The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: A CINC’S TOOLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

19960918 071

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUBERT L. QUICK, JR.
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1996

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: A CINC'S TOOLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

by

Lieutenant Colonel Hubert L. Quick, Jr.
United States Army

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Hubert L. Quick, Jr. (LTC), USA

TITLE: Multinational Logistics: A CINC's Tools for Implementation

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 January 1996   PAGES: 26   CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Logistical support of multinational forces has traditionally been a national responsibility. For many years military forces bore uniquely national characteristics, making the task of devising anything other than a national system of sustainment almost impossible if not unthinkable. Revolutionary changes with regard to military operations in this post Cold War era gives way to increased multinational or coalition operations that demand a reconsideration of how we collectively sustain the force. This study explores the degree of multinationality achievable and the integration of the sustainment effort occurring in multinational endeavors.
INTRODUCTION

Events of 1989 from within the former Soviet Union marked the beginning of profound change in the course of East-West and international relations and a far-reaching transformation of the security environment. Developments from this period marked a new era in international relations -- political, ideological, and military -- of world-wide significance. The most noticeable impact of the post Cold War era is on the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, of course, the United States. During the Cold War, the role of the United Nations was primarily to maintain an acceptable level in East and West tensions. The United States and NATO engaged in a defense strategy against an identifiable enemy: Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations.¹

The end of the Cold War has brought a greater emphasis on engagement and enlargement rather than containment and confrontation (the U.S. National Security Strategy).² As part of that strategy, and the emphasis on peacemaking and peacekeeping, the United States now finds itself increasingly involved in multinational UN, NATO and coalition operations. In keeping with the post Cold War cooperativeness, NATO has initiated a multinational, inclusive "Partnership for Peace"³ initiative and adopted a new Strategic Concept that focuses increasingly on multinational troop formations.⁴ The United States' involvement with both UN and NATO operations increases the emphasis on multinational force organizations and, therefore, the inseparable formation and use of multinational logistics.
Multinational logistics affords multiple directions for investigation from the SHAPE logistics staff to a U.S. Corps Support Battalion Commander commanding German, French, and/or British logistics soldiers. The focus of this paper is on those elements of multinational logistics that the SACEUR or CINC could most readily affect without micro-managing the battlefield. This paper will look at five facets of logistics which the SACEUR can significantly influence: (1) Unity of Command, (2) Rationalization, Standarization, and Interoperability, (3) NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, (4) Host Nation Support, and (5) Foreign Military Sales.

Inasmuch as NATO has been the leading U.S. military alliance for 45 years, much of the information collected to date, and the bulk of examples and descriptions presented here, pertain to that organization. It should be noted that although the focus of this document is on US - NATO arrangements, multinational logistics is no less important and relevant to coalitions to which the United States might be a member in future world events.

**DEFINING MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS**

Geoffrey Ashcroft characterized the word logistics as "a generic term to describe an incoherent range of miscellaneous functions." This definition seems even more apt in reference to multinational logistics as it is a broad concept encompassing all aspects of logistics support in an Allied or coalition military engagement.

For the purposes of this paper, multinational logistics will refer to cooperative support by Allied and coalition partners for a military operation, across all participating
forces. It closely follows the North Atlantic Military Committee's Military Decision on MC 319, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics (NU).\(^6\)

The MC 319 is a document which is clearly written with the Alliance's New Strategic Concept in mind. That concept requires that in future operations NATO forces would be structured as a multinational military force. Logistics resources from participating nations would be integrated to form one coordinated effort and force.

The SNLC (Senior NATO Logisticians' Conference) report referenced in MC 319 analyzes

"the key characteristics of NATO's Military Strategy and Force Structures and their implications regarding future logistics principles and policies. In essence, the report emphasizes that nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistics support of NATO's multinational operations, that nations must ensure, individually or by co-operative arrangements, the provision of logistics resources to support their forces allocated to NATO during peace, crisis and war, including adequate provision for strategic mobility, transportation and movement of forces, and that NATO Commanders must have appropriate authority to control certain logistics assets."\(^7\)

The Central European Pipeline System, which supplies POL to military forces throughout much of NATO, the U.S.-German host nation support agreement, and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO) are working models which exemplify multinational logistics as defined above. Other examples of multinational logistics are less evident. Consider a commercial repair facility in an Allied nation used in peacetime by both the military of that nation and American forces stationed there. If this combined use is coordinated and agreed to between the two countries and if the facility is supplied with equipment furnished by the two governments with a
view to wartime capacity expansion, it is an example of the multinational logistics precept.

