welcome, they are more tolerable when environmental complexity is minimum. Starting with Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the impact of the Information Age's information processing and dissemination requirements on the Army's Personnel Information Systems is becoming apparent. These systems are not sufficiently integrated in their present configuration to accommodate the ever-increasing complexity of internal and external requirements.

The landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 has also increased environmental complexity. According to Senator Barry Goldwater, the act provides for the first time in our nation's history "...organizational arrangements that will lead to true unity of effort in the Pentagon and in the Warfighting commands in the field."16 By increasing the authority and responsibilities of the Warfighting CINC's and improving joint officer management in Title IV, GNA significantly changed the way the Uniformed Services conduct business. As a result, Service component commanders are faced with new personnel information requirements (e.g., CINC's want to track individuals in route to, within, and departing from their Areas of Operation), real-time information reporting expectations, and joint reporting formats as opposed to the old Service-specific ones.

These realities dictate that the Army Personnel Community change its culture,
modify business practices, apply new information management technologies, restructure organizations, and retrain on new procedures.

The key Army requirement is to efficiently manage change from existing personnel information systems to the new JMPMS. How change is implemented depends upon a number of factors including the rationale for change (the foundation for a strategic vision), type of change desired, external environment, competence of the changing organization, size of the organization, and type of organization. This requirement clearly demands a comprehensive strategy to transition the Army from its current state to a desired end state where it can better meet future personnel information management requirements.

**TRANSITION STRATEGY PROPOSAL**

In *Transforming The Organization*, Francis Gouillart and James Kelly define transformation as the “...orchestrated redesign of the genetic architecture of the corporation, achieved by working simultaneously--although at different speed--along the four dimensions of reframing, restructuring, revitalizing, and renewing.”

Reframing involves shifting the company’s conception of what it is and what it can achieve. Restructuring deals with bringing the corporate body to a competitive level (as defined by organization leadership) of performance. Revitalization involves igniting growth by linking the corporate body to the environment. Renewal deals with the people's side of the transformation, and with the spirit of the company. It involves “...investing individuals with new skills and new purposes, thus allowing the company to regenerate itself.”
Using this genetic architecture redesign concept as a foundation, a recommended Army JMPMS transition strategy synthesizes transition models developed by William Pasmor and John Kotter. The proposed transition strategy model consists of twelve steps: analyze strengths and weaknesses, develop a vision, create a powerful guiding coalition, establish a sense of urgency, communicate the vision, empower others to act on the vision, prepare, develop integrating mechanisms, design and implement projects and work systems, create short-term wins, consolidate improvements to produce more change, and institutionalize new approaches.

Analyzing strengths and weaknesses is the first step because it provides a baseline assessment of the Personnel Community’s current capability. The strategic vision is developed from the baseline assessment. The remaining steps are in the recommended sequence, although steps three through nine can be implemented simultaneously.

This model is similar to the Total Quality Management (TQM) concept. TQM is “both a philosophy and a set of guiding principles that represent the foundation of a continuously improving organization.” The Army embraced the TQM philosophy in November 1988. TQM efforts in the Army are referred to as Total Army Quality (TAQ). TAQ is structured to ensure internal and external customer requirements are understood and satisfied and continuous process improvement is institutionalized.

This paper is not recommending that the Army suspend its TAQ philosophy to implement JMPMS, rather it advocates taking TAQ a step farther to incorporate reengineering. Reengineering is defined as “the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to bring about dramatic improvements in performance.”
Successful migration to JMPMS requires more than improving existing personnel processes, it requires rethinking the process and designing a new way to conduct business.

The remainder of this section will first provide background on the Pasmore and Kotter transition models, then explain the proposed Army transition strategy.

**Pasmore and Kotter Transition Models**

In *Creating Strategic Change*, William Pasmore asserts that "...the more flexible an organization becomes, the better it can respond to change." He promotes a strategy of flexibility that prepares the organization for continuous change. Additionally, the book discusses the merits of flexible people, flexible technology, and flexible work as the cornerstones of efficient change within an organization.

