A SMALL VIEW OF WAR: TOWARD A BROADER FM 100-5

A Monograph
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Abstract

A SMALL VIEW OF WAR: TOWARD A BROADER FM 100-5 by MAJ Michael D. Stewart, USA, 56 pages.

The nation’s security needs have dramatically changed since 1989. While the Army may, and probably will, fight a conventionally armed enemy in the future, it must also prepare itself to operate across a broad range of missions for which it is ill-prepared. The new security environment, with no colossal adversary but with a multitude of missions, placed the U.S. Army in a tenuous position with respect to its doctrine. What may become the most likely Army operation in the 1998 to 2003 period is the form of conflict variously known as small wars, unconventional war, low-intensity conflict or operations other than war (OOTW). These missions are equally as difficult to execute as war and require a trained, disciplined Army backed by a substantial doctrine.

Clearly, the U.S. political leadership expects the military to play an increasing role in these operations. Additionally, a wide range of authors and studies point to this type of conflict as the most likely one requiring U.S. involvement, but it is precisely this area for which current Army operations doctrine is least prepared to meet. Specifically, the question under consideration is an assessment of the adequacy of the Army’s FM 100-5, Operations in responding to this range of missions.

Current operational doctrine focuses on the most dangerous to the detriment of the most likely. Doctrine should provide the analytical framework for examining, framing, and operating in diverse environments in which U.S. forces are neither at war nor are they conducting peacetime training. The question faced by the Army is whether to develop, as has been the pattern in the recent past, a doctrinal model which focuses on the most dangerous enemy or whether to adopt a broader doctrine which is relevant and accounts for the most dangerous threats as well as the most likely. Doctrine, and by extension the Army, faces a danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant if it does not address the operations which it conducts on a daily basis. Preparing for the once-in-a-generation war may lead to an army which can fight and win the nation’s wars, but it can also lead to a disconnect between the strategy of the nation and the capabilities of the nation’s instruments.
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Chapter One

Introduction

"Each day, newspaper headlines reinforce the wisdom of maintaining a capability to respond rapidly to a wide variety of situations."¹ "U.S. Troops in Firefight in Liberia," "Long-term role seen in Bosnia," and "Temptation of the Hegemonic Hermit [North Korea]" demonstrate the dangers and uncertainty facing the U.S. in the post-Cold War period.² Responding to the diverse array of situations in this post-Cold War world requires a flexible military which possesses a wide range of capabilities.

The nation's security needs have dramatically changed since 1989. While the Army may, and probably will, fight a conventionally armed enemy in the future, it must also prepare itself to operate across a broad range of missions for which it is ill-prepared. In some ways, the Army faces a crisis of identity caused in part by the decline of the Soviet empire and also by the new National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. During the Cold War, the U.S. Army had an enemy. Defeating this enemy, the Soviet Union, became the basis of Army doctrine. With the decline of the Soviet empire starting in 1989, a new and uncertain world emerged.

This new security environment, with no colossal adversary but with a multitude of missions, placed the U.S. Army in a tenuous position with respect to its doctrine. Lacking a central focus, the U.S. Army has had to adopt a much more flexible view of possible threats, and Army doctrine must take into account the uncertain nature of future enemies. Concurrently, employment in a broader range of missions has become the norm for an
Army focused, at least in the recent past, on fighting and winning a major conventional war.

The Army faces a fundamental tension between its primary role of fighting and winning wars and the competition provided by its employment in other roles. Although "[t]he Army's fundamental strategic role is to generate land power in military operations across the operational continuum,"\(^3\) through doctrine, the Army continues to define itself as a warfighting force. Evidence suggests that the Army is not completely comfortable with nor prepared to operate across the entire continuum.

FM 100-5 defines the Army mission "to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of America"\(^4\) by "deterring war and, when deterrence fails, by achieving quick, decisive victory--on and off the battlefield--anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions as part of a joint team."\(^5\) In further defining itself, the Army has adopted a view that winning wars is its primary reason for existence. FM 100-5 extends this further by narrowly focusing operations doctrine on warfighting. "Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual."\(^6\) While this may be adequate for defining the Army’s ultimate purpose, in light of the NSS, NMS, and operational experience, this may be too narrow a definition.

Colonel (ret.) Robert Helms suggests in an article "New Directions: Will Army Jump or Be Pushed?" that the Army needs to "determine what business it is in and what it wants to be in and make necessary changes or ... swim against the currents of history."\(^7\) The Army cannot alter its environment nor can it decline the missions assigned to it by its civilian leaders. Worse yet, it risks failure if it ignores the fundamental changes in the
nature of the international order. While a conventionally armed enemy is plausible, it is more likely that the Army will face something less. Operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Macedonia clearly show a growing pattern of participation in these “lesser” missions. Because the U.S. Army has defined itself as a doctrinal army, how the Army incorporates these “lesser,” but more frequent, missions will determine how well the Army executes them in the future.

In 1993, the Army published an updated version of FM 100-5, Operations, designed to account for the significant changes in the nation’s security environment after the end of the Cold War. As the keystone manual in the Army’s doctrinal hierarchy, FM 100-5 links the National Military Strategy to Army roles and missions. It also serves as the basis from which all other doctrinal manuals are developed. In a project begun in 1995, the Army has yet again undertaken a revision of its operational doctrine. The proposed 1998 version of FM 100-5 will focus on addressing the Army’s operational requirements in the years 1998 to 2003.

While no one can predict with any certainty what the world will look like in 2003, a reasonable projection can be made using key national strategy documents, assessments, and writings from individual authors. Drawing from these sources, one finds that the U.S. faces no definable threats similar to that faced by the U.S. in the Cold War. What these sources do recognize is a greatly increased level of instability worldwide from a variety of national, transnational, and criminal sources. Consequently, the Army will operate in an environment of relative uncertainty filled with diverse and sometimes questionable threats to national security.
What may become the most likely Army operation in the 1998 to 2003 period is the form of conflict variously known as small wars, unconventional war, low-intensity conflict or operations other than war (OOTW). While this genre has no common name, many factors including recent experience indicate that the Army will find itself increasingly involved in missions which do not fit the Army's definition of war. The 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement specifically refers to the use of military force in peace operations, counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, and a vague category known as other missions. These missions are equally as difficult to execute as war and require a trained, disciplined Army backed by a substantial doctrine.

Clearly, the U.S. political leadership expects the military to play an increasing role in these operations. Additionally, a wide range of authors and studies point to this type of conflict as the most likely one requiring U.S. involvement, but it is precisely this area for which current Army operations doctrine is least prepared to meet. This becomes a starting point for assessing the readiness of the Army to conduct these missions. Specifically, the question under consideration is an assessment of the adequacy of the Army's FM 100-5, Operations in responding to this range of missions.

A criticism of past operations doctrine is that it had too narrow a focus. FM 100-5 acknowledges that it must address the full operational spectrum, but examining FM 100-5 reveals it devotes much of its content to the conduct of major conventional war. Some observers hold that the full range of military operations needs much greater attention in doctrine, and they criticize the Army's focus on conventional war in rather strong terms. “Because irregular warfare is often seen as a distraction from the real business of war, it
rarely receives significant emphasis in military academies and training centers. Despite the American Army’s extensive experience in guerrilla warfare, it ignores the subject.” In examining the current FM 100-5, this indictment can be extended to the whole range of military operations excepting major conventional war. While FM 100-5 does not ignore these other missions, it does not embrace them either.