Multinational logistics refers to any form of executed or planned collaborative support of military forces by Allied or coalition forces. The distinction between planned and executed closely parallels the differences between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, logistics is primarily a planning activity with exercises to ensure the validity of the plans (CONPLANS and OPLANS) for execution in wartime.

**UNITY OF COMMAND**

One of the nine basic principles of war is "Unity of Command."\(^8\) Unity of command requires that "all forces are under one responsible commander ...with requisite authority to direct all forces."\(^9\) "Unity of effort - coordination through cooperation and common interests - is an essential complement to unity of command."\(^10\) It follows, therefore, that multinational warfare is most effective when there is unity of Allied command.

A few military provisions have moved in the direction of combined logistics management. For example, Allied Command Europe has a Logistic Coordination Centre (LCC).\(^11\) The wartime mission of the LCC is to provide a permanent link for consultation and coordination on logistic requirements between the Allied nations and the SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This consultation and coordination allow for operational decisions and logistic capabilities' synchronization.
Associated with the LCC is the Logistics Readiness Centre (LRC). The LRC is a control organization set up to monitor logistic activities and reporting in wartime. In addition, in peacetime the LRC assesses logistics preparedness in SACEUR's area of responsibility. NATO empowers the LRC to allocate resources among national forces, provided the countries owning those resources have earmarked them explicitly for that purpose in annual LOGSTAR II reports. Other than this limited authority over earmarked resources, both the LCC and LRC are without command authority. Further, because the LOGSTAR II reports are only updated annually, they lack real-time visibility over national assets. This means even if the LCC and the LRC had authority over NATO available resources, they would be unable to exercise it effectively because would be blind to any resources other than those identified in the annual LOGSTAR II reports - lists which could be a year old.

It is evident that although the doctrine requires multinational logistics, in NATO the practice is more parochial. Nations limit the oversight that the LCC and LRC have and rely on logistics as a national responsibility. The consequence is that logistics unity of command in NATO is very low. In 1969, Ashcroft set himself the task of inquiring what it would take to achieve "integrated" logistics wherein NATO would become very much like a nation. His treatment of this question gives fascinating insight into the problems of moving a mammoth political bureaucracy. While he comes to no conclusion on how to achieve multinational logistics, he makes it clear that the issue is monumentally difficult, but not impossible.
In 1988, the General Accounting Office issued this indictment of the logistics integration in NATO. This is a problem that is not new and is slow to get better.

NATO logistics are severely limited, largely due to a lack of integration and central direction. NATO commanders lack authority over logistical support. A participant suggested that NATO should implement the logistics recommendations it adopted in the Long Term Defense Program of 1978, which stressed the need for multinational logistics as a NATO, rather than a national responsibility. In this regard, NATO commanders should have authority for logistical control rather than sovereign nations.14

One potential reason for the difficulty in achieving Unity of Command is a perception that any war fought in Europe would last only a few days because of rapid escalation to the nuclear stage. If one agrees with this, then what is the point of worrying about wartime logistics, integrated or otherwise? The war would be over before logistics - and especially multinational logistics - becomes an issue.

R.D. Lawrence and J. Record advocate a multinational logistics command (MLC) for central Europe15- even with the likelihood of a short war. Their argument is that multinational logistics makes political and economical sense in peacetime. They argue that it would reduce the total peacetime requirement for support forces by cutting down on duplication of effort across nations. Coordinating efforts and equipment under one command could lead to less materiel redundancy among member nations - leading to less expenditure of limited resources and funding.

Their concept of an MLC would fall somewhere between integrated logistics and the committee-like LCC/LRC. The responsibilities of the MLC commander would be to assure uniform support for all national forces operating in NORTHAG (Northern
Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group), to establish logistics policy, conduct detailed logistics planning, assign missions, and allocate resources to multinational support forces under his control, and to set priorities for support.\textsuperscript{16}

If war came tomorrow, the SACEUR would start out having essentially no direct dominion over the logistics resources or infrastructures of the forces under his command. The SACEUR could order national combat forces to redeploy in accordance with tactical demands. He would, however, have neither authority nor command and control facilities to dispose the military transportation facilities required to bring about such a redeployment. If multinational logistics require unity of command as a prerequisite, its future is anything but bright.

To increase unity of command in logistics, NATO should begin on a smaller scale with a NATO line of communications (LOC) command in central Europe. The LOC Command would control the ports, transportation resources, and communications facilities needed for the massive force augmentation. The LOC Command would also coordinate follow-on support expected in a major war of conventional arms. The LOC command would form the basis for a multinational command that would evolve into total logistics integration.