Flexible people are characterized as "...open-minded, willing to take reasonable risks, self-confident, creative, able to learn from experience, active, resourceful, good communicators, good listeners, and adaptable to new circumstances." These traits and skills are desirable to any organization, including the Army.

Flexible technology involves "...thinking about every technical system as a sociotechnical system." In other words, it involves looking at how the entire system of people and technology function together. This is important because the best technology (in this instance defined as the best hardware and software systems developed by either commercial vendors or the Services' Central Design Agencies) available could not function properly if operated by untrained people. Conversely, the best trained people cannot make a poorly designed technical system operate efficiently.
Work is flexible when conducted by "...people possessing both highly developed technical skills and problem solving capabilities." Additionally, it requires a base-level understanding of the whole work task or system. Applying this concept to Army Personnel organizations, S1 and Personnel Administration Center (PAC) personnel should understand personnel operations from their tactical level through the Personnel Service Detachment and Personnel Service Battalion to the Personnel Group (operational level). Personnel Service Detachment and Battalion staff should understand personnel operations from S1/PAC level up through the Personnel Group to the United States Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). Personnel Group staff should understand personnel operations from the S1/PAC level up through PERSCOM to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). Correspondingly, DCSPER and PERSCOM staff should understand the entire personnel system from their strategic level down to the S1/PAC. These recommendations will require the Soldier Support Institute to enhance its current training strategy but will produce the type of highly trained, systems-oriented personnel needed in the Information Age.

Individually and collectively, these three attributes can significantly contribute to the ability of an organization to effect change. Acknowledging that "getting there" takes time and preparation, Pasmore offers a sequential eight-step strategy that prepares an organization for change: preparation, analyzing strengths and weaknesses, designing new organizational sub-units, designing projects, designing work systems, designing support systems, designing integrative mechanisms, and actually implementing the change.
John Kotter has witnessed a significant amount of waste, anguish, and errors during the past decade while observing over 100 companies try to remake themselves. He developed the following eight-step module for transforming an organization to prevent these problems: establishing a sense of urgency, forming a powerful guiding coalition, creating a vision, communicating the vision, empowering others to act on the vision, planning for and creating short-term wins, consolidating improvements and producing still more change, and institutionalizing new approaches.\textsuperscript{33}

**Army Transition Model**

An analysis of strengths and weaknesses compares the organization to some external benchmark.\textsuperscript{34} The analysis provides the foundation for adopting specific measures to determine the amount of change needed. An analysis of existing Personnel Information Management systems is necessary to determine the amount of needed change. To assist this process, I propose using OSD standards since they incorporate current personnel requirements and serve as the foundation for any future modifications. As indicated earlier in this paper, the key functional standards desired by OSD are: active and reserve integration, in-theater tracking, effective Personnel and Pay exchange, Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS) implementation, DOD standard data, and support for Service operational requirements. Shown in Figure 2 is the OSD assessment of the Army (as of February 1996\textsuperscript{35}) in each of these areas.

By OSD assessment standards, the Army needs improvement in several areas. Active and reserve integration is a major area of deficiency with no concrete plan for resolution.
Figure 2. 1996 OSD Assessment of the Army IAW Key Functional Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active/Reserve Integration</th>
<th>Track In-Theater</th>
<th>Effective Pers/Pay Exchange</th>
<th>Use DJMS</th>
<th>DOD Standard Data</th>
<th>Supports Service Operational Reqs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current System</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes/PAS*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Modernization</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes/PAS*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funded Follow-on</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes/PAS*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Personnel Accountability System (PAS)

In fairness to the Army, Congress hampered its efforts to meet standards in this area by requiring a separate system for the reserve components.36

PAS partially satisfies the in-theater tracking requirement because it is not integrated with the current SIDPERS-2.75 field system nor the Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB).37 This means that vital information cannot be transferred seamlessly via automated means to the corporate Army database. Standard Installation/Division Personnel System, Version 3 (SIDPERS-3), the Army’s upgraded full-Service personnel system that is scheduled for fielding this fiscal year, will also provide information necessary to track individuals; however, changes are required to TAPDB before this capability is realized.38 Efforts to resolve the Personnel and Pay exchange issue are discussed later in this paper.

