The Strategic Use Of Military Force:
Was the Strategic Use of Force in the Late 19th and the Early 20th Century A Model for the U.S. Army and Operations Other Than War?

A Monograph
By
Major Alexander A. Cox
Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 95-96

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
**Title and Subtitle**


**Author(s)**

MAJOR ALEXANDER A. COX

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**

School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**

Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Abstract (Maximum 200 words)**

SEE ATTACHED

**Subject Terms**

OCTW, SMALL WARS, LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS

**Security Classification of Report**

UNCLASSIFIED

**Security Classification of This Page**

UNCLASSIFIED

**Security Classification of Abstract**

UNCLASSIFIED

**Number of Pages**

55

**Price Code**

UNLIMITED

---

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Alexander A. Cox

Title of Monograph: The Strategic Use of Military Forces:

Was the Strategic Use of Force in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century

A Model for the U.S. Army and Operations Other Than War?

Approved by:

Ernest Evans, Ph.D.  Monograph Director

COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.  Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this ___ day of April 1996
ABSTRACT


by MAJ Alexander A. Cox, USA, 55 pages.

The objective of this monograph is to first, discern whether the lessons learned from historical cases can be used today, second, develop possible solutions for the operational problems of our most recent deployment into Haiti by considering the lessons learned from the units in the historical models; and, thirdly, to evaluate those successful operations and the means by which they achieved success. A comparative analysis of historical models will be conducted to determine the characteristics of their successes and failures. Once these characteristics have been outlined, the most recent U.S. deployment to Haiti will be analyzed to see if these characteristics are applicable there. This comparative analysis will thus extract useful lessons for today’s deployments; drawing parallels to current operations where relevant. The cases selected for the study were the British Army and its small wars, the U.S. Marine Corps and its small wars and operations short of war, and the U.S. Army and its Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

The monograph first defines Operations Other Than War, Low Intensity Conflicts, Operations Short of War and Small Wars using the British and the Marine Corps Small Wars manuals, FM 100-20, studies, reports, etc. Once the main object of the monograph was defined, its traits or characteristics were applied to the case studies.

The outcome of the comparative analysis lead to the conclusion that all the cases had certain traits in common and that operations other than war are nothing new to any of the cases discussed, in particular, the U.S. Army.

The monograph concludes with lessons learned. In all the cases, it is very obvious that the same types of operations are being conducted. The British Army and the United States Marines are held up as a prime examples for the major lessons to take away, that is, they are learning organizations that are capable of making doctrinal adjustments based on their lessons learned from past experiences. The U.S. Army has some difficulty with making adjustments even when lessons learned point out the fact that change is needed. Ultimately, the U.S. Army must not just learn lessons, but also must institutionalize these same lessons learned in its planning and its doctrine. Whether or not the civilian leadership will ever realize these issues is unknown. The military leadership must take any measures possible to educate them in order to meet our national political objectives.
The Strategic Use of Military Force: Was the Strategic Use of Force in the Late 19th and the Early 20th Century A Model for the U.S. Army and Operations Other Than War?

The relief column wound its way through the narrow, dusty streets, pushing themselves to move quickly, fully understanding that the forces in the compound, whom they were to relieve, were being hard pressed by the attacking forces. Fortunately, the resistance that they encountered in the dark streets was fairly light and the obstructions across their path were limited to a few haphazard barricades. The enemy force that besieged the multinational force in the walled compound was large, well supported and very dedicated to their mission. The defenders were fighting a desperate battle. The attackers had pushed them back to the British diplomatic mission’s quarter, which was the last walled section of the compound. The outlook was extremely bleak. After 55 days under siege, the defenders were running out of ammunition and supplies. Finally, when the enemy forces were beginning to breach the final wall, the 20,000 soldier International Relief Force arrived. The enemy quietly retreated back into the shadows.

In another part of the world, three companies of soldiers debarked from U.S. naval warships.\(^1\) Their mission was to deliver an ultimatum to the country’s warring factions, both the government and the rebels must demonstrate that they were capable of carrying on their warfare in the countryside using civilized methods or be subject to U.S. imposed order and discipline. The primary, though hidden, mission behind restoring order was to prevent other armed international intervention in the country’s affairs aimed at the collection of debts. The political situation was extremely volatile and the military leadership had to act with the utmost discretion.\(^2\)
Throughout our history, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the military is a crucial tool of diplomacy. There are countless examples where the military has had to deal with very politically sensitive situations. Though Operations Other Than War (OOTW) or Operations Short of War (OSOW) may be perceived to be strange and new missions, they are nothing new for our military. Though these two narratives sound very current, possibly 1980-1990’s types of situations, they were from much earlier in our history. The date of the first vignette was August 14, 1900, the place, Peking, the scene, the Boxer Rebellion. The date of the second incident was early 1904 and the place was the Dominican Republic, a location to which our military would return approximately sixty years later.

While we all understand that war is the continuation of politics by other means, do we also understand that these operations can also be within themselves a continuation of our political policies? Throughout our history, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been used extensively, as has the U.S. Army, as a key policy tool of our civilian and military leaders. Great Britain has likewise used its army throughout history in much the same way; and, like the United States, has experienced some failures and some successes.

In today’s volatile international political arena, the missions of the armed forces of the U.S. may seem to have changed from their primary mission of warfighting; but a look at our history shows that many of today’s missions have not changed much from the sort of operations we were involved in 100 years ago. The U.S. armed forces have always been very much a tool of our government.

On the premise that many of the missions that we are involved in today are much like missions of our past, I contend that there are vital lessons to be learned from such past
missions that we can apply to the missions of today and of the future so as to prevent us from repeating the same mistakes. The bottom line is that we seem to be making the same mistakes as we did in our distant and not so distant past. Therefore, it is clear that there is something that we can learn from our history and it is imperative that we do so.

The objective of this monograph is to first, discern whether the lessons learned from historical cases can be used today, second, develop possible solutions for the operational problems of our most recent deployment into Haiti by considering the lessons learned from the units in the historical models; and, thirdly, to evaluate those successful operations and the means by which they achieved success.

A comparative analysis of the historical models will be conducted to determine the characteristics of their successes and failures. Once these characteristics have been outlined, the most recent U.S. deployment to Haiti will be analyzed to see if these characteristics are applicable there. This comparative analysis will thus extract useful lessons for today’s deployments; drawing parallels to current operations where relevant.

This monograph will attempt to define success for the historical models as well as for the Haiti operation by using after-action reports, diplomatic journals and reports, historical research documents, etc. The nature of this success will be explored and quantifiable lessons learned will be identified.

The two historical case studies to be analyzed are as follows: the British and their small wars and operations other than war from the late 19th century through the middle of the 20th century, and the U.S. Marine Corps and its small wars and 'Operations Short of War' through the early 20th century. These case studies will first be analyzed based on
the quantifiable indices of success or failure; and then the question of whether or not these indices are applicable today will be addressed. The same definitions and analysis will be next applied to Operation *Uphold Democracy*, the most recent U.S. deployment of military forces into Haiti.⁸

There have been extensive reports written on the most recent deployments and the problems and successes encountered in these deployments by our armed forces. The intent is to take the problems and successes of the historical cases, apply them to our most recent deployment to Haiti, and then discern whether we have learned from our mistakes and whether the historical models are of any use in the future.

Two key questions to answer are first, is history actually a key to our future, i.e., does history give us a good look at methods for planning future operations? A related question to answer is whether or not in our time of incredible technological advances is there in fact anything to be learned from our past that can be applied to the high-tech battlefield of today?

This monograph will achieve its end-state by first briefly discussing the theory of OOTW, and then discussing the British army, the USMC, the U.S. Army’s OOTW missions of the past, and the U.S. Army’s recent deployment into Haiti. This condensed historical overview will be followed by an evaluation of the small wars and OOTW that the British military and the USMC were involved in. Finally, there will be a discussion on the evolving nature of today’s missions, a summary/analysis, and a conclusion.

**THEORY AND OPERATIONS SHORT OF OR OTHER THAN WAR**
In today's high-tech world, is there such a thing as Low Intensity Operations and 'Small Wars', or the commonly used term OOTW, that require different frameworks of planning, tactics, and techniques than high intensity operations do? Or is the only type of military operation still the tank versus tank, army against army, and the 'decisive battle is the way to victory' mentality?

The 19th century military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, would probably have said yes to this second question. He stated that in order to attain the political goal of the war, the goal of the military should be to destroy their opposition's army. He wanted to make it absolutely clear that the destruction of the enemy is what always matters most. In today's world of not so typical military missions, this may not necessarily be true.

Sun Tzu, a Chinese military theorist born around 534 B.C., spoke of the apogee of military skill being those skills which a soldier possessed that allowed him to subdue his enemy without fighting. When a victory can be effectively obtained in ways other than a pitched battle then the battle should be avoided. Thus, achieving a victory in every battle is not absolute perfection. If you can neutralize an enemy's forces without battle then you have achieved perfection. These ideas are quite relevant today. We cannot expect every military action to be a pitched battle. We can expect some of our future military actions to be Low Intensity Conflicts, 'Small Wars' or Operations Short of or Other Than War.

What do these terms, Small Wars, Operations Short of War, Operations Other Than War, and Low Intensity Conflicts, actually mean and are they vastly dissimilar?
Small Wars are wars that do not require a major mobilization of the U.S. military and may include low intensity conflicts. An example could be the so called Banana Wars.\textsuperscript{12}

According to the U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual, Small Wars are operations that are undertaken under executive authority, during which military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal and external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the foreign policy of the United States.\textsuperscript{13} This definition still appears to be appropriate.

In our past, most small wars were conducted as a result of our commitment to the Monroe Doctrine and were conducted to suppress insurrection or lawlessness. The magnitude of the small wars varied from simple demonstrative operations, i.e., shows of force, to military interventions just short of all out war.

There is a slightly different definition for the British Small Wars. Acknowledging that the term is difficult to define, in their own Small Wars manual\textsuperscript{14} they assert that Small Wars include all operations other than those that involve the use of regular troops on opposing sides. Such wars include expeditions against savages and semi- or uncivilized races by disciplined soldiers, those campaigns that are undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where we see organized, well-trained armies struggling against these opponents that refuse to meet them on the ‘open field’, and many other types of operations varying in scope and in their conditions.\textsuperscript{15} The British definition is thus not one of scale but rather of the fact of regular armies going against irregular forces.
For the United States Armed Forces, in accordance with Joint Publication 3-07, 

**Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict**, examples of military operations considered to be **Low Intensity Conflicts** (LIC), include antiterrorism, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, support to counterinsurgency, contingency operations in LIC, and peacekeeping operations.\(^{16}\)

In addition to these operations, there are additional operations that we will label **Operations Short of War** or **Operations Other Than War** (OSOW/OOTW). These operations cover a wide spectrum. They span the continuum from peacemaking or peace enforcement operations (aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts), foreign as well as domestic humanitarian assistance, support to civil law enforcement (assistance in controlling domestic disorder or disturbances), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), nation-building, counterdrug operations, etc. These can all be added to our OOTW/OSOW vocabulary as possible scenarios that the military forces of the United States Army might get involved in.\(^{17}\)

These operations are not unlike those undertaken by Great Britain throughout its lengthy history of military actions outside of its shores nor those undertaken by the U.S. Marine Corps or the U.S. Army throughout their histories. In brief, these operations are not new to the 20th and 21st centuries; on the contrary, they have been going on for centuries.

These operations can be conducted as individual operations or as operations undertaken simultaneously or sequentially in association with or in connection with other operations from this list. Regardless how they are undertaken, Low Intensity Conflicts,
Small Wars, Operations Short of War and Operations Other Than War are quite similar and are basically the same types of operations. Though there are subtle differences between some of the operations, for the purpose of this monograph they will be combined under the heading Operations Other Than War (OOTW), the most recent and recognizable term used by our armed forces. In the areas of the historical case studies their case specific terms will be used, but OOTW will be the main term used for these types of operations.

With such a protracted list of, seemingly, dissimilar operations, are there principles of war for Operations Other Than War that are different from those of high intensity operations? How do you develop and implement such principles? Is there a need for a special doctrine for OOTW? Dr. Bill Gregor from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has succinctly summarized the need for military doctrine based on military history:

"Military doctrine without military history is like a tree without roots, Military history without military doctrine is like a tree without its fruit."

Doctrine has recently been written dealing with these operations. The list of operations in and of itself tends to provoke the planner to some sort of organization. With the growing recognition that these are indeed legitimate operations for our military, joint doctrine has slowly developed concerning these various phenomena.

Are certain organizations more amenable and flexible to this change in doctrine than others, e.g., why did the Marines learn more from their Beirut experience than the U.S. Army did? Have we seen cases where history has actually changed the course of our
doctrine, not necessarily as an evolutionary process, but retroactively? Should history be used to guide the development of our doctrine?

These historical case studies and the analysis of the most recent Haiti mission will help us answer these questions and will thereby establish the fact that our current doctrine as well as our current mindset needs to be changed. After all, some might argue that we are now entering a new era of ‘Banana Wars’. 18

In this new era, are we continuing on along the same road that we have always traveled, or are we seeing an unconscious evolution of the Small Wars/Operations Short of War/Low Intensity Conflict idea into what we now call Operations Other Than War? It can be argued that while we are conducting missions very much like those in our past, our short memory or short-sightedness prevents us from seeing the past for what it is; i.e., a window to the future. This is significant because we as a nation continue in our role as the world’s ‘brushfire expert’. 19

The United States is not unique in its role as the worldwide problem-solver. In its long history of military interventions, Great Britain, too, has been involved in many and varied operations. A British army officer, Charles Edward Callwell, realized that there needed to be some treatment of the small wars portion of their military tactics and doctrine and consequently wrote the first edition of the British Small Wars Manual in 1885. 20

Like the United States, Great Britain has had its successes and its failures; in their numerous small wars, the British have encountered the same sort of difficulties that the United States armed forces have experienced in their small wars.
THE BRITISH IMPERIAL ARMY

The Kingdom of Great Britain was interested in exploration early in its history but didn’t start the building of its colonial empire until much later in its history. Comparatively speaking, England was one of the last of the European powers to begin colonialization. As early as 1497, an English monarch, Henry VII, sent explorers west to find a new route to the East Indies; instead, they discovered the Newfoundland codbanks. There seemed to be a hesitance and timidity in this and subsequent English monarchs to invest in worldwide exploration and colonialization. After all, with an ever antagonistic France just across the channel, a hostile Scotland at its back, a restive Wales to its front, and a resentful Ireland across the Irish Sea, England could ill afford any sort of colonial expedition that might drain its coffers of monetary as well as military strength.

Nearly one hundred years later, England finally organized a successful transoceanic trip for the primary purpose of establishing a colony overseas. Great Britain’s dominant motive for colonialization was the pursuit of wealth and comfort and the power that accompanies it. Subordinate goals for colonizing new territory were to gain international prestige, to expand its empire, to provide new areas to which to draw off England’s surplus population (thereby relieving unemployment and arresting crime and disorder), and to spread the gospel to ‘the damned sauvages’. England, like many western countries, felt that their brand of civilization and culture was the optimum for mankind and that they were doing these savages a great favor by imposing their lifestyle upon them.
Starting with small settlements in North America and in Bermuda, fishing expeditions to Newfoundland, and trading ventures in Africa and the West Indies, England laid the foundations for its great empire. Throughout this colonial period, there were off and on skirmishes between companies of merchants from different countries and sometimes even between small military units. England would learn early on that any serious colonial or trading expedition would have to be protected by warships and soldiers.

Restricted to a fairly small-sized army, England ensured that the soldiers that it did possess were well-trained and dedicated professionals, ready to sail to all points of the globe for their monarch. Though its powerful navy protected it from invasion, the utility of this small, professional, elite army as a decisive power was degraded by the European development of national conscription. The huge armies being fielded in Europe could easily overcome by sheer numbers even the extremely well-trained British army. Being a colonial power, however, required that Great Britain possess and field an army of professionals, small though it may be.

In the period from 1746 to 1814, Great Britain was involved in no less than ten ‘minor expeditions’, which involved its army in combined operations, offensive actions to protect its borders, support to insurgency operations, and nation-building. These expeditions occasionally involved the use of force to coerce opposing forces into submitting to British desires.

While it was acquiring colonies, British military operations were frequently standard force-on-force type missions. Once Britain had its colonies, military operations often
became ‘brushfire warfare’ throughout the empire’s vast regions, i.e., sudden flare-ups of a military nature, threatening to spread or intensify unless quickly brought under control.

Through the years, as these brushfires increased in number, they also increased in complexity. No longer were they just force-on-force. Now the British army had to deal with insurgency (guerrilla warfare) and counterinsurgency and with problems of fighting in new areas and against an unknown enemy in unknown terrain.27

Not knowing your enemy can have quite disastrous effects, as exemplified in South Africa during the Zulu War of 1877 and during the First Boer War of 1881. Though the Zulu’s had no territorial ambitions, their 40,000 man army made the British and the Zulu’s European neighbors uneasy, and other native South African tribes defiant.28 The Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Bartle Frere, felt that for these two reasons he was justified in conducting a preventative war against the Zulu’s.29 This small war brought on purposely by the British governor proved to be quite ill-conceived and poorly conducted as the forces camped at Isandhlwana, the six companies of the 2nd Warwickshire, were destroyed to a man.30 Despite this defeat, the British were eventually victorious.

After the British had ended the threat of a Zulu invasion, the Boers felt it was about time for the British to leave their country. The First Boer War was a matter of the British underestimating their enemy. They thought that the Boers were ill-prepared to fight against the British army; arguably one of the most professional armies in the world at the time. The British were sadly mistaken in this estimation of the preparedness of the Boers. The Boers not only possessed better firearms than they did, but they also possessed an incredible tenacity and sense of tactics that caught the British completely off guard. The
British had made one of the cardinal sins of warfare, underestimating your opponent. This was one of their Small Wars that did not go well, culminating in a victory for the Boers.

While heavily involved in the First Boer War in 1881, the British were unaware of a new threat coming on the scene in the Middle East. Mohammed Ahmed el-Sayyid Abdullah was fanning the flames of discontent among the down-trodden in Sudan. The threat posed by Abdullah and his Dervish force was demonstrated by the attempt to withdraw the British Egyptian army from its garrisons in the Sudan; the relief force was wiped out in this operation. Eventually, though, Great Britain was able to have all the British troops pulled out of Sudan.

In 1896-1898, Great Britain mounted the Sudan Expedition to reclaim the Sudan. The time was right for revenge; specifically, the British went in with overwhelming force and firepower and soundly destroyed their enemy. The next mission, as in Egypt, was to rebuild the infrastructure and get the economy moving forward. The last phase of the operation was to withdraw troops; however, the troops were not withdrawn: the Suez Canal had proven to be too valuable to the British.

In Egypt, Great Britain had never wanted to stay long and become like the long chain of conquerors of the country who had come to Egypt to drain off its wealth. Yet, because of the importance of the location, Britain did eventually become like them, though to a different degree. Though they treated Egypt not so much as a conqueror but more as a doting uncle, the English misread the nationalistic feelings arising in Egypt. They mistakenly took this resurgence of nationalism for outbreaks of anarchy and fanaticism. It
was not until 1956 that Nasser would finally convince the British that it was time to leave.\textsuperscript{32}

In the mad scramble for Africa in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, England’s actions were more a reaction to the actions of the other colonial powers than any sort of plan for expansion. Throughout this period, the British were heavily involved in guerrilla warfare with the indigenous personnel who refused to be conquered.\textsuperscript{33} These lessons on guerrilla warfare would hold them in very good stead for the upcoming operations of the 20th century; particularly in Malaya.

One of the main lessons learned by the British from the Malaya experience in 1948-1960 was summed up in General Templer’s (British Army) statement, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”\textsuperscript{34} This statement shows that while that the British have been learning the same lessons about counterinsurgency for nearly 200 years these lessons were not always acknowledged.

Though they didn’t realize it immediately, in the American Revolutionary War the colonials were fighting a guerrilla war against the British. When they tried to meet the British face-to-face in the European style of warfare, they met with quick and decisive defeat. The colonial soldiers were the heart and soul of the American’s strength.\textsuperscript{35} They had to be conserved and used wisely, hence, the colonials resorted to guerrilla tactics.

The British strategy for dealing with the colonials evolved through several stages as the British tried something different when a particular stage was unsuccessful. The first stage of the 1777 strategy was just a continuation of the 1776 strategy, i.e., destroy, disperse, or demoralize the rebel army and to quarantine New England insurgency by
gaining control of the Hudson Valley. Not meeting with much success, the second stage was initiated.36

During the second stage, the British army and naval commanders were empowered to negotiate with rebel leaders. This phase was not really successful either because, except during a short period of time in 1776, the rebel leaders were never really desperate.

The third stage saw an escalation of the war, as Great Britain went to war with France. France now threatened the British possessions in the West Indies, bringing the English center of gravity southward. A loss of the West Indies would cause great economic and military repercussions. This stage failed for three reasons. First, neither the British nor the rebels felt that the bloody civil war in the South was favorable to their side. Secondly, the relative proximity of a large British army had a surprisingly unfavorable effect on civilian attitudes. Thirdly, every time there was a British troop movement, it would send further negative shock waves to civilians throughout the surrounding area.37

Finally, a new strategy was developed. The British design was to regain military control of some major colony, restore its full government, and then expand both control and government with a step-by-step operation conducted behind a slowly advancing shield of British regulars. In other words, they had instituted a plan of pacification. For the first time, the British understood that the key to success was the population. The people should be the major focus in planning a war of this type.38 This was an extremely important lesson that would be remembered during planning for the Malaya operation in 1952.
In Malaya, as in most colonies, a great impact was made by the efforts of the British colonial government to modernize the country and to develop a more effective political system. As this is happening, there is a move from the stability of the traditional system to the instability of the new, modern system, as it imposes its new system of socioeconomic changes and its new political-psychological tenets. This whole process of change leads to opposition groups, counter-elites, etc.

The occupation of Malaya began in the 18th century, with the country firmly under British control in 1824. It was formed into nine states, each with either an advisor or a resident who acted as a de facto ruler. The western states had a greater degree of British control while the others exercised a more traditional type of government. It became, basically, a 'patchwork quilt' of different political systems under British rule.

There the occupation of the 1940's caused an upheaval in the socio-political system. This included a general awakening in Malaya of political awareness, the Communist party becoming more organized, and the beginning of an unavoidable disillusionment with the British as a colonial power. This situation was aggravated by the new Malayan Union constitution of April 1, 1946, which placed Malayans in the government solely in positions to advise on Malay customs and religion; there was no power associated with these positions. English-educated Malayans quickly lodged protests against this constitution and the British soon after voided it.

In 1948, the Federation of Malaya Agreement was instituted. This agreement gave much power back to the states, in fact stipulating that none but a Malayan could hold any of the important government positions. This of course caused problems with the Chinese
in Malaya. These problems were the birth of the Chinese suspiciousness and distrust of the government as well as of the British.

The Communist insurrection in Malaya was the perfect test case in which to apply the British lessons learned from past insurgencies. The most important lesson, mentioned above, was to make central to your strategy the effort to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people. They did not do this in America during the Revolutionary War but did do so during the ultimately successful operations in Malaya.

Two important lessons were learned by the British from the American Revolutionary War: compromise and patience. If England had compromised in 1775 it could have kept the thirteen colonies in its empire. Instead, the British refused to compromise with the rebels, telling them that they would be severely punished after England won the war. The British remembered this lesson and compromised with the Malayans, assuring them of their self-rule as soon at the hostilities ceased. For this reason, only a very few Malayans went to the side of the Communists. The lesson of patience was well utilized as the British did not try to achieve a quick military victory but instead chose the longer and more lasting approach of getting the entire population to support their efforts.

The British resettled large groups of Chinese in new villages. This policy of resettlement had several positive results. They moved the people to safer areas where they could become more productive in a more benign environment. Also, these new villages were placed under more centralized administrative control. Finally, probably the most important result of these moves was that they took away the support base for the Communists by successfully separating them from the people. This was not a new idea
from a brilliant planner but another lesson learned; specifically, a lesson from the 2nd Boer War.

After years and years of colonial experience, the British knew their limitations in manpower and funding. Given this knowledge, in Malaya the British pursued a strategy of having the police take over areas from the army as soon as practical, and of using indigenous personnel to make up the bulk of the forces used in the country. The British are an excellent example of using the lessons learned from past mistakes as well as from past successes. Through the education of its military, such lessons are passed on to the future generations of soldiers.

In summary, the British major lessons learned were: use an economy of force, through this economy of force, empower the host nation to police itself, i.e., make them actively participate in handling their problems; conduct operations with an impartiality, offering opposing sides adequate opportunities to end the conflict; and lastly and most importantly, patience, don’t expect to ‘rebuild the world’ in a year, i.e., in order to do it right, it takes time to make a lasting change in a country. These lessons were not lost on the rest of the world. As will become evident, the United States Marine Corps clearly paid close attention to British small wars and evaluated the lessons of these wars in light of their own experiences.

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
The first American Marines were formed in 1740 from men of the thirteen British colonies in North America. They were to fight the army of Spain during the War of the Austrian Succession. From the very beginning, there was an attempt to pattern these American Marines after the British marines, who had a long record of successes.

The Continental Marines were authorized thirty-five years later, by an act of Congress on 10 November 1775, which established the First and Second Battalions of American Marines. From this point on, the United States Marine Corps began its long and tortuous evolution from a colonial infantry to an amphibious force and then to one of the United States’ principal highly-mobile and deployable, readiness forces, able to react worldwide at short notice. From this juncture in the eighteenth century through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (and probably likewise through the twenty-first century), the President has on countless occasions sent the message to the Department of the Navy to, “Send in the Marines.”

The mission of the Marines has, more often than not, taken them far from their home shores. The Marines were sent to many distant and exotic places, ranging from Formosa in 1867, Japan and Uruguay in 1868, Korea in 1871, 1888, 1895, & 1950, the Hawaiian Isles in 1874 & 1889, various regions of Central America in the 1880-1890’s and 1989, China in the 1930’s, Africa and the Middle East, and numerous other locations.

Those domestic missions that the Marines were involved in, though not as far from home, were just as sensitive as those involving international powers. These missions included; their peacekeeping efforts in 1857 in Washington, D.C. involving the “Plug-Uglies”, the arrest of John Brown in 1859; quelling the ‘yellow fever riots’ on Staten
Island in 1862, actions to reduce illegal whiskey trafficking in Brooklyn in 1867; combating lawlessness in a railroad strike in 1877; suppressing a riot among army recruits of the Empire Brigade in 1886; restoring order after a major fire, also in 1886; conducting activities in support of lawful government by seizing 125 members of a Cuban filibustering expedition at Gardiner’s Island; restoring order after a strike against the Central Pacific Railroad in 1894, preserving the peace during the race riots in Washington, D.C. in 1919; and lastly, protecting the U.S. mail in 1921 and 1926 from a crime wave of rather substantial proportions.

Even though in the early 20th century it was often involved in missions that were not only important but also politically sensitive, both on the domestic as well as the international theater, the United States Marine Corps gradually became aware of its secondary status in the United States armed forces. It did not have a branch or department of its own and was bounced back and forth from under the control of the navy to the army depending on whether it had a sea-born mission or a land-based mission.

Many in the Marine Corps have had long-standing fears of being swallowed up by the army. The Marine Corps believed that in order for it to survive the cutbacks after the First World War and to preserve its identity, it had to make itself extremely proficient and capable of accomplishing its certain special missions.

Thus evolved the early Marine Corps transition from the role of the conqueror to that of the diplomat. After 1915, it became apparent that this was an additional, and very valuable, role for the Marines. This additional function would be added to their already ponderous role as the wandering warrior.
This function expanded into a new role for the Marines within Central America. This role was as occupier and proconsul of areas where the United States was expanding its control. Here was something that was extremely difficult to do but very important to the international power, prestige, and policy of the United States. These missions were new to the Marines and involved things not easily taught and not part of the combat skills of the common U.S. Marine.

During the period 1910-1933 these skills would come in handy as the U.S. Marines made two major interventions in Nicaragua. The first intervention was the concentration of U.S. Navy ships off the coast of Nicaragua in February 1910. A U.S. Army regiment onboard the U.S.S. Buffalo was to land and restore order. When the fighting shifted to the opposite coast, this mission fell to the seamen and marines on the U.S.S. Dubuque and the U.S.S. Paducah. A neutral zone was established and the insurgents were stopped dead in their tracks. Mission complete, six months later the Marines were back on the ships headed towards Panama. This lightning swift campaign prevented international intervention and aided the country in attaining financial stability. It was both a political as well as a military success. Was this perhaps one of the lessons learned that we later had to relearn, i.e., get in and get out as quickly as possible? Of course, this lesson may not necessarily fit all missions that the U.S. may encounter.

The benign situation in Nicaragua was not to last. By 1912, the country was once more headed for anarchy and in August the U.S.S. Annapolis and the U.S.S. Tacoma again landed U.S. Marines on the shores of Nicaragua. Operations were in the very able hands of Major Smedley D. Butler, a hero of the Boxer Rebellion.
Not as swift in reaching its endstate as the first Nicaraguan intervention, the second intervention was also much less successful from a political standpoint. Though they were successful in their peacekeeping mission in halting the civil war, they were unsuccessful in a couple of important respects. First, the country was not completely at peace since the die-hard insurgents were never completely vanquished. Second and probably most detrimental to the United States itself, Latin Americans now looked on the U.S. with fear, suspicion, and even in some cases hatred because of these interventions in Central American affairs.

This was not the end of U.S. interventions in Central America. Just a scant decade later, events were building up on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, that would lead to the first U.S. military intervention in the country of Haiti.

Traditionally, in Haiti as in the Dominican Republic, the government offices were held by the political elites. Poor financial planning and exorbitant personal habits put the country into substantial foreign debt. This foreign debt made Haiti ripe for international military intervention by the creditor nations. The interest the U.S. had in this island was its two naval bases on either side of the island, one on the northern shore in Haiti (Mole St. Nicholas) and one in the Dominican Republic (Samana Bay). From these bases, the U.S. could control the Windward and Mona Passages into the Caribbean leading to the Panama Canal.

Conducting what some called ‘preventive intervention’ in the period 1905-1913, the U.S. posted ships carrying Marines offshore to support the negotiators and to protect
foreigners. The country had obviously been suffering from insurgent violence for years, from the period of 1908 through 1915, Haiti had seven different presidents, three of whom were killed by insurgents as Haiti went through a whirlwind of coups and civil wars.

To aid in the control of violence within Haiti itself, the United States assisted in the formation of a Haitian constabulary, the Gendarmerie D'Haiti, which was to be lead by American officers. 58 Also referred to as the Garde d'Haiti, these individuals were the sole military and police force for the country. These gendarmes basically ran every facet of the country. They did everything from presidential security to operating hospitals and supply depots to constructing buildings and roads to running the military schools for the officers, even to assisting in sanitation, i.e., cleaning streets. 59

The Marines learned through its long years in this type of operational environment (and from the British experiences) that the country in which they are intervening must be responsible for its own policing in order for it to put down insurrections and conflict within its borders. If an outsider attempted it the result, more often than not, was that the task could not be completed. This is especially the case with respect to the United States in Central America.

As in Haiti, the U.S. Marines were sent into the Dominican Republic in the interest of order and justice for the people. The Marines first entered the Dominican Republic in the early 1900's (about the same period as the first Haiti intervention), with our State Department, oddly enough, siding with the insurgents. This put the military in a rather peculiar position since the Navy and the Marines aligned themselves with neither side, entering the country to manage the customs houses in order to facilitate the payment of
the Dominican Republic’s international debts. With minimum casualties and destruction to the island and its inhabitants, the operation was successfully concluded with lessons that would hold the Marines in good stead later on in this hemisphere.

The major lessons learned, which parallel quite closely those of the British, were impartiality, economy of (minimum use of) force, empowering the host nation to police itself, and patience. Anything more drastic would have embroiled the U.S. in the Dominican Republic for years. The man President Roosevelt saw as the future for the Dominican Republic in 1905 was General Ramon Caceres, who was expected to put them on the road to peace and prosperity. This peace, violent though it was under Caceres, would last for sixty years until the next Marine intervention.

From these operations and from those operations that came before them, the Marines developed their 1940 Small Wars Manual. This manual put forward a five-step plan: first, either a demonstration of forces or the quiet, gradual buildup of forces; second, reinforcement and the general field operations (occupation of vital areas); third, the assumption of control of executive agencies and cooperation with legislative and judicial agencies that includes the establishment of a constabulary of local nationals that would be lead by Marine officers and would assume the responsibility for the policing and protection of their country; fourth, routine police actions which include the very important step of the conduct of ‘free and fair’ elections; and lastly, after the elections have been held and the local nationals have assumed control of the country’s domestic affairs, the Marines would withdraw from the Theater of Operations, leaving a small
guard with the legation. This is very clear evidence that the Marines do in fact consider historical lessons and make changes based on these lessons learned.

The next time the Marines were to enter the Dominican Republic was in April of 1965 in response to a revolt centered in Santo Domingo. After getting elected in 1930, President Trujillo systematically ravaged the country for the next 30 years for his personal gain. Finally, the people could take no more and assassinated him in May of 1961. In the following years of disorder and instability, President Johnson felt that the lives of U.S. citizens were in danger and consequently authorized the landing of the U.S. Marines to evacuate these citizens. When the threat of a Communist take-over appeared, the additional mission of preventing the establishment of another Communist state was added.

Four primary lessons came out of the operation. The first was that the shortcomings in command, communications, logistics, and the use of air in the operation should be examined closely, especially since the deployment was conducted virtually unopposed. Secondly, it was not primarily a military combat mission, but more of a political-military operation, bringing with it restrictions on the tactical commander. The third lesson, was that there was a need for an expanded intelligence gathering capability. More intelligence was required about the urban areas. During a combat focused mission you require a certain type of intelligence. During a mission of this type, a different type of intelligence is required, more focused on the people, on the facilities for providing welfare to the people, on the media, etc.

Lastly, since this mission is of a more politically sensitive nature, a more sophisticated and more responsive communications system is required that can interact with
representatives at the highest levels of the government. The lessons that the army learned, though similar in some cases, were in most cases vastly different. The same can be said for the experience of the U.S. Army versus the U.S. Marines in Vietnam.

The Marines in Vietnam were not apprehensive when it came to trying something different. In retrospect, we can see that there were several general military lessons learned from Vietnam and thus, we can gauge the actions of the Marines by these lessons learned. The general lessons learned included:

(1) **Inadequate civil-military relationship.** There was a need for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between our military power and the need for the development of the political base and of effective psychological operations in a country of insurgents.

(2) **Misunderstanding the relationship of domestic politics and foreign policy.** For a country like the U.S. to sustain an operation like the war in Vietnam, it must somehow be related directly to our national interests.

(3) **Failure to adapt to our environment.** The lack of understanding of what Vietnam was all about caused us to rely on doctrine and policies based on what we did know and understand, i.e., large-scale war in Europe using conventional forces. This lack of understanding of OOTW-type operations was also evident in our intelligence gathering. We focused on what we were familiar with, i.e., order of battle and identification of large conventional units, totally neglecting the guerrillas and the Viet Cong Infrastructure.
(4) **Definition of the U.S. goals.** The inadequately defined U.S. goals caused those of the military to also be ill-defined. There was a lack of understanding of the nature of victory and defeat for this war, i.e., a clearly defined endstate.\(^1\)

(5) **Too centralized decision-making.** The improvement in communications made possible almost instantaneous communication, centralizing decision-making and restricting the flexibility of the field commander.\(^2\)

(6) **Lack of unity of command/effort.** There was no unity of efforts to bring all aspects of the complex political-military conflict together. The civilian had no desire to work under the military commanders and vice versa, thus no one worked together. This caused over-lapping programs and competition for resources leading to an over-militarization of the war (the military had the bulk of the resources, i.e., manpower and funding). This also led to no one taking responsibility for the insurgency problem which in turn led to the ultimate failure of the Pacification Program.\(^3\)

With these lessons in mind, we can look back at Marine Corps’ ability to conduct operations in Vietnam. The Marines, in addition to their success in the combat role, were also innovators when it came to pacification. The French were never able to gain the trust and confidence of the people. The Marines made it part of their mission and emphasized the absolute, critical importance of gaining the confidence and support of the people.\(^4\) They subsequently instituted what was called the Combined Action Platoon (CAP).

The mission of the CAP was to deny the enemy access to the rice-rich coastal areas which was where the majority of the population resided.\(^5\) This would force the enemy to fight on the terms of the Marines, which was the strategy for success in Vietnam. Taking
one of the lessons learned from the British in Malaya, the CAP was very effective in separating the Viet Cong (VC) from possible support bases.

Each Combined Action Platoon (CAP) consisted of a squad of thirteen men plus one navy corpsman. The requirement to be in a CAP was to be a volunteer with at least six months experience in the country, though this was often over-looked. These men were given additional training, consisting of four weeks in language and customs, though the lack of proficiency in the language was a weakness of the CAP.\textsuperscript{76} The members of the CAP worked very closely with their counterparts, the Popular Forces (PF’s) and the Regional Forces (RF’s). Some CAP’s got so close to their PF’s that they were more of a family than a multi-ethnic fighting unit.\textsuperscript{77}

The CAP was a sound concept, but took time to institute as well as to execute. Pacification is not something you can achieve overnight, it is a labor of years. This is where the Marines used their lesson of patience from past experiences. This and the lesson of winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous personnel were paths to success though the program may have been too little, too late.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{THE UNITED STATES ARMY}

The first American national army came into being in 1775 after the thirteen colonies had banded together to throw off the yoke of British tyranny. It was initially structured much like the British army.
From the 18th through the 20th centuries, the United States Army has been involved in several major conflicts. These included the French and Indian War which began in 1754 (in Europe it was the Seven Years War, 1756-63), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the War of 1812 (1812-1814), the War with Mexico (1846-1848), the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Spanish-American War (1898), the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1941-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and the Vietnamese Conflict (1960-1972). Though these were major events for the U.S. Army, the army was in fact involved with a larger number of smaller operations, what we would today call OOTW.

Like the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army has been quite active throughout its history in dealing with domestic operations. Between 1789 and 1878, Federal military forces were used frequently in response to domestic disorders. The Second Congress passed a law on May 2, 1792, delegating the power to the president to intervene with military force in cases of domestic disorder.

The first of these many domestic disorders was a debtors revolt, Shays' Rebellion, in 1786-1787, that occurred in western Massachusetts. This leaderless revolt was conducted by many former continental soldiers who had lost much of their personal property and wealth to speculative interests; these interests seemed to have reaped the rewards of the soldiers' wartime sacrifices. To protect the national arsenals in the vicinity, Congress increased the size of the army from 900 to 2,040 men. After a confrontation with a small group of militia which fired upon them with cannon, the rebels fled. They lacked both the will and the arms to forcibly confront Federal troops.
Other examples of Federal domestic intervention, cover the spectrum from Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791, the Fries Rebellion of 1799, the Burr Conspiracy and eventual apprehension in 1807, the enforcement of the embargo against France and England in 1808, etc. The list goes on and on. The army was also employed quite often on the international front, in major campaigns as well as small wars.

A more recent operation was the one shared with the Marines in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. The army portion of the operation was spearheaded by the 82d Airborne Division, historically, the main ‘brush-fire’ division in the army. As was discussed before, this was a complex mission because of the political sensitivities involved in having U.S. forces again intervening in Central America. The lessons learned on the army side of the operation were slightly different from those of the Marines. The first lesson dealt with how the division was actually employed. It was employed both as a multi-national peace-keeping force as well as an independent unit.

The task force’s mission was to stabilize conditions and maintain the peace so as to facilitate the reinstatement of democracy. General Palmer, commanding the U.S. troops, was given the mission by President Johnson to protect American lives, prevent a Communist takeover of the government, establish a stable atmosphere, and assist in OAS negotiations. The general very clearly understood that the solution of the problem did not necessarily lie in the defeat of a particular political faction, but was founded in the source of the problem, the economy and welfare of the nation and its people.
The mission was successful, despite avoidable problems and shortcomings with the initial intelligence and planning (a recurring problem) and the fact that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) changed drastically and often. Luckily, the well-trained paratroopers were able to make the adjustments. The overwhelming size of the forces that deployed into the Dominican Republic took the rebels by surprise. The U.S. forces were able to quickly separate the combatants and force the move to negotiations. Brute force was the solution for the day, though the lessons for the day were the restraint (in use of force) and the adaptability (to the quickly changing political environment) that was observed by the U.S. troops.

Successful in this hemisphere, the army did not fare as well on the other side of the world in Vietnam. Though well versed in the techniques of large-scale battle with massed units and overwhelming force, the U.S. Army in Vietnam came up short when it came to battling insurgents.

The army did in fact make some attempts, though poorly applied, to counter the insurgents. The first of these was the military adviser program. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in 1961 and consisted of individuals who, for the most part, were trained to advise the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) on conventional tactics and not on insurgency techniques. The responsibility for internal security fell primarily on the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, who were ill-equipped and poorly trained. Though the U.S. Army had been involved in counterinsurgency and insurgency for years, e.g., Philippines at the turn of the century, Burma during World War II, Greece and the Philippines after the war, and had observed
the British in Malaya and the French in Indochina, we did not have a comprehensive doctrine for dealing with insurgents. In Vietnam, there seemed to be a lack of appreciation for the social and political dimensions of insurgency and what the insurgents were striving for, i.e., political legitimacy and power. What the army had to do and failed to do was to organize the population in the support of the government.

An attempt at such organization was the Strategic Hamlet Program launched by the South Vietnamese President Diem in late 1961. Diem had hoped to build thousands of new, fortified villages. The individuals to populate these villages were displaced from their homes and moved to new areas. These villages would provide for their own defense, though initially ARVN and paramilitary forces would secure them. This was Diem's attempt at a British Malaya technique of separating the population from the insurgents.

Unfortunately, the Viet Cong soon learned to cope with the more modern weapons of their adversaries and began to systematically concentrate on and destroy the strategic hamlets. The VC understood that the biggest threat to their insurgency were these strategic hamlets. Another problem with this strategy was that Diem built too many hamlets to defend. At times the weapons and supplies were withheld from the hamlets for fear of the VC capturing the supplies. The Vietnamese hid the truth about the failure of the strategic hamlets from the U.S. advisors. Eventually, Diem, felt to be a liability, was ousted by some of his own generals and then he and his brother were assassinated.

Was the system Diem attempted in 1961-1963 doomed from the start? Was there a lack of U.S. commitment to the idea of strategic hamlets or just to the idea of combating insurgents in general?
As mentioned earlier, there existed no insurgency doctrine for the army. Was there a phenomenon of denial or of a refusal to change, in the belief that the war in Vietnam was an anomaly? Was the momentum and the inertia of a huge organization like the army too difficult to sway from its path of major warfare? If the phenomenon of institutional inertia was in fact in evidence in Vietnam, was it something that could be rectified by a universal (Army-wide) awareness of the phenomenon? In other words, because of the nature of the beast, will this continue to happen when we encounter contingencies other than the usual conventional mission?

There are countless examples in the history of the U.S. Army, as well as the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, of military operations other than major warfare or major conflict. Are we learning from history? It seems that we in fact are learning from our past, but only up to a point. The problem we seem to encounter is in the application and the execution of some comprehensive strategy dealing with operations other than war. An examination of later operations may lead us to an answer.

**HAITI: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY**

On September 19, 1994, United States Army forces switched from a forced-entry deployment to an unopposed air movement into Port-au-Prince International Airport to signal the initiation of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Initially, the mission of this operation was to protect U.S. citizens and interests, protect designated Haitians and third country nationals, restore civil order, assist in the reorganization of the Haitian police
force and armed forces, and assist in the smooth transition to a democratic form of
government. This in fact was completed on October 15, 1994, when President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide returned to the country. This was not really the endstate that should
have been sought after. The real test would be the turn-over of the government to the
next popularly elected president, i.e., Rene’ Preval, on February 7, 1996, and whether or
not this transition of power lasts an extended period of time after the U.S. pulls all its
soldiers out of the country.

This deployment started out quite a bit differently from that of the deployment by the
Marines sixty years before. In this second intervention U.S. forces went into Haiti with a
massive show of force. This immediately violated the economy of force lesson learned
from British and U.S. Marine Corps experiences, though we saw the same use of large
forces in 1965 when the U.S. Army used massive force when dealing with the Dominican
Republic. There was also a disregard for army lessons learned in post-Spanish American
War Philippines, as U.S. soldiers battled Emilio Aguinaldo’s Tagalogs, i.e., using
minimum necessary force (since the army was reducing forces anyway - 100,000 were
mustered out of the active force) while trying to woo the local population (win the hearts
and minds). This Philippines operation was low cost using an all-volunteer force.

In contrast to this all-volunteer force, in Vietnam, large numbers of conscripts were
used, setting off massive domestic protests. Only in 1972, after draftees were no longer
being sent to Vietnam did these protests drop off. Democracies cannot fight long, drawn-
out campaigns with conscript armies. Though not using a conscript army, in order to be
successful in Haiti would require a low-level involvement for a long period of time. It would be operationally impractical to do otherwise.

Our intervention in Haiti with the presence of overwhelming combat power intimidated any hostile forces into avoiding confrontation. This interfered with the lesson of impartiality, immediately polarizing different factions into an us-them situation.

There are several additional examples of our intervention in Haiti ignoring our earlier lessons learned. Our lesson of patience is violated by our need to show quick results. There is a desire for the quick in-and-out type of operations, fearing that public opinion would wane if we keep our troops in a protracted situation. This is shown by the congressional mandates requiring drug-producing countries like Colombia to show each year positive improvements in human rights and in the war against drugs.

The violation of this lesson of patience is not so much the fault of the military as the fault of our political system that requires the ‘quick fixes.’ We as military men are confronted with this problem since, as Mao Tse Tung said, ‘political power comes out of the barrel of a the gun and therefore the party must always control the gun.’ Likewise, we are controlled by our civilian politicians who usually want quick results. In Haiti, it may have been a case of confusion, e.g., our civil affairs personnel in some cases were talking about nation building or nation assistance, which in accordance with our Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, these two terms refer to extended operation which are long term in duration. What was actually being conducted
was Developmental Military Civic Action or Mitigating Military Civic Action, which are of a much shorter duration.96

The need to find a quick resolution to the problems in Haiti caused another ignoring of a lesson learned, i.e., the need to make the nation police itself. The operation into Haiti was military police intensive, with a large portion of the military police sent into Haiti being used as a guard force.97 The sensitivity of the operation required the use of the military police’s expertise for dealing with the civilian populace and their training in the restraint in the use of force. What should have been happening was the use of the British Malaya model where the nation itself provides the police force with the ‘assisting country’, i.e., the U.S., providing advisers (which in fact our Special Forces to some degree are able to do). Specifically in Haiti, the Special Forces was focused on shoring up the Haitian population from the bottom up, i.e., basically organizing the population to help themselves, which in fact is following the lessons learned. While the conventional forces were focused on other matters, the special forces were actually conducting operations that the entire force as a whole should have been conducting.98

Eventually, the Department of State sponsored an International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program to train and assist two Haitian police forces, the Interim Public Security Force (UPSF) and the Haitian National Police (HNP). The goal was to have at least 4,000 graduates by the end of 1995 and 7,000 by the end of 1997. This training was labor and personnel intensive and should have been instituted from the outset. As it was, operations included 900 policeman from 23 different countries, not including
those supplied by the U.S. In other words, there was a very obvious lack of understanding of the idea of economy of force.

**TODAY'S MISSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

As is evident throughout these case studies, there are very real and often intangible differences in Operations Other Than War and what we consider 'traditional military operations'. An example is peacekeeping versus traditional operations. In this operation, there are no enemies, just opposing sides. Our military is trained to fight against an aggressor or an enemy, in defense of another friendly state. OOTW pushes our military not to divide the local population into friends and foes, but to make the great leap to impartiality, something which is often difficult to do.

There is also not necessarily a military solution available to accomplish this mission. It is not just a battle of force against force, in fact, it may not even involve traditional military forces such as armor or artillery. OOTW, and peacekeeping specifically, call for a smarter military force composed of humanitarians, diplomats, civil affairs personnel, and statesmen. Our military forces require mission specific training in order to adequately complete their mission. When is the mission actually complete?

Often in OOTW there is not an identifiable end-state. There may not be the clear cut goal that is expected by the traditional military force, i.e., the enemy force is destroyed or the capitol of the country is captured and the head of the state had been deposed. When the
peacekeeper leaves the country at the cessation of hostilities, things may be little different from when they entered the country except that hostilities have temporarily ceased.

As if having no clear end-state is not bad enough, in this mission we may encounter contradictory political directions, especially when opposing sides have very different or hidden agendas. Though the world may see the peacekeepers working towards world peace and acting with the justification of a 'just cause', the actual nations involved may be working towards bettering their position economically, posturing for that naval base or that patch of ground for long range bombers to refuel, or just for new security ties.

These nationally imposed agendas also cause nationally imposed constraints to be placed on the peacekeepers on the ground based on the desires of their nation of origin. These constraints often can have negative repercussions on the accomplishment of the overall mission, e.g., a representative of a country will be given a time-sensitive mission which he will not execute until he is given the permission by his own country.100

The nature of the mission dictates that the force be a multi-national force, which brings with it many additional difficulties. These include language and cultural differences, different types of weapon systems - consequently different ordnance requirements, various and complicated treaties with countries, possibly on both sides of the peace table, different procedures for staff planning and execution of military orders, and even down to difference in types of foods that certain soldiers can eat. An example would be if the military force were Moslem in religion, being supplied by the United States with logistics, in an area such as eastern Europe. The Moslem country may very well possess Warsaw Pact equipment that we do not have repair parts for. Additionally, the Moslems cannot
eat certain types of food and observe different religious holidays that we do. Eastern Europe as a location also has different cultural habits, e.g., the consumption of alcohol, which does not fit into the Moslem tradition. These are but a small part of some of the problems that could be encountered in this multi-national, multi-cultural, and multi-racial caldron.

The force that comes together for the mission may not necessarily be a balanced force. It may not be composed of forces that the force commander needs or wants. These forces consist of units available to the different countries or forces that they want to send, e.g., a certain country may send just a hospital unit, thinking their soldiers would more likely be out of harms way.

Lastly, the peacekeeper has to be especially cognizant of international borders, insuring that any conflict is confined within predetermined borders. Also, within the peacekeeping environment, there are some very sensitive applied force issues, e.g., once a peacekeeper has crossed the line and become a peace enforcer, he cannot cross back over to his peacekeeping role again.101

SUMMARY/ANALYSIS

As evidenced above, the armed forces of the United States now must be prepared for practically any contingency. As discussed, the missions of today are little different from past missions. Our Somalia and Haiti missions both proved to all that even in a time of
high technological advances, there are some missions that, in the end, will have to be left to the ground soldier, due to the environment, restrictions, etc.

As has been discerned through the historical case analyses, history holds many lessons for us both today and in the future. Lessons that we have learned from our past experiences point to four rather important aspects which recur throughout the cases and in fact ultimately lead to the success or failure of the operations themselves. These include: use an economy of force, through this economy of force, empower the host nation to police itself, i.e., make them actively participate in handling their problems; conduct operations with an impartiality, offering opposing sides adequate opportunities to end the conflict; and, lastly, and one of the most important lessons, patience, don’t expect to ‘rebuild the world’ in a year, i.e., in order to do it right, it takes time to make a lasting change in a country.

We see that the British and the Marine Corps have made good use of these lessons learned and have adapted to changing roles and new environments. What about the U.S. Army? Is there a short-coming in the army’s ability for adaptive response? Could it be institutional inertia? If we are guilty of this institutional inertia, are we doomed to continue to refight old battles in new environments?

CONCLUSION

It would seem that if we do not become more aware during our planning of the past lessons learned, we will undoubtedly relive our old mistakes. We often do not pay the
most strict attention to our lessons learned as evidenced by our most recent Haiti
operation. The turning point for our military will be when we can take lessons learned and
actually apply them doctrinally to our warfighting or peace-making procedures. Doctrine
should not be changed with the publication of every lessons learned document, but should
be seriously studied so decisions can be made to implement these lessons when applicable
so that we do not again fight our Vietnam's or the British refight their Malayan
operations.

A comparison of British military education versus U.S. military education indicates
that a major disparity is present in the matter of military education related to OOTW
missions. Today, the British Army Command and Staff College (ACSC), which resembles
the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, devotes approximately 22% of
classroom time to Operations Other Than War.103 Conversely, the U.S. Army's Command
and General Staff College allocates approximately 5% of classroom time on the same
subject.104 Does it make a difference? It is quite apparent that it does.

The British have demonstrated quite clearly that they are in fact more of a learning
organization than the military forces of the United States; perhaps because they started the
OOTW type of operations long before the U.S. military was in existence. The British
have not always been successful, but from a general viewpoint, they have done well in the
area of changing doctrine in light of new threats. The British operation conducted in
Malaya is the primary example used in this monograph, though they had several other
operations that met as great success, e.g., operations against Leftist guerrillas in Dhofar,
Oman in 1970-1975.105
The U.S. Marine Corps, like the British military, has also demonstrated its ability to change, maybe not to the same extent as the British, but more so than the U.S. Army. Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has demonstrated its ability to adjust to the requirements of the mission, e.g., most recently Vietnam, Haiti, etc.

In Vietnam, the Marines enacted the Combined Action Platoon Program which used the minimum amount of assets with surprisingly positive results. They were well supported by the local populace and in some cases relations with this populace became quite close, demonstrating their ability to win the hearts and minds of the people. The nature of the environment precluded an extended time period as well adequate personnel resources to make the program a full success and to have any significant impact to the conflict. Though the CAP enjoyed a fair amount of success, the Marines allotted only 2.5% of their total forces in Vietnam to this program.

The U.S. Army, as of late, has put more emphasis on the recording of lessons learned. Maybe there is a change in the wind. Will there be a greater emphasis also on applying these lessons learned to our doctrinal processes? It is essential that we be able to do this, though, our environment may not allow this in all cases. As was mentioned earlier, our civilian leaders must first be made aware of the fact that at times an operation needs to be conducted over an extended period of time in order to meet a successful and lasting endstate. If this doesn’t happen, our military leaders will be greatly restricted to what they are able to do.

In some circumstances, a plan of ‘quick in and out’ may work, e.g., Desert Storm, but in certain areas of third world countries that have not had a stable and legitimate
government for years, e.g. Haiti or the Dominican Republic, this abbreviated plan of
operations may not work. It may enjoy a short term success, but in most cases, the long
term stability that is desired will remain elusive.

Ultimately, the U.S. Army must not just learn lessons, but also must institutionalize
these same lessons learned in its planning and its doctrine. Whether or not the civilian
leadership will ever realize these issues is unknown. The military leadership must take any
measures possible to educate them in order to meet our national political objectives.
ENDNOTES

1 *U.S.S. Detroit* and *Dallas*.


4 Hereafter will be referred to as the USMC, marines or the Marines.


6 OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY


8 September 19, 1994.


18 A term used for our military interventions in Central and South America from early 1900 on.

19 A sudden flare-up of a military nature, that threatens to spread of intensify unless brought under control.

20 Charles Edward Callwell wrote the first rendition of his manual while a subaltern during his second year at Camberley. It was actually first published in 1896. C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars - A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers*, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1990), VI-X.

24 Combined British and Russian expedition to the Helder, 1799. Intelligence Branch, Quartermaster-General’s Department, British Minor Expeditions: 1746-1814. (Dublin, Ireland: Alex. Thom & Co., Limited, 1884), 31-45.
25 During the expedition to Quiberon Bay in on the coast of France, 1795, the British had hopes to march on Paris, taking sufficient stores, uniforms, and arms, to supply the peasants in the countryside once they were aroused by the British soldiers. Intelligence Branch, Quartermaster-General’s Department, British Minor Expeditions: 1746-1814. (Dublin, Ireland: Alex. Thom & Co., Limited, 1884), 20-27.
26 England went to the assistance of Holland (1813), who was determined to throw off the yoke of French tyranny. Ibid, 80-88.
27 Algiers, 1830, heavy ground mist looked like part of the ocean - coupled with poor intelligence and maps of the area caused the commander to make his attack in a tactically poor direction. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars - A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1990), 46.
29 Today, we’d probably call this a preemptive strike.
31 Ibid, 234-238.
32 Ibid, 238.
33 Ibid, 249-253.
35 American Revolutionary War, 1818, John Adams (U.S.A.): “The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.” Ibid.
37 Ibid, 210-213.
40 Ibid, 56.
41 Ibid, 58.
43 Ibid, 89.
44 These individuals were intent upon taking control of the polls. There were nearly successful when they put the Washington police to flight. Robin Higham, ed., Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1969), 117-118.
47 Ibid, 121.
50 Id est, the highly deployable combat force.
52 Ibid, 5.
53 Ibid, 34.
54 Ibid, 7.
55 Ibid, 34.
57 Ibid, 181.
61 The Marines learned valuable lessons from the Haiti and the Dominican Republic experience. The same cannot necessarily be said for the State Department and its ability to learn.
65 Ibid, 1-3.
66 Ibid, 54-55.
68 Ibid, 276.
69 Ibid, 276-277.
70 Ibid, 271.
71 Ibid, 276-277.
72 Ibid, 277.
73 Ibid, 271.
74 "Win the hearts and minds of the people."
76 Ibid, 22-27.
77 Ibid, 27.
78 Only approximately 2,500 out of 80,000 Marines in Vietnam were in the CAP. That is about 4%. A good concept, but the environment they were working in may have restricted more widespread use of the CAP, i.e., the methods of the army may have had detrimental effects on their programs. Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 177.
81 Ibid, 4-7.
82 Ibid, 69-77.
83 Ibid, 77-83.
84 We see a 6,000 man increase in the size of the army during this period to handle these domestic disorders that included Indian problems on the frontier.
86 Ibid, 94.
87 Ibid, 93.
88 Ibid, 96.
90 Ibid, 625.
91 Ibid, 634-636.
92 Ibid, 635.
93 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy - Initial Impressions: Haiti, D-20 to D+40, Volume I, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1994), i.
95 Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy - Initial Impressions: Haiti, D-20 to D+40, Volume I*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1994), iv.
96 Ibid, 204.
97 Ibid, iv.
98 Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy - Initial Impressions: Haiti, D-20 to D+150, Volume II*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1995), 131.
100 Major General Crabbe, Commander, Canadian Land Forces Atlantic Area, and Deputy Commander United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Information from briefing to Advanced Military Studies Program students at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 22 February 1996.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


__________________________


__________________________


Department of the Army. FM 100-20: Operations Other Than War. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1995 (Draft).


CD ROM


**PERIODICALS**


**REFERENCE MANUALS**


**REPORTS/STUDIES**  
(Study Projects, MMAS Theses, Monographs on Microfiche)

Binkin, Martin & Jeffrey Record. *Where Does the Marines Corps Go From Here?*  

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Lessons Learned*. (CD ROM)  


**REPORTS/STUDIES**  
(Study Projects, MMAS Theses, Monographs)


VIDEO