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PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP (PSRC)
PANACEA OR POISON?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. MORROW
United States Army Reserve

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PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP (PSRC)

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LTC ROBERT P. MORROW

COLONEL ROBERT WIG
PROJECT ADVISOR

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert P. Morrow (LTC), USAR

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The Reserve Forces of the United States have historically supported the nation in time of war or national emergency. Today's reduced military structure coupled with our current national military strategy require an increasing dependence upon use of the Reserves in both national emergencies and smaller strategic contingencies. Title 10, USC, section 12304, sometimes called the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authorizes the activation of Reserve Forces in support of active forces for operational missions (other than war or national emergencies). The President has invoked the PSRC on three occasions: Desert Shield, Uphold Democracy, and currently Joint Endeavor. Has the PSRC provided the appropriate level of accessibility to Reserve Forces for successful operational missions? What long-term affects will Bosnia-type PSRCs have on the readiness, strength and viability of the Reserve Forces? The purpose of this research is to address these questions, identify strategic concerns regarding the Reserves, and recommend modifications to the current language of the PSRC as well as current Implementation of the statute.
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Since the founding of the United States, our nation has consistently depended upon its reserves to help fight its wars. Whether called "minutemen," volunteers, national guardsmen or reservists, the nation has frequently called upon its reserves to supplement regular forces in the defense of the nation. While state militias and volunteers composed the primary source of reserves through the Civil War, the turn of the century saw changes in the law that created the United States Reserves as well as the state National Guard forces. Since that time, the Reserve Components (RC) have played a vital role in the defense of the nation and the conduct of military operations.

With today's volatile and ambiguous environment, military operations other than war (MOOTW), now called smaller scale contingencies (SSC) have increased the tempo of deployments of both active and reserve forces. As part of today's national military strategy, military leaders increasingly call upon reserves forces to both complement and supplant active forces. The mechanism to activate these reserve forces is based upon Title X of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Title X authorizes the President and/or Congress to activate (call to active duty) the reserve forces for a given period of time. Currently, there are three primary levels of declared mobilization: full mobilization, partial mobilization, and a lesser mobilization instrument called the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC).

The PSRC, which is the subject of this paper, has been in existence since 1976.\(^1\) It has been modified on several occasions, the last time as part of the National Defense Act of FY 1995. Now, nearly three years later, what is the verdict concerning the PSRC? Has it provided military and political leaders the desired accessibility to reserve forces? Does the PSRC adequately support the military strategy of the United States? In its current form, is the PSRC a viable mechanism for reserve force employment in the future? While I believe the answer to
these questions is a qualified "yes," I believe the PSRC definitely needs modification, if not overhaul.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the primary ramifications of the PSRC, identify shortfalls to the current process, and recommend possible modifications that address the negative effects of the PSRC. Finally, I will pose some questions that address potentially devastating situations regarding the reserve forces, mobilization, and the nation. Agencies such as Rand, Army Research Institute and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR) have ongoing studies regarding these issues. Future researchers and policy makers should glean much food for thought from the results of these studies.

In discussing this topic, I will provide a brief background regarding the history of the PSRC, its evolution and legal basis. I will then discuss the recent usage of the three declared PSRCs and comment on the effectiveness of the mechanism. Lastly, I will identify shortcomings and make some recommendations to correct these shortcomings.

BACKGROUND

Since the American Revolution, America has been a nation based on a militia-based armed force. The earliest force was a home-defense force, composed of almost every able-bodied man, armed but largely untrained. Its primary purpose was to execute the laws of the Union, repel invasions, and defeat insurrections.²

From the Revolution through the Mexican War, the militia remained a popular concept, albeit with a less than exemplary record. In nearly all instances, the militia failed miserably. Principally due to a state allegiance and under control of the respective governors, the militia was
seldom accessible for defense of the nation. During the War of 1812, the US raised a standing militia and regular force of over 527,000. Yet, a British force of less than 5,000 men successfully invaded the nation and burned the Capitol. During the Mexican War, the militia was unavailable. Constitutionally, service in Mexico was not part of repelling invasions or suppressing insurrections.