\textbf{RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND INTEROPERABILITY}

Just as unity of command would benefit multinational logistics so, too, would multinational success improve by international uniformity of equipment specification and procedures. The Logistics Management Institute prefaches a report on progress
in RSI with the comment that “the inability to communicate and to share logistics resources with our allies are two of the most critical issues facing U.S. Army commanders in Europe”.  

Progress toward uniformity can be measured using rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) as the yardsticks. Equipment commonality constitutes the most visible aspect of RSI, but there are others. The RSI effort encompasses operational and administrative practices such as command and control methods, training regimens, requisitioning procedures, and prioritization rules.

Uniformity within alliances is a goal formally advocated by the U.S. Congress since 1975. Yet, the traditional posture of the United States toward RSI is one of the problems in promoting multinational logistics. The U.S. attitude is that the proper way to accomplish standardization is for Allies to arm with American military equipment. The U.S. would then support and maintain the equipment throughout its lifetime with American-furnished training, replacement parts, and logistics. Valid though this view may have been at one time, it does not register well with allies, especially those with highly developed arms industries of their own. The fear of adverse effects on sovereign economic, political, and technological affairs works against arms cooperation. If, for example, host nation support for U.S. forces saves U.S. money, it is also likely to take jobs away from American companies and nationals.

There is at least one additional roadblock to RSI. There is the risk that the Allies providing the support may falter in time of crisis. An obvious danger is that they may disagree as to the immediacy of a given threat and refuse to mobilize in
synchrony with the United States or vice versa. Complete interdependence on Allies, while it may save U.S. resources and money, may lead to less independence in national security policies and decisionmaking.

RSI is not bleak. There are a few areas in which RSI has progressed. Because of historical U.S. leadership in arms dissemination in the free world, many American logistical practices are adopted elsewhere, and a certain amount of RSI has naturally occurred as a result. Of note, NATO has adopted the U.S. federal stock numbering scheme, as well as the U.S. priority-of-issue system. There is some encouragement with respect to aircraft in use by the year 2000. The projection now is that the F-16, F-18, F-4, Tornado, and Harrier will be the aircraft of choice for NATO operations.

There are even some who may argue that RSI is not necessary for the overall success of multinational logistics, albeit multinationalism and interoperability among Allies would be aided by RSI. Incorporating RSI would result in less redundancy of personnel, equipment and training among all Allies. Complementary skills and materiel would make utilizing and maintaining equipment easier and more cost effective for all nations.

It is difficult to assess the broader future prospects for NATO RSI. On making recommendations and decisions about multinational logistics, the positives and negatives to national interests, limited resources, reliance on Allies, and related concerns must be weighed and balanced against each other.
NATO MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY AGENCY

Chartered in April 1958, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization -- initially known as the NATO Maintenance and Supply System -- is composed of a board of directors, executive committees, and an operating arm — The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). NAMSA's creation was at the instigation of the United States, which wanted a central point of contact in Europe for coordinating logistics support deriving from U.S. foreign military sales. NAMSA was to serve as a kind of international clearinghouse for American security assistance logistics. Headquartered at Capellen, Luxembourg, NAMSA employs some 1,100 people.

Although NAMSA operates in several logistical domains, its dominant activity over the years is procurement of weapon system spare parts. Chiefly, what it has to offer customers is the prospect of peacetime cost savings rather than enhanced combat sustainability. If several countries need the same spares, NAMSA ordinarily can get better prices by consolidating their orders. Also, NAMSA may have better worldwide access to vendors than individual nations and so can stimulate broader competition. On the demand side, NAMSA strives to spread its purchasing as equitably as possible among the parties to a procurement agreement.

During the 1960's and 1970's, the U.S./NAMSA relationship remained remote. In 1980, the NATO Mutual Support Act authorized acquisition of limited logistics support from NATO allies for U.S. forces in Europe. The passage of this act marked the beginning of heightened interest on the U.S. side in coalition military arrangements.
generally, and U.S. use of NAMSA in particular. Probably the main contribution of the act was to eliminate U.S. objections to logistics cooperation deriving from previous foreign aid regulations such as the "buy American" law.\textsuperscript{22} Today, the United States is doing more, mainly in connection with such weapons as the Patriot system and the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). This role never fully, or even substantially, materialized.

