THESIS

MEXICO: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

by

Yvonne D. Norton

December 1996

Thesis Co-Advisors: Mary P. Callahan
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MEXICO: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze why Mexico has failed to democratize and offer recommendations for U.S. policy towards Mexico. The thesis examines the impact of three causal variables on the level of democracy in Mexico: civilian control of the military, the fairness of Mexico's political party system and U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. This thesis concludes that although civilian control of the military is necessary, but not sufficient, for democracy; that because Mexico's political party system is unfair, Mexico does not have competitive political parties; and that there is some linkage between U.S. economic assistance and democratization in Mexico. The prospects for democracy in Mexico are cloudy. For the PRI, there is much to lose should Mexico become more democratic. A recommendation for U.S. policy is to develop a special relationship with Mexico and prioritize U.S. interests in Mexico.
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<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>National Peasant Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNOP</td>
<td>National Confederation of Popular Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>COFIPE</td>
<td>Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures</td>
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<td>CTM</td>
<td>Confederation of Mexican Workers</td>
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<td>IFE</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Institute</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>PAN</td>
<td>National Action Party</td>
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<td>PNR</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Party</td>
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<td>PRD</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Party</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis analyzes Mexico as one of two Latin American countries that have failed to become a full democracy. With the exception of Cuba and Mexico, between 1980 and 1990, most Latin American countries became democracies: Peru (1980), Argentina (1983), Grenada (1983), Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), Panama (1989), Chile (1990), Bolivia (1990), Nicaragua (1990), Haiti (1990), and Paraguay (1990). Why did Mexico not become a democracy along with these other Latin American countries? The puzzle of the thesis is: Why has Mexico failed to democratize? The major questions that are addressed throughout the thesis are: Why does Mexico have a military that is subordinated to civilian control, yet no democracy? Why does Mexico not have a competitive multi-party political system? And why has U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico failed to bring about democratization when the policy has been seemingly successful elsewhere in Latin America?

Chapter II examines the necessity of subordinating the military to civilian control as an element of democracy. The chapter analyzes the impact of Mexican civilian control of the military on democratization. The Mexican Revolution set the framework for current relations between a civilian ruler and the military institution. Traditionally, military generals claimed the presidency by initiating coups. The post-Revolutionary years witnessed the decline of the military’s influence in politics. Since 1940 and through a series of political “controls,” Mexican presidents have asserted their power over the military. The controls, however, have failed to produce democratization in Mexico.
The chapter begins by analyzing the historical (1900-1940) and postwar (1946-1996) relations between the Mexican military and the president. The chapter examines how the military became subordinated to civilian control through subjective and objective initiatives. Through government institution and control by the elites, Mexico’s military was subjectively controlled. Objective control was established through autonomy, professional training, and depoliticization of the military. The chapter analyzes the implications of civilian control of the military by employing a case study of the 1994 Chiapas uprising. Finally, the chapter concludes that civilian control of the military is necessary, but is not sufficient for democracy.

Chapter III analyzes the political party system in Mexico and the fairness for all legally recognized parties. The chapter begins by introducing Mexico’s major political parties and providing voting percentages for national and midterm elections. Major parties include the PRI, the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Labor Party (PT). The chapter then analyzes four indicators to measure the fairness of the political party system between the parties: stability in the rules between interparty competition, stable roots in society, legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties subordinate to ambitious leaders. The chapter concludes that Mexico lacks a viable political party system because the playing field is not level for all parties.

Chapter IV analyzes the role of the United States in “convincing” Mexico to become democratic. The chapter explores the history of U.S. foreign policy towards and relations with Mexico. The chapter then examines current U.S. policy towards Mexico and how the policy has failed to make Mexico’s political structure more democratic. Economic assistance is the major
U.S. influence on Mexico’s political system. The chapter concludes that U.S. influence has played a minor role in promoting democracy in Mexico.

Chapter V concludes that theories introduced throughout the thesis that are applicable to other countries have failed miserably when applied to Mexico. Prospects for the future are cloudy because of exceedingly high costs to the PRI and the reigning Mexican president. In addition, most Mexicans view democracy as rhetoric the PRI espouses to maintain support.

Mexico’s political system directly impacts the United States. A recommendation for the United States is to establish a special relationship with Mexico and clearly state U.S. interests. There is abundant evidence that democracies most fully satisfy the social and economic demands of its citizens. A democratic Mexico also will become more effective in stemming the flow of migration to the United States because it assists in improving socioeconomic conditions in Mexico.
I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1980 and 1990, observers of regime transitions witnessed a dramatic change in Latin America authoritarian regimes shifted to democracy. Brazil was ruled by the military from 1964 until its return to democracy in 1985. In Argentina, General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri was forced to resign after his actions during the start of the Falklands/Malvinas War. By 1983, Raul Alfonsin was elected to the presidency and Argentina began its transition to democracy. Carlos Saul Menem was elected president in 1989 and succeeded Alfonsin. Other Latin American countries that democratized or redemocratized during the 1980s and 1990s include Peru (1980), Argentina (1983), Grenada (1983), Uruguay (1985), Brazil (1985), Panama (1989), Chile (1990), Bolivia (1990), Nicaragua (1990), Haiti (1990), and Paraguay (1990). The only two countries that failed to transition from authoritarian rule to democracy were the Republic of Cuba and the United Mexican States (Mexico).

Mexico's political regime is unique in Latin America for various reasons. First, unlike all other Latin American countries Mexico is not a democracy, but possesses some of the characteristics of a democracy. Samuel P. Huntington describes Mexico's political system as liberalized-authoritarian because there is a "partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing government leaders through freely competitive elections."

Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley classify Mexico as a stable-limited and an inclusionary-authoritarian regime because there has not been an establishment of elite consensus, elite unity, and mass participation in elections and other institutional processes.\(^2\) Giovanni Sartori argues that Mexico’s political system is “hegemonic” because

> The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis . . . The implication is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not. While the predominant party remains submissive to the conditions that make for a responsible government, no real sanction commits the hegemonic party to responsiveness. Whatever its policy, its domination cannot be challenged.\(^3\)

Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset argue that Mexico’s political system is “semi-democratic” because the political party competition [is] restricted, the freedom and fairness of elections are compromised so that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not produce true popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and political liberties are so uncertain that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves peacefully, without fear.\(^4\)

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This thesis considers Mexico a semi-democracy because there is some competition between political parties yet the competition does not appear fair for each competitor. Elections, though appearing more fair in recent years, are still considered “fixed” in the minds of most Mexican citizens. For example, 1994 accounts of sudden electrical power outages during the opposition’s lead during the presidential election resulted in voting ballots being tabulated by hand and a victory for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) - the long-standing ruling party.

In Mexico there are groups that are afraid to voice political opposition for fear that the ruling party will suppress their “freedom.” Members of opposition parties, and particularly the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), seem to attract attention from the violent arm of the PRI. Deaths of opposition party members are explained as ‘personal rancors’ of the PRI.\(^5\)

Mexico is unique in that its military has been subordinated to civilian rule for almost 70 years and it, as an institution, demonstrates virtually no significant political voice. Yet, Mexico is not a democracy. In other Latin American countries the military has been a central political actor, at times intervening overtly in the political process through coups. Only with the military’s subordination to civilian rule has democracy been restored.

Another unique characteristic is that Mexico shares a 2,000 mile border and close economic ties with the United States. The United States is considered one of the greatest models of democracy in the world and its foreign policy has consistently stressed, at least rhetorically, support for democracy throughout the region. Consequently, democratic support has ostensibly

led to U.S. military invasions in Haiti, Panama, and Grenada. Given limited characteristics of a democracy, a military that is controlled by civilian authority, and the shared border with the United States, why is it that Mexico has not progressed towards democracy? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze why Mexico’s political system has failed to democratize and what its prospects are for democracy. Considering the analysis, the thesis makes recommendations for U.S. foreign policy.

Theoretically, the prospects for democracy in Mexico are relevant for three reasons. First, Mexico is a deviant case in that civilian control of the armed forces has failed to produce a democracy. Scholars argue that one of the necessary conditions for democracy is the subordination of the military to civilian authority because generally when the transition begins, there is no civilian control. Since the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), the Mexican military has been subordinated for 70 years. Yet, Mexico is a long way from being considered a democracy.

The second significant aspect of this topic is that U.S. foreign policy has, for many years, stressed assisting democratic governments over undemocratic regimes. Rather than the United States taking stronger measures to encourage Mexico to become more democratic, the United States has practically ignored Mexico’s political status in exchange for its economic advantages. Finally, this topic is relevant because it reveals an unfair political party system.

Practically, the thesis is important because of the size and geography of Mexico in relation to the United States, Guatemala, and Belize. Each of the countries shares a border with Mexico and the events that impact one country could impact another. Both the United States and Mexico share a unique relationship through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Finally, the United States and Mexico are members of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN).

A. DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Definitions of democracy vary. Among the possibilities, there are some that stress the sources of authority for government, other that stress purposes served by the government, and still others that focus on procedures for constituting government. The thesis focuses on procedural democracy, as defined by Robert A. Dahl and Terry Lynn Karl. According to Dahl, characteristics of democracy are:

opportunities to oppose the government, form political organizations, express oneself on political matters without fear of governmental reprisals, read and hear alternative points of views, vote by secret ballot in elections in which candidates of different parties compete for votes and after which the losing candidates peacefully yield their claim to office to the winners, etc.

Karl defines democracy as

a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives.

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Definitions of democracy are important because each scholar views democracy as having different characteristics. Dahl and Karl focus on the characteristics of democracy that are found in all developed and some developing nations. Scholars use characteristics of democracy to measure the presence of democracy in developing nations, such as Mexico. In Mexico, Dahl's characteristics of democracy are overwhelmingly absent; Karl's characteristics are mixed. In Mexico, the presidential elections are held once every six years, the senate elections every six years, and the representative elections every three years. The elections, although regularly scheduled, are not held within the context of the law and are frequently referred to by Mexican citizens and foreign observers as "riddled with fraud."

B. METHODOLOGY

Robert Jervis asserts four levels of analysis that can be applied to explain Mexico’s unique political configuration: the international, national, bureaucratic, and individual levels. Each level of analysis is important to understanding Mexico’s failure to become a democracy. The international level is important when examining the impact of U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. The national level is significant when studying the impact of opposition political parties on the PRI. The leading opposition parties in Mexico are the National Action Party (PAN) and the PRD.

The bureaucratic level is best understood by examining the internal workings of an institution, such as political parties or the military. The individual level investigates the performance of an individual, such as a president or a party leader, and his impact on democracy.

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This thesis focuses on the international, national, and bureaucratic levels of analysis. At the international level, the thesis examines the role of external actors on Mexico's political regime and its transition, especially U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico. At the bureaucratic and domestic levels, this thesis examines the significance of the military and the level of institutionalization within the party system to further understand their impact on the democratization in Mexico.

Of all of the Latin American countries that transitioned towards democracy from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, Mexico and Cuba resisted this "wave" of democracy. The puzzle of this thesis is: why has Mexico failed to progress towards democracy? This thesis argues that democracy has failed to develop in Mexico because ruling elites have not approved of a democratic regime. Mexican elites have much to lose should the country transition to democracy.

Employing a case study of Mexico, the dependent (outcome) variable is the lack of democratization, explained below; the three independent (causal) variables to be tested are civilian control of the military, foreign assistance, and the degree of institutionalization within the political party system. The thesis utilizes preexisting data from scholarly and on-line sources. Although the progress of democracy throughout the 20th century will be analyzed, the central focus lies between 1988 and 1996.

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10 Huntington refers to a wave of democratization as a “group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.” Huntington, 1991, p. 15.
For the research of this thesis, scholarly publications were augmented with on-line sources (Netscape and LEXIS-NEXIS) and articles on Mexico and other Latin American countries. Together, these references produced excellent data for the measurement of variables and their impact on Mexico's democratization process. Research for Chapter 2 was conducted by performing a word search on the Dudley Knox Library and Monterey International Institute Studies catalogues for "Mexico and military," "Mexico and armed forces" and, "Mexico and civil-military." Foreign Broadcast Information Service on CD-ROM and daily reports provided articles formulated from the Mexican and Latin American press that augmented published works. The author routinely skimmed journals that focused on occurrences in Latin America.

The research for Chapter 3 included a trip to the University of California in San Diego's Mexican Studies Center and the International Relations/Pacific Studies Library. The author accessed an English translation of the Mexican Constitution, articles published by the Institute of Federal Elections in Mexico City, and English sources printed elsewhere in Latin America, such as the Latinamerican Press. The Mexico and NAFTA Report provided monthly updates of political issues and was essential to keeping current of political events.

Research for Chapter 4 was conducted using State Department dispatches and background notes found through Netscape. LatinoLink, an on-line service, provided extensive articles specifically related to Latin America. Major American newspapers in LatinoLink's data base included the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The News, and the New York Times. The News, a Mexican daily newspaper published in Mexico City in English, was another valuable source to the author. A subscription to the San Jose Mercury News allowed the researcher to
keep abreast of binational news not printed elsewhere. An example was Mexican nationals who have died while fleeing California civil authorities and the status of the events since their occurrences. The researcher visited Washington, D.C. to interview military, civilian, and political-military experts on current U.S. policy towards Mexico, the controversial legislation of the Helms-Burton Law, and the impact of the Helms-Burton Law on U.S.-Mexican relations.

C. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, Daniel C. Levy, Kathleen Bruhn, Donald E. Shulz, Edward Williams, Cesar Cansino, and Dahl have sought to explain the democratization “wave” in Latin America. Mexico, because of its virtual one-party system and civilian rule, is anomalous. The PRI has sustained power for 66 years without an opposition party ever winning a national election. This thesis will apply existing comparative and theoretical literature to Mexico and explain its uniqueness.

A review of the literature by Cornelius and Craig suggests that political scholars analyzed the 1988 national election as the watershed event that would start Mexico’s transition towards democracy. The voting percentages captured by the PRI were at an all-time low: In 1982, the PRI earned 71.0 percent of the votes; in 1988 50.7 percent.\footnote{Craig, Ann L. and Wayne A. Cornelius. “Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in Mexico” Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 258.} Many predicted the sudden downfall of the PRI. The breakup of the PRI was further underscored by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari during his 1988 inauguration speech. Salinas proclaimed that “The era of the virtual
one-party system [in Mexico] has ended,” giving way to a period of “intense political competition.”

Throughout Salinas’s reign (1988-1994), however, the PRI grew stronger. By 1994 the results of the national election forced political scientists to reconsider their forecast from the previous national election, as PRI presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon captured 48.77 percent of all votes.

Theoretically, Dahl explains Mexico’s two types of regimes; Levy and Bruhn explain Mexico as and case of stable civilian rule. Dahl considers closed hegemonies a reference point and provides three types of possible political regimes: competitive oligarchy, democracy, and inclusive hegemony. In a competitive oligarchy, public contestation is limited to the elite and the masses do not participate in political activities. In a democracy, regimes are “substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.” In an inclusive hegemony, public contestation by the elite is limited and the masses do have a limited political voice. Dahl concludes that the best route to democracy is by way of the increased liberalization and public contestation.

Dahl’s analysis is relevant because Mexico has pursued a combination of the second and third paths. Under President Salinas, political reform granted liberalization to opposition groups,

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such as access to the media and limits on campaign expenses of the PRI. Mexican citizens have dissociated themselves from political parties, especially the PRI, in favor of other political parties and groups. The Union of Unions (UU) and the Independent Confederation of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC)\(^\text{15}\) are groups that have been established in Chiapas as a result of members leaving the peasant sector of the PRI. This thesis assumes that democracy is one possible political regime in Mexico.

Levy and Bruhn further distinguish Mexico on the basis of stable civilian rule. Levy and Bruhn select common causal variables (such as state-society relations, political culture, and historical sequencing) to explain democratic stability. Mexico, they conclude, is not a democracy but possesses characteristics of a “semi-democratic” regime.\(^\text{16}\) Levy and Bruhn emphasize how Mexico is one of the Latin American countries that does not fit the characteristics of a democracy.

Donald E. Schulz and Edward L. Williams examine why Mexico has failed to advance from an underdeveloped country to an industrialized country. They focus on internal as well as external variables that influence democratization. The internal variables are limited to the political parties, the emergence of a civil society, the military and its changing roles, state-labor relations, and civil-


military relations; external variables include U.S.-Mexican relations, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and labor migration. Schulz and Williams classify Mexico as an unstable country because of the oil and peso crises in the 1980s and the Chiapas uprising and political assassinations in 1994. Moreover, Schulz and Williams believe that Mexico is undergoing a political crisis rather than a political transformation.\textsuperscript{17}

Similarity, Cesar Cansino argues that the events since the 1988 federal elections and the 1994 assassinations and uprisings are evidence that the PRI has begun to “crack and deteriorate.” Cansino believes that the transformation of Mexico’s political system lies in the strength of opposition parties and other civil groups. Moreover, he predicts that the future of Mexico’s political system is “highly uncertain, tense, and potentially explosive.”\textsuperscript{18}

In summary, the demise of the PRI, as proclaimed in 1988, has not occurred. Dahl proposes a path to democracy that is liberalized and inclusive for both the elites and the masses; Levy and Bruhn indicate that Mexico is stable under the rule of a civilian leader but is far from being a democracy; Schulz and Williams categorize Mexico as in a state of crisis; and Cansino argues that political opposition parties and civil groups play a major role in regime transitions. These brief arguments conclude that the prospects for democracy are mixed. By analyzing civilian control of the military, the political party system, and foreign assistance, this thesis will suggest


why Mexico’s path to democratization has varied from the paths of other Latin American countries and evaluate more accurately Mexico’s prospects for the future.

In Chapter II, the thesis analyzes Mexico’s civilian control of the military. The primary question is: why is it that Mexico has a weak military, but no democracy? Chapter III examines Mexico’s history and the level of institutionalization within the political party system. Considering the level of institutionalization of the political system, the puzzle is: why does Mexico not have a competitive multi-party political system? Chapter IV examines the role of the U.S. policy towards Mexico and how U.S. foreign policy contributes to or undermines the democratization of Mexico. Specifically, why has the U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico failed to bring about democratization in Mexico? Chapter V contains the conclusions, implications and recommendations.
II. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of civilian control of the military on democratization in Mexico. Specifically, why is it that Mexico, with a relatively weak military (politically speaking), has maintained a semi-democratic political system, rather than fully democratizing? Political scientists argue that subordinating the military to civilian rule is a necessary condition for democracy. This has transpired in Mexico, yet no democracy has resulted. This thesis argues that in Mexico civilian rule over the military is necessary for democracy.

Sam C. Sarkesian defines civil-military relations as the interaction between an armed institution and political civilian leaders. The civilian control of the Mexican military and the impact on democratization is a relevant area of Latin American study. Like other Latin American countries, Mexico maintains a military subordinate to civilian leadership. The Mexican military is a professional force stripped of political involvement and performs as a civic force (beautifying public grounds and building hospitals) instead of a defense force. Mexico’s military does not deploy outside of its borders. Reductions in military expenditures have consistently decreased since the start of the twentieth-century. Fewer funds have been another means of controlling the military.

Recently, however, Mexico’s military has become more visible. Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon’s announcement of an army general to fill the most senior police post in

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Mexico City and the hiring of senior military officers to replace senior policemen may represent a greater role in politics for the Mexican military.

This chapter is important for a few reasons. First, it examines Mexico as a deviant case in that civilian control of the armed forces is a necessary condition for democracy. Second, it analyzes the relationship between the military and civilians, and its impact on the political system. Third, it raises additional issues related to Mexican civil-military relations, from a historical perspective. Fourth it raises issues of interest to U.S. agencies even though the Mexican military has not overtly intervened in politics in more than 50 years. U.S. agencies that monitor domestic and international events of Mexico include the State Department, Department of Defense, National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In an overview of the chapter, the second section provides historical and current perspectives of the Mexican military. The third section analyzes variations of civilian control of the military. The fourth section examines the implications of civilian control of the military and the potential for the military’s involvement in politics. The final section contains the conclusions. A tentative conclusion is that Mexican civilian control of the military has not produced a democracy because the ruling oligarchy has much to lose should democracy occur.

In Mexico, the army is by far the dominant service. In 1994, the armed forces comprised 130,000 in the regular army; 29,000 in the navy; 8,000 in the air force; 8,000 marines; and 14,000 in the paramilitary’s rural militia. Most of the information in the chapter refers to the Mexican army. “Army” and “military” will be used interchangeably throughout the chapter. The military as an

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institution "includes the bulk of the military organization - those who staff the bases and carry out their routine training cycles, manage the complex network of the military - schooling system, except intelligence, do the day-to-day work of a military bureaucracy, and are available as a strategic reserve if there is a major national 'emergency'.”21

1. Review of the Literature

A review of the literature suggests that most scholars are not satisfied with the available information on the Mexican military. Monica Serrano, David F. Ronfeldt, and L. N. McAlister argue that literature on the Mexican military is lacking.22 There are, however, a few similarities that most scholars employ when writing about the Mexican military. Most scientists trace the roots of the military to the Mexican Revolution, most scholars analyze the modifications made to the military by each president; and, most agree that after 1940 the Mexican military's role in society was civic action and crisis management.

Edwin Lieuwen studies the Mexican armies of the revolutionary period. Lieuwen's contribution sets the framework for other scientists. His study of Mexico focuses on the changes within the military between 1910 and 1940.23 Lieuwen's additional chapter expands the years of his


previous research and analyzes the depoliticization of the military between 1915 and 1950.\textsuperscript{24} Lieuwen’s works are widely cited in current articles.

Roderic A. Camp breaks new ground as he undertakes an empirical study of the Mexican military, the first - according to Camp - of its kind. Camp focuses on military history and civil-military relations to explain the role of the army generals and why the military, since the revolution, has not intervened in politics. Indicators of his variables include composition, experience, background, and behavior of Mexican generals. Conclusions as to why the military no longer intervenes in politics are professionalism (specialized training of the armed forces) and the autonomy of the military to deal with military matters.\textsuperscript{25} Like Lieuwen, Camp’s masterpiece is often cited in articles on Mexico’s military.

Monica Serrano explores the relationship between society and the military institution in Mexico. Serrano explains the paradox of the pact that transferred power from the military to civilian control. Serrano’s argument is that the pact subordinated the military to civilian rule yet ensures that the resort to violence by civilian authorities occurs within constitutional limits. She examines the roles of the military under former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and concludes that


civilian control, through professionalization and autonomy within the armed forces, prevented the military from reemerging as a strong political actor.\textsuperscript{26}

In summary, Lieuwen provides the historical background of the Mexican military; Camp argues that the military has not intervened in politics because of the professionalization and autonomy of the military; and Serrano analyzes the conflict between civilian control of the military and the use of force by the military.

2. Theoretical Framework

During and after the Cold War, scholars suggested that one of the characteristics necessary for democracy was to subordinate the military to civilian control. One political scientist, Paul W. Zagorski, theorizes that “Civilian control of the armed forces is necessary for democracy.”\textsuperscript{27} He posits that civilian control can be established only through military reform. Zagorski employs a comparative analysis on the internal dynamics\textsuperscript{28} of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay) to analyze the issues relevant to civil-military relations.

The argument of this chapter is that civilian control of the Mexican armed forces that has existed for 67 years will continue. In Mexico, any control over the military will not bring about


\textsuperscript{28} The internal dynamics Zagorski studies are human rights, internal security, military reform and reform of the state.
democracy if the PRI elites do not want democracy to occur. PRI elites will lose many existing benefits if the regime proceeds toward democracy. In the current regime, PRI elites maintain power over the military through a broad range of authoritarian practices.\(^{29}\) Therefore, civilian control of the military is necessary, but not sufficient for democracy in Mexico.

3. Methodology

The puzzle of this chapter is: why is it that Mexico has a politically weak military, but no democracy? A case study of Mexico will be employed. The outcome (dependent) variable is democratization; the causal (independent) variable is civilian control of the military. Indicators of civilian control include military expenditures, numbers of military personnel in key positions, and the overall importance of the armed forces through civil-military relations. Mexico is a deviant case in that like other Latin American countries its military is subordinated to civilian control, but unlike other countries there is no democracy.

Origins of the Mexican military derive from the country’s independence in 1821. However, this chapter will focus on Mexico’s military experiences of the twentieth century. The next section analyzes historical and current perspectives of the Mexican military from 1900 to 1996.

B. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES

1. Historical Perspectives - The Mexican Revolutionary Period: 1900-1940

McAlister analyzes four paradigms to describe military interactions with the civilian population in Latin America. Of the four, three are relevant to twentieth-century Mexico: the

gendarmist state, the praetorian state, and the civilist state. In a gendarmist state, a single actor emerges as the head of the state. The gendarmist state best explains Mexico’s civil-military relations from 1900 to 1910 under the dictatorship of General Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910). “In a gendarmist state a single individual, generally but not always a military man, uses a mercenary army to make himself master of the state, imposes social and political order, tames the army and uses it as a [national police force] to maintain himself in power.”  

In a praetorian state, there are frequent coups. The praetorian state best characterizes Mexico during the Revolutionary years (1910-1924) in which the presidency changed between military and civilian rule. Zagorski adds that “while praetorianism is too unnuanced to serve as a complete description of the Latin American political tradition it delineates a pattern of political behavior that has plagued much of the region.” Finally, in a civilist state, there is civilian control of the military. The civilist state best explains Mexico’s civil-military relations since the 1920s. The civilist state is “characterized by civil supremacy over the military and exists in relatively stable societies with professionalized armed forces.” The fourth paradigm, not evidenced in Mexico, is the garrison state in which the military dominates the state and attempts to militarize the societies.

Mexico entered the twentieth century under the dictatorship of Diaz who initially filled senior administrative positions with prominent military officers. Having learned that military officers lacked expertise in politics, Diaz replaced the officers with professional bureaucrats. Three lessons were

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learned. First, "Military officers must form an alliance with civilian sympathizers who have the skills and inclination to be politically active."³³ Samuel P. Huntington argues that most military officers become involved in politics only out of personal and professional interests such as higher pay, increased benefits, distribution of power and status, and increasing forces.³⁴ The experience required of cabinet-level positions far exceeds that of military officers who dabble in politics.

Second, "Physically removing military officers from political office is a first step, however small, in conveying to the population, the political leadership, and the officer corps itself, that the political arena is the purview of civilians, not military men."³⁵ Third, Diaz created civilian loyalists, directly and indirectly, by employing professional politicians in top jobs. Diaz became immersed in political matters and ignored the military. As a result, the army diminished from 35,000 in 1900 to 20,000 in 1910.³⁶ A decline in the military permitted an opportunity for other political aspirants to seek office.

In 1911, a coup was staged and Francisco Madero overthrew Diaz. Madero, a civilian activist, initiated the Mexican Revolution by leading similar wealthy individuals who were denied political opportunities under Diaz.³⁷ While a presidential candidate, Madero openly contested militarism through the publication of *Sucesion Presidencial en 1910*³⁸ Madero’s Plan of San Luis

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³³ Camp, 1992, p. 16.


³⁵ Camp, 1992, p. 16.

³⁶ Camp, 1992, p. 16.

Potosi was an antimilitaristic pronouncement that stated the rule of the generals would have to end before democracy would come to Mexico.\textsuperscript{39} Madero established a revolutionary army (the Ejercito Libertador) to fight the Mexican regular armed forces (Federal Army) under Diaz.

By 1911, the Federal Army totaled 28,000.\textsuperscript{40} In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta and the Federal Army initiated a coup and brought down the Madero regime. One year later General Venustiano Carranza’s Constitutionalist Army defeated Huerta’s army. Between 1914 and 1915, three revolutionary generals unsuccessfully intervened to overthrow Carranza: Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Alvaro Obregon. In 1916, Carranza called for an election of 221 delegates to write a new constitution. Federal Army officers and “Villistas” were excluded from the election. As a result, only 45 military officers were elected to assist with the new legislation. The 1917 Mexican Constitution, the first since the Revolution, was a watershed mark in that it was initiated by an army general and drafted by civilians.\textsuperscript{41}

Preparations for the 1920 elections increased violence as revolutionary generals were concerned that a civilian would lead the country. General Obregon ended the speculation when he appointed himself as the president. Two weeks after his election, Obregon was assassinated and General Plutarco Elias Calles assumed the presidency. General Calles accomplished three major feats

\textsuperscript{38} Translated, the title is the Presidential Succession in 1910. Lieuwen, 1968, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{39} Lieuwen, 1968, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{40} 16,000 were part of the Mexican Federal Army and 12,000 came from Madero’s Ejercito Libertador. Lieuwen, 1968, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{41} Lieuwen, 1968, p.41.
before terminating office. First, Calles further institutionalized the military by approving a set of laws that stated the military’s mission, promotion procedures, discipline, and retirement benefits.42

Second, backed by the elite settlement, Calles created a political pact in 1928 to peacefully transfer power from the military generals to the civilian political elite.43 The pact “demilitarized political competition, but restricted the arena of competition to the new party.”44 Finally, Calles founded the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), the organization to promote a formal peaceful political succession to the presidency. Calles stepped down, but not before naming his successors: “Left-leaning” lawyer Portes Gil (1928-1930), General Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932), and General Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934). These presidents made no major changes to the military.

In 1934, Lazaro Cardenas was elected to the presidency. To reorganize the army and subordinate it to politics, Cardenas devised the Plan Sexenio Militar. The plan had two goals: to further professionalize the army and to institutionalize the political participation of the military.45 More important, Cardenas brought the army closer to the people and the people closer to the army by making civilians more appreciative of the military role. The army was exposed to the civil sector as manpower to construct buildings, to beautify cities, and to perform as teachers.46

42 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 87.


44 Serrano, pp. 431-432.


46 Lieuwen, 1968, pp. 120-121.
In 1938, Cardenas created the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) which included four sectors: labor (Confederation of Mexican Workers-CTM), peasant (National Peasant Confederation-CNC), popular (National Confederation of Popular Organization-CNOP), and the military. The purpose for bringing in the military was not to politicize it, but to ensure the military played a minor political role in the process of presidential successions.

Mexico's Revolutionary period ended with the election of General Avila Camacho in 1940. Under President Camacho (1940-1946), the military influence was greatly reduced because the elite-class was in its final states of consolidating control of the military.\textsuperscript{47} To keep the military from gaining political strength, President Camacho eliminated the military as a sector from the PRM and folded it into the popular sector. Less one sector, the PRM was renamed the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI).

From 1900 to 1940 Mexico experienced a violent transition of leadership between civilian and military rule. The military experienced drastic manpower cuts, increased professionalism, and decreased political power. Clearly, the end of the Revolutionary period resulted in the military being subordinated to civilian leadership. Table 1 summarizes the decline in military percentages of the total budget from 1914 to 1940.

\textsuperscript{47} Lieuwen, 1968, p. 143.
Table 1 - Mexican Presidents and the Status of the Military Between 1914 and 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Military Budget</th>
<th>Mil Percentage of Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Gen Venustiano Carranza</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Gen Plutarco Elias Calles</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Portes Gil</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Ortiz Rubio</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Abelardo Rodriguez</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Lazaro Cardenas</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Gen Avila Camacho</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total budget and military budget are represented in millions of pesos. The military budget includes Defense Ministry appropriation plus those for the Military Factories.


In Table 1, the largest amount of the military budget and the military percentage of the budget occurred in 1920 as more funds were allocated to improve military professionalism. Calles further professionalized the military but with fewer funds. Generally, a decline in military percentages of the budget represents the strengthening of civilian control over the military.

In summary, by the end of the Revolutionary period the military confined its political activity to nonviolent competition and bargaining within an institutionalized decision making political party clearly dominated by civilian elites. The Revolutionary period also marked the last of Mexico’s military’s officers who served as presidents.


Revolutionary events that rocked Mexico during the first half of the century abated after 1946. During the post-Revolutionary era, the military endstrength dwindled from its revolutionary numbers and its role in politics grew silent. Miguel Aleman ushered in the second half of the century by winning the 1946 election. Aleman was Mexico’s first elected president who secured civilian
supremacy over the armed forces by allocating seven percent of the total budget to military expenditures. Succeeding presidents reduced the political activism of the military by encouraging military professionalism while decreasing military expenditures. Although the military's occupation of top positions in public offices declined, the president traditionally appointed a military man to serve as the PRI chairman.

Table 2 lists Mexican presidents who were elected since 1946 and the corresponding status of the military.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>ME/GNP</th>
<th>Endstrength</th>
<th>Per 100 People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Miguel Aleman</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Adolfo Ruiz Cortines</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Adolfo Lopez Mateos</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Gustavo Diaz Ordaz</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Luis Echeverria Alvarez</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Jose Lopez Portillo</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Carlos Salinas de Gortari</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Table 2 includes percentages of military expenditures (ME) of the gross national product (GNP) for that year, the endstrength in thousands, and the percentages of the armed forces per 1000 people. The evidence shows that military expenditures in the latter half of the century have steadily decreased; the endstrength has more than doubled since 1964; and, the more people are joining the military. Although more people are enrolling in Mexico’s military, civilian control is demonstrated through fewer resources allocated to the military. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 is impossible because of the lack of single source data from the beginning of the century to the present.

a. The Mission and Roles of the Mexican Military

The Constitution of 1917 and the 1926 Organic Law set forth the Mexican army’s mission of today which is “to defend the integrity and independence of the nation, to maintain the Constitution, and to pressure internal order.” The mission has remained unchanged, but the roles have significantly changed. These changes are relevant because as the roles of the military become important so do its significance.

Virginia Prewett studied the Mexican Army in its role after the Revolution. She learned that the Mexican military was employed as construction workers, road builders, and beautifiers of towns. Similarly, Ronfeldt lists some achievements of the Mexican army employed as a domestic police rather than a defense force. The army’s notable policing accomplishments include suppressing the 1968 student-based riots in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco Square, subduing electoral disturbances,

50 Lieuwen, 1968, p. 87.

quelling labor and industrial disturbances, combating guerrilla insurgencies, and hunting down cattle's rustlers and bandits in the rural areas.  

According to Andrew Reding, other roles of the Mexican military have included "kidnapp[ing] suspected dissidents, hundreds of whom were never heard from again . . . [and] in the early 1970s . . . crush[ing] a peasant rebellion in the state of Guerrero with a scorched-earth policy that made little distinction between combatants and civilians." As a result of the 1994 Chiapas rebellion the military has reform[ed its] organization and modified its roles to "fight against insurgents and the fight against drugs." The military mission remains constant, the roles are changing, but Mexico's military is still internally focused.

To summarize this section, the end of the Mexican Revolutionary period initiated the decline of the military's involvement in politics and control of civilian authority through limiting the amount of funds distributed to the military. In 1920, the military percentage of the total budget was 65 percent. By 1940, the military was allocated only 21 percent of the budget. The civilianization of political power through the creation of the PRI eliminated the military's direct role in political decision making.

During the Post-Revolutionary period, the funds allocated to the military further decreased as more of the population joined the armed services. By 1988, the military received only

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.6 percent of the budget. President Aleman secured the civilian control of the military with his election in 1946. Succeeding presidents lacked the “experience of the Revolution” but were aware of the consequences of military involvement in politics. This section referred to civilian control of the military throughout the century. The next section analyzes the types of civilian control employed in Mexico.

C. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

As of 1996, all Latin American militaries are subordinated to civilian rulers. Huntington posits two varieties of civilian control of the military that will be analyzed within the framework of Mexico: subjective and objective.\(^{55}\)

1. Subjective Civilian Control

Subjective civilian control of the military decreases the power of the military by promoting the interests of civilian groups. The leadership has three means of maximizing civilian power. The first is by government institution. In Mexico, this has occurred by increasing the power of the Congress while maintaining the relative influence of the military. Mexico’s government is highly centralized as the president controls the legislative and judicial branches of government.

The second means of increasing civilian power is through constitutional reform. “Civilian control is identified with [a] democratic government, military control with absolute or totalitarian government.”\(^{56}\) By definition, Mexico’s semi-democratic regime does not fit this definition of increased civilian power over the military. However, in Argentina, President Raul Alfonsin controlled

\(^{55}\) Huntington, 1957, pp. 80-85.

\(^{56}\) Huntington, 1957, p. 82.
the military by placing civilians in key positions over the military: Secretary of Defense, Director of
the National Defense School, and the senior intelligence gathering agency. In Uruguay, a civilian
heads the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Congress reviews the military budget as submitted by the
MoD and if there are budgetary questions, the Congress summons the MoD.57

Finally, civilian control can be maximized by social class. After the Revolution in Mexico,
elites consolidated their power to control the military. Between 1934 and 1940, the elites further
controlled the military as a sector of the PRI. By 1946, the military was excluded from the PRI but
still under the control of the Mexican oligarchy. Elite control of the military resulted in increased
autonomy and professionalism of the military. In summary, Mexico’s military was subjectively
controlled by government institution and the elite class.

2. Objective Civilian Control

The second variety of civilian control is objective. Huntington argues that objective civilian
control is preferred to subjective control. Objective civilian control is “militariz[ing] the military [by]
making them the tool of the state.”58

Objective civilian control involves 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition
by military officer of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination
of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and
military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by the leadership of an area of professional
competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military
intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.59

57 Stepan, 1988, pp. 87-90.
58 Huntington, 1957, p. 83.
59 Huntington, Samuel P. “Reforming Civil-Military Relations.” Journal of Democracy 6.4
The intent of objective civilian control is to provide the military with more institutional autonomy, more professional training, and less political involvement.

a. Military Autonomy

According to David Pion-Berlin, military autonomy refers "broadly to the relative independence with which the armed forces behave . . . [and] the institutional and political dimensions to the military's behavior." He studied the autonomy of the postauthoritarian armed forces in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru to determine the degree to which the military is willing and able to defend perceived prerogatives by decision site. Pion-Berlin found that the armed forces in all countries succeeded in protecting professional (core) functions that are central to the institution. Countries were less successful in protecting political (periphery) functions.

In Mexico, the military, too, is highly autonomous in professional issues and less so in political involvement. The Mexican Army and Air Force Development Plan calls for the first unprecedented reorganization of the army and air force in 61 years. While the military downplays the reform as "nothing spectacular," some civilian strategists believe otherwise. Guillermo Garduno, a military strategy expert, says, "thanks to the [reform], the army will become the most modern public administration sector that will have a very broad and sophisticated information network capable of

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61 Decision sites includes personnel decisions, force levels, education, doctrine, reform, budget, arms production and procurement, defense organization, intelligence gathering, internal security, and human rights.

62 The professional functions, the core, include junior-level decision-making, military doctrine, military education, and military reform. Political functions, the periphery, include human rights and internal security. The remaining decision sites were found inconclusive and classified as professional-political.
going anywhere.” Garduno adds that “With a weak president like the one we now have, [President Zedillo] could become hostage of the armed forces.” By contrast, Brazil’s modernization plans that included new equipment and force restructuring under the first two years of civilian rule “did not cause any significant conflict with the new civilian government because military expenditures were low.” The military designed the plans and Congress accepted them without argument.

Post-Revolutionary presidents allowed the military great autonomy. An unwritten rule was that no civilian was allowed to criticize the military either in speech or print. Now, the military roles are at the forefront of public debate. The military has gone public with refusal to become involved with future demonstrations and encouraging participation in civilian decisions concerning employment of the military. In summary, there are some signs of growing autonomy (such as a reorganization plan) and weakening autonomy (such as the reappearance of military issues in national debate).

b. Military Professional Training

The Mexican Development Plan supports the civilian control of the military through professionalism. Throughout the twentieth-century, numerous “isms” have described the Mexican military’s involvement with civil society. First there was caudillism, militarism, then professionalism. Caudillism was the ideology of a dictator as displayed by Diaz. According to McAlister, militarism

64 Stepan, 1988, p. 88.
was associated with all forms of organized violence employed to meet political ends. It not only classified institutional action of the armed forces with that of savages but concentrated on the spectacular manifestations of military political action as exemplified by military caudillos. The two drawbacks of militarism were that it “glorified war and emphasized strong imperialist overtones. It did not cover instances in which armed forces have been nonpolitical.”

Moving from militarism to professionalism, Federick M. Nunn offers professional militarism as a representation of authoritarianism. Once the armed militants occupied the presidencies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, they offered no improved solutions to national problems than the civilians. Although the account of militarism seems controversial, it is clearly an appropriate ideology for Mexico’s revolutionary turmoil. With the end of the Revolution, militarism was replaced with professionalism.

Several examples demonstrate how specialized training increases objective civilian control of the military. Under Diaz, top lieutenants and captains attended military academies in Spain, Italy, and the United States. Mexican officers, schooled abroad, who returned to Mexico initiated military programs without foreign assistance. “In 1951 the [United States] offered mutual defense assistance pacts to eight Latin American nations under which they were to receive military assistance


68 Nunn, 1995, pp. 2-5.

in exchange for assuming hemisphere defense responsibilities. Although Mexico’s armed forces welcomed the offer, the civilian dominated administration of Miguel Aleman refused.\textsuperscript{70}

Professional standards initiated by President Calles included: testing officers, abolishing political involvement of the military, and introducing standards of conduct. By improving the professional training, young military officers were exposed to discipline, subordinated to civilian control, and discouraged from engaging in political matters. In summary, the Mexican military is indeed a professional force. Mexico’s military does have standards of conduct and there are service academies to train officers at all levels of rank. Furthermore, the military has survived the control of civilian rulers and it is extremely autonomous in military matters.

c. Military Depoliticization

Depoliticization is de-emphasizing political appetites of the military through a variety of ways. Mexican presidents galvanized depoliticization in various ways: frequent transfers of military zone commanders,\textsuperscript{71} offering incentives for staying out of politics, and strongly discouraging the military from becoming involved in politics. Military zone commanders were frequently transferred to prevent them from building up large personal following of troops and local politicians.\textsuperscript{72}

Another way of depoliticizing the Mexican military was removing it as a sector from the PRI.


\textsuperscript{71} Each state in Mexico is divided into zones. Some states, such as Chihuahua, Jalisco and Guerrero are divided into two zones. As of September 1995 Mexico had 36 military zones. Rodriguez Reyna, Sep 25, 1995, FBIS-LAT-95-193.

Camp offers convincing evidence that since the Diaz regime, the number of military office holders has steadily, and in some cases, drastically declined. Table 3 shows the percentages of Mexican military officers by administration.

Table 3 - Percentages of Mexican Military Officeholders by Administration 1900-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1900, under a dictator, military officers held 30 percent of the jobs. Percentages for the 1913 regime are unusually high because both Madero and Huerta were battling for the presidency. Since then, the percentages have steadily declined. In the 1990s, military officers hold fewer than [two] percent of all important political jobs.\(^{73}\)

In summary, an application of Huntington’s definition of objective civilian control of the Mexican military shows that 1) there is a high level of professionalism and military officers know not to overstep their limits and intervene in politics; 2) without a doubt the military is under the control of President Zedillo; 3) the military has its autonomy in that the senior military leadership

\(^{73}\) Camp, 1992, pp. 68-69.
selects who may join and become promoted; and 4) the military has not overtly intervened in politics nor have the politicians interceded in military affairs.

**D. IMPLICATIONS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY**

The subordination of the Mexican military to civilian leadership and the roles of the military as maintainers of the status quo have led to unprecedented but tense civil-military relations with complicated implications and threats to democratization. The role of the military as a civil force poses inconsistencies between definitions of civil-military relations. On the one hand the military unquestionably executes the orders of the President; on the other hand the military utilizes force commensurate with its mission. One example of this paradox is the January 1, 1994 Chiapas uprising that caught the civilian leadership in Mexico by surprise.74 Three days after the offensive and the military’s response with overwhelming force,75 President Salinas ordered a halt to the massacre in exchange for “unity among civilians to confront the nation’s problems.”76 The military’s use of excessive force attracted scrutiny from domestic and international human rights activists.

The alleged violations committed by the Mexican military were brutal and to date the debate still lingers as to who was at fault. Civilian authorities have yet to prosecute anyone for the abuses

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74 The January 1, 1994 Chiapas uprising was the result of the Indians in Mexico’s poorest state, Chiapas, to draw attention to their plight of loss of land and economic misery. After the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) captured four towns (San Cristobal de las Casas, Ocostongo, Las Margaritas, and Altamirano) the army was called upon to suppress the rebellion. For more on the rebellion see Collier, George A. and Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello. *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994.

75 The military troops numbered about 12,000 versus 1,000 peasants. The military was supported by artillery, armor, helicopters, and airplanes. Montes, Julio. “Mexican Revolution-1994 Style.” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*. 6.3 (1994): 138.

that occurred in Chiapas. Examples of excessive force and violations of human rights by the Mexican army include: torturing women and children, severing human appendages;\textsuperscript{77} killing and injuring unarmed residents; shooting men point-blank when their wrists were bound; illegally detaining residents; raping women; and firing on journalists who clearly displayed a white flag.\textsuperscript{78} Reports by Amnesty International and Americas Watch have also accused the military of torturing indigenous peoples in Chiapas.\textsuperscript{79}

Accusations of human rights abuses suggest implications for relations between civil society and the military, political leaders and the military, and within the military. Relations between civil society and the military only worsened after the Chiapas massacre. The army lived up to its reputation of a brutal repressive force against unarmed civilians. Just as the army did during the Revolution and the 1968 student demonstrations, the Chiapas rebellion forced the army to take up arms against the people.

In Mexico, strained relations between civil society and the military are not favorable conditions for democratization. As the civilian leader, the use of the military as a civil means is a president's prerogative. In Mexico, the military is employed as maintainers of the status quo. In Uruguay in 1996, the president used the military as a threat to quell a prison revolt. Instead of using

\textsuperscript{77} These are the accounts of rebel leaders who signed a communique denouncing the Mexican army. Darling, Junita. "Army Actions Raise Fears for Chiapas Rights." \textit{Los Angeles Times}. NEXIS. On-line. Feb 14, 1995.


manpower, the government “unfolded an impressive display of military firepower outside the prison [to warn] rebellious inmates of what could be in store for them.”

In Guatemala, former defense minister Hector Gramajo Morales is credited with bringing democracy to the country. Some of his initiatives include sending officers to seminars that espouse how the military benefits in a democracy. Guatemalan soldiers also participate in local soccer leagues, award ceremonies at schools, and encourage plantation owners to pay workers at least minimum wages. The Guatemalans respect neither Gramajo nor the army because of the repressive activities demonstrated against the insurgents. The military’s subordination to civilian rule in Guatemala will continue because the military presence alone “unnerves a community still suffering a sort of collective post-traumatic stress syndrome” and most Guatemalans “do not believe in military people.”

In an unsurprising move, President Zedillo, in June 1996, named Army Brigadier General Enrique Salgado Cardero as Mexico City’s top policeman. As the seventh army general to hold the position since 1958, Salgado swore in “[eleven] army generals and [nine] colonels each of whom brought with them teams of military advisors.” The unprecedented move of generals and colonels in top-level civil affairs positions led onlookers to speculate how soon the military might regain its foothold in politics.


In early July 1996, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), an armed group in Guerrero, Mexico, emerged and began shooting automatic rifles. Rather than sending the police to quell the disturbance of dozens of peasant farmers, the government deployed hundreds of heavily armed soldiers, helicopters, and tanks to find the guerrillas.\textsuperscript{83} Although the crisis is in its infancy, the Mexican military is being scrutinized like it was in 1994 during the Chiapas uprising.

E. CONCLUSION: CIVILIAN CONTROL AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

In conclusion, the purpose of this chapter was to analyze the impact of Mexican civilian control of the military on democratization. The Mexican Revolution set the framework for current relations between a civilian ruler and the military institution. Traditionally, military generals claimed the presidency by initiating coups. The post-Revolutionary years witnessed the decline of the military’s role in politics. Since 1940 and through a series of “controls,” Mexican presidents have asserted their power over the military. The controls, however, have failed to produce democratization in Mexico.

The evidence is clear that both subjective and objective controls of the military have been implemented in Mexico. Obviously, both “controls” have made a dramatic impact in Mexico to the extent that the military has not initiated any coups since the Revolution. Mexico’s military today is highly professionalized, extremely autonomous, and greatly depoliticized. The future interest of the military in politics is still in doubt, especially with the increased presence of senior military officers performing in senior civil positions.

Throughout this chapter, the current status of the Mexican military vis-a-vis civilian elites appears contradictory. On the one hand, the military is subordinate to civilian control. On the other hand, the post-Chiapas military may constitute a threat to civilian control.\footnote{For more on the military’s new professionalism see Stepan, Alfred. “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion,” in Stepan, Alfred. Ed. \textit{Authoritarian Brazil}. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 52.} In Mexico, civilian control has been demonstrated quite effectively since the end of the Revolution. The reorganized military is not yet a threat to civilian control. Given more of a defense budget, the lack of civilian leadership to demonstrate control of the country, increased weaponry, and increased scope of civil responsibilities, the military could become a threat to civilian control.

Zagorski theorized that civilian control of the armed forces is necessary for democracy. In a comparison of Chile and Mexico, Chile’s military, after 16 years of authoritarian rule under General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-1990), is heavily involved in politics. In Chile, civilian control of the armed forces is necessary for democracy. In Mexico, the evidence is clear that civilian control may be necessary, but it is not sufficient for democracy. If civilian control was sufficient, observers would see democracy in Mexico based solely on civilian control of the military. However, civilian control alone does not bring about democracy. Other variables that could influence democracy include the fairness of the political party system and the power of external actors. Mexico’s armed forces have been subordinated to civilian control since 1934. In Chile, the regime has been relatively unstable; in Mexico, the regime has remained stable. In Chile, there is democracy, in Mexico there is no democracy.

Given the fact that the military is subordinated to a civilian ruler and lacks political involvement, why has Mexico has failed to democratize? A primary reason is because of the...
authoritarian nature of the PRI elites. Elites have much to lose should the regime transition to democracy. As the situation now stands, the oligarchic PRI members employ the military for control of civil unrest. These measures have included quelling disturbances at election polls and intervening in armed uprisings. Should the country become democratic, PRI elites will lose some of their power to other social classes. Democracy for the elites means an end to employing the military as elites see fit.
III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of institutionalization of Mexico’s political party system and draw some conclusions as to why institutionalization of the political party system has failed to bring about democracy in Mexico. The puzzle of this chapter is: why does Mexico not have a competitive political party system? This chapter argues that a single-party system has ruled Mexico because of a combination of characteristics that are inconsistent with political parties. The indicators include stability in the rules between interparty competition, stable roots in society, legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties subordinate to ambitious leaders. This chapter analyzes the historical background of the major political parties, the political party system, and the implication of an institutionalized party system for democracy in Mexico.

Political party, political party system, and institutionalization of the political party system warrant a brief definition as each will be extensively utilized throughout the chapter. A political party is an “organization that seeks to win elections, to take control of the machinery of government, and to determine public policy.”85 In Mexico the parties consist of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), and the Labor Party (PT).

Giovanni Sartori defines a political party system as “the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function . . . of the other parties and reacts, competitively or

otherwise, to other parties." Mexico's political party system includes the relationship among all officially recognized parties. Huntington defines institutionalization as

The process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of any political system can be defined by the adaptability [the more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid the lower it level of institutionalization], complexity [the more complicated the more institutionalized], autonomy [the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior], and coherence [the more coherent the more highly institutionalized, the greater the disunity the less institutionalized] of its organizations and procedures.

Most scholars refer to Satori's definition of a political party system and Huntington's definition of institutionalization in their writings on the party system. Likewise, these definitions will be employed throughout this thesis.

1. Review of the Theoretical Literature

Ronald H. McDonald studies political party systems and finds common fundamental characteristics prevalent in Latin America. The first is that elites control the decision making processes and sustain the political parties. The second is that parties are shaped around the personalities of the existing leader. For example, in Mexico, Lazaro Cardenas is one exceptional leader who molded the PRI. Cardenas fired his predecessor's cabinet-level administrators and closed profitable casinos to create an exemplary image of the party.

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In other examples, the Revolutionary Party in Guatemala was formed around the personality of Mario Mendez Montenegro. After his death in 1965 Montenegro was succeeded by his brother, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, who lacked experience but drew on the personal characteristics of his brother and family. In addition, the Colorado Party in Uruguay was organized under the personality of José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-1901 and 1911-1915). The third characteristic is that parties are highly organized and support clear political visions. Examples given include Mexico’s PRI, Uruguay’s Blancos and Colorados, and Chile’s Christian Democrats.

McDonald categorizes party systems as either single-party dominant (where one party wins not less than 60 percent of the seats of a legislative party), two-party competitive (two parties receive not less than 40 percent of the legislative seats or more than 60 percent of the total seats), multi-party dominant (one party receives not less than 40 percent or more than 60 percent of the seats in a legislative body, and in which no additional party receives more than 40 percent of the seats), and multi-party loose (one in which there are three or more parties competing and no party receives more than 40 percent of the seats) systems. Within these parameters, Mexico is a single-party dominant system.

Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully have edited an important book on political party systems of major Latin American countries. In contrast to McDonald, Mainwaring and Scully classify party systems as either institutionalized, hegemonic, or inchoate. Institutionalized party

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89 McDonald, 1971, p. 19.

systems meet four criteria: stability of rules exist between interparty competition, parties are rooted in society, major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties, and parties are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. Examples of institutionalized party systems include Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Argentina.

Mainwaring and Scully consider Mexico and Paraguay hegemonic party systems. The fusion between the state and party dictates that social organizations “support and participate in the governing parties in order to have access to state resources.” Peru, Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador are inchoate party systems because according to the criteria of institutionalization these countries are not fully institutionalized.

In contrast to McDonald, Mainwaring, and Scully, Michael Coppedge compares the political systems in Mexico and Venezuela. Specifically, he examines the consequences of political systems on the personal and daily lives of citizens. Coppedge argues that competition between parties is important. Competition, he writes, helps improve relations between the government and opposition parties and “affords a greater potential for peaceful evolution of the political system.”

Jorge Alcocer V. focuses on the five major electoral reforms in Mexico between 1978 and 1994 and argues that Mexico must implement yet another reform to become democratic. Alcocer

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91 Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, pp. 4-5.


V. further argues that Mexico’s next electoral reform should be a reconfiguration of the party system - especially the PRD and the PRI because they are more enigmatic. The PAN, according to Alcocer V., is more stable and can easily adapt to the new reforms. The major reforms, already implemented, are outlined in the Appendix.

In summary, McDonald organizes party systems into four categories that consider legislative voting patterns; Mainwaring and Scully address the degree of institutionalization of the party system; Coppedge asserts that competitive party systems promote democracy; and Alcocer V. argues that Mexico must continue to revamp the party system if democracy is to occur.

In analyzing Mexico’s political party system, the most important document is the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1917. Given that the Constitution is the supreme law, legislation is secondary to it and laws override all customs. The Constitution states: “It is the will of the Mexican people to organize themselves into a federal, democratic, representative Republic composed of free and sovereign states in all that concerns their internal affairs, but united in a Federation established according to the principles of this fundamental law.” Article 41 of the 1917 Constitution pertains to political parties and states:

The purpose of political parties is to promote the participation of the people in democratic activity, to contribute to forming the national representation as organizations of citizens, to make possible their access to the exercise of public power, in accordance with the

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programs, principles and ideas which they postulate and through universal, free, secret and direct suffrage.\textsuperscript{97}

Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution are important because they direct the form of Mexican government and shape the framework of the party system. Mainwaring and Scully theorize that "An institutionalized party system, per se, does not automatically deliver or even facilitate most outcomes that are hopes a democracy will produce."\textsuperscript{98} In other words, because a political party system is institutionalized, there is no guarantee that democracy will occur. This chapter goes one step further to analyze how fair the political party system is.

2. Methodology

The puzzle of the thesis is: why has Mexico failed to become a full-fledged democracy? Specifically, the puzzle of this chapter is: why does Mexico not have a viable multi-party political system? The causal (independent) variable is the lack of an institutionalized party system. Indicators that determine the level of institutionalization include stability in the rules between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders.\textsuperscript{99} One advantage of using the four indicators to measure the level of institutionalization of the political party system is that either all or none of the parties should meet the criteria. Any indication that some, but not all, of the parties adhering to the "rules" immediately determines an unfair or "uninstitutionalized" system.

\textsuperscript{97} Political Constitution of the United Mexican States Title II, Chapter 1, Article 41.

\textsuperscript{98} Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{99} These indicators are borrowed from Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, pp. 4-5.
B. POLITICAL PARTIES IN MEXICO

This section examines the major political parties in Mexico by analyzing the background and voting patterns for each party. Key political parties in Mexico include the PRI, the PAN, the PRD, and the PT. The tables provided throughout this section should be read with skepticism as elections in Mexico are not considered free of fraud.

1. The Institutional Revolutionary Party

The predecessor of the PRI was the PNR, which evolved out of the Mexican Revolution and was created by President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) as a means to peacefully transfer presidential power. The PNR was a left-of-center party until the creation of the Revolutionary Party of Mexico (PRM) in 1940 by President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940). Key initiatives by Cardenas included the co-option and incorporation of opposition groups to form the "pillars of the regime." The composition of the PRM included the agrarian (peasant farmers), labor (urban workers), popular (teachers, businessmen, and intellectuals), and military sectors that formed the base of support.

The PRM shifted more to the right but remained left-of-center as the party again changed its name to the PRI in 1946 and deleted the military sector. Today, the PRI is more "centered" than the three major opposition parties but demonstrates its revolutionary side when threats to the party become apparent. The three sectors are still incorporated under the PRI, but membership has fizzled as voters have become disgruntled and have opted to support other political parties and civil groups.

Domestic dissatisfaction over socioeconomic failures and unfulfilled campaign promises are key reasons why PRI membership and presidential voting percentages have dwindled.
Percentages for congressional elections have remained surprisingly consistent. Table 4 shows results of presidential voting percentages and voter turnout. Table 5 shows the voting results of percentages for congressional elections.

Table 4 - PRI Voting and Turnout Percentages for Mexican Presidential Elections: 1934-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Voting Percentages for the PRI Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Percentages of Turnout for Eligible Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>48.77</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - PRI Voting Percentages for Mexican Congressional Elections: 1946-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentages for the PRI Congressional Candidates</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentages for the PRI Congressional Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188.

In Table 4, voting percentages for the PRI candidates throughout the years have declined and voter turnouts have been inconsistent. In 1994, however, Mexican nationals arrived at polls in record numbers. The results clearly show that even though they voted, Mexican citizens wanted the PRI to remain in power as candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, from the PRI, earned almost 49 percent of all votes. Table 5, in comparison, reiterates the pattern of unpopularity and decline of votes for the PRI during and mid-way through the presidential terms. The results of 1988, 1991, and 1994 are puzzling. In 1988 the party earned 51.1 votes, in 1991 the PRI votes increased to 61.5 percent, and in 1994 percentages tumbled to 50.3 percent - the lowest in the history of the PRI.

2. The National Action Party

The PAN was founded in 1939 primarily by Catholic students and businessmen. The students struggled against the socialist Left to promote its proclerical ideology; the private sector wanted to protect investments from the socialism of President Cardenas. After the Revolution,
religious members fought to restore the rights of the Church during the pre-Revolutionary era. Businessmen, lawyers, bankers, journalists, and industrialists, protested against the nationalization of resources and formed to PAN to voice their disagreement.¹⁰⁰

By 1946 and with the election of President Alemán, a staunch conservative, PAN businessmen shifted their allegiance to the PRI. After President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado nationalized the banks in 1982, most businessmen returned to the PAN, where they have remained. PAN supporters, since the 1950s, have focused on democratizing Mexico. Unlike the PRI, the PAN selects its presidential candidate democratically. There is competition within the party and leaders are selected in an open and pluralistic manner.

The PAN is the most representative political party in that its primary constituents are middle and lower-middle class urban citizens while the party also attracts support from conservative peasants. Generally and geographically, the PAN draws its base of support from the northern border states (especially Baja California Norte, Jalisco, and Guanajuato) Yucatán, and Mexico City. In 1946, the PAN won four seats in the Chamber of Deputies and for each subsequent election has increased its representation. Ernesto Ruffo, a PAN candidate, won the governorship of Baja California Norte in 1988. In 1991, the PAN won its first Senate seat also from Baja California Norte.

Examples of political “firsts” for the PAN do not undermine the image of the PRI and the absence of democracy in Mexico. Under the PRI rule, PAN members are represented, although

inadequately, in high-level government positions. In addition to the PAN governorship in Baja California Norte, PAN members now control governorships in Jalisco (1994) Guanajuato (1994), Baja California Norte (since 1989), San Luis Potosí (1988) and Chihuahua (1992).\textsuperscript{101} As of October 1996, Antonio Lozano Gracia, Mexico’s Attorney General holds the most senior position as a PAN member in the Zedillo administration.

As PRI voting percentages decline, the PAN is capitalizing on the PRI’s losses. Table 6 shows the PAN voting and turnout percentages during the national elections since 1952, the first year the party decided to run a candidate against the PRI. Table 7 shows the percentages of Mexicans who voted for the PAN during congressional elections since 1946.

Table 6 - PAN Voting and Turnout Percentages for Mexican Presidential Elections: 1952-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Voting Percentages for the PAN Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Percentages of Turnout for Eligible Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7 - PAN Voting Percentages for Mexican Congressional Elections: 1946-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Congressional Candidates</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Congressional Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188.

An analysis of Table 6 shows that since 1952, more Mexican nationals have favored the PAN for each subsequent election. Moreover, the 1994 numbers indicate that the PAN captured its highest percentages ever. Table 7, likewise, underscores the significant gains made by the PAN during midterm elections. During the 1994 election, the PAN captured one quarter of the available congressional votes. A comparison of the PRI and PAN voting percentages (Tables 4 and 6, respectively) shows that the losses of the PRI were gains of the PAN. More importantly, the comparison of the 1994 congressional results between the PRI and the PAN (Tables 5 and 7, respectively), clearly indicates that the PAN drew votes from the PRI.

3. The Democratic Revolutionary Party

The PRD is currently the major party of the Left and has undergone numerous name and structural changes under one leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, the son of President Cardenas (1934-1940). For the 1988 national and congressional elections the major party of the Left was the Democratic National Front (FDN). The FDN was established for the purposes of
forming one left-of-center political party, running one presidential candidate, and winning the 1994 presidential election. The coalition consisted of four parties: the Democratic Current (DC),\textsuperscript{102} the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolutionary (PARM), and the Party of the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction (PFCRN).\textsuperscript{103}

The FDN was a significant contender for the Mexican presidency during the 1988 election, but has since suffered internal turmoil and loss of confidence from voters. As a result, the PRD was formally established in May 1989. The radical pattern of parties splitting, allying, and losing legal registration makes it difficult to show voting patterns for major parties of the Left. However, the results of the 1988 national election voting percentage for the FDN beg attention as it attracted 31.1 percent of the votes,\textsuperscript{104} the highest ever for any party of the Mexican Left. In the 1994 national election the newly formed PRD, having split from the FDN, earned only 16.5 percent of the votes.\textsuperscript{105} Percentages of voter turnouts for 1988 and 1994 elections were 49.4 and 77.7, respectively.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{102} The DC was headed by former Mexican Presidents Luis Echeverría and José Lopez Portillo.


\textsuperscript{104} Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Mexico and NAFTA Report} Sep 29, 1994, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{106} Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 258.
Table 8 shows voting percentages for congressional elections for the left.

Table 8 - Left Voting Percentages for the Mexican Congressional Elections: 1982-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentages of Congressional Votes for the Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188.

Results for 1982 and 1985 are shown as a benchmark for Leftist parties prior to the FDN. Worth noting in Table 8 is that the FDN captured almost 30 percent of the votes for 1988. After the PRD was established, votes for parties of the Left declined to almost nine percent only to climb close to 17 percent for the 1994 election.

In 1988, a comparison of voting percentages of the Left to the more Rightist PAN (Tables 8 and 7), reveal that percentages for the left nearly doubled those of the PAN. Moreover, the 1991 percentages favor the PAN, a reversal of the 1988 election. More striking are the 1994 results in which the PAN placed second with more than one quarter of the voting percentages and the PRD short of 17 percent. Considering the Congressional elections as a measure to determine party popularity between national elections, a conclusion can be drawn that the PAN has indeed consistently drawn votes from the PRI since 1988.
4. The Labor Party

The Labor Party (PT) warrants a discussion here because of the role it played during the 1991 midterm and 1994 national elections. As a moderate Leftist party the PT won 1.2 percent of the votes in the 1991 congressional poll.\textsuperscript{107} According to analysts, the success of Cecilia de Soto and the PT in 1994 was allegedly part of a plot by the PRI to detract votes from the PRD. The conspiracy was unfounded as the PRD earned far fewer votes than either the PRI or the PAN in 1994. The PRD would have needed about ten additional percentage points to tie the PAN and many more to challenge the PRI. Moreover, the PT won 2.74 percent of the national vote, more than any of the other minor parties.\textsuperscript{108}

The minority parties all received less than one percent of the votes as follows: the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) won .93 percent; the Cardenista Front of the National Reconstruction (PFCRN), created in 1947 and until 1994 was a major party on the Left, .85 percent; the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) .55 percent; the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) .47 percent; and the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM) .28 percent.\textsuperscript{109} Because these percentages are lower than the legally mandated minimum of 1.5 percent of the 1994 national


\textsuperscript{108} Mexico and NAFTA Report Sep 29, 1994, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{109} Mexico and NAFTA Report Sep 29 1994, p. 3.
vote, these parties have either lost their registration, like the PVEM and the PDM, or are no longer eligible for public campaign funds, like the PPS, PARM, and the PFCRN.

In summary, the PRI which was established as an outgrowth of the Revolution has consistently won all national elections since its existence. The PAN is the most stable and well organized of the parties. The PRD has not been active long enough to draw any conclusions. A fact is that should the parties on the Left pool resources and unite, the chances of a presidential candidate are greater than if the parties continue to splinter.

C. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN MEXICO

Historically, impartial rules between the PRI, the PAN, and the PFCRN have never existed. On the surface there seems to be some level of fairness of the political party system in Mexico, but upon closer examination the playing field is not equal. This section analyzes the institutionalization, the fairness, of the Mexican party system to determine where the strengths and weaknesses are in relationship to Mexico’s progress towards democracy. First, an overview of the electoral system is vital to explaining the institutionalization of Mexico’s political party system.

1. The Mexican Electoral System

Federal electoral laws in Mexico have historically been amended to favor opposition groups with representation in the Congress. In 1963 the Federal Elections Commission created the “diputados de partido” (deputies of the party) so that Congressional seats could be easily

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112 The Deputies are equivalent to the U.S. Representatives. Elections for Deputies occur every three years.
won by parties that earned 2.5 percent of the national vote. The law allowed each party that received the legal minimum votes five seats in the Congress plus one seat for each additional .5 percent of the national vote.\textsuperscript{113} The problem was that many political parties, especially those on the Left, could not capture 2.5 percent of the national vote.

In 1977, the electoral law was again amended and the legally mandated minimum to acquire congressional seats was lowered to either 1.5 percent of the national vote or registering 65,000 members. Other major revisions included public financing and free radio and television time to all parties, the inclusion of the Left in the party system, and an increase of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 400, 100 of which were reserved for opposition parties under a proportional representation system.\textsuperscript{114}

In 1984, the Federal Elections Commission again revised the electoral law and chose proportional representation formulas that favored opposition groups. Table 9 shows the percentage of seats in the Chamber of Deputies according to political party from 1982 to 1994. The table begins with 1982 to provide consistency with the previous table.


\textsuperscript{114} Cornelius, 1987, p. 20.
Table 9- Percentages of Mexican Congressional Seats: 1982 to 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentages of Congressional Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levy and Bruhn, 1995, p. 188.

An analysis of Table 9 shows that the PRI in all instances has maintained the majority in the Congress. The PAN, in 1988 was third after the success of the FDN. However, in 1991 the PAN dropped a few percentage points only to regain their losses in 1994. In addition, the key electoral reform between 1986 and 1988 increased the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 500, 100 more seats than in 1977.\(^{115}\) The additional seats contributed very little to Mexico becoming more democratic as the electoral system was viewed by Mexican citizens as favoring the PRI.

Administrative changes between 1989 and 1990 included the creation of the Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) and the newly Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The COFIPE was charged with improving elections and some of their initiatives included tamperproof photo identification cards for voters and an electoral registry. The IFE was an independent organization that consisted of representatives of the executive and legislative

\(^{115}\) Alcocer V., 1995, p. 59.
branches, the political parties, and the citizenry. An autonomous association not dominated by the PRI would make upcoming national elections appear more legitimate than in previous years. More importantly and for the first time, the PRI did not control these groups.

Before the 1994 election another key reform restructured the Senate so that each state increased its share of senators from two to four. The reform also implemented a mixed election system for the senators which meant that the “majority party in each state would occupy three Senate seats and the fourth would go to the second leading party.” Before this revision, senators were directly elected by the voters in their respective states. Additionally, Senate terms were to coincide with the election of the president. The results of the 1994 national election were that the PRI won 300 of the 500 Deputy seats, the PAN 119, the PRD 69 and the PT 12. In terms of the Senators the PRI won 95 seats, the PAN 26, and the PRD 7; no seats were won by the PT.

In summary, the electoral system clearly is ever-changing in an attempt to become more fair and democratic. Since 1978, there have been more major changes to the electoral system than between 1929 and 1976. A legitimate electoral system is key to institutionalizing a party system. Otherwise, the system is viewed as flawed and open to corruption. The next section analyzes the institutionalization of Mexico’s party system.

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2. Institutionalization of the Mexican Political Party System

Mexico’s current party system includes all legally recognized parties who maintained at least 1.5 percent of the 1994 national vote. This system includes the PRI, the PAN, the PRD, and the PT. The laws governing the party system are grounded in the 1917 Constitution and as further stipulated in ongoing electoral amendments initiated by the IFE. This section concentrates on the institutionalization of the party system, considering the stability in the rules between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders.

a. Stability in the Rules Between Interparty Competition

Mexican electoral reforms occur as additional parties meet the minimum qualifications to become registered and as the parties make attempts towards democratizing the political system. Between 1946 and 1976 there were very minor changes to the electoral laws but by 1977, electoral reforms preceded midterm and national elections. Between 1977 and 1994 there were five major reforms to the electoral system: in 1978, 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1994. Frequent electoral reforms have resulted in unstable rules between interparty competition.

Reforms of campaign spending ceilings initiated in 1992 went unheeded during the 1994 presidential election. Of the U.S. $1.3 billion spent on the 1994 elections, the PRI accounted for 78 percent, the PAN 10.4 percent, and the PRD less than 4.6 percent. In the state of Tabasco, the PRI candidate, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, exceeded spending limits on his 1994

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120 “Zedillo Tries to Keep the Show on the Road as Cárdenas Lurches Further to the Left.” Mexico and NAFTA Report RM 95-02, Feb 23, 1995, p. 3.
mayoral campaign. Evidence produced shows that he spent U.S. $76 million on his campaign—twice the amount that Ernesto Zedillo spent on his presidential campaign. According to the electoral authorities, Madrazo spent “70 times what he was allowed to spend.”¹²¹ This election demonstrates how unfair the rules are between parties and how far the PRI can go to control voting polls.

There is more evidence that rules between interparty competition favor the PRI who has violated equal access to the media coverage. The Civic Alliance, a Mexican nongovernmental organization and political watchdog group, learned that prior to the 1994 election “television viewers and radio listeners were twice as likely to see and hear Ernesto Zedillo, the presidential candidate of the long-ruling [PRI], as to see or hear any of his rivals.”¹²² In essence there is no enforcement of stability in the rules and interparty competition as campaign spending limits and media coverage are violated by the PRI.

b. Stable Roots in Society

For the purpose of this thesis, longevity determines the stable roots in society. Without a doubt the PRI and PAN are well-established in the Mexican society as they have been active since 1929 and 1939, respectively. Up until 1991, the PRI drew dominant support, 70 percent to 100 percent, from its states of Campeche, Chiapas, Nuevo León, Puebla, Tabasco, and


San Luis Potosí. In a recent election, the PRI won control of the 189 townships, the PAN the state capital and 21 townships, and the PRD seven townships. Moreover, the PRI’s three sectors have helped to sustain its longevity through internal linkages between client and patron - a characteristic not documented in any other party in Mexico.

The PAN, which historically drew support from the northern border states, is only ten years younger than the PRI. In recent elections, the PAN has become more competitive in terms of gaining governorships, seats in Congress, and other positions of authority. The PAN has increased state deputies from 171 to 240; the numbers of mayors have climbed from 118 to 218; and the PAN now “rules 25 percent of all Mexicans, almost twice as many as at the beginning of the year.”

The PRD, created in 1989, is not yet considered, by this author, as having stable roots in society, simply because the organization has been active for only six years. Cardenas does not have an outstanding history of leading parties for any length of time, as demonstrated by the FDN and the PFCRN. The PT, likewise, lacks stable roots in the Mexican society.

c. Legitimate Electoral Process and Parties

The PRI, PAN, PRD, and PT are recognized by the IFE as being legitimate, given that each of the parties received more than 1.5 percent of the 1994 national vote. However, the electoral process is not legitimate because of its inherent flaws. According to Andrew Reding, the PRI for the 1988 national election “resorted to wholesale fraud to maintain its grip on the


presidency."¹²⁶ "The huge pluralities, 90 percent in many cases, suggest[ed] systemic electoral fraud."¹²⁷ Moreover, the Mexican government invested U.S. $730 million¹²⁸ in a computerized vote-counting device to provide immediate results over national television. When it was obvious that the FDN was in the lead, the system conveniently "failed," causing results to be tabulated by hand. In days following the election, completed voting ballots were found floating in rivers and burning in bonfires along the roads.¹²⁹

Six years and three electoral reforms later, Mexico’s electoral system has improved but still received considerable criticism over the conduct of elections. During 1994, tens of thousands of Mexican poll watchers helped coordinate nearly 1,000 foreign ‘visitors’ the government permitted to witness the election.¹³⁰ According to Dan La Botz, the majority of election observers reported grave discrepancies of the electoral process. There were irregularities in staffings at polling places. Observers were given names of Mexican nationals who were to staff the polls. When the observers arrived, they found other nationals in charge.¹³¹


‘Visitors’ noted PRI members “eyeing” voters going in and out of the booths, where booths were available, which created immense intimidation for participants. In the absence of polling booths, citizens voted out in the open, losing the freedom of a secret-ballot vote. Many observers, primarily in rural areas, witnessed Mexicans being turned away from polls either because polling places had run out of ballots or the polling location was relocated at the last minute. One observer even saw two people in one booth - a PRI member and a first-time elder voter.132

To underscore that discrepancies in the electoral process are still present, a recent local election in the state of Quintana Roo resulted in the PRI winning all eight mayor races with a combined 55 percent, compared with 33 percent for the PAN. In what was not perceived as a fair election, the opposition has vowed to contest the state results. “[The PAN] complained of ‘an open and brazen complicity’ between the head of the Quintana Roo state electoral council and the PRI state governor that were used to perpetrate ‘serious irregularities.’”133

The electoral reform is still the primary concern in Mexico’s progress towards democracy as the PRI, PAN, PRD, and PT continue to debate issues. One hot topic pertains to the proportional representation system and the maintenance of party registration. The PAN and the PRD want the threshold for representation set at five percent and the minimum percentage of party registration set at three percent. The PT wants the proportional representation set at 2.5


133 “PRI Victories Give Zedillo a Boost.” San Jose Mercury News Feb 23, 1996, p. 12A.
percent and the party registration set at two percent of the total national votes. Other sticking points between the parties include: the selection of electoral authorities, the electoral process, the way parties compete in elections, and the structure, legality, and representation of parties.

Following these debates, 17 Mexican Constitutional amendments and dozens of supplementary bills have been passed. The goal was to expand democracy and eliminate electoral fraud. One amendment grants Mexicans living abroad an opportunity to cast absentee ballots for the presidential election in the year 2000. Another links the voting system to the federal judiciary. For the first time in history, Mexico’s supreme court can intervene in electoral disputes. Yet, another amendment permits citizens to join a party of their choice instead of being coopted into a PRI sector.

d. Parties Subordinate to Ambitious Leaders

Mexico does not differ from other Latin American countries where “presidencialismo,” the personal politics of the president, is prevalent. Ernest A. Duff studied the relationship between political leaders and political parties in Latin America. He argues that political leaders created parties capable of resolving crises with a minimum amount of violence. Duff gives examples of strong leaders who made a positive impact on the party. Among them are


President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-1907 and 1911-1915) of Uruguay’s Colorado Party, President Victor Raul Haya de La Torre (1978-1979) of Peru’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) of Mexico’s PRI, and President Rómulo Bentacourt (1945-1948 and 1959-1964) of Venezuela’s Democratic Action Party.

In Mexico, former President Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) practiced personalistic politics in that he utilized the PRI to gain personal wealth while sacrificing the good of the party. By the time Salinas left office, he “allegedly garnered over $100 million in unexplained wealth during [his] presidential tenure from 1988 to 1994.”138 The PRI, however, still remains very much a dominant political actor although Salinas no longer resides in Mexico.

In summary, the evidence shows that institutionalization of the party system in Mexico, while improving, is still inadequate because of unbalanced outcomes of each indicator. First, electoral reforms to bring about fair party competition only occurred between 1988 and 1994. Second, the PRI and PAN are the only two parties who have existed for 65 and 55 years, respectively; the PRD and PT have experienced only one national election and two midterm elections. Third, the political parties are legitimate, but the evidence shows that the electoral process has not significantly improved since the 1988 election. Fourth, Salinas typifies a recent PRI leader who sacrificed his party for personal gain.

D. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

In conclusion, the level of institutionalization of the political party system in Mexico is a major drawback to the progress towards democracy. The evidence in relation to the four indicators of institutionalization (stable rules between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders) clearly shows that the political party system is not equally fair for all parties. The evidence indicates variation in the indicators, which in some instances favor one party but not the other. For institutionalization of the political party system to become successful each indicator must exist for either all or none of the parties.

Considering the evidence, the conclusion is that there are some major improvements to the political party system, but that they are still inadequate. Furthermore, the key is not where Mexico is, but the direction in which it is heading. The comparison below shows the status of institutionalization of the political party system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>What the evidence shows:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stable rules between party competition?</td>
<td>Absent, but improving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable roots in society?</td>
<td>Present for PRI and PAN; absent for PRD and PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate electoral process?</td>
<td>Absent, but improving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate parties?</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party subordinated to personal interests of a leader?</td>
<td>Absent for the PAN, PRD, and PT; neither absent or present for the PRI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The current system is unfavorable to multi-party competition because of PRI elites and the fortunes they stand to lose should Mexico transition to democracy. Some of the losses that could be incurred by the PRI should other parties be “allowed” to compete in politics include the loss of benefits reaped through the patron-client relationship. Under Mexico’s one-party system, clients are indebted to patrons for promotions and jobs in exchange for promises to “vote PRI,” for example. Since the existence of the ruling party, the pattern of the president has been to enter office, employ relatives and close friends in cabinet-level positions, gather a mass fortune (normally through illegal means), appoint a successor, leave office, and retire in luxury. The loss of these benefits could further deter elites in any regime from becoming democratic.

For the PRI, the disadvantages of a multi-party system are also linked to why the electoral system, especially before 1994, appeared illegitimate. Although numerous reforms have been approved to become more democratic, in 1994, observers witnessed “flaws” in the electoral process. These “flaws” are ways to ensure that other parties do not compete for office. If parties do compete for office, the “flaws” ensure candidates do not stand an equal chance as the PRI at winning. The decision to disregard campaign finance laws is another way to ensure that the PRI remains in power. The amount of funds spent on campaigns for the PRI versus campaigns for the other parties is not even close. The campaign funds spent by Madrazo in the Mexican state of Tabasco clearly underscores the PRI’s grasp on political power.

Therefore, Mexico does not have a viable multi-party system because the party system itself is not fully institutionalized. That is the playing field is not level for all parties. Stable rules between party competition, a legitimate electoral process, and legitimate parties are lacking. Until
each indicator applies to all parties, the party system will not become viable. And, as long as there is not a viable multi-party system, democracy in Mexico will not be consolidated.
IV. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and to assess the impact of U.S. foreign policy on Mexico's progress towards democratization. The broader puzzle is: why has Mexico failed to democratize? Considering the U.S. agenda to promote democracy in Latin America and the substantial amount of U.S. economic and diplomatic involvement with Mexico, one would expect that Mexico's political structure would be more democratized than it currently is. Although U.S. foreign policy has played a dramatic role in instituting democracy in Panama and Haiti, the policy has had inconsiderable impact on Mexico's progress towards democracy. Some would even argue that U.S. foreign policy has negatively impacted Mexico's transition to democracy, given Mexico's reluctance to acquiesce to the United States.

Dahl provides the theoretical framework for this chapter. Within this framework, the second section analyzes the historical background of U.S. foreign policies towards Mexico and the nature of U.S. relations with Mexico. The third section analyzes U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and its impacts on the democratization process in Mexico. The fourth section contains the conclusion to this chapter.

1. Review of the Literature

Recently, there has been an explosion of literature on U.S.-Mexican relations. A common theme of Mexican writers is Mexico's reluctance to subordinate itself to the United States. For example, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, a former advisor to Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) and a current congressman, argues that the biggest mistake a Mexican presidential candidate can make is to gain the endorsement of an American president or any of his appointees.
That fear is grounded in history. When the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson expressed preference in 1913 for overthrowing Francisco Madero and replacing him with General Vitoriano Huerto, the legend of “el beso del diablo” - the kiss of the devil - began. “The kiss” (or the United States) became the most expeditious way to kill a candidate’s chances to win as office seekers were soon labeled puppets of the United States. By 1946, with the election of Avila Camacho, U.S. presidents have steered clear of involvement in the Mexican presidential campaigns and, likewise, Mexican presidential candidates have not linked themselves with U.S. presidents. At the presidential level, U.S. presidents have taken the course of staying out of Mexican presidential campaigns. As a result, U.S. influence on Mexico is limited. Efforts to exercise influence are often counter-productive.

2. Theoretical Framework

Dahl specifies three ways by which external actors can influence democracy in a particular country. The first way is through manipulating any combination of variables, such as socioeconomic order, equalities and inequalities, subcultures, and beliefs. The second way is through “the actions of foreigners who may alter the options available to a regime without necessarily altering the form of the regime.” The third way is through “outright foreign domination.” The United States has played a major role in initiating democracy in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti through employing Dahl’s third option. This option is not a U.S. consideration because of the nature of the U.S.-Mexican relationship, discussed below.

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The second type of external influence is using political leverage to limit options available to the Mexican government. Examples include the United States denying visas to Mexican nationals, restricting U.S. citizens from traveling to Mexico, and charging Mexican nationals fees to enter the United States via the legal border-crossing points. Realistically, none of these options could be effectively enforced. If visas are denied, Mexican nationals will only cross the border illegally out of desperation for economic survival. The reactions of Americans being told where not to travel will, likewise, go ignored. This form of influence is impossible to enforce, not feasible, and will not be addressed in this chapter. Therefore, concerning Mexico, the focus of this chapter is on Dahl’s first way to affect democratization.

To characterize the linkage of the United States and Mexico, Bruce M. Bagley refers to the U.S.-Mexican relationship as one of asymmetrical interdependence. Bagley further argues that “[n]owhere in the world is the interrelationship between a developed and a developing country more extensive, and the two societies promise to become even more interdependent in coming decades.”\textsuperscript{141} The incentives for the United States to maintain favorable ties with Mexico are for access to increased inexpensive resources, increased trade and jobs, and decreased illegal migration. The incentive for Mexico to the United States is continued economic assistance. Throughout this chapter, evidence will be presented as to the asymmetries between the United States and Mexico.

3. Methodology

The argument of this chapter is that Mexico should be much more democratic because as U.S. international prestige grows the more influential the United States becomes; the more influential

the United States, the greater likelihood that a particular society will comply with the desires of the United States. Applying this argument to Mexico, this means that Mexico should be more democratic because of U.S. influence. Employing a case study of Mexico, this chapter focuses on the causal (independent) variable of U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico and the outcome (dependent) variable of lack of democratization. The puzzle of this chapter is: why has U.S. foreign policy in favor of democratic reform failed to bring about democratization in Mexico? The next section examines a historical overview of U.S. policies towards Mexico and the nature of U.S. relations with Mexico.

B. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

1. **Background: U.S. Foreign Policies Towards Mexico**

   Relations between the United States and Mexico were affected by the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) in which the two nations fought over the annexation of Texas. Briefly, in 1846 when U.S. President James K. Polk was unable to purchase what today is California and New Mexico, the United States and Mexico went to war. The result was that the "United States agreed to make a cash payment of $15,000,000 to the Mexican government and to assume $3,250,000 in claims that the United States citizens had against [the Mexican] government. For a total of $18,250,000, Mexico’s territory was reduced by half."\(^{142}\) Although Mexico’s major loss of land is no longer at the forefront of U.S.-Mexican relations, Mexican nationals still remember this significant event.

   Beginning in the early 20th century, U.S. foreign policy shifted from isolationism to interventionism. The United States intervened in Mexico for the Occupation of Veracruz and to hunt for Pancho Villa. In 1914, service members from the USS DOLPHIN were arrested in Tampico.

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while purchasing supplies. When Mexican President Huerta refused to apologize, the United States bombarded Veracruz. Between 1916 and 1917, U.S. General John Pershing and 10,000 troops deployed to Mexico to unsuccessfully search for Pancho Villa, who had entered New Mexico and killed 17 U.S. citizens.\textsuperscript{143}

Considering the policy and tense relations, in 1933, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the Good Neighbor Policy. Briefly, this policy included

essential qualities of a true Pan Americanism [that] must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other’s point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which confidence, friendship, and good will are the cornerstones.\textsuperscript{144}

After the Good Neighbor Policy, there were ongoing initiatives on both sides of the border to improve relations. The spread of communism following World War II provoked U.S. presidents to formulate foreign policies to protect the Americas from communism. These policies were expressed through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Pact of 1947, a regional security system, and the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1948. With the demise of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, the policy shifted to engagement and enlargement.

Under the U.S. foreign policy of engagement and enlargement, political and economic liberalization led to amiable relations as the United States, Canada, and Mexico concluded negotiations and agreed on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992. With the


Mexican government receiving internal and external pressures, Mexico reformed its electoral system modestly to become more democratic. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton used the Summit of the Americas as the forum to espouse the U.S. foreign policy of promoting democracy towards Latin America.

In summary, throughout the 20th century, U.S. foreign policies toward Mexico were driven by global threats (communism), political freedoms (democracy), and liberal trade. The above examples illustrate past U.S. policies towards Mexico and how the United States has been extremely protective of the Americas. Now that the Cold War has ended and the United States receives a great economic benefit from Mexico, the United States has major economic interests in protecting Mexico from potential threats. Similarly, Mexico would not want to lose the benefits of trading with the United States. The next section examines the U.S. relations with Mexico.

2. **Nature of U.S. Relations with Mexico**

Abraham F. Lowenthal argues that the interpenetration between the United States and Mexico has been evident through economic, political, and historical linkages. The asymmetries are stark. Economically, there is a developed United States compared to a developing Mexico. The border separates the relatively rich Americans from the relatively poor Mexicans. Politically, there is a decentralized government in the United States compared to a highly centralized Mexican government dominated by the PRI. Historically, the linkages date back to the American-Mexican War of 1846 when the United States “took” one-half of Mexico’s territory. Other examples include: Operation Secado in 1947, in which one million Mexicans in the United States were rounded up and returned.

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to Mexico; the last few decades of the United States preventing illegal drugs from crossing the U.S.-
Mexican border, and the 1996 beatings of Mexicans by U.S. border patrol agents which were aired
throughout the United States and Mexico.

These instances point out the interpenetration of U.S. and Mexican affairs. According to
members of the Binational Commission on the Future of the United States-Mexican Relations, "What
happens in Mexico City is almost always important to the [United States], and often intimately affects
Washington's security interests."\(^{146}\) Mexico's problems are increasingly becoming problems in the
United States because of the extent of the intertwined relationship.

The nature of the U.S.-Mexican relationship is best explained by analyzing recent U.S.
legislation. In March 1996, the United States approved the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act also known as the Helms-Burton Law (H.R. 927). Under this law, the United States should
sanction Mexico for trading and conducting business transactions with the Cuban government. The
law empowers the U.S. president to "encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit relations
with Cuba."\(^{147}\) Also, the legislation reduces U.S. foreign aid to countries, like Mexico, that support
Cuba through regional trade, something the United States advised Mexico to do to expand their
economy. Officials in Latin American countries have voiced strong opposition to the legislation.
During U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Latin America, he was met with

\(^{146}\) Binational Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations. "Foreign Policy
and Inter-State Relations." The Challenge of Interdependence: Mexico and the United States.

\(^{147}\) Refer to H.R. 927, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Title I, Section
102 that was approved by the U.S. Congress (74 votes for and 22 votes against) on March 5,
1996.
nationals who conveyed their strongest disapproval of the Helms-Burton Law.\textsuperscript{148} As Cuba's third top investor, Mexico is faced with choosing between supporting U.S. demands or suffering the consequences espoused by the United States.

According to U.S. Army Major Craig A. Deare, the Helms-Burton legislation threw a wrench in the U.S. current policy towards Mexico, especially after the recent approval of NAFTA and the March 1, 1996 certification of Mexico for financial assistance. The approval of the law has resulted in U.S. and Mexican officials being bombarded routinely with questions challenging the implications of the law.\textsuperscript{149} In any case, the United States has given Mexico an option to comply with the new law or face the consequences of U.S. sanctions.\textsuperscript{150} James Jones, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, said that the "act is susceptible to being amended by future U.S. Congress sessions but in the meantime countries doing business with Cuba after the implementation of the act will be punished."\textsuperscript{151} What remains to be seen is the law's impact on future policy and relations between the two countries. The law, approved before Christopher's trip to Mexico, was not on the agenda during his visit to Mexico City but received considerable coverage during a question-and-answer session.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{149} Deare, Craig A. Personal interview. May 23, 1996. Major Deare is the Country Director for Mexico in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Inter-American Region.


\textsuperscript{152} Meade, Robert. Personal interview. May 28, 1996. Mr. Meade is the Caribbean Affairs Desk Officer at the U.S. Information Agency.
Why is the Helms-Burton Law relevant to U.S.-Mexico relations? First, the law creates strains in relations between the two nations. The law weakens the progress of the Binational Commission by ordering Mexico to either sever business ties with Cuba or accept U.S. sanctions. Second, after a “hands-off” U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico, the law intervenes in Mexican affairs and dictates Mexico’s business partners. U.S. foreign policy and the Helms-Burton Law send conflicting messages as to what U.S. interests really are in Mexico. On the one hand, the United States is interested in a democratic Mexico. On the other hand, the United States wants to influence Mexican commerce by approving its trading partners. In summary, the contradiction of U.S. foreign policy, discussed later, and the Helms-Burton Law baffles political scientists on both sides of the border.


Economically, Mexico matters to the United States. During the 1970’s oil boom, Mexico became a major supplier of petroleum to the United States. The United States “was compelled to acknowledge its dependence on foreign petroleum just as Mexico discovered vast reserves of oil and natural gas . . . By the 1980s Mexico was the third largest trading partner of the United States.”153 As of 1996, the United States became Mexico’s largest trading partner.

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Table 10 presents trade data between the United States and Mexico.

Table 10 - Trade Data between the United States and Mexico
(in U.S. billion dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports to Mexico</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From the US</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FTAA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the EU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World Imports</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports from Mexico</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To the US</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FTAA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the EU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Japan</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World Exports</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage data includes the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which includes 34 Latin American countries.

Source: InterAmerican Development Bank. Integration and Regional Programs Department, Statistics and Quantitative Analysis and DATAINTAL. Netscape. On-line. 1996.

The evidence clearly shows that Mexico receives more imports from the United States than any other trading partner, including the 15 European countries and Japan. This element alone underscores one major asymmetry between the United States and Mexico. Mexico imports more from the United States than Mexico exports to the United States, which underscores the economic dependency Mexico has on the United States. Data from the 15 European countries, Japan, and the world is provided to show that although Mexico does have other trading partners, the United States is by far
Mexico’s major trading partner and is in the best economic position to influence political actions in Mexico.

Not only does Mexico rely more heavily on the United States for trade, the United States has recently provided Mexico with economic assistance. In December 1994 the world witnessed the devaluation of Mexico’s currency, the peso. By January 1995, rather than ignoring Mexico’s financial crises, President Clinton invoked the executive power and loaned Mexico U.S. $20 billion through the U.S. Treasury’s Economic Stabilization Fund.\(^{154}\)

From the perspective of the United States, there were three advantages of rescuing the Mexican economy. The first was that the bailout was expected to save 700,000 American jobs.\(^{155}\) The second was that it cushioned the ramifications to other countries beyond Mexico. U.S. non-involvement would have jeopardized political and economic progress elsewhere in Latin America. Moreover, a “collapse of the peso and the consequent ruin of the Mexican economy would have weakened the U.S. dollar, hurt exports, and caused convulsions throughout Latin America’s Southern Cone Common Market and other emerging markets.”\(^{156}\) At stake was the potential loss of Mexico as the third largest trading partner of the United States and the losses that U.S. companies would incur.


Third, a crisis in Mexico threatens the security of American borders and citizens. According to Robert A. Pastor and Jorge G. Castaneda, "Instability in Mexico [has] more serious consequences for the [United States] than instability in any other country."\textsuperscript{157} Had the United States failed to lend money to Mexico, no doubt some Mexicans would have fled north across the border in search of jobs and higher wages. Even without a crisis the U.S. border patrol agents are already overwhelmed with illegal immigrants bound for the United States. Detentions of illegal aliens increased from 102,156 in January 1995 to 169,463 in January 1996 and arrests have skyrocketed in a few traditionally less traveled places.\textsuperscript{158} Most apprehended immigrants who are processed for illegal entry, and repatriated to Mexico, vow that they will cross the border again. In summary of the economic relations between the United States and Mexico, economic measures have been the primary means for the United States to maintain positive relations with Mexico. More on economic assistance will be provided later in this chapter.

To conclude this historical perspective, the background to U.S. policies towards Mexico and the nature of the relations between each country are relevant and worth considering in the formulation of U.S. policy towards Mexico. The more linkages the United States has with Mexico, and vice versa, the more complex the relationship. The more complex the relationship, the more difficult the policy becomes to draft. At stake for the United States is the loss of economic advantages provided by Mexico and the decline of relations between the United States and Mexico. Moreover, the United

\textsuperscript{157} Pastor and Castaneda, 1994, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{158} Of the nine border sectors (San Diego and El Centro, CA; Yuma and Tucson, AZ; El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen, TX), less traveled places include Tucson, Yuma and El Centro, AZ with increases of 116 percent, 144 percent, and 278 percent, respectively. Verhovek, Sam Howe. "With Detentions Up, Border Is Still Porous." \textit{New York Times}. NEXIS. On-line. Feb 13, 1996.
States does not want to jeopardize relations with the Mexican government by espousing a too-aggressive foreign policy. The next section analyzes the current U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico.

C. AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MEXICO

1. The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Mexico

 Broadly, current U.S. foreign policy outlines five “challenges,” two of which are relevant to the study of Mexico. The first pertains to economics, including increasing trade, exports, and jobs. These economic aspects strengthen the United States domestically and globally and are mutually reinforcing for countries that trade with the United States. The second relevant area is the reduction of international terrorists, criminals, and narcotics traffickers. The global strategy includes “intensive diplomacy to ensure that other nations fulfill their international obligations [and] broader international cooperation in asset forfeiture and money laundering. . . .” Promoting democracy and stability in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are also concerns of the policy. The other “challenges” in U.S. foreign policy that are not relevant to the U.S.-Mexican relationship include reinforcing the security of the European states, aiding the peace process in the Middle East, and committing to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 159

During his May 1996 trip to Mexico City, Secretary Christopher asserted that the United States has a vital interest in “a stable, prosperous, and democratic Mexico.” 160 Mexico has some of the basics of democracy, such as elections, presidential term limits, and an increasingly diverse press,


but falls short of other prerequisite characteristics.\textsuperscript{161} However, the United States has taken a "hands-off" approach to democratization in Mexico. Mexico has never been a full democracy, yet since World War II, the United States has conducted business transactions with Mexico.

According to Donald E. Schulz, "In the past, Washington has almost always valued stability over democracy."\textsuperscript{162} There are at least two advantages of a stable Mexican regime: less illegal immigration to the United States and trade. In terms of illegal immigration, an unstable Mexico could provoke more Mexicans to flee across the U.S.-Mexican border. As a result, the U.S. president would need to take increased actions to secure the southern border. Second, with instability comes the possibility of jeopardizing trade relations with Mexico. These trade relations, already analyzed, are important to both Mexico and the United States.

2.  \textbf{An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Mexico}

This section analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy on democracy in Mexico using the economic variable as espoused by Dahl. Dahl's theory of external influence contributing towards democracy applies in the case of U.S. relations with Mexico. Table 10 underscored the strength of economic linkages between the United States and Mexico. Because of the linkage of Mexico's economy to U.S. trade, manipulating Dahl's economic variable has resulted in a more, but not fully, democratic Mexico.

\textsuperscript{161} Some of the democratic characteristics that Mexico's political system lacks include secret ballot votes, fear of reprisals among dissenters of the ruling party, and fair elections.

Table 11 shows U.S. economic assistance to Mexico from 1946 to 1994.

Table 11 - U.S. Economic Assistance in Loans and Grants: 1946-1994
(in millions of U.S. dollars, rounded to the nearest even dollar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Latin America</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>24,811</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>30,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mexico</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures do not include military assistance or other U.S. government loans. Row totals may not add up to the totals because of adjustments of capitalized interests, net obligations, and other adjustments.


Between 1946 and 1994, the United States extended $670 million to Mexico for foreign assistance. That is an insignificant amount considering that in 1995, the U.S. lent Mexico $20 billion to help soften the blow of the devalued peso and limit its devastating affects throughout the Latin American region. Since 1991, U.S. aid to Mexico has consistently decreased. This may be because the United States no longer has the wherewithal to continue such aid. With the money that the United States has given or lent to Mexico, the evidence shows that there is some linkage between foreign economic assistance and democratization.

If the United States desires to provide economic assistance as a means to affect the democratization process in Mexico, there are several options available: to continue the present level of aid, to reduce aid, or to increase aid. Most Americans would oppose an increase in aid and instead
would opt to maintain roughly the current level of aid, although at a slightly lower level. A significant decline in U.S. aid could spark an economic crisis in Mexico causing Mexicans to cross the border illegally. A lack of aid could cause a decrease in Mexican jobs, which could result in fewer exports from the United States to Mexico. This means that the United States would have to find other markets for its goods. In essence, the devastating consequences are that both countries sacrifice the benefits of trading with each other.

There are other economic variables which could also be manipulated: loans through the World Trade Organization, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the U.S. Economic Stabilization Fund. The United States exercises considerable influence in international organizations, and could utilize that influence to further assist Mexico.

To summarize, U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico has not produced full democracy in Mexico. Political leverage and domination are not feasible options to bring about democracy in Mexico. Dahl's theory of impacting democratization through manipulating foreign policy variables may be applicable to other countries, where economic ties are not as strong as they are between the United States and Mexico, and where countries lack a common border. Since Dahl's theory falls short when applied to Mexico, perhaps arguments that democratization should come from internal factors beg consideration for Mexico.

D. CONCLUSION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO

In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico from 1945 until 1990 stemmed from major global threats to the security of the Americas. The nature of U.S. relations with Mexico varied from friendly to strained, depending on the era. The current foreign policy towards Mexico stresses U.S. interests and democracy. U.S. relations with Mexico, however, have been strained because the
Helms-Burton Law dictates Mexico’s business partners must meet U.S. approval. Scholars who generalize that the United States has dramatic influence in changing political systems should reconsider the substantial economic and border-related linkages like those between the United States and Mexico, which seem to limit U.S. political influence.

An analysis of the U.S. foreign policy clearly shows interest in Mexico’s progress towards democratization through economic measures. The mere linkage of Mexico to the United States clearly demonstrates the pull of influence towards democracy but not necessarily the acceptance of democracy by the ruling Mexican elite. The mixed results of foreign influence to produce democracy in Mexico leads researchers to study the role of internal factors. A major barrier to democracy is the absence of a fair political party system. Mexico has been a single party state, dominated by the PRI. As discussed in previous chapters, the biggest obstacle to democracy in Mexico is the PRI and the major losses it could incur should Mexico democratize.

The United States, however, has supported Mexican democratic initiatives by encouraging U.S. citizens to observe the 1994 presidential election. Concerning Mexico, recent U.S. policy has generally not been aggressive or interventionist, but instead supportive, with agreements coordinated through governmental and nongovernmental organizations. A harsh and more intrusive policy would be counterproductive and jeopardize relations with the Mexican government. U.S. interference in the Mexican democratization process could become counterproductive because at stake are Mexico’s concerns for sovereignty and nationalism.
V. CONCLUSION

A. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the thesis was to analyze why Mexico’s political system has failed to democratize and what its prospects are for the future. Three causal variables were analyzed to explain Mexico’s lack of democratization (the outcome variable): the lack of an institutionalized political party system, the civilian control of the military, and the role of U.S. foreign policy through economic assistance.

Mexico is the exception in many instances because theories pertaining to other Latin American countries are not necessarily applicable to Mexico. Concerning the armed forces, Zagorski theorized that subordinating the military to civilian control is necessary for democracy. But in Mexico, civilian control of the military is evident; democracy is not. Mexico’s military grew politically active during the Revolution but was eventually subordinated to civilian control. To assert its control of the military, civilians encouraged the military to become more professional, less political, and more autonomous. Because Mexico employs its military as an internal police, recent “warlike” actions against innocent civilians have worsened relations between civil society and the military. The two major negative events that widened the gap between civilian and military relations since the Revolution were the 1968 student demonstration and the 1994 repression of the Chiapas uprising. Because civilian control of the military alone has not brought about democracy in Mexico, civilian control of the military is a necessary, but insufficient condition for democracy.

Concerning the party system, Mexico has various political parties, some with a long history and tradition. This would seem to support democratization. Mainwaring and Scully have theorized
that an institutionalized political party system helps guarantee democracy. Upon closer examination of the four characteristics of an institutionalized party system, the evidence shows that Mexico’s political party system does not equally favor all officially recognized parties. The four characteristics include stability in the rules between party competition, stable roots in society, a legitimate electoral process and parties, and parties that are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders. The rules clearly favor the PRI; the PRI and PAN are the only two parties that have roots in society; the electoral process is undergoing reform; and the PRI is subordinated to personal interests of its leader, the president. Perhaps Mexico’s elite should heed the advice of Charles G. Gillespie who wrote on democratization in Paraguay: “The best way for a ruling party to adopt to a genuine situation of multi-party competition is for it to allow dissident strains of opinion to flower in its own midst.”

Applied to Mexico, this would mean allowing for greater pluralism within the PRI itself. This would then help the PAN and PRD to develop stronger political parties while the PRI is in power.

Finally, foreign influence is often posited as being important in democratization. The United States has been a champion of democracy, and yet its neighbor, Mexico, has failed to fully democratize. Dahl argues that economic variables are one way a developed country can manipulate a developing country to become democratic. Since 1946, the United States has consistently provided Mexico with economic assistance. Yet Mexico has never experienced full democracy. Moreover, U.S. support for democracy in Mexico is variable. The United States espouses global democracy, but when democracy interferes with U.S. jobs, regional security, and the loss of Mexico as a potential

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market, democratization of Mexico becomes less important. Nowhere on record has the United States taken a strong and concerted stand on behalf of democracy in Mexico.

In summary, what scholars have theorized about democratization does not necessarily apply to Mexico. A politically lame military and a competitive political party system are minimum preconditions of democracy. External influence can bolster democratization. In Mexico, a politically lame military clearly exists. Political parties are vibrant, but the political party system is not fair. And, while the United States yields considerable influence with relations with Mexico, that influence has failed to yield full democracy.

B. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Given the above assessment, there is no guarantee that full democracy will be brought about in Mexico. Currently, there are at least three directions in which the Mexican regime can head: 1) the regime can become more authoritarian, like Mexico prior to 1970; 2) it can maintain course and make no changes to the existing structure, allowing the PRI to remain in power; or 3) it can become more democratic by lifting restricted political party competition, conducting free and fair elections, and promoting freer civil and political liberties. The authoritarian regime is part of Mexico’s heritage; the democratic structure will be a new experience.

According to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, a country’s transition to democracy is the interval between one political regime and another, which has yet to occur in Mexico. However, the transition from liberalization (redefining and extending rights) to democracy

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in Mexico is happening, though at a snail's pace. In 1990, Cornelius suggested various reasons why Mexico's democratization appeared to be crawling along: poorly institutionalized opposition parties; no credible alternative to the PRI at the national level; the reduction of influence of PRI sectoral bosses and local structures; the dedication of the rural agrarian farmers to vote PRI; the lack of "young Turks" to join the PRI at the state and local levels; the reticence of reigning presidents to carry out political reforms; and the PRI distrust of the motives, policy-making, and competence of the opposition.\textsuperscript{166} Since 1990, Mexico has made progress in its transition towards democracy. The most obvious improvements are recent Constitutional amendments and electoral reforms to "improve" democracy, such as granting Mexicans living abroad an opportunity to cast absentee ballots for the upcoming presidential election and permitting citizens to join a party of their choice instead of being coopted into a PRI sector. In 2000, the elections of the mayor of Mexico City and the president, should they be free and fair, will be a test of democratization and perhaps transition in Mexico.

Given the conditions noted by Cornelius above, the prospects for democracy are cloudy. The PRI's power structure established during the Revolution is virtually immutable. Schulz predicts that Mexico's prospects are mixed because of the costs for the PRI and the president. He also anticipates a long and drawn out democratization process that could take decades to complete.\textsuperscript{167} Concerning the costs, a progressive president may risk an assassination attempt from members of his own party who want the political system to remain as it is. Luis Donaldo Colosio, the 1994 presidential


\textsuperscript{167} Schulz, Donald E., 1996, p. 138.
candidate, was gunned down in Tijuana, possibly because of his platform of promoting democracy, especially within the PRI.

One manner in which the PRI risks an erosion of the party’s dominance is through PRI infighting. During the PRI’s September 1996 convention, tensions erupted between the party’s reform-minded leaders and the old guard of anti-reformers (also known as dinosaurs) about the qualifications of future presidential candidates. The convention established that the candidate must have held elective office and have been a PRI party member for at least ten years.\textsuperscript{168} This was a victory for the dinosaurs, who resented the fact that Mexico’s last three presidents, considered technocrats, never held elected office prior to winning the national election.

Before the 1994 presidential election, Denise Dresser analyzed five scenarios for Mexico, which are appropriate for the upcoming presidential election in the year 2000. The first is a “recognized victory” in which either the PAN or the PRD defeats the PRI. The second is a “fraudulent PRI victory with governability,” which is what happened during the 1988 election. During this scenario, the PRI victory is disputed by other political parties, but the PRI still remains in power. The third is a “PRI victory without governability.” In this case, the PRI victory is disputed intensely by opposition parties and citizens. The PRI presidential candidate would be forced to resign, an interim president would be installed, and another presidential election would take place. The fourth is a “PRI victory endorsed only by the PAN.” The final scenario is a “PRI victory endorsed by both the PAN and the PRD.”\textsuperscript{169} The 1994 election came close to this scenario. The first


scenario is clearly the solution that seals Mexico’s transition to democracy. The fifth scenario could be a step toward the first scenario in a later election.

The PRI will attempt to hold on to power as long as possible, as other groups try to gain more political power. Some strategies to help the PRI maintain its power include revising electoral laws to appear to favor “disadvantaged” political parties, refusing to welcome viable opposition parties to the political arena, controlling elections through historical methods, and strengthening the PRI through “anti-reformist” rules as demonstrated during the national convention. Other groups within civil society, however, will demand greater political freedoms. Membership within the PRI’s three sectors will decline as more citizens join other civil organizations not controlled by the PRI. Mexico will transition from a dominant party nation-state to a multiparty state, but the questions are whether the transition will be peaceful, when will the transition occur, and at what pace.

To underscore that PRI elites will hold on to power as long as possible and that democracy is not in the forefront of Mexican affairs, in his September 1996 State of the Union Address, President Zedillo focused on the economy and the retaliation of the Popular Revolutionary Army. Zedillo only briefly mentioned the importance of democracy to Mexico. Zedillo’s address would have been the perfect time to brief Mexicans on what Constitutional changes and electoral reforms have occurred and what they mean for democracy. Clearly, the democratization of Mexico is not as important as some in the PRI claimed after the 1988 presidential election.

For many Mexicans, democracy is only rhetoric that the PRI espouses to maintain support. In a La Reforma poll of 1,500 Mexican adults in 25 states who were interviewed in their homes

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between August 1 and August 7, 1996, many did not see Mexico becoming more democratic. Of those interviewed, 40 percent said that Mexico is no more democratic now than it was three years ago; 19 percent said that there is less democracy now; and 33 percent said that Mexico is more democratic. In short, the prolonged democratization process does not guarantee democracy in Mexico and the prospects for democratization are uncertain.

C. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All American citizens should be concerned about the political situation in Mexico and the implications for the United States. Mexico’s political system affects the United States. Major shared interests between the United States and Mexico include controlling a permeable 2,000 mile border, expanding trade, decreasing illegal immigration, and stemming the flow of illegal drug trafficking into the United States. With the democratization of Mexico, illegal immigration into the United States from Mexico could decrease if Mexico became more stable, and especially if bilateral trade were to increase. Most economists agree that trade makes nations wealthier. Income earned through trade can be better spent within a nation’s borders by creating jobs. Stemming the flow of illegal drugs will only occur if the demand for the product decreases.

For some, there is also the concern that should the PRD win an election, Mexico could become unstable. A PRD victory could hurt U.S.-Mexican relations and wreak havoc on present trading practices. A more nationalist political system in Mexico would force the United States to confront issues, such as: will the United States continue to trade with Mexico, how will the border be reinforced, and how will U.S. citizens and their properties be safeguarded against potential threats?

171 The margin of error is plus or minus three percent. The poll was conducted jointly between the Los Angeles Time and La Reforma. Fineman, Mark. “The Times Poll: Mexicans See Their Nation in Moral Decline.” Los Angeles Times. Netscape. On-line. Sep 14, 1996.
In addition to considering the implications of U.S. policies for Mexico's political structure, there are a few approaches the United States can take in its relations with Mexico. Lowenthal offers four options for U.S. policy towards Mexico: adopt a nationalist approach, address binational issues one issue at a time, adopt a special relationship with Mexico, and adopt a broader policy that focuses on major issues in Latin America.¹⁷²

The first option is for the United States to adopt a nationalist approach of ignoring concerns in Mexico and focusing on those within U.S. borders. This author believes the nationalistic approach limits U.S. leadership in Latin America and goes against U.S. foreign policy and advances made during the 1994 Summit of the Americas. Furthermore, this approach prevents the United States from protecting its vital interests in Mexico, like trade. This approach could attempt to prevent illegal immigration from occurring, but realistically, totally sealing off the border is impossible.

The second option is to continue addressing individual issues. Since U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo created the Binational Commission in 1978, it has been the primary means to discuss and resolve issues. The nature of the interdependent relationship between the United States and Mexico makes this recommendation feasible. The United States and Mexico share a complex relationship within which each issue could be individually addressed.

Third, a special relationship between the United States and Mexico already exists. The proximity and interrelated economic, political, and historical asymmetries make the U.S.-Mexican relationship delicate. This relationship dates back at least to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and will continue as long as the two countries share a border.

The final option is to ignore a special relationship with Mexico and adopt broader policies that generally pertain to Latin America. As discussed before, the nature of the complex relationship prevents the United States from totally ignoring events in Mexico. This author believes that with the economic advantages both the United States and Mexico reap through trading with one another, ignoring Mexico could hurt the United States.

This author argues for Lowenthal’s third option. U.S. policy towards Mexico should clearly state U.S. interests in Mexico and provide a ranking of U.S. priorities. Currently, there seems to be a conflict between trading with and supporting democratization in Mexico. Which is the most important? The author believes that while a fully democratic Mexico may create short-term instability and pose special challenges to U.S. foreign policy, in the long term, a democratic Mexico is in the best interest of the United States. There is abundant evidence that democracies most fully satisfy the social and economic demands of its citizens. A democratic Mexico will be more effective in stemming the flow of migration to the United States because democratizations should assist in improving socioeconomic conditions in Mexico.
APPENDIX. ELECTORAL REFORMS IMPLEMENTED IN MEXICO: 1978-1994\textsuperscript{173}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key Reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Party system expanded from 4 officially recognized parties (PRI, PAN, PPS, and PARM) to 7 (adding PCM, PST, and PDM); proportional representation introduced in Chamber of Deputies: total number of deputies increased from 300 to 400, of which the original 300 remained “uninominal” (elected by majority vote within each of Mexico’s 300 voting districts) and the new 100 seats were to be “plurinominal” (elected according to the percentage of votes cast for each party in each of five zones into which the country is divided for that purpose, with an equal number of representatives from each zone).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1986–1988</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Code enacted; Chamber of Deputies enlarged to 500, with 300 uninominal representatives and 200 plurinominal; Senate terms changed from concurrent with the presidential sexenio to half concurrent, half starting at midterm (concurrent terms reinstated in 1993 reforms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1989–1990</td>
<td>Constitutional amendments to electoral process; Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) issued, establishing the independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE); new electoral registry developed; tamperproof photo IDs issued to voters; sanctioning powers of Federal Electoral Tribunal broadened; “governability” clause enacted, guaranteeing majority of seats in Chamber of Deputies to ruling party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>Amendments to Constitution, COFIPE, and electoral law promoting pluralism in Congress (by doubling number of Senate seats from 64 to 128 and guaranteeing 25% of Senate seats to the leading minority party in each state, by preventing any party from holding more than 2/3 of Chamber of Deputies seats, and by repealing “governability” clause); establishing campaign-spending ceilings and prohibiting political contributions by government agencies and officials, the private sector, religious institutions, and foreign individuals and organizations; expanding rules promoting equal access to media coverage of political parties; establishing office for prosecuting electoral crimes and expanding sanctions on such crimes; creating double-blind random lottery to select 800,000 citizens to be trained and serve as polling officials.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{173} Alcocer V., 1995, p. 59.
5.  1994

Multiparty agreements reached on accountability (external audit of voter registry, special prosecutor for electoral crimes, serial numbering of ballot stubs); Citizen Counselors on IFE General Council (proposed by parties not president, elected by 2/3 majority in Chamber of Deputies, and given voting majority on Council, while party representatives to Council lose right to vote on Council decisions); acceptance of international “visitors” during federal elections; new voting booth technologies; electoral registry (to be shared with parties monthly before elections); expanded programs for ensuring reliability of vote counts; expanded free media access to parties, monitoring of coverage by IFE, suspension of party-paid advertising and government promotion of PROCAMPO and PRONASOL programs 10 and 20 days, respectively, before federal elections; restric-
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