PEER REVIEW
COORDINATING DRAFT

TASK ANALYSIS
FOR

DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN
EXECUTION OF BATTLE
(CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION 20)

AS ACCOMPLISHED BY A BATTALION TASK FORCE

Author: PAUL JARRETT, HumRRO

Submitted by Harold Wagner, Acting Chief
Unit-Collective Training Research Unit
and
Jack Hiller, Director
Training Systems Research Division
and
Mr. Michael R. McCluskey,
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited

19960916 054

U.S. Army Research Institute

Prime Contractor: BDM Federal, Inc.
W. J. Mullen, III

POC: Bartholomew J. McIlroy, Jr.,
BDM Federal Inc., (408) 372-3329

Program Director: Thomas J. Lewman
BDM Federal, Inc.

January 2, 1995

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENSE
TECHNICAL
INFORMATION
CENTER

UNCLASSIFIED

This document is best quality available. The copy furnished to DTIC contained a significant number of pages which do not reproduce legibly.
Task Analysis for Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle as Accomplished by a Battalion Task Force. Critical Combat Function 20 (CCF 20)

Paul Jarrett

BDM Federal, Inc.

August 1996

United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: This report has been cleared for release to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC and will be available only through DTIC or the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).

FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The views, opinions and findings in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

1. **AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)**
2. **REPORT DATE**
   - August 1996
3. **REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED**
   - Interim Report
   - 07/17/92 - 03/15/96

4. **TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
   - Task Analysis for Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle as Accomplished by a Battalion Task Force
   - Critical Combat Function 20 (CCF 20)

5. **FUNDING NUMBERS**
   - MDA903-92-0075-0005
   - 3414
   - C01
   - 665803
   - D730

6. **AUTHOR(S)**
   - Paul Jarrett

7. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
   - BDM FEDERAL INC.
   - DOD CENTER MONTEREY BAY
   - 400 GIGLING ROAD
   - SEASIDE, CA 93955

8. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

9. **SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
   - U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE
     BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
   - 5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE
   - ALEXANDRIA, VA 22333-5600

10. **SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
    - Contractor Report 96-40

11. **SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**
    - The COR is Michael R. McCluskey. This report of published to meet legal and contractual requirements and may not meet ARI's scientific or professional standards for publication.

12a. **DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
    - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
    - DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

12b. **DISTRIBUTION CODE**

13. **ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)**
    - The purpose of CCF 20 is that the task force performs its assigned missions more effectively and quickly than the enemy and achieves the brigade commander's intent.
    - The outcomes include: 1) The TF commander's decisions result in orders which are feasible, suitable, acceptable and rapid enough to cause the TF to gain and/or retain the initiative. 2) The TF staff gathers accurate information, makes it available to the TF commander, other TF decision makers and staff members in time to be of use in executing the mission. 3) The TF staffs' analysis of information results in sound assessments that match the actual situation; recommendations to the TF commander which are feasible, suitable, acceptable, and in time to assist his decision making process. 4) No breakdowns in the TF's ability to maintain clear communications with higher, adjacent and subordinate head quarters. 5) The TF commander infuses his will and intent among his subordinates without losing the ability to respond to changing circumstances with the task force. 6) The TF consolidates and reorganizes during/after mission. 7) TF staff ensures that the TF commanders guidance and orders are executed.

14. **SUBJECT TERMS**
    - Command presence, information distribution, continuity of command, TOC operations, synchronizing tactical operations, maintaining unit discipline

15. **NUMBER OF PAGES**

16. **PRICE CODE**

17. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT**
    - UNCLASSIFIED

18. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**
    - UNCLASSIFIED

19. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**
    - UNCLASSIFIED

20. **LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
    - UNLIMITED

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std 238-16
298-102
INDEX

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION 20
DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN EXECUTION OF BATTLE

Preface.................................................................................................................. ii
Index of Critical Combat Functions (CCF).......................................................... 1
Structure of Critical Combat Functions.............................................................. 2
Outcomes and Purpose of CCF 20...................................................................... 11
Flow Charts by Battle Phase (Plan, Prepare, Execute)........................................ 12
Other CCF Which Interact with CCF 20............................................................... 15
CCF 20 Key Participants by Task........................................................................ 18
Key Inputs/Outputs to CCF 20............................................................................ 19
Task List Summary............................................................................................. 23
Execution Task List............................................................................................ 24
CALL Lessons Learned Relevant to CCF 20...................................................... 56
Lessons Learned Integrated into CCF 20 Task List............................................ 70
CCF 20 Critical Tasks and Other Linkages......................................................... 82
References......................................................................................................... 88
End Notes............................................................................................................ 91

January 2, 1995
PREFACE

This task analysis of Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle, Critical Combat Function 20 (CCF 20), is an intermediate product of the process of developing a training strategy for the CCF. The analysis reflects tasks, products, participants and processes required by the TF to execute a task force operation in compliance with the commander's concept and intent.

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS: The integration of related players and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

This CCF addresses the execution phase of the task force battle. For this analysis, execution commences whenever enemy contact is made or, when preparations for battle are completed to the task force commander's satisfaction or when the task force has physically occupied its sector, commenced movement toward its objective, or is actively seeking enemy contact and, at the effective time of the TF mission (e.g., "defend as of _____" or LD time).

The function of directing and leading the TF during the execution of the battle is a responsibility of the TF commander, his staff, and his subordinate commanders. This CCF is designed to outline those critical tasks and subtasks which are essential to execute a mission.

The following model reflects that a leader goes through a decision making process based on his knowledge of his unit's operations plan and what changed about the situation since he formed his plan. He processes and appraises the information received through his C3I system and/or by directly viewing the battle.

The commander's visualization of the battle is largely a process of synthesis. He will never have all the facts. His understanding of what is happening and the implications thereof, comes from what he knows and does not know. His judgment is based on the significance he attributes to information he receives and the conclusions he draws from it. The TF commander also receives recommendations from higher headquarters, subordinate commanders, and his staff.

The commander leads the TF through his personal presence. He directs the TF with guidance and orders. He utilizes his experience, knowledge, judgement, and intuition to monitor the TF's mission execution; monitoring is performed to identify deviations in actual performance from intent and to make decisions to change on-going actions or establish new actions.

The staff seeks, gathers, and analyzes information identifying facts. From the facts, the staff builds a picture of the battle so as to make recommendations to the commander. The TF executive officer, as the director of the TF staff, calls "huddles" as required in order to ensure information is shared throughout the staff and to identify gaps in information and coordination requiring addition staff work.

The process of the commander acquiring information by observing, receiving reports and staff recommendations along with the staff's actions of gathering and analyzing information is a continuous cycle. All actions are simultaneous where new information is acquired, shared, confirmed, and acted upon by the commander and the staff.

The commander monitors the situation, plans his next order, and directs the task force by first, providing information to and receiving information from higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. He then assesses changes to the situation and appraises his plans and his operation in light of what is needed to be accomplished. Upon completing his appraisal, the commander comes to a decision that leaves the plan as it is, refines it, or makes radical changes to it. Whatever his deci-
sion, the commander must communicate his intent to the staff and subordinate leaders, and then he must ensure that his intent is implemented. Implementation of the commander's decisions will then be achieved through the efforts of subordinate commanders and his staff. The commander and the staff supervise this implementation. The process of "monitor, plan, and direct" is continuous and will be done in seconds or hours depending upon the tempo of the battle and the decision to be made. Many decisions may be "working" at any one time.

The process outlined in this CCF is based upon the *Blueprint of the Battlefield* for the purposes of analysis and portrayal of the battle phases. In actual fact, the tasks will likely occur simultaneously and will often be repeated as METT-T or perceived METT-T changes. At the time of this writing, the Army's doctrine and techniques for planning and decision making are under review. The decision making processes outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 "Draft" and the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 are the basis of this process described in the task analysis of CCF 18, 19, and 20.

