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UNDERSTANDING RECRUITING DUTY: HARD WORK OUTSIDE THE FENCE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNDERSTANDING RECRUITING DUTY: HARD WORK OUTSIDE THE FENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The American people have a high level of confidence in the military and support the idea of an All Volunteer Force (AVF). That support and government policies related to the sustainment of the AVF create the environment in which the services recruit. In turn, the military services establish goals, policies and incentives for recruiters to achieve enough accessions to maintain the AVF. All of the truly hard work is then done by the individual recruiter. A thorough understanding of this process by all involved would help ensure an uninterrupted flow of high-quality recruits and provide a viable force for the next century.
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INTRODUCTION

Successfully recruiting a high-quality, all-volunteer military for the next century is not guaranteed. A thorough understanding of the recruiting atmosphere and process by all concerned, from public opinion through government and military service policies down to the recruiter on the street, would have a positive impact on our continued success. Research for this paper includes recent articles from major civilian and military newspapers and journals, hard data from producers of statistics - including the Government Accounting Office and the Rand Corporation, telephone interviews, books, and the authors three year personal experience as a recruiting commander on the streets of Los Angeles.

Public opinion and the Vietnam War brought an end to the draft in 1973, and the All Volunteer Force (AVF) was established. Since then public opinion of the military has changed dramatically. In addition, government policies and laws relating to the military have changed as well. Throughout this period, military services fought for and against policies and laws which impact recruiting. On the
street, recruiters and their commanders have adjusted to both sweeping and incremental changes.

Understanding the connection and interrelation between 1) public opinion, 2) government policies, 3) service regulations, and 4) the hard work of the individual recruiter is essential. Each of these four levels interact simultaneously and produce an interesting dynamic. Again, a more comprehensive, albeit cursory, understanding of the whole process by all concerned and involved might prove beneficial. This strategic overview is, therefore, intentionally, purposefully and necessarily broad in scope. We’ll start on the street.

Recruiting duty is a grinding experience for the individual recruiter. It is mentally, emotionally and physically exhausting. Many have called it the most arduous non-combat duty. The majority of active duty military personnel knows little and appreciates even less about this duty. They know only to avoid it if at all possible. Their understanding and active support would make a difference.

A limited knowledge of what it takes for the individual recruiter to achieve just one of the 226,000 accessions required for FY 1997 will serve the reader when the atmosphere in which the recruiter operates is outlined below.¹ On average, depending on each service’s structure
and mission, the individual recruiter must send at least two recruits to boot camp each month throughout his 36 months on duty. To enlist one individual, who will eventually ship to a service boot camp, two fully “screened and sold” individuals must be brought (at 0530) to the local Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). One will eventually get on the bus or plane to boot camp. The other one, despite the best efforts of the recruiter and his immediate chain of command, will be found not medically qualified that day at the MEPS (heart murmur, hearing loss, eye refraction, no pectoral muscle, and so on) or, sometime later, will refuse to ship to boot camp (pregnancy, marriage, family pressure, better job or education opportunities). No one is forced to go - the basic premise of the All Volunteer Force (AVF).

In addition, prior to bringing the applicants to the local MEPS, the recruiter must obtain certain documents. Examples are birth certificates, social security cards, high school diplomas, police record checks, department of motor vehicle checks, parental consent forms (if the applicant is under 18), high school progress reports, resident alien documentation, and more. Many of these are obtained by the recruiter when the applicant has lost or never applied for
them; a written, then faxed, parental consent from an out-of-state, trucker-father at the end of the month to make mission/quota serves as one colorful example.

Before bringing those two applicants to the MEPS, the recruiter must have found at least three or four prospects to screen, interview-in-depth and try to sell; more must be found if his sales skill/closing ratio is weak. A 2:1 or 3:1 closing ratio is good - at least half of the fully qualified cannot be convinced to join. Three to five appointments per day should be scheduled to find that one qualified person to further interview and then attempt to sell (two or three of your daily appointments will cancel or simply not show and many will be found unqualified during the appointment). As a result, a recruiter should talk to at least 10 new people per day (some say 20) in order to screen out the obviously unqualified and get the three to five 'promised' appointments - remember, the target population is unreliable and unpredictable. Most 17 - 21 year old civilians have yet to develop a solid sense of the discipline and obligation that the new recruiter expects.