The Army has implemented DJMS, but its effectiveness is hampered by a paper-intensive interface between personnel and pay systems (a partial automated data exchange does exist in the form of magnetic tape and electronic file transfer from TAPDB to the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS)). The subsequent problems with data
accuracy and timeliness of information required to calculate and process pay only
complicate matters. Many of the Total Army systems (including United States Army
Reserves and Army National Guard) meet Army Regulation 25-9 standardized data
standards; however, do not comply with DOD standards.

The PERSCOM Personnel Information Systems Directorate (PERSINSD)
recently conducted another assessment of the Army’s Corporate Personnel Information
System. The study, which was briefed to the PERSCOM Commander and DCSPER,
concluded that there was no overall integrated systems architecture.³⁹ Other findings
included a non-integrated TAPDB structure, saturated mainframe, limited
communications, and inefficient change management.⁴⁰ Additionally, the assessment
noted that the Army Personnel Community’s information management focus was
outdated, or mainframe-centric; with closed systems; COBOL-driven, batch-oriented
processes; and text-based screens. Lack of integration across components and functions,
as well as the peacetime focus of the Army’s current personnel systems (vice
mobilization focus) were also identified as factors that contribute to data accuracy
problems.⁴¹

This candid assessment demonstrates that PERSINSD, PERSCOM, and the
DCSPER are synchronized with the OSD and DSB studies. These assessments give the
Army Personnel Community a baseline for developing a JMPMS transition strategy as
well as implementing initiatives to improve system efficiency along the way.

A vision clarifies the general direction for change, motivates people to take action
in the right direction, and helps coordinate the actions of different people in a remarkably
fast and efficient way.\textsuperscript{42} The strategic vision model developed by Glenda Nogami (1994) is recommended to establish the impetus for change. A graphic representation of the model is shown at Figure 3.

In this instance, the vision should not be developed in a Senior-level vacuum, rather Senior Personnel Leadership should take advantage of the immense technical and functional capability that exists at all levels and components within the personnel chain of command. This will facilitate buy-in and implementation of the vision.

**Figure 3. Strategic Vision Concept**

The Army Personnel Community’s current information management operational mode is mainframe-centric, closed-system, Service-specific (and, at times, component-specific), batch-oriented technology and processes. The current industry standard is network-centric, open-systems, interactive, Internet/Intranet processes with graphical user interface (GUI) capability.\textsuperscript{43} PERSCOM PERSINSD envisions “one integrated personnel information architecture...responsive, accurate, timely, and reliable.”\textsuperscript{44} From this information, a vision of the year 2001 environment and the role the Army will or
should play in that world can be established. The desired Army Personnel Information Management endstate and strategy (courses of action) to achieve that endstate can then be developed. At a minimum, this strategy should assess the problem, decide the amount of change needed, implement the changes, determine success, adjust and revise as appropriate, and document the results. As pointed out by Nogami, the strategy will influence the future environment (both reactively and proactively) which will require that the strategy be flexible to accommodate unexpected changes.

The creation of a powerful guiding coalition is key to the transition process because "...a guiding coalition that operates as an effective team can process more information, more quickly. It can also speed the implementation of new approaches because powerful people are truly informed and committed to key decisions." To build a coalition that can make change happen, three requirements must be met: finding the right people, creating trust, and developing a common goal. Since cooperation among Army components is vital to the Army achieving meaningful and lasting change in its personnel information systems; representatives from each component must participate in the guiding coalition. Equal status and participation will build the trust among components that is necessary for them to agree on common goals.

Recommended members for the first tier of the guiding coalition are: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller); Army Representatives to the DSB (Two Retired Army Generals); DCSPER; Director, DFAS (Army); and Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4). This group
would act as a “Board of Directors” or “Steering Committee” and meet on a quarterly basis.