Consequently, Congress authorized the organizing of volunteers, who were not subject to the laws of the militia. Though organized on a militia basis, these volunteer units were not the militia, and unlike the state militias, they played a decisive role in preserving the Union during the Civil War.³

The Spanish-American War, legally the same as the Mexican War, again prevented the dispatch of the militia. The war did, however, emphasize the need for legislative reform regarding accessibility and use of the militia. Early in the twentieth century, Congress passed several legislative acts which started to modernize the militia. The Dick Act provided for a truly organized militia, known as the National Guard, to be trained in accordance with Regular Army guidance. In 1908, and especially in 1916 with the National Defense Act, Congress expanded the mission and accessibility of the National Guard to include service abroad. Additionally, the Act established a Naval Reserve, a Marine Corps Reserve, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

The evolution of the National Guard and Reserves continued through World War I and in 1933, the National Guard was made a component of the US Army. Thus, the President could federalize the National Guard when needed for federal service.⁴
In World War II, both National Guard and Reserve units served the nation around the world, most with distinguished records. Korea brought a change in attitudes for many reserve forces personnel. While service during World War II was generally unwavering, the activation of National Guardsmen and Reservists for Korea met with much dissatisfaction. Apparently, the mindset of the original militia was still in place. Many expressed great willingness to serve when a national emergency had been declared. However, Korea was not a national emergency. Therefore, many resented being uprooted from their civilian lives to serve in a non-emergency situation.

During the Korean War, and influenced by the above indignation, Congress passed the Armed Force Reserve Act of 1952. Though far-reaching in its effect, the most important dimension of the Act was the establishment of several categories within each service: a Ready Reserve, a Stand-by Reserve, and a Retired Reserve. It also delineated when the various categories would be available for active duty call-up, thus establishing some stability and reliable expectations within the Reserves. Importantly, the law established a procedure and limitations concerning how and when the reserves could be called to active duty. It established that the President must declare a national emergency and Congress must determine the number of members who may be so ordered to active duty.5

Throughout the early years of “containment," the US followed a generally two-tiered philosophy regarding Reserve forces activation. In the event of a national emergency, the President and Congress could authorize either full or partial mobilization, depending on the severity of the emergency. Although the nation called upon the RC several times during the next two decades, the activations were often the result of a partial mobilization or through the use of
reserve volunteers. Partial mobilizations included: the Berlin Crisis in 1961 with over 148,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists called to active duty; the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 with the activation of nearly 14,000 Air Force Reservists, the Vietnam War and the Pueblo Incident in 1968 with 37,000 individual and unit members of the National Guard and Reserves called to active duty.\(^6\)

While the above activations implied a definite threshold for Reserve forces implementation, many experts believed that in the event of less volatile operations arising from other than a Cold War scenario, active forces could handle the situation. However, in 1976, Congress acknowledged that such an assumption could be erroneous, especially concerning the accessibility of the Reserves.\(^7\) Since the early 1970s, there had been a determined effort to increase the viability and use of RC forces. In 1973, as a result of forced downsizing, elimination of the draft, and a belief that the RC was the connecting link with the American public, the Department of Defense established the Total Force concept. One of the principal goals of this concept was to integrate the RC into the total force. In the army, Chief of Staff GEN Creighton Abrams accomplished this by assigning major combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) responsibilities principally to the RC.\(^8\)

As the US military increased its reliance upon the RC for CS/CSS functions, third-world developing nations simultaneously experienced increased volatility and instability. Issues involving starvation, genocide, governmental instability and the like fostered an increasing need for military assistance in situations usually requiring less than overt combat operations. Instead, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs assistance, and the need for infrastructure reconstruction increasingly became the norm.
Consequently, and due to a growing concern regarding accessibility of Reserve forces, Congress amended the existing law through passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1976. The new law included a mechanism that facilitated the use of reserve forces for operational missions less than a national emergency and not requiring partial mobilization. This was the PSRC.

