A LEAP INTO THE DARK: CRISIS ACTION PLANNING FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

A MONOGRAPH
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Operation RESTORE HOPE provides a recent example of a time sensitive, contingency joint and combined operation. More importantly, the campaign is illustrative of potential future MOOTW conflicts that this nation may be committed to. In little more than two weeks, operational planners developed and implemented a complex regional campaign plan that included all deployment, force employment and crisis termination requirements for the area of operations (AOR). To further complicate the planning effort of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, little was known regarding the AOR and the composition of participating joint forces and coalition nations repeatedly changed over time. A detailed examination of the planning environment at the early stage of the crisis will characterize the difficulty in collecting requisite information and consolidating planning resources to complete the operational planning task.

In the initial and potentially most crucial phase in the campaign formulation for Somalia, operational planners believed that their was neither theoretical or doctrinal mechanisms to assist them. What resulted was a dynamic, inconsistent, conceptual strategy that in the end had little resemblance of what had been proposed in the beginning. An examination of Operation RESTORE HOPE will serve to show the existence of potential MOOTW theoretical or doctrinal deficiencies.
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GLOSSARY

ATU-Amphibious Task Unit
AOR-Area of Operations
CAC-US Army Combined Arms Center
CAP-Combat Air Patrol
CINC-Commander-in-Chief
CJCS-Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMOC-Civil Military Operations Center
CNA-Center for Naval Analysis
COCOM-Combatant Command
COL-Colonel
CPX-Command Post Exercise
DOD-Department of Defense
HOC-Humanitarian Operations Center
HRO-Humanitarian Relief Organization
HRS-Humanitarian Relief Sector
HQ-Headquarters
I MEF-First Marine Expeditionary Force
JFC-Joint Force Commander
J1-Personnel
J3-Operations
J4-Logistics
J5-Strategy and Policy
JTF-Joint Task Force
LNO-Liaison Officer
LTC-Lieutenant Colonel
LTG-Lieutenant General
MEU (SOC)-Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MOOTW-Military Operations Other Than War
MP-Military Police
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA-National Command Authority
NGO-Non-governmental organizations
TPFDDL-Time Phased Force Deployment Data List
TRADOC-US Army Training and Doctrine Command
UN-United Nations
UNITAF-United Nations Task Force
UNOSOM I/II-United Nations Operations in Somalia I and II
USC-United Somali Congress
USCENTCOM-United States Central Command
USARFOR-United States Army Forces
USMARFOR-United States Marine Force
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INTRODUCTION

The nation cannot afford uncoordinated approaches among the domains of strategy—military, economic, diplomatic, or informational—which often manifest themselves as institutional and bureaucratic barriers to unity of thought and action. Political and military leaders must work closely, interacting on desired end states, objectives, capabilities and risk.¹

The United States (US) has emerged as the only combined political, military and economic superpower on the planet. The demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in a new international order with unique expectations and roles for the community of nations. To many, there was relative security in a bipolar world. Distinctions between competing global belligerents were clear. For forty years, world order seemed to require little more than a balancing of individual national interests within a foreign policy framework of security. Bipolarity was generally accepted by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO as a zero sum game, where any advantage gained by one side was perceived as a disadvantage to the other. There was order and focus in military, political and economic operations. Global reality appeared to be homogeneous and simple; you were either on one team or another. The employment of military force in a crisis situation was predictable. Everyone anticipated that war, if it came, would be a final nuclear exchange or a thoroughly planned and rehearsed mid to high intensity mechanized conflict conducted on the Northern German plains. Today, the new world order has created opportunities as well as potential dangers. Undoubtedly, the United States will continue to take an active global leadership role and utilize various selected power instruments to maintain or protect national interests.

Most recently, the United States military has conducted contingency operations
in Panama, the Saudi Arabian peninsula, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Zaire, among others. The military fought forest fires in Oregon and California, assisted Hurricane victims in Florida, and continues to patrol national borders jointly with other federal agencies. If recent history provides any window to the future, the requirements for the employment of military forces and resources will occur with little warning or preparation and will involve "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)."

Today, the classical use of military force to resolve a regional crisis may not be consistent with the concept of maintaining strategic interests. Recent examples of the employment of US military forces in a time-sensitive, crisis environment have shown that force, in and of itself, may serve to eliminate the crisis symptom, but may not necessarily cure the prevailing cause and in the long term only act to exasperate the situation. The defeat of a military adversary may do little to resolve the crisis and potentially could create further obstacles to securing a peace consistent with US, goals and interests.

During peacetime, numerous governmental agencies are involved in developing regional strategies and policies. Yet, during a crisis, it is the regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC), in coordination with the National Command Authority (NCA), who calculates the most efficient and practical ways to apply military power in harmony with other available means of power, influence, and persuasion, to achieve an overall end-state consistent with U.S. strategic interests. In peace, CINCs take action to deter and prepare for war by planning and organizing for war. During the last ten years, military forces have been committed to operations other than those that meets the classic definition of war and,
the MOOTW framework will, undoubtedly, characterize the future. The deployment of forces to Somalia (Joint Task Force-JTF Somalia) to participate in the United Nations sponsored Operation RESTORE HOPE provides an example indicative of potential future US military conflicts.

From receipt of initial orders, until the deployment of forces, JTF Somalia had little more than seven days to plan, rehearse and coordinate joint and combined staff and command components, as well as draw in an assortment of seemingly disparate governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (NGOs). Additionally, it was immediately apparent to the campaign planners that a clear understanding of the competing belligerents, their motivation for continued antagonism, or an awareness of the distinctive Somali political processes did not exist. Little was known of the theater of operations, or the demographic, political and social characteristics of the country in conflict. Further, little was understood about conducting the type of operation that the NCA anticipated.

Information acquired by the JTF from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) J5 (Strategy and Policy), and all four military services regarding the political, economic, and military situation in Somalia was fragmented, compartmentalized and often wrong². Consequently, the initial development of the operational plan was based upon questionable assertions and judgments regarding the region. JTF campaign planners viewed US joint military doctrine as ambiguous, obscure and inadequate for dealing with issues relevant to Somalia. In the initial and potentially most crucial phase in
the campaign formulation for Somalia, operational planners believed that there were few practical, theoretical or doctrinal mechanisms to assist them. Yet, successful campaign plans must provide for a sequential linkage and logical evolution of the operation from the point of crisis initiation through crisis resolution to a conclusion favorable to national interests. Plans should be coherent, have substance and must be focused. Operational focus is normally derived from the early identification of a desired operational end-state. Experience has shown, however, that clearly defined and measurable operational end-states during MOOTW are difficult to identify and have a tendency to change over time. In the development of the Operation RESTORE HOPE campaign plan, JTF planners encountered difficulty obtaining an unambiguous and clearly understood end-state from either the NCA or the UN.

The significance of Operation RESTORE HOPE is that it represents a category or type of conflict for which US combat forces may be used in the future. It serves as a historical example of a time sensitive, military, contingency crisis action. Did Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrate doctrinal and practical problems in the execution of MOOTW? Were there doctrinal mechanisms available to ensure pertinent political and military issues were addressed and answered to achieve the desired regional and strategic end states? What implications does this pose for campaign planners tasked to design and execute similar future operations and what utility does a clearly defined end-state provide the campaign planner attempting to develop a functional concept, determine requisite assets and to logically fuse these resources? It is these issues that this paper will address.
JOINT MILITARY THEORY AND DOCTRINE

The complexity and magnitude of conducting either traditional combat or MOOTW are such that it is neither efficient or practical to expect any one military service to accomplish either alone. This recognition of a need for joint operations made up of coordinated air, ground and naval actions in multiple theaters of war resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 that consolidated the military services under a Secretary of Defense, created the Joint Chiefs of Staff and initiated an evolutionary process that eventually resulted in the current US military organization and command structure.³

The Department of Defense Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) was designed to enhance the effectiveness of contemporary joint and combined military operations. It designated the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principal military advisor to the President, directed him to develop the strategic direction for the armed forces and required him to formulate both strategic and contingency military plans.⁴ Additionally, the legislation made unified and specified commanders responsible to the National Command Authority (NCA) to execute strategic and operational guidance within the region or functional area in which they operate. Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) were given combatant command (COCOM) over operational forces in their assigned area of responsibility (AOR). Additionally, COCOM specifies the authority over assigned forces granted to a CINC by the NCA and provides the requisite authority to organize and employ forces to accomplish his assigned mission.⁵ Of the eight unified commands, five (Atlantic Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Central Command and Southern Command) are assigned a specific geographic AOR and are
responsible to the NCA for the development of regional contingency plans and the
execution of strategic guidance and military operations. The theater of war includes all
land, sea, and air forces that are, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of
war. The theater of war may not only encompass the combatant commander’s entire AOR
and may be further organized or subdivided into one or more theater of operations
controlled by a subordinate commander.

CINC s translate national military and security strategy into regional specific concepts
to meet war planning requirements and contingencies. Theater strategies, campaign plans
and other plans are coordinated with supporting commanders, allies and other coalition
members. During peacetime, CINC s take action to deter and prepare for war by planning
and organizing for war. Theater strategic policy is derived from regional considerations,
intelligence evaluation, and other characteristics of the region. This, coupled with the
commander’s strategic vision, evolves a family of theater campaign and contingency
plans designed to achieve national or coalition strategic military objectives.

