A CHANGE OF PLANS

A Monograph
By
Major Lester W. Knotts
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Second Term AY 95-96

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</th>
<th>2. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</th>
<th>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>MONOGRAPH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Change of Plans</td>
<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
<th>12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
<th>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE:</td>
<td>DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</th>
<th>14. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEE ATTACHED</td>
<td>Operational Planning, Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>16. PRICE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</th>
<th>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</th>
<th>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
<td>UNLIMITED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
ABSTRACT

Using the 1983 US invasion of Grenada and the 1992-3 military humanitarian intervention in Somalia as case studies, this monograph shows how post-Cold War operational planning can benefit from the experiences gained from recent deployments. The cases are taken from before and after the Goldwater-Nichols defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to show the impact on joint operations caused by that legislation. Criteria used to assess the relative success of both operations comes from FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. The three criteria chosen for this study were achieving the theater goals while striving for limited casualties, nesting the operational commander’s intent with National Command Authority intent, and meshing the tactical commander’s intent with the theater commander’s intent.

The monograph goes on to recommend further adjustments to Crisis Action Planning for the purpose of making rapid planning more inclusive of necessary participants from the Joint Planning and Execution Community. A model showing why illustrative scenario planning for deliberate plans ought to give way to frequently exercised Crisis Action Planning is presented. The argument is that high probability lesser conflicts will emerge more frequently and call on military resources more often than low probability high intensity conflict. The US military ought to prepare for both, but practice planning more for those interventions which will be more frequently encountered. The paper also suggests more comprehensive integration of political aims into military execution by promoting continuous exchange among military and civilian planners.
Major Lester W. Knotts

Title of Monograph: A Change of Plans

Approved by:

Robert H. Epstein, Ph.D.  Monograph Director

COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.  Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 23d day of May 1996
ABSTRACT

Using the 1983 US invasion of Grenada and the 1992-3 military humanitarian intervention in Somalia as case studies, this monograph shows how post-Cold War operational planning can benefit from the experiences gained from recent deployments. The cases are taken from before and after the Goldwater-Nichols defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to show the impact on joint operations caused by that legislation. Criteria used to assess the relative success of both operations comes from FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. The three criteria chosen for this study were achieving the theater goals while striving for limited casualties, nesting the operational commander's intent with National Command Authority intent, and meshing the tactical commander’s intent with the theater commander’s intent.

The monograph goes on to recommend further adjustments to Crisis Action Planning for the purpose of making rapid planning more inclusive of necessary participants from the Joint Planning and Execution Community. A model showing why illustrative scenario planning for deliberate plans ought to give way to frequently exercised Crisis Action Planning is presented. The argument is that high probability lesser conflicts will emerge more frequently and call on military resources more often than low probability high intensity conflict. The US military ought to prepare for both, but practice planning more for those interventions which will be more frequently encountered. The paper also suggests more comprehensive integration of political aims into military execution by promoting continuous exchange among military and civilian planners.
A Change of Plans

Strategic Environment

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, priorities for US military contingency planning have changed. It may not yet be clear where to concentrate the US Army's planning focus without the old Soviet monolith to plan against, but this monograph offers a suggestion. Despite the Berlin Wall coming down at the end of the European Cold War, American operational planning continues to be bound by an old strategic constraint. A military establishment designed for strategic defense against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact nations has been thrust into offensive conventional and other-than-war interventions around the world. Doctrinally, operational-level offense has been a standing part of the strategic defense of Europe. The absence of the strategic defense there could give new importance to operational offensive campaigns without the restrictions imposed by Cold War strategic defense. This monograph explores the US armed forces use of experiences from recent deployments as catalysts for greater effectiveness in operational planning and in the development of operational planners.

Since the Second World War, America has maintained forward defenses in European and Asian theaters. Cold War force development emphasized a most dangerous scenario of World War III on the European Continent, NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Defense spending was directed toward maintaining combat forces abroad, together with training oriented toward battle in central Europe. Despite the defensive nature of US military policy during the Cold War, protecting US national interests has meant strategic deployment and imposing the US will on enemies through operational offensives. Emphasis on a forward-based counter to the Soviet conventional and nuclear threat, rather than investing in strategic mobility, worked against the
versatility required by today's threats.\textsuperscript{1} The US Army prepared to fight a great hypothetical
defensive land war. In reality, US Army forces were being regularly deployed to fight lesser
offensive actions in the Caribbean and further abroad. The discontinuity between strategic
direction and tactical reality is revealed in operational planning challenges evident in US Army
interventions of the last fifteen years.

Problems in planning and execution among Army and the other component services were
exhibited in Operation URGENT FURY in the southern Caribbean nation of Grenada during
October-November 1983. Joint cooperation was lacking; from planning through execution the
operation proceeded without a coherent set of procedures to make the joint and combined
intervention function smoothly. A partial resolution to the lack of joint cooperation was
forthcoming in the Goldwater-Nichols Act which restructured authority to give the geographic
CINC\textsuperscript{s} more discretion in war fighting decisions. After Defense Reorganization was enacted in
1986, the 1987 JUST CAUSE operation into Panama demonstrated an improved level of
cooperation and effectiveness of US joint operations. Joint procedures showed promise for
increased interservice efficiencies--until OPERATION RESTORE HOPE in 1993 required new
levels of restraint which mitigated against newfound US military effectiveness.

The quest for greater efficiency in operational planning and development of operational-
level planners is the focus of this monograph. Operational planners generally serve on the staffs
of geographic CINC\textsuperscript{s} and lower staffs. Whether their planning is tactical or operational depends
on the mission of the unit in theater. An operational plan meets strategic objectives through
tactical means. Thus, operational planning may occur at task force or division level.

Following a discussion of the Army and service joint planning procedure, this paper highlights
problems based upon two case studies: US deployments to Grenada and Somalia. The chronological presentation of these cases provide examples of operational planning before and after legislation was passed designed to improve joint operations. These two cases are assessed in terms of success as defined in FM 100-7, *Decisive Force*. FM 100-7 is the Army’s manual on operational art focused at the operational level of war. It links theater strategy with campaign planning and tactics, and is the bridge between theater-wide campaigns and localized battles and engagements.\(^2\) The measure of success in Army theater operations, according to the doctrine in FM 100-7, means achieving theater objectives while striving to incur minimum casualties. Success also means that CINC’s intent and military end state agree with the broader intent of the President and Secretary of Defense. Finally, success means that the operational commander understands all aspects of the geographic CINC’s intent.\(^3\) Case study information for Operations URGENT FURY and RESTORE HOPE derive from published accounts, Army Lessons Learned Reports, and in the OPLANS themselves.

The monograph concludes by offering two approaches to improve the effectiveness of operational planners and operational plans. The first goal is to streamline the Crisis Planning process and make it more comprehensive. Timely and complete integration of strategic national policy aims into operational planning is a second goal. Routine practice and full participation of military and political leaders will help in these areas.

On the way to understanding an operational planner’s challenge, the source of the planner’s information must be understood. Strategic military planners start out with national aims driving their planning. These higher level planners learn what the national security agenda is via the President’s publication of the annual *National Security Strategy*, or NSS, which is completed

During the Cold War, the US strategic security emphasized containment of communist expansion. Post-Cold War emphasis is on Engagement and Enlargement, the title of the current NSS. Overall security strategy is based on interests which the President considers to be vital to the United States. Examples from the current national strategy distributed in February of 1995 establish global free markets, unrestricted access to world oil supplies, and promoting democracy as being of vital interest to the US. Engagement under this document, therefore, means opening foreign markets, helping democratic regimes, and joining with other nations to address global problems. Enlargement means expanding the community of market economies while deterring and containing a range of threats to US interests.

Strategic planning at the National Command level encompasses all national interests, and engages all elements of national power to protect those interests, rather than using military involvement and military end states exclusively or primarily to promote diplomatic or political outcomes. Strategic planning considers other forms of national power to attain the national will—diplomatic power, economic, political, sociologic, and informational. Military strategy is but one, albeit the most visible, element of US national strategy.

Military planning strategists derive their guidance for the National Military Strategy (NMS) directly from the President’s NSS. For example, in the current NMS, America’s vital interest in access to oil fields and international markets translates to maintenance of open sea lines of communication for the US Navy. For the Army and Air Force, maintaining access means being prepared to deploy rapidly to counter any threat that would seek to deny access to the mid-east oil or might try to limit US access to international markets for raw goods or finished
products. As stated in the November 1995 NMS--Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement--support for vital interests means participating with allies in cooperative and defensive security arrangements which preclude conflict and foster peaceful enlargement of the community of free market nations.  

The National Military Strategy promotes scenario-based planning using postulated threats in illustrative scenarios, but operational planners give detail to those priorities based on real situations.  

At the next level below military strategy, military operational artists envision a desirable end state derived from national aims, define a set of favorable conditions, then deploy and array available military resources to create a physical reality from that vision. The planners give detail through deliberate planning which results in shelved plans addressing the particular scenario and the particular threat, plus possible permutations called branch plans or sequels. The resulting family of plans forms the basis for an operational campaign. Ultimately, tactical planning employs military forces directly, usually under an operational campaign program of sequenced or concurrent engagements against an identified threat under specified conditions. In other words, operational planning generates the battle and campaign plans by which U.S. armed forces execute tactical missions. This monograph examines the integration of strategy into operational level planning.