One may compare this debate over doctrine to that of preparing enemy courses of action (COA) during the Deliberate Decisionmaking Process (DDMP). During the development of possible enemy courses of action, the intelligence officer normally develops a minimum of two: the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous COA. Similarly, Army doctrine could adopt one of two possible outlines for its operations doctrine. The first outline would focus on preparing for the most dangerous threat, major conventional war. Doctrine would assess the most dangerous combination of capabilities and seek to counter that particular enemy. The capability to respond to lesser threats and missions would come from residual capability developed as a means to counter the most dangerous possibility. This particular model adopts a narrow view of operations and most resembles the current approach of FM 100-5.

A second view of doctrine would assess the most likely threats and missions. This doctrinal model would array forces and capabilities against the enemies and threats to national security which are likely to be encountered, and it would then seek to provide a functional doctrine which addresses them. This model counters those threats which the Army is most likely to confront in the future. To be effective from a national security
perspective, however, this doctrinal model could not ignore the most dangerous enemy, and it would have to address the requirement to fight and win wars.

Current operational doctrine focuses on the most dangerous to the detriment of the most likely. While some concepts can be transferred, most that do come by means of the "appliqué method." That is, what worked in war must also work in peace or conflict. Doctrine should provide the analytical framework for examining, framing, and operating in diverse environments in which U.S. forces are neither at war nor are they conducting peacetime training. The question faced by the Army is whether to develop, as has been the pattern in the recent past, a doctrinal model which focuses solely on the most dangerous enemy or whether to adopt a broader doctrine which is relevant and accounts for the most dangerous threats as well as the most likely.

A related question which remains to be answered is how well FM 100-5, Operations, correlates to the day-to-day actions of the Army. "FM 100-5 should assume an important place in the day-to-day life of the Army and receive serious attention from professional soldiers. The reality is far different, however." While FM 100-5 may guide the actions of the Army in a major conventional war, few chapters correspond directly to the soldier's daily duties. Worse, FM 100-5 has had little direct applicability to many of the recent deployments involving U.S. troops. This further indicates the need for a broader operational doctrine.
Chapter Two

Background

To develop a broader FM 100-5 which is more inclusive of the realities of the post-Cold War world, the Army must answer three questions. What are operations? This particular question has several components. What military operations can be derived from the NSS and NMS? What is the nature of the threat which the nation faces and what future environments must the revised operational doctrine address? What tasks arise from these environments? Next, does the Army understand that it has a larger role in the conduct of U.S. international relations than simply fighting and winning the nation’s wars? If so, where does current operations doctrine demonstrate a deficiency in addressing the missions? Finally, how does the Army define operations, what does doctrine say about operations, and what has the Army leadership said regarding operations?

The intent of this monograph is not to argue that the Army should ignore its primary mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars but rather to establish that the Army’s narrow view of operations hinders the doctrine’s effectiveness. By adopting a narrow view of war, Army doctrine falls short of one of its stated purposes which is to guide the actions of commanders. Army commanders operating in Bosnia have already experienced this problem. Given that U.S. military doctrine provides the framework around which operations are built, a narrowly-focused doctrine may lead military planners to violate Clausewitz’s dictum: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it
into, something that is alien to its nature. Through its focus on the most dangerous scenario, our operations doctrine compromises response to the most likely scenario the Army will face under the current NSS and NMS. More disturbing, the Army may be doctrinally focused on situations and scenarios which have no relationship to the actual operational environment.

One problem with the debate regarding military operations is that no standard terminology exists. To one set of individuals, conflict is a subset of war. To others, all disagreement between nations is war. Even more diverse is the range of terms associated with military operations in anything other than major conventional war. No standardization exists in the application of these terms, nor does the Army appear content with the term it first used in the 1993 FM 100-5: Operations Other Than War (OOTW). While this monograph will not seek to settle this wide-ranging debate, it is important to make certain distinctions regarding terms.

As a standard, this monograph will use the level of national interest as the discriminator in describing low- to high-intensity conflict. While Army doctrine has generally defined conflict levels in terms of weapons employed, this paper takes a more strategic view. Sam Sarkesian, author of numerous books on low-intensity conflict, makes the important distinction that intensity of conflict has nothing to do with the level of violence, but it defines policy and strategic indicators. Thus, many levels of violence can occur within a given conflict, but it is the political nature of the struggle which defines the intensity. Clausewitz in On War and Sir Julian Corbett in Some Principles of Maritime
Operations second this understanding in their discussions of limited war. Across this backdrop, the military can be expected to operate as an instrument of U.S. national power.

What are Operations?

Drawing another analogy from the DDMP, the Army can derive specified and implied tasks from higher directives. Two documents which provide a basis for determining the scope of Army operations are the 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) and the 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS outlines three basic objectives: enhancing U.S. security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy. While military tasks may be derived from each, the most important of these three to explore is the military’s contribution to enhanced security. The key element of enhanced security which is applicable to the Army is the maintenance of a strong defense capability. Tasks which are derived from this element include: dealing with major regional contingencies, providing overseas presence, countering weapons of mass destruction, supporting multilateral peace operations, and supporting counterterrorism efforts and other national security objectives. Although some of these tasks involve warfighting, the vast majority do not. Nonetheless, the NSS authors’ clearly expect the Army to contribute to the accomplishment of all of the objectives.

The nation’s military strategy provides more specific guidance to the military services. The three components of the NMS are peacetime engagement; deterrence of aggression and prevention of conflict; and fighting and winning wars. Specific elements of peacetime engagement are military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security
assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. Deterrence includes nuclear deterrence, regional alliances, crisis response, arms control, confidence building measures, noncombatant evacuation operations, sanctions enforcement, and peace enforcement. Fighting and winning the nation’s wars remains self-explanatory. What becomes clear from this brief enumeration of the NMS is that the nation expects military forces to function across the broad spectrum from peace to war.

Both the NSS and NMS establish a framework for the employment of military forces, but several implied missions underlie the specified tasks as well. The NMS contains an almost hidden reference to a wide range of potential operations. It states, “On occasion, U.S. forces may participate in peace enforcement operations or other operations which stand in the gray zone between peace and war. [Italics added] These operations are characterized by the use of force or the threat of the use of force, and are interwoven with diplomatic and economic efforts, often involving both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Such actions may be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security or to respond to acts of aggression.”16 This particular statement embodies many possible operations, and it is a clear reference to operations other than major conventional war.

Starting with the NSS and NMS, the Army can deduce that it has a wide variety of missions for which it must prepare. In general terms, operations constitute those missions undertaken by the military to support the NMS and NSS of the United States. Ranging from fighting wars to combating drugs, the Army faces a challenge in ensuring that it can
meet the array of possible threats defined by these key security documents. For analysis, a more specific framework must be constructed.

**The Environment of Operations**

Doctrinally, the Army holds that military operations occur across a continuum of peace, conflict and war. Doctrine formalizes this concept as states of the environment. Peace may be the easiest state of the environment to define. In black-and white terms, peace is the absence of war. Further examining this definition, however, reveals that peace does not necessarily mean no competition exists. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Hunt, formerly of the Army Propensity Office for LIC, recommended the following as a description of the environment the Army faced in peacetime engagement:

> Throughout history, violence has been part of the human condition. While men may wish for a world completely at peace, there is no indication that the goal will be achieved any time soon. There is, however, a low ambient level of violence which is an acceptable and attainable goal. In such a situation, men are generally secure in their persons and property. Countries are not at war. Governments are not threatened by imminent overthrow. Violence is generally limited to crime for personal gain, although the threat of political upheaval is never far removed. Countries engage in trade, agree to recognize each other's territorial boundaries, and seek to settle disputes by diplomacy. The relations among governments is guided by international law. They generally limit their use of force to attempts to deter or punish domestic crime.