Since NAMSA's original design was for multinational collaboration, it is reluctant to participate in the purely bilateral arrangements that characterize FMS. Arguably, if NAMSA was to act as an FMS go-between, it would have to duplicate the vast U.S. infrastructure already dedicated to FMS logistics, which would be both cost-prohibitive and unwise.

Finally, at a level of effort of 1,100 people, NAMSA's ability to be a leading player in NATO logistics is questionable. Currently, its customers tend to employ NAMSA disproportionately in relation to the more expensive, high technology items, and tend to purchase their common-weapon spare parts on a national basis. It is difficult to imagine the workload magnitude if all purchases were conducted through NAMSA. Certainly the agency has the potential to do a large enough share of spare's procurement to make an important difference, but it is difficult to ascertain whether it can handle the volume required.

Why NAMSA's promise goes forever unrealized is a persistent enigma. It appears that NAMSA was born in a cloud of confusion as to its function; and that has not greatly changed in the succeeding 37 years. For instance, Ashcroft asked: "If
great benefits are potentially available through the use of NAMSA, why are they not sought out more eagerly, and why is the work of NAMSA not greatly enlarged?" And as J. Kitfield notes: "Many Alliance observers say NAMSA is a good idea whose time has come -- and gone -- and come again." 

Most observers agree there is something wrong with NAMSA, but there is little concurrence as to the nature and cause of the ailment. Insiders and outsiders both believe that adjustments are needed, such as increased operating efficiency, more aggressive marketing of wares, or a less political general manager. Even after observing 37 years of listlessness on the part of NAMSA, no one seems willing to consider radical change. Possibly the most extreme proposal for change is to expand NAMSA into a European defense supply agency on the pattern of DoD's Defense Logistics Agency. This expansion suggestion, however, would constitute more of an extension of what NAMSA already does rather than a revamping of mission. Only deeper and more fundamental changes are likely to excise NAMSA's three basic maladies.

First is the NATO doctrine that logistics is a national responsibility, a tenet with which NAMSA -- as a loyal subsidiary of NATO -- scrupulously complies. Little evidence is found to indicate that NAMSA ever attempts to encroach upon national responsibilities. In fact, NAMSA involves itself only in transactions when nations go to NAMSA for assistance. In view of this process, it is small wonder that NAMSA stays relegated to a minor role in the overall scheme of logistics operations.
In the early days of NATO, it was the United States who promoted the notion of logistics as national responsibility. U.S. insistence was an effort to get other countries to absorb a greater proportion of the military support burden. Now that the United States wishes to encourage internationalization of logistics -- again so as to increase burden sharing -- it finds itself "hoisted on its own petard." All the same, for NAMSA to get anywhere, the notion of national logistics requires adjustment. The issue requires resolution at the highest levels of NATO -- SACEUR; and, if it is true that the United States caused the problem, then the United States must assume leadership in change.

There is a possibility that the concept of logistics as a national responsibility may evolve of its own accord in response to changing times. The question arises, however, of how long one is willing to wait. Any kind of positive action is more promising than continued patience. Perhaps an appropriate research program can identify the necessary actions. Responsibility for logistics within a military alliance should permeate all phases and aspects of multinational logistics throughout the world, thereby not limiting it to NAMSA.

NAMSA's second problem is that, like FMS, it is a resource geared to peacetime procurements and logistics support that are in danger of drying up in time of major war. Although the United States consumes little from NAMSA, the equipment NAMSA supports is largely American-made, so the U.S. military-industrial complex remains NAMSA's predominant supplier. Brokerage of FMS logistics alone accounts for about 40 to 50 percent of NAMSA's current intake.
NAMSA is an organization that is not configured for and is unprepared for war. In a wartime setting, its pipeline of supply seems likely to dwindle away as national interests supersede alliance interests. Nations furnishing stock to NAMSA will probably divert items for their own use in wartime, just as will the United States. Additionally, this pipeline may shut down, owing to priority allocations and uncertain FMS transportation.

To compensate, one of NAMSA's functions is to develop alternative sources of supply. The problem is that where the technology is proprietary and not licensed elsewhere, no alternative source is possible. With alternatives limited and a limited charter and organization, whatever NAMSA may contribute to the combat readiness of NATO forces in peace, its promise -- in its present configuration and orientation -- for contributing to sustainability in war is questionable.