Existing US military operational doctrine at both the strategic and theater operational level permits planners to execute campaign plans which support national aims. While allowing deviation for commander's judgment, doctrine is a guide which sets some limits on operational artists. FM 100-5, Operations, explains how strategic guidance and objectives are turned into executable plans for the Army. It is basic how-to-fight instruction. Joint operational planners
use Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* for orchestrating cross-service resources. Operational planning itself has three sub-components by which the strategy is converted into a series of tactical engagements.

The *Joint Operations Manual* delineates the three types of planning which the services—and most important to this study, the US Army—use to prepare and prosecute operational campaigns. Campaign planning, Deliberate planning, and Crisis Action planning are the three types currently in use. Campaign planning at the theater level occurs when the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of military involvement requires it. Campaign plans provide the strategic and operational framework within which detailed Operation Plans, or OPLANs are prepared. These OPLANs become operation orders (OPORDs) when the NCA (the President or Secretary of Defense) directs them to be executed.

Basic doctrine from manuals is applied under a uniform military implementation procedure known as JOPES, the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System. This system, also a part of the Defense Reorganization Act, is designed to satisfy the information needs of national and theater-level commanders in the conventional command and control of forces during planning and operations. Under JOPES, communication between higher and lower staffs occurs through established reporting structures supported by a designated array communications systems. Deliberate and crisis planning under the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System translate policy decisions into plans and orders. The two procedures have dissimilar steps, but similar outputs—military action options for the President and Secretary of Defense in the form of OPLANs or OPORDs. Among the differences between deliberate and crisis planning are in greater time for preparation of, and more varied input for the deliberate plan. Basic deliberate
planning takes advantage of time available to consider in detail responses to a potential, or slowly evolving, scenario. From initiation through concept and plan development to review, a deliberate plan can take eighteen to twenty-four months to prepare. Appropriate members of the joint planning community participate in a deliberate plan. Members besides the joint and service staffs may include transportation commands, logistics and intelligence agencies, and other agencies fitting for the scenario. Inclusion of multiple agents generally increases the time to consolidate a plan of action. Partly due to reducing the number of participants, Crisis Action Planning occurs in substantially less time.

---

### Figure 1. Joint Operations Deliberate Planning

1. Initiation
2. Concept Development
3. Plan Development
4. Plan Review
5. Supporting Plans
Figure 1 shows where Deliberate Planning occurs as part of strategic planning, and includes the five phases which result in a plan or a family of plans. Deliberate plans are based on the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which is published every two years. The Capabilities Plan is derived from the NMS, which is a derivative of NSS. Civilian leaders top the list of contributors to the deliberate planning process. The President and Secretary of Defense participate; the NSC, the CIA, State and Defense Departments are among the numerous agencies which contribute as part of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported CINCs and supporting commands have input as well. These contributors form the Joint Planning and Execution Community. Deliberate planning includes them all.

Crisis situations demanding response in hours or days may be somewhat predictable, but most often they are unexpected—hence the crisis label. By definition a crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the US possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. In a crisis situation, the information and decision cycle is speeded up, as depicted in Figure 2, below:
Figure 2. Crisis Action Relationship to Strategic Planning

Preparation for an operation accomplished under Crisis Action planning provides the geographic CINC with increased input by cutting other member of the Joint Planning Community out of the decision cycle. Under the Crisis Action bypass in Figure 2, the President gives specific guidance to planners at line 1 about the strategic outcomes he is seeking. Operational planners develop alternatives as time allows to give the President a range of response options at line number 2. At line number 3, the President selects a course of action and the operational planners conduct detailed operations planning to bring it about.
OPERATION URGENT FURY

US military intervention in Grenada serves as an example of how crisis planning was applied in 1983. Theater operational commanders had little time to translate strategic end states into clear military objectives. Air Force and Army supporting commands conducted parallel planning over four days or less to support the JTF specified aims. In the haste and secrecy of the crisis, CINCLANT did not provide a fully developed strategy to subordinate staffs. Concurrent, or parallel, planning among the echeloned staffs from JCS through component services precluded giving URGENT FURY operational planners a comprehensive strategy before execution.

Operation URGENT FURY was set in a post-Vietnam context. During the Vietnam War, 58,000 US soldiers died in a failed effort to contain communism in Southeast Asia. Because American forces evacuated Vietnam without victory in 1975, the context during the unfolding of the Grenada crisis was one of a demoralized military exhibiting slackened professionalism. The stigma of strategic defeat in Vietnam which marred both military and civilian attitudes toward the armed services remained in 1983. Added to that loss was the Mayaguez failure in 1975, failure in 1980 to rescue hostages in Tehran, and 241 dead Marines in Beirut during the crisis planning for URGENT FURY. The sum was a malaise of failure affecting the US military. President Ronald Reagan and the armed services were in need of a military victory to revitalize US military morale and self-respect; Grenada presented the occasion for one.

As events in Grenada developed to a point which merited US military intervention, Britain, France, and the United States each held protectorate states in the Caribbean. The US claimed the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Guadeloupe and Martinique were departments of
France. Britain administered the former colonies of Anguilla, Montserrat, and Grenada, the latter a tropical island off the coast of Venezuela, twenty miles long by ten miles wide. As her ability to manage a wide-ranging empire continued to lessen, Britain granted independence to Grenada in 1974. At the time, Grenada was under an unstable rule by Prime Minister Eric Gairy, who had won office overwhelmingly in a popular electoral victory. The British Governor-general, Sir Paul Scoon, remained in place representing the Queen as head of state on the island of 110,000. After his assumption of power, Prime Minister Gairy became increasingly autocratic (though still pro-western) due to the lack of effective governing skills he brought to office. The negative influence of an opposition political party known as JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) contributed to Gairy’s need for increased centralized control, if he wanted to maintain his party’s integrity and continue to hold his office.18

By 1979, Marxist-leaning New JEWEL leaders were organized enough to assume power, but did not think they could beat Gairy in a popular election. Therefore, the group staged a bloodless coup while PM Gairy was abroad at the UN when the coup took place on the small island.19 In less than a single day, JEWEL leaders dispersed the small pro-Gairy government military, and began consolidating their power by decree and curfew.

In a deliberate shift away from US influence, the new Grenadian leaders signed an extensive military aid agreement with Soviets in Havana, Cuba on 27 October 1980, and willingly became a client state of the Soviet Union. It was this agreement which resulted in the delivery to Grenada of eighteen ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft artillery guns, a thousand AK-47s automatic rifles, and fifty-four 7.62 caliber PKM machine guns. Large amounts of ammunition were included in the deal.20
On 27 July 1982, a signed agreement between JEWEL-sponsored Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and Moscow for the Soviets to provide fifty light armored vehicles and equipment for 1500 soldiers. Most of the gear remained in warehouses. The heightened military connection between Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union nettled the US security planners, who watched the associations grow, but could not act against them. Respect for national sovereignty stymied any overt action, but with the coastline from Texas to Florida encircling the entire northern Caribbean, the area was of vital interest due to proximity of potentially hostile (i.e. communist) entities near American shores. The high volume of US trade and oil which transits the Panama Canal and which is shipped through the Caribbean Sea makes the area even more important as a commercial interest. The US continued to watch, and Grenada continued to draw closer to the communists.

Both continental US security and Caribbean sea routes appeared to be threatened by the construction of a 9,180 foot runway at Point Salines airport on the southern tip of the island. That project became the most visible and controversial initiative of the Prime Minister Bishop, by which he hoped to show the Grenadian people that the associations with Cuba and Moscow were fruitful. According to the Bishop government, the airfield was an economic necessity to promote tourism on an island badly in need of new industry and new money. Nutmeg, cocoa, and bananas were, and are, the chief exports of Spice Island, a nickname for Grenada. The best prices on the world market would not go far enough to produce a favorable balance of trade for that country. The new airfield would accommodate jet aircraft, which would, according to the government of Grenada, have permitted more direct flights to bring tourists and their money straight to the island.

Cuban construction workers and Soviet equipment made the project visible proof of the
direction of foreign ties and subservience to the Soviet state. American observers publicly feared the airfield was suitable for military uses, and declared the strip a threat to US security. Not satisfied that commercial use was the purpose of the construction, the US government pressed Prime Minister Bishop to explain the need for the lengthy runway. The PM’s pointing out a lack of underground fueling stores, inadequate apron space for multiple military aircraft, and the absence of security bunkers and revetments did not alter the official US opinion concerning this risk. Concern was heightened further when Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard visited Moscow and signed a treaty giving the Soviets permission to land the TU-95, a long-range reconnaissance plane, in Grenada when the airfield was completed.

Instead of accepting the Grenadian government’s explanation of the public and private use for the airport, the US responded with presidential speeches condemning the pro-Soviet government and the strip construction. The US launched exercises, including OCEAN VENTURE 81 (an amphibious landing on Vieques near Puerto Rico), which Prime Minister Maurice Bishop decried, with remarkable prescience, as a rehearsal for a US invasion of Grenada. What the Prime Minister wanted was to sound an alarm to the world community that an injustice was about to be served on his country, and perhaps forestall an event which would undercut his sovereign authority. Grenada did not have the assets to resist directly American might, and PM Bishop could not yield to US pressure to reverse his international political choice to befriend the Soviets. Neither could Bishop submit to any US overtures, nor initiate any friendly relations on his own, because his power at home was weakening and his leadership was already being challenged within his own government.

Prime Minister Bishop did not known how tenuous his hold on government was, but he
found out when the challenge to his authority was consummated on 13 October, 1983. Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest by his political opposition, much to Fidel Castro’s consternation. Castro rebuked the New JEWEL central committee by a letter which warned that an explanation of the arrest to any world audience, including communist ones, would not be easy. The socialists in Grenada’s People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces seemed to be ignoring the New JEWEL Central Committee, and lacked a coherent political focus of their own.

The lack of control among the revolutionaries manifested itself a week later on 19 October when Maurice Bishop and seven others were assembled in a courtyard at Fort Rupert, and gunned down by People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces. These soldiers who committed the killings were formerly government of Grenada troops who shifted their allegiance to Deputy Prime Minister Coard’s political group, which stood in opposition to Bishop’s ruling New JEWEL movement. After the deaths, a sixteen-man military council under General Hudson Austin assumed control of the government in Grenada.

International response to the killings was mostly unfavorable for Grenada. Neighboring Caribbean States considered the acts of murder and subsequent secret burials to be the acts of a dangerous outlaw nation, Leaders in Barbados took the lead in rallying Caribbean regional leaders, and it was this assemblage that suggested to Milton Bish, the American Ambassador, that there might be sufficient local support for US involvement in the region. In fact, some Caribbean leaders thought that military American intervention was urgent. Barbados offered a small contingent up front to show support for a multilateral coalition with the US. The American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean States gave his impressions to the State Department in Washington. Were a strong enough request to be forthcoming from the Caribbean regional
leaders, the US would respond with force to reduce the instability. Some military intervention was already being planned; The US Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent a warning order to Atlantic Command to plan for evacuating American noncombatants from Grenada. But Grenada was still a British Commonwealth country, and after President Ronald Reagan informed her of his intentions, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher expressed “grave concerns” about the necessity of an invasion. Her misgivings did not give the President much pause.

Because of the violent transfer of power in Grenada, the National Security Council had been considering a military intervention in Grenada since 20 October. The USS Independence Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Squadron Four were already en route to a station north of the island (actually in the vicinity of Puerto Rico, so as not to alert the Grenadians prematurely). President Reagan tentatively decided on military intervention on 22 October, with a final decision to be made on 24 October. The JCS were therefore instructed to plan for noncombatant evacuation and full military intervention. The threefold reason was to protect American lives, restore legitimate democracy, and come to the aid of a head of state requesting assistance under provisions of the charter for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to restore peaceful, stable government. Beyond these public reasons, President Reagan was chiefly interested in discouraging communist expansion in the region. Also, regional control and maintenance of US status as western hemisphere hegemon were important. Based upon the comments of President Reagan about Grenada joining them to spread Marxism in the region, Cuba and Nicaragua were indirect targets for US action in Grenada. It served American interests to demonstrate a willingness and the ability to act in a region considered vital.

Although the US may have welcomed an opportunity to reestablish influence in Grenada,
and by so doing, among all the observing Caribbean states, it was Caribbean "regional powers [who] inspired the intervention, not the US." America did not initiate the call to action, nor did US desire to intervene manifest itself in any special effort to gather detailed intelligence on the country, its forces, or potential objectives. As late as D-day on 25 October, 1983, little was known about the Grenadian military. Nor was much known about the geography of the island that would be tactically useful. The US had the surveillance capability, and would reasonably have used it to prepare for an operation that had to succeed, considering the risk to superpower status at stake well within America’s sphere of influence.

Reasons of national pride and hegemony were foremost among the unpublicized reasons for entering Grenada. However, primary among the President’s publicly stated reasons to intervene was the rescue of American nationals. Hundreds of US citizens had chosen schools in the Caribbean to study medicine. Many US citizens were attending medical school at St Georges in Grenada. But the rescue force did not know where the American nationals on Grenada were. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which should have had the most current information, knew about the portion of medical students at the main campus in St. Georges. Although there was no reason, and no attempt, to hide the whereabouts of the branch campuses where the remainder of the American students were, the agency did not know about two other locations for the medical school on the island with which most of the allegedly endangered Americans were associated. When the DIA finally discovered that three sites existed, intelligence analysts did not report the additional locations of St. Georges Medical School until it was too late for the locations to be of use to operational planners. One site, that near Point Salines Airport, was the focus of the rescue until a second campus at Grand Anse was revealed by happenstance from
travel pictures of a mother working at DIA who had a son attending school there. A third site, housing another third of the students, was discovered after the invasion was underway, this one located at Lance aux Epines, the True Blue campus on the southern tip of the island.38

What the Americans did know was that the Grenadian Militia was apparently disaffected. It was untrained, and failed to respond in any substantial numbers to the call for defense against the impending American invasion. The Grenadian government knew the Americans were coming, called for its military to rise up in defense, yet failed to generate coherent resistance to last more than a week and two days.39 The invasion force prevailed, accomplishing the operational objectives and thereby achieving the strategic aims of the President with low casualties. The results of Operation URGENT FURY qualify as a success by the criteria from the Decisive Force field manual.

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF URGENT FURY

Within the JOPES system, Deliberate Planning never stops. Adaptive planning under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requires CINCs to develop a range of response options to potential lesser regional contingencies in their areas of responsibility.40 In keeping with the illustrative planning scenarios appropriate to a geographic command, US Atlantic Command had small island defense contingency plans (CONPLANs) to protect US lives and interests in the Caribbean prior to the Grenada intervention. As might be expected, some of the contingency planning had gone toward restoration of states friendly to the US. The military would be used to set the conditions for democratic rule to prevail, and then allow the domestic political process to take over, with economic and political assistance from America. Noncombatant evacuation on the passive end of intervention, and ground invasion on the active end of the spectrum were
considered in these CONPLANs.\textsuperscript{41}

By 19 October, a Joint Chiefs of Staff Warning Order under the Crisis Action Planning process required ADM McDonald, Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), to review existing plans, and then submit alternative courses of action for the NCA to consider.\textsuperscript{42} If none of the available plans were suitable, crisis action planning requires the CINC to make one that \textit{does} fit the scenario. His estimate was due in six hours. Admiral McDonald responded in two hours with six alternatives, because one of the existing Atlantic Command CONPLANs had suited the Grenada scenario. The off-the-shelf plan was expanded from an evacuation plan to remove the American students to include replacing the anti-western government.\textsuperscript{43}

The CINCLANT plan emphasized the use of Marines, which may have been parochial, since Marines are the ground force of choice in naval operations. Or the emphasis on Marine operations may have been appropriate, considering the objective sites were on an island where forced entry into hostile defenses would require a foothold that the Marines specialize in supplying.\textsuperscript{44} In either case, the Army was not fully incorporated in the early forced entry planning.

Late on 21 October, the 82nd Airborne Division was told of its involvement in the intervention which was to occur three days later on Monday, 24 October 1983.\textsuperscript{45} However, for operational security reasons, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) continued to plan in isolation from the 82nd Airborne until 23 October.\textsuperscript{46} Coordination of conventional and unconventional, naval, air, and army ground forces remained imperfect because Atlantic Command liaison officers could not understand technical information on deployment and capability of the 82nd, which had been belatedly tasked to participate in planning for URGENT
FURY.

While President Reagan considered signing the execute order, the CINCLANT decided to form a joint task force tailored to the impending mission, including Army and Marine forces in his planning. The JTF commander and his staff generated the force list for the operation in isolation from the sister service troops required by the plan. The invasion was primarily a ground force operation, however, instead of assigning the XVIIIth Airborne Corps as the commander of US Forces in theater, CINCLANT assigned Commander of the Second Fleet as JTF Commander. Further, the Navy commander did not use the available Army XVIIIth Corps headquarters as the Army component in the joint task force to support the 82nd Airborne Division, which was to have the bulk of the ground mission after the Marines and Rangers established a foothold on the island and gained necessary reconnaissance for the main body consisting of army troops. Doctrinally, because the 82nd Airborne is subordinate to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, the XVIIIth Corps should have provided required logistic support to sustain the division for the duration of deployment. For the expedition to Grenada, the 82nd Airborne would need corps assistance.

None of the joint planning considerations interrupted the planning which continued in Norfolk Virginia, CINCLANT headquarters. Even though the 82nd planners had come and gone from the planning conference in Norfolk, coordination between airborne officers and planners at Norfolk was incomplete, because the airborne planners left without a clear concept of operations. They lacked detail on their mission. Several factors contributed to the lack of clarity, chief among them the belated informing of the airborne division leaders and planners of their involvement. Further, no maps were used at the conference. And coordination with the Marines was ignored, even though the Marine Landing Battalions were supposed to hand over the mission to the army
airborne division. Joint doctrine requires that coordination between the services for contingency operations be accomplished by the Army Forces Component Commander. None had been chosen.

Finally, on 23 October 1983, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was picked to represent the Army in the JTF. MG Schwarzkopf was commanding a mechanized division in Georgia at the time of his selection by Forces Command. Operation URGENT FURY was less than forty-eight hours from execution, and the Army was finally, and belatedly, represented on the JTF staff.

President Reagan authorized execution of the invasion plan on 24 October in spite of Prime Minister Thatcher's reservations. However, the US did send some Special Forces to preserve the welfare of the British Governor-general, who was helpful in providing a backdated letter requesting US assistance. The letter of authorization served as a dubious source of international legal justification.

Political maneuvering for legitimacy did not keep each phase of the operation from having its own operational surprises and setbacks. President Reagan declared the welfare and safety of the students to be the main purpose of the operation, yet critical information as to their whereabouts on Grenada did not influence execution. On October 22, the National Military Center Intelligence confirmed that all students were living at True Blue campus, near the east end of the Port Salines runway. In truth, only about a third of the students lived there. Hundreds of parents knew of other concentrations of students, as did US Caribbean partners in Barbados. Students at Lance Aux Epines and Grand Anse campuses, two and ten miles north of True Blue respectively, were in telephone contact with the US up to and during the assault. LANTCOM
learned of the other campuses at the last minute, but assaulting troops did not learn of the existence of the student concentrations they were to secure until they arrived on the island. When late-breaking information about the second (and third) campus sites became available in Washington between 17 and 25 October, it did not affect planning.

In the execution of URGENT FURY, two Ranger Battalions were tasked with seizing key facilities, including the Point Salines Airfield, to assist the air landing of the follow-on 82nd Airborne Division. The plan gave battalion missions to the Ranger battalions, but neither Ranger battalion arrived at full strength. Employment of two full strength battalions was frustrated by a lack of fully trained air crews to support the night insertions via MC-130 required to execute their clandestine missions. Both Ranger battalions landed in Grenada at fifty percent strength.

Planners made no apparent adjustments to the Ranger mission based on this information.

After four days of preparation, US joint and combined staffs executed URGENT FURY against a small, ill-prepared Grenadian People’s Revolutionary Army. Confusion and lack of information at all levels was overcome to meet the national objectives through applied tactics. Poorly effected operational planning was the source of many of the deficiencies from logistics to intelligence to maneuver.

Analysis of Operation URGENT FURY

Several aspects of doctrine were misapplied during URGENT FURY, chief among them was unity of command, or designation of a headquarters that would have overall responsibility for the operation. Admiral Wesley McDonald as CINCLANT had the geographic responsibility for the Caribbean. Under his authority as a unified commander, he established Task Force 120, and appointed Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III as its commander. Both Admirals McDonald and
Metcalf required joint staffs which included members from the services comprising the force to be used “to ensure that each commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force.” The JTF 120 commander did not establish a joint staff, not did he augment his staff with officers from other services.

Joint amphibious doctrine developed in World War II set a long-standing precedent for Army-Navy operations. The Naval task force commander is overall in charge until forces are ashore, then command of the forces passes to the ground commander when he is ready to exercise control. This precedent in joint cooperation was ignored when the naval commander failed to assign a ground commander from the available headquarters, either the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Marines, or the 82nd Airborne Division headquarters.

Insufficient time was given for the deploying staffs to plan adequately, or to coordinate appropriate support and maneuver. Thus, when the NCA directed that JTF 120 not only evacuate the American nationals but also undertake peacekeeping duties, the mission exceeded the capability of the force. That change of mission occurred on 21 October, and the Army and Air Force had to be belatedly included in the operation. Had the JTF commander established a joint staff right away, the transition and planning would have had more time to develop smoothly. But when Vice Admiral Metcalf got execution approval for the LANTCOM plan from the President via the CJCS on 23 October, the army corps headquarters was still officially excluded from the planning sessions, the first of which had occurred the day prior to approval, on 22 October. No unified ground force commander was ever designated.

When Major General Norman Schwarzkopf arrived on the 24th of October to participate in joint planning on the JTF-120 staff, he came from a heavy division. He did not bring with him
the expertise required of a mission requiring airborne troops. He essentially came alone, with one
other assistant arriving later, one day before the operation was to begin. The assembling of
component services for planning was far too late, particularly when the strategic lift and logistics
sustainment portions of the intervention had yet to be arranged.

As late as the 24th, LANTCOM headquarters was still confused about how to employ the
Rangers and how the airborne alert sequence would affect the readiness and location of the
airborne troops. Airborne planners were still sketchy on the concept of execution, and Army
logistics planner were never invited to join the planning sessions. In short, there was neither a
satisfactory joint maneuver plan on the morning of the 24th, nor was there a suitable joint support
plan. And time to generate either was spare. Rapid deployment was necessary to exploit a short-
lived opportunity in Grenada to break the hold of a communist regime in the US sphere of
influence before decisive global political pressure could build against the US intervention.55

The need for rapid deployment ordained the force selection for the short-notice operation
URGENT FURY. The Army units with the highest readiness posture and the greatest mobility
were chosen; light infantry airborne, Ranger, and Delta Forces were created for such
contingencies. It is unlikely that a heavy armored or mechanized force could have been moved by
ship to Grenada in time to achieve the rapid finish desired by the President.56 The 82nd Airborne,
on the other hand, keeps a brigade on alert with the mission to be prepared to deploy within
eighteen hours of notification.

The airborne N-hour sequence posed one of the problems in this joint operation. Inability
of the LANTCOM staff to grasp airborne capabilities and limitations confused assault planning
and complicated plans for the relief of Marines securing island objectives. Lack of joint
cooperation and understanding, plus the abbreviated time for coordination, left the LANTCOM staff thinking that the 82nd Airborne could have fighting units on the ground in Grenada within eighteen hours—one of several significant misunderstandings which decoupled the joint operation. Other challenges had to do with fuel and water resupply, and the sustainment of committed troops. The misunderstandings might have been disastrous against a stronger enemy. But LANTCOM and the subordinate JTF sent overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission, to make sure that they would be stronger than this enemy. The fight against a suspected 1200 PRA troops 600 Cuban construction workers was initiated by 1500 Marines and Army Special Forces troops to attain tactical surprise. Six battalions of 82nd Airborne troops supported the initial entry troops over the next three days. The JTF under Atlantic Command looked like this:

![Diagram of Task Force 120 Organization]

**Figure 3. Task Force 120 Organization**
An aspect worth noting in the task organization is how compartmented the task forces were. In this case, the separate blocks representing units were kept separate in reality as well. In an apparent attempt at simplicity, units which needed to maneuver closely with others were deliberately kept apart. The Marines had missions in the northern part of the island, while the Rangers attacked in the south. The airborne troops designated to relieve both early entry elements were kept apart from them in the planning, allowing no preparation for the 82nd’s assumption of the Ranger and Marine missions.

In terms of FM 100-7, the operation was successful. The Atlantic commander, Admiral McDonald, clearly understood the breadth of the LANTCOM mission, and that the tasks needed to be done quickly, so as not to suffer a repeat of the Iranian hostage crisis of a few years earlier. Fortunately, the Grenadians did not attempt to hold Americans hostage, even when they had opportunity to do so. Fortuitously, a hostage situation was avoided.

In terms of finishing quickly and sustaining few casualties, the protection, neutralization, and stabilizing missions were accomplished in nine days. Marines and Rangers secured their respective initial tactical objectives at Pearls Airport and Port Salines within three hours of landing. 600 Cuban prisoners were taken almost immediately, with an additional one hundred captured over the next few day of fighting. Seventy Cuban and Grenadian forces were killed, and more than 400 were wounded reducing the Grenadian resistance. Eighteen American service members died in action. 116 received various wounds. The fourth specified task, maintenance of the peace, was turned over to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force as the Americans withdrew at the end of that time period. Those casualty figures were low enough to satisfy the NCA.58

Despite having to do ad hoc coordination during execution, having no unified commander,
and having no tactical maps, the tactical commanders of the attacking units understood the CINC’s intent well enough that they accomplished their assigned tasks. Had the joint command been activated sooner, the intelligence community and logistics planners might have alleviated the transportation, coordination, and logistics problems. The mission was a success in spite of the deficiencies. Considering that the Grenadian government was aware of US intentions two or three days before the assault on the island, operational security need not have excluded necessary participants from the planning until the day before execution.

A lack of codified and mandated joint procedures left planning and execution to the judgement of the commander, resulting in a lack of cooperation and the outright exclusion of available forces which could have facilitated the accomplishment of the mission. A unifying procedure was needed—some methods to enable services while ensuring service component cooperation. Defense Reorganization provided much of the absent procedure.


After URGENT FURY was complete, and partially catalyzed by that deployment, a review of the arrangement of national military command was completed. Jointness, deliberately and formally involving the ground, air, and sea forces into a coordinated union, was formalized in its current state by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Before the provisions of that act were adopted, mechanisms for interservice cooperation were lacking. As was evident in operation URGENT FURY, necessary planning went undone. The evolving process by which crisis and deliberate planning was formalized to ensure necessary planning gets done came about under JOPES during Defense Reorganization.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 amends Title 10 of the U.S. Code, with the
purpose of improving military advice to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the act was intended to increase the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, and finally, to strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense. The senior civilian decision makers will, by the provisions of the act, not only get a consensus of military advice, but also be presented a full range of divergent advice, should the senior advisors disagree.

Defense Reorganization requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans, which the top civilian defense managers use to formulate military strategy, plan for contingencies, and to set priorities among major military missions. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the Secretary of Defense provides the JCS Chairman annual written guidance for the prompt review of contingency plans for contingencies which can be reasonably anticipated. Utility of JCS plans would be improved if contingencies were based on policies and political assumptions approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President (the Secretary of the Army and secretaries of the other military departments have no role in operational matters). This NCA approval was included.

The JCS prepares strategic plans that give direction to the armed forces, but does not provide the joint staff any command authority. Plans must conform with objectives and resource levels projected by the SECDEF. Unconstrained planning is useful in first stage of planning, but once deficiencies are identified, force size, configuration, and capabilities must be considered for subsequent planning. This joint military strategic planning would guide choices among competing priorities in the programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation process. According to Army directive, the ultimate job of the Army planners, programmer and budget people is to provide the operational CINCs the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within
Operational leaders are the main focus of resourcing, and they are the main source of input on how to use available resources under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In developing the concept of the Reorganization Act, the Senate Armed Services committee considered adding three mission-oriented Under-secretaries of Defense because of an absence of adequate focus on major military missions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This portion of the law was not enacted, but the communication and reporting between the CINCs and the SECDEF was enhanced. The increased exchange was necessary to ensure that success as defined in FM 100-7 could occur, where the CINC appreciates fully the NCA’s intent, and subordinates his own intent to that higher intent.

The Grenada crisis operation was developed under the old system. Unfortunately, “details and supporting objectives for this exercise were unclear or unstated, leaving room for interpretation and conflict either in establishing objectives or constraints, or in clearly setting out the desired course of action to be planned and executed. This pattern of failure suggests that there may have been an important lack of connectivity between policy, national strategy, theater (operational) strategy, and military operations. The linkage among these levels may be broken, but it may not be at all clear where the breaks occurred.” Some of the breaks were noted, and many of them repaired prior to deployments which followed URGENT FURY.

**OPERATION RESTORE HOPE**

One operation which took place after the provisions of Defense Reorganization took effect was Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Africa. The first case study, URGENT FURY, was concerned with one of three basic categories which the National Security Strategy states merit the use of armed forces--an important US interest. A second area which can cause
deployment of military force is a threat to a vital US interest. The third area meriting American military intervention, Operation RESTORE HOPE, serves as a useful case study for humanitarian assistance.

On 27 July 1992, the United Nations authorized the emergency airlift of aid to Somalia. In December, the UN further mandated the deployment of major UN forces to Somalia to serve as components of a US led international coalition. UN Security Council Resolution 794 was passed to “establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,” where help was badly needed for the hundreds of thousands who were in danger of mortal malnutrition.

As the enduring sources of the hunger and deprivation continued to increase the numbers of people needing assistance, relief workers from around the world worked to provide health care, food, and shelter to Somalis in need. The US created JTF RESTORE HOPE to effect secure distribution of humanitarian supplies to the victims of many years of warring and drought. The US National Command Authority assigned the mission and apportioned forces to the Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), who formed a Joint Task Force for the conduct of the relief operation. But why intervene in Somalia, when so many other places were suffering equal devastation from fighting or natural disaster? What may have prompted the humanitarian action was the impact of timely television images communicating the suffering of the malnourished Somalis directly to the homes of a sympathetic US and world audience, and sympathetic government officials in a position to act.

Strategically, during the Cold War, America was interested in countering communist expansion. The Soviets had alternately assisted the Ethiopians and the Somalis as occasions arose.
to influence African politics toward communist ideology. Under the national security policy of containment, America was obliged to counter the Soviet influence as close as possible to existing Soviet borders. That was the beginning of US involvement in Somalia, but other reasons followed.

What interests the US did have at the time of intervention were potential base and overflight agreements, staging areas, and naval ports. Somalia juts into the Indian Ocean on the east coast of Africa. The distinctive shores which shape the seaward edges of the country identify this land mass as the Horn of Africa. Somalia’s location just below the Arabian Peninsula made basing rights a practical consideration for potential conflicts in southwest Asia, despite a lack of infrastructure in the country beyond the port. Loss of Saudi Arabia as a staging base might have increased the importance of African nations as points of debarking for US force projection in the Middle East. Even without any host nation support to offer a staging force, the location of Somalia would serve well as a relatively secure place to marshal equipment near a Southwest Asian conflict.

Somalia’s location was important in the past for commercial reasons. The country’s recent political history was as a British and Italian territory. For these two European nations, Somalia was useful as a trading point for goods from the African continental interior to the Red Sea route to Europe. After WWII, Italy gave up rights to Somalia, and the nation became a protectorate of the UN for ten years. In 1959, the trusteeship ended. Somalia requested and obtained independence under the rule of a three-part coalition government. Although the government was formed with representatives from each of the major ethnic groups, ethnic jealousy soon divided the country. Those internal divisions were set aside while Somalia
expanded westward to include the cultural Somali peoples in neighboring Djibouti, Kenya, and especially Ethiopia, with whom Somalia shares an extended and shifting border. From 1963 to 1964, Somalia fought a losing war with Ethiopia, catalyzed by popular irredentism, to expand her borders. The fighting contributed to the poverty of the nation by expending already limited resources in an unsuccessful bid for more area with more people.

In 1969, the military under MG Muhammad Siad Barre took control of the government. Siad Barre turned for support to the Soviet Union, mostly because neighboring enemy Ethiopia was getting assistance from the US. The two countries were regional rivals on the Cold War front. After building up military strength under General Siad, Somalia attacked Ethiopia again in 1977 to take claimed territory. The attack was unsuccessful, mainly due to Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia, which had shifted alliances and turned toward Marxism after the Haile Selassie was deposed in 1974.

The government of Somalia expelled the Soviet forces in their country because of that country's support to the Ethiopian enemy. Somalia then invaded the disputed territory of the Ogaden in 1977, but Ethiopia regained control of the area. Since the Somali-Ethiopia War of 1977-1988, the nation of Somalia has descended into anarchy. The US and other western nations began food shipments to help feed the refugees flowing into Somalia from the Ogaden, partially filling the support vacuum left by the departed Soviets.

After 1988 and the end of the conflict with Ethiopia, domestic opposition increased against the existing government of President Siad Barre. Barre's initial response was brutal domestic repression, which was met by increased anti-government clan action, which eventually toppled the Barre government. In 1991, President Barre fled the country. Interim President Ali
Mahdi Mohammed asked all factions to support national elections, but the request was met with a declaration of independence by the Somali National Front in the northern part of the country. Thereafter, factional leaders, clans, and subclans and independent rogue elements began competing with each other for influence and survival. None of the elements had, or has, enough power to establish central control, and no central government is in effect. Internecine fighting continues.

Besides destructive border warring and domestic rebellion, the greatest blight on the Somali people is drought. Lack of water devastated this agricultural society, which survived in the 1980s on aid from the US, and from Iran and Saudi Arabia. But war and clan fighting remain the greatest threat to social order and potential national coherence in Somalia.

Despite a major international relief effort, Somalis continued to starve in large numbers, while the security for relief agencies attempting to alleviate the dying grew steadily worse. Airfields and relief ships were taken under direct and indirect fire, and relief operations were interrupted continuously by local factions which hijacked convoys for food. They looted supplies, frightened and extorted relief workers. Aid products ended up in clan control, either for their own consumption or to be sold at high prices.

**Operational Aspects of RESTORE HOPE**

In an acknowledgment of the worsening conditions, on 3 December 1992 the UN Security Council authorized the use of military force to provide security for relief efforts in Somalia. According to the UN authorization the US was charged to “lead the expedition to establish a secure environment for relief organizations to continue their work.” Strategically, President George Bush’s stated aim was to create a secure environment for relief organizations, reduce
starvation, and prepare for quick transfer of the humanitarian mission to a United Nations peacekeeping force. These objectives were met by the time the UN assumed the mission on 4 April, 1993, five months after the initial US deployment. From the outset, the nature of the operation was a humanitarian one. RESTORE HOPE was a mission to open lines of relief supply delivery and secure famine and relief centers to feed the starving people and protect non-governmental organizations and troops doing the work. The CENTCOM mission was a joint and combined operation to Somalia to open ports and secure distribution points and routes for the purpose of humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

There was no preexisting TPFDD (an acronym for Time Phased Force Deployment Data commonly used as a noun, and pronounced "TIP-FID") for RESTORE HOPE deployments to Somalia; it was built as the operation unfolded. Based on an existing CENTCOM deliberate plan, the Joint Task Force Somalia headquarters generated force deployment data to move troops and equipment into theater by schedule. Although the early deployment schedule was drawn from an existing plan, command and control arrangements were completed under the JOPES Crisis Action Procedures, due to the crudely understood, rapidly developing nature of events in this case. The TPFDD works best as a long-term planning document, since ship may not respond rapidly to schedule changes in the five days prior to debarking. Airplanes can respond more quickly to changes in the strategic lift requirements, but the change usually means settling for less than optimal filling of available space on available airframes.

As the TPFDD was changed and executed, composition of the forces in Somalia shifted from month to month, but a representative Task Organization for the Joint and Combined Task Force Somalia as of 21 January, 1993 included the following international units:
Among the task force troops was the headquarters and 2nd Brigade of the US Army 10th Mountain Division. The mission for the troops of the 10th Mountain Division as part of the Combined Task Force Somalia was to establish the conditions for secure delivery of relief supplies, and to secure the distribution bases to allow relief agencies to continue their work in safety. Ten thousand U.S. Army troops were on the ground in Somalia the month after President Bush ordered the execution in December of 1992. Nearly 21,000 were directly involved by February 1993, with 16,100 actually on the ground in Somalia. The NSS emphasized coalition operations, the NMS emphasized combined operations, and Goldwater Nichols emphasized joint operations. These considerations, plus the need for armed combat troops to defend workers against armed clan members in wheeled vehicles and on foot, resulted in the force mix sent to Somalia. Lack of an air threat meant the UN/US Air Force component had only small detachments of German and British cargo planes. Lack of an armor threat meant that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Commanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
<td>Brigadier General Solomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier General Fratarangelo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Naval Squadron, Somalia</td>
<td>Brigadier General Mikolajcik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Forces</td>
<td>Major General Arnold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Task Force Support Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF Provide Relief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Mountain Division (-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Belgian Parachute Battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Royal Australian Regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF Kismayo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Task Force 36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marine Forces</td>
<td>Major General Wilhelm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Navy Forces</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Peterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>Colonel Smith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34
the US Army forces shipped no tanks to the theater. During the period from December 1992 through the beginning of May, 1993, the task organization for the United Task Force, of which the 10th Mountain Division was a part, looked like this:

![Diagram of UNITAF Somalia Task Organization]

**Figure 4. UNITAF Somalia Task Organization**

Operationally, 10th Mountain Division had to make some planning assessments in the two and a half weeks between notification and executing the mission given them. Among the assumptions the division made were that the infrastructure would be severely degraded or non-existent. Although entry was unopposed, US forces could expect no host nation support, and thus had to be self-sufficient, to include water and electrical support. Not only would the Americans have to sustain themselves, they had to assume that they would have sufficient stores for self-sustainment, and that they would be authorized to logistically support other participating UN nations.
Still, despite the weeks of warning and knowledge of a near complete lack of infrastructure, none of the Army’s prepositioned ships was ordered to begin moving to Somalia before D-Day (the day the Marines landed—9 December, 1992), though they carried needed hospital facilities, matériel handling equipment, and food supplies. The JOPES-generated troop deployment scheduled by the TPFDD had to be modified due to increased threat and mission changes. The adjustments were limited because numbers of troops were decided in advance in a force limitation of 13,400 total personnel. The personnel limitation included combat and service troops, and the number was not adjusted as the mission may have required.

In RESTORE HOPE, Army operational planners were plagued by the strategically assigned force cap, which was introduced even before the mission, and before courses of action were decided on. It is difficult to know how much military force is needed to accomplish a mission until the mission itself is understood. RESTORE HOPE strategic planners were required to accept a predetermined force size, then assign missions.

Mission requirements were provided by President Bush at the outset of the deployment, but there was no early indication of how much troop strength would be needed to bring the mission to a successful end. Success meant that a secure environment was established for relief workers and soldiers. Since security in non-quantifiable, the JTF commander would have to decide how much safety was adequate. To give clear, attainable goals to tactical operators, operational planners preparing for the security mission needed a clear mission statement with a desired military end state.

Measures of effectiveness—success criteria—and planning constraints (including troops available) were unavailable to Army planners. Under JOPES, when the required information is
not available due to insufficient collection or lack of time, the operational commander must present a restated mission, intent, and end state up to the strategic level for consideration.88 Strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders need to reach closure quickly on what each is trying to accomplish. This agreement is particularly important in non-standard interventions such as Somalia. The link between the three levels is currently missing from the Crisis Action Planning process.89

Lack of time or a desire for security may have been the reason for the decoupling of the levels of planning, since by the time the 10th Mountain Division was alerted for possible deployment to Somalia, strategic analysis for the operation had been in progress for some time. Had the strategic planning been conducted as parallel planning, the Army component commander could have contributed to the development of missions statements, task organization, intelligence requirements and end state conditions.90

Analysis of Operation RESTORE HOPE

Despite the injunctions of Goldwater-Nichols, joint doctrine was misapplied or ignored during the planning and execution of RESTORE HOPE. In terms of the three criteria of success provided by FM 100-7, RESTORE HOPE would be considered a success. First, the theater mission as first assigned was accomplished in five months, with few casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis received food who would have otherwise continued malnourished had it not been for US intervention. For example, the number of Somalis dying each day in the western Bardera relief sector fell from more than 300 in November 1992 to fewer than five per day by April 1993. After the Americans and the United Task Force established security along relief routes and at relief centers, general community violence decreased. The number of daily gunshot
victims admitted to Mogadishu hospitals fell from fifty per day to five or fewer. UNITAF personnel repaired roads, airfields, and wells in the five months they were active as part of the JTF. The President’s goal to feed the starving was a resounding success during the time American forces were on the ground in Somalia.

The CINC and his JTF Somalia commander met the NCA guidance for the first part of RESTORE HOPE. By establishing end state conditions for each mission in terms of commander’s intent, operational planners were able to determine what needed to be accomplished so that the commander would know when the mission was complete. These conditions were expressed early in planning to ensure that relief supplies could get to those who needed them.

Concerning the last measure of success, wherein the operational commander of the JTF, LTG Robert B. Johnston, understood and fulfilled the CINC’s intent. The CENTCOM mission was clearly stated: “... conduct joint/combined military operation in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open passage of relief supplies, provide security of relief convoys, and assist the UN and non-governmental agencies provide humanitarian relief under UN auspices.”

As far as JOPES and the TPFDD, CENTCOM conscientiously prepared a deployment database, then gave subordinate commands access to it, with permission to make changes. The changes to units, personnel, and deployment dates were voluminous, and the deployment schedule was ruined. The relative inflexibility of the TPFDD is what makes deliberate planning useful as a basis from which to start the flow of forces to a contingency location. The necessary and inevitable changes to make the proposed flow match real needs are what make proficiency at crisis planning more urgent.
For all the success, planning could have been improved. For example, by the time the division was alerted on 30 November, strategic analysis had been going on for some time. Had the joint task force commander and his army component been able to conduct parallel planning, the subordinate commanders could have productively participated in generating a more fully coordinated mission set. Early participation would have given the subordinate commands access to strategic intelligence useful for preparing rules of engagement and techniques to be used during the deployment.

**Recommendations**

By the success criteria offered in FM 100-7, the theater CINC's intent would have to agree with the NCA's intent. The Operational Commanders intent would also be consistent with the Geographic CINC's intent. Finally, Army theater objectives would be met with low casualty rates for both friendly and enemy personnel.

In both of the case studies, the CINCs were able to understand the President's will for the operation. President Reagan expressed his desire to restore legitimate and stable government when he made the public announcement for URGENT FURY. He told America that young citizens abroad were in need of rescue. Both of those objectives were met.

Presidents Bush and Clinton both advised America that the troops were executing RESTORE HOPE to stop the starving in Somalia, and to protect relief workers and themselves. The starving was forestalled, and the relief workers were protected during that deployment.

In each of these cases, operational commanders were able to translate policy into action, but they had to interpret for themselves what success looked like. If a dialogue continues between senior and subordinate staffs, the theater commander arrives at reasonable end states which satisfy
the geographic commander and the NCA. Under JOPES, the CINC’s Strategic Concept is approved by the CJCS, since as senior uniformed military advisor to the President, the CJCS has a clear understanding of what the NCA is trying to accomplish. An OPLAN review further ensures that theater end states match strategic aims. Having a military planner on the strategic staff accelerates understanding and reduces changes when the OPLAN or OPORD is reviewed. Having a strategic civilian planner on the operational staff would do even more to increase understanding between the planning levels. The temporary assignment of a civilian planner to the CINC’s staff ought to be considered.

With respect to pre-planned force deployment lists, there is little chance that the templated force will be correctly tailored for an evolving contingency. To get task organization right, the scenario planners would have to foresee the future. They cannot. In Operation RESTORE HOPE, the TPFDD changed constantly, because subordinate planners had been given access to revise their deployment schedules as they needed, requiring weeks to properly reschedule the deployment. Planners will make task organization meet the requirement against which the force will be used. Task organizing has to be done, but will likely be later in the planning process, to account for mission and force changes. A more responsive scheduling method is needed.

Given that the future remains hidden from the planners, this monograph proposes two recommendations to make planning more responsive to civilian policy, and more inclusive of the members of the Joint Planning Community—a modified adaptive planning process. Currently, the joint community and the Army have in place a deliberate process which takes months to generate a contingency plan. When the contingency does occur, as in Grenada or Somalia, the pre-written plan is useful for a base line by which to begin deployment, but then the plan is adjusted to
real unanticipated needs. Because baseline computations for strategic lift and sustainment are so vital, and because ships and planes cannot effectively be programmed with a few days notice, deliberate plans are still useful. American Army experience shows that TPFDDs, like other prepared plans, are invariably changed before or during execution. Such change ought to be incorporated into the JOPES planning process used to create crisis OPLANs and OPORDs.

By design the current deliberate process is too slow and too rigid a procedure for responding to immediate crises. It is these short-notice contingencies to which U.S. Army is frequently being called. Adaptive planning is the framework within which deliberate planning processes to produce comprehensive (by including appropriate advisors) and integrated (nests the higher and lower intents) options for high-level decision makers to choose from. Comprehensive planning and nested intents are consistent with the success criteria in FM 100-7. As these features are important in deliberate planning, they ought to be included in crisis planning, too. But crisis planning under JOPES sacrifices comprehensiveness for speed. Attaining both may be possible.

**New Emphasis in Planning**

JOPES rapid adaptive planning recognizes the diverse threats America faces since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. That breakup meant that assumptions based upon Cold War data about warning times, order of battle, and political decisions were less accurate, jeopardizing the usefulness of many on-the-shelf strategic plans. For this reason, the primacy of Deliberate Planning over Crisis Action Planning needs to be reversed. Appropriately modified Crisis Action Planning ought to be the main source of just-in-time, or same-day plans. Because the US will likely face more high probability, low-intensity (compared to conventional combat) Modified Crisis Action ought to be the pattern of choice among operational planners. Deliberate planning
will still provide functions which lay the groundwork for any military operation, but the emphasis needs to be on a modified Crisis Action Planning Procedure (CAP). The modification to the current CAP would be twofold: include the full complement of the JPEC, and elevate the practice of crisis action planning as the major duty of operational planners. With constant practice, an effective response options can be developed more rapidly than the adversary can act in a crisis. Deliberate planning would still be used, but would, because the fixed scenarios limit training flexibility, be exercised much less often than multiple, changing crisis scenarios.

The proposal works well with abbreviated planning time, includes the full JPEC community, gives the National Command Authorities more options, and could increase operation success rates by making the U.S. national leadership more selective about which world events both warrant U.S. intervention (and are winnable). Figure 5 shows how a range of considerations yields a range of options, rather than concentrating on a single hypothetical sample from among the possible encounters.

In this case, the point represents an Iraqi armored invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1997. Iraq has up to twelve divisions to commit to the fight. The U.S. has a set base force, which is being established by DOD and Congress now. For this example, the base force is ten divisions, four of them heavy. Regional allies have three equivalent divisions in the area. In the case presented, regional allies defend temporarily, while the U.S. responds with air power. Air supremacy is attained within ten days of mobilization. American ground forces follow more slowly, mostly by sea lift. The position of the particular case shows that if any of the conditions are not met, such as fewer allied divisions are available or fewer than ten days pass between preparation and D-day, the particular scenario shifts into the range where success is possible, but
not assured. Other conditions would have to be favorable for the allies to win. Among those other conditions are the moral factors, leadership, political commitment and popular support which cannot be registered in equivalent divisions.

**Figure 5. Adaptive Planning Scenario Space**

The purpose of the scenario space diagram is to show that predictable behavior by Warsaw Pact in Central Europe is obsolete, because it was only one case among many possibilities. That is, as much as NATO knew about the Soviet Union and her allies, nothing about the war plans to defend Europe was predictive (for either side), no matter how much intelligence was dedicated to reducing the uncertainties.
An approach which takes advantage of computer technology to model thousands of scenarios with a proactive and reactive enemy has excellent potential to exercise operational planners on how to be fast and flexible with response options. (Planning staffs would only practice on dozens out of the millions of scenarios, but with short suspenses and changing contexts.) Optimizing the effect of exercises would mean cultivating a staff of trained and studied planners, the other part necessary to make the proposed combination work. Gamed warning and execution time lines and repetitive scenarios give way to more realistic complex (and probably foreshortened) response times.

Integrated adaptive planning can make seamless the connection between policy and execution of the military portion of that policy. Integration means training planners together in a single system which permits training across the lines of tactical, operational, and strategic realms. Multiple institutions could house the training, but all planners would be exposed to a single planning system, and would all gain an appreciation, if not a full understanding, of what planners at other levels do to contribute to a suitable, executable plan.

Common to both examples used in this monograph was the Crisis Action Planning which bypassed portions of the JPEC in order to save time. The problem this proposal seeks to resolve is that staffs charged to do CAP spend most of their time working deliberate plans. Practicing the art of CAP using available technologies should increase the ability of planners to do the type of planning they will most likely be called upon to do.

The second problem to be resolved is the omission of agencies in CAP. Those JPEC members which contribute largely to the long-term after-effects of any US course of action ought not be cut out of the process because a quick action is necessary or desired.
Both URGENT FURY and RESTORE HOPE show that resourceful planners and motivated operators can make faulty plans into successes. It is time to create the conditions where the planners can excel in the best of circumstances.
ENDNOTES

1. P.K. Davis and L. Finch. "Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era. Giving Meaning to Flexibility, Adaptiveness, and Robustness of Capability." (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), p. 15. In the 1980s the US Army developed the National Training Center with a Soviet-style OPFOR to train heavy brigades to counter Warsaw Pact tactics. Forward defense in the Cold War meant up to 240,000 troops stationed in Europe, waiting for a Soviet offensive. Purchases of fast sea lift (by which over 95 percent of all military matériel travels into theater) were delayed indefinitely in favor of maintaining troop levels abroad. Davis and Finch offer the trade-offs between versatility and specializing.


3. FM 100-7, pp. 1-2 to 1-5. Success criteria for theater operations are listed early in the manual. Objective success with minimum casualties is explained; getting the CINCs, who are empowered with combatant command, to agree with the National Command Authority is discussed in the first few pages of the manual. Success culminates in the operational commander having a full understanding of what the geographic CINC has in mind.

4. William J. Clinton, National Security Strategy, (Washington, February 1995), pp. 1-24. The NSS is the President's document to his security staff and to the world which outlines what global and domestic interests will invite or merit a US response, including military intervention. It is not exhaustive or prescriptive, but a guideline for the employment of the elements of power.

5. Clinton, National Security Strategy, pp. 20-23. The President explains why access to Persian Gulf oil is of vital national interest. He calls for unrestricted access to this critical resource due to depletion of US stores and because 45% of US oil is imported. Vital dependence upon ties with Asian trading partners gets emphasis. Promoting democratic rule in its various forms is stressed, and enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations supports all of America's interests.


economic and military elements of power by adding informational and sociologic dimensions to the grouping.


9. National Military Strategy, p. 4. The document describes how the military will use overseas presence and power projection to engage, deter, and if necessary, fight for America’s interests.


12. Joint Pub 5-0, p. III-10. According to LTC Lloyd Sherfey of the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College Department of Joint and Combined Operations (DJCO) points out that the CJCS has ordered the time be reduced to twelve months.


15. AFSC Pub 1, p. 7-5.


17. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1989), pp. 105-112. Adkin explains that America needed a win to restore confidence in a flagging military. Despite the political risks of violating international law of sovereign nations and offending Britain by attacking one of her Commonwealth states, President Reagan seized a chance for near-certain victory and thwarted Marxist influence in Grenada.


30. William C. Gilmore, The Grenada Invasion: Analysis and Documentation, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1984), pp. 97-98. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States met on October 21, 1983 to consider and evaluate the overthrow and killing of PM Bishop. They decided that the military buildup combined with a “draconian” 96-hour curfew signaled a serious threat to other Caribbean states. In a joint statement on the Grenada situation, OECS member states “considered it of the utmost urgency that immediate steps be taken to end this threat” and sought assistance from friendly countries in the region and outside. Those countries were Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States of America. Statement is reproduced in the appendix.


32. Pirnies, p. 54-55.

33. Pirnies, p. 27.


35. Gilmore, p. 29. A British lawyer serving as an educator in the Caribbean during the crisis observed that America was principally after the goal of excluding further communist/Marxist influence in the southern hemisphere.


38. Pirnies, p. 52.

39. William Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention*, pp. 93-94. Reproduced in the text is the diplomatic note from the Grenada Revolutionary Council to the Embassy of the United States in Barbados of 23 October, noting that the name of the United States had been mentioned frequently as participating in a military force to invade Grenada, and that they had observed two US warships patrolling well within Grenada's territorial waters, about twelve to fifteen kilometers off shore. The Revolutionary Council wanted to ward off what was clearly an imminent attack, and offered to negotiate rather than fight, and vowed that the US citizens in Grenada were in no danger, and could come and go to and from the island as they pleased.

40. AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-11.

41. Pirnies, p. 61.


43. Pirnies, p. 62.

44. AFSC Pub 1, p. 65 and Appendix K, Chart 4, p. K-2. The CINC is supposed to proceed through crisis planning and to whom he reports. Author Bruce Pirnies gives the actual time line in which Admiral McDonald did respond.