The analysis of ends, ways, means, and acceptable risks, guides CINC s as they
organize forces and allocate resources. Supporting commanders develop their own plans
to ensure operational and logistical integration, uniformity and compliance. The extent of
military, economic and political options, required to address each potential threat defers
in each AOR. Joint operational planning is an integrated process that requires uniform
policies, procedures and reporting structures resulting in coordinated problem solving and
decision making. During peacetime, the joint campaign planning process is highly
structured and deliberate. During a time sensitive, crisis situation, this process is

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accelerated, truncated and decentralized.

The joint operational planning processes are categorized as either campaign, deliberate or crisis action. Campaign planning includes both deliberate and crisis action planning and is the process whereby combatant commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts composed of various tactical actions. It is the primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort, and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within AOR. Deliberate planning is normally conducted during peacetime, accomplished in prescribed DOD planning cycles and based upon assumptions regarding both the circumstances and the threat that could exist when the plan is executed. Crisis action planning is based upon current events and circumstances and is normally time sensitive. Deliberate and crisis action planning are interrelated. Since the deliberate planning process anticipates potential crises and develops joint operational plans, it facilitates the rapid development and selection of a course of action during a crisis. Due to the very complex nature of deliberate planning rationale, it is hoped that a complimentary campaign plan (utilized as a base document) requiring minor alterations is available to provide, at a minimum, essential information and data to help solve the crisis.

It is significant that Operation RESTORE HOPE was an example of a contingency, time constrained operation. The six phases of the crisis action planning process (situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development, course of action selection, execution planning and execution) were compressed into a two week window. However, this abbreviated planning process may not necessarily have been an anomaly. It may have
been an example of potential future conflicts.

Anticipated future US regional crisis engagements, be they either military or political, are more likely to occur during MOOTW conditions, similar to a RESTORE HOPE, rather than in the fashion of a more traditional conflict. Yet, MOOTW operations possess the unique ability to combine the tactical, the operational and the strategic levels of war. A single careless tactical move by a soldier on patrol can immediately transform the characteristics of the campaign.

Not only was there no off-the-shelf planning document able to be modified to the existing conditions in Somalia, US military forces began operations in Somalia without the benefit of a standard joint peacekeeping doctrine. Since then, a family of tactical, operational, conceptual and doctrinal manuals have evolved that provide a foundation for building joint plans and orders. US joint doctrine provides guidance to joint force commanders for the direction, planning, execution and support of operations in either traditional conflict or operations other than war. Joint Publication 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations) and Joint Publication 3-07 (Doctrine for Joint Operations Other Than War) are primary joint operational planning documents and provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. The MOOTW principle of "objective" is particularly relevant to Operation RESTORE HOPE. Simple put, every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable "objective." Inherent in the principle of objective is the requirement to understand what constitutes mission success and what conditions must be established in order to achieve an operational "end-state" consistent with US national interests.
THE PEOPLE, THE CRISIS AND THE UN' CALL FOR ACTION

By November, 1992, Somalia possessed few characteristics resembling a nation-state. Nearly half of the total eight million population were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease. It was estimated that nearly 500,000 people had died in the previous twelve months, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. In eighteen months, Somalia had become a nation without a functioning government, police force, military, or economy. Somalia faced unrelenting clan violence and the virtual starvation of its population. Despite the combined humanitarian assistance efforts by numerous (over 30) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and attempts by the U.N. to politically rectify the volatile situation, the devastation and suffering of the people continued. The conflict threatened the stability throughout the Horn of Africa region. And endangered regional peace and security.\(^{15}\)

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992) and established UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia).\(^{16}\) Throughout the spring of 1992, the U.N. attempted extensive consultations with the various Somali leaders and clan elders throughout the country. The effort proved futile. The political and economic situation throughout the country progressively deteriorated. On 27 July, the Security Council concluded that UNOSOM I must expand its involvement in Somalia in order to bring about an effective cease-fire. Largely, due to Boutros-Ghali's insistence, the U.N. (Resolution 775, 28 August, 1992) further increased its humanitarian assistance and nation-building efforts.\(^{17}\) Within days, UNOSOM I included six U.N. coordinating
organizations and a much larger military contingent. Throughout southern Somalia, a
dozen or more factions, some torn by internal divisions, were active. Without a
central government or viable military, the resulting political disorder and extensive
physical destruction of the infrastructure severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian
supplies. Internationally, Somalia had emerged from virtual sub-Saharan oblivion to
become front page news. In the hearts and minds of the community of nations, it was time
now to "stop the dying" in Somalia and who better prepared to exercise this option than
the U.S. military sponsored by the U.N. and its Secretary General.

The ongoing situation in Somalia was not lost in the eyes of either the US press,
congress or chief executive. In early 1992 Senator Paul Simon (D-IL.) chairman of the
Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Nancy
Kassebaum (R-KS) called for urgent international action to save the Somali people.\textsuperscript{18}
Kassebaum traveled to Somalia in July, 1992, to witness the situation first hand. Based
upon her observations, she and Simon introduced a congressional resolution calling for the
deployment of UN forces to the region with or without the approval of any Somali
faction.\textsuperscript{19} On 27 July, the State Department issued a public statement in support of
sending armed UN security personnel.\textsuperscript{20} More congressional visits to the region in the
fall of 1992 and the persistent media intervention rhetoric coupled with a residual Gulf
War "success fever" political and military bias encouraged the Bush Administration to do
something, anything, to resolve the crisis.

On 25 November, 1992, the Acting US Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger,
informed Boutros-Ghali that the U.S. would be ready to lead in organizing and

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commanding a humanitarian relief operation in Somalia. On 3 December, the Security
Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992) authorizing the use of "all
necessary means, to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations in Somalia." Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council
authorized the participating member states to intervene militarily in Somalia and,
specifically, for a "member nation" (US) to command and control all forces that would
be involved.

The large (initial commitment of 24,000 troops) and powerful US led Joint Task
Force (later renamed United Nations Task Force-UNITAF) had the resources but insisted
that the commitment must be both limited and non-political. The NCA characterized the
role to be played as a limited humanitarian assistance operation without any nation
building objectives. More restrictive was the US military employment time table
to conclude no later than the Presidential inauguration on 21 January, 1992: "Our mission
is humanitarian, . . . We do not plan to dictate political outcomes." But, the scope
of UN Resolution 794 was not limited to securing humanitarian relief efforts within
southern Somalia. Specifically, UN Resolution 794 stipulated that the restoration of
peace, stability and law and order to facilitate the process of a political settlement aimed at
Somali national reconciliation was the ultimate goal of the operation. Even at this early
stage of the operation there was general disagreement between the NCA and the Secretary
General regarding the role that the US would play in the operation. The Resolution, either
by design or by oversight, does not address the character, form or duration of the military
mission. There is no definitive explanation regarding the conditions that must exist prior to

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the transition to eventual U.N. control. Any “secret hand-shakes” or “side-bar agreements” between President Bush, Eagleburger, or Boutros-Ghali were kept out of the official record. The opportunity to settle the issue was at this early point of the operation. Instead, each group continue to coordinate, plan and execute based on contradictory planning assumptions. Not until after the vast majority of US forces had deployed to the AOR, successfully completed the security mission and redeployment activities were being contemplated would these issues come to a head. Any enduring solution to the Somali crisis would require patience, time and resiliency. UNITAF’s fast paced “peacemaking” operation could not be planned or conducted in isolation of the UN’s long term “peacekeeping” ambitions without adversely impacting the population or the fragile peace. Yet, this apparent disagreement between US and UN intervention ambitions became a significant operational obstacle and foster antagonism between the two.

On 3 December, 1992, The President directed the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to plan a large scale humanitarian relief operation (Operation RESTORE HOPE) in Somalia. Ultimately, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) was identified as the Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for the overall planning and execution of the campaign.

**JTF SOMALIA: CRISIS ACTION PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT**

As the situation in Somalia deteriorated during the early 1990's, the NCA had directed USCENTCOM to prepare for the possibility of intervention and the USCENTCOM staff had created several broad concept plans for this eventuality. These plans included limited and restrictive military actions such as the evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel,
as well as a more definitive military and political intervention response. It was the widely held belief by the USCENTCOM staff that if military force would be employed anywhere in Northern Africa, the chances were that it would be in either Sudan or Egypt. The potential of a military deployment to Somalia, under any conditions, appeared to be highly remote.25 Additionally, the I MEF headquarters had conducted two training exercises in the spring and summer of 1992 using humanitarian intervention as the exercise theme.26 The first (EMERALD EXPRESS), was a communications exercise that required the staff to respond to a scripted humanitarian intervention scenario. The second, was a more useful command post exercise (CPX), that involved the entire staff as the nucleus of a joint staff in a conventional warfare scenario. Although, the scenario for both training exercises bore little resemblance to what the military would eventually encounter in Somalia, it did train the I MEF staff as a functional joint headquarters.