The third problem is that NAMSA's location organizationally is in the wrong part of NATO. The NATO organization includes a civilian side that deals with politics and economics and a military side that addresses combat management. In continental Europe, NATO's military branch is SHAPE; and NAMSA, which resides in the civilian part of NATO, is detached from SHAPE. This detachment distances NAMSA from SHAPE's war planning process. Only after NATO is committed to war is there provision for SACEUR to place requirements on NAMSA. By that time, NAMSA could have problems requisitioning from member nations (see above). As a result, its wartime viability is dubious.
Whatever the value of the functions performed by NAMSA in peacetime, there is a void in wartime logistics coordination in NATO. NAMSA should be repositioned in the NATO organizational structure -- under SHAPE -- and assigned a dramatically altered role. Uppermost in priority should be to prepare NATO logistically for conventional war.

**HOST NATION SUPPORT**

The expectation of fighting any future war on other countries' soil generates problems of deployment and sustainment for the United States. An obvious means of relieving these logistical burdens is to attain host nation support. The United States has had considerable success in this direction over the past several decades. The most notable example is the 1982 agreement between the United States and Germany. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States would field 10 combat divisions in NATO within 10 days of crisis onset and Germany would furnish some 84,000 military support personnel. The 1982 agreement included many areas for support such as: ammunition storage, handling and transportation, transportation services, maintenance services, local procurement of materiel, etc.

The idea of substituting host nation personnel for American nationals in the above fashion is far from new. Many thousands of such persons are employed by the U.S. armed forces already. In today's atmosphere of relaxed East-West relations and heightened budgetary pressure, it is possible to carry host nation support even farther. Host Nations could expand their role of operating noncombat functions of U.S. military facilities overseas. The security benefit sought from this type of arrangement is to get
more combat power in place faster by reducing the airlift and sealift needed for support personnel and equipment. In addition, however, host nation support furthers the long-standing goal of Congress to increase defense burden sharing by allies.\textsuperscript{27}

Assuming the host nation shares predominantly in the cost of providing the needed support, the United States stands to foster several political and economical desirables in one stroke. Consider the following: (1) Stronger deterrent presence of combat elements in threatened theaters; (2) faster closure in case of war; (3) fewer American military personnel overseas in both peace and war; and (4) reduced peacetime military expenditure, with advantage to the balance of trade.

Politics and economics aside, the question combat effectiveness and wartime logistic support of U.S. forces by foreign nationals is controversial among the military. For one thing, many commanders argue that combat forces and their support units must train together. Fulfilling this proposition is difficult when combat forces and support units are stationed on different continents, with resources for exercising combat deployments constrained.

To achieve better wartime coordination for Host Nation Support, the MC 334, NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support, enhances and defines the role of the NATO Commander in HNS.\textsuperscript{28} In the past HNS was more or less a bilateral affair between Host and Sending nations. The logistics study group concluded and supported the enhanced position of the NATO commander. MC 334 now gives the NATO commander an active and positive role in HNS that can only benefit any future multinational mission. It is important to note, however, that this is but a beginning.
There is still considerable coordinating and reporting within NATO and among nations before any HNS agreement is final. It is a great start in the right direction.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

The term security assistance used here means the transfer of American military goods and services to friendly foreign countries. The State Department is responsible for security assistance oversight and overall policy. Negotiation and management of the transfers are the responsibility of DoD, with the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) having the dominant role. The Security Assistance Management Manual (DoD 5105.38-M) is the "bible" on policy and procedures.

One type of transfer is direct sales to foreign governments by American manufacturers. A major attraction for foreign buyers to direct sales is the incentive of lower prices. Direct sales do not carry the burden of a three percent contract administration fee. However, in direct commercial sales, the customers are responsible for their own logistics support. Although the State Department and DSAA both must approve direct sales, these agencies are not responsible for the manufacturer's truth in advertising. Far from it, they must be cautious of excessive intervention in free enterprise and so try to remain aloof. A recurrent problem is the belated discovery by purchasers that the U.S. government owns some of the technology that buyers thought was in the deal they made with the manufacturer. This misunderstanding has led to painful complications in obtaining logistics support for the technology. While the complication is due to the manufacturer, the dissatisfied buyer
tends to blame DoD for his problems. For economic and political reasons, DoD, which had little to do with the transaction, now must bend over backward in the interest of maintaining good international relations.

It is understandable that DoD ardently favors Foreign Military Sales, a government-to-government transfer mechanism for which it is directly responsible. In an attempt to clarify the various differences between FMS and direct sales, DSAA issued a widely distributed point-by-point pamphlet comparing the two. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each has an infrastructure for managing security assistance relevant to its own pursuits.