45. Pirnies, p. 68.

46. Pirnies, p. 69.

47. Edwards, Anastasio, Harper, and Simmons, “Grenada: Joint Logistical Insights for ‘No-Plan’ Operations,” pp. 34-35. Force planning by the Navy JTF Commander was done under tight security and without the benefit of having either Army combat or logistics planners available to confer.

48. FM 100-7: *Army in Theater Operations*, p. 6-5.

49. FM 100-7 pp. 6-4 and 6-5. Adkin, p. 129-131. The lack of coordination between Army, Navy, and Air Force may account for the strafing of 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division operations center by an A-7 on 27 October, when the Army headquarters called for fire support from the Navy. Author Bruce Pirnies gives the actual time line in which Admiral McDonald did respond.

50. Pirnies, pp. 54-55.
51. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada, pp. 129-131. A description of the potentially tragic intelligence oversight is in this text. The tragedy would have been greater if the Grenadian authorities had wanted to take American hostages, they could have easily done so after the invasion began, because the students were dispersed, and the American military forces sent to protect and evacuate the students did not know where to find them.

52. Pirnies, pp. 74-75.

53. Pirnies, p. 68.


55. Adkin, pp. 108-109. The pretext of rescuing students as impetus for invasion may have actually jeopardized their safety. No invasion meant no cause for hostage-taking by the Grenadian authorities. President Reagan feared a no-win Tehran-type hostage situation where the US was held helpless by a small group holding a few US citizens. That scenario would further weaken American prestige.

56. Edwards, et al, p. 19. The implied missions were to minimize US and foreign national casualties, and accomplish the specified tasks quickly--evacuate Americans, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace.

57. Adkin, pp. 140 and 224 give troop and unit numbers.

58. Edwards, et al, “Joint Logistical Insights,” pp. 1-38. The details of the operation--dates, times, and numbers-- are culled from the text on these pages, and shaped into the four paragraphs ahead of this note.


60. Congressional Record Volume 131, 1985 and Congressional Record Volume 132, (Washington: September 12, 1986). Clause (1) of Section 141© of subsection (d) points out specifically the limitation on the JCS.

61. Department of Defense Directive 7045.14 of the planning, Programming, and Budgeting System lists support of operational CINCs as the purpose for the system.

51. Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada*, pp. 129-131. A description of the potentially tragic intelligence oversight is in this text. The tragedy would have been greater if the Grenadian authorities had wanted to take American hostages, they could have easily done so after the invasion began, because the students were dispersed, and the American military forces sent to protect and evacuate the students did not know where to find them.

52. Pirnies, pp. 74-75.

53. Pirnies, p. 68.


55. Adkin, pp. 108-109. The pretext of rescuing students as impetus for invasion may have actually jeopardized their safety. No invasion meant no cause for hostage-taking by the Grenadian authorities. President Reagan feared a no-win Tehran-type hostage situation where the US was held helpless by a small group holding a few US citizens. That scenario would further weaken American prestige.

56. Edwards, et al, p. 19. The implied missions were to minimize US and foreign national casualties, and accomplish the specified tasks quickly—evacuate Americans, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace.

57. Adkin, pp. 140 and 224 give troop and unit numbers.

58. Edwards, et al, “Joint Logistical Insights,” pp. 1-38. The details of the operation—dates, times, and numbers—are culled from the text on these pages, and shaped into the four paragraphs ahead of this note.


60. Congressional Record Volume 131, 1985 and Congressional Record Volume 132, (Washington: September 12, 1986). Clause (1) of Section 141© of subsection (d) points out specifically the limitation on the JCS.

61. Department of Defense Directive 7045.14 of the planning, Programming, and Budgeting System lists support of operational CINC's as the purpose for the system.

going to the operational CINCs.


65. S.L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, “A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War,” (Fort Leavenworth, Winter 93-94 Parameters), pp. 4-6. American civilians were already in Somalia. Red Cross, Save the Children, and Doctors Without Borders were among the agencies which the US military went to secure.


67. Clinton, National Security Strategy, p. 7. Without immediate strategic importance, intervention in Somalia offered the US a chance to show benevolence to a global neighbor in need, and to model peaceful altruism to the rest of the world. The act of humanitarian aid could also have meant increased stature for America in the world community, but was in direct opposition to President Bill Clinton’s desire not to become the world’s policeman stated in the 1995 National Security Strategy. In that document, the President points out that the US could not afford to act in every case of need just because it could, nor would the other nations of the world expect the US to do so.

68. Eric Ransdell, US News and World Report, (December 12, 1994), p. 67. It is commonly argued that media emphasis on the plight of the starving Somalis, compelled the US to undertake the relief project. Ransdell reports that “It was images of children starving while men in technicals [armed civilian vehicles] looted food convoys that prompted George Bush to send U.S. Marines to Somalia two years ago this week.”

69. Arnold and Stahl in “A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War,” Parameters (Fort Leavenworth: Winter 93-94), p. 25. Goods and services which might have been contracted for elsewhere such as ice and trucks had to be brought into Somalia for use by the forces there.

70. Kent H. Butts, “DOD Role in African Policy,” Parameters, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA Winter 1993-94), pp. 59-62. Butts describes the value of Africa to the US from a force projection standpoint. It continues to be politically unacceptable to position forces, supplies and equipment on the ground anywhere in the Middle East. Africa is the next closest staging location, if the US wants to continue the rapid response capability identified in the NSS and NMS.
71. **OPLAN 93-2, Operation RESTORE HOPE**, page 1. Among the larger factions were the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Ogaden Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali National Front (SNF) and the United Somali Congress (USC).

72. **OPLAN 93-2, Operation RESTORE HOPE**, page 1.

73. Pamphlet 93-1, "Somalia," (January, 1993), Appendix A. The history of Somalia is one of existing and forced factiousness with shifting borders and opportunistic international and domestic alliances. Clan and individual self-interest seem unabashedly to dominate the political dealings. In this respect, it is not surprising that fighting for scarce resources along clan and tribal lines continues to this day.


75. David Kassing, *Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope* (Santa Monica: 1992), pp. xiv & xv. In the Rand study, the conclusion is stated as self-evident that the military accomplished its tasks as assigned. The shortcoming, according to this study, is that the military did not make a continuing assessment of its success in doing and reporting what the President charged it to do, while it was being done, so the armed forces could take credit for the success.


77. *Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope* by David Kassing, p. 12.

78. *Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope* by David Kassing, p. 11.

79. Operations Plan 93-2, 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, Operation RESTORE HOPE, (4 December, 1992), non-paginated insert. 21 January troop list was selected from those monthly recapitulations of troop strength available as extracts in the OPLAN.

80. **Operation RESTORE HOPE**, pp. 3-4. The unclassified mission of the 10th Mountain division comes from this source.

81. *Transporting the Army for Operation RESTORE HOPE*, p. xi.


83. *Transporting the Army for Operation RESTORE HOPE*, pp. 4-5.

84. *Transporting the Army for operation RESTORE HOPE*, pp. 8-9. The belated movement resulted from joint priorities conflicting with and taking precedence over army priorities.

85. Arnold, S.L. and David T. Stahl. "Power Projection in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters* XXIII (Winter 1993-4), p. 11. The force cap was a planning constraint established at the strategic level, in this case based upon political and economic considerations. Operational
commanders were not adequately aware of the limitations imposed by the caps. Caps ought to consider operational objectives as well as political and economic ones.


88. AFSC Pub 1, pp. 7-9 through 7-32. Chapter 7 covers the exchange of information between the CINC and the Joint Staff and the NCA. The reporting is dialogical throughout the process.


95. AFSC Pub 1, p. 6-4. The publication describes the production, coordination, review and approval routine for peacetime plans. Up to two years may be required to deliver a strategic plan.

96. AFSC Pub 1, p. 6-11. This text acknowledges the uncertainty of plans based upon Soviet propensities. States independent of the former USSR behave less predictably than before. There is some question as to whether predictions about Soviet actions were stereotyped and made unrealistically predictive in Davis and Finch's study for Rand Corporation, Defense Planning, page xv.

97. Davis and Finch, Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era: Giving meaning to Flexibility, Adaptiveness, and Robustness of Capability, (Fort Leavenworth 1993), p. xxiv. Davis and Finch argue for greater flexibility to rapidly emerging contingencies by having a rapidly developing plan.
Davis and Finch, *Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 45-49. Multiscenario Analysis and notional capability in scenario space comes from a Rand Corporation study. The model suggests the futility of training for a particular case, when the possibility of hitting upon the right one is remote. This feature meshes with my own idea of training creative thinkers as planners, and making sure that both civilian and military planners cooperate from inception through execution to completion operational tasks designed to meet strategic objectives. One feature the authors describe which helps generate exercise scenarios is reducing the thousands of potential variables to a few broad categories (called dimensions) to make war gaming practical.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles


*Books*


**Government Documents**


57


**Unpublished Documents, Dissertations, and Monographs**


U.S. Army Regulations and Pamphlets


59