As enacted by Congress, section 673b of Title X was intended to provide the President with expanded crisis response flexibility. Under 673b, the President could respond militarily without declaring a national emergency that might be considered provocative or premature. Additionally, this limited call-up was designed to enhance the accessibility of the Reserves in the Total Force concept. The legislation would allow the Department of Defense to assign support missions to Reserves with the presumption that they would be available in situations short of a national emergency.9

Originally, the PSRC authorized the call-up of 50,000 Selected Reservists for ninety days. In 1980, Congress amended the law to authorize the call-up of up to 100,000 Selected Reservists. And in 1986, the law was again amended to increase the call-up authority to 200,000. Additionally, Congress authorized the President to extend the active duty for an additional ninety days if he deemed such action necessary in the interests of national security.10

Despite the numerous changes mentioned above, from 1976 to 1989, no President invoked the PSRC. However, in August 1990, President Bush implemented the first PSRC to augment active forces following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. He eventually extended the PSRC in November 1990 for an additional ninety days. In January 1991, Bush authorized a partial mobilization which effectively superseded the PSRC.
Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, military leaders concluded that a ninety day mobilization with a ninety day extension did not allow the accessibility and flexibility needed to conduct operations. Leaders feared that the next crisis would not allow the US the same six month luxury to deploy forces and prepare for war. Come-as-you-are war scenarios indicated that forces would need to be readily accessible and dependable throughout a campaign.

Additionally, CINC's argued that military downsizing and continued force structure changes which placed increased CS/CSS responsibility upon the RC jeopardized their abilities to plan for operations exceeding 180 days. Throughout the ninety's, with increased instances of MOOTW, these concerns increased. MOOTW, such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations, by definition, often require larger proportionate numbers of CS and CSS personnel than do traditional combat operations. Additionally, these operations often require extended timeframes, frequently duration of more than a year. Consequently, military leaders urged a modification of the PSRC to allow for an initial activation of 180 days with an extension of an additional 180 days.

In 1994, Congressional leaders agreed that the "ninety and ninety" did not meet the needs of the country but refused to amend the law to a "180 and 180." Congress refused to accept arguments that military leaders would no longer utilize reserve forces unless the time periods were extended. Additionally, Congress accepted the argument from Gulf War veterans who argued that any length with a possible extension added uncertainty and lowering of morale for reservists. As a compromise, Congress modified existing legislation. The National Defense Authorization Act of FY95 authorized a PSRC that included a one-time mobilization of reserve units for up to 270 days, with no extension.
In 1994, President Clinton invoked the PSRC to provide Selected Reserve support for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Among the Reserve Forces involuntarily called up, 2091 Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel were activated. Due to the length of the operation, RC units conducted multiple rotations to provide the necessary support. While lengths of active duty varied to some degree, Army Reservists and National Guardsmen generally served not more than 180 days on active duty (from mobilization to demobilization).\textsuperscript{15}

In 1995, President Clinton again authorized the call-up of Selected Reservists under the PSRC to support Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia). As of January 1996, over 7000 Army Reservists have been called to active duty in support of this mission.\textsuperscript{16} So far, the Army Reserve has supported the active forces with three rotations. Currently, Operation Joint Endeavor is planned through mid-1998.\textsuperscript{17} This will necessitate at least one more rotation of personnel.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Assessment}

As described previously, the intent of the PSRC is to provide a call-up mechanism of the Selected Reserve in order to augment active forces for any operational mission (other than during war or national emergency). The current PSRC, as prescribed in Title X, section 12304 of US Code enables the President to "authorize the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service of the Navy, without consent of the members concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit, of the Selected Reserve...to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 270 days."\textsuperscript{19} Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active duty under a particular PSRC at any one time. Reservists on active duty under PSRC may not perform
functions for the Federal or State governments associated with a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.²⁰

What does this mean? The legislation provides for call-up of Selected Reserve members, i.e., troop program unit (TPU) members, members of the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) pool, and members of the Active/Guard Reserve (AGR). An important exclusion is that it does not include members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

From an utilization standpoint, it means that members may not “volunteer” for the PSRC, nor may they be activated for any particular PSRC longer than 270 days. Additionally, PSRC forces may not be used to assist in domestic missions even as a result of a natural or manmade disaster, i.e., hurricane disaster relief or domestic riots.