The major drawback of direct sales is logistics support. Even if customers are aware of possible future logistical problems, however, they tend to rate logistics support lower in importance than do American counterparts. Initial and follow-on support offer support in several areas, including spare parts supply and repair, support equipment, technical data, and training. Logistics support is no doubt important to some customers, and no one supports better than the United States. Once committed, the United States agrees to continue any such support as long as the system remains in the U. S. Inventory, active or reserve. Provided he can afford it, the FMS customer gets very fine logistics support. To a weapons purchaser interested in support performance, one of the attractions of American arms is that no competitive supplier comes close to matching FMS in the realm of logistics.

In all services, the chief avenues to FMS follow-on spare parts supply is the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA). With CLSSA, the
purchasing country enters into the DoD supply system and receives support as if it were part of the U.S. military establishment. Owners of equipment in the U.S. inventory, called standard items, can contract for logistics support through FMS whether the equipment was purchased through FMS or by direct sales. Most direct purchasers avail themselves of CLSSA. The governing policy on CLSSA is found in DoD Directive 2000.8. There is every expectation, however, that CLSSA stocks simply would not be available during times of war. The supply channels directed toward Allied countries may remain in place, but little or nothing is likely to flow through them.

It follows that what possibly is the single most potent source of logistics support for American-made arms possessed by friendly countries is for peacetime application only. When war comes and the United States really requires Allied help, a principal mechanism for supporting Allied weapon systems may vanish. Evidently, there is no planned wartime mechanism to replace it. Allies depending on FMS logistics support must have the foresight and capital to provision in peacetime sufficiently for war. They must also develop alternative sources of supply or they must rely on the hope that the U.S. military will find ad hoc means of supporting them.

In some wartime scenarios, weapon system attrition rates are so high that there is no requirement for follow-on logistics support; in others, nuclear escalation prevents the need for logistics. However, in equally probable scenarios, combat success depends crucially on sustainability, and among the first things likely to happen in war is that a major potential source of Allied sustainability will cease.
The above analysis of logistics, with regard to security assistance, necessitates revisiting the question concerning what value criteria to invoke in assessing multinational logistics opportunities. If the intent of security assistance is not to promote the combat readiness and sustainability of allies, then harping on the imminence of wartime cutoff of FMS logistics support is irrelevant. Assuming, however, that wartime effectiveness holds an important place in the spectrum of FMS value considerations, then the U.S. must relook the issue of the continued flow of logistics support during wartime.

CONCLUSION

NATO has completed a substantial work effort concerning Multinational Logistics -- and their endeavor continues. The continuing work is essential for prosperity, as there is yet much to accomplish. Of note, the logistic studies by the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staffs for 1994 and 1995 show the level of emphasis required if multinational logistics as an operational concept becomes reality. These studies also indicate the tremendous work yet to accomplish.

Evident by the studies, nations continue to agree-to-disagree. Understandably, with the uniquely national spirit of military forces, nations are reluctant to forego their indigenous or guaranteed supply of resources and to rely exclusively on other nations in an area so fundamental to military success. Although, in principle, a multifaceted international system is conceivable, such a system would be extraordinarily difficult to establish and manage, given the wide range of activities and interested parties.
involved. The nationalist protectionist instinct also inhibits the equitable sharing of the logistics task among nations with assets. Thus, logistics remains essentially a national responsibility, despite the desirability of, and potential for, a more multinational system.

The focus of this paper was on those elements of multinational logistics that the SACEUR or CINC could most readily affect without micro-managing the battlefield. This paper looked at five facets of logistics which the SACEUR can significantly influence: (1) Unity of Command, (2) Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability, (3) NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, (4) Host Nation Support, and (5) Foreign Military Sales. The key, therefore, is to determine the optimum degree of multinationality achievable in the different multinational endeavors, and how to integrate those efforts to ensure mission success.

None of the areas discussed in this paper are new to the alliance. They are, however, issues in my opinion that are at the very heart of making multinational logistics a workable, efficient, and effective concept for both daily use and future operations. The framework for success is present. Military Decision on MC 319, as discussed earlier, is a good document. After 45 years, it is time to get past the politics and petty “nationalistic” principles and do what is right for the alliance -- make Multinational Logistics an operational reality.
ENDNOTES


2. NATO, July 1990.

3. NATO, July 1990.


7. NATO, MC 319, 1-1.

8. FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, p. 2-5.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


16. Lawrence, 80.


23. Ashcroft, 23.

24. Kitfield, 34.

25. Ashcroft, 32.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Defense Security Assistance Agency. *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts*. Wright-Patterson, AFB:


