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TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT TO TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS—AN UNACCEPTABLE SCENARIO

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Current U.S. military strategy calls for Two (Nearly Simultaneous) Major Regional Conflicts (2MRC). A serious question remains about the transportation systems ability to support this scenario. Granted, the Army has honed its skills over the last six years in twenty-five deployments; however, there is still need for robust strategic transportation capability although some equipment shortfalls have been addressed. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the U.S. had time to introduce combat forces and build a sustainment package. Regional and global commitment boosted U.S. ability to logistically support the Gulf War. An in-process reduction in forces was halted. If the U.S. supports one MRC at a Gulf War tempo, a second MRC may not ever receive the required support.
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INTRODUCTION

"Logistics determines the how, when and where the force arrives in theater; when and where the combat power can be massed. Logistics underwrites the concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver and is the fulcrum upon which the leverage can be created."

LTG William G. (Gus) Pagonis
The Land Warfare Papers

The Clinton administration's policy of Engagement and Enlargement, a key part of our National Security Strategy (NSS), requires military deployment throughout the world. It also requires the military to serve in a number of non-traditional roles. This paper focuses on the Nation's ability to deploy forces anywhere in the world and raises the critical question, do we have the strategic transportation necessary to deploy and sustain forces.

A cursory review of recent U.S. military history reveals that initially there has never been enough strategic transportation to rapidly introduce an overwhelming force into any Theater of Operations at the level and tempo required for a Major Regional Conflict (MRC). To understand the problem, both the U.S. National Security and Military Strategies will be discussed. An excellent example of the
problems faced in transporting troops and equipment can be seen in the Gulf War. This paper will discuss the magnitude of the logistical requirements, the follow-on requirements as the theater matured, and the impact on logistics as the defensive operation transitioned to an offensive operation during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Lessons learned during the Gulf War will be discussed. Finally, this paper provides an assessment of U.S. National Security and Military Strategies and considers our ability to conduct a 2MRC scenario and provide the requisite amount of transportation assets needed to support the warfighting Commander-in-Chief (CINC).

A UNITED STATES PREPARED FOR WAR

It has been said that history has a way of repeating itself. If one takes a Monday morning quarterback view of our strategic mobility in the late 1930's and into the early war period it seems obvious that the United States was unprepared to go to war against the Axis powers. Yet, we were fortunate because preparations were underway prior to December 7, 1941. Our shipbuilding program between 1941 and
1945 constructed 5,500 merchant ships to support the war effort. This was a herculean task to say the least. Because of our ability to mobilize the American people, our industrial base and strong leadership from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall during World War II, the U.S. seized the opportunity to begin war production efforts early and sustained Allied forces throughout the war. The U.S. successfully waged a two-front war with a Europe-first strategy in name only. When compared to our current strategy, one can note a similarity in two front operations but the difficulty with this comparison occurs in the magnitude of American involvement and effort.

Similar problems occurred during the Korean War where airlift played a significant role. "Over a period of three years the Command (Military Air Transport Service) transported nearly 80,000 tons of cargo and 214,000 personnel from the United States to the Far East." These numbers, while impressive, only represent about one percent of the total tonnage shipped to the theater. Considerable congestion developed in the ports of Pusan and Inchon for varied reasons. Lack of a skilled workforce, shortage of
trucks, an inadequate road network and the location of supply depots near the ports contributed to this congestion. It required a great deal of effort to establish the transportation system in Korea to the level needed to support our forces. This took valuable time to develop the infrastructure needed to support the forces in the Theater.

In Vietnam, 95 percent of all the supplies went by ship. This conflict was marked by a progressive build-up of men and materiel occurring over a period of years. The 95 percent formula used during Vietnam seems to be a mark on the wall. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the ratio to air and sealift was the same due to the time we had to get our forces in place.

It is important to consider these brief historical vignettes because the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, in relationship to the National Military Strategy (NMS) of Flexible and Selective Engagement, requires the United States to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The 2MRC strategy results in a 90/10 split between sealift and airlift. The question remains, however, can the United States support a 2MRC
strategy? To adequately answer this question, the Strategy
must be briefly reviewed.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIES

The most recent National Security Strategy is entitled
the National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement, issued February 1996. Published by the Clinton
administration, it sets the basic policy for the U.S. and
it’s Armed Forces. The NSS states:

"This strategy focuses on new threats and new opportunities
its central goals are:

• To enhance our security with military forces that
  are ready to fight and with effective representation
  abroad.
• To bolster America’s economic revitalization.
• To promote democracy abroad."

It recognizes that "Military force is the indispensable
element of our nation’s power." Of the four elements of
power (economic, political, informational and military) it
is the military element of power that has been stretched
thin since the end of the Cold War. Many of our senior
leaders have expressed their personal and professional
concerns pertaining to the Operations and Personnel Tempo
(OPS/PERSTEMPO) the military is presently experiencing.
By most accounts, the United States military since 1990 has been involved in 25 operations, many of which we are still engaged in today. In fact, according to a daily briefing in the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, the U.S. Army had a total of 31,908 personnel deployed to 69 different countries as of February 6, 1997. This represents an increase of 300 percent of personnel deployed for Operations Other Than War (OOTWA) operations in the last six years. In the previous 40 years prior to 1990, we were involved in 10 deployments. During the last seven years, we have and currently are experiencing draw-downs throughout the services. The increased OPTEMPO has significantly affected the PERSTEMPO. In fact, this is affecting retention of young officers and enlisted personnel further exacerbating readiness and training issues.

Our National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement is driven by politics. General Shalikashvili prefaces the NMS stating:

"The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces must remain to fight and win our Nation's wars whenever and wherever called upon. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must maintain its capability to deal with more than one major crisis at a time. For this reason, our Armed Forces must maintain the capability to fight and win two
nearly simultaneous regional contingencies, even as we continue to restructure and reduce the size of the force.”

General Shalikashvili also commented:

“The challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon.”

This is where the challenge for the military lies. Resources and resourcing are being reduced. The current authorized end-strength of the U.S. Army today stands at 495,000. Although the record shows the U.S. military has performed magnificently since the end of the Cold War, our successes have led the President and Congress to believe the Services can do more with less. Popular thought as well seems to be, that given a mission, any mission, the military will accomplish the job and do so professionally. The question remains, however, whether the Armed Forces are able to successfully engage in the profusion of OOTW missions and stay prepared to engage in regional wars.

Currently, there is disagreement among our senior military leaders about our ability to perform all OOTW in which we are engaged and our readiness to fight and win in a 2MRC scenario. These serious concerns exist at the Service Chief level. This debate was highlighted in a recent Army
Times article between the current Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. General Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, supports the 2MRC strategy while General Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, points out our current engagement of military forces throughout the world should cause us concern. General Fogleman stated that:

"...proliferation of peace operations since the end of the Cold War argues for a one and a half MRC strategy that aims to win one major conflict, a smaller war elsewhere, and still have enough forces left over to handle two peacekeeping operations."\(^{11}\)

Our military requirement to support the NSS has the U.S. militarily more involved (engaged) throughout the world than ever before. Future disengagement from these Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs) to fight a 2MRC scenario will be difficult politically and militarily. The forces in the LRCs consist primarily of Combat Support and Combat Service Support. As General Fogleman points out, missions such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and Somalia are missions the military have been involved with since the 2MRC strategy was formulated. He further describes these missions as "coming in all shapes and sizes".

It is the plethora of missions we are engaged in that become the true distracters to our NSS and NMS. When the
President uses the military as the primary means of National Power at the exclusion of the other three elements, the duration and length of reach of U.S. military combat power comes into question. It then becomes even more unlikely our current and projected transportation assets will be able to cope with the magnitude and multitude of transportation requirements needed to properly support the warfighting CINCs in a one or two MRC scenario.

In a presentation to the U.S. Army War College Class of 1997 by the CINC, USTRANSCOM (Transportation Command), the warfighting scenarios were depicted as MRC-East and MRC-West. Resources needed to fight these wars would have to be assembled and then deployed so the force can be employed by the warfighting CINCs. Disengaging our forces from locations around the world will place a severe strain on transportation time lines. Forces currently engaged in OOTW missions were provided by units designated for the 2MRCs thus causing additional problems in the sequencing of forces. Training and readiness issues will also be significant challenges for these forces. Designation of units and their readiness, however, are only parts of the overall problem. Equally serious, most of our
transportation will be engaged in the support of one MRC until such time we are able to engage transportation support for the other MRC. This assumes a great deal of risk and a very robust transportation system.

In the event of multiple regional contingencies, our strategic leaders must assume that there will be enough warning time to bring all of our resources to bear. This will include the Reserve Component mobilization, mobilization of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). To accomplish a feat of this magnitude, like Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Nation's Strategic Mobility Triad (consisting of Airlift, Sealift and Prepositioned (PREPO) equipment) must be able to successfully introduce overwhelming combat power into the Theater. The Triad is designed to move personnel and equipment from the fort to the port. Delays caused by any one of the three Triad points would cause significant problems in the deployment and employment of forces. In Desert Shield/Storm, it took 205 days to bring the force to the Theater. When this campaign occurred, it was the only military contingency occupying the Armed Forces and was the focus of our Nation. In fact, the world was involved in the
Gulf crisis thereby allowing a coalition of forces to develop over time as well as significant host nation support.

Essentially, the warfighting CINC is concerned with three phases for a campaign: the Halting Phase, the Buildup Phase and the Counterattack Phase. Problems with equipment and force sequencing should not be the major issue requiring his focus. The challenge of the logistician is to use the Triad to close the first MRC within 75 days and the second MRC well before we closed the force into the Desert Shield/Storm Theater. In the case of a 2MRC scenario, the requirement is to support each MRC with five-and-third divisions. It must be noted the 2MRC scenario can not be supported with all the transportation support required as outlined in the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) until the year 2001. This assumes that all the resources needed are funded and procured. Politics and the quest to establish a balanced budget will regretfully play a significant role in determining whether this is feasible.

Prior to illustrating key issues surrounding the 2MRC scenario and the MRS BURU coupled with the prospect of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it is important the reader be exposed to transportation lessons learned during Desert Shield/Storm. While some of these lessons may not relate directly to the Triad, there is a point in time during the Gulf War where linkage can be established.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM--LESSONS LEARNED

Desert Shield/Desert Storm and President Bush's skillful handling of this crisis galvanized the American people. In the end, it synchronized the Service components (Active, Reserve and Guard) into a fighting force with the resources and the will to execute U.S. National Security Strategy. U.S. forces deployed to the Gulf to protect the sovereignty of an invaded nation and U.S. vital interests. We had the backing of the United Nations, our coalition partners and the American people. The fact Iraqi President Saddam Hussein inaccurately gauged his relative political and military strength in the region gave us the time we needed. As a consequence, we were able to formulate our strategy, put in place the forces needed to conduct defensive and offensive operations, and have the logistics
in place to completely support the Commander-in-Chief Central Command (CINCCENT).

Time allowed the logistics community to deploy and sustain our force to a theater 8,000 miles away by air and 12,000 miles away by sea. It took 205 days to deploy a trained and combat ready force halfway around the world. Although this combat force represented 25% of Army combat divisions and included two marine corps divisions, the logistics infrastructure was completely engaged, often at the expense of the remainder of the total force.

The enormity and significance of this achievement is often overlooked. On August 8, 1990, soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division deployed from Pope Air Force Base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. At the same time, the 24th Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia, began their deployment by sea from Savannah. In addition, the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, deployed from Campbell Army Airfield and from Jacksonville, Florida. The strategic lift required for these forces was tremendous and the challenges logisticians faced were incredible.
The 24th Infantry Division took 16 days to load 7,678 pieces of combat loaded equipment and the Aviation Brigade and 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division required 56 C-141 and 49 C-5A sorties over a 13 day period to close into the Theater.\textsuperscript{22} 1st and 3d Brigades of the 101st loaded ten ships and deployed from Jacksonville and it took 17 days to close the 82d Airborne Division into the Theater.\textsuperscript{23} The logisticians made the system work; however, the deploying force failed to meet CINCCENTs Latest Arrival Date (LAD) by several days due to lack of deployment infrastructure and equipment shortfalls.\textsuperscript{24}

Once forces arrived in Theater, more logistics challenges were provided to the logisticians for resolution. The Theater was not austere but neither was it perfect for this operation. Although both Air/Sea Ports of Debarkation (A/SPODs) quickly became congested with men and materiel, logisticians ensured they were received/staged and prepared for onward movement while sustainment supplies continued to be flown into the Theater. There was a significant amount of host nation support provided throughout Desert Shield/Storm. Laborers from third-world nations were used extensively and contracts were established to provide the
necessary supplies and support. As of August 1, 1991, food, fuel, water, transportation and facilities provided by Saudi Arabia to U.S. forces amounted to $13.4 billion.\textsuperscript{25}

Similarly, supply requisitions reached as many as 10,700 per day producing processing delays and a loss of confidence in the supply system. Units submitted an inordinate amount of high priority requisitions (64.9%). This workload further exacerbated delays in unit receipt of supplies and equipment and caused additional supply and transportation problems.\textsuperscript{26}

As the Theater stabilized, the mission changed to include the possibility of an offensive campaign. VII Corps was alerted and began their movement to the Air/Sea Ports of Embarkation (A/SPOEs) on November 8, 1990. VII Corps in Europe required 435 aircraft and 31 ships for deployment to Saudi Arabia and the 1st ID at Fort Riley required another 143 aircraft and 31 ships to deploy.\textsuperscript{27} This occurred after the XVIII Airborne Corps had closed into the Theater. The sustainment and logistics build-up were still underway to include the increase in the stockage objective from 30 to 60 days of supply (DOS) compared to the 2MRC scenario, where the plan calls for only 30 DOS.\textsuperscript{28} CINCENT initiated the air
campaign on January 17, 1991 once the force arrived in the Theater and he had the coalition forces needed to fight the war. Simultaneously, the ground forces began movement to their Forward Assembly Areas (FAAs).

Ground movement to the FAAs ended on February 7th. VII Corps used their organic lift to move into their FAAs, while the XVIII Airborne Corps needed 535 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) lifts, 1,793 lowboy lifts and 2,815 flatbed lifts.29 Once the air campaign began, expenditure rates increased well beyond the anticipated supply levels. Twenty-one days before the ground campaign began, 3,500 convoys traveled more than 2,700 miles of Main Supply Routes (MSRs).30 Coalition forces provided more than 4,000 trucks saving the equivalent of 67 Army truck companies.31 Of the 1,200 HETs available in Theater, only 497 were U.S. owned.32

Following over 94,000 aircraft sorties flown by coalition forces On February 24, 1991, the ground offensive commenced.33 In less than 100 hours of ground combat operations, the military objectives of the campaign were achieved. One of the keys to our overwhelming success was the fact we had time to mobilize our resources. It took time to establish a coalition of forces needed to fight this
war politically and militarily and move those forces into the Theater. At the same time, logistical challenges were met by the logistics community and solved but not without the extensive involvement of the Transportation community. Further, it took a significant amount of coalition and host nation support to ensure successful offensive operations. We cannot be assured of this luxury in future wars. Today, we have major transportation shortfalls which could cause serious deployment issues if we need to deploy combat forces to two Theaters.

TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT SHORTFALLS IN THE 2MRC STRATEGY

As previously discussed, we never have been properly or adequately prepared to go to war. If we were required to engage in a major conflict today, it could be extremely difficult for the military to respond within the required amount of time and with the right amount of forces. It is important to consider that U.S. OPSTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are at an all time record high as we are engaged in 69 different countries. Reduced military resources are being continuously and constantly engaged because use of the
military element of National power has been increased. We are engaged worldwide and units and personnel are required to deploy on short notice. With Desert Shield/Storm we were fortunate because it came at the end of the Cold War when the focus was on a European Theater and at a time when our resources were more robust.

In fiscal year 1989, the force consisted of 18 active divisions and 770,000 personnel. There is stark contrast when compared to today's force of ten active divisions (and two armored cavalry regiments) of 495,000 personnel. Permanent Congressional legislation established an endstrength floor of 495,000 in it's 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. However, DOD's fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) reduces active Army force structure 20,000 below the Congressionally mandated floor in 1999.

Referring back to the Army Force Structure Briefing given to Dr. Hamre and General (Ret) Otis on January 25, 1997, it is clear that "10 divisions and 495,000 AC end strength is the minimum force required to execute the current NMS with acceptable risk." Reducing force structure by another 20,000 to 475,000 does not support the
Army our military leaders are fighting for in the halls of Congress in order to fight and win a 2MRC scenario. It is important to note that "The active Army is divided between operational (63 percent) and institutional forces (25 percent), with the remainder of the force in temporary status, such as students (12 percent)."\textsuperscript{40}

By taking a quick look at the active force structure of today relative to U.S. National Security Strategy, it becomes painfully clear there is at least a "moderate" risk associated with the Nation’s ability to conduct a 2MRC strategy. The degree of acceptable risk is still the question. Whether the force is deployable or sustainable is a major issue and is addressed in the next several paragraphs.

There have been significant improvements in each segment of the Strategic Mobility Triad. The investment in terms of dollars/resources ($34+ billion) is tremendous.\textsuperscript{41} Many of our senior leaders are confident we can support the 2MRC strategy but there are many who are skeptical, and for good reason. The MRS BURU indicates we will not be able to support a 2MRC strategy with the required transportation until Fiscal Year (FY) 2001.
The Report Of The Defense Science Board Task Force On Strategic Mobility (August 1996) states we will meet the 2MRC transportation requirements "by about 2003." This is relevant to the airlift part of the Triad in that the C-17 aircraft deliveries will not be completed until FY 2003. This is seven years away from today. Inherent risks considered in isolation do not first appear to be show stoppers. Looked at collectively, however, the magnitude of the risk becomes significant.

The Science Board Task Force goes into significant detail delineating the issues and describes the proper way to address each one. There is a disconnect between USTRANSCOM and the supported warfighting CINC. "Specifically, the hand-off of personnel, equipment and materiel...at the ports of debarkation appears to be the critical seam where disruption of the deployment flow is most likely to occur." It is this hand-off part of the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) that is critical. The entire RSOI process is being looked at extremely hard in order to avoid some of the challenges encountered during the Gulf War.
Planning for a variety of threats at the Air and Sea Ports of Debarkation (A/SPODs) must be taken into account during training and equipment purchases. During Desert Shield/Storm we had secure world-class A/SPODs. In fact, 96 percent of the cargo shipped by sea went through two SPODs and 78 percent of all air cargo went through five APODs. Regardless of the method or the weapon, significant problems will occur if any one or more of these type targets are degraded or destroyed. The deployment timeline will be affected as will the task organization of forces. While this is not the direct concern of this paper, the impact on transportation will be significant.

Required utilization of alternate port facilities coupled with a loss of transportation assets and loss of host nation support will cause significant problems to the flow of men and materials into the theater(s) of operation. MRS BURU did not consider the impact of port degradation resulting from combat. It is much more significant than just getting all the "stuff" into the ships and planes and pointing them in the right direction. The rest of this section focuses on the current status of each of the three elements of the Triad.
Strategic airlift represents the quick introduction of forces and equipment into one of the two MRCs. The total air cargo capability required by the MRS BURU is 49.7 Millions of Ton Miles/Day (MTM/D). The Civil Reserve Air Fleet provides "...approximately 19.5 MTM/D (Stage III) of (this) total cargo capability...." This partnership with commercial industry will provide the total strategic airlift capability needed to support the 2MRC strategy by FY 2003. As the C-141 fleet retires, the C-5, KC-135 and KC-10 fleets stay at a relative steady state as is the CRAF capability at Stage III (National Mobilization).

The shortfall in strategic airlift is present today due to timelines associated with the acquisition and fielding of the C-17 fleet (25 percent delivered) in concert with the retirement of the C-141 fleet. CRAF is a proven partner of the Department of Defense and during Desert Shield/Storm CRAF aircraft accounted for about 20 percent of the total airlift missions flown.

There is risk associated with the above. The assumption is we have enough available airlift to support the NSS and the NMS. With a finite number of aircraft on-hand and in the acquisition pipeline we are already short of
the requirements for a 2MRC scenario. Another consideration must be made when you add the Craf capability into the total equation—Craf is a voluntary program. Since 1944, when the U.S. determined air superiority was vital to success over a given battlefield, we have been able to control the airspace over our combat forces when it was desirable. What if our air supremacy should ever be contended? If the airline industry was targeted by our adversaries, our plans could be significantly disrupted during the introduction of forces into any Theater.

Strategic sealift capabilities are important to the introduction of forces into a Theater of Operations and to the sustainment of those forces once introduced. The requirement to deploy 5-1/3 Army Divisions 9,000 miles in 75 days plus Marine Expeditionary Forces to one MRC supports the need for the following:

- Prepositioning--The requirement is for 34 ships (this number will go to 37) of which 8 are the large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs). Along with six chartered ships, these are designated for the Army. There are 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships for the Marine Corps (three more expected). Additionally, three ships are designated for the Air Force, and four fuel tankers belong to the Defense Logistics Agency.