The preceding serves to provide an extremely brief outline of the amount of work which must be accomplished to obtain just one accession. It does not convey the constant
sense of urgency required, the isolation of many from a familiar military environment and associated support services, the emotion expended from repeated rejection (even after correctly using your new recruiter MOS skills), nor does it convey the relentless pressure of never-ending quotas/missions. The high-volume, people funnel described above, which the recruiter must ceaselessly feed, is a new environment for the recruiter - completely outside the fence - where enough have succeeded to sustain the AVF.

Factors contributing to our sustained success in recruiting the AVF include; the quality, skill and determination of the individual recruiter, the leadership and management skills of local and regional commanders, the structure, policies and support of the individual services, the policies and general atmosphere created by the current congress and the current administration, and the continued support of the American people. These factors will be discussed from the top down to show how each factor contributes to the overall environment within which the individual recruiter operates. From the mindset of the American people toward the military to the attitude of the recruiter on the street, each of these levels interact
simultaneously, each level impacts recruiting in one way, shape or form.

SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

America was fought for and founded using the concept of the citizen soldier. Control of our military by a freely elected civilian government is deeply rooted in the minds of the people. And, for 222 years - since declaring our independence, we have fielded that military using various combinations of a draft/conscription or volunteer system in order to "provide for the common defense", as the Constitution demands. These basic concepts are somewhere in the minds of America's parents when their sons and daughters serve in the armed forces. More important, the performance and conduct of active duty personnel, with whom their sons and daughters serve, will have a significant impact on the perception of the American people and their resulting support for the AVF.

Since the end of the draft in 1973, the American people, their government and the military services have agreed to support the concept of an all volunteer force. The draft used to support the Vietnam War was viewed as
inequitable and became unacceptable - the changeover to the AVF was by popular mandate. It was not an easy transition. Many in the government and in the military argued against abolishing the draft, and this issue has recently resurfaced.\textsuperscript{4} When the draft ended, the recruiting services faced a tremendous challenge adjusting to accessing a purely volunteer force.\textsuperscript{5} Of note, in the first few years of the transition, there was "a continual flow of reports in the media from academicians, military personnel, reporters, columnists, and elected officials questioning and attacking the all-volunteer concept."\textsuperscript{6} It was argued that the core principal of the citizen soldier would be lost, and the evolution of a more isolated, less representative military would result. The counter-argument was that the draft never drew from across the broad spectrum of American society as originally intended. Either way, recruiting the AVF in the 1970s was extremely challenging in terms of adjustment and scope.

Volume was the name of the game. Quantity was important. The American people had demanded an end to the draft and recruiting the new AVF could not fail. Unfortunately, one of the first, short, shaky steps taken was from (Secretary of Defense Robert) McNamara's 100,000 in
the 1960s to hordes of category IV (Low-Aptitude) individuals in the 1970s. This, however, was the military’s problem to solve. Public opinion of the military after Vietnam was already low, and was further shaped by the final fall of South Vietnam, the Mayaguez incident, American hostages in Iran, and the failed rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980.

The low quality of many recruits during this period drew the attention of the government and of the services. In the field, commanders were wrestling with the consequences - problems included low morale, unauthorized absence, desertion, racial tension, drug use, theft, and more. On the street recruiters said, ‘If he can fog a mirror, send him downtown’. In other words, if he was breathing - barely qualified - try to enlist him. This quote came from my Sergeant Major who recruited 288 individuals during a three year tour in the late 1970s. A recruiter today is commended for recruiting 100 high quality recruits during a three year tour.

Clearly, recruiting the AVF in the 1980s needed to be different. Fortunately, policy makers, with the wholehearted support of newly elected President Ronald Reagan, pushed for quality changes across the board. With
some stability in terms of total force end strength and fewer accessions required to support that end strength, it was time to address the quality issue. Total accessions had dropped from roughly 400,000 per year in 1973 to around 300,000 per year in 1983. At the same time, the number of accessions with a traditional high school diploma rose from 61 percent in 1973 to 91 percent in 1983 while the number of upper mental group/high aptitude accessions (non category IV) rose from about 65 percent in 1973 to 92 percent in 1983.

The sweeping changes in recruit quality which began in 1981 were the result of a cooperative effort between the government and the recruiting services. In turn, commanders from in the field became unanimous in their praise of the improved quality of individual serving in the AVF by the end of the 1980s. On the street, recruiters successfully executed the transition from quantity to quality (with an unswerving emphasis from recruiting service, regional and local commanders). As a result, the public saw higher quality individuals, operating new and sophisticated equipment, completing more successful missions in Grenada, Libya, Panama and Southwest Asia.
With the end of the Cold War, the budgetary constraints of maintaining a large military, and competing domestic issues began an orderly end-strength drawdown. Accessions required dropped from around 300,000 in 1989 to 200,000 from 1991 through 1995.\textsuperscript{11} Other major course corrections were unnecessary, and enlistment quality standards were held relatively constant - recruit quality was, however, incrementally increased throughout the 1980s ultimately reaching over 99 percent traditional high school grads and only case by case acceptance of category IVs. Recruiting services reduced structure, reorganized, and polished hard-learned techniques, procedures, and policies. As the gross number of accessions required was reduced, the number of production recruiters was reduced in rough proportion. On the street, the hard work continued with fewer disruptions caused by major course corrections seen in previous decades.

The 1990s began with arguably the most decisive and overwhelming military intervention in history - Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Subsequent operations saw military forces succeeding in numerous international humanitarian and peacekeeping operations as well as many domestic disaster relief, fire-fighting, and even riot control operations.
Public opinion towards and confidence in their military remained extremely positive in the 1990s.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The drawdown begun by the Bush administration continued through the early 1990s. The Clinton administration pursued further drawdown and brought other "climatic" changes. While public opinion toward the military remained high, the Clinton administration would not mirror that high regard. Moreover, policies toward women and gays in the military would change. As a result, the recruiting environment would change in less tangible ways during this period. Previous changes in quantity and quality were easier to measure. The impact of these new policies would be harder to define and assess as they reverberated through the services and found their way onto the street with the recruiter.

At first glance the drawdown would seem to make recruiting easier. The recruiting services had bemoaned recruiting during the "Baby-Bust" - the low point of the target age population - which occurred in 1989.\(^\text{12}\) A cursory glance by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) of the accession requirement as a percentage of the target
population showed a decrease from two percent in 1980 to one percent in 1995.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, recruiting should be easier now since the services needed to recruit a smaller percentage of the target population.

There is more to this story. As Charles C. Moskos, Jr., a noted sociologist states, "A solid anecdote is to be trusted more than a slippery statistic."\textsuperscript{14} The GAO numbers did not reflect the increased degree of difficulty recruiting services faced in the 1980s when quality standards were drastically and then incrementally raised as previously discussed. Obviously, the qualified "target population" declines rapidly when high school dropouts and prospects with low test scores are excluded from the total numbers. Again, Moskos states, "There should be a rule that when quantified data run contrary to common sense, professional judgments or field observations, first question the quantified data rather than the common sense."\textsuperscript{15} This kind of logic is rare in Washington; it should be heeded more often.

At the same time, the drawdown may have other, secondary, less tangible effects. In concert with factors previously discussed, some note a change which may have greater impact,
"In the long run, however, victory over Iraq and in the Cold War may cause the armed forces to lose precisely that saliency in American society that has guaranteed them a flow of high-quality recruits. If the military downsizes below a certain 'critical mass' — which cannot be easily determined in advance — it may become invisible in the minds of a large segment of the population — potential recruits and their parents."\textsuperscript{16}

This view is shared by other armies around the world concerned with recruiting an all volunteer force during dramatic drawdowns. On his return from France, General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army stated,

"As most of you know, France has just announced a major restructuring of their army. Basically, they will go from 230,000 soldiers to 140,000. They will also go from a conscription force to a professional force. This is a major change for them and they are dealing with many of the same issues we dealt with in the mid-1970s when we went to our volunteer force. Their challenge is compounded by some of the results in a recent poll done in France. Less than 5% of those surveyed see the military as a good career option for their sons or daughters. While they do much better in things like traits people admire, they still feel they must deal with the fundamental issue of uncertainty. Although they never mentioned it directly, there are concerns about their ability to recruit quality and stay in touch with the people of France."\textsuperscript{17}

Our government should carefully weigh these intangible factors and concerns before advocating another drawdown. When combined with ever-increasing operations and personnel tempos, further drawdown could amplify a potentially negative recruiting environment. To reinforce an earlier
point, it might make it harder to recruit a smaller AVF rather than easier; an important point the GAO would probably not state as they produce cold, "slippery" statistics.

Other 'atmospheric' changes occurred with the election of President Clinton in 1992. A generational change occurred with his election, and it caused friction at high levels. General officers were justifiably forced to retire or received reprimands if they publicly mentioned their views on the Clinton "character issues" - pot smoking, draft dodging, and womanizing. Airing of these views was not prudent or justified; again, they simply add to the general atmosphere. Even greater friction was caused by the Clinton agenda which included gays in the military, women in combat and his perceived negative regard for the military.

As stated earlier, the negative regard for the military stood in direct contrast to public opinion. Recent articles quantify this negative regard. A Christian Science Monitor editorial declares,

"We hadn't known that practically all the men on the White House staff (96 percent) are...nonveterans...And more than 80 percent of the men among the more than 800 Senate-confirmed positions in the Clinton administration." All this while, "In the civilian work force 37 percent of the men over 35 are veterans."\textsuperscript{18}
There is also a growing trend toward the declining numbers of congressmen and congresswomen with military experience. The Retired Officers Association monitors congress and reports,

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<th>103rd Congress</th>
<th>104th Congress</th>
<th>105th Congress</th>
<th>105th Congress (freshmen only)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>48%</td>
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<td>House</td>
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This lack of experience, in both the executive and legislative branch, caused a great deal of friction as policies on gays in the military and women in combat were debated and distilled to a point of mutual agreement.

The issue of gays in the military resonated from the level of public opinion down through to the recruiter on the street. The main battles prior to the enactment of the "Don't ask, don't tell" law was enacted, however, took place between the government and the services. Both during and after the law, recruiters were barred from campuses by either school officials or state supreme courts.²⁰

Recruiters, myself and hundreds of recruiters I spoke with at the time from all services, were discouraged and
public opinion remained widely divided until the environment stabilized.\textsuperscript{21} A major victory for the services was accomplished when the Congress agreed to deny federal funds to colleges that banned recruiters.\textsuperscript{22} In sum, the issue proved to be highly divisive at all levels, and it now lies dormant. For leaders and policy makers the impact was hard to quantify and even harder to explain.

On the other hand, the impact of women in the military is easier to quantify. In contrast, women in the military has generally been a success story. During the 1980s females in the military averaged around 13 percent.\textsuperscript{23} With the change in policy on women in combat and a general acceptance of their contribution over time, the numbers increased to where "women constituted 7 percent of Marine Corps recruits, 15 percent of Navy recruits, 20 percent of Army recruits and 26 percent of Air Force Recruits in fiscal 1996."\textsuperscript{24} With the increase in quality required, some have gone as far to state, "I don’t think it’s a stretch to say that women saved the all-volunteer force."\textsuperscript{25}

Females will continue to provide a source of high quality recruits. The challenge will be for males in the service to conduct themselves in a professional manner and prevent an erosion of public opinion or government support
through misconduct. As mentioned earlier, the successful performance of our military in international operations can have a positive effect. Similarly, the conduct of our forces can have at least an equal, if not greater, impact.

Education benefits are a prime motivator for enlistment. The Montgomery G.I. Bill was resurrected in 1985 and offered military veterans around $10,800 for tuition. New initiatives, however, could undermine this hard earned benefit. The Clinton administration’s national service program, Americorps, will provide “young adults living allowances and as much as $9,500 in vouchers for college tuition for two years of nearly full time community service work”. The Americorps education benefits appear disproportionately large when compared to four years of service, family separation and risk endured by young adults serving in the military.

Undermining the G.I. Bill could have a negative impact on recruiting. The services should engage in debate over this new program and request an increase in total tuition moneys for military veterans or an elimination of the $1,200 contribution by service members to enroll in the program. Just as public opinion drives government policy in various ways which impact the recruiting environment, government
policy will influence military policy in greater and more tangible detail.

MILITARY SERVICE POLICIES

On one hand, the leadership in the recruiting branches of the military services must try to assess public opinion and monitor government policy and budget formulation. On the other hand, they must ensure that their internal structure is efficient and that scarce resources are productively distributed. Public opinion can be influenced by advertising, the performance and conduct of active duty forces, and the up-close-and-personal performance and conduct of the individual recruiter. At the same time, perceptive and proactive military leadership can anticipate changes in policy, inform and educate a government with declining military experience, and engage in debate when necessary.

Internally, the services must assess factors affecting recruiting results and appropriately allocate resources. Some of the factors affecting recruiting results include the unemployment rate, the youth population, the number of recruiters, relative military pay growth, education
benefits/college funds, enlistment bonus programs, national advertising, and local advertising. Clearly, some of these are outside the direct control of the military services; some target public awareness and opinion, and some fall into the Washington arena, while others are under the direct control of the military services. The resources military services can use to shape the recruiting environment include dollars for advertising, the personnel and structure of service recruiting command and regional staffs, the quality of local commanders and the individual recruiters, and incentive and quality of life initiatives.

The biggest factor affecting recruiting results is the unemployment rate. While unemployment rates have been low, this negative environment was further exacerbated by the drawdown and a public perception that 1) the military was no longer hiring or 2) the military was no longer a viable career option (as stated earlier). Advertising budgets were increased to counteract these misperceptions. The Army went as far as firing their advertising agency and has, as a result, produced a more competitive campaign.

As mentioned earlier, the performance and conduct of active duty forces influences public opinion. For example, unfortunate incidents of sexual misconduct in the military
has produced "negative advertising". Again, proactive
"damage control" by service leadership can minimize their
impact. For example, the generally forthright and
responsive handling of the Aberdeen recruit training
allegations by the Army stands in contrast to the handling
of Tailhook incident by the Navy.

Unfortunately, each service has had and will continue
to experience negative incidents. Attempts to shape service
culture and attitudes may help reduce the number of
incidents, minimize their impact, and serve to increase
positive public opinion. Today's recruit advertising
emphasizes high moral principals, ethical core values, and a
sense of integrity of purpose. Without insulting parents,
the services attempt to portray a positive, hopefully
permanent improvement in character building at their recruit
training/boot camps.32

The second largest factor affecting recruiting results
is the number of recruiters on the street.33 During the
drawdown recruiting services reevaluated structure. The
Marine Corps reduced the number of recruiters as the number
of accessions declined; the other services delayed that
reduction. The Marine Corps also restructured to stand up a
Recruiting Command roughly similar to the organizations in
the other services. Services will have to increase the number of recruiters as the number of accessions rises in the late 1990s. For example, the Army’s non-prior service active duty accession requirement increases from a FY94 goal of 68,000 to a goal over 90,000 in FY97.

Dramatic changes in either quantity or quality should be forecast and minimized/dampened by the services. Other changes, experiments, or suggestions should be carefully examined and evaluated before being implemented by the recruiter on the street. Some examples include 1) the two year enlistment - which slightly increased enlistments, saturated the training pipeline, minimized the return for investment in the field, and caused the recruiter to recruit again in just two years; 2) targeting minorities - suggestions to do so would prove publicly and politically unacceptable; 3) closing recruiting offices in areas of the United States that are least cost effective - outwardly a good suggestion, if, and only if, the opportunity to enlist at another nearby office existed, the suggestion implied abandoning large segments of the nation.

The third largest factor affecting recruiting results is relative military pay growth. Again, this is a battle service leadership must fight in the Washington arena.
Interestingly, as the statisticians were compiling these factors their footnote reads "estimates hold recruiter effort constant".\textsuperscript{40} This intangible, fourth factor can be influenced by service policy.

In a broad context, the quality of the individual recruiter improved as the overall quality of the recruits improved throughout the 1980s. Still, few volunteered to be a recruiter. For the Army, Navy and Marine Corps 85 percent of their recruiters are non-volunteers.\textsuperscript{41} Enlisting in the Air Force is seen by youth as less dangerous, less stressful, and more high-tech with better skill transfer to a civilian job. As a result, the Air Force gets a majority of volunteers for recruiting duty.\textsuperscript{42} The challenge for the other services is how to motivate a nonvolunteer recruiter to produce a greater effort.

Incentives for recruiters include special duty pay, a greater chance for meritorious promotion, and an outside chance to serve at or near your home town. Recent increases in special duty pay and in the number of meritorious promotions for recruiters reflect a renewed emphasis and focus by senior leadership.\textsuperscript{43} This attention and acknowledgment has, perhaps, the greatest impact on recruiter performance. Other reflections of emphasis
include ribbons, badges, patches, programs to reduce the sense of isolation, and reciprocal base housing agreements among the services.\textsuperscript{44}

Perhaps the most significant change has been a greater emphasis on the leadership provided to the local recruiter. The Marine Corps has gone as far as to formally screen and slate majors for command of their recruiting stations.\textsuperscript{45} Other services use similar formal and informal means of selecting local leadership. Moreover, after a successful tour these leaders are given a choice of billet, location or professional military schools. Also, more regional and service recruiting commanders have recruiting experience; it was unwise to select senior leaders with no experience or background in the business. This emphasis on the importance of recruiting duty may increase the number of volunteers.

Changes made by the recruiting commands of each service have produced greater efficiencies and highlighted the importance of the duty. In the field, commanders and other leaders must also recognize that importance. They must encourage quality individuals to seek recruiting. They will be rewarded by the recruitment of thousands more since recruiters naturally attract prospects of similar character.
The struggle to maintain the nation's AVF deserves high quality individuals. This individual will represent the service in the local community.

ON THE STREET

Despite the emphasis and awareness described above, the services have repeatedly failed to achieve recruiting goals. Adjusting to the new AVF in the 1970s, recruiters fell short of their goals by thousands.\(^\text{46}\) Since then all services have failed to meet goal on either a monthly or quarterly basis.\(^\text{47}\) And, recently, annual goals have been missed for the first time since 1980.\(^\text{48}\) While the numbers fell just short of goal, it is significant for the services to admit to failure. Adjustments in manpower are usually made through increased reenlistments and even involuntary extensions to achieve end strength requirements at the end of the fiscal year. These facts are presented since many in the active duty military are unaware of the struggle going on outside the fence.

The hard work of the recruiter described at the beginning of this overview was not meant to serve as complaint. Few in today's military shy away from simple,
hard work. Inside the fence, service members are doing the job they signed up to do surrounded by familiar support services and are successful applying their MOS skills most of the time. Outside the fence, 85 percent of recruiters are not doing the job they signed up to do surrounded by an unaware and, at best, unsupportive population and are successful applying their new MOS skill less than half the time. The verbal abuse, condescension, apathy and sometimes physical violence experienced by recruiters is hard to describe and is rarely mentioned. Extremely thick skin is required to survive a successful tour on recruiting duty.

If you are not successful, it could be worse. Too many officers and enlisted recruiters are relieved either for cause or for the good of the service. Colonels an below have been relieved for not achieving goals or for other misconduct outside the fence. While this is no different for commanders inside the fence, the difference should be readily apparent. Other stories related by recruiting veterans amplify these concerns on a personal level. These stories tend to offset the initiatives and improvements made by the recruiting services.

Finally, all of this has an impression on the individual recruiter. These concerns must be forced to the
background as the recruiter represents each service on the stage of the local high school and in the living rooms of parents across the country. It is an awesome responsibility, and one that is not often fully understood or fully appreciated.

CONCLUSIONS

Understanding recruiting duty is a difficult and complex undertaking. Factors including public opinion, government policy, military service policy, and hard work outside the fence all interact simultaneously with widely varying tangible and intangible effect. A more thorough and thoughtful attempt to understand the entire spectrum of the process might be beneficial for all concerned, especially active duty military in the field.

Successfully recruiting a high-quality, all-volunteer force is not guaranteed. Yet, clearly, sustaining the quality of America’s all-volunteer force will be in our national interest as we enter the 21st century.
ENDNOTES

2 Description of the enlistment process from author’s personal experience in accessing over 3,600 individuals at the Los Angeles MEPS from 1989 - 1992. The Los Angeles MEPS is the largest in the nation. Interviews with other service commanders there and USMC wide data studied throughout those three years confirm the "volume pyramid" which must be fed in order to achieve one accession.
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Janice H. Laurence and Peter F. Ramsberger, Low-Aptitude Men in the Military - Who Profits, Who Pays? (New York: Praeger, 1991), 1-147. Good description of the results of accessing low-aptitude individuals from the 1960s through the 1980s. For the new AVF in the 1970s, a "mismorning" of the ASVAB tests was blamed for many of the low quality accessions.
8 Bowman, 26 -27.
9 Ibid., 26-27. Interestingly, none of the sources consulted showed the exact same numbers. From civilian texts to GAO reports to military quotations, each projected requirement and reported actual result varied by as much as 15 percent.
10 Ibid., 31-33. The "mismorning" of the ASVAB in the mid 1970s, as mentioned above, makes accurate reporting of upper mental groups for this period inexact. All sources agree, however, that a significant number of Category IV accessions were inducted in the mid 1970s.
12 Ibid., 25.
13 Ibid., 26.
14 Bowman, 16. Quote is by Charles C. Moskos, Jr. in his chapter The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique.
15 Bowman, 16. Another great quote by Moskos.

18 Christian Science Monitor (editorial), "Hire A Vet" 19 December 1996, 20. Predictably, the Army, Navy, and Air Force Times magazines each followed up on this article in their 30 December issues.


21 Authors personal experience on the campuses of the University of Southern California and University of California Los Angeles.


24 Andrew Compart, "Recruiting goals met - but wait till next year", Navy Times, 2 December 1996.

25 George C. Wilson, " Civilians, know and understand your military", Navy Times, 23 December 1996.

26 Beth J. Asch and Bruce R. Orvis, Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications - Preliminary Analysis and Recommendations, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1994), 21.


29 Asch, 21.

30 Ibid., 21.


32 "The few, the proud, the smart, the moral", U. S. News & World Report, 16 December 1996, 33.

33 Asch, 21.


36 Richard Buddin and J. Michael Polich, "The 2+2+4 Recruiting Experiment: Design and Initial Results", (Santa Monica: Rand), October 1990, 1-29.


Asch, 21.

Ibid., 21.

Thomas, 1.

Ibid., 1.


Ibid.

This change took effect in FY 95; the results are formally announced via message traffic.


Webb and others. In 1994 a full colonel and four majors were relieved in the midwest. I was a short notice replacement for a lieutenant colonel who did not successfully complete his three year command tour.
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