A “working group” would make up the second tier of the guiding coalition and meet on a monthly basis. Recommended members are: Commander, PERSCOM; Commander, Soldier Support Institute; Deputy Director, DFAS (Army); Commander, ARPERCEN; and Director of Personnel, Army National Guard. This group would maintain greater contact with the operational and tactical levels of the personnel and finance communities and decide which issues require decision by the Board of Directors. Collectively, both groups will provide senior leadership, direction, and sustain momentum during the change process.

Changing an organization requires great cooperation, initiative, and willingness to make sacrifices from many people. Establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to combating complacency and gaining needed cooperation. Within the personnel community, the DCSPER is the focal point of personnel policies and procedures. Accordingly, the DCSPER has to establish the necessity for changing from the status quo to JMPMS. The key to this process is selling the benefits of JMPMS to all Army components. Specifically, how does JMPMS improve data accuracy and timeliness; how does it solve the Active and Reserve component integration problem; how does it improve personnel Service support provided to soldiers, families, and commanders; how does it improve the operating efficiency of PACs, PSDs, PSBs, and Garrison Military Personnel Offices (MILPOs); how does it improve the automation support at these organizations; and when will it be fielded? Ideally, this understanding of why the change
is worthwhile should go down the chain of command to the most junior personnel specialist in each component. Realistically, the initial target should be general officers, field grade officers and warrant officers, Department of the Army civilians in grades GS-9 and above, and Senior NCOs (Sergeant First Class and above) in each component. This is the organizational core that must go beyond the normal call of duty to identify the deficiencies in current personnel information management systems and sell the benefits of migration to JMPMS. The commitment of this credible group is essential to starting the change process, gaining momentum by selling the benefits to each level in the chain of command, and equally important, sustaining it.

Next, the vision is communicated to the Army Personnel Community and more importantly, the supported soldiers and commanders to gain understanding and support. As indicated by Kotter, "...the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an organization have a common understanding of its goals and direction." To accomplish this, "the leader must have the ability to articulate the desired endstate and to direct the organization." Key elements that contribute to the effective communication of the vision are: simplicity, use of metaphor, analogy, and example to create a verbal picture; use of multiple forums, repetition, and leadership by example; explanation of seeming inconsistencies; and two-way communication. The guiding coalition, DCSPER, and key members of the personnel chain of command should use every means available to communicate the vision for change to the rest of the Army. This process is critical because as one General put it, "there is no vision unless everybody signs up for it."
Empowering members of the Personnel Community to act on the vision is essential to success. This involves removing obstacles to change, encouraging risk taking and creativity, and increasing individual, group, and sub-organization capabilities. The four biggest obstacles are structures, skills, systems, and supervisors.\textsuperscript{52} To support the JMPMS vision, many of the personnel community’s organizational structures may need to change; personnel managers, technicians, and operators will require retraining; personnel information systems that are not eliminated will require “alignment” to “fit” JMPMS; and supervisors who undercut needed change must be confronted. If this step is done properly; barriers are removed, performance expectations rise, and people are prepared to effectively and efficiently participate in the transition process. Through empowerment, the Army creates in effect, Pasmore’s “flexible person.”

The preparation process enables all components and levels of the personnel community to participate in the change process. Additionally, stakeholders such as soldiers (customers), unit commanders, JCS and OSD staffs must also be prepared. Preparation involves training in individual skills and job skills. Advance preparation is vital for the group of functional and technical specialists that will represent the Army’s JMPMS development team. This group will have to identify core, multi-Service, and Service-unique functional requirements, identify related personnel and pay functional requirements, document functional requirements, use latest generation CASE development tools, coordinate JMPMS system development with the Navy and Air Force Central Design Agencies, develop and participate in the test and evaluation process, develop training programs, monitor JMPMS fielding, and support the best interest of
OSD while not neglecting the best interests of the Army. These major tasks clearly require thorough preparation to ensure success.

Integrating mechanisms help all players understand what is going on and how they fit. These mechanisms should "...collect and disseminate information, act in real time, understand the language and perspectives of the parts of the organization being integrated, have a memory to provide guidance to current decisions based on past organization learning, have a vision to help the integrative decisions made today lead in a direction that will still work tomorrow, influence actions taken by people in the system, and have legitimacy in the eyes of those affected by its decisions." An excellent example of an integrating mechanism is a Configuration Control Board (CCB) that brings representatives from associated organizations together on a regular basis to make decisions that reflect their best collective interests. To support the JMPMS effort, establishing CCBs within each component and at DCSPER level to integrate the components into a Total Army solution would be an effective strategy.

Designing and implementing projects and work systems is the next step to effect desired changes in the Army's Personnel Information Management Systems. While details are beyond the scope of this paper, changes will be necessary to existing personnel information systems, hardware configurations, business processes, organizational structures, and the overall Personnel Information System Architecture. These improvement and learning projects must incorporate how strategies will be developed, work completed, resources allocated, activities integrated, finances looked after, people
recruited and developed, laws and regulations obeyed, linkages with other projects accomplished, and success measured.\textsuperscript{54}

Once projects are developed, work systems must be designed to perfect the core processes to be performed, identify appropriate technology, develop processes to measure performance, include the customer in the work process, integrate with other work units, facilitate individual and organizational learning, and design reward systems.\textsuperscript{55} Accomplishment of this step incorporates Pasmore's "flexible technology" and "flexible work" concepts.

Examples of ongoing Army Personnel improvement projects include the Army's Personnel Systems Architecture (PSA), which is actively migrating from a function-specific and interfaced architecture to an integrated architecture. Automated interfaces that exist within the current architecture will be significantly enhanced as the Army strives toward single-source data, one-time data entry, enhanced data sharing, and interoperability among the Total Army Personnel Information Systems Community.

A short-term TAPDB modernization effort involves the development of the Inter-Component Data Transfer utility that improves the interface between active and reserve component personnel systems. Interface objectives include rapid movement of data to support management and sustainment of soldiers in peacetime, mobilization, and wartime; reduction of manual data entry; and reduction of duplicate data entry via increased data sharing capabilities. These efforts also include expanding the data interface with DFAS and providing personnel tracking requirements to the Defense Manpower Data Center.
A longer-term initiative is TAPDB modification that replaces the current system of five non-integrated databases with a single, integrated, multicomponent database as the nucleus of personnel automation. The integrated database will meet DOD data standards and become the foundation of the Army portion of JMPMS.

Another initiative, Personnel Enterprise System-Automation (PES-A), currently provides a fully integrated top-of-the system ADP platform for Army strength accounting, personnel movement, assignment actions, career management, recruiting, reenlistment, mobilization, and other associated personnel operations and functions. PES-A of the near future will infuse a variety of proven and emerging information technologies, in tandem with business process redesign efforts to support headquarters-level personnel operations. It will also replace outdated automation equipment at four central locations and provide electronic interfaces with systems supporting the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve Personnel Center.

SIDPERS-3, scheduled to begin fielding in fiscal year 1997, is designed to be a full-Service personnel system, integrating personnel management and strength accounting and supporting day-to-day management of active duty personnel. It will serve as the Active Army system during peacetime and support the Total Army in mobilization, war, and demobilization. This system will also provide a new Pentium-based client server infrastructure at field and installation level.

The final example, Personnel and Pay Integration Study, proposes to integrate appropriate personnel and pay functional processes into single-source input transactions, thereby providing an efficient "automated interface" between emerging personnel and
pay systems. The study will also integrate personnel and pay functional organizations, thus creating a multi-functional organizational structure (initially at battalion level and ultimately at brigade level) that will provide true one-stop Service to soldiers and commanders.

Pasmore asserts that once projects and work systems are designed, "...implementation planning will clarify the work that must be accomplished to make the change real, who does it, and when it is to be done." It also clarifies the time and resources required to support that work. Additionally, it means developing success measurement methods that allow calibration along the way. The more energy put into the planning process, the better people recognize what needs to happen and more committed they are to making it so. This process is important because it helps people take the first steps toward greater flexibility and signals the start of projects and work which effect change.

