# Title

A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Nations of South Asia

## Author(s)

- Douglas Makeig
- Russell Ross

## Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)

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## Abstract

Monthly (previously annual, semianual, and quarterly) bibliography series contains citations of monographs and serial articles relating to the countries of the Indian subcontinent: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The compilation is selective and is intended principally as a reference work for research on the foreign relations, governments, and politics of the nations concerned.

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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
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Authors: Douglas C. Makeig
         Russell R. Ross
PREFACE

This bibliography contains citations of monographs and serial articles relating to countries of the Indian Subcontinent: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The compilation is selective and is intended principally as a reference work for research in the foreign relations, governments, and politics of the nations concerned. The bibliography is divided into country sections preceded initially by a general interest and reference section. This first issue covers material published or copyrighted in 1981.

Wherever the hard copy of the material being cited could be obtained, a brief abstract, review or summary is presented with the citation. Where existence of a work was reported or verified (e.g., through publishers' notices, review articles, etc.) but a hard copy could not be obtained, the article/book is merely cited without further description. All listings are by author, last name first, except where the author is unknown. In such cases, the work is listed by title.
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1. GENERAL INTEREST AND REFERENCE

This is more than a bibliography because the author has used his background in defense analysis to produce a guide to worldwide information sources. He examines more than a thousand published sources and nearly as many periodicals. Emphasis is placed on official government publications, both here and abroad. The book has a feature not often included in such guides, that is, names and addresses of sources for specific kinds of information, generally official. Only specialists will agree with the author's cautionary note that the work is not exhaustive. The choice of sources is more than adequate, and the writing and arrangement are both excellent. This book will be appreciated by students and researchers in academic and special collections. No single volume takes its place. (LJ 15 Oct 81)


Sources providing economic overviews of every country in the world range from expensive multivolume sets to the more affordable but less comprehensive almanacs such as the Europa Handbooks and Statesman's Yearbooks. While the book under review belongs to the latter category, it focuses more attention on current structure and direction of national economics and the role of governmental organizations. Unlike other purely statistical compilations, it is analytical in its approach to economic data and dwells on their worldwide significance. A reasonably priced, handy compendium, recommended for academic and large public libraries. (LJ 15 Sep 81)


Publication contains recent biographical information on noted Indian personalities.


Starting with the Basmachi revolts of the 1920s and until the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet vulnerabilities in their Central Asian empire have been a pet topic for Western analysts. The problem of absorbing non-Slavic peoples into the Soviet mainstream continues to bedevil the Kremlin's policymakers. Although the work does not deal directly with Afghanistan proper, the Rywkin study is an important contribution to the literature for those analyzing Soviet intentions in this strategic region. When viewed in light of past Soviet experiences in the region, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan takes on an internal logic of its own which is born out of Soviet insecurities.

This wide-ranging compendium includes numerous essays by eminent scholars who discuss the history of Islam in the modern age. Besides a number of works on the Middle East and specific problems of modernization trends within Islam, three essays deal specifically with South Asia. These include Mowahid H. Shah's "Pakistan, Islam, and the Politics of Muslim Unrest," Peter J. Bertocci's "Bangladesh: Composite Cultural Identity and Modernization in a Muslim-Majority State," and Walter K. Anderson's "India: A Case Study."


Twenty-five regimes self-described as Marxist are discussed in this monograph. Each article includes a history of the country's transition from colonialism or capitalism to Marxism, a description of that country's party and government structure, biographies of leading officials, and military, economic, and demographic data. China and the USSR receive only 119 pages, but lesser-known regimes do receive adequate coverage. Although contributors are non-Marxist, they avoid partisanship. Bibliographies are extensive but not exhaustive, making this a good reference tool for students. Recommended for most general academic collections and large public libraries. (LJ 1 Nov 81)


On 8 July President Reagan announced substantive changes in American arms transfer policy—changes which were immediately reflected in the military sales package to Pakistan. At the request of the House, the Congressional Research Service produced this volume detailing the contents and implications of the Reagan policy. Along with exhaustive tables of American arms transfer to the Third World, the study raises significant questions about the wisdom and effectiveness of the policy. Also included is a comparative study of the Carter arms policy. Case studies involving the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan and Venezuela are discussed at length. An invaluable reference work on American arms policy in the Reagan era.
2. AFGHANISTAN

Prospects for peace talks diminish severely as Kabul and Islamabad disagree on who should be invited to the conference table. Afghanistan is omitted from the draft declaration for the Nonaligned Movement Foreign Ministers meeting.


The Central Asian Arabs are a little-known people of northeastern Afghanistan. This book is an account of the changes that have taken place in their way of life over the past 50 years as they switched from a form of subsistence pastoralism to a cash economy. Barfield's research constitutes a substantial revision of standard hypothesis on the economic and social status of nomadic pastoralists, as originally posited by Fredrik Barth. One of Barfield's main purposes is to provide a case study that illustrates the wide-ranging complexity of pastoral nomadism, its integration into a regional economy, and how structural changes have occurred within the pastoral economy itself.


The author, a young, Persian-speaking globetrotter, writes of his meanderings through the Western outback of Afghanistan during the Daoud years just prior to the Soviet invasion. Chaffetz has a keen eye for detail as he frequents the samovars in remote villages, plies the primitive transport network on Russian army vehicles, and watches the time-honored religious way of life at the shrines and mosques of Afghanistan. The two images that virtually leap from every page are the tribal and religious identities which are the stuff of Afghanistan to this day. Interethnic animosities between Pathan, Uzbek, Turkoman, and so on are constantly simmering under the surface of a feudal society only superficially held together by the bonds of Islam. At one point, a lowly bureaucrat in the middle of nowhere on the Afghan steppes praises the Soviets for their contributions to the depressed economy of the region; in the next breath he warns that the new Russian-built road system will be able to carry Soviet tanks if the need arises. Although there is not a wealth of information which directly contributes to analytical efforts, the piece is well worth reading, if only to get a "feel" for the country. As the author hints in retrospect, this may be the last glimpse into an Afghanistan that is not Sovietized.


As the snows thaw, guerrillas resume widespread fighting against embattled Soviet troops and demoralized Afghan Government forces.


Despite factional fighting, Afghan exiles in Pakistan try a new political initiative by holding a tribal assembly.

Giradet's series of reports from behind rebel lines in Afghanistan provide invaluable insights into the pace and style of the insurgency. Giradet traveled extensively into Afghanistan with the mujahidin. He witnessed firefights with Soviet/DRA troops and toured the war-ravaged Panjshir Valley. Like other intrepid reporters who have covered the war, Giradet maintains the Soviets are fighting a holding action and have effectively conceded control of the countryside to the guerrillas. These are probably the most thoroughgoing eyewitness reports to emerge since the fighting began in Afghanistan.


Libraries needing up-to-date data on the political situation in Afghanistan will welcome this title. The author, who lived there many years, draws on interviews with many politically prominent people as well as on his own experiences. Griffiths' historical overview shows the role Afghanistan played in earlier power struggles, especially as they related to India and Iran. His recurring emphasis on the need for Western support of the current insurgency movements may bother some, but most general readers will profit from this book. Especially for public libraries. (LJ 15 Sep 81)


This paper utilizes ethnographic, historical, and economic data in depicting the Afghan sociocultural and linguistic profile it presents. It further offers a model of a state organization which purports to serve as a central distributing agency for national surplus wealth and for the integration of disparate social units within a specified area. The development of the state and the emergence of an urban political elite within the ethnolinguistic and cultural diversities of Afghanistan are discussed. The Russian colonial role and the roles of other colonial activities and interests, insofar as they relate to the evolution of the Afghan state and the elite, are examined. It is argued that the cultural, social, linguistic, and regional cleavages within Afghanistan have never been consolidated by a unified government apparatus. It is proposed that vested colonial interests must bear the primary responsibility for this failure.


Harrison argues that the main motivating factor behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the Kremlin's fear that Amin had become an "Afghan Tito," an ideological apostate who was beyond the control of Moscow and liable to be overthrown by rebellious tribesmen. The Soviets were taken by surprise when the Khalqis first came to power. After initially seeing the gains to be made from supporting the Afghan regime, the Soviets quickly became alienated from Amin when he clumsily tried to suppress with force a tribal revolt against modernizing reforms. Harrison notes that the reluctance on the part of the Soviets to invade may signal the possibility that the Kremlin may be amenable
to a negotiated settlement (though he also warns that the Soviets will not leave Afghanistan open to Western influence). After reviewing the negotiating positions of the respective parties involved, Harrison lays out his own proposal which, he believes, stands a chance of acceptance by all sides. The Finlandization he proposes would be a "Soviet-tilted brand of neutrality" which would preserve the autonomy of Afghanistan while simultaneously reassuring the Soviets of their legitimate defense interests in the region. Harrison dismisses arguments that Finlandization amounts to appeasement.


This paper examines the economic impact of political upheavals on a developing country. The economic conditions of Afghanistan before and after the period of political instability since the 1978 revolution are compared. Agricultural production and foreign trade are used as indicators of economic change, as they had assumed an important role in the economic development of the country. A least-square trend analysis is performed in the growth data of these two major sectors of the economy for the period 1955-72. Projected growth for the period 1973-83 is compared with the reported growth since 1973. Differences between the apparent and the projected growth rates, together with a number of alternative explanations, are examined in the light of the political instability during the years following the change in government.


The author assumes a pro-Soviet and pro-Afghan Government stance and deprecates the scope and intensity of the insurgency sweeping the country.


The Soviet-installed Prime Minister of the DRA details his version of events leading to the "new phase" of the Saur Revolution and expatiates on the glories to be derived from a reliance on Soviet patronage. Although the style of the article follows the standard cant and phraseology common to most Soviet/Afghan propaganda, this article addresses Western critics in a forthright manner. Predictably, Karmal has nothing but good to say of the Soviets and nothing but bad to say of "counterrevolutionaries" thwarting his country's socialist "progress." Nonetheless, this can be treated as an authoritative statement by the primary tool of Soviet policymaking in Afghanistan.


In "The Afghan Crisis and the Afro-Indian Ocean" the editor of this volume is the author of an article that prefers to give the Indian Ocean the more accurate title of Afro-Indian Ocean. It is his premise that unless greater cohesion and unity among the countries of the region can be brought about, they will continue to be exploited by the affluent powers who serve only their own interests. Dealing first with the Afghan crisis, Kaul suggests that India should assume the responsibility of relieving Soviet forces in
Afghanistan as "messengers of peace," under the banner of "Hindi-Afghan Bhai Bhai" with the Soviet Union remaining responsible for logistics and paying India for its services. The author contends the scheme is advantageous to both the Soviet Union and India. The former will be free to deal with the situation in Europe and with the Chinese and regain some of the influence it has lost among Third World countries; the latter would regain its leadership of the Third World, being the only country in a position to extract such a concession from the USSR. The Indian advance party, using no weapons, would be airlifted to make contact with the Afghan rebels while the main force would be transported in via the Black Sea and the USSR. The whole pacification campaign might extend over 5 years or more with other like-minded Third World countries acceptable to the Soviet Union taking part. The effort should focus on ushering in a free government friendly to the USSR whose interests Kabul should not threaten. Two other points of importance discussed by the author are the use of the Indian Navy to show the flag among the US and West European fleets now cruising off the Gulf and the transfer of the Island of Diego Garcia to the United Nations for surveillance of the surrounding ocean.


As the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan enters its second year, a negotiated settlement seems to have no more than a limited chance of success. Part of the reason is the misperception, both in Moscow and Washington, that shutting the door to the resistance groups in Peshawar would stop rebel action, whereas in fact most combat engagements are being conducted by rebel groups inside the country with no connections outside Afghanistan. In addition, internally and externally based insurgent groups hold different perceptions about their country's future.


Leaders of some of the groups opposing the Soviet invaders have a history of insurgency going back to 1973. The article also discusses the Pushtunistan issue, the Durand Line, and Afghan relations with Pakistan and Iran.


Linkages between the security situations in the Gulf and those of Afghanistan are long-standing. They were a cornerstone of British security policies in the 19th and 20th centuries and they remained a factor in the foundation of the Baghdad Pact-CENTO axis in the 1950s. Recent Soviet activities in Afghanistan, culminating in the invasion of December 1979, have acted as a powerful catalytic agent on the nascent movement of the Gulf states towards political-security cooperation. These states have reason to fear both the extension of Soviet aggression to their region and the efforts of the United States either unilaterally or in cooperation with some of the regional states, but without their unanimous consent, to insure the security of the region against Soviet aggression.
The background of these linkages is discussed in relation to three recent periods: the British colonial period (pre-1947); the period of British-American cooperation coinciding with the Baghdad Pact-CENTO and the opening of Afghanistan to Soviet military/economic aid; and the period of Iranian hegemony in the 1970s, coinciding with the first Afghan republic under Sardar Muhammad Da'ud Khan and his attempt to establish an oil-supported Persian Gulf alternative to dependence on the Soviet Union.