As noted above, the President has invoked the PSRC on three occasions, all during the 1990s. Although one PSRC recently concluded and another is ongoing, I believe it is fair to assess the success and utility of the PSRC as a mechanism of accessing the Reserve Forces.

In general, the PSRC has succeeded as a tool to access and utilize the Reserves, both from a military standpoint as well as an implement of national power. First, it provides the President an additional diplomatic/political signaling mechanism. Through the PSRC, the President may send a visible and measured signal regarding US interests and resolve to friend and foe alike. The US has effectively used the PSRC in this manner in all three instances. In Desert Shield, President Bush used the PSRC to indicate to Iraq and the world that the US considered the stability of the Middle East a vital interest. In Operation Uphold Democracy and Operation Joint Endeavor, President Clinton used the PSRC to signal US resolve and commitment to regional neighbors as well as our security alliances, i.e., NATO.
As a method for accessing needed Reserve forces to augment active forces in operational missions short of war, the PSRC has apparently provided forces in adequate numbers. So far, the 200,000 limit has proved sufficient for all three PSRCs. If necessary, the PSRC also allows for a "stop loss" of forces through section 12305 of Title X, further ensuring adequate reserve forces.\textsuperscript{21}

The issue of timely access to RC units is both relative and contingent upon several external factors. Presidential delays obviously influence the speed with which Reserve forces can be activated and utilized. Once activated, timely submission of force requirements by the supported force also impacts the timeliness of RC support.\textsuperscript{22} This is a contentious issue that I will further discuss in the next section.

Finally, the PSRC can serve as a precursor for a partial mobilization. While many experts argue that the tiers of mobilization (PSRC, partial, full, total) are not necessarily incremental, most agree that one of the utilities of the PSRC is that it may in fact precede and make ready for a partial mobilization, as in Desert Shield.\textsuperscript{23}

During Desert Shield, the PSRC allowed President Bush to activate uniquely skilled RC personnel needed to provide early and critical support missions vital to establishing the flow of men and materiel to the Gulf. On 22 August 1990, less than two weeks after US forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, President Bush signed Executive Order No. 12727, exercising Title X, Section 673b of the U.S. Code. This order authorized the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation to activate units and individuals of the Selected Reserve. One day later, Secretary of Defense Cheney authorized the service secretaries to activate up to 48,800 members of the Selected Reserve.\textsuperscript{24} From 24 to 26 August, the services called the first Air Reserve Components, Army National Guard and Army Reserve to active duty. By 14 November, the Army had activated 235
Reserve and National Guard units and over 24,000 personnel. In the US as backfills and in Saudi Arabia, many of these soldiers performed critical medical, maintenance, port and terminal operations and other critical combat service support functions. Like the Army, by mid-November, the Navy Reserve had activated more than 285 units and nearly 5,000 personnel to perform cargo-handling, minesweeping, and various sealift missions. 25

**Problems With the PSRC**

If the PSRC has generally accomplished its primary intent, that of accessibility to Reserve Forces, should it be changed? Why not leave well enough alone? I believe the PSRC in its current form has fostered problem areas for the military as a whole and the Reserves in particular. Some of these problems simply detract from the effectiveness of the PSRC. Others, if not addressed, could reduce readiness to a point where our national military strategy is jeopardized.

**Need for timely activation of critical Reserve forces**

Although the PSRC allows for activation of designated forces, the timeliness of such action is in the eye of the beholder. While the PSRC provides the President another option from which to choose, it is a politically volatile issue with its own set of potential ramifications. Prior to PSRC declaration, the President typically must assess the international impact of US statements and actions. Government officials must often confer with possible coalition partners and key neutral nations. Furthermore, the President will normally consult with Congress prior to any activation. 26 Consequently, the President must calculate the effects of PSRC declaration, possibly losing critical time needed to activate those reservists desperately needed by the active
forces. Even though President Bush declared a PSRC on 22 August 1990, it was already two weeks after active (and reserve volunteers) had begun deploying to Saudi Arabia. By the time respective service secretaries activated their forces, additional days/weeks had elapsed. Meanwhile, over 10,000 Reserve Component personnel had volunteered and were serving as part of Operation Desert Shield. Even though matching skills with urgent job requirements challenged the active forces, those volunteers provided much of the support augmentation needed during the early days of deployment for Desert Shield. Under the current PSRC law, volunteers are not allowed. To access volunteers, the military must employ other sometimes cumbersome procedures.

Although the US enjoyed the luxury of a gradual build-up during Desert Shield, the next crisis may not afford us such time. Many key leaders believe an additional option is needed, less politically volatile, yet more responsive than the current PSRC. Military planners need access to a relatively small, yet reliable reserve force possessing critical skills needed to support early deploying forces in the event a PSRC or larger mobilization is executed. Recommendations supporting this alternative have been proffered in the past. In fact, military leaders recommended such an addition to the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. As an adjunct to section 12304, proponents recommended that the Secretary of Defense be authorized to activate up to 25,000 Selected Reservists for up to ninety days. This force was to “prime the pump” and provide critical skills needed to support the earliest deploying forces as well as filling vacancies for units with less than wartime strength. Such forces typically include port and terminal operating personnel, air reserve units, and even civil affairs/psyop personnel. Senate committee members opposed such an amendment and the final bill legislated no such action.
PSRC Allows for Unit Call-up only; Hinders Ability to Tailor the Force

Section 12304 of Title 10 specifically authorizes only members of the Selected Reserve to be involuntarily called to active duty. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) may not be activated. This restriction prevents the use of volunteers and exacerbates the above-mentioned problem of timely access to available RC forces. Additionally, it forces military planners to access needed reserve personnel using methods which jeopardize the readiness of the RC. As in Desert Shield, the President waited over two weeks after the Iraqi invasion before invoking the PSRC. In the interim, military forces desperately needed critical skills from Reservists, and in some cases, just bodies willing to help. Ten thousand Reservists volunteered before President Bush authorized the PSRC. These individuals played a key role in administration, deployment, and transportation requirements prior to RC availability through PSRC.

Yet, the PSRC today intentionally prohibits use of Reserve volunteers for PSRC and thus inhibits the RC’s ability to provide a timely and quality support force. The PSRC process forces military planners to exercise other options to access and tailor the needed force. Examples include temporary tour of active duty (TTAD), active duty for special work (ADSW), active duty for less than fifteen days under section 12301 of Title 10, and utilization of an expedient called the derivative unit identification code (DUIC). During Operation Uphold Democracy and now in Operation Joint Endeavor (at least involving Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces), planners naturally tailor unit needs to operational requirements. Instead of submitting mission requirements, supported task forces typically submit personnel requirements consisting of
requests for individuals and teams rather than larger units. Consequently, RC force providers must create support packages composed of less-than-complete units.

To illustrate the problem, USAREUR often submits personnel requirements for support Operation Joint Endeavor as individual or less-than-unit requirements. These personnel requirements pass from USACOM to FORSCOM. When FORSCOM directs that specific requirements be filled by reservists, the USARC attempts to fill USAR requirements. Whenever possible, the USARC selects non-Force Support Pool (FSP) units which meet the mission requirements. Due to the uniqueness of the requirements (each and teams rather than units), the USARC is unable to fill most requirements with established units. Consequently, the USARC must create a derivative unit identification code (DUIC).

The DUIC is nothing more than a mechanism to administratively combine individuals of varying skills into an ad hoc unit. Its utility is simply to consolidate diverse skills into a single newly created unit designation. As a practice, the USARC may initially create the DUIC with a portion of an actual unit. Unable to fulfill personnel requirements through combining pieces of existing units, the USARC requests assistance from ARPERCEN (now PERSCOM-USAR), the headquarters which manages the IRR. ARPERCEN canvasses the IRR pool for individuals who meet the required criteria and queries qualified reservists for volunteers. Since the PSRC does not allow volunteers nor does it allow members of the IRR to be activated, ARPERCEN transfers qualified IRR volunteers to the Selected Reserve and assigns them to the newly created DUIC. In other words, ARPERCEN asks qualified IRR soldiers to volunteer to be transferred into a new-created unit so they can be involuntarily called-up.
Some military leaders consider this ingenious practice simply creative management. Even if this practice is legal, it raises a more important issue -- the effect on existing units.

