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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT: LESSONS FROM TUL KARM AND KALKILIEH FOR SENIOR LEADERS

BY

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The September 13, 1993, Oslo Declarations of Principles and the subsequent Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in September 28, 1995, marked a turning point in Israeli and Palestinian relations. Having agreed to mutual recognition, the two sides engaged in the process of transferring police and civilian control from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank. This paper follows this process from the military perspective as Israel strove to protect its security while complying with the Interim Agreement. It examines the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions of the Interim Agreement and its application as experienced in Tul Karm and Kalkilieh. Included are lessons learned and concluding thoughts by the Ephraim Brigade Commander who was directly involved in implementing a portion of the Interim Agreement at Tul Karm and Kalkilieh.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION.............................................1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY...............................................2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND...............................................2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS................................6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC WAYS, ENDS, AND MEANS..........................9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS...............................11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAIN OF COMMAND.........................................15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK ORGANIZATION........................................21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EPHRAIM BDE EXPERIENCE...............................22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESSONS LEARNED...........................................29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION...............................................31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES..................................................33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPS.......................................................37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The September 13, 1993, **Oslo Declaration of Principles** (DOP) marked the occasion when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared mutual recognition and entered into formal peace negotiations. With recognition and dialogue, subsequent agreements ultimately resulted in the September 28, 1995, **Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**. This document delineated specific, detailed transfers of territory and civil control to the Palestinian Authority (PA) by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The purpose of this paper is to examine the process in which the IDF is successfully transferring both police and civilian control to the PA in the West Bank with emphasis on the transfer operations in Tul Karm and Kalkilieh from July, 1994, to August, 1996. This examination will focus on three phases leading to the actual transfer: First, the **Oslo Declaration of Principles** and subsequent agreements which set the background. Second, the implementation of Israel’s national security strategy within the context of a military operational plan. Third, the execution of the operational commander’s guidance to the tactical level leading to the successful outcome of the mission. The conclusion will focus
on the lessons learned from a sample operation as seen from the perspective of the Ephraim Brigade's (877th Regional Brigade) Commander, Colonel Gadi Eisenkot.

**Methodology:**

The preponderance of our background information is derived from English documents published by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information pertaining to the separation of forces and the transfer of authority in the West Bank, in general, and in Tul Karm and Kalkilieh, in particular, is based on a series of interviews conducted in Hebrew by the author and Colonel Eisenkot at the United States Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no published accounts of the planning and the execution of this operation. In addition to Colonel Eisenkot's recollections, some of the information is based on his notes and fragments of operational and tactical orders he kept for his own reference. The original orders are part of the IDF archives and are not available for release at this time.

**Background:**

In May, 1948, when Israel declared its independence, the Arab world refused to accept Israel's right to exist as
a nation state. War ensued and Israel has been in a state of conflict with one or more of its neighbors ever since. During the Six Day War of June, 1967, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and captured territories to include what is commonly called the West Bank. The West Bank is an oblong stretch of land that encompasses territory which is approximately 135 kilometers long and 45 kilometers wide at its longest and widest points. It is situated along the western bank of the Jordan river. The population, today, consists of 1.4 million Sunni and Christian Arabs and 150,000 Israeli settlers.

Israel has gradually succeeded in making peace with its Arab neighbors. The 1978 Camp David Accords led to the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The 1991 Madrid Conference paved the way for bilateral and multilateral negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. The United States played a key role in the ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Arab nations to include not only the Camp David Accords but also the Israel-Palestinian agreements of 1993-1995, and the October 26, 1994, Israel-Jordan peace treaty.
What is commonly referred to as the "Oslo Accords" in the press is actually a series of statements and agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. Behind the scenes negotiations took place between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Oslo. This led to an agreement between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat. On September 9, 1993, Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in which he stated that the PLO unequivocally:

- Recognizes the right of Israel to exist in peace and security;
- Accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Commits itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict;
- Assumes responsibility over all PLO elements to ensure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators;
- Renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence;
- Affirms that those articles of the PLO covenant which deny Israel's right to exist are inoperative and no longer valid;
- Undertake to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes to the Covenant. 5

In response to Chairman Arafat's letter, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations. This was followed with the September 13, 1993, joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements (DOP)
signed by the two parties in Washington, DC. The DOP comprises the following documents: (1) the Declaration; (2) four separate annexes that deal with elections, Israel’s withdrawal from Jericho and the Gaza Strip, Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation, and Israeli-Palestinian regional cooperation; (3) a series of Agreed Minutes that clarify issues in the DOP. The DOP was also to serve as a timetable for the transitional period described in the Camp David Accords and the Madrid Conference which would determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The DOP, as the title suggests, is not a comprehensive document but is a statement of agreed principles. It can best be described as an "agreement to reach agreement".6

The Stage I of the Declaration of Principles included a proposal for additional Interim Self-Government Arrangements. This led to three agreements and one protocol to include the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed on May 4, 1994; the Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed on August 29, 1994; The Protocol signed on August 27, 1995; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed on September 28, 1995. The last document is directly related to our discussion. It spelled
out the conditions for "a comprehensive agreement on the transfer of powers and responsibilities in the West Bank from Israel to an elected Palestinian Council". This agreement, incorporated and superseded the earlier Gaza-Jericho and other empowerment agreements. It set forth the terms for future Israeli and Palestinian relations supplemented by seven annexes which dealt with security arrangements, legal matters, civil affairs and the transfer of powers, economic relations, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the release of prisoners. As part of the security arrangements, maps were drawn to illustrate IDF redeployments from populated areas of the West Bank which include Tul Karm and Kalkilieh.8

Strategic Considerations:

When Israel defeated Jordan, Egypt and Syria in June, 1967, and took control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, Israel chose to defer the final status of the territories until a comprehensive peace could be arranged with the Arab states.9 The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were never sovereign entities even when under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman empire, until World War I, and the United Kingdom, until 1948. The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 181, (November 29, 1947) called for the creation of two distinct states in Palestine, one Jewish and the other Arab. The Jewish population accepted the resolution while the Arab nations rejected it. War ensued immediately, and during Israel’s War of Independence which began in May, 1948, Israel repelled the attack by the Arab states and succeeded in adjusting the boundaries based on its success in battle.

Following the cease fire and General Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt (February 1949), and Israel and Jordan (April 1949), the boundaries differed from Resolution 181 giving Israel additional territory. Nevertheless, the Armistice agreements gave Jordan control over what now constitutes the West Bank and gave Egypt control over the Gaza Strip. Since the long term strategic goals of both Jordan and Egypt were the establishment of a single Palestinian State which would dismantle Israel and put the Jewish population under Arab rule, Jordan and Egypt never offered either sovereignty or autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Instead, the Arab population in both areas were subjected to the military-administrative jurisdiction of Jordan and Egypt.
For all practical purposes, the indigenous population remained stateless.\textsuperscript{11}

The dilemma Israel faced after 1967 was the problem of what to do with the new territory under its control and the Palestinian population. If Israel should choose annexation of both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, based on demographic considerations alone, over time, the Arab - Moslem population would soon exceed the Israeli - Jewish population of the entire country thus changing the entire character of the State of Israel.\textsuperscript{12} In the ensuing years, as a consequence of war and diplomacy, both Egypt and Jordan disengaged from any claims over the population of Gaza and the West Bank.

Complicating matters further was the fact that since 1967 more than 150,000 Israelis have settled in the West Bank. Still, annexation became the least acceptable solution. Israel had hoped for some linkage relationship between the West Bank and Jordan. However, once Jordan severed any claims to the West Bank as it formally did in 1988, this potential arrangement was no longer feasible.\textsuperscript{13} Israel's only alternative was to find a solution that would be acceptable to Palestinians and Israelis and at the same
time guarantee its own security from what Israel perceived as a hostile Arab population.

**Strategic Ways, Ends, and Means:**

Israel's strategy is focused principally on the defense of the nation. The *end* state, from Israel's perspective, is secure and defensible borders, peace with the Arab nations that border Israel, formal diplomatic relationships with all nations in the region, free access to markets and the removal of internal and external terrorist threats.¹⁴

Formal peace treaties with Egypt, in 1979, and Jordan, in 1995, and the ongoing dialog with the PLO that began in Oslo constitute, in part, the diplomatic *ways* that have enabled Israel to achieve the desired *ends* in its overall strategy. Israel's regional military and technological superiority coupled with its democratic values and unflinching will to fight for survival constitute the necessary *means* in providing the national strategy credibility. However, since Israel, territorially, lacks strategic depth, it is very reluctant to yield any land even though it sees itself as militarily stronger than its neighbors.
Israel's overriding concern with the Palestinians is how to address Palestinian demands for self determination and at the same time insure Israeli security. This thorny problem is further compounded by radical elements from both the Israeli and Palestinian side. Palestinian terrorists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad have engaged in terrorism to further their aims. Israel has employed military force, restrictive laws and administrative policies against the Palestinians to promote its own agenda. The rhetoric from both sides, even now, remains hostile as peace between the Palestinians and Israel remains elusive.

The focus of Palestinian strategy contrasts that of Israel because Israel is a recognized, democratic, nation-state. The Palestinian Authority, on the other hand, does not, at this time, represent a sovereign state. The PLO has observer status in the United Nations and it represents a stateless constituency that occupies most of Gaza and the West Bank. Incidentally, there exists one Palestinian State in the Middle East, namely, Jordan, whose population is more than 60 percent Palestinian and the remainder, including the monarchy, is Hashemite. However, the Jordanian "Palestinian" population is no longer a factor in the
Palestinian overall strategy. After the PLO expulsion from Jordan in 1970, the PLO makes no claim on Jordanian sovereignty or territory. Nevertheless, the Palestinian national strategy is directed towards two simultaneous, immediate, end states, namely, control over the territory and the Arab population in Gaza and the West Bank and the establishment of an economically and politically viable sovereign nation within universally recognized borders. The ways in which the PLO strives to achieve these goals includes applying diplomatic pressure from supporting Arab and Islamic nations, alignment with radical Arab regimes such as Iraq, as it did during the Gulf War, which engenders regional instability, and the masterful use of the media that portrays Palestinians as a beleaguered and oppressed people. The PLO successfully employed armed struggle as the military means to accomplish its goals by sanctioning terrorism and the Intifada -- local uprisings against IDF targets in Gaza and the West Bank.

Operational Considerations:

After the historic handshake in Washington, DC, on September 13, 1993, between Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat, the IDF began working simultaneous
plans for a Stage I re-deployment of IDF forces from Gaza and Jericho and for a Stage II re-deployment from the West Bank. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) provided the conceptual framework for the movement of troops out of Palestinian populated areas and the transfer of security and civil authority to the Palestinians. The specific details, however, were left to the operational and tactical commanders in the field to work out. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement took seven months to complete following the signing of the DOP, and from the troop re-deployment and security perspective, it laid the groundwork for the more complex Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.¹⁸

The Strategic principle that governed both Phase I and Phase II re-deployments was derived from the DOP which stated that:

Israel and the PLO agree that during the interim period, Israel will remain responsible for security along the international borders and the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan. Israel will also retain responsibility for and the overall security of Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli settlements in those areas, and freedom of movement on roads.¹⁹
Within the context of Israel's overriding responsibilities for external security and the security for all Israelis including those dwelling in settlements, the Israeli Government directed the IDF with the mission of insuring internal security and public order while simultaneously withdrawing to new locations and turning over security and administrative responsibilities to the PA. The Interim Agreement reaffirms and expands upon the DOP from which operational concepts were extrapolated. The territory of the West Bank and the Gaza strip were to be divided into Areas "A", "B", and "C".

In brief, Area "A" comprised the seven, heavily populated Arab cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tul Karm, Kalkilieh, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. The IDF was required to withdraw completely from these towns and the Palestinian Authority was granted full responsibility for internal security, public order and civil affairs. In Area "B", which comprises Palestinian towns and villages and 68 percent of the population, the PA was granted full civil authority as in Area "A". The PA was also charged with public order while Israel retained the overriding authority for security of its citizens and to combat terrorism. This
authority would take precedence over the PA responsibility for public order. Additionally, 25 Palestinian police stations would be established in certain towns and villages so that the PA could exercise its responsibilities for public order. In Area "C", which consists of unpopulated areas in the West Bank, strategic areas of importance and Jewish settlements, Israel would maintain full responsibility for security and public order. The PA would assume all civil responsibilities not related to territory to include health, education, economic and so on. ²⁰

Most noteworthy is that shortly after the DOP was signed in 1993, IDF planners recognized that they would soon be tasked with developing and implementing a re-deployment and security plan. During the next two years, until the Interim Agreement was finalized and signed, the IDF provided ongoing input to the national command authorities recommending which parcels of land were to be included in Areas "A", "B" or "C", what command structures needed to be established both on the Israeli and Palestinian side and how the transfer of authority was to be implemented. From the Chief of Staff down to the battalion level, the IDF leadership became heavily involved in developing plans that
protected both Israeli interests but which could be acceptable to the Palestinians.

Before we examine how the operational and tactical commanders influenced the outcomes of these agreements, we will first explain the IDF chain of command and the parallel Palestinian chain as they apply to our discussion.

**Chain of Command:**

The size of the IDF in peace time, the proximity of the armed forces to the national command authority and Israeli custom and culture allow for a closer role between governmental leaders, such as the Prime Minister, and the military, than do other democracies. For example, in the United States, the President will normally works through the National Security Council and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify operational issues. In Israel, the chain of command tends to be more flexible. Yitzhak Rabin, while he was Prime Minister, simultaneously served as the Defense Minister. Rabin, a former IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister under previous governments, throughout his political career maintained a close relationship with Israel's military leadership. In his dual role as Prime Minister and Defense Minister, he periodically exercised his
prerogative to go directly to brigade and battalion commanders for on the spot updates of the situation on the ground and to offer guidance. Rabin’s close relationship to operational and tactical commanders enabled him to render quick decisions that supported his government’s policies and minimized the risk of error by subordinates.

During the development and the implementation of the **Interim Agreement** the IDF chain of command is shown alongside the Palestinian chain.
After the DOP was signed, Prime Minister Rabin directed the Chief of the General Staff, LTG Eihud Barak, and soon following, Barak’s replacement, LTG Amnon Shachak, the task to design an implementation plan for the withdrawal of forces from Jericho, Gaza and the West Bank. LTG Shachak, in turn, gave the mission to MG Dayan of the Planning Branch who became the operational planner for the mission now named Keshet Tzvaim (Rainbow of Colors). MG Dayan served in two capacities. As the operational planner he prepared orders for approval by the Chief of Staff to the Central Command Commander, MG Biran. Operational orders, in turn, were translated into tactical orders beginning with the Commander of Judea and Samaria, MG Ophir. Under MG Ophir’s command were six regional brigades commanded by colonels to include Colonel Eisenkot’s Ephraim Brigade. Additionally, MG Dayan chaired the Joint Security Team Coordination and Cooperation Committee (JSC) with the senior leadership of the Palestinian Authority in participation. LTG Shachak gave MG Dayan the authority to negotiate with the PA security issues and the protocols for the transfer of authority. Within the Planning Branch, MG Dayan created a special coordinating cell between the Planning Branch and the field commanders at the tactical
level to assist commanders in resolving specific force separation issues and redefining boundaries.

In addition to the normal chain of command relationships from the Chief of Staff through the Central Command Commander, unit commanders coordinated their activities with the Military-Civil Affairs Administrators. The responsibility for the day to day administration of the West Bank and Gaza for such services as health, education, taxation and other municipal functions came under the jurisdiction of the head of the Military Government commanded by MG Oren Shachor. This independent chain of command, separate from the Central Command units, placed the Military Government and subordinate administrators directly under the Prime Minister. In practice the officers of the Military Government worked closely with their IDF counterparts in the field to insure that appropriate municipal services were provided as these services were turned over to segments of the Palestinian population.

Another chain that the IDF established in accordance with the Interim Agreement was the “Joint Security Coordination” chain. This functioned on two levels. The Interim Agreement mandated the creation of a Joint Security
Coordination and Cooperation Committee (JSC) whose purpose was to deal with all security matter of mutual concern for the West Bank and Gaza. The JSC provided the strategic guidance for security. The JSC set the tone by which operational and tactical leaders from the IDF and the PA could dialogue face to face and resolve security issues at their level. On the Israeli side, the senior Israeli representative of the JSC, was BG Herzel Gage. Assigned to the General Staff Branch, he reported to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, but on a day to day basis he worked for the Central Command Commander. The JSC Palestinian counterpart, a brigadier general, worked directly for PA Chairman Yasser Arafat. At the next level down, the Regional Security Committees, (RSC) one for Gaza, and the other for the West Bank, were represented by colonels on both sides. For the Israelis, the West Bank RSC reported to the Commander of Judea and Samaria and the Palestinian colonel counterpart reported directly to the Palestinian RSC representative. The RSCs, as operational level organizations, provided the DCOs with security and policy guidelines and resolved issues referred to it by the DCOs. As a 24 hour headquarters, it maintained a communication
links between the Israeli and Palestinian sides and conducted regular meetings with the IDF both to include the Central Command Commander, the Judea and Samaria Commander and the commander of the Palestinian Police for the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Similarly, at the next level down the eight District Coordination Offices (DCO) were represented by lieutenant colonels and their staffs in equal number for the Israeli side and the Palestinian side who worked for brigade commanders. The DCOs functioned at the tactical level and like the RSCs, maintained 24 hour operations. Each DCO was staffed by a team of six officers comprising of one commander and five duty officers for each side. The DCOs’ two primary functions were to review, investigate and report to the RSC on the overall situation within their district and to direct the Joint Patrols (JP) and Joint Mobile Units (JMU) operating in their area. The JMUs and JPs worked for the battalion and company commanders. The primary mission of the JPs was to assist in ensuring free, unimpeded and secure movement in their designated areas. In areas that were under Palestinian control, the Palestinian JP vehicle was the lead vehicle and the Israeli vehicle assumed the lead role in Israel
controlled areas. The JMUs provide rapid response in the event of incidents and emergencies following similar procedures as the JPs.23

Task Organization:

The six territorial brigades that comprised the Judea Samaria Command were assigned in proximity to major Palestinian population centers. The areas of responsibility and the grid coordinates were:

Ephraim BDE: Tul Karm (577691) and Kalkilieh (563686)
Menashe BDE: Jenin (594716)
Shomron BDE: Shechem (Nablus) (567712)
Benjamin BDE: Ramallah (532708)
Etz Tziyon BDE: Beit Lechem (Bethlehem) (510709)
Judah BDE: Hevron (Hebron) (490700)

Each of the territorial brigades consisted of three organic battalions; one light infantry battalion, one field artillery (155mm SP) battalion, and one armor (Mercava) battalion. Each brigade was supported by at least one and not more than three border police companies (Mishmar Hagvul). The manning for each brigade consisted of 200 regular army personnel supplemented by reservists for a total of 1400 soldiers. The separate border police companies
contained a total of 150 regular army soldiers. Additional support came from General Security Services (Sheirut Bitachon) detachments.

The structure and composition of the Palestinian Police is delineated in the Interim Agreement. In many ways it mirrors the Israeli military and police structures. The creation of parallel security structures helped engender a greater sense of equality as both sides dealt with mutual security issues. It can be argued, that for all practical purposes, the Palestinians now possesses a small army and like an army the security services are structured in battalions and brigades. The total number of police allotted to the Palestinians is 30,000; 12,000 in the West Bank and 18,000 in Gaza. The police are divided into six categories to include civil police, public security, preventative security, personal security for the Chairman, intelligence, and emergency services and rescue. The weaponry allotted to the Palestinian Police in the West Bank are 4,000 rifles, 4000 pistols, 120 machine guns, and 15 unarmed riot vehicles.24

The Ephraim BDE Experience:
When Colonel Eisenkot took command of the Ephraim Brigade in July, 1994, the re-deployment of IDF units from Gaza and Jericho was already in effect. Colonel Eisenkot received two missions. First, to provide security for his Area of Operations (AO) which was 45 kilometers long and 25 kilometers wide at its furthest points and included an Arab population of 200,000 and a Jewish population of 50,000 in 25 settlements. Second, to begin assessing his area in order to make recommendations for IDF re-deployments based on the Gaza-Jericho model. As the ground commander, Colonel Eisenkot was uniquely qualified to recommend to his chain of command how best to divide the AO into what later became Areas “A”, “B”, and “C”. Frequently, the operational commander, the Chief of Staff, and the Prime Minister’s Office consulted him for clarification and further suggestions. This dialogue that involved tactical, operational, and strategic level planners and policy makers enabled the Israeli negotiators to bring to the bargaining table a plan that truly represented a unity of effort from the Israeli side. When the Interim Agreement was signed in September, 1995, and the General Staff published its guidance for tactical commanders, it was relatively easy to
implement that guidance because of the input of the tactical commanders.

The following is a synopsis of the General Staff Guidance published in September, 1995.25

Re-deployment:

- The IDF will re-deploy from all populated areas in Judea and Samaria.
- Populated Areas:
  - Those areas marked "A" (the 7 large cities) and "B" the towns, villages, hamlets and refugee camps. ("A" + "B" = 27% of the territory and almost all the population).
- The IDF will remain in Area "C".
- The Military Government will withdraw and the civilian administration will dissolve.26
- A period of overlap for ten days prior to each phase of re-deployment
- The PA will assume full control of Area "A" and will establish 25 police station in specified areas in Area "B".

Apportionment of Areas of Responsibility for Security:

- Israel maintains full and overriding security responsibility
  - External security to include the borders with Jordan and Egypt both air and sea.
  - Security for Israeli citizens.
- Area "A" - Palestinian:
  - Full civil (municipal)authority.
  - Full security authority (internal security and public order) over Palestinians.
  - Security arrangements for Jewish holy sites.
- Area "B"
  - Palestinian:
    - Full civil (municipal)authority.
    - Responsibility for public order.
  - Israeli:
Overriding responsibility for protection of Israeli citizens and for anti and counter terrorism.

Area "C"
- Palestinian:
  - Partial municipal authority for Palestinians in the area.
- Israeli:
  - Full security authority.

**Movements of the Palestinian Police**:

- Area "A": No limitations. Exit from Area "A" only with Israeli permission and coordination.
- Area "B":
  - 25 civilian police stations in accordance with the Agreement.
  - Freedom of movement of police station personnel in its designated area.
  - Movement outside of designated area via coordination and permission with the DCO.
- Area "C": Movement only with Israeli coordination and permission.

The guidance from the operational level to the tactical level embellished higher headquarters guidance and covered eleven categories for Areas "A", "B" and "C" to include:\(^{27}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>AREA &quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>AREA &quot;B&quot;</th>
<th>AREA &quot;C&quot;</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Authority</td>
<td>Internal security and public order (excluding Israelis)</td>
<td>* Public order (excluding Israelis) PA responsibility Internal security and public order - Israeli responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA responsibility</td>
<td>* Internal security &amp; counter terrorism Israeli responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Authority</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>* Functional authority with no connection to the area - PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* All other - Israeli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25
| Movement of PA Police | * Free movement for security branches  
| From "A" to "B" or  
| From "B" to "A" -  
| permission of DCO  
| * From "A" to "A" crossing "C" -  
| coordination &  
| permission of DCO | * Free movement for civilian police only  
| at 25 stations  
| * Movement to  
| another "B" area -  
| coordination &  
| permission of DCO  
| * From "A" to "A" or  
| "B" to "B" crossing  
| "C" - coordination &  
| permission of DCO  
| * Movement of security police by permission only | * The PA police has no authority to operate in Area "C"  
| * PA police, armed or unarmed, in or out of uniform cannot operate in Area "C" without DCO permission and coordination |
| Israeli Movement (Security Forces and Civilians) | * Right to use roads  
| * PA police may stop Israeli vehicles and pedestrians for ID checks (excluding IDF) | * Free movement for  
| PA police may request ID (excluding IDF) | * Free movement under Israeli responsibility |
| Movement of Foreigners and Tourists | * Covered under PA law  
| * PA police has the right to demand ID via passport | * Same as in Area "A" | * Free movement under Israeli responsibility |
| Authority for Criminal Activity | * PA authority for all criminal activity in the area (not including Israelis)  
| * Israel has exclusive authority for Israelis  
| * Israel has authority for criminal acts against Israelis | * PA authority for Palestinian non security crime  
| * Israeli authority:  
| - Palestinian security crime,  
| - Foreign security crime,  
| - Israeli crime | * Exclusive Israeli Criminal Activity |
| Arrest Authority | * Palestinian criminal - PA Police  
| * Israeli Criminal - PA Police until the arrival of Israeli Police with warrant  
| * Tourist or visitor - PA Police  
| * Visitors to Jewish holy sites - Israeli Police | * Palestinian Criminal - PA Police  
| * Palestinian Security Criminal - IDF  
| * Foreigner 'Security Criminal - IDF  
| * Foreigner non-security criminal. First, then PA  
| * Israeli Criminal - Israeli Police  
| Israeli Only |
| Elections | PA Responsibility | Coordination with IDF via DCO | Israeli Permission via DCO |
| Cooperation and Coordination | JP - PA lead vehicle  
| JMU - Holy Sites | JMU - IDF lead vehicle  
| JMU - IDF lead vehicle |
| Holy Sites | * PA security responsibility  
| * Israeli civilian security guards at the sites | Cave of the Patriarchs and Rachel's Tomb retains status quo |
| Building Restrictions | In designated areas building heights restricted to 5 floors - 15 meters | * Security roads 50 meters wide on each side  
| * Bridges under 5.25 meters are restricted | No Change |
With guidance from his higher headquarters in hand, Colonel Eisenkot set December 17, 1995, as his target date for the transfer of authority to the PA of Tul Karm and Kalkilieh, the establishment of two functioning DCOs and subordinate JPs and JMUs and the clear delineation of Areas "A", "B" and "C" within the Ephraim Brigade’s area of operations. During an intensive three week period leading up to December 17, Colonel Eisenkot established time lines and milestones to accomplish his mission. Success hinged upon accomplishing the following:

1. Preparatory meeting to introduce key individuals from both sides involved in the transfer of authority.
   - Meeting with IDF Commanders from Central Command, Judea and Samaria Command, JSC, RSC, Brigade Commanders, DCOs and PA counterparts.
   - Clarifying and interpreting the Interim Agreement with emphasis on the Areas.
   - Explaining Time Tables.
   - Exchange of names of the DCO and support staff
   - Explanation of PA role in Area "A".
   - Explanation of joint activities.
   - Communication protocols.

2. Tours of Areas "A", "B", and "C" two weeks prior to target date (T Day) by Brigade Commander, DCO, and Commanders of Police Stations.
   - Designation of Area "A" and "B"
   - Deployment of PA Police.
   - Designating Joint Patrol routes.
   - Designation of Joint Mobile Units.
   - Base camps erected for PA.
   - Explanation of vital infrastructure sites (water, electricity and communication).
3. Arrival of PA advance party to Area "A" on T-1 and departure of IDF forces.
   - Order in which PA will arrive.
   - Armored escort and types of vehicles.
   - IDF exit points and traffic plan.
   - Communication links and protocol.
   - Period of transfer of authority.
   - Instructions concerning use of firearms.

4. Arrival of PA police main body to Area "A" on T Day.
   - (Same as 3 above)

5. Activation of the JP on T+1.
   - Reporting procedures.
   - Joint exercise on T-1.
   - Time tables.

6. Arrival of PA uniformed police to Area "B" on T+1 and departure of IDF forces.
   - Departure points from Area "A".
   - Arrangement for busses, police cars, and weapons for each police station.
   - Departure routes for DCOs and Command and Control Points.
   - Manner in which police are accompanied by Border Police.

7. Activation of the JMU on T+2.
   - Place, schedule, and method of operations.
   - Joint exercises.

Colonel Eisenkot’s After Action Reviews indicate that he accomplished his mission flawlessly. In spite of the great enmity between both sides, the IDF and the PA conducted themselves in a highly professional manner. There were no violent incidents. Colonel Eisenkot’s sensitivity to
the political context and the cultural environment in which Keshet Tzvaim took place, enabled IDF forces to re-deploy and the PA to assume its new role in the designated areas on schedule.

Lessons Learned:

What makes Keshet Tzvaim so unique is that for all practical purposes, the operation resembled a peacekeeping-peace making mission; but it differed because the two opposing, hostile, sides transferred power and control without the benefit of an external party. The IDF and the PA accomplished their mission in a highly charged, volatile atmosphere, without the assistance or interference from another armed force. What fostered success? Colonel Eisenkot offers six lessons and recommendations derived from his experience:

1. The army should not interfere in political decisions. The IDF remained outside of the political decision making process which concluded thirty years of open hostility.

2. The implementation of the Interim Agreement required military solutions to complex security problems. This required a close relationship with strategic, operational and tactical planners both in the government and the IDF,
and later, between the Israeli Government, the IDF and the PA. In an environment in which outbreaks of terrorism, rebellion, hostile press and disunity among political parties is prevalent, strategic leaders must be closely attuned to the tactical situation and recognize that a routine order from a junior officer at the company level can adversely affect strategic decisions.

3. Success requires intensive preparation to include: joint seminars, preparatory exercises, simulations, jointly written Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and establishing base camps and joint facilities.

4. Studying and applying the lessons learned from the earlier and simpler Gaza-Jericho re-deployment provided a useful foundation for Keshet Tzvaim.

5. Part of the training process for IDF soldiers included seminars on the history, culture, religion and political aspirations of the Palestinians. Building trust depends on understanding the other side.

6. Create effective mechanisms for command and control. The IDF and PA worked together in developing maps, schedules, communication procedures, routes, and mutually agreed and tested techniques for emergency rapid response. All
documents were translated into Hebrew and Arabic and reviewed jointly.

Conclusion:

In September 1996, a serious incident erupted in the West Bank following the tunnel opening in the Old City of Jerusalem. The number of deaths and injuries were limited because the cooperative RSC and DCO process restored order fairly quickly. The recent re-deployment of the majority of IDF soldiers from Hebron in January 1997 with only minor hostile incidents is another tribute to the joint security arrangements agreed to by Israel and the PA.

The DOP, Interim Agreement, and subsequent security arrangements by the IDF and PA illustrates a new manner in which military forces are employed in keeping the peace. Unlike classical soldiering which focuses on attacking, killing and destroying equipment to win wars, in this situation the IDF’s role required an entirely different approach to achieve mission success. Perhaps this is an indication of the emerging role and the preparations required as armed forces will undertake unconventional missions in the next century.
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MAPS

The Partition Plan, 1947.............................................38
Armistice Lines, 1949................................................39
Pre-1967 Vulnerability................................................40
Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement Map No. 1...........41
The Partition Plan, 1947
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181
Syria
Galilee
Haifa
Jerusalem
Judea
Be'er Sheva
Egypt
Transjordan
Eilat

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