Many sub-tasks are taken directly from appropriate ARTEP Mission Training Plans. While the wording of each task is sometimes a direct quotation from the *Blueprint of the Battlefield* or Mission Training Plan, usually the analyst has synthesized the CCF task titles from MTPs, applicable FM's, and other related doctrinal manuals.

The analyst selected the tasks and the level of detail based on the perspective of the task force commander. Although battalion task force subordinate commanders are responsible for compliance with branch training strategies and achieving Mission Training Plan (MTP) task and subtask proficiencies, some tasks and subtasks below task force level, are critical to task force success. This analysis highlights these tasks and subtasks for possible emphasis by the task force commander in his training guidance.
INDEX OF
CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS
Grouped By Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

INTELLIGENCE
(1) Conduct Intelligence Planning
(2) Collect Information
(3) Process Information
(4) Disseminate Intelligence

MANEUVER
(5) Conduct Tactical Movement
(6) Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver

AIR DEFENSE
(16) Take Active Air Defense Measures
(17) Take Passive Air Defense Measures

FIRE SUPPORT
(7) Employ Mortars
(8) Employ Field Artillery
(9) Employ Close Air Support
(10) Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming
(11) Conduct Battlefield PsyOps
(12) Employ Chemical Weapons
(13) Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations
(14) Employ Naval Gunfire
(15) Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support

MOBILITY AND
SURVIVABILITY
(21) Overcome Obstacles
(22) Enhance Movement
(23) Provide Countermobility
(24) Enhance Physical Protection
(25) Provide Operations Security
(26) Conduct Deception Operations
(27) Provide Decontamination

COMMAND AND
CONTROL
(18) Plan for Combat Operations
(19) Direct and Lead Unit During Preparation for the Battle
(20) Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT
(28) Provide Transport Services
(29) Conduct Supply Operations
(30) Provide Personnel Services
(31) Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment
(32) Provide Health Services
(33) Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties
(34) Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations
(35) Conduct Law and Order Operations
(36) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations
(37) Provide Sustainment Engineering
(38) Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations
(39) Provide Field Services
STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS
RELEVANT TO BATTALION TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION: The integration of related players and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

I. Intelligence BOS — The ways and means of acquiring, analyzing and using knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain required by a commander in planning, preparing and conducting combat operations. These CCF are continuous throughout the planning, preparation and execution phases of the battle.

1. CCF (1) Conduct Intelligence Planning — The development and coordination of information relative to the enemy, weather and terrain prior to and during the development of the unit OPORD; the planning to collect information from battlefield sources and to acquire intelligence from other headquarters. Focus of this CCF is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This CCF addresses:
   a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan.
   b. Integrated threat templates (doctrinal; event; input to DST).
   c. Terrain and Weather analysis.

2. CCF (2) Collect Information — Obtaining information in any manner from TF elements and from sources outside the TF (e.g., higher headquarters; adjacent units): this CCF includes the tasks associated with managing the processes and activities necessary to collect battlefield information which may eventually be used to provide intelligence relative to the enemy, terrain and weather. This CCF addresses:
   a. Information collected as a result of R & S plan.
   b. Continuous information collection and acquisition from all sources.

3. CCF (3) Process Information — The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation in a continual process. This CCF addresses:
   a. Evaluation of threat information.
   b. Evaluation of physical environment information.
   c. Integration of intelligence information.
   d. Development of enemy intentions.
   e. Development of targeting information.
   f. Preparation of intelligence reports.
   g. Update of situational template.
   h. Provision of battlefield area reports.

4. CCF (4) Disseminate Intelligence — Transmission of information by any means (verbal, written, electronic etc.), from one person or place to another to provide timely dissemination of critical intelligence to all appropriate members of the combined arms team. This CCF addresses:
   a. The sending of processed intelligence in a timely manner to those on the combined arms team who can by its receipt, take appropriate actions to accomplish the mission. This includes intelligence on the enemy, terrain and weather.
b. The sending of raw intelligence directly from those responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance to the commander should that raw intelligence be time sensitive (and not be subject to receipt and processing by intelligence analysts).
c. Dissemination of battlefield reports.

II. Maneuver BOS — The employment of direct fire weapons, platforms and systems through movement and fire and maneuver to achieve a position of advantage in respect to enemy ground forces, in order to accomplish the mission. The direct fire weapons are: tank guns; BFV 25mm; anti-tank guns and rockets; attack helicopter guns and rockets; small arms; crew served weapons; directed energy weapons systems.

1. CCF (5) Conduct Tactical Movement — Position direct fire weapons systems relative to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage making full use of terrain and formations. Tactical movement occurs when contact with the enemy is likely or imminent but direct fire engagement has not yet occurred. Units supporting maneuver units are included. This CCF addresses:
   a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
   b. Preparation for movement.
   c. Movement, mounted and dismounted; on and off road.
   d. Closure of movement — tactical assembly area; tactical positions.
   e. Navigation.
   f. Force protection.
   g. Air movement.

2. CCF (6) Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver — Entering into ground combat with the enemy using direct fire and/or close combat in order to destroy the enemy or cause him to withdraw. This CCF relates only to those direct fire weapons systems associated with the Maneuver BOS. This CCF is initiated with the OPORD at the completion of the planning phase of the battle and includes all tasks associated with subordinate echelon planning, preparation and execution of the battle. This CCF addresses:
   a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
   b. Preparation of engagement areas.
   c. Rehearsals of battle plans.
   d. Pre-combat prepare to fire checks.
   e. Target acquisition.
   f. Fire control and distribution.
   g. Fratricide.
   h. Conduct close combat.
   i. Integration of direct fire with maneuver.
   j. Control of terrain.
   k. Prestocked ammunition.
   l. Resupply during operations.
   m. Maintenance during operations.
   n. Consolidation and reorganization.

III. Fire Support BOS — The collective, coordinated, and synchronized use of target acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) and other lethal and non-lethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations and to achieve the commanders intent and scheme of maneuver. The Fire Support BOS addresses these weapons: mortars; field artillery; close air support; electronic measures; naval gunfire.

August 29, 1993
1. **CCF (7) Employ Mortars** — Employment of mortars by the maneuver unit to place fires on the enemy or terrain to support the commander’s concept and intent. This CCF initiates with the receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and address those tasks required during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:

   a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
   b. Prepare to fire checks.
   i. Rehearsals.
   c. Pre-combat checks.
   d. Development of order to fire.
   e. Tactical movement.
   f. FDC operations.
   g. Target engagements with illumination, smoke, HE.
   h. Sustainment operations.

2. **CCF (8) Employ Field Artillery** — The ways and means employed by the maneuver unit to cause indirect artillery fires to be placed on the enemy or terrain to support the commander’s concept and intent. This CCF initiates upon receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and includes tasks performed during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. The Fire Support Coordination tasks necessary to integrate the field artillery and the maneuver units are the primary focus. This CCF does not address those field artillery tasks associated directly with those actions taken by the batteries of the artillery battalion in the conduct of their support mission such as FDC operations, gun operations, etc. This CCF addresses:

   a. Fire Support — Maneuver unit rehearsals.
   b. FSE operations during the preparation and execution phase of the battle.
   c. FSO and FIST operations in coordination with their maneuver commander.
   d. Positioning and movement within the maneuver unit sector or zone.
   e. Indirect fire missions in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.
   f. Sustainment operations.
   g. Indirect fire planning as battlefield METT-T change.

3. **CCF (9) Employ Close Air Support** — Planning for, requesting and employing armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) in coordination with other fire support (lethal and non-lethal) against ground targets in support of the maneuver force commander’s concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

   a. Air-ground attack requests.
   b. Air space coordination and management.
   c. Air Liaison Officer, Forward Air Controller; other Army Fire Support Coordination Officer; USN/USMC Bde Team Commander, SALT-O and FCT-O tasks that enable air to ground attacks.

4. **CCF (10) Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming** — Actions taken to deny the enemy effective command, control and communications of his own tactical force in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent. This CCS includes jamming, deception, and collection.

5. **CCF (11) Conduct Battlefield PsyOps** — Conduct psychological activities as an integral part of combat operations to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of tactical objectives in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.
6. **CCF (12) Employ Chemical Weapons** — Employ chemical agents or other means to degrade enemy capabilities in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.

7. **CCF (13) Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations** — Suppress (e.g. using smoke or dazzling illumination) or degrade enemy direct observation, optics, radar, sensors, electronic DF equipment, and imaging systems in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.

8. **CCF (14) Employ Naval Gunfire** — The means and ends to provide naval gunfire in support of the maneuver commander's tactical operation.

9. **CCF (15) Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support** — Coordination of all fire support means in support of the maneuver commanders concept and intent. This CCF addresses the preparation and execution of tasks necessary to integrate the fire support detailed in the OPORD. The CCF integrates CCF 7-14 in support of maneuver commander's concept and intent.

IV. **Air Defense BOS** — The means and measures organic or assigned to the maneuver commander which when employed successfully will nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne.

1. **CCF (16) Take Active Air Defense Measures** — Application of firepower to destroy enemy air targets. This CCF addresses the coordinating tasks which enable the maneuver commander to successfully employ any attached or assigned air defense weapons system as well as the tasks necessary to employ all organic weapons systems against enemy air targets. This CCF addresses:
   
   b. Employment of maneuver unit weapons systems such as small arms, automatic weapons, BFV 25 mm and TOW missiles, tank main gun against enemy air.
   c. Airspace management.
   d. Early warning.
   e. Sustainment.

2. **CCF (17) Take Passive Air Defense Measures** — The protection of the maneuver force from enemy air by means other than weapons. This CCF will focus on the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
   
   a. Early warning.
   b. Dispersion.
   c. Cover and concealment.
   d. Air watch.
   e. Deception.

V. **Command and Control BOS** — The way and means a maneuver commander exercises authority and direction over organic and assigned combat power in the accomplishment of the mission.

1. **CCF (18) Plan for Combat Operations** — The integration of all members of the combined arms team in the coordinated development of the maneuver unit Operations Order which will guide the activities of the combined arms team in conducting combat
operations to accomplish assigned missions. The product/outcome of this CCF is a briefed, understood OPORD. This CCF addresses:

a. Receipt and analysis of higher HQ OPORD.
b. Issuance of Warning Order.
c. Restated mission statement.
d. Commander's estimate process/troop leading procedures.
e. Commander's guidance.
f. Mission analysis (includes course of action development).
g. Decision brief to commander.
h. Development of a synchronized OPORD.
i. Reproduction and distribution of OPORD to all participants.
j. Briefing of OPORD; understanding of order by participants.
k. FRAGO planning and issue.

2. CCF (19) Direct and Lead Unit during Preparation for the Battle — The ways and means to prepare combined arms task force for the battle so that the combined arms task force is ready to support the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

a. Commander's activities.
b. Communicating information.
c. Briefbacks and backbriefs.
d. Rehearsals.
e. Management of the means of communicating information.
f. Maintaining and updating information and force status.
g. Managing information distribution.
h. Decisions to act or change ongoing actions.
i. Confirming IPB through the reconnaissance effort.
j. Determining actions to implement decisions.
k. Providing command presence.
l. Maintaining unit discipline.
m. Synchronizing tactical operations (e.g., execution matrix DST).
n. TOC operations (e.g., staff integration and battle tracking).
o. Continuity of command.
p. Second in command (2IC responsibilities).
q. Continuous and sustained operations.
r. Communications (e.g., planning, installation and operation of system, management, site selection).

3. CCF (20) Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle — The ways and means to command and control in the combined arms task force execution of the battle plan (engaging the enemy in battle) to accomplish the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

a. Directing the conduct of the battle.
b. Issue orders.
c. Command presence.
d. Information distribution.
e. Decide on need for action or change.
f. Maintaining unit discipline.
g. Synchronizing tactical operations.
h. TOC operations (includes CP displacement, security, survivability).
i. Continuity of command (e.g., C2 redundancy).
j. Second in command (2IC) responsibilities.
k. Continuous and sustained operations.
l. Consolidation and reorganization.

VI. Mobility and Survivability BOS — The ways and means of the force that permit freedom of movement, relative to the enemy, while retaining the task force ability to fulfill its primary mission as well as the measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protection from the effects of enemy weapons systems and natural occurrences.

1. CCF (21) Overcome Obstacles — Enabling the maneuver force to maintain its mobility by removing or clearing/reducing natural and man-made obstacles. This CCF will initiate after receipt of the OPORD and address subordinate echelon planning as well as task force preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:
   a. Breach obstacle. Clearing a path or lane for personnel and equipment through a battlefield obstacle.
   b. Cross gaps. Passing through or over any battlefield terrain feature, wet or dry, that is too wide to be overcome by organic/self bridging.

2. CCF (22) Enhance movement — Provision of adequate mobility for the maneuver unit in its area of operations. This CCF addresses:
   a. Construction and repair of combat roads and trails.
   b. Construction or repair of forward airfields.
   c. Facilitating movement on routes. (This includes control of road traffic and control of refugees and stragglers.)
   d. Tracking status of routes.
   e. Host nation support.

3. CCF (23) Provide Countermobility — Delaying, channeling, or stopping offensive movement by the enemy consistent with the commander's concept and intent by enhancing the effectiveness of friendly direct and indirect weapons systems. This CCF addresses:
   a. Emplacement of mines and complex obstacles.
   b. Digging tank ditches.
   c. Creation of road craters with explosives.
   d. Terrain enhancement.

4. CCF (24) Enhance Physical Protection — Providing protection of friendly forces on the battlefield by enhancing the physical protection of personnel, equipment and weapons systems, and supplies. This CCF addresses:
   a. Construction of fighting positions.
   b. Preparation of protective positions.
   c. Employment of protective equipment.

5. CCF (25) Provide Operations Security — Denying information to the enemy about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations. This CCF addresses:
   a. Analysis to determine key assets and threats to them.
   b. Cover and concealment.
   c. Camouflage.
d. Noise and light discipline.
e. Counter reconnaissance.
f. Smoke/obscurants.
g. Physical security measures.
h. Signal security.
i. Electronic security.

6. **CCF (26) Conduct Deception Operations** — Taking actions to mask the real objectives of tactical operations in order to delay effective enemy reaction. This CCF addresses:
   a. Physical deception.
b. Electronic deception.

7. **CCF (27) Provide Decontamination** — Making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material. This CCF addresses:
   a. Decontamination of individual soldiers and equipment.
b. Decontamination of weapon systems and supplies.
c. Hasty and deliberate decontamination.

VII. **Combat Service Support BOS** — The support, assistance and service provided to sustain forces, primarily in the area of logistics, personnel services and health services.

1. **CCF (28) Provide Transport Services** — Providing or coordinating for transportation which will assure sustainment support operations in support of the maneuver commander. Upon receipt of an OPORD, this CCF addresses preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve transportation support of the maneuver force. This CCF addresses:
   a. Movement of cargo, equipment and personnel by surface or air.
b. Loading, transloading and unloading material and supplies.

2. **CCF (29) Conduct Supply Operations** — Providing the items necessary to equip, maintain and operate the force during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
   a. Requesting, receiving, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating and issuing supplies to the specific elements of the force.
b. Providing munitions to weapons systems.
c. Providing fuel and petroleum products to equipment and weapons systems.
d. Reporting status.

3. **CCF (30) Provide Personnel Services** — Management and execution of all personnel-related matters to sustain the force. This CCF addresses:
      1) Replacement, casualty reporting.
      2) Awards and decorations.
3) Postal Operations.
4) Promotions, reductions.
b. Financial services.
c. Unit Ministry team.
d. Legal.
e. Public Affairs.
f. Reporting personnel status.
g. Preservation of the force through safety.
h. Management of stress.

4. CCF (31) Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment — Preservation and repair of weapons systems and equipment. This CCF includes the provision of repair parts and end items to all members of the combined arms team before, during and after the battle. Included also is doctrinal echeloning of maintenance (organization, DS, GS). This CCF addresses:

a. Preventative Maintenance.
b. Recovery.
c. Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair and return of equipment and weapons systems to the combined arms force.
d. Reporting status.

5. CCF (32) Provide Health Services — Performance, provision or arrangement for health services regardless of location, to promote, improve, conserve or restore the mental or physical well-being of individuals or groups. This CCF addresses:

a. Preventive medicine.
b. Field sanitation.

6. CCF (33) Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties — Application of medical procedures on battlefield casualties beginning with "buddy aid" through trained medical personnel. The CCF includes movement of casualties from the forward edge of the battlefield back to division-level medical facilities. This CCF addresses:

a. Triage of battlefield casualties.
b. Treatment and movement of casualties to rear (medevac).
   1) Identification of levels of care and locations.
   2) Synchronization and coordination of movement of medical facilities to ensure continuity of care.
   3) Establishment and maintenance of communications with redundant means.
   4) Rehearsals.
   5) Resupply.
c. Evacuation:
   1) Ground ambulance.
   2) Aero medevac.
   3) Non-standard evacuation.
d. Handling and processing the remains of soldiers who have died of wounds.
e. Reporting status.

7. CCF (34) Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations — The collection, processing, evacuation and safeguarding of enemy prisoners of war. This CCF addresses:

a. Collecting and evacuating EPW.
b. Searching, segregating, safeguarding, silencing, and rapid rearward movement of EPW.
8. **CCF (35) Conduct Law and Order Operations** — Enforcement of laws and regulations and maintenance of units and personnel discipline.

9. **CCF (36) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations** — Conduct of those phases of the activities of a tactical commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities, and the citizens in a friendly or occupied country or area when U.S. military forces are present.

10. **CCF (37) Provide Sustainment Engineering** — The repair and construction of facilities and lines of communication. This CCF addresses:
   a. Rear area restoration.
   b. Construction and maintenance of lines of communication (roads, railroads, ports, airfields).
   c. Construction support:
      1) Marshaling, distribution and storage facilities.
      2) Pipelines.
      3) Fixed facilities.
      4) Drill wells.
      5) Dismantlement of fortifications.

11. **CCF (38) Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations** — The use of available military and host-nation resources for the evacuation of US forces, dependents, US government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and other). This CCF addresses:
   a. Medical support.
   b. Transportation.
   c. Security.
   d. Preparation of temporary shelters.
   e. Operation of clothing exchange facilities.
   f. Operation of bathing facilities.
   g. Graves registration.
   h. Laundry.
   i. Feeding.

12. **CCF (39) Provide Field Services** — Performance of service logistics functions by and for Army elements in the field. This CCF addresses:
   a. Clothing exchange.
   b. Bathing facilities.
   c. Graves registration.
   d. Laundry and clothes renovation.
   e. Bakeries.
   f. Feeding (rations supply, kitchens).
   g. Salvage.
## OUTCOMES AND PURPOSE OF CCF 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The TF commander's decisions result in orders which are feasible,</td>
<td>The task force performs its assigned missions more effectively and quickly than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suitable, acceptable, and rapid enough to cause the TF to gain and/or</td>
<td>the enemy and achieves the brigade commander's intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retain the initiative.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The TF staff gathers accurate information and makes it available to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the TF commander, other TF decision makers and other staff members in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time to be of use in executing the TF mission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The TF staff's analysis of information results in tactically sound</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assessments that match the actual situation and, recommendations to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the TF commander which are feasible, suitable, acceptable, and in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time to assist his decision making process.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There are no breakdowns in the TF's ability to maintain clear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The TF commander infuses his will and intent among his subordinates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without losing the ability to respond to changing circumstances with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the whole task force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The TF consolidates and reorganizes during and after mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>execution so as to be able to efficiently continue its mission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The TF staff insures that the TF commander's guidance and orders are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>executed and that all relevant actions are coordinated with higher,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

January 2, 1995
TASK FLOW

Note 1: While this flowchart is based on a time flow from left to right, the flow is cor
while this flowchart is based on a time flow from left to right, the flow is continuous and simultaneous.
- Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

1. Assess Situation, the TF Commander Visualizes the Battlefield

2a. TF CDR Evaluates Incoming Information
   - Identifies Critical Information
   - Determines Credibility
   - Determines Relevance

2b. TF CDR Reviews Current Situation. Compares Current Situation With His Running Estimate. Uses CDR's Intent, METT-T

2c. CDR Projects Future Requirements. Determines if Mission Can Still Be Accomplished

2d. Decide on Need for Action or Change. TF Commander Makes Decisions on the TF's Actions and Plans

December 9, 1994
**TASK FLOW:**

1. **BDE**
   - BDE CDR Sends FRAGOs

2. **TF**
   - **3a.** Determine Actions, TF Commander Directs Changes to the Operation or Plan
     - 3a1. TF CDR Decides to Develop a New Plan or to Modify a Planned Branch
       - 3a1.1. TF CDR Determines:
         - Amount of Staff and Time Available
         - Whether to Use DDMP, CDMP, or QDMP

3. **2(d1).** Leave TF Plan As It Is, Orders:
   - Maneuver
   - Fires
   - Resupply
   - Synchronizes TF

4. **2(d2).** Decides That the Situation is Close to What Was Desired, TF Modifies Plan and Issues FRAGOs

5. **2(d3).** Determines Situation Does Not Match the Desired End State, But Does Resemble a Developed Branch. TF Modifies Branch and Issues FRAGO

6. **2(q4).** TF Creates a New Concept to Meet Situation and End State

7. **3.** Can Operations Continue?
   - **Yes**
     - **2(q5).** TF CDR Orders a Tactical Pause
       - FRAGO, HDEF
   - **No**
     - **2(q6).** Co/Tms Receive FRAGOs, Modify Actions to Meet Requirements, Report Compliance or Need for Modification

---

**Notes:**
- **Note 2:** At the time this task analysis was developed, the Army's decision making process was outlined in the 1993 Advanced Tactic Analysis Conceptualization. This is the basis of the process described in the task analysis.
Note 2: At the time this task analysis was developed, the Army's doctrine and technique for planning are under review. The decision making process, outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 and the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 is the basis of the process described in the task analyses of CCFs 18, 19, 20.
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

3x3 Grid:
- CDR Makes a Tentative Plan
  - METT-T
  - CDR's Intent
  - Issues Planning Guidance
- Develops COA
- Analyzes (war games) COAs
- Compares COAs

December 9, 1994
OTHER CCF WHICH INTERACT WITH CCF 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCF #</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>LOGIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCF 1</td>
<td>Conduct Intelligence Planning</td>
<td>Continuous intelligence planning results in current and updated products that will enhance rapid and accurate decision making during the execution phase of a battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 2</td>
<td>Collect Information</td>
<td>During the execution phase of a battle, time-sensitive intelligence information must be continuously collected in order to identify critical enemy locations, actions, and intentions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 3</td>
<td>Process Information</td>
<td>The processing of intelligence information during the execution phase must be timely and accurate to deliver analyzed critical intelligence information to the elements of the task force who need it in their execution of the battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 4</td>
<td>Disseminate Intelligence</td>
<td>The sharing of critical intelligence among all elements of the TF during the execution phase of a battle is essential. Equally crucial is ensuring the most current intelligence is provided to the TF commander for his timely decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 5</td>
<td>Conduct Tactical Movement</td>
<td>Combat, CS, CSS, and C2 elements move based on TF commander’s scheme of maneuver, decisions, and intent. Tactical movement sets the stage for engaging the enemy with direct fire and maneuver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 6</td>
<td>Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver</td>
<td>Co/Tms execute direct fires and maneuver in accordance with the TF commander’s decisions and intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 7</td>
<td>Employ Mortars</td>
<td>Mortar fires compose part of the TF combat power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 8</td>
<td>Employ Field Artillery</td>
<td>Artillery fires compose part of the TF combat power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 9</td>
<td>Employ Close Air Support</td>
<td>Close air support composes part of the TF combat power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 15</td>
<td>Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support</td>
<td>The coordination, synchronization, and integration of artillery, CAS, and mortars enhances maneuver, direct fires, and protects the force; fire support permits freedom of action. Because fires can be rapidly moved, they represent a significant means by which the TF can react to a changed situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 16/17</td>
<td>Take Active and Passive Air Defense Measures</td>
<td>Active air defense provides protection for the force; passive air defense helps conceal the TF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF #</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>LOGIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 18</td>
<td>Plan for Combat Operations</td>
<td>The TF plan captures the commander’s concept and is the basis for change. As METT-T changes, it’s necessary to refine or even change the plan. As changes in the situation are identified, the commander adjusts his assessment or “running estimate” and gives directions that change the TF plan. Using the Quick Decision Making Process to change the plan is similar to the more deliberate planning process in CCF 18. It is also probable that the TF will be planning for future operations during the conduct of the present battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 19</td>
<td>Direct and Lead Unit During Preparation for the Battle</td>
<td>Refinement/modification of the commander’s concept can occur while the TF prepares for battle. During this time the commander insures that his plan and intent are understood at all echelons and that all subordinate echelons’ plans are synchronized with the TF plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 21</td>
<td>Overcome Obstacles</td>
<td>As the TF fights the battle (offense), it integrates earlier plans and preparation to negotiate obstacles encountered during movement and maneuver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 23</td>
<td>Provide Countermobility</td>
<td>As the battle progresses (defense), the TF executes planned countermobility operations so as to divert, delay, or obstruct the enemy so that he can be destroyed/attritted by direct or indirect fires. Decisions about the timing of closing gaps in obstacles, employing FASCAM, and repositioning forces and fires are important to the execution phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 24</td>
<td>Enhance Physical Protection</td>
<td>The TF commander must monitor efforts to protect the force and make the command and control systems more survivable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 25</td>
<td>Provide Operations Security</td>
<td>TF commander must conceal his plans and intentions from the enemy through security operations, signal security, and other measures in order to allow the TF to achieve surprise and exercise initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 27</td>
<td>Provide Decontamination</td>
<td>Commander’s decision to conduct decontamination includes considerations of the loss of combat power while decontamination is being conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 28</td>
<td>Provide Transportation</td>
<td>The TF commander must monitor efforts to transport equipment needed to complement the TF plan and replace losses, as well as supplies to sustain the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 29</td>
<td>Conduct Supply Operations</td>
<td>The TF commander must monitor the outcome of efforts to provide timely resupply of the TF. Also, he must monitor the security of the rear area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF #</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>LOGIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 30</td>
<td>Provide Personnel Services</td>
<td>TF commander monitors TF personnel strength reporting and tracking, and replacement of personnel losses so as to assess TF strength and take action to fix problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 31</td>
<td>Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment</td>
<td>TF commander monitors equipment evacuation, evaluation, repair, and reporting on status so as to assess TF combat power and to take action to fix problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 33</td>
<td>Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties</td>
<td>TF commander monitors the timely treatment and evacuation of casualties, repositioning of medical assets to support the battle so as to assess the function and to take action to fix problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle

CCF 20

KEY PARTICIPANTS BY TASK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Task force command posts acquire and communicate information and maintain status.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S1 and Section, S2 and Section, S3 and Section, S4 and Section, Battle Captain, CESO, Communications Platoon, LNOs, ADO, FSO and FSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assess situation, the TF commander visualizes the battlefield.</td>
<td>TF CDR, Co/Tm CDRs, XO, S3, S2, LNOs, Scout Platoon Leaders, Army Aviation, AF TACP, FSO and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine actions, TF commander directs changes to the operation or plan.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S1 and Section, S2 and Section, S3 and Section, S4 and Section, Co/Tm Leaders, FSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TF commander directs and leads subordinate forces.</td>
<td>TF CDR, CSM, XO, S2, S3, FSO, Co/Tm CDRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Task force command posts locate where they can control the battle; reestablish C2 functions after the loss of command post or commander.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S1 and Section, S2 and Section, S3 and Section, S4 and Section, CSM, Co/Tm CDRs, CESO, FSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Task force consolidates and reorganizes.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, CSM, S1, S2, S3, S4, BMO, Tm./Co CDRs, XOs, 1SGs, FSO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KEY INPUTS/OUTPUTS TO CCF 20
(W/ CRITICAL INFORMATION)

KEY INPUTS

BDE-1 Division Commander's Intent from the Brigade Operations Order
   a) Purpose of the operation.
   b) End state of the operation.
   c) How the division will achieve the end state.

BDE-2 Brigade Commander's Intent
   a) Purpose of the operation.
   b) End state of the operation.
   c) How the brigade will achieve the end state.

BDE-3 Brigade CCIR
   a) Situational dependent information.
   b) Information specified by the commander.

BDE-4 Brigade Battlefield Updates
   Changes to Enemy and Friendly Situation:
   a) Intelligence.
   b) Maneuver.
   c) Fire Support.
   d) M/CM/S.
   e) NBC Defense.
   f) Combat Service Support.
   g) Command, Control and Communications.
   h) Air Defense.

BDE-5 Brigade WARNOs/FRAGOs
   Changes to BDE:
   a) Mission.
   b) Task organization.
c) Scheme of maneuver.
d) Priorities.

**ADJ-1**  **Adjacent Unit Updates**

Changes to Adjacent Unit's Situation:

a) Intelligence.
b) Maneuver.
c) Fire Support.
d) M/CM/S.
e) NBC Defense.
f) Combat Service Support.
g) Command, Control and Communications.
h) Air Defense.

**TF-1**  **TF OPORD**

a) Task organization.
b) Situation.
c) Mission.
d) Concept of the operation.
e) Scheme of maneuver.
f) Fire support.
g) Sub-unit instructions.
h) Coordinating instructions.
i) Priorities.

**TF-2**  **TF Battlefield Updates (All BOSs)**

Changes to Enemy and Friendly Situation:

a) Intelligence.
b) Maneuver.
c) Fire Support.
d) M/CM/S.
e) NBC Defense.
f) Combat Service Support.
g) Command, Control and Communications.

h) Air Defense.

Report TF CCIR to Commander.

**TF-3**  **TF CCIR**

a) Situational dependent information.

b) Information specified by the commander.

**TF-4**  **Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TAC SOP)**

a) Intelligence.

(1) SPOTREP procedures.
(2) SALUTE reports.

b) Maneuver.

(1) Actions on contact.
(2) Formations.
(3) Battle play book.
(4) Format for battle update.

c) Fire Support.

(1) Sequence of fires.
(2) Requesting of fires.
(3) Requesting of CAS.
(4) Target designation.
(5) Target acquisition procedures.

b) M/CM/S.

(1) Breach lane marking procedures--hasty and deliberate, mounted and dismounted lanes.
(2) Protective minefield and obstacles marking and recording procedures.

c) CSS.

(1) LOGSTAT (logistics status) contents and reporting procedures.
(2) PERSTAT (personnel status) contents and reporting procedures.

d) Command, Control and Communications.

(1) Attach/Detach procedures.
(2) Adjacent unit coordination procedures.
(3) OPORD, DST, synchronization matrix and overlay contents, production and distribution.
(4) Near and far recognition procedures.
(5) TRP markings, day and night.
(6) Vehicle markings by unit, day and night.
(7) Rules of Engagement.
(8) Succession of command procedures.
(9) SITREP reporting.
(10) TIR numbering system.

h) Air Defense.

(1) Early warning procedures.

KEY OUTPUTS

TF-5  Battlefield Updates (No mission change)

Changes to enemy and friendly situation:

a) Intelligence.

b) Maneuver.

c) Fire Support.

D) M/CM/S.

e) NBC Defense.

f) Combat Service Support.

g) Command, Control and Communications.

h) Air Defense.

Report Brigade CCIR.

TF-6  WARNOS/FRAGOs (Mission change/modification)

Changes to TF order:

a) Situation.

b) Mission.

c) Execution.

d) Service Support.

e) Command and Signal.

TF-7  CDR's Decisions/Orders/Guidance (other than FRAGOs)
TASK LIST SUMMARY FOR CCF 20
DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN EXECUTION OF BATTLE

The tasks listed below are concerned with how the TF directs and leads a unit in battle. Tasks 2, 3, and 6 are directly concerned with the TF commander and his staff as they observe and control the task force during and after battle. Tasks 1, 4, and 5 are critical command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) tasks that support the commander in his leadership duties.

PLANNING

1. Task force command posts acquire and communicate information and maintain status (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901, 3901/12/14, 3902/1/3, 3903/7/8, 3904/1/3/5/15, 3912, 3913; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; Battle Command (Draft)).

2. Assess situation, the TF commander visualizes the battlefield (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/11/14, 3903/1/4/7; FM 71-100, Chap. 1, 6; FM 100-5, Chaps. 2, 6; Battle Command (Draft)).

3. Determine actions, TF commander directs changes to the operation or plan (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/2/3/4/6/7/8, 3902/2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 101-5, Chap. 2, 4).

4. TF commander directs and leads subordinate forces (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/12, 3903/4; FM 22-9, Chap. 4; FM 22-100, Chap. 1; FM 22-103, Chap. 1; FM 101-5 (FINAL DRAFT), Appendix M).

5. Task force command posts locate where they can control the battle; reestablish C2 functions after the loss of command post or commander (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3904/1, 3035, 3036, 3913/11; FM 71-123, Chap. 1).

6. Task force consolidates and reorganizes (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3022, 3023; FM 71-2, Chap. 3).
DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN EXECUTION OF BATTLE
EXECUTION TASK LIST

The tasks listed below describe how a TF in battle is led and directed. Tasks 2 and 3 contain subtasks that focus on the TF commander’s key aspects of command and control which must occur if combat power is to be applied successfully in a synchronous manner. Tasks 1, 4 and 5 are critical command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) tasks accomplished by the staff to support the commander in his battle command. Task 6 is the consolidation and reorganization of the TF after the battle. The tasks are not necessarily sequential in the order listed. Tasks 3, 5, and 6 are executed as needed; all other tasks are continuous and interdependent.

Each task below is closely linked to the other tasks listed and is based upon the Blueprint of the Battlefield. Listing of sub-tasks under one or another task does not lessen their linkage and importance to another task. Many sub-tasks can be placed under several different tasks; for simplicity sub-tasks have been listed only once. The analyst has grouped the tasks and sub-tasks to model the process of directing and leading a unit in battle.

Each task contains a subtask which lists critical considerations for the integrations of the Battle Operating Systems (BOS) collect from the other CCFs.

1. Task force command posts acquire and communicate information and maintain status (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3401, 3901/12/14, 3902/1/3, 3903/7/8, 3904/1/3/5/15, 3912, 3913; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; BATTLE COMMAND (DRAFT)).

a. Communicate information.

1) TF staff sends reports and recommendations to TF commander and BDE headquarters for their information and decisions.

   a) CCIR are immediately sent to the TF commander and the rest of the staff and to subordinate commanders IAW the TF SOP.1

   b) Routine information (pipeline information) is provided by the staff and Co/Tm commanders to the TF commander, and others as necessary or as required.2

   c) TF staff responds to requests for information from TF commander or higher headquarters (tree mode information).3

   d) TF staff and elements send "alarm" information to the TF commander, staff, and other affected TF elements immediately.4

2) S2 collects and evaluates information, identifies significant changes, uses information and intelligence reports, and distributes information.

   a) Receives

      (1) INTSUMs from brigade.
      (2) Responses from brigade to TF requests for information (CCIR, and IR).
      (3) Spot (SALUTE) reports from TF elements.
      (4) Information by eavesdropping on CMD Nets and O&I Nets.
      (5) Reports received from other staff members (e.g., FSO).
b) Tracks enemy.
   (1) Location.
   (2) Activity.
   (3) Adherence to, or deviation from, postulated enemy COA.
   (4) Strength (losses) and capabilities (remaining).

c) Evaluates information, comparing known enemy activity with envisioned enemy COAs.
   (1) Records information.
   (2) Identifies significant changes.
   (3) Identifies answers to PIR, IR.
   (4) Identifies possible changes to current enemy COA.
   (5) Identifies possible future enemy COA.

d) Updates intelligence products.
   (1) Intelligence estimate.
   (2) Situational template.
   (3) DST.
   (4) Intelligence overlay.
   (5) R&S plan.
   (6) Data base.

e) Reports PIR and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
   (1) TF CDR/S3.
   (2) TF XO
   (3) TF operations section.

f) Reports enemy's situation, evaluation of enemy COA, recommendations and information that fulfills PIR, IR to:
   (1) Co/Tms.
   (2) Scout platoon.
   (3) CTCP.
   (4) Relevant TF staff officers.
   (5) BDE S-2.

3) S3 receives, evaluates, identifies significant changes, and transmits operational information.

   a) Receives
      (1) Guidance/direction from TF commander.
      (2) Situation reports from Co/Tms and scout platoon.
      (3) Requests for resources, recommendations, or changes to OPLAN from subordinate elements.
      (4) Direct observation of operations.
      (5) Information by eavesdropping on BDE and TF CMD Nets.

         (a) Information and recommendations from other staff members (e.g., FSO, S2) to TF commander.
         (b) FRAGOs and situation reports from BDE.
(c) FRAGOs from TF Commander (to Co/Tms).
(d) Updated intelligence estimate, IPB products.
(e) Current unit strength reports.
(f) Current unit equipment reports.

b) Evaluates guidance/direction and information, comparing desired TF end state with current TF situation and trends.

(1) Answers EEFI.
(2) Identifies significant changes to the situation.

c) Updates operations data.

(1) DST.
(2) Event matrix.
(3) Operational graphics.
(4) Operations estimate.

d) Reports EEFI and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:

(1) TF CDR.
(2) TF XO

e) Passes directives and coordinating instructions, reports of the TF situation, evaluations of TF COAs, recommendations, and information that fulfills EEFI to:

(1) TF XO.
(2) S2 section.
(3) Operations section.
(4) Co/Tms, scout platoon.
(5) CTCP.
(6) Relevant TF staff officers.
(7) BDE TOC.

4) The S1 and S4 receive, evaluate, identify significant changes, and transmit logistical information.

a) Receive.

(1) Unit personnel and equipment status reports (S-1).
(2) Casualty feeder reports (S-1).
(3) Requests for maintenance and recovery support (S-4/BMO).
(4) Requests from Co/Tms for CL III and V resupply (S-4).
(5) Reports on new or repaired equipment (S4, BMO).
(6) Reports on incoming replacements or personnel returning to duty (S1).
(7) Reports on CL III & V on-hand and resupply from the BSA (S4).
(8) Information concerning the situation learned from eavesdropping on TF CMD and O&I Nets.
(9) Enemy and friendly situation updates.

b) Evaluates information, comparing desired TF situation and end state with current personnel and supply status.
(1) Answers EEFI.
(2) Identifies significant changes to personnel and/or logistical situation.
(3) Compares status with requirements.

c) Updates personnel and logistical data.
(1) Personnel strength status.
(2) Equipment readiness status.
(3) Supply stockage and resupply status.
(4) Medical treatment and evacuation plan and status.
(5) Personnel estimate.
(6) Logistics estimate.

d) Reports EEFI and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
(1) TF CDR/S3.
(2) TF XO
(3) TF operations section.

e) Reports personnel and logistical situation, recommendations and information that fulfills EEFI to:
(1) TF XO.
(2) S3 operations.
(3) Co/Tms.
(4) CTCP.
(5) Relevant TF staff officers.
(6) BDE S4/S1.

5) Special staff officers ("slice element" officers, e.g., FSO, ADLNO, Avn LNO, ALO, En, CMLO, etc.) receive, evaluate, identify significant changes, and transmit information.

a) Receive information and status reports from their "slice elements" and their higher headquarters.

b) Evaluate the changes to situation of the "slice elements."

c) Update their estimates and graphic aids.

d) Report EEFI and other critical information concerning the ongoing and future missions along with recommendations to:
(1) TF CDR/S3.
(2) TF XO
(3) TF operations section.

e) Report their situation, recommendations, and relevant information to:
(1) TF XO.
(2) S2
(3) Operations section.
(4) Other staff sections.
(5) Co/Tms.
(6) CTCP.
(7) Corresponding special staff at the BDE TOC.
(8) Parent units.

6) Co/Tm commanders and other subordinate leaders send reports to TF commander and CPs (report according to unit SOP).
   a) Elements report situation, significant changes in plan or intelligence, and information that fulfills EEFI to TF commander and CPs.
      (1) Reports enemy contact per SOP (SALUTE).
      (2) Reports Co/Tm course of action.
      (3) Requests required assistance.
      (4) Changes in status.

7) The operations center "Battle Captain" in the main CP and operations section receive and pass information IAW TF SOP.
   a) Receive orders, operational, intelligence, and logistical reports on the command, O&I, and administrative/logistics nets.
   b) Log orders, operational, intelligence, and logistical reports in the staff journal.
   c) Evaluate orders, operational, intelligence, and logistical reports for critical information.
   d) Staff "huddles" are conducted as directed by the TF XO to:
      (1) Allow each staff officer to disseminate information relevant to the entire staff.
      (2) Appraise information for completeness and to determine information gaps which require additional staff work.
   e) Pass CCIR and other time sensitive information immediately to the TF commander, XO and affected staff section(s).
   f) Pass other reports, orders, information, and TF commander’s directives (critical information is passed immediately to the section or sections to:
      (1) TF XO.
      (2) CTCP.
      (3) FTCP.
      (4) Brigade Headquarters.
      (5) Staff officers and their sections and LNOs in the Main CP (e.g., FSO, TF engineer, ADLNO).
   g) Monitor and supervise OPSEC measures (physical, signal, and information security) within the TF.
   h) Monitor TF execution of operations to ensure mission time lines are maintained.

8) Coordinate operations with appropriate adjacent, forward and higher units.
a) CMD GRP

(1) TF commander talks directly to the brigade commander.

(2) TF commander or S3 personally perform coordination with adjacent/forward battalions on brigade command net.

b) Main CP performs coordination with brigade and lateral coordination with adjacent/forward battalions as directed by the command group. TF establishes and maintains liaison. LNOs (both those sent and received by the TF):

(1) Conduct adjacent unit coordination.

(2) Provide respective locations, activities, capabilities, status, and intentions.

(3) Coordinate unit boundaries and gather information. This can include placement of LNOs at coordination points to continuously exchange information on unit positions, activities, and the enemy situation.

(4) Give and receive details of specific information requirements generated by the TF commander and staff.

c) CTCP coordinates delivery of supplies from BSA and ATPs to TF units.

d) TF "slice elements" coordinate with parent battalions.

(1) FSE keeps DS artillery battalion informed of the TF situation.

(2) AD element coordinates with its AD battery headquarters, AD battalion headquarters, and the BDE A2C2 element.

(3) Engineer element coordinates execution of obstacles in TF sector and other engineer work with other engineer elements not attached to the TF.

b. TF CPs manage means of communicating information.

1) "Information manager" controls the flow of information.\textsuperscript{5}

a) Facilitates the flow of information and communications between staff members and subordinate units.

b) Insures that a specific individual, e.g., the "Battle Captain," is responsible for each shift to insure that information essential to continuity of operations is passed between shifts.

c) Outlines and monitors the performance and responsibilities of the staff in processing information to support the operation and the commander's requirements.

d) Ensures contact is maintained with elements and/or devices that report CCIR, enemy and friendly situations, terrain, obstacles, etc. and allow the TF commander to see the battlefield and anticipate future actions.\textsuperscript{6}
(1) Scout platoon.
(2) TF and other security elements in sector or on avenues of approach that concern the TF.
(3) Army aviation elements.
(4) FAC, CAS aircraft.
(5) Co/Tms
(6) FISTs, FOs, and COLTs (on the FSO net).
(7) UAVs, GSR, etc.
(8) Brigade headquarters.
(9) TF Staff.
(10) Adjacent and forward units.
(11) TF liaison officers.
(12) TF "slice" elements (reporting information received from their higher headquarters, e.g., artillery, engineer, ADA).

2) CMD GRP maintains communications on:
   a) TF Command Net.
   b) BDE Command Net.
   c) FS Net.
   d) O&I Net.

3) Main CP maintains communications on:
   a) TF Command Net (NCS). 7
   b) BDE Command Net.
   c) TF Operations and Intelligence Net (NCS). 8
   d) TF Administrative/Logistics Net.
   e) BDE Operations and Intelligence Net.
   f) FS Net.
   h) AD Early Warning Net.
   i) Surveillance Net (Scout Platoon Frequency).

4) CTCP maintains communications on:
   a) TF Command Net.
   b) TF Administrative/Logistics Net (NCS). 9
   c) BDE Administrative/Logistics Net.
   d) The CTCP must have the capability of expanding its communications functions when it becomes the Main CP in an emergency.

5) TF reacts to meconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion.
a) Uses wire communications.

b) Works through interference.

c) Increases power.

d) TF shifts to alternate frequency at a designated time, event, or on-order.

e) TF continues the mission without communications, until they are restored.

f) MIJI report sent to Main CP by wire or messenger; report is forwarded to BDE S2.

c) TF commander receives responses to CCIR and other information.

d) Maintain information and force status.

1) CMD GRP maintains/updates:¹⁰

a) Current operations and intelligence map.

(1) Operations overlay (TF, higher and adjacent units).
(2) Intelligence overlay.
(3) Situation template overlay.
(4) Event template overlay.
(5) Combined obstacle overlay.
(6) FS overlay.

b) DST.

c) Synchronization matrix.

d) FS execution matrix.

2) The Main CP maintains/updates:

a) Current operations and intelligence map.

(1) Operations overlay (TF, higher and adjacent units).
(2) Intelligence overlay.
(3) Situation template overlay.
(4) Event template overlay.
(5) Combined obstacle overlay.
(6) CSS overlay.

b) DST.

c) NBC map.

d) Plans map (with overlays for future operations).

e) FSE map with FS overlay and FS execution matrix.

f) TACP map.
g) Intelligence staff journal.

h) Operations staff journal.

i) Synchronization matrix.

j) Personnel and equipment status.

   (1) Current strength.
   (2) Operational equipment strength.

3) CTCP maintains/update:

   a) Current operations and intelligence map.

      (1) Operations overlay (TF, higher and adjacent units).
      (2) Rear operations, security, and threat overlay.
      (3) Intelligence overlay.
      (4) Situation template overlay.
      (5) Event template overlay.
      (6) Combined obstacle overlay.
      (7) FS overlay.

   b) DST.

   c) FS execution matrix.

   d) CSS situation map.

   e) CSS staff journal.

   f) Synchronization matrix.

   g) Personnel and equipment status.

      (1) Current strength.
      (2) Operational equipment strength.
      (3) Status of supplies.
      (4) Casualties: wounded in action (WIA), disease-non-battle injury (DNBI),
          killed in action (KIA) current status/location.
      (5) Replacement personnel status/location.
      (6) Damaged & destroyed vehicles and equipment.

          (a) Recovery status.
          (b) Repair status.
          (c) Replacement status.

h) Status on location and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war and their equipment.

i) Status on location and evacuation of displaced persons.

e) Critical considerations for integration of the BOS.
Intelligence

1) An information manager monitors the situation and ensures that the TF commander receives information relevant to CCIR.

2) Enemy contact is gained quickly and maintained to provide continuous intelligence information (CCF 2, Task 3c).