Amid a flurry of diplomatic activity on the Indian Subcontinent, Kabul makes an offer of talks to Pakistan and Iran, and the Soviets offer either to withdraw their troops or to step up the fighting.


Recent happenings in Afghanistan have turned that ancient, near-feudal country into one of the most explosive trouble spots in international politics today. A number of questions have been raised. For instance, what was the nature and background of the Saur Revolution (April 1978)? What was the extent of Soviet influence on the event? Why did the Soviet Union choose to intervene militarily in December 1979? Was it mainly "to save the Revolution?" And did it do so by invitation? If so, who sent out the invitation, and when? What are the implications of the Soviet intervention for the future of Afghanistan, South Asia, and the Middle East? What problems has it posed for the foreign policies of Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan and India? What roles are China and the United States expected to play in the continuing crisis? What has the world community (and the United Nations) done to resolve the crisis? Afghanistan in Crisis represents an attempt by some of the best experts in India to examine and study these and other aspects of the crisis. The book includes the following essays: "The Saur Revolution and After" by M. S. Agwani, "Soviet Action in Afghanistan" by A. K. Damodaran, "China and the Developments in Afghanistan" by Gargi Dutt, "The United States and Recent Developments in Afghanistan" by B. K. Shrivastava, "India and the Afghan Crisis" by Bimal Prasad, "Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan" by Kalim Bahadur, "Afghanistan Conflict and the United Nations" by K. P. Saksena, and "The Afghan Revolution, April 1978 to June 1980: A Bibliography" by Rashid Masood.


This study examines the Soviet Union's military presence in Afghanistan in relation to Soviet global policies and military doctrine. It addresses these questions: Has Russia historically sought control of Afghanistan? Why did the Soviet Union choose such an unpropitious time to invade another country? What are the political and diplomatic consequences of this move for the Soviet Union? Was the invasion influenced chiefly by Soviet military doctrine? The study begins with a historical perspective and brings the reader up to the present, when hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops have arrived to shore up the shaky Marxist regime. It concludes with some policy recommendations for the West. Alfred L. Monks is associate professor of political science at the University of Wyoming. He has written articles on the Soviet military and a book, Soviet Military Doctrine, 1960-1980.

The first signs of a possible negotiated settlement to the Afghan crisis begin to emerge at the United Nations.


UN-sponsored talks on Afghanistan have failed and the protagonists have fallen back to their previous hardline positions.


This highly readable work is one of the first studies to be published after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the work will no doubt become outdated as more information comes to light, it is nonetheless a useful background study to the invasion. The Newells' treatment of the Daoud years and the hapless interregnum of the Khalq is well documented. The authors clearly see the invasion as a radical break with Soviet experience in the past, although they discount any Soviet offensive motivation such as the mythical drive for warm water ports through Pakistan. Their sympathies are with the mujahedin, who are described at great length. The final chapters prescribe suitable responses for American policymakers.


The author, a prolific writer on recent Afghan events, provides an overview of the various international responses to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Included is a review of the policies of key Islamic states and several Western nations. Also discussed in some detail is the Soviet strategy of covering up a blatant violation of international law with the argument that the Red Army was "invited" into Afghanistan by a legally constituted regime. The author sees little movement toward an early resolution of the conflict either at the negotiating table or on the field of battle.


Since the mid 1950s, Afghanistan has received $1.75 billion in gross foreign assistance. The major source of this assistance has been the Soviet Union. In view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a fundamental question arises as to the nature and purposes of this assistance. The pattern and sectoral size distribution of Soviet assistance point to the presence of a long-term strategem to increase linkages, and thereby the dependence of Afghanistan on the Soviet Union. There is also evidence to indicate that this assistance was used to lay the structural foundations to facilitate an invasion of the kind that has taken place. Furthermore, some argue that eventually the Soviets will be forced to bear the costs of reconstruction and future development in Afghanistan in a manner similar to the pattern of their economic relations with other Communist countries, where such aid is in part effected...
through subsidies. There is evidence, however, from the exports of gas, Afghanistan's largest single commodity exported to the Soviet Union, that the policy of Afghan trade for Soviet aid presently employed results in gains to Afghanistan which are below expectations. This policy is likely to be repeated for other commodities in this bilateral exchange and Afghan resources are likely to be used to pay for Soviet "assistance."


Shaken by the ideological challenge from the Islamic fundamentalist Afghan rebels, the regime of President Babrak Karmal appears to be adopting its own style of Islamic nationalism in an effort to match the rebels' religious appeal. Karmal and the Soviets have good reason not to offend Islam: at least twice this century, attempts to subjugate Muslim teachings have led to the fall of a ruler.


Since the 1950s the Soviet Union, has provided successive regimes in Kabul with the bulk of its economic and technical assistance. The advent of the Marxist-styled "revolution" in Afghanistan increased the size and scope of Soviet aid. Under the Babrak Karmal puppet regime, the Soviets have embarked on a policy of rapid development of the mineral wealth of the northernmost Afghan provinces which are easily accessible to Soviet economic penetration from the central Asian republics. The author argues that the main thrust of Soviet/Afghan economic schemes is to enmesh these provinces inextricably with the economies of Soviet Central Asia.


Kabul's Marxist regime's attempt to gain support from the nation's Muslims by organizing a National Fatherland Front is an effort to soft-pedal ideology and make an uninhibited appeal to the Islamic sentiments of the population.


Soviets fight the Islamic insurgents while waiting for the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul to consolidate itself as it searches for legitimacy.


The final declaration of the Nonaligned Movement Foreign Ministers meeting calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The declaration is interpreted as a clear snub for the USSR and its allies who sought to push through an attenuated resolution that would have softened Third World condemnation of Moscow.
A number of Afghan defectors have charged that the Soviets are systematically plundering Afghanistan's mineral wealth. This article by Richardson predates many of these revelations. The author argues that Afghanistan's untapped riches of emeralds, natural gas, and iron ore may have provided the Soviets with an economic motivation for taking over the country. He posits that the invasion occurred not long after the publication of a World Bank study detailing Afghanistan's potential mineral wealth. Soviet strategy has left little doubt that rapid development of this potential wealth is a top priority for the Kremlin.


