NON-MILITARY AGENCIES IN CAMPAIGN PLANNING

A Monograph
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### Non-Military Agencies in Campaign Planning

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ABSTRACT

Non-Military Agencies in Campaign Planning, Major Thomas F. Greco, USA, 61 pages.

This monograph maintains that the military acting alone can never achieve a comprehensive solution to a crisis situation. For success, the military must work in conjunction with diplomats, politicians, and humanitarians.

The monograph begins by comparing the organizational culture of the military with that of politics, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid. Two case studies, Bosnia and Somalia, are used to illustrate the differences in organizational cultures, and to provide lessons for planners on how to overcome these differences. Both case studies describe the missions of the military, politicians, diplomats and humanitarians. Also, the case studies describe how the different organizations interact.

The monograph concludes that the various agencies can successfully interact. Further, the monograph offers some concrete techniques for future military planners that must assume a mission from an existing, robust, US led force. Specifically, the lessons learned that are discussed in this monograph are applicable to a force which would replace the Interim Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.

Finally, the monograph concludes with broader lessons for military planners. These lessons provide a method for including non-military agencies into military planning. The method outlined is a step by step description on how to successfully integrate these agencies at the operational level.
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Also, I would like to thank LTC Russell Glenn and Professor Robert M. Epstein for serving as examples of professionalism worthy of emulation.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the encouragement of my wife, Alice, and my children, Mary and Joseph. They are the best team any dad could ever have.

No soldier ever accomplishes anything alone. Except any errors or omissions in this monograph. Those are mine alone.
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The military acting alone can rarely provide comprehensive solutions to complex problems. In conventional war, and other scenarios, the military must rely on the efforts of other agencies to achieve comprehensive solutions. Among those who are needed for success are diplomats, politicians (and other leaders), as well as humanitarian aid workers and those who can assist in developing the economy. It is only through integrating these many different agencies that comprehensive solutions can be achieved.

The purpose of this monograph is to determine how military planners can better integrate non-military agencies into campaign planning. In order to achieve this purpose, this monograph will use two case studies: Bosnia and Somalia. They will provide lessons on the operations and roles of the three types of agencies whose cooperation is required for comprehensive success. These agencies fall into three categories: the military/security services, diplomatic/political leadership and economic/humanitarian agencies. In addition to looking at the individual roles of each category of agency, these case studies will look at the interaction of these agencies as it applied to the military campaigns.

Understanding the nature of the campaign plan will facilitate later discussions in the case studies, where there are great weaknesses in coordination at the operational level. At the operational level, structures should allow strategic ends to be tied to tactical level actions. The absence of these operational level structures in some non-military agencies prevents these agencies from having nested concepts. The campaign plan binds the tactical to the strategic, provides the military with guidance and requires consideration of non-military agencies.
A campaign is defined in US joint doctrine as a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time or space.\textsuperscript{1} The goal of a campaign is to link operations sequentially or simultaneously in order to achieve strategic ends through tactical operations. The campaign plan “provides the broad concepts of operations and sustainment . . . (and) provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.”\textsuperscript{2} While the campaign plan provides broad guidance for the military, there is wide recognition that military operations do not stand alone in achieving success in a campaign.

Colonel James Dubik, a noted military author and a brigade commander during the US military operations in Haiti, wrote that the choice of campaigns is never purely a military decision. Political, economic and social factors all will affect how the military instrument is used.\textsuperscript{3} In US joint service doctrine, coordination and integration of interagency support is required when planning and conducting a campaign. The Universal Joint Task List states that non-military agencies must be included:

To facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition or agency forces, and provide a forum where routine issues can be resolved among staff officers. This task is facilitated by robust liaison. It specifically involves the exchange of plans prior to publication to obtain feedback from other members of the coalition or agencies for incorporation into the final plans.\textsuperscript{4}

Dubik recognizes and joint doctrine requires the military to consider non-military actors in military planning. This interaction is difficult given the differences between the military and diplomats, politicians and aid workers.

There are differences in organizational cultures between the various agencies which cause the members of these agencies to behave differently though they are
pursuing similar ends. These differences, however, can be overcome. Lessons from these case studies will provide the basis for recommendations for including civilian agencies in planning for future operations. A brief discussion of the varying roles and organizational cultures of each of these three types of agencies will facilitate examining the case studies.

The role of the military is to create a secure environment and provide logistical capabilities. To provide a secure environment entails a wide range of missions. The 1993 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, lists 13 missions for the military entitled Operations Other Than War (OOTW) beyond conventional warfighting. These missions complement the military missions in conventional war. However, whether in conventional war, or OOTW, the military can not operate alone. Conventional war can not be conducted in a vacuum. There will be displaced civilians, concerns for collateral damage, and political, diplomatic, and economic considerations. The military may not be the best agency to deal with some situations and should understand that some civilian agencies are better equipped mentally and by training to meet certain requirements. Because some agencies are better suited than the military to handle some tasks, it is important to understand how the military interacts with diplomats, aid workers and politician, and how their cultures differ. This interaction can be tense and unintentionally counter-productive to the long range goals of the respective agencies.

The interaction of the various organizational cultures, regardless of type, can breed distrust. This distrust can stem from overlapping organizational mandates, competition for resources or prestige, the stresses of the situation, or the lack of any one agency being in charge. “In such a vacuum the military, trained to deal with chaos can
be perceived to be usurping the prerogatives of other agencies.”⁷ In order for the military and other agencies to succeed, they need to move beyond their own organizational cultures.⁸ They must surrender some autonomy, and contribute to the improved understanding and interaction of all concerned.⁹

The military and diplomats historically have had a tenuous relationship. Some diplomats consider US military activities abroad to be unwelcome, as opposed to a valuable adjunct to diplomacy.¹⁰ But despite this view, the military and career Foreign Service Officers have much in common. Both have an “up or out” promotion system, both reward field work more than work in Washington, and both face similar problems when abroad especially security. The State Department is hierarchical, but is more casual in interaction between seniors and subordinates than is the military. State Department personnel have career specialties (for example political, economic, press, and administration) as do military.¹¹ One significant difference is the senior level leadership at the field level. The ultimate leadership of a diplomatic post is an ambassador. Unlike the military where generals must rise through the ranks, ambassadors may be appointed from other professions. This can cause frustration for career diplomats. The clash of organizational cultures, however, is greatest in regard to how work is performed. The work of diplomats often focuses on discreetly obtaining information to be transmitted back to Foggy Bottom; or in carrying out directives from Washington with little room for maneuvering. The military works under the direction of the campaign plan. Military men (and women) prefer broad guidance and act routinely on the directives emanating from the operational level, not from the Pentagon. The
military has three levels of control: strategic (the Pentagon), operational (unified and specified commands), and tactical commands. State also has regional and specialized bureaus, however, they do not have the same latitude or importance as military unified and specified commands. They function more like the various armed services, providing resource and personnel management to support the directives emanating from the seventh floor at mother state.

The military also has cultural conflicts with political leaders. The military, especially in professional interaction, is structured by rank and protocol. Political leaders derive their power from popular mandate and actual power is not vested solely in one’s position. In the military, decision making is similar to the legal process; it is orderly, based on fact and the consistency of the outcome to preconceived precepts. For politicians, decision making can be subject to other concerns; bargaining, compromise, consensus, trade-offs and deals. In the military decisions are made by one man, the commander. In politics, decisions are often crafted by many hands. But, there is some commonality. Senior military officers must have some level of political acumen to have risen through the ranks and to serve effectively at the highest positions. While generals and admirals may be political, that is they know the merits of bargaining, they ought not be partisan, favoring one political element over the interests of the nation. Partisan generals and admirals run the risk of being ostracized by mainstream military personnel. But, political persons do control the military, in Washington, with indirect effects that reach throughout the services. Politicians control the military budget, appoint and confirm leaders to the highest positions, and give strategic orders. Because military
operations require officers to instill order out of chaos, the military has developed an institutional culture which abhors disorder. In policy making, there can be an absence of sequential planning, and procedures can be disorderly compared to military planning. "Military officers thus grow frustrated by the failure of civilians to adopt rigorous procedures for defining strategic objectives and allocating resources and attempt to seize functions that they perceive civilians are not performing or are performing adequately." Therefore, there are many clashes between the organizational cultures of military officers and politicians. There are also clashes between military officers and humanitarians and those who are involved in economic development.

Humanitarian assistance and economic development can be divided into three categories: short term emergencies, reconstruction of essential infrastructure, and long range assistance. All of three categories of humanitarian assistance can occur within the framework requiring a campaign plan. Usually, and there are some notable exceptions, the military will arrive after and leave before the humanitarians. Thus the military role can be ancillary to the humanitarian effort.

There are ten participants in humanitarian action in times of war: UN organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), The Red Cross agencies, the host governments/regimes, insurgents/opposition forces, people’s organizations that are not part of the regime or the opposition, the media, regional bodies and the military. The first three participants require further examination.

The UN is a very diverse collection of international bodies. These bodies are manned by a combination of career international civil servants and short term contract
hires. Each agency within the UN system has its own budget, charter and governing body. Procedures within the UN are heavily bureaucratic and centralized. Officers in the field have little leeway to take initiative and decision making is very slow. Many of the operations of the UN agencies are hostage to special interest international politics and are ransomed to whims of the member states who provide financial support.

NGOs are also very independent from any authority, except the leverage exercised by donor states and individual donors. NGOs are international, usually not for profit agencies that provide relief, assistance, development and monitoring to further certain humanitarian principles. There are over 15,000 NGOs listed with the Union of International Organizations.

The Red Cross, perhaps the most famous NGO, is composed of three bodies and is unique among aid agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross is mostly Swiss, fiercely neutral and serves to support humanitarian interests in times of war and internal unrest. Its behavior is specified in mandates determined in Geneva which offer limited room for interpretation by personnel in the field. The second arm of the Red Cross are the national societies, and the third arm is the Federation of Red Cross Societies which coordinates the humanitarian activities of the national societies when acting together or abroad. In sum, humanitarian agencies are many and diverse. Some suffer from overly centralized control, limited regional autonomy and limited room for local initiative. Most humanitarian aid agencies objectives are set by donors.

The military and humanitarians can have cultural clashes. The military is “highly disciplined hierarchical, politically and culturally conservative, tough with a mission to
defeat the enemy." Conversely many humanitarians are "independent, resistant to authority, and culturally liberal (with the exception of some Christian agencies) sensitive and understanding with a mission to save lives." Conflicts often arise from the preconceptions military personnel and humanitarians have of each other.

Some military personnel see humanitarians as "incompetent anti-military 'do gooders' out to 'save the world' who show up without the requisite capabilities and who get in the military's way." Humanitarians on the other hand see the military as "inflexible, overly bureaucratic gunslingers who would rather use force than save lives." Humanitarians may have "unrealistic expectations about what the military can do, such as running all the bad guys away, disarming a populace and responding to a constant stream of transportation requests... they openly flout military priorities like security and well-being of the troops." These preconceptions are in the extreme and as our case studies will show the military and humanitarians can and do get along.

One final element of national power, the media, should be considered prior to examining the case studies. The media must be factored into the campaign plan. They can, with modern communications technology, interject themselves into the scenario regardless of military leaders desire to exclude them. Also, the media serves as an important feedback device to insure that the operations maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the American public. The media can also be used to lead public opinion to support an operation if political leaders set the terms of discussion. In its most basic form, the media can highlight successes as well as failures and check the rhetoric of adversaries. Certainly the media can distort information, just as the military, diplomats, humanitarians
and politicians can. It is incumbent upon all members work together within the confines of security to insure that the public is honestly and accurately informed. The case studies discuss the impact of the media on operations.

The case studies will examine the role of the military, political/diplomatic actors and the humanitarian (or development) agencies in Bosnia and Somalia. The topics covered are: the missions and mandates; planning and operations to achieve these mandates; and the command, control and coordination between agencies on the ground. The first case study will be the United Nations’ effort in Bosnia. It examines the recent history of the conflict, the mandates, missions, planning assessments, operations, organizational structures and inter-agency coordination of military and civilian agencies in the former Yugoslavia.

With the death of President Tito in 1980, the state of Yugoslavia started to disintegrate. With no clear successor to Tito, long surpressed nationalist movements and a declining economy, the conditions were set for the state to break up. Further, the central government of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbs. This Serbian domination led to the transfer of wealth from the prosperous northern states to the poorer southern ones. Additionally, the nation had historic enmity between its peoples of different ethnic identities. In 1990, newly elected governments in both Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) and Croatia unilaterally declared independence. Slovenia, with virtually no ethnic Serb minority, was freed after only a minor struggle with the Yugoslav Army. Macedonia was abandoned almost immediately by the Yugoslavs. Croatia and BH, with their large Serb minorities, were a different story.28 The fighting in Croatia
slowed significantly at the end of 1992. This resulted in the Serb minority ensconsed in four border sectors between Croatia and BH. In BH, the fighting continued until December 1995, when the warring factions concluded an agreement in Dayton. The Dayton agreement established two separate regions, one under the control of the Croat-Muslim confederation and the other under the control of the Bosnian-Serb government. Prior to the Dayton agreement, the UN had three separate missions, one to protect the Serb held areas in Croatia, one to prevent the spread of the conflict into Macedonia, and one to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid while awaiting a peace accord in BH. This section will focus on the UN led mission in BH.

The international community’s efforts in the former Yugoslavia were led by the UN, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General. He conducted, under joint auspices with the European Union, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which met in Geneva. The ICFY’s mission was to negotiate peace, relieve suffering, promote security and development, and re-establish the region in the family of nations.

Australian Brigadier John Wilson, the first UN flag officer in former Yugoslavia, wrote that the ICFY would not ever achieve the best solution to the situation there, it would only achieve an acceptable one. Its success was limited by the political culture described earlier. Politics relies on consensus building, which infers compromise. Compromise leads to settlements that are sub-optimal. Further, the ICFY was never able to achieve a settlement because it was always reacting to events rather than directing events with a coherent plan. The effect of the media, and manipulation of the media by
the Bosnian government, thrust the ICFY, and the UN, into a situation where it “had to
do something,” lest it appear to be useless.\textsuperscript{34} The political, military and humanitarian
effort often found itself reacting to the broadcasts of the media.\textsuperscript{35} The inability to take
the initiate away from the media and the factions can be traced to the UN’s field
structure.

The UN structure in Yugoslavia was poorly integrated. Its main arm was the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was directed by the Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). His the mission was the supervision
of the military, political and humanitarian efforts.\textsuperscript{36} His ability to lead was limited by
organizational stovepipes and national agendas.

The primary mission of UNPROFOR was to support the delivery of humanitarian
aid; the other, to help establish conditions for a political or diplomatic agreement.\textsuperscript{37}
According to Swedish General Bo Pellnas, the Chief Military Observer in the first of
these missions, humanitarian assistance involved four tasks: protect the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) convoys, secure storage sites, protect convoys of
other aid agencies, and provide security for the airfield in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{38} The second
mission, helping to facilitate a diplomatic agreement, required liaison with the warring
factions. Both of these missions were complicated by the civil war.

The mission of the political arm of UNPROFOR, establish an acceptable peace,
was inhibited by severe personnel shortages at the tactical level.\textsuperscript{39} Meanwhile, the
missions of the military and the humanitarians would be hamstrung until peace was
achieved. The shortage of political negotiators was filled by unqualified military
personnel from UNPROFOR. The mission to negotiate solutions was beyond the mandate of the UN military forces, it was a task for the UN diplomats.\textsuperscript{40} UNPROFOR, as will be shown, was not able to intergrate the political elements into the inter-agency effort to the same degree that the military and humanitarians worked together.

Despite the supposed leadership of the DSRSG, unity of effort, much less unity of command was never achieved. The humanitarian effort was led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The military effort was led by the military Force Commander (FC) of UNPROFOR. Both resisted the efforts of the DSRSG for what they perceived as outside interference.\textsuperscript{41} UNPROFOR was designed to combine the efforts of the military and political arms, and its leader was nominally in charge of all UN activities in former Yugoslavia.

Contributing nations desired to maintain some control over the assets they put at the UN disposal, especially military forces where casualties can occur.\textsuperscript{42} Within agencies there is parochialism. Regional or ethnic groups may also seek to work with others of similar backgrounds (Nordics, Africans, Muslims). All these conflicting links served to erode the continuity of effort of the multi-agency effort.

The decision on how to deploy UNPROFOR was based upon an assessment conducted by experts from several UN agencies and NATO’s Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). NORTHAG’s headquarters would serve as the basis for the UN Headquarters in Bosnia. Using an existing headquarters as base with attachments serves several purposes. The existing headquarters will have established procedures, speak a common language, possess its own equipment, and staff officers will know each other.
With a few attachments, the headquarters can assume its mission more easily than a completely ad hoc headquarters.\textsuperscript{43} The UNPROFOR mission in Croatia was already operating in the region and forwarded an assessment that was largely ignored.\textsuperscript{44} The mission required a rapid deployment of troops. Further, there was limited information otherwise available to the UN in New York.\textsuperscript{45} To ignore the voluminous work of the forces already on the ground was an error. If the United States military is to deploy, especially if it is as part of an interagency effort, it should take advantage of an interagency assessment team and try to obtain information from the US country team, if available. Upon their arrival in BH, the military met with the UNHCRs special representative for former Yugoslavia, Jose Maria Mendaluce. This would be the beginning of close cooperation between UNPROFOR and the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{46}

Former UN commander, British General Sir Michael Rose, offered a campaign plan to resolve the situation in former Yugoslavia with inter-agency cooperation. He believed that before UNPROFOR could accomplish its two missions there would have to be some type of agreement. The agreement could either be political agreement, or a military truce. Since the international community was unwilling to use force to compel an agreement, and none of the factions had the means to win a decisive victory and thus impose their will, the agreement would have to be political. This political agreement would be the first step in the campaign plan.\textsuperscript{47} In each phase of Rose's campaign model, there is a different lead entity. Implied in Rose's model is that politicians/diplomats, the military and humanitarians may be pursuing different objectives concurrently. Further,
they may be involved in more than one phase at the same time, and the phases may not sequential.

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<td>Leverage Settlement</td>
<td>Emergency Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Establish Control</td>
<td>Develop Institutions</td>
<td>Establish benign conditions &amp; confidence building measures</td>
<td>Restore Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Economy Recovers</td>
<td>Promote autonomy</td>
<td>Military withdrawal</td>
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*Figure 1 Rose's model of the consolidated campaign plan.*

In the first phase, while the political agreement was being negotiated, the military would provide leverage and establish conditions were other agencies could act in security. Humanitarians, meanwhile, would provide only emergency support. The political negotiations would be the main effort, with the military and humanitarians supporting negotiations. Unfortunately, the parties did not want peace. The forces provided to the UN military were never adequate for either leverage or security. And the humanitarians would not have a benign environment to deliver aid.48 A peace agreement was not reached until the Serbs had achieved nearly all their objectives and great pressure was brought to bear on the government of the rump Yugoslavia. Also, the Bosnia Muslim-Croat Federation realized that the Dayton Agreement was the best deal they would obtain.
Phase two begins with a political agreement where the military activity assumes the main effort. The military's task is to establish a zone of separation between combatants, provide a confidence building measure for the parties and insure security throughout the areas in concert with the factions in control on the ground. The political aim in phase two is to develop legitimate local institutions. Humanitarians would try to restore essential infrastructure. Much of the political and humanitarian work of phase two began in phase one. This stage started with the Dayton agreement.

Finally, in phase three the primary mission becomes development, not security or emergency aid. The humanitarians and economists must implement long term economic programs to make the nation self supporting. The military must turn over any remaining security functions to local bodies, and the politicians and diplomats must develop some political normalcy. This final phase can begin before phase two is complete.

As stated earlier, the task to assist diplomatic negotiations was complicated by a shortage of political officers. UN civil affairs officers were authorized down to the brigade, and in some instances battalion level. Not all slots were filled and many more were needed as low as company and platoon level in many instances. The lack of resources provided to the local political effort is understandable, given that the parties did not yet want to come to any agreements. UNPROFOR’s military staff did its best to support the political sensitivities of mission, beyond just negotiating. However, it had limitations due to the resolve of the parties not to stop fighting.
The mission of the UNHCR was to serve as the lead agency to relieve the suffering of those displaced by the war and those suffering from the effects of the war, and to assist in the repatriation of displaced persons and refugees. This mission was complicated by the scale of the humanitarian tragedy, and by the efforts of all sides to limit amount of aid allowed to pass to those under siege. In addition to the UNHCR, there were several other UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in the humanitarian effort. Just as the UNHCR saw its humanitarian effort independent of the leadership of the SRSG and his deputy, many aid organizations saw their humanitarian efforts independent of those of the UNHCR.

One of the most prominent NGOs in BH was the Red Cross. The Red Cross sought to guard its neutrality by refraining from association with the UNPROFOR and its military. While many aid agencies used guards to escort convoys, the Red Cross would only allow them if all parties agreed guards were acceptable. The Red Cross also sought to guard its independence from the UNHCR by establishing a network of missions throughout the region. Unfortunately, these mission offices were often co-located in the same towns as UNHCR missions. Finally, in order to maintain its autonomy, the Red Cross set up missions in close proximity to each other on opposite sides of confrontation lines. This allowed humanitarian operations without the various parties accusing the Red Cross of partisan activity. The unfortunate consequences of the Red Cross effort was that it was redundant. This redundancy was not unique to the Red Cross.

Many other NGOs acted independently of the UNHCR effort as the lead agency. The UNHCR was mandated by the UN to lead the humanitarian relief effort, but it was
not manned sufficiently. This lack of manpower inhibited its ability to conduct the
needed liaison to affect NGO cooperation. In order to compensate for the shortage of
manpower, UNHCR was able to second several military officers. These officers, draw
temporarily from NATO units, were primarily logisticians who planned the Sarajevo and
Tuzla Airlifts, the Humanitarian Air Drops, and also coordinated convoy scheduling and
storing supplies. Besides using borrowed military manpower, there are other means to
share expertise between agencies. There are three ways in which the UN and other
agencies could have improved its cooperation in Yugoslavia. The agencies could have
established more unified command and control mechanisms; they could have established
interagency directives; and they could have improved local coordination with more
frequent meetings and staff coordination. There was a lack of unity of command and
there were few control structures within the interagency effort.

Coordination did take place at several levels, however. The DSRSG in Zagreb
would hold weekly meetings with the heads of other key agencies. These meetings
included the military Force Commander, the UNHCR special representative and other
UN and non-UN agencies.

At the sectors, similar meetings would be held under the leadership of the sector
Force Commander. Additionally, local meetings and coordination sessions would be
held to plan upcoming convoys. These meetings, and the subsequent coordination
stemming from them, were the reasons the humanitarian tragedy in Bosnia was not much
worse. However, the lower level meetings were very ad hoc and attempted little long
range planning. Further, there were few standard procedures for the conduct of
coordination. Additionally, few directives or written agreements were published. And, if any were published, they would have to overcome problems of confusing terminology. Humanitarian and military operations as well as diplomatic negotiations are laden with jargon, and many of action officers had limited facility with English, the mission language. Any written agreements would have to be clearly and simply written. Finally, much of the coordination was at the whim of the personalities of those on the ground. The humanitarians, logisticians and soldiers on the ground had the unenviable task of trying to translate what they thought the leaders in New York and Geneva wanted, into missions they could accomplish. Although there was an echelonment of coordination, there were frequent breakdowns in the nesting of higher level intent, due to an operational level of control in many NGOs. Fortunately for the needy in BH, the personalities on the ground made due with the resources despite the lack of guidance from higher headquarters.  

Finally, several UN Security Council resolutions provided the mandated missions for what was widely a two fold UNPROFOR mission in BH. These numerous mandate changes did not provide forces adequate time to retrain, rearm/re-equip, or modify Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the newly mandated missions. Changes in mandates either are in response to a change in the mission environment, or seek to initiate a change in the mission environment. Each change in mandate should result in a review of the mission analysis and any estimates and assessments.

In UNPROFOR there was a fundamental problem between the perceived desired political ends and the resources applied to achieve these ends. Though the military and
humanitarian forces met the stated requirements of their mandates, their success was not adequate to resolve the problems in the mission area. This failure was due to the inability to obtain a political settlement that the warring factions would support. Further, the warring factions would not consent to peace; and the UN effort, political, military and diplomatic, lacked the leverage required to compel compliance.

The discussion on the UN operation in Bosnia highlights several considerations for campaign planning. The political mandate must fit the military and humanitarian situation on the ground. The resources must be adequate for the task at hand. Cooperation between agencies can be accomplished, often informally or through meetings. The lack of resources or the inability of some agencies to perform their tasks will cause the military to fill gaps, though they may or may not be the best qualified to do so. Use of military officers secunded to other agencies benefited both the military and the other agencies. Finally, the competition between agencies and the lack of unity of command can waste resources. But, in the end, individuals on the ground will work together for the common good.

The operations in Bosnia occurred simultaneously with those in Somalia. The next section describes the lessons learned in Somalia that are applicable to campaign planning.

The Somalia case study examines the three phases of the international community’s efforts in Somalia. The first phase is the international intervention led by the first United Nations’ Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Next, it discusses the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a US led coalition that temporarily established a secure
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Finally, the case study examines the period of international intervention led by UNOSOM II. In each of the three periods, the political, military and economic elements of the intervening agencies are examined. Then, the effectiveness of the interaction of these agencies is discussed.

The United Nations established an arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992. The clans agreed to a cease fire at a conference in New York jointly sponsored by the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Islamic Conference.\textsuperscript{61} In March, Mohamed Sahnoun, a regionally respected Algerian diplomat, was dispatched to Somalia by the new UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to appraise the situation. He found Mogadishu virtually deserted, fighting was sporadic despite the cease-fire, and nearly 300,000 people were in danger of dying of starvation.\textsuperscript{62} The country’s livestock had been lost and its agricultural areas devastated. Most of the farmers were displaced to the remote areas or were part of the half million refugees in camps on the borders.\textsuperscript{63} The result of Sahnoun’s appraisal was the deployment of 50 unarmed cease-fire observers and the first UN coordinated 90 day plan for the distribution of humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{64} He was then named the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) UNOSOM I.

UNOSOM I was a very loosely united political, economic and humanitarian effort. The mission of UNOSOM I was to facilitate an end to hostilities, aid in national reconciliation, facilitate the flow of humanitarian relief, and aid in national development.\textsuperscript{65} Despite Sahnoun’s personal efforts, his mission would not be accomplished.
UNOSOM I’s political arm was lead by Sahnoun, and consisted of a small staff of UN political advisors and negotiators. His small staff sought to negotiate a political agreement with the clans to establish a legitimate government for Somalia. Sahnoun conducted negotiations with leaders at all levels. He divided Somalia into four zones to decentralize operations. Unfortunately, he had inadequate staffing to man all the areas. Sahnoun’s political efforts had other problems beyond that of inadequate manpower.

When UNOSOM deployed to Mogadishu it was welcomed by the leadership of each of the clans and the population at large. Sahnoun was very capable of achieving consensus in his many negotiations with clan leaders, neighbor states, and with regional bodies (OAU and the Islamic Conference). But, despite his regional reputation, his political efforts soon lost credibility because he lacked any means to compel or reward cooperation. Sahnoun wrote, “Had the UN’s assistance, both military and humanitarian, been forthcoming in the way and at the level expected by the relief workers and Somalis, it would have greatly contributed to an atmosphere propitious to dialogue and compromise.” Sahnoun resigned in October of 1992, frustrated at the UN bureaucracy for its lack of timely support and guidance. His departure was welcomed by the UN bureaucracy which considered him to be too independent in his negotiations with the clans. Sahnoun was replaced by Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani, from the UN Secretariat.

Kittani alienated clan leaders by requiring them to negotiate with his subordinates. Clan leaders saw this behavior as being aloof and an affront to their positions. This marginalized Kittani who had the same problems as Sahnoun, virtually no means, political assets, military force or development aid, to foster an agreement. The
difference between Kittani and Sahnoun highlight the critical impact leaders can have on a diplomatic or political mission. Kittani, by being aloof, alienated the clan leaders. While Sahnoun realized he had to be personable if he hoped to succeed, Kittani did not.

Sahnoun wrote:

The UNOSOM team, of which I was the head, had limited resources with which to work, yet we were expected to help supply food, provide administrative expertise, and coordination for relief operations, help restore infrastructure, and of course mediate all kinds of clan disputes. There was no military option at this early stage. The UN mission had to rely . . . on moral suasion to get things done. 69

UNOSOM I’s 50 unarmed observers could do little militarily to coerce a settlement, protect supplies or intimidate warlords. Later, Kittani had a Pakistani battalion, but it too was not large enough to make a difference. Even the entire authorization of 3,500 armed UN soldiers (only 759 deployed) would not be nearly enough to protect aid convoys, ports and vital stores and aid in establishing a political solution. 70 The lack of manpower in UNOSOM I was similar to the limited manpower of UNPROFOR. Both UN forces were mandated to use force only in self defense. 71 In addition to minuscule military arms, both also lacked the humanitarian that would address fundamental economic and social problems.

The aid agencies in Somalia sought to reduce the widespread starvation and supplement the evaporating medical and industrial infrastructure. These efforts continued to be plagued by looting and violence. The NGOs, many of whom had operated in Somalia since the 1970s, worked independently of each other, despite the nominal (perhaps notional) leadership of the ICRC. Additionally, the efforts of the NGOs were not coordinated with that of the UN agencies. The UN agencies did not
coordinate actions, each agency followed the directives of its headquarters, not Sahoun or Kittani. Further, the UN agencies were also short manpower and rarely left their headquarters in Nairobi, Mogadishu and Djibouti. There was no structures for aid agency interaction at the field or regional levels. There was only limited cooperation at the international level in the form of donor conferences held in Geneva.

These conferences coordinated a 90 day plan in April 1992 and a 100 day plan in October of 1992 to distribute humanitarian aid. Neither plan made a marked difference on the situation since aid pledged at the conferences often did not arrive. In fact, despite the US led humanitarian airlift which began in August 1992 (Operation Provide Relief), mass starvation seemed imminent due to inadequate aid deliveries and poor coordination. UNOSOM I had failed. UNOSOM I’s inability to take quick action, its confounding byzantine UN organization, its lack of interagency cooperation and its general lack of resources had created the conditions for catastrophe.

The deteriorating situation in Somalia was best described in an article by S. L. Arnold and David Stahl as being replete with:

...natural and man made problems. Warlords and faction leaders were in a state of endless conflict. Bandits and warlords drove farmers from the fields, then stole relief supplies that were intended to offset the decline in agricultural production and commerce in the country. Somali citizens, displaced by years of civil war, had been pouring into camps established by relief agencies to prevent mass starvation. The forms of society as we know them had disappeared. There was no justice system, no police force, no transportation system, no electricity, no infrastructure to speak of. Nearly all markets had ceased to operate. Schools were closed and businesses operated sporadically. Somalia was in chaos.

Visits to the region by many influential politicians, diplomats and public figures motivated US President George Bush to unilateral action. He ordered the deployment
of US armed forces to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid. He also deployed a personal envoy to coordinate the political and diplomatic aspects of the mission.

President Bush chose Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia, as his envoy. He, along with a small staff, constituted the US Liaison Office (USLO). Their charter from the President was to conduct diplomatic negotiations to facilitate humanitarian aid distribution and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, and ultimately to the Somalis.\textsuperscript{78} Oakley's efforts were concurrent with and much more effective than those of Kittani whose marginalized UNOSOM I political structure continued to exist but contributed little.\textsuperscript{79} While Kittani had little to offer, Oakley offered the Somalis a means to access the voluminous US and international aid that was forthcoming, and the security afforded by the US military forces.

Oakley was tireless in his multi-echeloned negotiations and his methods were very similar to those of Sahnoun. But, Oakley, unlike Sahnoun, had a responsive bureaucracy. Oakley was closely tied to UNITAF (the military). In fact, it was common for Oakley, or his staff (the USLO), to precede military forces into new areas. The USLO would announce the intentions of the military effort and solicit the acquiescence of the local population and warlords. This effective link between political diplomacy and the military operations is virtually unparalleled at the tactical level.

Oakley sponsored conferences in Mogadishu, Addis Abba, and elsewhere with clan leaders, NGOs, UN agencies (to include Kittani and UNOSOM I), neighbor states and regional groups. These conferences supported the end state established by the US government. This endstate was formulated by the Commander in Chief of Central
Command (CINC CENTCOM), General Joseph Hoar: “The end state desired is to create an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for security and operation of the Somalia humanitarian relief effort.” It is noteworthy that the CINC’s endstate was validated by the National Command Authority (NCA).

The US military effort was joined by many of America’s traditional allies and other states to form UNITAF. Eventually, UNITAF would contain 28,000 American Servicemen and women of whom 8,000 were afloat, and 17,000 others from 20 countries. This provided UNITAF leverage UNOSOM I lacked. UNITAF headquarters was built around a Joint Task Force (JTF) formed from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEU) led by Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert Johnston. An existing staff, in this case the MEU staff, expanded with the addition of sister service officers to form a JTF. Representatives from coalition armies then joined the JTF to form the Combined Task Force (CTF). This CTF came to be known as UNITAF.

UNITAF’s predeployment planning was not well coordinated. Each nation sent its own assessment teams, and links between national contingents were not formed until after troops arrived in country. Often the military assessment teams did not consult knowledgeable American individuals then on the ground. American assessment teams from many agencies deployed and operated separately with little coordination and information was not shared. The US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) account states that there was an absence of intelligence required for planning. The information was available from relief agencies and diplomats, but no procedures existed to acquire it.
S. L. Arnold, who led the US Army forces under UNITAF, wrote that he did not know if the factions would resist the intervention or the status of the local infrastructure. Oakley had attended the early December conference chaired by the UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, where clan leaders agreed to the deployment. Also, the Department of State established an interagency task force in Washington to coordinate information. The comic marine assault that was greeted on the beaches of Mogadishu by media cameras, not technicals, could have been prevented. Instead, the US military looked foolish. This fed an impression that its robust presence was superfluous.

The American experience stands in contrast to that of the Australians who gained valuable information from their NGOs. The lead Australian NGO, CARE Australia, provided a full time liaison officer to the Australian forces from the start of the mobilization process. The Australians also have a number of military officers seconded to aid agencies. This tour with aid agencies improves the communication between the Australian military and their NGOs, and helps facilitate coordination when required.

LTG Anthony Zinni, who held key leadership positions in the Gulf War, Northern Iraq, and Somalia, advises that joint assessment teams are critical to success. Zinni maintains that by conducting a joint assessment one gets the value of varied perspectives and propagates a common vision of the operation and desired end state. US CENTCOM did not get other agencies integrated early, but did incorporate political, military and humanitarian concerns in their course of action development. In fact,
General Hoar chose a plan not only for military considerations, but also for political reasons. Wider use of non-military agencies would have facilitated planning.

Throughout UNITAF’s operations, one consideration was critical, cooperation with the aid agencies. The military’s tasks were to escort aid convoys, secure and operate the airfields and ports in order to minimize the threats to the international intervention. The NGO presence grew considerably from the four that remained in early 1992. More than 80 aid agencies participated in relief operations while UNITAF was deployed. The missions of the NGO’s were two fold: first, to relieve the human catastrophe of mass starvation, and second, to help develop Somalia’s ability to support itself. Given the violence of the situation, the NGOs needed military assistance if they were to overcome the impediments to their operations before thousands died. Many aid organizations maintained guards from the local clans throughout the periods of international intervention.

Many NGOs arrived in Somalia before UNITAF. Since they were rarely included in deployment planning, or in establishing the criteria for success, the NGOs initiated efforts to coordinate with the military in Washington and Mogadishu. Upon the arrival of UNITAF, a structure was created that would allow NGOs to participate in planning and operations. This structure was known variously as the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) at the unit level, and the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) at the UNITAF/UNOSOM level. Many aid organizations may have had an aversion to close participation with the military before Somalia. The realities of Somali violence and risk
of being outside the mainstream when viewed by donors, enticed many NGOs to cooperate in the CMOCs.

A CMOC is a "field office or coordination center responsible for the interaction of the military with government, international, non-governmental and private organizations." In Somalia during the operations of UNITAF, political, military and humanitarian actions were coordinated at CMOCs. The CMOCs were echeloned so that each of the nine operational regions had one, and liaison was conducted to the lowest levels.

LTG Zinni contends that there needs to be three levels of CMOCs: an executive level CMOC that manages solely policy issues, regional CMOCs that coordinate area requirements, and local CMOCs at the tactical level. Zinni maintained that the CMOCs in Somalia were very effective, but the operational level HOC got too bogged down. For example, while the HOC was considering issues like disarmament, it would also have to manage mundane issues like convoys. He felt that the HOC should have solely managed operational level policy issues, leaving lesser issues for lower levels. The USLO, UNITAF, UNOSOM, NGOs, UN agencies and clan leaders all participated at the HOC. The HOC met several times weekly to coordinate efforts and resolve issues. Regional CMOCs were used in conjunction with the efforts of civil affairs personnel to establish unity of effort with NGOs and to provide Somalis with an opportunity to articulate their requirements. The local CMOC often operated in a form of Somali town meeting. They would meet several times weekly to coordinate operations and to share information. One example of interagency cooperation was the formation of an interim police force.
Oakley and LTG Johnston wanted to set up the interim police force in order to free its troops from constabulary tasks, and to prevent their troops from getting caught in the local squabbles that surround law enforcement. Also, if UNITAF's troops were free of police duties, they could do more humanitarian support or be withdrawn. The Somali police would handle ordinary criminals and start to take responsibility for their own policing as a part of the Somali solution to the problem. Kittani opposed the idea; setting up a Somali police force would prejudice the ultimate solution. Nation building needed a nation before it could have a police force to protect it. Kittani felt these interim police had no legitimacy. The police force idea was very popular with local people, but not the warlords who saw it as a threat to their leadership. The Pentagon and the State Department were against the creation of the force, to them it seemed like "mission creep". It had no legitimacy in the mandates and ran counter to the congressional prohibitions of the military being used to assist foreign police. The UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance (DHA) representative in Mogadishu, Philip Johnson, liked the idea and supported it over Kittani's objections. Oakley and Johnston, with Johnson's aid, proceeded with the program despite its unpopularity in Washington. The Military Police trained the Somali police, and eventually the Somali force numbered over 2500. The police, in Mogadishu and eventually other cities too, had street patrols, controlled traffic, had courts, and established a prison system. Police were paid with food and eventually received money. Thus, a police force and justice system began. This is an example of a tactical operation conducted in contradiction to the wishes of policy makers. It did facilitate the overall strategic objective of UNITAF being relieved of responsibilities.
The UN's lack of unity of effort (Johnson's disregard of Kittani's disapproval) was similar to the US lack of unity of effort where Oakley and Johnston both ignored the Washington position on forming the police force. This is a classic example of how the strategic headquarters, because it is subject to political considerations, can make a decision for expedience at the risk of tactical needs. Kittani was at the operational level, but was too concerned about the politics of the initiative. Oakley and Johnston felt empowered as operational level leaders to interpret strategic guidance and implement it as they saw fit. Johnson, of DHA, was a direct subordinate of a UN Agency, DHA. He ignored the warnings from New York for the good of the mission, until he was ordered otherwise.\textsuperscript{102} Another example of dissent between echelons occurred resettling refugees.

The UNHCR met with the USLO, UNITAF and UNOSOM I to discuss refugee resettlement.\textsuperscript{103} The agreed plan was for the refugees across the border in Kenya and Ethiopia to return to the southern part of Somalia. The military would secure the safe passage of the refugees as they moved and to assist them in establishing domiciles. The 10th Mountain Division drew up plans to secure the movement, and to construct homes, schools and roads to support the resettlement. The UNHCR would spearhead the efforts of several NGOs who would have overall responsibility for the project. The NGOs would provide immediate life sustaining supplies as well as agricultural and other development aid so the Somalis could become self-sustaining. The plan was never executed because of the beginning of foul weather season. By the time the weather changed the 10th Mountain had been diverted to other missions.\textsuperscript{104} One factor that contributed to the diversion of the 10th Mountain was fear of extended involvement.
While the military and the NGOs had developed a good plan for the refugees, not all the interactions were positive. The military often ignored the insights of the NGOs. When the security situation started to fray, the NGOs identified the indicators to the military, who dismissed the NGOs concerns. Even after attacks, the military often failed to heed the warnings of the NGOs who had been on the ground longer and would remain after UNITAF’s departure. The military did not understand the security situation’s complexity as well as the NGOs.

An attack by some technicals on a marine helicopter in December serves as a good example of how the military, diplomatic and humanitarian arms interact. Oakley used diplomacy to get clan leaders to denounce the attack on the marine helicopter gun ship. The political arm (Oakley) tried to make the use of force by clans counter productive because the clan leaders would denounce it. Being denounced did not, however, isolate or de-legitimize the leadership of the clan that launched the attack. The Marines reacted to the attack on the gun ship by annihilating the attackers. This just made the stakes higher. The clans now concluded that if one is going to attack the UNITAF, one must make sure one has the capability to overwhelm them, or not get caught. Development also gained from the incident. Humanitarians used the temporary lull in the violent environment to push out as much aid as possible, but they could not make a lasting difference. The USLO concluded that “the combined presence of the USLO political officer, UNITAF military forces and culturally sensitive experienced aid workers changed the local political situation significantly.” This is, perhaps, some what overstated.
The American military thought that the center of gravity of the operation on Somalia was the power of the warlords.\textsuperscript{109} If this were true, then UNITAF's combination of political maneuvering, military deterrence and humanitarian development should have been successful in delegitimizing the clan leadership. Peter Kieseker wrote that the international community opted for the simple solution by treating the symptoms of the Somali problem.\textsuperscript{110} Violence was a symptom of a deeper problem. The true mission should have been to prevent the violation of basic human rights by the clans which exercised power.\textsuperscript{111} The problems of famine were made worse by the maldistribution of meager assets by the clan in power. Disenfranchisement of the other clans found an outlet for its frustration through violence. And violence created a cycle of retribution and greater violence; which fed the cycle of poverty and famine. But, by late January 1993, about one month after UNITAF's arrival, the situation in Mogadishu seemed improved.

UNITAF created a temporary peaceful regional situation, but it did not provide a comprehensive coordinated solution to the impediments to aid distribution. Because the symptom was relieved, no more local violence, it did not mean there was a lasting solution to the violent environment. Peace gained by using force is only a temporary solution. For all of Oakley's good efforts, and agreements at conferences, there was never a lasting political consensus.\textsuperscript{112} Some clans would try to take whatever political steps necessary to overcome their temporary military inferiority, waiting for a chance to challenge other clans, UNITAF or its successor UNOSOM II.

There were three conferences held in January 1993: a political conference, a humanitarian conference and a disarmament conference.\textsuperscript{113} At the disarmament
conference, clans agreed to demobilization and disarmament. The problem then became how does society incorporate these former fighters? Many agencies are needed to support their reintegration. The main effort is not immediate aid societies, but the Brenton Woods organizations, like the IMF and the World Bank, that focus on long term development.114 Another complication was UNITAF's claim that it lacked of troops to disarm the clans. Given only a few hundred were needed to disarm the factions in Latin American, several thousand troops could have disarmed the Somalis.115 More likely, UNITAF feared disarmament would prolong its involvement. General Johnston wanted the UN to be in charge of disarming the population. Kittani said no, and the UN in New York wavered. Finally in March the UN in New York agreed to have the UN do it but by then UNITAF was leaving. When UNITAF left, it was not a lack of soldiers that precluded disarmament, it was the lack of UNITAF's diplomatic and economic leverage. This made disarmament unappealing to the clans. Compounding the loss of leverage was the reduced capabilities of the arriving UN forces.

At the humanitarian conference the Somali clans, UNOSOM, USLO, UNITAF, UN Agencies and NGOs met to coordinate plans for continued development and humanitarian aid distribution. Though a great deal was pledged to be provided for distribution in Somalia by several organizations, little was provided. This further eroded the credibility of the international intervention. The Conference on National Reconciliation was held in Addis Abba.116 It developed a plan to transfer control of the country to the national council over a period of two years. The plan according to Hirsch
and Oakley, was “vague and not self enforcing.” US leadership was lacking, without which, the agreement floundered as rival clans jockeyed for pre-eminence on the council.

Meanwhile, Mogadishu appeared to be mostly peaceful, and the economy started to develop. Famine, however did still exist on the fringes of the UNITAF area of operations. Most of the heavy weapons were out of Mogadishu, or hidden, out of fear of confiscation. This fear of confiscation was a direct result of the efforts of the US Marines, US Army and Botswana Army who had done a good job of clearing the city. But this did not eradicate the capabilities of the clans. The assessment of the 10th Mountain Division stated that the conditions for the transition to UNOSOM II were set. The gradual transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II ended on 4 May 1993. The departure of UNITAF weakened all efforts in Somalia. The result was an organization as ineffective as UNOSOM I.

Ismat Kittani was replaced as the SRSG by retired US Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe. Howe has served as a national security advisor under President Bush, and was accorded the diplomatic rank of Ambassador in his new diplomatic role. Howe arrived in Mogadishu on 20 March 1993 and immediately asked that UNITAF be extended until June, at the earliest. He requested this extension because he felt the clans had not been adequately disarmed. His request was denied by the United States; the UN support keeping UNITAF longer. The hard work to be done, disarming the factions, building the nation, and building the economy would be left to UNOSOM II.

Howe pursued his duties with the same vigor that Sahnoun and Oakley had pursued theirs. Unfortunately, he had the same problems with the UN bureaucracy that
Sahnoun experienced, despite the added leverage of the US’s permanent seat in the Security Council. He also lacked the close relationship with the US forces Oakley enjoyed. Lastly, Howe and his military commander, Turkish LTG Cevik Bir, made the mistake of looking to the UN headquarters in New York for policy guidance. Guidance from New York, when it came at all, was late and usually of little value.¹²²

Bir did not have the advantage of an established core staff like the MEU to build his headquarters around. Instead, his headquarters was developed ad hoc from staff officers already deployed with the US, Italian, French, Belgian, Pakistani and Malaysian contingents.¹²³ The staff that resulted was more bureaucratic and much less responsive than was the unwieldy CTF structure of UNITAF. In May 1993 some of the pledged forces had yet to arrive and the residual UNITAF units were set to leave without replacements.¹²⁴ Also, Bir did not control all allied forces operating in Somalia.

Perhaps the greatest offender of the disregard for unity of command was the United States. The United States maintained a parallel chain of command over the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). While it worked in conjunction with UNOSOM II, it was under the command of the American Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II, Major General Thomas Montgomery. It was clear, however that the deployment of the US QRF was a US national contingent matter, not the UN’s.¹²⁵ The American disregard for unity of command was imitated by other contingents that checked with their senior leaders before agreeing to execute orders.¹²⁶

The logistics structure for UNITAF was a US support command. Under UNOSOM II, logistics would be provided by the time consuming UN field services
contracting and bidding process. While the US was conducting the logistics support, 75% of the cost of sustaining the operation was borne by the US. Under the UN the US portion was its usual peace keeping assessment of 25% of the mission costs. The resulting loss of US funds limited the amount of money the UN could spend to support the operation.\textsuperscript{127}

Probably the greatest loss in the transition from UNITAF to that of UNOSOM II was the departure of the manpower and structures for the CMOCs. Liaison was still conducted at the UNOSOM level, however it was no longer echeloned. What resulted was a lack of local coordination and the re-formation of information stovepipes. The CMOCs had provided a structure for communication between humanitarians, soldiers, diplomats and local leaders. Now this channel was gone. The humanitarian effort reverted back to what it had been before the deployment of UNITAF. In those areas no longer patrolled by the military, or where military presence was less credible, aid again became the target of banditry. Clans also became more aggressive in attacks against UNOSOM II personnel.\textsuperscript{128}

There are several lessons that can be derived from the interventions in Somalia. The energy and personality of the lead diplomat must be complimented by a means of leverage. The UN bureaucracy is slower and less responsive than that of the US further limited diplomatic options. A diplomatic settlement must address the root problem and not symptoms. The military forming an ad hoc headquarters is an inferior alternative to building upon a core headquarters and planning must include other agencies. Unity of effort is difficult to achieve in coalition and interagency operations, but establishing a
CMOC aids in establishing dialogue. Political considerations may lead to decisions that will build consensus, but may not be the best decision for efficient operations. Commanders at the operational level must establish end states that can be approved by political leaders. From this end state commanders can derive tactical tasks. These tasks must be tied back to the political objectives. The tactical commander must have adequate resources to achieve his tasks. Finally, humanitarians and the military can, and do, work together effectively, from planning to executing operations. However, the military needs to understand that humanitarians (who may have been on the ground longer), and even diplomats and politicians can offer valuable insights into improving operations. Thus far, this monograph has discussed the organizational cultures and interactions of the military, politicians, diplomats, and humanitarians. The two case studies, Bosnia and Somalia, have illustrated that the military is only one of the components required to achieve comprehensive solutions. There are a number of conclusions that can be derived from these case studies that are of value to planners. These conclusions will be divided into three parts. The first conclusions describe how the lessons from the failure in Somalia can be applied to Bosnia. Next is a discussion of broader conclusions on fostering cooperation between military and non-military players. Finally, this monograph concludes with a step by step methodology for including non-military agencies in military planning.

There are specific lessons from UNOSOM II for the follow-on to BH Interim Force (IFOR), or any other unit that will replace an intervening force which possessed a robust military capability. IFOR was so named to insure that its transitory nature was
clear. It replaced UNPROFOR and will be replaced by some yet to be determined follow-on force. Whomever must follow IFOR into Bosnia will inherit a situation that has been sternly policed by the military with a lagging political and diplomatic effort. While it must be noted that the scenario facing UNOSOM II was significantly different than that of the follow-on to IFOR, there are still lessons on post-intervention operations.

IFOR, like UNITAF, is a US led coalition. It has a headquarters built around a preexisting core headquarters (NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, ARRC). IFOR has great combat power in some task forces, with access to US strategic assets, but other task forces with more limited firepower. However, the political and development arms of the operation are not as well integrated in IFOR as they were in UNITAF. The success of the non-military elements is treated as something separate from the military and is not developing as quickly as that of the military arm.

The mission of UNOSOM II, which replaced UNITAF, was to protect the flow of humanitarian supplies. This mission crept to include nation building, establishing a police force, refugee resettlement and disarming the armed factions. The mission of IFOR was to create a Zone of Separation (ZOS) between former belligerents mandated by a political agreement. However, the mission may, during IFOR’s tenure or that of its successor, creep to include hunting down war criminals, establishing a permanent ZOS, nation building, refugee resettlement, investigating human rights violations, disarmament or other ancillary missions.

Based upon his experiences in Somalia, S. L. Arnold wrote that “mission creep” is inherent in Operations Other Than War, OOTW. Actually, what has been mis-
identified as "mission creep" is really the natural progression of an intervention. In Somalia, the missions, in addition to protecting aid, were clearly necessary if a comprehensive solution was to be gained. However, UNITAF took a minimalist approach, desiring not to be involved in major additional tasks in its haste to hand over the missions to the UN.

Just as the initial mission of a combat force will change as the combat environment matures, the missions of an intervening force will change as its overall environment matures. The environment for the intervening force will have greater uncertainty if the commander fails to integrate the political, diplomatic, humanitarian and development situation into his estimate of the situation. "mission creep" is really a failure to identify branches and sequels whose indicators may be non-military. This monograph has shown how the military and non-military agencies are inextricably tied. For future follow-on forces, there are some specific lessons from this discussion.

The robust intervening force must not leave before the difficult tasks of disarmament, refugee resettlement and indigenous self policing are accomplished; or, adequate resources have not just been committed but have arrived, and the associated development programs are being visibly executed.

Units must be aware of pent up frustration with the intervention and must show the value of the continued presence. Elements of the incoming force with lesser capabilities must be especially cautious since they are easier targets. Whatever force replaces IFOR must be prepared for retribution from frustrated factions. This will be true in any intervention unless the political and development situation can comprehensively
erase root problems, or show that it is effectively moving toward solutions. Adequate and appropriate military, political and developmental resources must be available.

The operational commander ought to establish his headquarters by augmenting one already operating. He must insure he has unity of command over all military forces, and he must limit the autonomy of national contingents, to include the Americans. The new force must derive as much information as possible from its predecessor, and others already on the ground. Also, a consolidated interagency assessment is required.

Structures for coordination, like the CMOC, must remain upon departure. With the decline or change in military capacity, the need for cooperation and communication becomes greater. Stovepiped information flow will disguise branches and sequels.

The follow-on to IFOR ought to be cautious of awaiting guidance from New York, Washington, or from wherever the mandate emanates. The force may have to act independently. In the final analysis, commanders are judged not only on how well they followed their orders and fulfilled their mandates, but also on how successful they were in accomplishing what the mission was perceived to be.

Finally, the new intervening force must have a mandate that is appropriate for the realities on the ground, resources must be adequate to complete mandated and implied tasks. It must possess the ability to achieve the desired comprehensive end state through tactical tasks.

In addition to the lessons for the follow-on to IFOR, there are some noteworthy broader lessons from the case studies. These lessons illustrate the earlier discussions of
the importance of overcoming organizational cultures. Additionally, there are lessons in establishing military operational level structures and conducting campaign planning.

The organizational culture of the military, politics and diplomacy differs in that politicians and diplomats often make decisions based on consensus and expediency. This can lead to changes in the mandated or implied missions of the military force. Some humanitarian and developmental agencies value their independence. They prefer not to be associated with the military. Even within the UN, there is a great deal of autonomy and lack of unified effort. Yet, the cooperation of politicians, diplomats, humanitarians, and others has value. This value was demonstrated by the fleeting success of UNITAF, and the inability of others to succeed. The shortcomings of the military were also demonstrated. Politicians and diplomats were more successful in local negotiations in both Bosnia and Somalia. NGOs were often more in touch with the population. But there are ways to cooperate with non-military agencies.

The relationship between the military and the non-military agencies can be improved by personal communication. This communication begins with joint assessments, assigning liaisons officers to the headquarters of other agencies, or sharing headquarters. Inviting non-military agencies to participate in military training can also be useful. Cooperation can be fostered over the long term by securing military officers to other agencies and adding non-military staff to military headquarters down to brigade level. Exchange assignments allow officers from all agencies to develop networks of trusted agents that fosters action officer level contacts. These friendships with trusted agents in other organizations can lead to multi-echelon cooperation as officers rise in
their respective bureaucracies. Over time there will be layers of peer networks crossing bureaucratic boundaries. In addition to individuals developing networks of colleagues, individuals themselves can make a difference.

As was seen in the success of a relentless Morillon, or the failure of a stand-offish Kittani, personalities make a difference. Oakley’s success showed that the military can benefit from cooperative diplomats and politicians setting the proper conditions. Military officers certainly would prefer a unified command structure with one person in charge. However, non-military agencies are reluctant to surrender autonomy. The best that one can hope to achieve is unity of effort with those elements which are key to comprehensive success. In the current system no one agency has overall command; thus, communication skills and structures that cross organizational cultures become very valuable. Individuals who understand other organizational cultures can overcome bureaucratic barriers and gain cooperation without being in charge.

Establishing structures for interaction also aids in overcoming barriers. One excellent mechanism is the use of the CMOC. The CMOC provides a wide forum for representatives to gather to work out shared objectives or resolve conflicts. Additionally, inviting counterparts to regularly scheduled meetings and using liaison officers, provides structures for interaction between agencies. Also, the structure of the military headquarters can facilitate communication.

By starting with a core headquarters, adding sister services and allies, and then non-military agencies, the headquarters will have the breadth needed for interaction. Co-locating the headquarters of civil agencies with the military headquarters can both
facilitate communication and make logistic and administrative support more efficient through sharing assets.

The goal of establishing consolidated headquarters is communication. This communications helps bind the capabilities and objectives of the various agencies. If headquarters at many levels have integrated headquarters, the ability to tie tactical actions to the common strategic ends of many agencies can also be enhanced.

The final conclusions of this monograph are the step by step process to incorporate non-military agencies into military planning. This process requires that when a situation arises a consolidated mission analysis must be conducted to determine a shared end state. Operations then must be phased with one agency identified as the lead in each phase. Finally, feedback mechanisms must be in place as operations are conducted to insure the constant validity of the plan and of the agreed agency missions.

Step 1, Situation Development: As the situation develops, the military (most likely the theater commander in chief, CINC) should start its own mission analysis of the situation. This mission analysis should not focus only on what the military will have to do. Rather, it must analyze what is the root cause of the situation. From this rudimentary analysis, the CINC can invite input from selected representatives of political, diplomatic, and development agencies.

The goals of the CINC's initial conference (and this could be done by video teleconference) are solely to get the other agencies to agree to work together for a consolidated solution, and to identify action officers for detailed planning if inter-agency liaisons do not exist. Since many other agencies do not plan the way the military does,
these action officer points of contact may serve solely as advisors or as directed
telescopes for the leaders of the other agencies into what the CINC is planning.

Step 2, Assessment: The assessment process results in an agreed end state. After
achieving an initial degree of high level commitment, detailed mission analysis can
begin. The analysis stage of consolidated planning can be greatly facilitated if agencies
have liaison officers, or planners have trusted agents in other agencies. Mission analysis
must be focused on identifying the root cause of the situation, symptoms emanating from
the root problem, and a definitive multi perspective evaluation of the current situation. It
is during this phase that a consolidated assessment to the area must take place. Also, the
assessment must consider the observations of those already on the ground in the area.
Once a thorough evaluation of the situation is complete, the finding must be briefed to
executive level decision makers for guidance. Then, identifying the end state, can begin.

Identifying the end state in consolidated planning must be directed toward solving
the root problem not its symptomatic manifestations. The best means to determine the
appropriate end state is by including a diversity of views. The end state may be easier to
develop if there is a mandating organization sponsoring the planning effort. If not, it is
incumbent on the CINC to take the lead. The CINC runs the risk of overstepping his
bounds and creating resentment. But, he has the greatest resources available to commit
which gives him leverage. His leadership can be discreet if he has fostered positive
contacts with his executive level peers. Once the end state is determined consolidated
planning to sequence events to achieve that end state begins.
Step 3, Course of Action Development: The heart of the campaign plan is the sequencing of operations toward the desired end state. Once the end state is agreed upon, a series of intermediate objectives by agency type must be established. Each of these agency intermediate objectives drives a phase of the overall operation. In each phase of the operation tasks must be identified to achieve the agency’s task. For each task there must be a measurable success criteria and an agency which has primacy, or the lead, for the accomplishment of that task. The lead agency must identify what types of support it requires from other agencies for the task to be accomplished. If the operation is properly planned, the transfer of responsibilities from the military will be predictable, eliminating the need for hasty handovers of responsibilities.

Step 4, Course of Action Selection: The goal of this stage is to obtain high level inter-agency commitment on how operations will be conducted. The executive level of the various agencies must approve tasks and the associated success criteria. Leaders must commit their agency to either a lead or supporting role. These lead agencies are the key forces for a comprehensive solution. Supporting agencies render assistance to the lead agency based on high level agreements that set the direction for lower level action.

Step 5, Issue Guidance: Key forces must have the ability to echelon understanding of the overall campaign plan throughout their organization. In addition to nesting the plan within their own bureaucracy, they must establish structures for cooperation with the other agencies that will help execute their tasks. The mechanisms for coordinated action discussed earlier should be identified prior to deployment. In order to facilitate avoid confusion, once key forces are identified it may be useful to
establish written understandings of roles and responsibilities. In the military these
written understandings within the hierarchy are operations plans and orders. External
understandings are usually accomplished in the form of contracts, memorandums of
understanding, aides memoires, or terms of reference. These documents must be
carefully prepared, and if possible, they should be composed in a consolidated, inter-
agency effort. Once there is written guidance it can serve as a contract between agencies.
These documents must be constantly reviewed during operations. The tasks and end
states too must be constantly revalidated.

Step 6, Operations: Revalidation of tasks and end states can be achieved during
operations by close cooperation between agencies horizontally, and within organizations
vertically. The diversity of views inherent in consolidated operations creates self-
evaluation. Concepts that are consistent throughout the echelons of the agencies can
facilitate internal reviews as taskings flow between the levels of operations.

The military acting alone can not achieve a comprehensive solution. If the
military consolidates its efforts with polemical, diplomatic, humanitarian and economic
development agencies, all will be more successful. Coordination with civilian agencies
translates into the identification of branches and sequels to the initial mission, and in the
end a comprehensive solution to the situation. The military, if it acts alone may solve the
symptomatic manifestations of a problem, but not the root cause of the situation.
ENDNOTES


2 William W. Mendel and Floyd T Banks, Campaign Planning (Carlisle Barracks: The US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1988), x.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 81.


11 Ibid.

12 The author spent three years as the senior (only) commissioned officer assigned to a diplomatic post which was subordinate to the State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs.


14 Ibid., 12-13.


16 One notable exception is Operation Provide Comfort, where the military managed the refugee emergency and transferred responsibility for it to the humanitarian organizations. Another example was Operation Sea Angel, where marines returning from the Gulf War were rerouted to Bangladesh and Pakistan to stabilize a large area that had been ravaged by a typhoon.

17 Some of these humanitarian UN international organizations are: the World Health Organization -WHO, UN High Commissioner for Refugees -UNHCR, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights -UNHCHR, the World Food Program -WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization -FAO, UN International Children’s Fund -UNICEF.
Alvaro De Soto and Graciana Del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peace Building,"
Foreign Policy, 94 (Spring, 1994), 72.


Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “The International Red Cross Movement,” (Geneva: Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1991).

Natsios, 70.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


John Wilson, "Lessons from UN Operations in Yugoslavia," in Hugh Smith, 110

The missions were originally all termed the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), however, in 1995 only the mission in Croatia maintained that name, the mission in BH was termed the UN Peace Force, and the mission in Macedonia was termed the UN Preventive Deployment Force.

The European Union (the EU, formerly the European Community, EC) was concurrently conducting operations in both a redundant and complementary fashion to the UN’s effort. Their contributions during this period (1991-1995) were not of much value added except in the realm of sanctions monitoring. The EU, however, will be a critical element in the economic reconstruction and development of the entire region. The UNPROFOR effort was political, diplomatic and military; and coordinated with economic and humanitarian agencies. The EU focused mainly on political, diplomatic and economic issues; with the exception of the naval force of the Western European Union that enforced sanctions along the Yugoslav coast.

The first SRSG was former American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who resigned from the Carter administration because he opposed the use of force to free the hostages in Iran. The mission, Desert One, ultimately failed. Vance idealistically believed that the situation in Yugoslavia should be resolved through diplomacy. He was replace by Thorval Stoltenberg, a Norwegian diplomat with considerable UN experience. The EU representative was Lord David Owen. In early 1994 the UN/EC effort was subverted by a US led “Contact Group” of the US, Germany, France the UK and Russia. The work of the contact group eventually led to the Dayton agreement.

Wilson, 119.

The perception of most UN officers in Bosnia was that the Bosnian government was the most effective manipulator of the media. However, each faction tried to

Timothy Thomas, United Nations Crisis Management in Bosnia: Problems and Recommendations. (Fort Leavenworth: FMSO, 1995), 7. Thomas maintains that one cannot let the media drive the discussion of the issues or operations.

General Morillon, the French, UN commander in Sarajevo, made many headlines on the last days of his command by leading convoys himself with an entourage of media. His hope was to do all he could while awaiting a political settlement. He used the media as leverage to shame those blocking the roads in order to get his convoys through. One interesting anecdote to illustrate how the media can drive operations occurred just after the Sarajevo airlift had been initiated. CNN had traveled to several of the Muslim villages in Serb held territory near the airport. The broadcasts would show the flights entering Sarajevo airport and the announcer would say that although we are only a few miles from the airport the UN has not delivered aid here in weeks. The next day all priorities for convoys were adjusted to send aid to the spot of the broadcast. For the next several days the UNHCR found itself reacting to broadcasts. One American military officer on duty with the UNHCR remarked, call CNN and find out where they are going tomorrow so we can get ahead of this thing.


The Mandate for UNPROFOR states: “...In Bosnia-Hercegovina, UNPROFORs mandate is to lend its good offices to help defuse inter-communal tension and conflict, and to attempt to secure the reopening of Sarajevo airport to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies. UNPROFOR Civilian and military personnel will liaise with the appropriate authorities in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb. In support of the work of humanitarian agencies in the UN, UNPROFOR will also facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security of civilian displaced persons to their homes and protected areas.”

Bo Pellnas, “UNPROFOR,” an address to the UN Staff Officers Course, (Almas: Swedish UN Center, October 1993).

Ibid.


The UNHCR considered its mission to be independent of that of the military and political efforts. The military Force Commander (FC) in many UN peace operations is often ascribed the title SRSRG, and is overall in charge of the UN effort.

Roderick Cordy-Simpson.

Morillon, 31., and Wilson, 115-116.

Wilson, 112-113.

Ibid.

46 Morillon, 31.


Ibid.
Ibid.

For example, UN civilian police monitors had been working to establish law and order from the outset of the UN mission. Many aid organizations had also been trying to re-establish infrastructure in Yugoslavia, especially in highly visible Sarajevo.

Rose.

The shortage of political advisors/negotiators was mentioned by several authors, most notably, Cordy-Simpson, Morillon, Wilson and Hallqvist. UN civil affairs personnel have a wide portfolio, spanning all political matters that includes: human rights, boundary disputes, cease fires, justice, and police efforts.

General Morillon, the French Commander of the UN forces in BH, established two headquarters: one in Kiseljak and the other in Sarajevo. Sarajevo was often cut off from the rest of Bosnia and thus did not lend itself to controlling forces, but the symbolic importance of the capitol required the headquarters be located there. Kiseljak was not far from Sarajevo, and while it offered more freedom it was often under fire.

The ICRC mission is distinct from that of any other organization, visiting and aiding prisoners, locating services and other activities categorized as service to humanity. However, Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent activities almost always are redundant with capabilities of other agencies. The difference is the symbolic nature of a Red Cross presence.


C. Hogland, “Tactical Demands of a UN Peacekeeping Operation,” an address to the UN Staff Officers Course, (Almas: Swedish UN Center, October 1993).

Hallqvist.

Ibid.


Resolution 743 (February ‘92) established UNPROFOR. Resolution 758 (June ‘92) required Sarajevo airport be opened for humanitarian aid delivery. Resolution 770 (August 92) was authorized under chapter VII of the UN Charter; (chapter seven allows all means, including force, can be used) requiring UNPROFOR to assist in delivering humanitarian aid in BH. Resolution 781 (October ‘92) established a no fly zone over BH. Finally, resolutions 819 (April ‘93) and 824 (May ‘93) established the Safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac.


Ibid.

Ibid., 15 -16.

Ibid.

Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 26 - 27.

Ibid. Sahnoun managed to obtain the clans assent on many issues during a number of conferences held in New York, Addis Abba and Mogadishu. His reputation in
the region, and his personal commitment to resolving the issue, provided him with a
singular credibility. He was, however, doomed to failure by a UN bureaucracy that
neither provided the requisite resources nor the political leverage needed for success.

Hirsch and Oakley, 15-25.

Sahnoun, 16.

Hirsch and Oakley, 15-23. Sahnoun was able to get the clans to agree to the
deployment of an additional 500 armed soldiers. He, and the clans, found out that the
number had been increased to 3500 over the British Broadcasting System. The clans
thought that Sahnoun had been duplicitous while, in fact, he was ignorant of the increase
in manpower. Sahnoun's credibility suffered greatly.

Sahnoun 15-41.

Sahnoun, 37-41.

Ibid.

Ibid., 15-41. See also Hirsch and Oakley, 24-28.

Hirsch and Oakley, x-xvi.

S. L. Arnold and David Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other
Than War," Parameters, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Winter 1993-94), 4-41

There has been much speculation on why President Bush chose to intervene in
Somalia. One argument is that as a lame duck President, having recently lost his bid for
re-election, he sought to redefine his Presidency and leave a great humanitarian legacy.
The expeditious negotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II (START II) treaty
with the USSR, January 1, 1993, is another example of Bush's desire to leave one more
mark as President. President Bush was said to be deeply effected by the insights
presented by Kansas Senator Nancy Kasselbaum on her return from the region. Others
have cynically suggested that the intervention was initiated to confound the incoming
administration, an argument which has little credence given the then President-elect
Clinton's enthusiastic support for the operation.

Hirsch and Oakley, 49-55.

CALL, Operation Restore Hope: Lessons Learned Report, (Ft Leavenworth: US
Army Combined Arms Center, 1993), III-3 and VIII-21.

US Central Command, Briefing: "Campaign Planning: Somalia," (MacDill AFB:
May, 1993).

British Army, Wider Peacekeeping (Fifth Draft, Revised), (London: Ministry of
Defence, 1994), UNOSOM-3.


Ibid. Mellor stated that the Australians located their command post near that of
the Americans in order to facilitate coordination of intelligence and logistics. Some units
had severe restrictions on where they could be used, and this was not known until the
units arrived in country.

S. L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," Military Review, (Ft
Leavenworth, CAC, December 1993), 26-35. Arnold did bring in two experts on similar
mission, LTC Abisaid, who had commanded a battalion in northern Iraq and Andrew
Natsios, the highly regarded leader of US AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

85 Hirsch and Oakley, 46.
86 Hirsch and Oakley, 26 and 50.
87 Paul Kieseker, “Relationships Between Non-Governmental Organizations and Multinational Forces in the Field,” in Hugh Smith, 68 -75.
88 Kieseker.
89 Anthony Zinni, “Address to the US Army Command and General Staff College,” (Fort Leavenworth: March, 1996).
90 CENTCOM Campaign Planning Briefing.
91 Mellor.
92 Kieseker.
93 Ibid., see also Hirsch and Oakley, 31 - 61. One area of early successful coordination was UNITAF’s adoption of the same boundaries used by the aid agencies. The aid agencies had divided the nation into nine Humanitarian Relief Sectors. These sectors then became the unit boundaries.
94 Hirsch, 67 - 73.
96 US Army, 10th Mountain Division, “Executive Summary: Operation Restore Hope After Action Report,” (Ft Drum: 10th Mountain Division).
97 Zinni.
98 Hirsch and Oakley, 87 -92.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Mellor.
102 In UNOSOM II the State Department was negotiating with the Secretary General to end the manhunt for Aideed at the same time the independent US Task Force Ranger had its famous battle in Mogadishu. Ironically, Task Force Ranger was always under direct US military control and could have been ordered to end the manhunt without UN approval.
103 Hirsch and Oakley, 86 - 87.
104 Ibid.
105 Kieseker.
106 Hirsch and Oakley, 81.
107 Ibid.
108 Hirsch and Oakley, 84.
109 Kieseker.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Hirsch and Oakley, 81-96.
113 Ibid.
114 De Soto and Del Castillio.

Hirsch and Oakley, 81-96.

Ibid.

Hirsch and Oakley, 81.

Ibid.

US Army, 10th Mountain Division, "Executive Summary: Operation Restore Hope After Action Report."

Hirsch and Oakley, 110-111.

Ibid., 113.

Ibid.

Hirsch and Oakley, 107-115.


For example, the Malaysian force of APCs that transported the 10th Mountain Division soldiers that relieved B Company of TF Ranger on the morning of 4 October 1993, refused some orders from the UN operations center and the accompanying US liaison officers until they checked with their higher's.

Hirsch and Oakley, 107-115.

Ibid.

The political agreement was between the "Bosnian-Croat Federation" and the "Bosnian Serb Government" with the support of the rump Yugoslavia, Germany, France, Britain, Russia, the European Union and the US. This treaty is commonly called the Dayton Agreement which divides Bosnia between the two parties separated by the ZOS. This separation is a step on the way toward unification. Presently, it is unclear whether the unification will be that of a Bosnian Confederation as proscribed by the agreement; or, consolidation of the respective sectors into greater Croatia and Greater Serbia.

Arnold.

US joint doctrine maintains a 5 step crisis action process: Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, Course of Action Development, Course of Action Selection, and Publishing the Operations Plan or Order. The process presented here can consolidate Course of Action Development and Selection into one phase since the plan must be developed by consensus. Consensus will require negotiation and therefore selection is really arbitration or negotiation depending on the components involved. However, in some situations, this could be a two step process. Negotiation will require course of action that the various agencies desires be conformed , rather than one course of action being selected. As with any negotiation a consensus Course of Action is likely to be suboptimal.

There must be consensus on the end state by the key elements needed for a comprehensive solution. The US has the luxury of being able to set a unilateral end state because of its military force projection capability and huge economic base. However, the requirement for legitimacy may drive the US to compromise. The end must be established. Planners must have an end to work toward. Even a nebulous end state can be translated into reasonable tasks which can be adjusted as branches and sequels.
These mechanisms include the use of liaison officers, consolidated headquarters, frequent meetings and personal interaction.
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