What the I MEF headquarters may have collectively lacked in time sensitive contingency, joint, and combined operational training, it was more than compensated by the individual experience, capabilities and professional education of its individual command and staff members. The I MEF commander, LTG Johnston, served as General Norman Schwarzkopf’s Chief of Staff during the Gulf War and was well versed in the intricacies of joint and combined operations. In 1991, The I MEF Director for Operations, BG Anthony Zinni, served as the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT during the Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq and, in an earlier assignment at Headquarters Marine Corps, served as the Head of the Special Operations and Terrorism Counteraction Section.27 Zinni’s
Deputy, Colonel (COL) Wallace “Greg” Gregson had recently completed a tour as a military fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and had served as the Military Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Zinni’s plans officer, COL Pete Dotto, spent three years as a military attaché in Rome, was fluent in Italian and, in this capacity, had dealt extensively with the UN’s High Commissioner of Refugees and the World Food Organization. Perhaps more germane to the current situation in Somalia, was Dotto’s experience in commanding prisons; one at Norfolk, Virginia, and the other at Camp Pendleton. When the U.N. authorized the emergency airlift of humanitarian supplies to Somalia on 27 July, 1992, USCENTCOM directed I MEF to form Joint Task Force (JTF) PROVIDE RELIEF to conduct the operation. From air fields in Mombassa, Kenya, JTF PROVIDE RELIEF delivered supplies to relief distribution centers in Somalia. Personnel assigned to this JTF would also play a pivotal role in the development of the Operation RESTORE HOPE campaign plan.

On 20 November, 1992, USCENTCOM notified I MEF of the possibility of a time-sensitive, contingency operation to support humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. On 21 November, a I MEF planning cell (led by COLs’ Gregson and Dotto) traveled to USCENTCOM to develop joint planning documents for the anticipated intervention. The group returned to Camp Pendleton on 23 November after completing the framework for the mission statement, commander’s intent, and estimate of the situation. The campaign concept was a distinctively U.S. Marine product since the identification of combined, supporting service component forces or joint planning augmentation, at this point, had not occurred. On 25 November, after receiving the collective I MEF and
USCENTCOM conceptual design for Somalia from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

President Bush directed the use of military force contingent upon approval of a U.N.
resolution in support of the operation.

On 3 December, I MEF was officially designated as Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia,
responsible for the overall command and control of the operation. The mission received
from USCENTCOM was ambiguous and readily open to a variety of interpretations:

When directed JTF Somalia will conduct military operations in Somalia to secure the
major airfields, seaports, key installations, and relief distribution sites; to provide open
and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for relief convoys; to provide
security for relief organization operations; and to assist United Nations/non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing humanitarian relief under UN
auspices.29

At the force level, the JTF analyzed the USCENTCOM mission and formulated the
following restated mission and operational design:

JTF will create an environment in which the UN and non-governmental
organizations could assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the
Somalia humanitarian relief effort. To achieve this goal JTF will mount a four
phase operation; I. Establish Lodgment; II. Secure Relief Sites and Convoy Routes;
III. Expand Security in Relief Sectors; and, IV. Provide for the Transfer of its
Functions to UN Control.30

The JTF mission design and purpose was fundamentally consistent with that directed
USCENTCOM. However, it did not embrace the broader UN theme of peace
restoration and nation building. Essentially, the planning and execution focus of the JTF
was to deploy rapidly to theater, secure the major population centers in southern Somalia
to allow for the unimpeded movement of relief supplies and quickly transition control to a
yet to be specified other UN command.

The Secretary General’s ambitions for the region included humanitarian assistance,
peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks. Clearly, the JTF had the requisite combat power and control structure to successfully accomplish all UN goals for the region, but did not have the resolve. Based on NCA guidance, USCENTCOM purposefully omitted from the mission statement tasks that could only be achieved over an extended period, offered no measurement criteria and were inappropriate for military forces not operating in support of a host-nation government. The NCA’s approval of the USCENTCOM developed mission statement came after interagency coordination. US policy makers limited US military operations to those tasks required to achieve near-term objectives delineated by the mission statement.

To the JTF planners tasked with the responsibility of developing and implementing the campaign plan, the resulting analysis of the USCENTCOM mission statement meant a short term, rather than long, solution to the problem: “We wanted to get in and out. The mission was to stop the scenes of starving kids on the nightly news...solving Somalia’s problems required a nation building plan. The US military was vehemently opposed to that...we set up short term goals and accomplished them.” Even at this early stage of RESTORE HOPE, potential obstacles emerged in accomplishing the desired UN end-state for the region. While the additional UN tasks of peacekeeping and nation-building may have been essential to an enduring peace and security in Somalia, they were never specified or implied in the USCENTCOM mission statement.

To plan for the immense task of movement, and still remained focused on the follow-on phases of the operation, the JTF divided their planning resources into two groups; one, responsible for the TPFDDL (Time Phased Force Deployment and Data List), deploy-
ment, and Phase 1; the other, for the remainder of the plan. TFPDDL planning was done by the JTF J-5. While planning continued in Dotto's Future Operations Cell, establishment of the JTF command and control facility in the UN embassy in Mogadishu was headed by COL Gregson and the J-3 (Current Operations). This process allowed the JTF HQ to maintain focus on both strategic and operational levels of war. The bulk of the planning effort at this stage of the operation involved simply getting units into theater.

With little available information coupled with an extremely narrow deployment time table, Zinni and Dotto began the task of developing a force employment concept of operations. Southern Somalia, the region most effected by the famine and clan conflict, would be divided into eight (a ninth was added later) humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). The significance of the sectors was that each was relatively the same size and situated geographically in the proximity of a large village or town that had an airstrip, either paved or dirt. Figuratively, the town became the hub of the HRS wheel and the road network from the town to the various villages within the HRS became the wheel's spokes. Little consideration was given to tribal affiliation or traditional clan borders when determining HRS geographical boundaries. HRS determination and ultimate selection was based solely on terrain analysis conducted on a map at Camp Pendleton and information obtained from Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Ironically, the eventual HRS boundaries were almost exact replicas of past Italian colonial borders.

Planning for a time sensitive, crisis, contingency operation frequently follows a logical progression that prioritizes competing requirements into a critical task list to be conducted sequentially. The deployment of forces into the AOR and the initial employment of forces
throughout southern Somalia (the first three phases of the JTF campaign plan) would soon
prove to be a rather mechanical and tranquil affair when compared to the eventual
command transfer of the operation to the UN. The actual assignment of relief sectors to
coalition forces would not occur until Zinni and the JTF planners arrived in Mogadishu
on 10 December. Even then, due to the daily uncertainty of the actual commitment of
other U.N. forces to the mission, the military employment into the various humanitarian
relief sectors would become an ever-changing affair. By 5 December, the JCS,
USCENTCOM and the JTF, for all intents and purposes, had resolved the vast majority of
major issues regarding force deployment and employment, but had yet come to any basic
terms regarding the transfer of the operation to the UN. Later, on 9 December, during
hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1992, Major General Brandtner
(J3, JCS) testified that USCENTCOM, as the force provider, would subjectively judge
when the JTF had successfully completed its mission and when the follow-on UN force
could assume responsibility for the mission. Yet, UN Resolution 794, signed and
approved by the US on 3 December, 1992, stipulated that this would be the responsibility
of the Secretary General to make that decision.

While liaison officers (LNOs) from an assortment of assigned JTF units raced to Camp
Pendleton to begin parallel planning with their counterparts, USCENTCOM disseminated
the operation order on 5 December. Execution would begin four days later. Over the next
five days the JTF would refine the operational concept and continue to transmit
deployment orders to both US joint and UN coalition forces. Table 1 summarizes the both
the progress and products of the formal planning process.
Table 1. Crisis Action Planning Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation Development</td>
<td>Event occurs with possible National Security Implications</td>
<td>Commander’s Estimate</td>
<td>25 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Assessment</td>
<td>NCA determines if a military option should be prepared</td>
<td>Warning Order</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action (COA) Development</td>
<td>JTF/USCENTCOM staff analyzes and recommends COAs</td>
<td>Planning Order</td>
<td>3 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Planning</td>
<td>JTF/USCENTCOM staff develops operations order</td>
<td>Commander’s Estimate</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>NCA decides to execute military option</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
<td>5 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>6 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Execution Order</td>
<td>5 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the next week, supporting US military forces were identified and notified for eventual deployment as a part of the JTF. This was not a simple task. Deciding which Marine forces would deploy was relatively easy since most of them belonged to I MEF. Selection of army units was much more complex: Initially, the JTF requested commitment through USCENTCOM for a brigade from the 101st Air Assault Division because they were experienced at deployments, were already on the cumbersome TPFDDL and were highly mobile. Further requested were three military police (MP) battalions (with a MP Group headquarters) and two battalions of CH-47 helicopters (for heavy lift). Although this force structure was approved conceptually by the USCENTCOM J-3, later the Army’s 10th Mountain Division (MD) was substituted for the 101st. Only three US Army MP companies instead of the ten requested would deploy to theater and the CH 47s’ were never allocated. This was a significant force design distinction from what LTG Johnston and his planners had sought. Military Police are generally better trained and have much greater experience in similar type operations. The 10th MD was not on the TPFDDL, had little training in deployment and would encounter serious obstacles moving (19)
equipment in the middle of a blizzard from Fort Drum, New York, to the Somali theater of operations.