On the other hand, nations or other entities may disagree more strongly than can be settled through normal diplomacy. The scenario he described for a world that is not at peace nor war is more complex. “Between achievable, imperfect peace and the violence
of war lies a situation in which states or non-state organizations employ force in circumscribed ways for carefully limited purposes. Hostilities short of war occur when a state or organization either lacks the means or is unwilling to take the risk ongoing to war.\textsuperscript{19}

Colonel (ret.) Ed Thurman first described the continuum’s application to military operations in terms of power. Power comes through the military’s ability to influence (peace), persuade (conflict), and coerce (war).\textsuperscript{20} Given this continuum, the question doctrine must answer becomes how to generate power across the broad range of missions which occur within the continuum. One deficiency of Army doctrine which this paper will discuss is that it explains in great detail how to coerce a foe in war, but it does not address the other aspects of power in nearly equal measure.

Admiral Paul Miller articulates another view which corresponds to Thurman’s analysis and correlates well with the NMS and NSS. In his book, Swords and Plowshares, he examines the dual nature of military forces and contends that the nation, through the military, must be able to project influence (peacetime), power (crisis) and force (war). While he uses several terms--missions, operations, and activities--to describe what the military does within his continuum, they roughly correspond in content and intent to those of Thurman.\textsuperscript{21} What is most important is that Admiral Miller sees a military role in each of the three environments.

Using slightly different terms, Colonel James McDonough presents a similar requirement for a broader range of military operations. “Our nation will seek to achieve strategic objectives through the exertion of influence, persuasion and, if need be,
coercion." The Army can expect to be used to influence and to persuade other nations and transnational entities, but the Army needs to ensure that its doctrine clearly defines how it will do so. Grudging reluctance to embrace aspects of national strategy other than warfighting puts the Army at cross-currents with the will of the nation’s leaders.

**How does the U.S. Army define operations?**

Briefly stated, the Army views FM 100-5, *Operations*, as warfighting doctrine. Its content reveals a definite bias towards the most intense form of competition between nations. Public statements, articles and interviews with the Army’s senior leadership emphasize this orientation towards war as the Army’s accepted definition of operations. FM 100-5, Chapter Two, “Fundamentals of Army Operations,” discusses the context of operations. According to FM 100-5, operations are the combat and noncombat activities executed by the Army in three environments: peacetime, conflict, and war. Peacetime is characterized as a period of routine interaction between countries. Conflict involves some level of hostilities between nation’s pursuing competing agendas, and war constitutes the most intense level because it uses force to achieve those aims of the nation. These three different environments provide a necessary framework, but it is more suited to discussing the level of national interests involved rather than Army operations. It is important to note that while the primary focus of FM 100-5 is warfighting, war constitutes only one aspect of military operations.

Within the three environments, FM 100-5 defines a range of military operations. Military operations range from nation assistance to large-scale combat operations. Within this range of military operations, an arbitrary and confusing line has been drawn which
subdivides the military operational environment into war and operations other than war. War, as previously stated, involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy. The broad range of operations in peacetime and conflict constitute operations other than war. Doctrine attempts to array these military operations against the backdrop of the three environments, but a specific mission rarely fits into one particular category.

This division of operations unnecessarily complicates discussions about the subject, and using the definitions provided by FM 100-5 quickly produces confusion when an attempt is made to apply them to actual situations. For instance, should operations in Somalia from December 1992 to October 1993 be classified as humanitarian assistance and nation-building; peace enforcement; or strikes and raids? Which environment were the units operating in? Doctrinally, nation-building is a peacetime noncombat operation, but operations in Somalia involved significant aspects of the types of combat operations which doctrine places in the category of conflict. Combat activities occur in both war and conflict, and FM 100-5 notes that all three states of the environment may exist simultaneously in a theater. As previously noted, the U.S. participation in Somalia involved the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy. By the doctrinal definition, this constitutes war, but few would suggest that the U.S. was at war with Somalia. While historians may be able to separate the actions into specific categories years afterwards, the commander on the scene can quickly lose sight of the mission when trying to apply doctrine to operations.
What constitutes Army operations?

The Army's senior leadership has recognized for some time the evolving nature of Army operations. General Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, said that the post-Cold War Army must now respond to "new or expanded" missions, but he cautioned that the Army could not be structured solely to deal with these emerging missions. In another interview, General Sullivan outlined his view of what constitutes military operations. "[W]e can expect to operate across the entire continuum of military operations anywhere in the world--from fighting forest fires to fighting a heavily armed enemy, from building roads to assisting refugees, from conducting counterdrug operations to conducting counterinsurgencies. Our doctrine must take into account this breadth of operations." As evidenced by his statements, recognition of the wider range of operations and the requirement for a doctrinal explanation had been growing since the early 1990s.

In 1991, an important document circulated within the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Entitled "Commander's Vision for Low Intensity Conflict," this memorandum outlined a broad concept for incorporating LIC into the TRADOC system. More importantly, this document recognized that the Army must prepare to operate in a radically altered world. "While many of the challenges the Army may face in the future will require the use of military force in our traditional warfighting role, other types of threats to our national security interests will present qualitatively different challenges requiring the Army to operate in the low intensity conflict environment." It further specified that the Army must "incorporate low intensity conflict considerations into our routine way of doing business." This guidance did not envision
two separate armies like that possessed by the French in the early 1900s. But it does recognize that the methods for waging conventional war do not apply directly to low intensity conflict.\textsuperscript{28}

Several significant observations can be drawn from these statements. First, the world environment has changed significantly since the demise of the former Soviet Union. This radical change in the operational environment has opened the opportunity to employ the U.S. Army in ways previously made impossible by the Soviet threat. Second, the Army's senior leadership foresaw an Army role in many diverse missions. All but one of the operations outlined in General Sullivan's comments fall into the category currently defined as OOTW. Lastly, this diverse nature of Army operations was not adequately defined in doctrinal manuals and needed to be incorporated into Army doctrine.

To its credit, the Army did make an attempt to include these considerations into FM 100-5. Doctor John Fishel of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at the Army's Command and General Staff College makes the point that the mere inclusion of Chapter Thirteen, "Operations Other Than War," in its principal operations manual was a tremendous step for the Army. During the rewrite of the 1993 FM 100-5, a member of the writing team produced an article which echoed many of General Sullivan's comments regarding the increased scope of Army missions. "We [the Army] will be conducting a variety of missions--such as warfighting, stability operations, noncombatant evacuation, counter-terrorism, security, arms control and verification and protection of nuclear weapons--with a variety of government agencies, sister services and the forces of other
nations. The implications of these missions are significant and encompass the employment of the total force across the continuum of military operations.\textsuperscript{29}

Other articles recognize the need for a doctrinal definition of the emerging missions from the NSS. "The recently assigned missions of curbing contraband flow...should be more clearly defined. Other missions include security assistance, nation building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. All these missions may warrant doctrinal elaboration."\textsuperscript{30} Taken together, the comments of General Sullivan along with the articles mentioned indicate that the Army does recognize that it has a vital role in the broad range of military missions. The question then becomes how sufficient is the treatment of operations topics other than warfighting in FM 100-5. Unfortunately, the answer is not encouraging.

Surveying the contents of Chapter Thirteen, "Operations Other Than War," of FM 100-5, one finds that it comprises three distinct parts: a description of the environment of OOTW, a list of OOTW principles, and a list of OOTW activities. Scattered references in Chapter One, "Challenges for the U.S. Army," Chapter Two, "Fundamentals of Army Operations" and Chapter Twelve, "Logistics" comprise the remainder of the manual's discussion about OOTW.\textsuperscript{31} Given that the normal state of affairs is something less than war, this represents a possible disconnect between the NSS, NMS, and Army doctrine. Despite the importance of the Army's role in the more routine aspects of international relations as outlined in the NMS, Army doctrine falls somewhat short of providing a comprehensive view of its part in the execution of the nation's strategy.
Clearly, some of the authors of the 1993 version of FM 100-5 saw a broader mandate for the new manual. "FM 100-5, our keystone doctrine, should be an all-encompassing expression of how the strategic, total Army intends to fulfill its obligations across the continuum of military operations. The manual must expand both: vertically, to address in more detail the strategic-operational linkage; and horizontally, to encompass operations across the continuum of military operations in peace, crisis, and war." This is much broader than that which is found in the final product. If these statements taken as a whole are true, then why does Army operations doctrine focus almost exclusively on warfighting? Statements like "[w]inning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual [FM 100-5]" cannot be easily reconciled with the intent to produce a broad-based operational doctrine capable of guiding the Army in military operations across the operational continuum. Finding the answer as to why there is an underlying disagreement lies partly in an examination of contradictions.

The Army has expressed a reluctance to implement low intensity conflict precepts preferring instead to focus on major conventional war. Efforts to do otherwise have met with great resistance. "While the mechanisms to integrate low intensity conflict considerations already exist, the problem has been the reluctance to recognize the extent and criticality of future Army involvement in low intensity conflict." As was mentioned earlier, the NSS and NMS envision military participation in a broad range of activities other than warfighting. However, as Doctor John Fishel observes in "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," the Army has experienced a tension between conventional and unconventional from its inception.
From the highest levels downward, the Army hedges when it comes to incorporating emerging missions from the NSS and NMS into operational doctrine, and many contrary statements appear in published articles and interviews. One such instance occurred in an interview with the former Army Chief of Staff. General Sullivan asserted that the Army needed to be ready to “fight across the operational continuum.” This may be a misstatement, but it is telling that he uses the word “fight” instead of “operate.”

In another interview, the former Army Chief of Staff stated “[t]he Army can do these missions that we’re asked to do: fight forest fires, go to Florida, go to Somalia (although there is a lot of mission-related stuff going on in Somalia and elsewhere, as there is in fighting forest fires and so forth). We can do all of that as long as we keep our focus on the ultimate mission that must be uppermost in everybody’s mind—that we exist for one reason, and that is to fight and win the nation’s wars.” Overall, the comments of Army leadership seem to reflect a caution about fully embracing the new missions required by the NSS and NMS. While recognizing the requirement, there is considerable wariness to execute the required changes.

Regardless of the reluctance of the Army to embrace the requirement, the Army understands that it has a key role to play in the changing security environment. Additionally, the Army understood that doctrine must account for the widening role of the Army in OOTW. “The next manual must describe how our soldiers and forces meet the requirements of worldwide operations across the full range of operations and the three levels of war.” During an interview regarding the then forthcoming 1993 FM 100-5, TRADOC Commanding General Frederick Franks added, “For the first time FM 100-5
will also set out principles for conducting what he [General Franks] calls “operations other than war” including missions such as low intensity conflict, and counter-narcotics operations.\textsuperscript{39}

After publishing the 1993 FM 100-5, however, the Army also sought to deny that the nature of its operations manual had changed. Colonel McDonough, former Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, a key individual in the rewrite of the 1993 FM 100-5, seemingly contradicts himself in outlining the 1993 revision of FM 100-5. While stating that it should give the “principles by which we will do our nation’s bidding in peace, crisis and war,” he also states that FM 100-5 is warfighting doctrine.\textsuperscript{40} Again, this indicates a reluctance to accept any mission other than war in operations doctrine. One of the most blatant of these denials came as the Army released the 1993 FM 100-5. “Some reviewers expressed concern that by including references to operations other than war, TRADOC leaders had diffused the ‘warfighting’ intent of the book. ‘That’s just not so,’ [Brigadier General Lon] Maggart [then Deputy Commandant of the Combined Arms Center] protested. ‘This book is a ‘warfighting’ book.’”\textsuperscript{41} Despite the reality of a changed world, the decline of the traditional Soviet threat, and a nation which expected a greater return from its standing force, the Army revoked its tentative steps towards a comprehensive operational doctrine.

Several sources point to a lack of a comprehensive operational doctrine. These commentators include both soldiers and academicians. From their comments, one concludes that the Army has adequately addressed the upper end of the scale, and they indicate the Army has a natural capability to respond to very benign missions requiring
organized manpower at the lower end of the scale. They also show, however, that the Army's capability in situations requiring limited force is less robust. Most significantly, Army operations doctrine is most deficient in addressing what scholars term low-intensity conflict—which they deem the most likely threat to be faced.

One such source is Colonel McDonough. Compare his earlier statement about the warfighting nature of FM 100-5 with his observations about the product needed in the 1993 revision of FM 100-5. He commented, "Our current warfighting doctrine, as expressed in the 1986 version of FM 100-5, is largely confined to considerations of conventional, mid- to high-intensity warfare. Yet we find ourselves engaged around the world in a variety of missions that fall outside this scope. Doctrine should address nonconventional operations in hostilities short of war and in conditions of war and its aftermath." This is an important statement in that it explicitly recognizes the inherent limitations in Army warfighting doctrine. In some measure, the product which resulted from the Army's new approach redressed some of these deficiencies. But it did not completely integrate the new concepts into operational doctrine. As noted earlier, most of the detailed OOTW concepts are confined to a single chapter. Essentially, the chapter covering OOTW provides a lexicon for defining missions. This does not represent full acceptance of the missions embodied in OOTW.

The Army's current operations doctrine has several problems. As discussed earlier, the NSS and NMS require the military to participate in peacetime engagement, deterrence, and war, yet Army operations doctrine concentrates on major conventional war. FM 100-5 also segregates OOTW as a category rather than integrating it
throughout, and it gives a rather cursory overview of those missions which have caused the bulk of the Army's recent deployments. While there is great danger to the nation in not being capable of producing a force ready to fight and win, there appears to be an equal danger to ignoring the other requirements placed upon the Army. "The U.S. political-military posture seems best suited to the high intensity and the extreme lowest end of the conflict spectrum. U.S. capability is at its lowest in the middle range."

In doctrine, the Army may exist only to fight and win the nation's wars, but it is clear from recent deployments that the nation sees the Army operating in a much larger context.

Can the Army resolve this conflict between the role it has defined for itself in doctrine and the requirement to produce a useful doctrine for day-to-day operations? From background material used to produce the 1993 FM 100-5, it appears that the writers were prepared to include a far more comprehensive view of operations. Reviewing drafts of the 1993 version of FM 100-5 provides some insights into how far the Army was prepared to go to integrate the OOTW concept into keystone doctrine.