Planning for and creating short-term wins significantly aids implementation. This process provides evidence that sacrifices are worth the effort, gives reward change agents a pat on the back, helps fine-tune vision and strategies, undermines cynics, keeps bosses on board, and builds momentum. The personnel initiatives previously discussed provide examples for creating short-term wins to support the Army Personnel Community’s improvement efforts. They also build the foundation for JMPMS short-term wins.

Finally, by consolidating improvements to produce still more change and institutionalizing new approaches, appropriate incremental changes continue to be made,
the process is continuously reinvigorated, and the connections between new change behaviors and Army success can be articulated.

**IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY**

The final question to answer is, "Is there an overall strategy to effectively implement solutions and facilitate migration to JMPMS?" The answer to this question is that the strategy is being developed.\(^{58}\) The DCSPER has overall responsibility for the effective integration of the Army Personnel Community and migration to the OSD mandated JMPMS. The DCSPER Information Management Officer (IMO) is the executive agent for actual strategy development.\(^ {59}\) Key players in the strategy development process are PERSCOM (specifically PERSINSD), ARPERCEN, and Army National Guard Personnel Directorate. Each of these proponents must develop an Information Management Strategy that supports a Total Army solution. The overarching Information Management Strategy developed by the DCSPER must integrate and synchronize the strategies of all key players.

Discussion with the DCSPER IMO indicated that the underlying philosophy of the strategy is to first develop a Total Army solution by the end of 1998 then migrate to JMPMS in 2001.\(^ {60}\) A key requirement of the strategy development process is to establish relationships that enable change to occur. The critical success factor in a Total Army and Joint solution is a committed interaction between all components. Recognizing this reality, the DCSPER designated his Mobilization Officer as the active and reserve integration functional proponent. Each component will have a functional manager and
PERSINSD will serve as program manager.\(^6\) This is clearly an excellent decision that enhances prospects for success.

Execution of full scale strategy development is delayed pending receipt of additional JMPMS specifications and guidelines from OSD.\(^6\) In the interim, the Army Personnel Community is definitely moving in the right direction to effect changes in the way it does business.

**CONCLUSION**

As society transitions from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, complexity is increasing by orders of magnitude. Concurrently, the authority and responsibilities of the Warfighting CINCs and management of joint officers increased dramatically due to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. As a result, new information requirements are evolving that neither the Army nor the other Services can effectively meet given the present configuration of their Personnel Information System Architectures.

In response to this problem, OSD mandated Service migration to a single all Service and all component, fully integrated personnel and pay system. The new system will feature common core software built on a Commercial Off The Shelf human resources software application base, with an Initial Operating Capability of 2001 or earlier. The JMPMS will integrate active and reserve components, track individuals during deployment and while in theater, efficiently exchange personnel and pay information, standardize data and meet the Services’ operational requirements.

This migration mandate requires the Army Personnel Community to develop a comprehensive strategic vision for change. It is recommended that this strategic vision
include Army’s view of the year 2001 personnel information management environment and the role it envisions for itself in that world. The Army’s goal, objective, or endstate for personnel information management should also be included.

The next requirement is for the Army to develop a strategic transition strategy. DCSPER has already developed a high level strategic concept that first envisions a Total Army personnel information management solution by the end of 1998. This accomplishment would provide the platform for complete migration to JMPMS by the year 2001.

The 1998 Total Army solution is fueled by the ongoing Army Personnel Community self-assessments. The information obtained from these efforts has provided the impetus for a new series of revolutionary personnel initiatives that address most of the deficiencies identified by OSD. These initiatives also signal that the Army Personnel Community is entering the information age and leveraging emerging technology.

Although the plan is not complete, this vision for improvement clearly illustrates that the Army is starting to manage change, reengineering business processes, upgrading infrastructure, and restructuring itself. Over the next four to five years it will transform from mainframe-centric, closed system, batch-oriented technology and processes to that of network-centric, open-systems, interactive, Internet/Intranet processes. This transition will posture the Army to fully meet the current and future information needs of CINCs, OSD, and the Joint Staff.

The remaining portion of the strategic transition strategy outlines how to transition. To accomplish this enormous task, it is recommended that the Army consider
a transition model that synthesizes concepts developed by William Pasmore and John Kotter. The model consists of the following twelve steps: analyze strengths and weaknesses, develop a vision, create a powerful guiding coalition, establish a sense of urgency, communicate the vision, empower others to act on the vision, prepare, develop integrating mechanisms, design and implement projects and work systems, create short-term wins, consolidate improvements to produce more change, and institutionalize new approaches. This model offers a simple yet potentially powerful game plan for guiding the Army Personnel Community through a complex, technical, and lengthy change process.

Shared strategic vision; strong committed leadership; effective two-way communication; empowerment to act on the vision; and sound implementation strategy are the building blocks of a successful strategic plan that migrates the Army to JMPMS while improving itself along the way. The end result of this complex process is world class personnel Service and support to CINCs; Joint Staff, OSD, and Service personnel managers; commanders; and most importantly, soldiers and their families.
ENDNOTES


2 The name Joint Military Personnel Management System (JMPMS) is created by the author to simplify references to the system. The system does not have an official name as of the date of this paper.


5 Ibid., 3.

6 Ibid., 2.

7 Ibid., 3.


11 Ibid., 3.

12 Ibid., 23.
13 Ibid.


15 Army Recruiting and Accession Data System (ARADS) interfaces with the Military Entrance Processing Command Interactive Resources System (MIRS) to make reservations for aptitudinal testing and enlistment processing. It also operates in the office of the Reception Battalion NCO at each Reception Battalion for the purpose of renegotiating contracts. Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) is the primary system for processing assignments for enlisted personnel. It sustains unit readiness through the distribution and assignment process and provides Army personnel managers with on-line capability to update and review requisition and assignment data. Reception Battalion Automated Support System (RECBASS) provides automation of all operations within the Reception Battalion, to include inprocessing, administrative, and supply procedures. RECBASS captures accession data and builds individual personnel, finance, and medical records. Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS) is the primary system used by PERSCOM and MACOM requisitioning activities for determining and processing officer requisitions and assignments. The system provides Army personnel managers on-line capability to review, evaluate, and update requisition and assignment data.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


23 Ibid., 2-15.

24 Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Leadership for Total Army Quality Concept Plan (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, 1992), 2.

26 Pasmore, 4.

27 Ibid., 5.

28 Ibid., 47.

29 Ibid., 98.

30 Ibid., 106.

31 Ibid., 107.

32 Ibid., 245.


34 Pasmore, 225.


37 The Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) currently consists of 5 data bases: Active Enlisted, Active Officer, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Core (extract), using common data elements, but different data storage tables. The core portion of TAPDB currently includes an extract of over 850 selected data elements from each of the other four data bases and forms the basis for the future integration of the entire data base.

38 Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS-3) is the future automated field level military personnel management system designed to support the Active Army during peacetime and war. It will be provided to the Reserve Components for training
purposes and for use upon mobilization. It will replace the existing Army active duty field personnel system (SIDPERS 2.75).


40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., slide 13.

42 Kotter, 68.


44 Ibid., slide 14.

45 Nogami, 202.

46 Kotter, 55.

47 Ibid., 66.

48 Ibid., 35.

49 Ibid., 85.

50 Nogami, 202.

51 Kotter, 90.

52 Ibid., 102.

53 Pasmore, 258.

54 Pasmore, 251.

55 Ibid., 245.

56 Pasmore, 263.

57 Kotter, 123.

59 Colonel James Moore, DCSPER IMO, Telephone interview by author, 7 February 1997.

60 Colonel James Moore Electronic mail message, 7 February 1997.

61 Ibid.

62 OSD recently received Congressional direction concerning oversight, roles, and responsibilities of JMPMS program participants. As of the date of this paper OSD is drafting additional guidance for the Services.
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