TPFDDL aside, the substitution of different Army and Air Force units had a significant impact on the campaign plan. Where the organic helicopter assets of the 101st provided the coalition a highly lethal and mobile rapid response force. Movement in the 10th MD would be primarily limited to trucks. Even from a psychological warfare perspective, the Somalis admired and respected military power and the 101st could contribute quite a show with their attack aircraft. Johnston’s planners expended as much time and energy developing the campaign’s overall concept of operation as they did arguing task organizations with both the Army and Air Force.40

Although there had been substantial information published and available regarding the crisis in Somalia, the JTF could not get an accurate account of the situation from either military or other governmental intelligence sources. The primary JTF information guide was a US State Department area handbook that was last revised in 1972.41 It was accurate geographically but outdated politically. The handbook’s direct value was as a geographic guide to major population centers and airfields. It provided some fundamental information regarding the culture and clan structure, but had no usefulness in describing the current chaotic political and military situation in Somalia. To further complicate the planning effort, information regarding the commitment of some of the participating nations to the Somali relief effort was vague at best and often unavailable. Canada, France and Italy had decided to commit troops to support the humanitarian effort either before or about the same time as the US. Upon US commitment, they immediately sent liaison
officers (LNOs) to USCENTCOM. The French and Canadians also sent LNOs to Camp Pendleton; the Italian LNOs remained at USCENTCOM and Washington, D.C. These LNOs were present during the initial planning phases and JTF planners and had a good understanding of their forces and capabilities.

Since the US provided strategic lift to most coalition members (the Italians would be the only force to self-deploy), the JTF would be able to monitor and manage theater deployment schedules by numbers, type, composition and support required. As the NCA solicited support from the community of nations to the relief effort, USCENTCOM arranged transport. Initially, USCENTCOM accepted coalition forces that were difficult to employ because of either a limited capability or reluctance to go in harms way. This was resolved when LTG Johnston was given force approval authority. The difficulty that would soon be experienced on the ground in Mogadishu was that the JTF could not solidify operational plans until the coalition forces arrived. In almost every instance, Zinni and Dotto would negotiate missions and areas of responsibilities with coalition commanders, who in most cases required approval from their respective national command authority. Another problem concerned the Pakistanis, who were in Mogadishu as a part of the earlier relief effort, reported directly to UNOSOM I, would not work for the JTF, yet occupied some prime real estate at the airfield and in Mogadishu.

**JTF SOMALIA: ARRIVAL AND FORCE EMPLOYMENT**

By 8 Dec, the *Tripoli* Amphibious Task Unit (ATU), consisting of three amphibious ships were within 25 miles of Mogadishu. The following evening the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable-SOC) went ashore unopposed.
under the lights of the world press. By early the next morning, the Mogadishu port and airfield were secured. Follow-on units from the JTF began arriving that afternoon on chartered commercial airlines.

The specified operational objectives of Phase 1 were to establish a base of operations in Mogadishu, gain control of the humanitarian relief supplies within the city and to deploy other U.S. and U.N. forces as they arrived throughout the country. The JTF command group and campaign planners arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December, 1992, and established the its headquarters in the former U.S. embassy. The embassy compound had been destroyed and would require at least thirty days of extensive effort to restore even minimal services. As the JTF continued to plan and execute the operation, an almost nonstop flow of personnel and equipment moved to and through the Mogadishu air and port facilitates. Lodgment expansion and management of terrain throughout Mogadishu became a Herculean task. Since there was no existing host nation infrastructure to support either air or sea port operations, the JTF quickly identified military personnel with the requisite skills to run the Mogadishu sea port and airfield. A US Naval Reserve Captain called up for active duty, who, as a civilian, managed the port of San Francisco, took control of the Mogadishu sea port. Additionally, a US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel air traffic controller took responsibility of the Mogadishu airfield flight operations. With secure sea and air ports of embarkation, the movement of follow on combat and support troops and equipment proceeded rapidly.

During more recent UN sponsored regional humanitarian assistance efforts (specifically during Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and PROVIDE RELIEF), US
forces, to include some primary staff officers who would later serve in Somalia, obtained substantial experience planning and working with a multitude of UN and other national relief agencies. To solve the dilemma of individual relief agencies directly requesting support from the military, the JTF PROVIDE RELIEF Commander established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) to coordinate, support, and monitor HRO activities and the delivery of relief supplies into the various central distribution points. The Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) provided the JTF military liaison at the HOC. The CMOC’s most important function was to manage HRO requests in the area of technical assistance, space-available flights and security. The relationship became, essentially, a marriage of necessity and, yet, a very effective systematic measure to provide the greatest amount of relief supplies to the most troubled areas of southern Somalia. To capitalize on both his organization abilities and recent experience, LTG Johnston designated the Chief of Staff of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, COL Kevin Kennedy, as the director of the RESTORE HOPE CMOC. The HOC and CMOC organizational framework and process developed during Operational PROVIDE RELIEF was further expanded and modified to satisfy the conditions existing in Somalia in December, 1992. Eventually, each HRS would have both a HOC and CMOC centrally controlled at the national level in Mogadishu.

Not only did the LTG Johnston and his staff contend with the formidable task of HRO coordination, but was also responsible for the employment of over fifty military coalition forces (many involved merely as a means to obtain UN funds to pay their own military or to demonstrate broad international support for the UN mandate, than to provide

(23)
complementary military capabilities) throughout southern Somalia. The JTF attempted to align as ingeniously as possible the diverse coalition military and functional capabilities with that of the UN and HROs (none of whom felt obligated to follow JTF directives).\textsuperscript{51}

COL Dotto and his J3 Future Planning Cell was given the formidable task of identifying each coalition partner's military, functional and resource capabilities and attempt to logically and systematically organize it into each HRS. This process became a collective endeavor that involved not only military personnel, but civilian technical and regional experts as well. The Center for Naval Analyses, the US State Department, UN personnel and relief organizations familiar with the overall Somali situation were a principal part of the effort. The process was tedious, methodical and subject to constant revision based on the arrival of personnel and equipment into Mogadishu. Coalition combat and logistical capabilities were analyzed, as were cultural, religious, political and ethnic qualities. This comparison and alignment of personnel and equipment was conducted and constantly revised in all nine relief sectors. By design, traditional Moslem nations (Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates), already cultural and political partners based upon their collective involvement in the recent Gulf War, were combined and ultimately placed under US Marine control in the Mogadishu HRS. Historical adversaries (i.e., Pakistan and India, Russia and Germany) were deliberately separated. Coalition members who provided a specific functional capability (i.e., Swedish medical unit) were grouped in relief sectors with other nations possessing seemingly complementary traditional and cultural norms. The process was not perfect and had its unique challenges. Yet, as problems were recognized and further analyzed, an
equitable and functional solution was identified and quickly implemented. For example, Italian forces controlled the Gialalassi HRS. Yet, Gialalassi was geographically situated in the former, pre-1960, Italian colony. Clearly, to the average Somali this could have given the impression that the coalition’s purpose was colonization once again.

**Figure 3-Somalia: Humanitarian Relief Sectors**
**Source:** Daniel Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990’s*, Presidio (Novato, Ca), p. 66.

The primary objective of the campaign’s Phase II was to expand the territorial control of the JTF secure the major relief distribution sites throughout southern Somalia. The JTF anticipated a minimum of 60 days to complete this task. On 11 December, LTG Johnston,
BG Zinni and COL Dotto and the senior US State Department representative, former Somalia Ambassador Robert Oakley, met with several Somali warlords. Oakley, a highly respected career diplomat, was able to gain general agreement with the rival factions to allow for the unrestricted movement of humanitarian relief supplies throughout southern Somalia. Oakley’s extensive knowledge of the region, the rival militias, and Somali politics and culture, provided the JTF a readily accessible intelligence source for development of the combined political-military effort that ensued. With the assurance of the security of a truce and a relatively fragile agreement between the factions in hand, it was agreed collectively that the expansion of the relief effort throughout the region should proceed as quickly as possible. Starting on 13 December, the Baledogle HRS was secured by US Marines (USMARFOR) and security of the last relief sector, Marka, was completed less than three weeks later (29 December, 1992).

The strategy and actual conduct of employing military forces into each relief sector was rather simplistic and, after the success of the first operation, became mirror images of one another. Movement into each area was preceded by psychological operations leaflet air drops that clearly delineated the military task and purpose. The day before the operation, Oakley flew into each town and addressed clan elders, militia leaders and local officials. His purpose was to simply communicate that the coalition military would soon be entering the area, that they were not occupying force, provided assurance and generally prepared the population for the next day’s military operation. Early the following morning, a combat air patrol (CAP), either fixed wing or rotary, circled the town’s airstrip merely as a warning to potential aggressors. Soon thereafter, JTF troops conducted an air
assault and secured the airfield. Little was done in terms of threat evaluation or integration in any of the operations. The method of securing the airfields and towns was more on the order of a show of force than anything else. Yet, in the process, however, there was no JTF or Somali loss or life and it established the conditions for the unrestricted movement of relief supplies throughout southern Somalia. Initial operations were conducted by USMARFOR since they were the only combat forces available in theater, but by 14 December other coalition forces began preparation for future operations in HRS Oddur.

Table 2 summarizes HRS progress and the final coalition disposition.

Table 2. Securing Humanitarian Relief Sectors.53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HRS</th>
<th>Securing Force, Date</th>
<th>Final UN Control, Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>USMARFOR, 9 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Pakistan, 26 Apr 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baledogle</td>
<td>USMARFOR, 13 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Morocco, 1 Mar 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>USMARFOR, 16 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Australia, 2 Mar 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kismayo</td>
<td>USMARFOR, 20 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Belgium, 5 Mar 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bardera</td>
<td>USMARFOR, 23 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Botswana, 17 Apr 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gialalassi</td>
<td>Italy, 27 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Italy, 27 Dec 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belet Uen</td>
<td>USARFOR, 28 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Italy, 4 May 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marka</td>
<td>USARFOR, 3 Dec 1992</td>
<td>Pakistan, 28 Apr 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difficult task of coordinating the efforts of the numerous relief agencies had to be undertaken once a JTF military presence was established in each HRS. Autonomous negotiations by each of the NGOs with the numerous factions was necessary to get humanitarian supplies distributed throughout the region prior to the arrival of the JTF. The effort was inefficient, cumbersome and varied from NGO to NGO and from region to region. (27)
region. With relatively secure sectors, the JTF organized, assisted and controlled the relief supply distribution effort. Daily coordination between the NGOs and the JTF became not only an effective, but routine technique in simplifying operations and prioritizing requirements to distribute supplies quickly throughout the region. Phase II of the operation was declared complete with the securing of last remaining relief sector on 29 December.

The objectives of Phase III were the expansion of the JTF operations throughout the interior of the region and the transfer of operational control of the mission from the JTF to UN control. With the notable exception of UN control transition, the JTF declared Phase III complete on 4 February 1993. Actual planning for Phase III did not begin until 11 December. The JTF had clarified the end state for Phase II and was working on the objectives for Phase III that included a yet to be approved, embryonic UN command structure and transition strategy. Each HRS was amended to add coalition forces as they arrived in theater. Additionally, HRS boundaries were adjusted to be more consistent with traditional clan boundaries.

As military forces and HROs extended the humanitarian effort throughout southern Somalia, it became necessary to conduct a variety of nation building type activities. This included, but was not limited to, improvements in road networks and bridges, and the construction of buildings to support the ever expanding relief infrastructure. Though some coalition members had their own organic engineer support, there was no initial mechanism in the JTF to centrally control or focus their labor. BG Zinni quickly identified not only the requirement for extensive engineer work to support the expansion of the relief
effort, he combined the coalition's engineer assets into a much more effective and efficient JTF Engineer Group. For example, the extensive vertical construction capability of the Navy Seabees when combined with the US Army Engineer horizontal construction assets provided a resource to the JTF that was able to multiply what would have otherwise been a much more limited operation. Utilizing this technique, the JTF built or repaired 2500 kilometers of roads, nine airfields able to handle C-130 aircraft, eight-five helicopter pads and much more.\(^5\)

Soon after the arrival of the JTF in Mogadishu, it became apparent that, in order to improve the overall security in both Mogadishu and southern Somalia, some form of civil police force would be necessary. Seen as an expansion of the overall USCENTCOM mission design, the JTF was reluctant, at first, to be involved in the operation. However, it soon became clear that the establishment of such a force would not only eliminate the need for JTF troops to serve as police, but would reduce dissension with the local population.\(^6\) Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Steve Spataro, a military policeman and Gulf War veteran experienced in similar operations drew up the JTF plan.\(^7\) By mid-January, parts of Mogadishu were being patrolled by Somali policemen and similar interim police forces were established in the other relief sectors.\(^8\) Since the overall security in Somalia had dramatically improved USCENTCOM approved the JTF plan for redeployment on 28 January 1992.\(^9\)

Phase IV was the transfer of control of the operation to another UN command. Actual planning for this transition had begun as early as December. However, the UN's failure or inability to identify the command and control structure of its follow-on
headquarters severely restricted this effort. The apparent conflict between the UN and US interpretations of the UN Resolution 794 end state surfaced. Responding to pressure from the US, Boutros-Ghali defined the UN's position on 26 January, 1993. He linked the JTF's transition with UNOSOM II to a Somali political settlement that included an effective functioning government, general disarmament, extension of the operations into northern Somalia and the movement towards the establishment of a civilian police force. The obvious division between the US limited and the UN's broader goals and objectives in December finally surfaced in Boutros-Ghali's January report. Despite any UN rhetoric, the US rejected Boutros-Ghali's position and the JTF continued planning for the transition. On 3 March, 1993, finally acquiescing to US pressure, Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations effecting the transition from the JTF to UNOSOM II. Further, the transfer of command of the operation from the JTF to UNOSOM II could occur as early as 1 May, 1993 (later adjusted to 4 May), but would be at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

Although JTF Somalia neither considered nor carried out the more ambitious nation building goals defined in UN Resolution 794, the JTF did execute their NCA and USCENTCOM specified mission successfully. Not only did coalition forces relieve suffering through humanitarian assistance, their presence enhanced security and provided a relatively stable window of opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a mission that occurred under unique circumstances, conditions and planning challenges. The operation was truly a joint and combined effort, with each component working closely with the others. Yet, it contains enough similarities
of either manmade or natural disasters to justify attention as a possible model of future conflicts. Additionally, contingencies involving the US military forces will be characteristically joint, multinational and interagency operations. The analysis of RESTORE HOPE in relation to current joint theory and doctrine may demonstrate either potential doctrinal or practical challenges in the execution of similar future operations.

**ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS: JOINT THEORY AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE**

The United Nation’s departure from Somalia in March, 1995, marked the end of nearly four years of continuous regional and international political negotiations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and force employment. Despite the effort, southern Somalia and Mogadishu specifically, remain a collection of clan-based enclaves, each protected by its own militia. The humanitarian relief successes achieved by coalition forces operating under UNITAF control through 4 May, 1993, indicated the potential for both a political and military settlement of the region. Yet, the euphoria of May, 1993, was short lived.

Operation RESTORE HOPE was remarkable, both in time and circumstances. Operationally, it represents a category of conflict, joint and combined operations other than war, that is difficult to anticipate, plan and prepare for. The scope, duration and military employment of joint and coalition forces were significantly greater than those experienced during more recent UN sponsored humanitarian peacekeeping operations. Despite the United States’ limited operational objectives, RESTORE HOPE included the use of overwhelming combat power for a relatively short duration in order to establish the conditions leading to regional stability and a seamless transition to eventual UN control.
command. Although they did not accomplish the UN’s ambitious goals of nation building, JTF Somalia succeeded in establishing temporary regional stability, managed operational uncertainties and accomplished its military objectives far ahead of schedule and with minimal casualties. What makes the Somalia experience relevant for the US military practitioner is the implication that it is provides an example of potential future operations. Clearly, Operation RESTORE HOPE lessons learned must be modified and balanced against any similar future mission requirements, regional situations or conditions.

It is anticipated that future US military ventures in any form will be joint. Based on this reasoning alone there must be a commonality in terms and principles in order to function effectively as a team. US forces began Operation RESTORE HOPE without the advantage of an approved peacekeeping doctrine or process. Since then, the joint doctrinal library has developed and expanded to include doctrine for joint operations (Joint Pub. 3-0.), Doctrine for Joint Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub. 3.07.) and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations (Joint Pub. 3-07.3) that provide fundamental standards and validated concepts for both joint and coalition operations. All three publications specify six warfighting principles (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and legitimacy) to have particular and distinct significance in MOOTW. Yet, Operation RESTORE HOPE suggests that there may exist a seventh MOOTW warfighting principle, the principle of “flexibility.”

Although not specifically mentioned in contemporary joint doctrine, these MOOTW principles are interrelated, where changes in one may compel a corresponding modification to another. An analysis of the application the principles of Objective and Unity of Effort
are particularly relevant for Operation RESTORE HOPE, not only in the overall JTF campaign design, but to the entire extent of the operation. Since political considerations and the nature of MOOTW requires not only an understanding of the traditional principles of war, but the six additional MOOTW principles as well. Missing from these doctrinal principles is the concept of operational “flexibility,” that implies the ability to adapt positively to a given situation.

Joint doctrine specifies that “properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure.” Simply put, operational success is measured by the attainment of the overall political objective. Yet, during the early stages of a crisis, the political objectives and a definitive military end-state may be difficult to objectively quantify, eventually requiring some form of revision, be it either a nominal change or a complete alteration prior to the cessation of the crisis. MOOTW, habitually requires campaign planners to consider how an operation might end almost as soon as they are informed of their participation in it. The process is further complicated when you combine UN and coalition interests to the exit strategy equation. Clearly, Operation RESTORE HOPE is an illustrative example of this phenomenon. While JTF Somalia developed deployment and execution schedules and plans, campaign planners simultaneously attempted to determine what the eventual coalition end-state and exit strategy would be. Yet, what Operation RESTORE HOPE repeatedly showed was that any desired or anticipated military end state could potentially be modified or completely reversed at any point during the campaign based upon changing political conditions. This suggests that an operational planner involved in MOOTW must possess a requisite level of

(33)
operational "flexibility" to anticipate the impact of variations in the political conditions and modify the campaign plan, as necessary, to facilitate these changes.

**OBJECTIVE**

The MOOTW principle of objective specifies that all military operations must be directed at a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. It is this goal to which all military operations are directed. Inherent in this principle is the requirement to understand what constitutes mission success and what conditions must be present before an operation can be terminated prior. Generally, a MOOTW mission is derived from a combination of military and political objectives. In MOOTW, despite a natural resistance from the conventional military practitioner, the political objective dominates and must constantly be reassessed. Contemporary joint doctrine anticipates that changes to initial military objectives will be adjusted with any modification to the political or strategic situation. Shifts in the political objectives that necessitate a change in the military objective may be very subtle. If the modification is not completed to conform to the new political reality, the military objective may be rendered irrelevant.

The command and control structure of Operation RESTORE HOPE illustrates one of the UN’s fundamental organizational techniques to address a large scale contingency or peacekeeping operation. In this case, the US acting in the capacity of the lead nation, (acting within the provisions of UN Resolution 794) was given overall operational command of forces that would be involved. Specifically, UN Resolution 794 declared that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security and authorized the use of all necessary means to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.\textsuperscript{67} The resolution stipulated the Secretary General, not a member nation, would assess the overall security conditions in the region and determine when the JTF operation was completed and the timing for the ultimate transfer of the mission back to UN control.\textsuperscript{68} Clearly, the UN’s conditions for successfully establishing a “secure environment” had a broader implied meaning than was either initially, or later in the campaign, recognized by the US.

US objectives for Somalia were more modest, conventional and specific. President Bush, on 4 December 1992, stated, “This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.”\textsuperscript{69} He specified that the mission was limited, with the sole purpose to open the humanitarian relief supply routes and prepare for the assumption of the campaign by a follow-on UN peacekeeping force. In simplistic terms, the NCA envisioned a get-in and get-out quick mission that would be essential completed by the 21 January, 1993, Clinton inauguration.

At the force level, JTF Somalia translated the NCA and CENTCOM objectives into a four-phased mission statement. For all intents and purposes, both the JTF and the NCA, concluded that with the completion of the security mission in the last HRS (Marka) on 30 December, 1992, the transition to a follow on UN mission contingent could begin. The use of overwhelming combat power in a surprisingly rapid time period established the conditions for the secure movement of humanitarian relief supplies. The apparent conflict between the US and the UN regarding UN Resolution 784 mission objectives and end state success criteria had finally surfaced. As political administrations in Washington changed in January, 1993, it would be the JTF on the ground in Somalia that would
attempt to determine operational precision from ambiguity. Clearly, this is not what the campaign designers had envisioned when planning began in November, 1992.

Despite the conflict between US objectives and the ultimate UN aspirations for the region, the JTF never lost operational focus of the USCENTCOM and NCA objective. Each phase of the operation had clearly defined success criteria that combined time and event driven indicators for either the transition to the next phase of the operation or for conflict termination. Yet, LTG Johnston and his staff possessed the ability to adapt the campaign design and force structure to the reality of Somalia. The examples of a centrally controlled JTF engineer vertical and horizontal construction effort, the development of humanitarian relief sectors and refined civil-military and humanitarian operations and the establishment of a Somali police force repeatedly demonstrated the JTF’s operational agility to adjust to the regional crisis while maintaining focus on the mission’s objective

UNITY OF EFFORT

The MOOTW principle Unity of Effort is derived from the principle of war Unity of Command and emphasizes the need to ensure all means are directed towards a common purpose. Operation RESTORE HOPE is an example of a complex, arduous and multifaceted mission that began with diverse, unfocused and autonomous enterprises competing for scarce resources that eventually matured into a cohesive, focused and adept operation.

What the JTF experienced upon arrival in Mogadishu in December, 1992, was numerous interest groups, without a central organizational structure, attempting to relieve the widespread suffering of the people. The 31 (eventually grew to 60 by March, 1993)
disparate humanitarian relief organizations (HROs—consisting of international and regional nongovernmental and organizational agencies, private voluntary organizations and religious organizations) and other military forces received guidance, direction and information from their own sources and command authorities. With the approval of UN Resolution 784, the JTF was sanctioned to control coalition forces involved in the operation, but this was still only a part of the problem. Operational Unity of Effort and the corresponding imperative of Objective nurtured universal consensus and reconciled both philosophical and organizational differences by organizations involved in the crisis. HROs realized that without armed JTF assistance, movement of relief supplies throughout southern Somalia would halt. Without secure road networks and humanitarian relief sectors, armed factions would prevent the distribution of supplies. Without a relatively protected climate and cessation of hostilities, the move toward a lasting peace, the rebuilding of the government, infrastructure and the eventual resolution of the crisis would not be possible. The coalition’s overwhelming combat power inhibited overt clan violence, provided a window of opportunity for peaceful conflict resolution negotiations, and the organizational abilities of the JTF enhanced operational focus and established the foundation for Unity of Effort.

Operation RESTORE HOPE, in the pursuit of coalition harmony and consensus building, is rife with examples of the JTF Commander and staff modifying and adapting existing force structures and organizations to accommodate both the situation and the diverse mission requirements. However, inherent in the principle of Unity of Effort is the existence of a well-defined command, control and staff structure. Although, command (37)
arrangements among coalition partners may not ever be precise, internal JTF staff control and functions must be. The size and composition of the JTF headquarters that deployed to Somalia in December, 1992, was too large, inefficient and ill-prepared to execute sustained joint operations.

There are essentially three primary models to form a JTF headquarters. Fundamental, however, to any JTF headquarters staff organization are fully qualified personnel possessing some joint planning experience. One model is a headquarters manned with staffs that have trained together and developed habitual relationships and assimilated common planning experience during training. Another method is to provide the JTF headquarters with a standing, deployable JTF augmentation cell with joint functional expertise and have participated in contingency planning during major exercises. The third technique is to simply provide augmentation personnel from subordinate elements to the command that is assigned the mission of forming the JTF. JTF RESTORE HOPE is an illustrative example of this third model.

When first notified of the possibility of deployment to Somalia, the 1 MEF adopted the JTF headquarters staff table of organization developed during recent training and command post exercises. I MEF attempted to structure the JTF headquarters staff so that it would be capable of detailed direction to each component’s subordinate elements instead of assigning broad component missions. Instead of a compact staff used to working together, augmented by joint experts (see model 2 above), the headquarters was a large and unwieldy group of strangers. In fact, by 20 December, 1992, the size of the JTF headquarters had become so unmanageable and staff functions so redundant that a
number of staff personnel were returned to the US.

**FLEXABILITY**

Military operations other than war are often applied simultaneously with other instruments of national power and are always conducted in order to achieve political objectives. MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace, while war traditionally encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to either achieve or protect national interests and objectives. Political ambitions will always dominate military objectives during MOOTW. Yet, the unique characteristics of MOOTW may often prevent a clear understanding of military conditions required to achieve a desired political end-state. Since the correlation between military operations and political events is naturally ambiguous, warriors and statesmen have tended to follow an inane option of avoiding the issue of linkage by operating in separate domains. Not only must a coherent MOOTW strategy subordinate itself to political ambitions, it must remain flexible enough to adapt, modify or completely change ongoing operations to the reality of ever-changing political objectives.

The military purist will challenge that there is neither the requirement or the need for the military practitioner to concern himself with anything other than combat. This perspective is inappropriate in view of the more contemporary role of the US military. Recent engagements in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia have consistently demonstrated the requirements for service members to conduct two ostensible paradoxical missions. One mission was executed as a combatant, while the other was completed as a peacemaker. To further complicate the operation, both missions were accomplished simultaneously rather than in sequence. Not only must the campaign plan be adequately flexible to
address changes in policies, the combatant must be versatile enough to adjust to the ambiguity of MOOTW. The operational plan must traverse the broad spectrum between military tactical action and political strategy. The commanders and staff of JTF Somalia consistently displayed a high level of operational flexibility and adapted to a fluid political reality, while never losing focus on the desired political objective for the region.

Within a month after receiving the USCENTCOM alert order, the JTF and coalition forces deployed into the AOR, pacified southern Somalia, expanded the security operations to the various relief distribution sites and fed the population. Operation RESTORE HOPE represents a first for US forces in fulfilling peace enforcement and peacekeeping roles while supporting UN humanitarian assistance efforts. Through resourcefulness, hard work and imagination, the JTF adapted and modified coalition force combat and combat support roles and procedures to the reality of Somalia. It integrated the diverse engineer capabilities of the JTF into a highly functional joint and combined engineer command. It took advantage of the distinct capabilities of key JTF staff members and expanded their roles and missions to compliment civil-military and humanitarian operational ambitions. In essence, since every coalition member brought unique abilities to the AOR, the JTF was flexible enough to realize this individual potential and positively apply capabilities to the existing crisis.

Although current joint doctrine has delineated six MOOTW principles, it has failed to address an essential additional precept of operational "flexibility." By design and when applied, these MOOTW principles help ensure success and minimize losses by focusing on aspects of warfighting that deserve careful consideration. Yet, when the principles are
ignored, joint force commanders increase the risk to their forces and the possibility of failure. Operation RESTORE HOPE is a classic MOOTW example that demonstrates the application of these existing six MOOTW principles coupled with this seventh principle of "flexibility" enabled the JTF to become more effective, efficient and adaptable to the operational environment of Somalia.

CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of the Soviet Union has irreversibly modified the political and military position of the United States in the world community. In many respects, the balancing dynamics of bipolarity during the Cold War effectively sustained for nearly forty years a sensation of international political equilibrium. In the past, the political and military components of national power tended to remain separate. Today, however, the probability of this traditional view of war is much less likely to occur than the more obscure category of conflict labeled Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). In MOOTW, military and political objectives are both interactive and functional steps in the achievement of political goals and aspirations. The presence of a large military force during a crisis situation may help to establish the conditions necessary for a lasting political settlement, but will rarely solve the crisis alone. In fact, military operations planned in isolation and without regard to regional political and social realities may lead to the unenviable conclusion of a battle won but a war lost.

The UN’s supported multilateral political, economic and military intervention in Somalia was one of the international community’s first major attempts to respond to the challenge of state collapse, humanitarian assistance and social disintegration. Depending
upon your point of reference, Operation RESTORE HOPE could either be regarded as a military success or operational failure. The campaign confirmed that the US military, on relatively short notice, could assemble forces, deploy, and conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations proficiently. JTF Somalia consistently demonstrated the ability of the US military and other coalition members to successfully adapt to the uncertainties of the operation. It proved on more than one occasion an ability to modify operational theory, doctrine and concepts to the existing UN, coalition and Somali conditions. The JTF accomplished its NCA and USCENTCOM specified military objectives with few casualties, limited collateral damage and far ahead of the projected operational schedule. Operation RESTORE HOPE's most important accomplishment was the humanitarian relief and the support provided the HROs. However, despite its many positive accomplishment, the JTF was unable to either negotiate or establish the conditions required for an enduring peace, political reconciliation or rebuilding of the nation's infrastructure. In the minds of the JTF campaign planners and their immediate supervisors, USCENTCOM, nation building and peace keeping, went beyond the limited intervention mission intent. Yet, for an end state to attain operational relevance, it must be both unambiguous and have clearly defined measuring criteria of success.

An operational end state is little more than what the NCA envisions the environment to be when military operations conclude. During MOOTW, the conditions required to achieve the end state may be difficult to define readily and will require continued refinement during the campaign. The application of the elements of national power (military, political, economic, and information) often occur simultaneously during
MOOTW and will, inevitable, impact substantially upon one another. Simply put, end state strategies identified and developed at the beginning of a campaign may change dramatically by the end. The implication of this fact is clear, that the job of an operational planner does not stop once the campaign plan is approved. The plan must be constantly reassessed, interpreted, and modified.

Results notwithstanding, the significance of Operation RESTORE HOPE to the military practitioner is that it is a historical example of a time sensitive, contingency operation and represents a form of conflict in which the US military may be used in the future. Additionally, it identified and demonstrated theoretical, doctrinal and practical problems in the campaign planning process and execution of MOOTW.

Campaign operational critics dispute that the JTF’s scope and purpose were not aligned with that of the UN and that the military operations within the confines of southern Somalia enforced rather than discouraged a Somali perception of colonization and, in the attempt to broker a peace, the JTF legitimized military faction operations to the detriment of the recognized, traditional clan family system of arbitrating disputes. The use of overwhelming combat power for a limited duration during peacekeeping operations may have a variety of effects, some preferred and some not. The use of military force, in and of itself, may temporarily resolve a crisis but can also act as catalyst to further exacerbate the existing problems. The fundamental point, regardless of the campaign’s success or failure, is in any military operation, but MOOTW specifically, the political objective dominates all other considerations and that changes in any political objective may result in a corresponding adjustment to a military one.

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The task of campaign planning is always thankless, but even more so when planning time is severely constrained, when there is little fundamental knowledge of the region in crisis or beligerants involved and when there are no preexisting plans or concepts to use as a tool or model. JTF Somalia planners displayed on countless occasions an ability to anticipate requirements, adapting standard procedures and devising new ones to the existing conditions of the region. Perhaps most important, Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrates the necessity for a formalized JTF command, staff and control apparatus when conducting any joint or combined operation.

One cannot flagrantly discard, however, the suggestion that the importance of Operation RESTORE HOPE had little to do with alleviating the suffering of the Somali people, but rather the implication that the campaign is a likely example of future MOOTW engagements. Few would argue that the US military could potentially and, more probably will be, employed in a future MOOTW contingency operation under similar conditions experienced in Somalia. Available information regarding the AOR may be either limited or nonexistent and the campaign plan might be written without the benefit of an existing contingency plan or concept to be used as a guide. The operational headquarters could be comprised of a company of strangers, similar to JTF Somalia, who are unfamiliar with contemporary joint and combined doctrine and theory. Available time to plan the operation could be severely constrained and the strategic and operational guidance could be ambiguous and open to a variety of interpretations. The suggestion that RESTORE HOPE provides an operational mirror of the future is evident and the campaign planner embroiled in similar conditions must react effectively to the environment, and still prepare
appropriate, achievable and doctrinally correct campaign plans.

Not only is building a JTF staff complex, putting one together using augmentation further complicates the problem. The JTF staff must consist of personnel who are not only experts in their fields but should be fully trained and experienced joint and combined crisis action planners. Augmentation personnel to the JTF staff must be able to explicitly outline their service’s immediate and long term requirements, capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the JTF staff should be “flexible” enough to identify any operational requirement and adjust available resources, as necessary, to accommodate the demand. The development and implementation of joint tactics, techniques, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) would facilitate this process.
Annex A. Historical Summary of Somali Crisis

In August, 1992, the political, social and military situation in Somalia had digressed to such extent that Mogadishu was, in effect, a city under siege with virtually no potential solution of any of the innumerable problems in sight. The circumstances that led to U.N. intervention hinged on the twin disasters of famine and governmental collapse. The abundant supply of Soviet and American weapons left after the Cold War gave the numerous tribal factions a military capacity which was repeatedly translated into terrorism. Steps taken to relieve the starvation in the areas most seriously affected by the ongoing civil war and drought were resisted. Any remote chance of success for U.N. humanitarian relief missions in the region required some level of civil stability. Both the U.N. and U.S. would soon concede that resolution of the Somali crisis required a familiarity of Somali traditional values, heritage and an understanding of the clan and sub-clan political and social organization.

The Republic of Somalia became an independent state in 1960 with the union of two former European colonies, Italy’s Trust Territory of Somalia and the British Protectorate of Somalia. Located on the east coast of Africa (often referred to as the Horn of Africa) and north of the Equator, Somalia borders Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (See Figure 1). Both the terrain and climatic conditions are harsh. Somali cultural and racial features are distinct and are characterized by a clear hierarchical social order. The people share a common language, cultural roots, religion and genealogical ties that bind

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them to a common ancestor. Although 99% Islamic, Somali historical and cultural traditions pervade accepted Muslim protocols. Genealogical bonds account are the major cause of clan dissension and, yet, it is this same clan culture that makes the Somali resistant to control. Traditionally, however, Somalis will set aside their internal differences when they perceive themselves to be threatened by a common adversary, as both the British and Italians experienced and the U.S. was to learn.

**Figure 1-Somalia: Geographical Boundaries**


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3 Claudio, p. 4.
The six largest sub-clans or clan families in present day Somalia trace their ancestry from two brothers, Samall and Sab. Descendants of Samall, the Dir, Darod, Isaak, and Hawiye, comprise about 75% of the population. These sub-clans are nomadic and have their own distinctive dialect. The Digel and the Rahanweyn sub-clans trace their ancestry from Sab, have their own dialect and are generally agrarian. These six main sub-clans make up the Somali nation and for all practical purposes maintain a finite geographical base (See Figure 2). Each has evolved and adapted to different conditions and it is the

**Figure 2-Somalia: Ethnic Groups**

![Map of Somalia showing ethnic groups](image)


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4 Ibid. p. 3.
5 Ibid. p. 4.
Resulting distinctions that are the genesis of the current Somali predicament. Descent and lineage, though important, are not the sole factors that determine Somali loyalty. Membership in the same clan does not guarantee obligations or impose rights. Marriage agreements, treaties, or contracts may unite some sub-groups for political and military purposes, while other arrangements may link other seemingly dissimilar groups. Often, these alignments are more binding than traditional clan loyalty. Somali social order is based upon this competition and conflict between the various descent groups.⁶

The 19th century search for unrestricted harbor facilitates near the entrance to the Red Sea led to British domination of northern Somalia and Italian control of southern Somalia.⁷ In both regions, however, little consideration was given to traditional clan borders or social organization. Colonial boundaries that had little relevance to historical realities, were established to oblige colonial administration and essentially had no significance to the Somalis. The people were able temporarily to put aside their clan rivalry to collectively resist this European expansionist threat. By 1949, the U.N. approved the creation of Somalia as a sovereign state and for the next eleven years (until 1 July, 1960) the country remained under British and Italian control to prepare the Somalis for independence.⁸

When self-rule finally came in 1960, the character of the new central government's parliamentary democracy was nearly identical to that of the former colonial powers. The

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⁶ Ibid. p. 4-5.
⁸ Claudio. p. 8.
governmental organization and administration, justice systems and official language in the north, maintained a distinct British quality. While in the south, Italian methods dominated. The dilemma that the new central government would deal with was how to integrate the north and south as well as the various clans and subclans into a nation. From 1960 to 1969, widespread efforts were made to displace clan and sub-clans allegiance with loyalty to the new central government. Despite the effort, the nation was never able to overcome the traditional clan and sub-clan social structure and cultural bias. Other contributing factors to the central government's eventual overthrow was its move from representative democracy to a one political party autocracy, an inability to settle border disputes with both Kenya and Ethiopia, and the continued economic and political dependence on foreign aid. Development plans during the 1960's were so ambitious that the government could not spend the funds it borrowed and a large percentage of foreign aid inevitably found its way into the various bank accounts of the ruling elite. The assassination of the President on 15 October, 1969, paved the way for General Siad Barre's military coup the following week.

Barre hoped to prosper from the ongoing civil disorder. He benefited from the army's general resentment of the government's attempt to achieve peace with Kenya and Ethiopia and from the shift from military to civil developmental spending. He was able to arouse widespread dissension that inevitably strengthened his own position. He looked to the

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9 Ibid. p. 9.
10 Ibid. p. 10.
future for potential alliances and treaties that would fortify his regime. He anticipated that the Soviet Union would be interested in extending its strategic position across the Gulf of Aden to counter a U.S. presence in Ethiopia. The Barre government announced radical plans to transform the nomadic, poor and Muslim country into a modern socialist state. One of the first actions was to assault the traditional structure of Somali society in an effort to secure modernization. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the elite of the new government were clearly linked to Barre's family and sub-clan (Darood). His attempt to repress his opposition and deny any political outlet to groups that opposed him eventually resulted in universal resistance to the central government.

In 1977, strengthened by Soviet weapons, Barre hoped to gain from instability within the government of Ethiopia and its declining relationship with the U.S. in order to take over the territory of the Ogaden, where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis lived.\(^\text{13}\) Despite some initial success, Ethiopian troops (now sponsored by the U.S.S.R.) defeated the Somali effort. Responding to Moscow's support of Ethiopia, Barre now turned to the West for financial and military support. U.S. aid to Somalia, though substantial, was never as robust as what was previously received from the Soviets. Unable to secure continued assistance from the U.S., the country plunged into debt. By December, 1990, Barre's dictatorship was on the verge of collapse. Violence against the regime consumed the country. Barre's government was now perceived as a common threat by the Somali people. Clans and sub-clans united to overthrow the government and on 27 January, 1991,

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seized Mogadishu and overran the presidential palace, forcing the dictator to flee in a tank. Characteristically, for a brief period, clans attempted to set aside their historical and cultural bias in order to form a lasting democracy.

By May, 1991, the country had divided politically and geographically. In Somaliland, the northwest region that declared its secession from Somalia, elders used the traditional clan system to establish a framework for resolving disputes that brought about a relatively peaceful change in government and established a foundation for rebuilding society.\(^{14}\) In the south, centered around the former capital of Mogadishu, fighting continued between two of the principle sub-clans -- one supporting Interim President Mohammed Ali Mahdi and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress (U.S.C.), General Mohammed Farah Aidid.\(^{15}\) Numerous other nonaligned groups of bandits further exasperated the problem. For the next three years nearly eighty (80) different countries would invest over $4 billion and deploy in excess of forty thousand soldiers and supporting personnel to assist this nation torn apart by a protracted internal war, rampant disease, famine and poverty.


Annex B: Somali Clan Alignment and Military Factions

I. Clans

1. A Somalia clan or clan family is a division of a tribe (ethnic group) that traces descent from a common ancestor.
2. Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system.
3. Political and emotional allegiances are owed to lineage.
4. The six clan families have traditional corresponded to the Old Testament version of the tribal segmentation of the children of Israel.
5. The four pastoral clan families claim Samalle as the founding father
   a. Samaal clan
      1) Dir sub-clan
      2) Darood sub-clan
      3) Isaaq sub-clan
      4) Hawiye sub-clan
   b. Sab clan
      1) Digil sub-clan
      2) Rahanwayn sub-clan

II. Major Military Factions, Organizations and Warlords

There are fourteen (14) political parties throughout Somalia, all attempting to gain either regional or national dominance. Of these fourteen, however, only few have the requisite or sufficient popular and military support to be considered viable (listed with an asterisk).

1. Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS)
   a. Established in 1981 as a coalition of the Somali Salvation Front, the Somali Worker's Party and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia.
   b. Prior to 1991 had operated from bases in Ethiopia, with support from Ethiopia, Libya and Yemen.
   c. Chairman-Dr. Hassan Haji Ali Mireh
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) (Gadaboursi clan)
   b. Leader-Mohamed Dahir Farah.
3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) (Raheinweyn clan)
   a. Chairman-Mohamed Nur Aliyow

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2 Major Arlando Claudio and Mr. Roland Dutton, Somalia: Background Material for Planners, (Low Intensity Conflict Section, Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 24 December, 1992)
4. Somali Eastern and Central Front (SECF)
   c. Chairman-Hirsi Ismail Mohamed
5. Somali National Army (SNA)
   b. Primarily a guerrilla force comprising Ogadeni deserters from the former Somali army.
*6. Somali National Front (SNF) (Darod clan)
   a. Controls southwestern area (Bardera)
   b. Backed by Kenya
   c. General Morgan (son-in-law of Said Barre)
      1) 2-4000 troops
*7. Somali National Movement (SNM)(Hargeysa)
   b. Conducted guerrilla operations in north and north-west Somalia until 1991,
   b. President-Abd Ar-Rahman Ahmad Ali
8. Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)
   b. Guerrilla force comprising Ogadeni deserters from the former Somali army.
*9. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)(sna) (Darod-Ogaden subclan)
   b. Guerrilla force comprising Ogadeni deserters from the former Somali army
   c. Controls area in and around Kismayo
   d. Tenuous alliance with Ali Mahdi Mohamed
   e. Leader-Colonel Jess (2-4000 troops-deserters from former national army)
10. Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)
   a. Established by President Siad Barre in 1976 at the sole political party.
   c. Asst. Secretary General-Ahmed Suleiman Abdullah
11. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
   a. Claimed by General Aidid to support his faction of USC
   b. Leader-Abdi Warsame Isaaq
*12. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)(Hawiye clan)
   a. Established in 1989 in central Somalia
   b. Ousted former President Siad Barre
   c. Controls central and southern areas
   e. General Mohamed Farah Aideed
      1) Controls South Mogadishu
      2) 5-10000 troops, 30000 reserves

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*13. United Somali Congress (USC) (Hawiyé clan)
   a. Ali Mahdi Mohamed (self-proclaimed interim President)
      1) Controls most of central Somalia to north Mogadishu
      2) 5-10,000 troops
14. United Somali Front (USF)
   a. Established in 1989
   b. Leader-Abd Ar-Rahman Du’aleh Ali

**Figure 1-Ethnic Map of Somalia**

ENDNOTES


2. Telephone (E-mail) Interview (1300 hours, 3 November 1996) with COL Peter Dotto (USMC), J7 IMEF, Camp Pendleton, California. COL Dotto was the Chief, J3 Future Planning Cell, JTF Somalia throughout the campaign (22 November, 1992 to 4 May 1993). He was responsible for the development of the CJTF campaign plan, coordination of coalition forces, coordination USCINCCENT, and various UN agencies in Somalia.


7. JCS Pub. 3-0. p. 1-8.


9. JCS Pub. 5-0. p. ix.


11. Ibid., p. ix.

12. JCS Pub. 3-0. P. I-1.

13. Ibid., p. i.


17. Ibid., p. 21.


23. UN Reference Paper, p. 22.

24. Interview, Dotto, (3 November, 1996).


26. Telephone (E-mail) Interview, (1600 hours, 16 December, 1996), COL Peter Dotto, (USMC), J7, I MEF, Camp Pendleton, California.

27. Anthony C. Zinni, LTG, United States Marine Corps Internet Home Page, (Biography, General Officer, 12 July, 1996.).

28. Wallace C. Gregson, BG, United States Marine Corps Internet Home Page, (Biography, General Officer, 12 July 1996.).


30. CJTF Somalia Plan.

32. Ibid., p. 64.

33. Interview, Dotto (2 October, 1996).

34. Interview, Dotto (16 December, 1996).

35. Interview, Dotto (17 January, 1997).


40. Interview, Dotto, (16 Dec, 1996).

41. Interview, Dotto (16 Dec, 1996).

42. Interview, Dotto (16 Dec, 1996).

43. Interview, Dotto (16 Dec, 1996).

44. Zvijac, p. 6.

45. Interview, Dotto (17 January, 1997).

46. Interview, Dotto (16 December, 1997).


52. Zvijac, p. 41.


61. UN Reference Paper, p. 8.


63. JCS Pub 3-0, p. I-9.

64. Ibid., p. I-10.


66. Ibid., p. II-2.


68. Ibid., p. 23.


74. JCS Pub. 3-07, p. vii.

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76. JCS Pub. 3-07. P. II-8.
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Dotto, Peter (Colonel, USMC), J7 IMEF, Camp Pendleton, Ca., conducted in Carlsbad, California, 17 January, 1997. By LTC C.L. Baggott