The Pamir region of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and China have historically been beyond the control of centralized states. The Uighur, Tadzhik, and Kirgiz tribesmen who inhabit the desolate region have never been integrated into any of the states; nor have the states attempted to control them. Segal offers evidence that imperial Chinese governments were junior partners in the "Great Game" between the Russian and British Empires in the 19th century. Unable and perhaps unwilling to extend their sovereignty to the western reaches of the realm, the Chinese were usually content to lay claims on the region by issuing their own maps and leaving it at that. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the area has taken on renewed importance for all of the regional players. As part of their global campaign to oppose Soviet "hegemonism," the Chinese have restaked claims to the territory and argued that Soviet intervention is a threat to China since it shares a narrow border on the Wakhan Corridor. The Chinese have refused to recognize a border treaty signed between the Soviets and their Kabul allies. The article provides the historical positions of the respective parties and summarizes the strategic stakes involved in this sensitive arena of big power rivalry.


Sen Gupta, who is fast becoming a leading Indian commentator on current affairs, has produced a first-rate study of Soviet global power in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan. "How the world is to live with the USSR," writes the author, "is a question that must be answered more promptly and less ambiguously by the countries residing in the 'arc of crises' than by others in the Third World. How [South Asian] countries answer the question will determine to a large extent the answer that finally emits from the United States." Sen Gupta painstakingly pieces together his interpretation of the events of the winter of 1979-80. Separate chapters address the response of India, Pakistan, and China to the intervention. The final chapters theorize about overall perceptions of Asian states toward the Soviet Union and how these perceptions changed after Afghanistan. Moderate in its appraisals and illuminating in scope, the Sen Gupta volume is a valuable addition to the literature on a number of subjects.

This paper attempts to compare systematically the two Islamic armed resistance movements by examining the following: (1) the prerevolutionary socio-political and historical context of the two movements; (2) an assessment of the immediate causes of the uprising—e.g., agrarian reform, official repression, and the anti-Islamic stance of communism; (3) the military and/or political basis of the resistance movements, that is, the extent of their appeal to and active support among the masses, the extent and nature of factionalism within the movements, and the nature and extent of their access to external arms and political support; and (4) the stated minimal political goals of the Basmachi and the Afghan mujahidin.

The defeat of the Basmachi movement, it is argued, was largely due to the inability of its leaders to formulate a clear and firm national political ideology in step with their military efforts. Other factors influencing the outcome were factional infighting, lack of unity and of confidence among the leaders in their military capabilities, and the failure of outside help to materialize. The paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the current Afghan mujahidin movement in light of the Basmachi experiences.


The conservative Economist devotes six pages of this issue to review the fighting in Afghanistan and assess the probabilities for a Soviet or mujahidin victory. The magazine is highly complimentary in its comments on the mujahidin. Although they are disunited and ill-armed, they have waged a "courageous" resistance against Soviet occupation and will never give up the fight. In The Economist's view, the outcome of the war depends on two variables: the determination of the Soviets to hold Afghanistan at any cost, and the amount of support the guerrillas receive from the outside. After detailing the Afghans' pathetic arsenal of vintage weapons, the article concludes that "a little help could go a long way."


This lengthy document summarizes the issues facing Congress regarding American policy in light of Soviet activities around the globe. Of particular interest to South Asia analysts is a section entitled "Invasion of Afghanistan: A New Direction of Soviet Third World Policy?" The authors speculate that Soviet intentions in the area are to project their own power to the detriment of Western interests and to contain the Chinese. As an Asian power itself, the USSR has always taken a keen interest in the affairs of states on its borders. The report presents four interpretations of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These include: a defensive response to insure the stability of a fellow Communist regime in the sensitive Islamic lands on the rim of the Soviet Union; a desire to stifle Islamic resurgence for fear of it "contaminating" Soviet Muslim lands; an oft-cited offensive inclination to use Afghanistan as a springboard for further conquests in Pakistan and Iran; and "the prestige factor" (the consequent loss of face should Afghanistan slip out of the Soviet orbit). Finally, the report summarizes the Western response to the invasion and speculates on future US-USSR relations.

This study assesses sanctions launched by the United States in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Its purpose is to provide a better understanding of the issues involved in applying these sanctions against the USSR and their future implications for US trade and diplomacy in the 1980s. The report concludes with some policy options for the United States and the West.


INR analyst Eliza Van Hollen is the author of this public information update designed to keep the world's attention focused on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Reflecting Reagan administration views, Van Hollen sees the Soviet occupation as a decided failure. The Kremlin and their Afghan puppets control less than 10 percent of the countryside, the Afghan Communists are deeply divided, and the Red Army has performed poorly in its first combat test. While the mujahedin are themselves deeply divided, there is near unanimity among Afghanistan's tribal population that the Babrak Karmal regime is illegitimate and that the presence of Soviet troops is unacceptable.


3. BANGLADESH

Using the tehsil (subdivision) as the basic unit of study, the authors analyze the presidential election of 1978 and the parliamentary election of 1979. These elections provided Zia with a popular democratic base which allowed him to move the country out of a protracted phase of military rule and into a period of more open politics. Zia captured a full 76 percent of the votes cast in the presidential election. In view of the fact that Bangladesh has recently experienced another important election, the article is particularly useful for comparative purposes. The authors provide comprehensive tables showing the breakdown of the vote in the past six elections. The authors conclude that despite the impressive showing of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), political factionalism is a persistent problem in Bangladesh. While this tendency demonstrates that the evolving political system is open and democratic, the authors caution that continued political instability could well be the end result of the experiment.


This excellent two-part update on the Bangladeshi scene is divided into sections on the domestic order and international entanglements. Although the report was published prior to Zia's assassination, it still provides invaluable insights into the domestic chaos and tensions with India that have characterized the country's first decade of independence. Franda gives Zia high marks for his personalized style of governing. Zia's emphasis on his own personal charisma improved the country's prospects for economic growth but did not go far enough to address the chronic instability of the political system represented by Zia's hybrid party, the BNP. Zia constantly stressed domestic development issues during his tenure of power; nevertheless the intractable issues of water-sharing and territorial squabbles diverted Dacca's attentions to its relations with India. Finally, Franda theorizes about the amorphous elements of a Bangladeshi identity which have yet to be resolved.


After a decade of independence, Bangladesh's relations with India have undergone a decided transformation. Once viewed as a partner in the liberation struggle, India is now regarded as a hegemonic power that has impeded the new nation's path to stability and economic progress. The author lists the series of bilateral disputes which have poisoned Indo-Bangladeshi relations. These include the Farakka impasse, the Talapatty Island dispute, and Bangladeshi complaints that India has provided aid to antiregime guerrillas in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. After detailing the background and current status of each dispute, the author speculates that the impetus for improved relations will not be realized until the two sides are able to negotiate on an equitable, give-and-take basis. Since Bangladesh holds little leverage over New Delhi, Hossain implies that the burden falls on Mrs. Gandhi to improve the climate of the negotiations.

A series of articles describes the background, conditions, tensions, and rivalries that led to the assassination of Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman.


Leading candidates stand to lose votes to minor contestants in a crowded field in Bangladesh's forthcoming elections.


President Ziaur Rahman faces problems on the aid front and with fragmented opposition parties but pushes ahead with his plans. Article contains an interview with the president on various economic and political issues facing Bangladesh.


Bangladesh amends its constitution to allow the acting president to contest the September election, which is turning out to be a race among aging candidates of faction-ridden political parties.


Relations between Bangladesh and India, which improved following the visit of Foreign Minister Shamsul Huq's visit to New Delhi, have plummeted again after a bloody border incident in the Chittagong Hill Tracts where tribal groups seeking independence from Dacca have mounted an armed insurgency.


The author observes that Bangladesh has fallen victim to the same vicious cycle of military coups that have plagued Pakistan since independence. To explain this phenomenon, Khan cites three contributing factors. First, the military has traditionally shouldered the burden of "aid to civil" authorities in times of domestic crisis. Once set in motion, the reliance on the military for domestic order is difficult for civil authorities to contain. Second, sharp differences over national policy have been used by the military as justification to intervene forcibly into the political process. During periods of civilian rule, politicians are often held hostage to the interests of the armed forces for fear of setting a coup d'etat in motion. Third, the deterioration of economic conditions in the post-independence period has increased the politicization of the army. Moves to counter these trends by forming a Chinese-style People's Liberation Army have been staunchly resisted by the Bangladeshi military elite. The author suggests as remedies greater responsiveness to the needs of the military and a more rational utilization of human resources.

Khatib, a Bangladeshi journalist, focuses on the slaughter of Mujib and his family by recounting the events of that day in the style of numerous works on the Kennedy assassination. Khatib takes a dim view of the politicians and army putsch artists who made up the conspiracy, and even a dimmer view of the so-called "elite" of Dacca who acquiesced in the butchery. This study acts as a useful background counterpoint to the Soviets' and their South Asian partners' accusations of CIA complicity, although it is best read in conjunction with Lifschultz' book *Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution*.


Rumors and unconfirmed accounts of the coup attempt in Bangladesh continue in the aftermath of the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman in Chittagong.


As expected, 76-year old Abdus Sattar, who has presided over Bangladesh's troubled peace since the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman, won the nation's presidential election by a landslide. But with the opposition crying foul, Sattar's troubles may just have started.


Sen Gupta takes a long view of the decade of coups, countercoups, and conspiratorial intrigues that have marked the emergence of Bangladesh as a new nation. More in sadness than anger, Sen Gupta recounts in lurid detail the top echelon turmoil within the Bangladesh Government. Included is a short review of the assassination of Ziaur Rahman. The book is poorly printed but worth a reading if the decline and fall of regimes is what interests an analyst of Bangladeshi politics.


Bangladesh is passing through a confused and dangerous political situation following the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman. No fewer than 83 candidates have registered for the country's forthcoming presidential elections. Such a large number of candidates from all walks of life indicates no single leader has emerged as the natural successor to the assassinated president.
4. BHUTAN

This brief article on the mountain kingdom examines Bhutan's first attempts to assert a measure of autonomy in the realm of foreign policy. Ruling monarch King Jigme Wanchuk is severely limited in his options because of his economic and military dependence on India, enshrined in the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese treaty. In recent months, however, Bhutan has been taking a more independent course in the United Nations and is opening relations with other countries independent of India's guidance.
5. INDIA

Pakistani commandos foil the hijackers of an Indian aircraft, but the incident points out New Delhi's problems with separatism.


Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to India thaws the diplomatic climate as China and India agree to begin talks on their border dispute. Some observers believe it is in India's interests to develop better ties with China.


New Delhi would like to mend its relations with the United States on the eve of a change of administration in Washington. The Soviets, however, are in no mood to give up their cozy relationship with India: the country is far too important to the USSR as a geopolitical counterbalance to China.


India and the United States discuss the mutual termination of the 1963 Tarapur agreement under which the United States supplied enriched uranium for the nuclear reactor at Tarapur. Article enumerates options of the Indian Government and concludes that the issue will continue to bedevil Indo-US relations.


Writing for an official Yugoslav Government publication, the author reviews the conflicts and hints of rapprochement that have marked the past 20 years of Sino-Indian relations. Always with an eye toward the ongoing border talks between the two sides, the author believes that an attitude of give-and-take on both sides could go a long way in defusing tensions and improving the chances for a full normalization of relations between the two Asian giants.


Written shortly after the June Lok Sabha elections in which the Congress (I) made a virtual clean sweep, this article summarizes the "will-he-or-won't-he" guessing game that surrounded Rajiv Gandhi's plunge into electoral politics. In August, the heir-to-be told the press that he would not enter politics because "it would be wrong purely from a moral point of view." After dispensing with these moral qualms in short order, Rajiv has succeeded brother Sanjay in the Gandhi dynasty. D'monte writes: "Whether Rajiv has the stuff to cope with the severe strains of reigning over a nation as diverse and volatile as India, time alone will tell."
Contains an essay in which Colonel R. Rama Rao discusses the "Threats to National (Indian) Security in the Eighties" and argues it is implicit that American involvement in the subcontinent is against India's interests and makes Washington the most dangerous of India's adversaries. While he also deals with the threat from Pakistan and China, perhaps lack of space precludes his examining the constraints under which these two countries function, thereby reducing the degree of their threat to India. While Rama Rao builds scenarios which are possible and cannot be dismissed, his general solution does not specify how India can meet these challenges to its security within the financial constraints which will not be alleviated in the near future unless vast quantities of oil are soon found. His suggestion that greater reliance should be placed on domestic research and development will go a long way to solve many of India's problems. This premise should be taken seriously by those responsible for India's security because reliance on foreign crutches, especially those of the superpowers, is of doubtful value when India's own capabilities are of consequence.


The 14-month Emergency is the topic of this inquiry into the emerging patterns of Indian democracy. The author details the tensions between the military, the bureaucracy, and the states that resulted from the Emergency. At the conclusion of the article, the author speculates that the choices facing India under the second Gandhi government are between a further loosening of authoritarian control ("functioning anarchy") and the more likely course of imposed discipline from the top.


Malhotra's article is one of a series to appear last spring in which influential defense analysts bombarded the Indian press with strident calls for the development of a nuclear weapon. Malhotra sees three options for India to take in view of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. First, India can foreshow developing nuclear weapons even if Pakistan attains this capability. This option, argues Malhotra, would leave India vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by unstable regimes in Islamabad. The second option--to meet an expected Pakistani test with renewed Indian testing--is impractical since India would be far behind Pakistan in research and development efforts. The third option, which Malhotra supports, is the development and testing of a nuclear weapon without delay. "All powers, especially the superpowers, respect strength. Nuclear weapons are the current currency of international power... Only a strong nuclear India can be a bulwark for peace and integrity in the region," he concludes.


Newly designated US Ambassador to New Delhi Harry G. Barnes discusses the mutual misperceptions that India and the United States have of one another.
He views his new job as helping eliminate these misperceptions and misunderstandings.


The prickly issue of continued supplies of US fuel for the Tarapur reactor is the focus of this review article. Noorani summarizes in a concise fashion the checkered history of India's nuclear program from the 1974 test to the severe strains during the Carter years. Particular attention is paid to the 1963 agreement whereby the United States agreed to supply enriched fuel for the Tarapur reactor through 1993. After sifting through a wealth of evidence, Noorani concludes that the United States has embarked on a "radical unilateral change of policy" with regard to India.


Contrary to press reports that this expose should never have been printed because of the danger to India's intelligence operations, the book is an immense disappointment. A former RAW operative himself, Raina details the origins of the top secret spy outfit, its triumphs, and its failures. Without adding much controversial detail, Raina outlines RAW's involvement in the 1971 war, the Sikkim operation, and the development of the Indian bomb. Of particular interest to Raina are the intermittent political squabbles that developed. While Mrs. Gandhi is alleged to have abused her powers by unleashing RAW operatives for political purposes, Raina comes down hard on the Desai government for its indiscriminate dismantling of the nation's covert capabilities.

"A Raj or a Family?" The Economist, 5 December 1981, p. 43.

In spite of being the most heavily armed and industrialized country in South Asia, India see threats and pressures on every hand. New Delhi distrusts Pakistan and views Islamabad's offer of a nonaggression pact as insincere. India would like to adopt a foreign policy that resembles a South Asian Monroe Doctrine with the smaller states in the area recognizing its hegemony and upholding its interests.


In spite of Mrs. Gandhi's relative failures, a military coup is unlikely to take place, given the traditions and composition of the Indian Armed Forces.


India is shopping around for new weapons systems under its $8 billion 5-year military modernization plan which began in May 1980. India feels it must match the F-16 fighter, which Pakistan will get from the United States, with aircraft acquisitions of its own. The best candidates at present are the MiG-25 FOXBAT and the Mirage 2000.

A new separatist campaign by the Sikhs plays on the community's long-felt grievances against India's majority Hindus.


Having traded class struggle for a share of parliamentary power, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) is left with one preoccupation: retaining office in the states of West Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala. The price of keeping political power involves befriending its ideological rival--the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI)--and other opposition parties, while fending off the danger from India's ruling Congress Party.


As suspicions grow that neighboring Pakistan is developing atomic weapons, India is widely believed to be on the threshold of producing its own nuclear bomb. In reality, New Delhi is a long way from acquiring an effective nuclear deterrent because, despite impressive progress in nuclear research, the country does not have the industrial infrastructure to produce atomic weapons.


As India's outcaste harijans turn to Islam because of its philosophy that all men are equal before God, secular India faces a dual challenge to social stability.


Rees starts from the premise that the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan is the first move in a Kremlin strategy of capitalizing on instability throughout the region. The ultimate aim of this strategy is to deny the West and Japan access to the Persian Gulf oilfields. Rees sees Afghanistan as a de facto province of the USSR and foresees no Soviet withdrawal in the near future. Given that, Rees recommends a stepped-up American naval presence in the Indian Ocean to deter any future Soviet advances. He urges the upgrading of facilities at Diego Garcia, an intensive search for additional military bases in the area, and greater attention on the nascent Rapid Deployment Force.


PM Indira Gandhi, in a press interview, says Washington's decision to provide Pakistan with $3.2 billion worth of military and economic aid, including advanced F-16 fighters, has already triggered an arms race with India.

The article provides a review of all facets of Indo-Soviet cooperation in the fields of economics, political strategy, and military hardware.

The author sees the Soviet invasion as a prelude to further expansion. Without citing any sources, Sagar maintains that Mrs. Gandhi may have known of Soviet invasion plans in advance and may have come to an understanding with the Kremlin. Unlike many commentators who stress the mutual advantages of Indo-Soviet collaboration, Sagar stresses the dissimilarities between the two countries in terms of political outlook and geostrategic compulsions. The article ends with the standard medley of concerns regarding Pakistan, China, the Indian Ocean, and nuclear issues.


Using the 1964 defection of the CPI(M) from the parent body of Indian communism as a starting point, Sen Gupta details the political rivalries that have marked the development of communism under the Gandhi government. Moscow has been nudging the two parties toward unity. This strategy, however, runs the risk of aggravating Moscow's relations with New Delhi since both parties have ignored Moscow's pleas and criticized Mrs. Gandhi's domestic policies. The principal problem standing in the way of unification is the CPI(M) policy of "equidistance" between Moscow and Beijing. Sen Gupta doubts whether Mrs. Gandhi "can combine close cooperation with the Soviet Union and political confrontation with united Communist forces."

"Smash Griffin's Indian Gang." Blitz (Bombay), 31 October 1981, p. 5

This issue of the CPI tabloid Blitz features another in a long series of diatribes against alleged CIA operative George Griffin who was refused diplomatic accreditation to India. Largely the result of a Moscow-inspired campaign to discredit Griffin, Blitz features throughout the fall of 1981 clamored for India's refusal of his credentials. Griffin is accused of masterminding the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, undermining the Indian war effort in 1971, and traveling to New Delhi from his post in Kabul to disseminate "anti-Soviet slander."


The editor, a renowned "hawk" on nuclear issues, sets the tone and scope for this collection of nine essays by fellows at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Subrahmanyam and his colleagues are vehemently opposed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in its present form since it discriminates against developing Third World states while allowing the superpowers to proliferate virtually at will. This school of thought is much more concerned with the East-West arms race than with the dangers of horizontal proliferation around the globe. This concern breaks down when it comes to Israel, South Africa, and especially rival Pakistan. Subrahmanyam reiterates his argument for speedy development of an Indian nuclear weapons capability against a possible two-sided threat from China and Pakistan. Other essayists in the volume detail the nuclear perils facing India and the dangers involved in not meeting that threat.

The author, a noted commentator on political and military affairs in the subcontinent, posits in this incisive article that Indian and American perceptions of a stable state system in the subcontinent have diverged considerably in the past and can be expected to continue to diverge in the future. In essence, US foreign policymakers have stressed the "balance of power" theme as it applies to the subcontinent. Indians have dismissed this perception since New Delhi holds such a qualitative and quantitative superiority over its neighbors, particularly over rival Pakistan. India's primary security concerns—threats from Pakistan and from within—have always been a secondary calculation in Washington's perceptions. Thus, while India has been genuinely distraught by Soviet bellicosity in the region, the American response is viewed in New Delhi as inappropriate to the considerations of the region. The author concludes by suggesting specific policy measures that would reduce the seemingly unbridgeable differences between Washington and New Delhi.


The activities of a small but influential band of Sikh separatists is detailed in this broad survey of the issues involved in the Khalistan controversy. Probably the best piece to appear yet on the subject, the article traces the political infighting within the Akali Dal that led to the breakaway of the radical separatists. Although the separatists represent a tiny minority of India's Sikh population, the backers of Khalistan have hit a sensitive political nerve in the Indian Government. Included in the article are interviews with Punjab Chief Minister Darbara Singh and Home Minister Zail Singh.


Tirtha, a professor of geography at Eastern Michigan University, has produced a concise and clearly written socioeconomic geography of contemporary India. After two initial basic chapters on the environmental and historical background, the author utilizes an enormous amount of recent data to discuss various elements of Indian culture and society as well as the "developmental processes" (urbanization, agricultural and industrial development, planning and foreign trade) on that nation. This is a text aimed at undergraduates taking a first course on Indian society. The volume is weakened in that it does not develop any clear thesis, but it will serve as an excellent reference tool for undergraduates. There is a useful selected bibliography.
6. MALDIVES

The tiny Indian Ocean island republic of the Maldives (115 square miles and a population of about 1.5 million) has long been an overlooked, backward atoll that rarely figured in the strategic equations of outside powers. Now, with Soviet and American warships cruising the Indian Ocean and Red Army troops in Afghanistan, the archipelago has taken on a crucial significance, rivaled only by the nearby Island of Diego Garcia. The authors foresee further intensification of political rivalries in the region, although the Maldives can be expected to remain aloof from the contest and cling to nonalignment.
7. NEPAL

Nepalese wait to see whether a constitutional change will make the country more democratic. Article discusses the preparations for the forthcoming elections for a new parliament in May 1981 and whether voters will choose to lay the foundations for an electoral system based on political parties or on a continuation of appointed representatives by the King.


As a high school science teacher in a village in Central Nepal for one year, Coburn was the tenant of an elderly widow known to the villagers as Aama (mother). Much of the book consists of his black-and-white photographs and an earthy first-person narrative by Aama, which is often striking in its imagery (a swarm of bees "trembles like a possessed shaman"). It is also rich in details of family life, folk medicine, religion, and agriculture and housekeeping practices. As a result, we get an intimate portrait of Aama and of the village in which she lives, and a sense of the human consequences of such problems as deforestation, soil erosion, overpopulation, and the waning of traditional values and customs. This book should interest not only specialists in Asian studies, but also the growing number of people who have traveled in Nepal and wish to know more about its people. (LJ 15 Dec 81)
8. PAKISTAN

Despite attempts by some US legislators to block the way, Pakistan will get the military equipment it needs to bolster its defense against Soviet occupation forces in neighboring Afghanistan. But the major questions in Pakistan today center not on the perceived threats from east or west but on President Zia's Islamization program. That is a subject on which Zia has strong views, as he shows in this lengthy interview with *Asiaweek.*


President Zia's regime gives in to hijackers' demands, but makes fresh arrests of domestic opponents and gains political capital.


Pakistan's president steps up his Islamization drive, prompting critics to accuse him of using religion to gain popular support.


Pakistan is likely to remain a military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the foreseeable future, but it is a dictatorship that seems to be less oppressive than the democracy which preceded it. President Zia argues that Pakistani political parties are in no condition to take over power and instead he has revived the idea of a federal advisory council. The 350 members of this body would debate national policy, consider constitutional amendments and, perhaps in the distant future, evolve into a party system.


Without a doubt, this is one of the major works to appear on South Asia in years, and the final word on the formerly obscure movement for Baluch autonomy. Harrison, a longtime specialist in Asian affairs, uses a wealth of primary sources, including rare interviews with the key actors in the drama, to provide an in-depth assessment of the Baluch nationalist movement and the attendant separatist pressures growing in the Baluch areas of Pakistan and Iran. Separate chapters deal with national self-identity of the Baluch, the history of this ethnic group, the situation in Iran and Pakistan, Soviet temptations to play their supposed "Baluch card," and policy options for American and Western strategic architects.


The author of this carefully crafted piece is a former chief minister of Punjab with close political ties to Bhutto. After the Zia coup, he was forced into exile. While Khar is bitterly opposed to the imposition and
continuation of martial law in his homeland, he speaks with the measured voice of a constructive critic, not with the voice of a Pakistan People's Party ideologue. Khar acknowledges the precarious strategic position Pakistan finds itself in. The first three options he lists (close security ties with the United States, rapprochement with Moscow, and a heavy reliance on "romantic" Islam) are all seen as flawed responses to Pakistan's security dilemma. The fourth alternative—a carefully engineered detente on the subcontinent—he advances as both prudent and realizable. Khar lists specific politico-military steps India and Pakistan can take to bring about this thaw in bilateral relations.


The United States wants military base facilities in Pakistan as a quid pro quo for its $3.2 billion arms and aid package to Islamabad. Highest American priority is being accorded to the acquisition of sites to pre-position vast stockpiles of military equipment for use by the US Rapid Deployment Force. The United States will also seek access to Pakistani airbases in Karachi or along the Makran Coast for the purpose of basing antisubmarine surveillance aircraft.


Growing US-Pakistani relations could be threatened by Islamabad's ambitions for a nuclear capability. The US military and economic aid package may serve as a deterrent, however, but only if Washington exacts a quid pro quo for its assistance from Islamabad. This might consist of a Pakistani pledge not to develop fissionable material.


In 1979, the Governments of Pakistan, China, and Great Britain launched an investigative study of the regions which became accessible after the opening of the Karakoram Highway. The survey teams divided into five groups to investigate seismology, mapping, geomorphology, housing and natural hazards, and glaciology. The author presents the preliminary findings of the groups.


Through his deal with Pakistan, President Reagan seeks to show that nonalignment is no obstacle to a security arrangement.


Washington argues that selling arms to Pakistan will dissuade it from producing a nuclear bomb.


The author reports on his extended trip to Pakistan in which he interviewed Pakistanis from every walk of life. Although written from the standpoint of a skeptical Indian peering inside the curious amalgam known as Pakistan, Sen Gupta is surprisingly moderate in tone and evenhanded in approach. Sen Gupta sees no popular yearning for war with India beyond a "lunatic fringe of India-haters." The civilian opponents of the regime express uniform distaste for Zia's dictatorship. The no-war pact is seen as a nonstarter since Zia is well aware that he would be deprived of the imminent "foreign threat" he so desperately needs to keep his regime afloat. Pakistanis, the author reports, are generally opposed to renewed security ties with the United States, though popular emotion is usually reserved for India's refusal to grant Pakistan the sovereign right to acquire arms from abroad. Despite very real concerns regarding a deteriorating regional situation, the author bemoans the fact that "India continues to be the sole preoccupation of Pakistan's military planners and strategic designers." Sen Gupta echoes numerous reports he received in Pakistan that the F-16 transfer is only intended to bolster Zia's image and improve Pakistan's security posture vis-a-vis India.


An excellent example of investigative journalism, The Islamic Bomb focuses on the threat of nuclear proliferation. The authors detail, in a superb manner, nuclear arms developments in the Middle East and South Asia with a powerful analysis of related events in Pakistan, India, Israel, Iraq, and Libya. The terror, violence, and intrigue the authors uncovered make the threat of nuclear proliferation dangerously real. The background to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility in July 1981 and Pakistan's development of a nuclear arms capability highlight the book. Woven into the story is the intricate diplomacy involved. This is highly recommended for a wide range of readers, especially those whose interests include nuclear arms development or Middle Eastern politics. (LJ 15 Dec 81).


This is a highly controversial article written to demonstrate that Pakistan is on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Wright believes the program is being actively supported by the Turkish military government in collaboration with Pakistani scientists who have stolen the technology to produce a bomb. The author contends that, under these shady circumstances, the Reagan administration's offer of sophisticated weaponry to the Zia regime makes no sense. The bottom line of the expose' is that the Reagan administration has knowingly sanctioned the Pakistani weapons program in the interest of global anti-Sovietism.

This is a fairly representative piece culled from the Indian popular press on Pakistan's covert nuclear program which is expected to achieve a weapons capability in 1 or 2 years' time. Like many exposés written in past years, the India Today article pieces together Pakistan's covert purchasing network in Canada.


Sandwiched in between a series of articles dealing with Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy dilemmas is a lengthy interview with Zia. In it, Zia calls for improved relations with India and abjures any sinister intentions in Pakistan's nuclear program. The separate articles deal with Pakistan's perception of a foreign threat, Indo-Pakistani animosities, and Zia's mounting opposition at home. The formation of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, as well as the terrorist threat posed by al-Zulfiquar, is given prominent attention.


This review article highlights Zia's attempts to forge an Islamic state in substance as well as in name. The article discusses the prospects for a referendum, the zakat provisions, Islamic banking, and the political ramifications of implementing such policies within a martial law framework. The article concludes that the scheme enjoys fairly wide popular support when advanced in terms of general principles. As Zia has learned, however, implementing the program raises more questions than it answers and has led to considerable opposition from both the left and the right.


A highly usable thumbnail sketch of the issues facing Congress in handling the Reagan administration's request for increased US military and economic support for Pakistan to deter further Soviet aggression in the region. The analyst traces the history of US-Pakistani relations, particularly with regard to American arms transfers, the effects of arms transfer policies on relations with India, and the US response to Pakistan's nuclear arms program. The study investigates the balance of forces between India and Pakistan and the appropriateness of transferring sophisticated American weaponry to the Zia regime.
9. SRI LANKA

Prime Minister R. Premadasa sees economic advantages for Sri Lanka in joining ASEAN but the application from Colombo embarrasses the five-nation grouping.


Communal unrest leading to widespread rioting in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka compels the government to impose a nationwide state of emergency.


For decades the Tamil issue has simmered under the surface of Sri Lanka's idyllic outward calm. Recently, it erupted with savage suddenness in an orgy of mindless violence—the worst in recent Sri Lankan history. Arson, looting, and wanton destruction exploded simultaneously in nearly 30 towns and villages in five of the country's nine provinces.


The author is an anthropologist who attempts to explain the determination of the Ceylon Tamil population to form their own separate state, Eelam. According to Pfaffenerger, the Tamils of the northern stronghold of Jaffna stand apart not only from their fellow Sri Lankans but also from their co-religionists across the Straits in Tamil Nadu State. The Jaffna Tamils see themselves as the last upholders of the glorious Tamil traditions dating back several millenia. They are suspicious of the religious purity of Indian Tamils and openly disdainful of Tamil Muslims and east coast Tamils in Sri Lanka. The glorification of female chastity is a pillar of the community which, in many ways, defines the cultural self-identity of the Ceylon Tamils. Although TULF politicians give lip service to social reforms within the community, the author contends that real economic and political power is yielded by the Vellalar caste which is aligned with the Brahman priesthood.


Although there seems little probability in the near future of Ceylon Tamils carving out a separate, independent Tamil nation inside Sri Lanka, the issue has shown a tenacity and explosiveness that cannot be ignored and has led to virtual martial law in the northern district of Jaffna.