**Adverse Effect on Units**

Many experts agree that MOOTW, now SSCs, degrade unit readiness, regardless of the component. However, some argue that Reserve forces experience less readiness degradation than AC units. This is due primarily because in most SSC operations, RC personnel perform their regular wartime missions. As an example, active army infantry units, trained to close with and destroy the enemy through combat, quickly lose their edge when forced to perform traditional peacekeeping missions. Conversely, RC units, such as civil affairs, medical, and transportation personnel perform their actual missions during the course of an SSC. Rather than performance of unfamiliar tasks, the problems for deployed Reservists involve cohesion, morale, and unit effectiveness. As cited above, many of the units activated and deployed under the current PSRC are not really units. They are derivatives, pieces of units and individuals that have been combined for administrative convenience. Consequently, these personnel have not trained together, seldom have any established leadership as part of the deploying unit, and thus lack cohesion.

The effects on these personnel as well as the losing units are often disastrous. Units that send personnel to support the current PSRC face the issue of degraded readiness and the substantial requirement to refit and retrain upon mission completion. While readiness is a difficult problem for active units facing reduced training dollars, it becomes a monumental task for reserve units which have received 25-50% fewer funds than in previous years. MG (Ret) Sandler points out, "Breaking existing units to fill individual requirements impairs unit
effectiveness and jeopardizes the performance of the broken unit should it be subsequently
ordered to active duty.”

**Danger of RC Overuse and Loss of popular support.**

Although the PSRC has been authorized three times, only Operations Uphold
Democracy and Joint Endeavor involved operational missions generally considered non-
emergencies by the American public. Prior to 1994, RC forces were not involuntarily called-up
for operations considered non-emergencies. Some historians consider Korea the only
exception. Consequently, involuntary call-ups of Reservists for extended periods of time
during non-emergency operations (Haiti and Bosnia) appear to be a relatively new phenomenon.

While no one can predict the future, key military leaders publicly assert that the RC will
likely play an increased role in the implementation of future peacekeeping deployments. Is
there is a danger in frequent PSRCs for non-emergency missions? Several key leaders have
emphasized the danger of repeatedly calling on the RC for extended support in situations not
considered vital to American interests. MG (Ret) Sandler warns that, “going to the well too often
will destroy both public and employer support.” COL (Ret) Harry Summers emphasized in *On
Strategy*, a key ingredient to a successful US strategy is that intangible but often overlooked
principle -- the public will. To lose public support or violate the public will is strategically
devastating, as Vietnam depicted.

The point to this argument is that the Reserves have historically and steadfastly supported
the military whenever vital interests were at stake. Whereas national interests were less than
important, reservists and the nation as a whole, quickly lost support for the endeavor. Although
ongoing studies regarding continued use of the Reserves under PSRC for Bosnia are incomplete,
preliminary results indicate that tour length and repetitiveness are having an impact on family relationships, as well as perceived job and employer impacts. While many military/civilians involved in the process indicate we have not reached a point of public resistance, all express consternation that continued or increased levels of Reserve deployments under the current PSRC scenario will jeopardize Reservists' willingness to participate (similar to the declining levels of support experienced in Korea).

Additionally, many experts fear the continued tempo of Reserve usage for Bosnia-type PSRCs will eventually erode employer support. Key members of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve express alarm that employer support for deploying Reservists will soon wane, especially for endeavors that they do not consider vital to American interests.

The danger is much more than simply a peripheral concern. Second and third order effects from an eroding employer support base could easily undermine the entire national military strategy. Reduced employer support will directly and quickly affect retention and recruitment in the Reserve Forces. With retention and recruiting rates already below end-strength requirements, any further decrease in retention and recruiting would likely devastate the Reserves' ability to provide required support to almost any military scenario. The domino effect would be that the US military is severely debilitated in its ability to compel, deter or defeat potential or real enemies.
CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

Current US strategy indicates that we will continue to participate in “engagement” activities. This strategy, influenced by continued budget reductions and likely force drawdowns, point to an ever-increasing reliance upon the RC for Bosnia-like operational missions requiring PSRCs. To enhance the effective and timely utilization of RC forces, I recommend that military and civilian leaders consider the following actions as proactive initiatives.

1. Congress should modify existing PSRC legislation (section 12304 of Title 10) to include involuntary call-up authority of IRR personnel. This authority would alleviate many of the current problems resulting from Bosnia-type PSRCs. RC planners could pre-select and identify IRR soldiers possessing those critical skills needed yet absent in the active forces and the Selected Reserve. Force providers could utilize these personnel to augment shortfalls in both active and reserve units.

2. Congress should grant the SECDEF call-up authority of a small yet responsible RC force composed of both Selected Reserve and IRR personnel. These forces would probably be no different from the first units typically activated today: special forces, civil affairs, and transportation-related specialties. However, authority to call-up a smaller force by SECDEF might de-politicize the process and enhance a more timely activation of special reserve forces.

3. If the army continues to fill Bosnia-like PSRC requirements by breaking RC units into smaller teams with no command/control continuity, RC units will likely suffer low morale, reduced effectiveness and loss of cohesion. If these same units are subsequently called into major regional contingencies, it is indeed questionable whether they will perform to standards or expectations.
A. It is unlikely that RC leaders will successfully persuade supported CINCs to change their method of determining force requirements. To lessen the adverse effects of breaking units, RC leaders should consider force structure modification to existing units. Larger units, such as battalions and companies, should be restructured or “modularized” into smaller teams and sections. While this might require rank/position overhaul, it would facilitate the accessibility and efficient use of RC forces under the current scenarios. Training should be oriented toward individual and team skills rather than larger unit collective training.

B. To reduce soldier uncertainty and anxiety regarding PSRC deployments, I recommend that RC forces institute deployment scheduling plans for specific periods of time. Similar to the Navy’s deployment schedule for carrier battle group forces, planners could identify, in advance, units/personnel that would be susceptible to call-up for a given period of time. As an example, unit “X” (a USAR medium truck company) could be scheduled to support a PSRC during 1997-1999. While they might never be activated or deployed, they would be on stand-by for that period. Although crises requiring partial/full mobilizations would change the situation, other similar units would normally have some sense of stability for that period. Following the stand-by period for unit “X,” it would not be scheduled for call-up for a set period of time, maybe the next three years. Such a schedule would promote stability for reserve units as well as reservists’ employers. It could also help drive training plans. NOTE: Although rumors indicate that the USAR intends to implement a similar plan, I could find no evidence that such a plan exists.

4. Historically, America has been well served by patriotic volunteers, both active and reserve. However, history has also shown that both our reserves and the American public
quickly sour on the idea of prolonged involvement when our vital national interests are not considered at stake.

Whether prudent or otherwise, reduced budgets and drawdowns have forced US national military strategy to increasingly depend on the RC. Overuse or misuse of RC forces through the PSRC may quickly promote a backlash in public support, employer support, and reserve member support. The impact on our ability to effect military strategy would be catastrophic.

I recommend that the entire military structure conduct a nationwide publicity program to educate the American public and American employers of the emerging trends in US national strategy. The military and indeed the government itself must convince America that US "engagement," which will mean increasingly frequent activation and deployment of RC forces for longer periods of time, is a worthwhile sacrifice. The government must persuade the American public that frequent and extensive use of the RC to support SSCs worldwide is indeed part of our vital interests and necessary for stability and security. We must convince America that "preventive defense" is like the Fram oil filter commercial -- a small payment up front is much better than a costly repair bill later.

Military leaders must not cynically cast aside this issue. Never before has the US faced the likelihood of such a high optempo of RC utilization for perceived non-vital operations. If and when employer support wanes, reservists will quickly leave the Reserves. The consequences may devastate our military strategy.
ENDNOTES

1 Department of Defense, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces (April 18, 1994), 6.
3 Ibid, 3-5.
4 Ibid, 7-12.
5 Ibid, 7-33.
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