In January 1992, two chapters of the proposed 1993 FM 100-5 were circulated as author's drafts. They dealt with the Army's role in peacetime engagement and hostilities short of war. Totaling thirty-two pages, these draft chapters outlined proposed doctrine for inclusion in the forthcoming 1993 manual. These rather extensive discussions incorporated key elements of the still-to-come NSS and NMS and reflected a definite interest by the authors in incorporating a wider range of operations beyond major conventional war in the new manual.
It is important to note that the initial drafts placed some distance between the Army and these new missions. The first draft of the peacetime engagement chapter noted, "The principal focus of our Army is to prepare for, fight, and emerge victorious from battle. While the military possesses extensive capabilities to accomplish this primary mission, the capabilities can also be effectively utilized in support of peacetime engagement activities."44

A comparison of these drafts with the final product illustrates the dilution of the originally proposed content. Compare the initial draft’s opening paragraph with that of the final product. "Operations short of war, whether international or internal to a single country, are different from war.... The purpose of activities conducted in these environments is to achieve a political aim without resort to war. Specific actions taken are primarily political, with the judicious use of military force to support political actions as a last resort."45 In the final FM 100-5, this paragraph begins: "The Army’s primary mission is to fight and win the nation’s wars."46 These contrasts are significant, and they reflect the earlier comments about FM 100-5’s orientation.

Several important concepts were lost through this editing. Discussing the principles applicable to peacetime engagement and hostilities short of war, the February 1992 draft listed primacy of the political element, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, and restricted use of force as principles. These appear to be taken from a suggestion by Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) John Hunt of the Army Proponency Office for Low-Intensity Conflict (APOLIC). In the final version, objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security are listed. Adaptability was incorporated
within versatility as a new tenet of Army operations. More difficult to explain is the removal of the first principle: primacy of the political element. The final product did not merely substitute “objective” in its place; it deleted, or at best diluted, the concept. The OOTW chapter does contain a veiled reference in that it alludes to the Department of State having a lead role in some operations, but this is not the same level of recognition of the secondary nature of the military instrument in these operations. What this demonstrates in part is a refusal to acknowledge in doctrine that military forces may be employed as an adjunct rather than as the primary executor.

Background discussions which took place during the development of this section also give important insights into the nature of the debate. One interesting exchange between Army Proponent Office for Low Intensity Conflict and the authors of FM 100-5 occurred because the initial drafts omitted an active role for U.S. Army forces in insurgency and counterinsurgency in the initial drafts. Publication of FM 100-20 was delayed for eighteen months because senior leadership could not agree on the point. During a senior leader conference on the issue, two camps emerged. “On the ‘never again’ side was Gen. Foss whose viewpoint was a succinct ‘paratroopers don’t fight guerrillas.’ The other side [was] led [sic] by Gen. Gorman whose view carried the day, i.e. ‘soldiers fight when and where their civilian leaders tell them to, and you cannot determine or limit national security policy by Army doctrine.’”47 In the end, a statement acknowledging the need for general purpose forces in certain forms of counterinsurgency was added to both FM 100-20 and FM 100-5.48 The debate on this issue seems to carry
forward into the overall concept of U.S. Army operations in an environment other than war.

It is clear that the writers planned a much more extensive discussion of the Army’s role in peacetime engagement and deterrence. The final product, however, relegated OOTW to a mere eight pages. While the inclusion of OOTW was an important step, it fell far short of the Army’s need to define a confusing realm of combat and noncombat tasks. The Army’s needs lay more toward the breadth provided by the initial drafts, but the end product subordinated this need to the Army’s desire to define itself as a warfighting force. Indirectly, this focus on war has lessened the Army’s capability to respond to the situations it will most likely face.

Future missions may take many forms, and history has proven that the nation’s leaders will not hesitate to employ the military. “[C]ivilian decisionmakers repeatedly turn to the U.S. military to create solutions for international crises or dilemmas that economic sanctions and diplomacy have proved unable to resolve.” 49 This willingness of political leaders to use military force in a wide range of activities creates a doctrinal void in a force which sees itself primarily as an army concerned with large-scale conventional war.

In response to a question about future contingencies, General Sullivan replied, “That’s really impossible to predict. I think if the last four years are any indication of what’s to come, more of the same. We have approximately 20,000 people in 55 countries today doing any number of things, all the way from nation building to assistance of one type or another, to training, to Somalia. And we’re still in Zagreb peacekeeping.
peacemaking. Then the are natural disasters, refugees—you name it; we’re going to do it. None of these operations are wars, however.

From the end of World War Two until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army developed doctrine to deal with a well-defined Soviet threat. Referring to the evolution of FM 100-5 prior to 1976, Major Michael Cannon concludes that although some substantive change was made from 1949 to 1968, the Army essentially followed the same doctrine for the thirty years after W.W.II. This happened despite the Army’s deep involvement in Vietnam during the time the last two revisions took place. The Army has proven itself capable of doctrinal change, though. While the doctrine of previous years may have resulted from minor changes, the 1976 to 1993 versions represented a significant departure from the trend Cannon observed.

The 1976 version of FM 100-5 focused exclusively on defeating a Soviet attack in central Europe. Defensive operations to defeat the Soviet threat was a radical departure from the earlier doctrine. A more offensive doctrine emerged in AirLand Battle in 1982; doctrine which was further refined in 1986. With the demise of the Soviet empire, the Army’s prime enemy and doctrinal focus passed. The Army entered a more uncertain future which had no discernible threat, much less a definable threat. “In this era, doctrine must not be focused on a particular region or level of conflict.” Flexible doctrine had to replace the threat-based manuals of earlier years.

Given the uncertain nature of the future, the Army must seek a construct around which to define its possible missions. A strategic assessment from Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) gives an overview of likely employment of the U.S. military in
future years. In this report, the INSS contends that the U.S. Army may have to execute missions in four broad categories. First, the U.S. Army must be ready to conduct warfare at the technological edge against a comparable power. Second, the U.S. Army must be ready to fight a regional hegemon in a major regional contingency. Third, the U.S. Army must be capable of meeting transnational threats in "quasi-police missions." Lastly, the military must be prepared for commitment to assist troubled states. These categories roughly agree with the objectives laid out in the NMS.

The first two categories are traditional warfighting missions. Current Army operations doctrine readily accommodates these categories, and with continuing modification to meet technological improvements, future U.S. Army doctrine should adequately address these concerns. An examination of the latter two categories shows a deficit in current doctrine's applicability to these situations. The observation that "[t]he American public, government, and military have been slow to adapt attitudes, laws, and institutions to cope more effectively with the high incidence [sic] and prevalence of various types of low intensity conflict" applies to these missions. What makes this situation even more dangerous is that many authors believe that the U.S. faces a greater likelihood of becoming involved in this lesser form of conflict.

In the early 1990s, the Army recognized the significant changes which required a revision of the existing FM 100-5. Fragmentation replaced the bipolar world, previously subdued forces of nationalism, ethnicity, and fundamentalism rose up; and the nation decided it did not need a large standing army. Simultaneously, the nation called upon its Army to undertake new missions. "[W]hile we are not the world's policeman, we must be prepared to meet our responsibilities as the world's foremost democratic power." What is lacking in operations doctrine is a full recognition of this changed situation.
Chapter Three

The Future Environment of Conflict

Although several of authors whose views follow believe that Clausewitz has little utility to the present situation, Clausewitz himself may have provided two clues to the future. Commenting on the French Revolution’s impact on war, he observes “the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.” If politics undergoes another transformation, does the art of war change also? What the following authors provide is a view that at least some of the world is undergoing a rather dramatic change in politics as a result of the new world order. Within these regions, countries, or cultures, the U.S. may have legitimate interests. Instability may directly or indirectly threaten these interests. To counter these threats, the U.S. may, as part of its national security policy, dispatch U.S. Army forces to ensure that stability is restored. In these situations, U.S. Army forces may encounter opponents which do not or will not present a conventional target to which decisive force can be applied.

A closer reading of Clausewitz also yields the following observation: “The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more the political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to become decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.” In discussing this topic, Clausewitz does not separate the military from the political; the military becomes the ways to achieve the ends even if it is subordinated to other considerations. The political object may be the most important, but military action
will still be required to achieve it. The military extends the capability of the government. It is not a separate arm of the government used solely to fight large battles or campaigns.

Accordingly, the U.S. military may need to reevaluate some aspects of its doctrine. Doctor John Fishel argues that the Army’s attempt to separate military operations from the remainder of the instruments of the NSS is fallacious. The oft-quoted, and often misquoted, statement from Clausewitz that “...war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” indicates that the military does not stand alone from politics. As was shown earlier, the Army has had a difficult time coping with this reality and incorporating this tenet into doctrine.

Determining the proper scope of operations doctrine will require some anticipation of the future. If the sole threat to U.S. national security was an attack by a conventionally armed opponent, then the operations doctrine contained in FM 100-5 would be adequate. This is not the only threat faced by the U.S., so a broader view must be taken. Major Ralph Peters provides a balanced view of possible scenarios in the “The Culture of War.” In his estimation, conventional conflict will not disappear, but the overall level of violence will escalate. The nature of this increased violence can directly or indirectly threaten a state’s interests, and, therefore, may require a military response as part of the attempted solution.

Peters identifies nine new sources of instability which will modify the nature of conflict. The incompetence of the state, cultural failure, wealth polarization, social division, the rise of the anti-state, decisive technologies, resource scarcity, gross
overpopulation, and current and future plagues will change the nature of conflict. More frequently, nation-states will have to grapple with non-state actors in the realm of international relations. It is important for the Army to analyze these new conflict forms and to adopt a doctrine which can counter threats which may emerge as a result.

Continuing Peters' picture of a more turbulent world, William J. Olson outlines two distinct challenges which will cause most of the instability in lesser developed nations: the ability of the government to govern and the ability of the country to develop economically. A state which cannot govern demonstrates symptoms such as "declining public order, rising domestic violence, stagnating economies, and infrastructure deteriorating from lack of basic maintenance." Linked to this failure to govern is the inability of the government to implement a long-term economic strategy which provides for the needs of its citizens. This widespread failure to govern will lead to conflict. Susan Woodward argues that this was the principal cause of the civil war in Bosnia. These factors will combine to produce a much more disorderly world as states begin to disintegrate and threaten regional stability in forms of conflict which may not necessarily resemble war.

Other authors provide a contrasting view of possible conflict sources. The rise in non-state conflict will be foremost among these sources. Professor Robert J. Bunker contends that the U.S. approach to doctrine has a fatal flaw in that it rests primarily on Clausewitz's definition of war. The U.S. military and political view is hampered by a focus on the nation-state as the legitimate wielder of military power. Using this approach, he contends the U.S. method of war will not work in non-Western societies and
offers the recent failure in Somalia as an example. Bunker summarizes his argument with the observation that the entire continuum of military operations concept is wrong because of the focus on nation-states.

In his view, non-western societies will use four strategies to frustrate the American approach to war. Bunker says that future opponents will not offer U.S. forces targets by denying the real-time information needed to fight in the current doctrinal framework. Additionally, the same opponents will use their own network, which may be primitive by U.S. technological standards, to process their own real-time data. Because of cultural differences, non-western cultures will not follow traditional western rules of warfare which can place U.S. forces in a dilemma. Lastly, by operating in a manner which negates technological advantage, the non-western approach will turn the U.S. lack of manpower against it.

To respond to these asymmetrical strategies, Bunker says the Army should adopt two politico-military models, one traditional and one non-traditional, to effectively deal with possible threats. The former represents the current status quo. Peace is the natural equilibrium point for governments, and the nation-state is the director of military power. The non-traditional view would hold that “conflict and war represent the new natural order of government.” In this model, the realization that the western form of government cannot fit all societies must be incorporated. Military power may be held by groups which do not represent any government, and in fact, may be operating in an situation of no government. Further, the problem of operating in environments which require forces based on people versus technology must be addressed.
It is important to note that Bunker’s view includes a broad view of warfare, but his approach is at odds with U.S. doctrine. U.S. doctrine applies one model to all forms of war, but Bunker concludes that this will not work. Multiple approaches, while difficult to implement, has some merit in this uncertain world, but other authors disagree as to the ease by which an army can adapt to two forms of warfare.

A continuation of Bunker’s thesis may be found in Colonel Jeffrey Barnett’s critique of U.S. capabilities in non-state wars. He contends that non-state war differs fundamentally from war between states, and states which excel in the execution of warfare with another state may not have the means to defeat a non-state enemy. Israel’s difficulty in dealing with the Intifada is an example as is the U.S. failure in Somalia.

This difference occurs primarily because the state’s army cannot bring the nonstate enemy to Clausewitz’s decisive battle if the nonstate commander chooses not to fight.\textsuperscript{69} “In state (Clausewitzian) warfare, destruction of the opponent’s military is the measure of success.” “But in warfare with a non-state, there is no decisive battle--until the nonstate chooses to fight one.”\textsuperscript{70} Barnett also accepts that there are two forms of warfare, but he cautions that a military force proficient in one type is not necessarily prepared for the other. “...[S]tates should realize success or failure in one type of warfare has little predictive relevance to another type of warfare.”\textsuperscript{71} Trying to apply Clausewitz to a Maoist conflict will not work.

The end of the Cold War has also raised awareness of “smaller” human catastrophes. Events such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia might have gone unnoticed in the Cold War, but the evolving international scene now requires a military response to
these tragedies. Common to all views is a sense that U.S. interests will involve a significant share of missions in the low-intensity environment. This places the U.S. Army in a dilemma with respect to its doctrine. The current American approach using swift, decisive force will not work in a situation such as Bosnia which requires the military to subordinate itself to political considerations. Concurrently, an army combating non-state entities cannot use the same approach as might be used to fight a nation.

According to Peters, five forms of conflict will emerge in the new security environment. Civil wars, insurgencies, aftermath instability, intercultural struggles, and cataclysm response will require military involvement as part of a larger response. None of these are new, but their frequency and relative importance in the international scene will increase. Thus, nations will be compelled to use their militaries to operate in these murky conflicts. It should be noted that none of these potential conflicts play to current U.S. Army doctrinal strengths.

Peters’ contends that “LIC is a sorry job for general purpose forces unless a state opts for the approach that delivers overwhelming combat power in a swift and violent manner.” His assessment is based on a view that militaries cannot be competent at all tasks. A force well-suited for the most dangerous threat is not the force which can effectively operate against a lesser threat. The real problem may be, however, a lack of functional doctrine which allows the proper use of the available forces.

Olson also believes that the Army focuses too much on conventional war. “Most people will acknowledge that the LIC situation—ranging from peacetime contingency operations, counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations, to foreign internal defense—is
the conflict environment in which the United States has been most engaged since World War II, and that it is the most likely threat environment of the future. Yet, policy development, strategic planning, force design, equipment acquisition, and doctrine have tended to focus on major conventional war and above." Olson might well have been commenting directly about the content of the current FM 100-5.

Another challenge that the U.S. will face is the rise in non-state entities which will have access to modern arms. These transnational bodies will seek to advance their agendas in the international arena and will resort to armed force if needed. In some instances, fighting will take pace between non-state actors and failing states. The forms these conflicts will assume are varied. Generally, fighting will occur without war. Most of these conflicts will not escalate into major conventional war, but modern arms will give the appearance of such violence.

Those opponents who do choose to openly oppose the U.S. will likely not offer the lucrative targets that Iraq did in the Gulf War. As in Somalia, low-technology forces can, and will, use the limited means at their disposal to fight and win. Their lack of high technology can also be used to craft an asymmetrical response to U.S. forces. The mere possession of advanced systems does not guarantee victory. Only the force which combines technology with adequate doctrine can ensure success.

Bevin Alexander, in *The Future of Warfare*, presents a view that holds the U.S. will not have to fight an enemy of similar strength. As a result of overwhelming American success in Desert Storm, no enemy will fight the U.S. toe-to-toe. Given that
an enemy which chooses to mass against U.S. forces is presenting a perfect target for U.S. doctrine, Alexander contends that opponents will not try match U.S. strengths.

Under Alexander's model, limited conflicts in which the opponent seeks to duck under the American technological edge will likely be the norm, i.e. Korea, Vietnam. It is wasteful for weak forces to directly confront a conventional force supported by air power. Once again, these are precisely the type of conflicts for which U.S. doctrine is least prepared to address.

Alexander presents a case in which wars to oppose aggression and guerrilla wars constitute the most likely forms of future conflict. He balances this by stating, "The American military cannot abandon its large inventory of advanced weapons designed for larger wars on the theory that only smaller, limited wars will be fought. Nor can it cease developing weapons or defenses against weapons. A potential enemy is likely to exploit any gap that the United States allows to occur in its arsenal."

In his prescription for the future, Alexander urges that the military prepare to respond for a broad range of missions. This capability must include the ability to fight a conventional war against a well-armed enemy as well as engage in successful low-intensity operations. A great danger exists, though, in applying a force specifically trained for high intensity combat in situations which do not allow the massive application of firepower.

From the preceding outline, one may conclude that fundamental changes have occurred in the post-Cold War period. The world has become a more turbulent place with low-level violence replacing the superpower confrontation of prior decades. As a result, the U.S. will find itself involved in a series of actions which require military force. The
NSS and NMS recognize and affirm this situation, and both foresee a significant role for Army forces. What remains to be examined is the readiness of the Army's doctrine to meet these challenges.

Author Sam Sarkesian, who has written extensively on the subject of LIC, offers several criticisms of the U.S. Army approach to military operations. His concerns encompass threat, past experience and doctrine which taken as a whole demonstrate that the Army is less than prepared for operating in the environment he sees as most likely.

In Sarkesian's view, new states and Third World conflict will influence world affairs. In this more decentralized world, the U.S. faces threats to its interests by emerging nations. These states have imperfect political and economic systems which do not address the needs of the citizenry. Allowed to degenerate, these tensions can flare into wider conflicts. Other lesser-developed countries face even greater challenges from internal wars caused by a variety of factors. Strategic locations, mineral interests, and humanitarian activism can motivate the U.S. to act in these areas.

Prior to Desert Storm, contemporary wisdom held that the Army would not allow any more Vietnams. Indirectly, Sarkesian agrees with this assessment, but he does not follow the avoidance reasoning offered by most commentators. Sarkesian instead believes that the U.S. adopted the W.W.II model as the standard for future conflicts. In doing so, the Army saw itself primarily as a force oriented on maneuvering large combined arms formations against a similarly armed enemy. By using this model, however, the Army neglects another important part of its heritage which dealt with smaller enemies in less
well-defined situations. Events, such as Vietnam, which did not fit the W.W.II model were dismissed as anomalies.

Sarkesian, in general, decries the U.S. Army orientation on conventional operations. He defines conventional conflict as that extending from Clausewitz’ construct of war between the armies of nation-states in which the focus was the destruction of the opponent’s capability to wage war by destroying its military.\textsuperscript{82} He establishes that conventional conflict may range from a major war to one with limited aims. Common to all conventional conflicts, though, are several characteristics. These include “a high degree of mobility, the use of highly destructive munitions, the need for a large logistical support system, and a relatively large reservoir of manpower already in the forces in being and in reserve forces.”\textsuperscript{83}

Sarkesian comments that the Army tends to view all conflicts through the model supplied by Clausewitz and its past experience with large battles.\textsuperscript{84} An example of this view is the doctrinal proposition that the principles of war can apply equally across the spectrum of conflict. Sarkesian believes there is a significant distinction between the requirements of conventional and unconventional conflicts. “The primary determinant of U.S. policy effectiveness is the quality of the personnel on the ground in low-intensity conflicts, as well as in special operations.”\textsuperscript{85}

Although well-suited to many unconventional conflicts, special operations forces (SOF) are inherently limited by their small numbers. Increased participation in special operations and low intensity conflict will require a greater commitment of U.S. conventional forces.\textsuperscript{86} Recent events show that a significant force may be required to
execute these operations. The deployment of the U.S. 1st Armored Division to Bosnia in 1995 is an example of this phenomena. Other recent examples include Operation Restore Hope in Haiti during 1995 and operations in Somalia in 1992-93, both of which required a U.S. light infantry division. While the Army’s versatility in responding to these missions is remarkable, the fact remains that FM 100-5 pays scant attention to these missions.

In addition to his other concerns, Sarkesian believes that military doctrine is deficient towards low-intensity conflict. Simply put, the military has no coherent framework around which it can build an approach to low intensity conflict.\(^{87}\) Applying its conventional orientation to all conflicts, the Army’s approach neglects the political-psychological-social aspects of unconventional conflict.\(^{88}\) Overall, Sarkesian asks the Army to acknowledge that other forms of war exist and to recognize this in doctrine.

Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Hunt observed that: “Hostilities short of war, whether international or internal to a single country, are different from war. The purpose is different: to achieve a political aim without resort to war.”\(^{89}\) He goes on to add that “hostilities short of war must be conducted by the United States and its allies in ways different from its conduct of war.”\(^{90}\) The unrecognized truth in Army doctrine is that the purpose of military participation in these operations is to create conditions for the decisive application of political, economic, or information power.\(^{91}\)

FM 100-5 focuses on major conventional warfare. The Army has defined itself as a force which will prepare for the most dangerous foe which could threaten national survival. In the Cold War era, this was a relatively simple task since the Soviet colossus presented a threat which neatly fit the Army’s self-defined role. On the other hand, the

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most likely form of conflict the Army now faces falls well below the major conventional design of Army operations doctrine. Thus, employment of U.S. Army forces in these situations carries some risk because their preparation may not equal the task.

Doctrine flows, in part, from past experience, and the U.S. Army has ample experience in the types of conflicts foreseen by Sarkesian, Peters, and others. The problem becomes capturing this experience and translating it into a meaningful doctrine. "The United States has had a long a varied history in unconventional conflicts.... From this experience, it appears that few, if any, lessons have been learned, and in some respects, the wrong lesson have been learned." A reexamination of this little-acknowledged past may yield another view of war which is more applicable to the tasks faced by the Army given the new threats envisioned.

This review would likely provide contrasts to the current idea that preparing for the most dangerous also prepares an army equally well for the most likely. Sarkesian believes that there is a fundamental difference between warfighting doctrine and doctrine for low intensity conflict.

Unconventional doctrines must direct military operations to function closely with indigenous forces and stress combined civilian-military operations and tactical behavior appropriate for revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts. Doctrine must guide the intermix of U.S. and indigenous forces specifically at the operational level and aim at carrying out operations with a minimum of heavy weapons and air and logistical support. Doctrine must provide for an intermix of U.S. and indigenous forces while allowing a large degree of autonomy and visibility to indigenous forces.

This example gives a much different view than that portrayed in FM 100-5.
Another area which needs improvement is existing doctrine. Jennifer Taw, author of *Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army*, recommends five areas for additional emphasis in Army doctrine: unity of effort/unity of command; minimum use of force; preparation of troops to assume non-traditional roles; urban combat; and protection. While one finds these topics discussed in doctrine, their superficial treatment contributes little to clarifying an already confused topic. She also recommends that the Army formalize the nontraditional task organizations that may be required in OOTW missions.

Taw also indirectly suggests another principle—anticipation. She notes “…military commanders must anticipate abrupt changes in mission and/or rapid deterioration of the political-military circumstances in which the mission is performed, and task organize effectively.” While this idea requires further exploration, it requirement to anticipate changes which would require the commitment of additional capabilities beyond those which are readily apparent in the initial mission analysis seems logical on the surface.

Other items which need further examination include the principles of OOTW listed in FM 100-5. As already noted the Army needs to formally recognize the primacy of the political element in doctrine rather than sidestepping the issue with an oblique reference to the importance of the U.S. State Department in some operations.

Doctrine should also take a more realistic approach to the ill-defined nature of these conflicts. Doctrine formalizes the Clausewitzian nature of war as the extension of politics through other means. What is missing from this construct is the circular nature of the interrelationship between politicians and the military. Conditioned by doctrine and
training to expect top-level input, military planners expect the nation’s leaders to provide specific guidance on what is to be accomplished. Reality and experience show that this concrete guidance will seldom be forthcoming. Doctrine should reflect the uncertain nature of these conflicts and provide some framework for solutions.
Chapter Four

Conclusions and Summary

From the preceding examination, it is clear that the U.S. faces a significant threat to U.S. national interests from foes incapable of or unwilling to mount a full-scale conventional war. While the danger of a nation emerging which threatens national survival remains, the most likely threat which will be faced is something less than this. These lesser threats will not seek to achieve their objectives in a trial of strength against superior American capabilities but will instead use their advantages against our weaknesses. One of the Army’s weaknesses is a lack of a comprehensive operational doctrine which addresses these threats in terms less than defeat in a major conventional war.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Army’s doctrine has little utility in fighting these limited threats. The doctrinal focus on using general purpose forces to inflict decisive defeat upon a similarly-armed enemy neglects significant portions of the nation’s security and military strategies. Huntington contends that governments only need an Army for combat, but America also expects its Army to conduct a wide range of other operations.98 The nation’s political and military leadership has articulated this requirement through the NSS and NMS. While there is significant danger in not being ready to defend the nation’s survival, there appears to be equal danger in not having adequate capability to respond to lesser threats when called to do so. Moreover, these lesser threats appear to be the most likely operations which the Army will undertake in the future.
The Army has a tradition of focusing on the large war to come while ignoring the small wars which rage around it and indeed in which it may be immersed at the time. Doctrine, and by extension the Army, faces a danger of becoming increasingly irrelevant if it does not address the operations which it conducts on a daily basis. Preparing for the once-in-a-generation war may lead to an army which can fight and win the nation’s wars, but it can also lead to a disconnect between the strategy of the nation and the capabilities of the nation’s instruments. FM 100-5 clearly focuses upon the once-in-a-generation war while giving little attention or clarity to the Somalias, Bosnias, Rwandas, and Liberias of the world.

Further, by seeking to divorce war from the lesser forms of conflict, the Army has adopted a model contrary its central theorist—Clausewitz. While Clausewitz primarily describes war between nation-states focused on destroying the capability of armed forces, he also describes situations in which political objects outweigh military considerations. Clausewitz does not describe this area in detail, but he does recognize that it exists. Likewise, the Army needs to recognize that this exists and formalize it in doctrine.

In part, the Army does understand this relationship between the political and military. Despite its narrow focus, FM 100-5 does incorporate OOTW into the manual. What remains to be accomplished is a full integration of OOTW into the Army’s operations manual versus the current artificial segregation. While it continues its business of preparing for the next big war, the Army will conduct operations which do not fit its definition of war and may not involve combat. The Army must accept this form of operation as a normal role rather than the exception.
Endnotes


4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), iv.

5 Ibid, iv.

6 Ibid, v.


8 FM 100-5, iv.


10 John D. Waghelstein, “Preparing for the Wrong War” (Ph. D. diss., Temple University, 1990), 6.


17 FM 100-5, 2-0 - 2-1.


19 Ibid, 3.


23 FM 100-5, 2-0 - 2-1.

24 Ibid.


28 Ibid, 2.


31 FM 100-5, 1-1 to 1-5, 2-0 to 2-1, 12-7, 13-0 to 13-8. The Army leadership's priorities are clear in the 1993 FM 100-5. If volume is any indicator, operations in war are far more important than OOTW. FM 100-5 devotes over sixty-five of its 143 pages to specific discussions about war and warfighting. In contrast, FM 100-5 contains one chapter of nine pages regarding all other activities in peacetime and conflict. Six chapters discuss warfighting; however, only one chapter, Chapter Thirteen, deals with OOTW in any depth. While this emphasis on warfighting may be appropriate in terms of national survival, it does not adequately represent the scope of operations the Army undertakes on behalf of the nation.

33 FM 100-5, v.

34 Foss, “Commander’s Vision for Low Intensity Conflict,” 1.


43 Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 123.

44 Combined Arms Center, Initial Draft, FM 100-5, Operations, 22 February 92, 2.


46 FM 100-5, 13-0. A comparison of the extent of the draft to the final product is also revealing. The author’s draft of 17 January 1992 was a twenty page essay. In the initial draft dated 22 February 92, peacetime engagement became known as Chapter Ten and amounted to fifteen pages. Approximately a month later, this chapter had disappeared from draft copies. Comparing the initial draft chapter with the March 1992 draft, one finds the concepts discussed in peacetime engagement distilled to one page in the chapter entitled “Fundamentals of Army Operations.” A second draft chapter, “Hostilities Short of War,” also written on 17 January 1992, had twelve pages. This later extended to twenty-four pages, but it was reduced to fourteen pages. The content of both draft chapters were distilled into the eight pages constituting Chapter Thirteen, “Operations Other Than War,” in the final manual.

FM 100-5, 13-8.

Jennifer Taw, Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, RAND, 1995), 1.


Clausewitz, 610.

Ibid, 81.

Ibid, 87.


Ibid, 19-23.


Ibid.


Olson, 21-22.


Ibid, 38.
68 Ibid, 39.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, 87.
74 Olson, 53.
77 Ibid, 130.
78 Ibid, 49.
79 Ibid, 49-52.
80 Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 10-12.
81 Ibid, 105.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid, 106.
85 Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 121.
86 Sarkesian, U.S. Army, 14.
87 Sarkesian, The New Battlefield, 300. See also Sarkesian, U.S. Army, 15.
88 Sarkesian, U.S. Army, 209.
89 Hunt, unpublished manuscript, 7.
90 Ibid.

91 United States Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: Force XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994), 27.


93 Ibid, 239.

94 Ibid, 240-41.

95 Taw, 44-46.

96 Ibid, 30-34.

97 Ibid, 23.

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