- Surge Sealift--The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and the MRS BURU identify the need to have the
capability of 10 million square feet of surge shipping by FY 2001.\textsuperscript{50} There are 11 LMSRs (this brings the total to 19 with the eight prepositioned ships), eight fast sealift ships (FSS) and 65 ready reserve fleet (RRF) ships (including 36 roll-on/roll-on (RO/ROs)). These are available with response times of 4, 5, 10 and 20 days.\textsuperscript{51}

- Military Sealift Command controlled commercial fleet.
- Commercial charter--bilateral agreements.
- Commercial shipping for sustainment.
- 7,000 20 foot containers/week.
- 22,000 20 foot containers/week.
- 76,000 short tons of breakbulk ammunition.

The above represents a significant commitment by the Department of Defense and quickly depicts the magnitude sealift and prepositioning play as a part of the Triad. Adequate sealift to meet the requirements for the first MRC, and then the second MRC, should be in place by FY 2001 and is adequate through FY 2005 provided funding is available. Plans are underway to establish a CRAF type program for sealift known as VISA (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement). This will provide additional support during the sustainment phase should a 2MRC scenario become a reality.
Even with our current capacity, it must be noted there is a shortage of surge sealift capability. Delays in the LMSR construction program continue to occur. Additional delays are also being experienced within the RRF. There is a shortfall of five RO/ROs representing "the lift needed for a brigade-sized combat force."\(^{52}\) VISA is not yet approved and is in concept only. VISA does represent a means to support the current and projected sustainment requirement; however, like the CRAF program, it is voluntary and susceptible to the same problems and challenges.

For the Strategic Triad to work properly, each of the three elements of the Triad must be fully in place. Imagine the three-legged stool (NMS) of the National Security Policy Process model discussed during the early days of the Class of 1997 Army War College curriculum. Each leg (objectives, concepts, and resources) is dependent one upon the other. Should one leg be shorter than the other two, cracked or broken, there is serious risk that occurs. In each element of the Triad, there is a level of risk associated with the incompleteness of the identified requirements as well.

The preceding paragraphs depict the shortfalls existing today through FY 2001 and to FY 2005. The interdependent
relationships magnify when there is a need to support the warfighting CINC. There will always be additional needs and new requirements that may cause significant challenges to the transporter. Without parts of the puzzle on-hand to see the entire picture, it remains incomplete. One can still determine what the puzzle should be, but is unsatisfied with the long, tedious process it took to get to the nearly finished product. Winston Churchill is quoted often from his book, The River War:

"Victory is the beautiful, brightcoloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could not have blossomed."

CONCLUSION

A quick look at U.S. preparedness prior to World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts point out the U.S. was not prepared for possible political and military engagement. We failed to learn from this unpreparedness as we are again becoming dangerously unprepared. Recent reliance on the military to support the NSS points to an alarming trend. The United States NSS and NMS establishes the military as the key element of our nation's power. It is the primary tool used by the President to engage and enlarge. But, it
should not be overused at the expense of the three other elements of National Power. To continue to do so places additional risk on the NMS to support the NSS.

To deploy to 2MRCs, we must have the transportation needed to introduce overwhelming combat power into both Theaters of Operations. We must be mindful of what it took to move more than half a million U.S. service members with supplies, services, facilities, equipment, maintenance, and transportation halfway around the world to engage in combat and be victorious during the Gulf War. The decision of the CINC to deploy combat forces first created the ultimate logistician's nightmare. We needed the support of industry, our Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Ready Reserve Fleet, Propositioned Fleet, extensive Host Nation Support and an innovative and dedicated logistics force. We were able to redistribute another Theater warfighting CINC's assets and we were supporting only 25% of our combat forces with the majority of the logistics infrastructure. Force projection execution into this secure Theater was 95% by sea and 5% by air. In the future, we may not have luxuries of time and a Theater that is secure from our enemy and his weapons systems.
Our new challenge is to close the forces dedicated to the first MRC within 75 days.\textsuperscript{54} The question remains: Can we deploy forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs? Shortfalls within the Strategic Triad exist until the 2001 and 2005 time frame. Billions of dollars have been invested but the fact remains: the President, Congress and our National resolve must continue to recognize the need to equip and man the Armed Forces of America at the levels needed to support the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Currently, they are not.

"I don't know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."

\textit{Fleet Admiral E.J. King: to a staff officer. (1942)}\textsuperscript{55}
ENDNOTES


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6Sinclair, 31.


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