3) Minefields, obstacles, and contaminated areas are identified and reported to the TF commander (CCF 2, Task 3d).

4) Changes to TF estimate of the enemy’s capabilities, terrain analysis and/or the weather are reported to the TF commander.

5) Continuous observation is maintained by R&S elements on NAI, TAI, other critical areas, and when possible, high value targets (CCF 2, Task 3k).

6) Information is processed to confirm expectations or to detail differences with intelligence estimate and IPB (CCF 3, Task 2a).
   a) Intelligence requirements (PIRs, IRs) are evaluated for current situation; they are modified or new requirements are established to meet a new situation, or as the commander defines CCIRs.
   b) Information is analyzed to verify the threat situation template and determine the need to update:
      (1) Order of battle.
      (2) NAIs, TAIs, and HVTs.
      (3) DST.
      (4) R&S plan.

Maneuver

7) Subordinate commanders send situation reports (CCF 6, Task 16a, 18e(1)).
   a) Subordinate leaders report information on their status and situation.
   b) Enemy unit size, dispositions, and activities are reported.
   c) Anticipated enemy actions are confirmed or refuted.

8) The commander continuously monitors and tracks combat information and intelligence to derive (CCF 6, Task 16b):
   a) Location and activities of enemy forces.
   b) Location and activities of friendly forces.
   c) Combat status of subordinate elements.
   d) Commander's estimate of subordinate units' situations (present state versus mission and anticipated end state).
Fire Support

9) FSO checks that FIST/FO/other observers are observing planned targets for indirect fires. FSO shifts responsibilities for observing targets as necessary (CCF 7, Task 25a).

10) The TF FSO/FSE responds to changes in guidance and intent of the TF commander; the FSO coordinates as required with the BDE FSE, the DS FA battalion S3/TOC, adjacent unit FSEs, and subordinate FA assets to comply with TF commander's instructions (CCF 8, Task 29a).

11) DST and FSEM are updated for changes in the status of the mortar platoon and artillery by the FSO or FSE (CCF 7, Task 28a).

12) FSO/FSE provides updates to the TF commander and staff on the status of FA systems, personnel, and supply capabilities (CCF 15, Task 27c; CCF 8, Task 31b).
   a) Provides status of firing elements.
   b) Reports when artillery firing platoons and/or TF mortar platoon are displacing.
   c) Describes and outlines the execution of the fire support plan.
   d) Provides dispositions, status, and activities of fire support assets under TF control (COLTs, FIST, FIST-Vs, FOs, TACP, OH-58Ds)
   e) FSO directs repositioning of assets that acquire targets/request fires that are out of position or recommends repositioning of them to TF commander and/or S3.
   f) BDA.

13) The TACP has established and maintains communications with CAS/AFAC, FSO, FIST during the execution of a CAS mission (CCF 9, Task 27b(1)).

14) FSO operates forward with TF CMD GRP while FSE coordinates fires (CCF 8, Task 30a(3)).
   a) Analyzes the artillery plan to determine if it is still valid or requires modification/refinement/major change based on enemy activities.
   b) Conducts an assessment of the effects of indirect fires.
   c) Prepares to execute artillery fire support based on the DST and on branches or contingencies developed during the wargaming phase.
   d) Determines the availability of CAS and possible targets.

15) The TF commander receives recommendations to changes in the FS plan from the FSO (CCF 15, Task 31b).
Air Defense

16) The ADO reports to the TF commander changes to the air defense plan, weapons control status, and position of weapons systems. Air defense assets are kept informed of status of friendly air in the area (CCF 9, Task 29a(1) & (3)).

17) The TF commander receives air attack warnings and information of when enemy air is in his area (CCF 16/17, Task 30).

18) The TF commander verifies that air defense elements are positioned on the battlefield to cover critical TF assets (CCF 5, Task 36a (5)).

Mobillity, Countermobillity, and Survivability

19) The TF commander is kept informed on all phases of NBC operations by the TF chemical officer, S3, and/or subordinate commanders.

   a) Enemy capabilities and NBC attacks.

   b) Friendly use of chemical or nuclear weapons.

   c) Location of contaminated areas.

   d) Status of contaminated subordinate units.

      (1) Location of decon site.

      (2) Changes in status of NBC supplies (Classes IIIZ and VIIIZ).

      (3) Percent of unit decontaminated.

      (4) Time the unit will be mission capable.

20) TF commander is informed of enemy obstacles (CCF 2, Task 3g).

21) The TF engineer reports to the TF commander as obstacles or gaps are neutralized, reduced, or bypassed before they degrade the momentum of an attack.

22) The breaching element commander confirms that improved lanes of breached minefields are marked, recorded, and reported (CCF 21, Task 56i).

23) Current status of friendly obstacles is maintained. TF commander is informed as obstacles are executed.

24) The TF commander verifies that the scatterable mines are accurately emplaced on their pre-designated targets (CCF 23, Task 38b & c).

Combat Service Support

25) Significant changes in strength are reported to TF commander.

26) TF S1 tracks casualties by specialty and company and informs TF commander of significant losses.

   a) Reviewing casualty feeder reports submitted by subordinate units.
b) Evacuation difficulties, needs of assistance, and mass casualty situations are reported to TF commander.

27) CTCP personnel monitor TF command net and anticipate/identify support requirements (CCF 31, Task 24).

28) TF S4 tracks equipment readiness by type and company, keeps TF commander informed of status (recovery, repair, etc.).

29) CSS planning for the supply of consumable and expendable items (filters, MOPP suits, decon kits, detector kits, plastic bags, ponchos, rain gear, etc.) is continuous (CCF 24, Task 46g).

Command and control

30) The CTCP is positioned to maintain the same communications as the main CP and is prepared to function as the main CP.

31) The TACP locates with the command group where it can observe and control CAS (CCF 9, Task 27a(1)).

2. **Assess situation, the TF commander visualizes the battlefield** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/11/14, 3903/1/4/7; FM 71-100, Chap. 1, 6; FM 100-5, Chaps. 2, 6; Battle Command (Draft)).

   a. The TF commander evaluates incoming information.
      1) Separates critical information from routine information.
      2) Determines reliability and credibility of new information.
      3) Determines relevance of new information to situation.
      4) TF commander adjusts his CCIR as the situation changes and as he determines that different or additional information is critical to his decision making.

   b. TF commander continuously reviews current situation. The TF commander compares the current situation with his running estimate in regard to time, space, and purpose and identifies differences (change) from his earlier estimate.¹¹
      1) Intent: TF commander uses the division and brigade commanders' intents and concepts when assessing the relationship of time, space, and purpose with the terrain, enemy forces, and friendly forces.
      2) Mission: TF commander reviews and compares his mission, concept of the operation (maneuver, and fires), as described in his most recent orders, to the current mission and situation.
      3) Terrain: The commander determines differences in terrain, weather, visible light, as well as enemy or friendly use of obstacles, obscurants, and electromagnetic measures as they relate to the TF's and the enemy's maneuver, capabilities, and mission.
4) Enemy

a) Based on reports from the S2, Scouts, Co/Tms and other collection assets, TF Commander determines what has changed in his knowledge of enemy locations, activities, capabilities, limitations, and probable intentions.

b) TF Commander makes inferences and deductions to update his assessment of enemy activities, capabilities, limitations, and probable intentions. The commander assesses the information given him using his personal experience, knowledge of enemy doctrine and tactics, intuition, and understanding of patterns established by the enemy being faced. He uses the DST as an aid in comprehending the battle.

5) Friendly (Troops)

a) The commander knows the changes in the location, activities, missions, and intentions of subordinate units.

b) The commander knows the changes in the TF overall, and in the individual Co/Tm combat power, in terms of capability relative to missions.

   (1) Capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of subordinate commanders.

   (2) Capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of subordinate units.

      (a) Weapon systems and equipment.
      (b) Personnel available.
      (c) Supplies.

   c) The commander knows the changes in location, activities and intentions of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear and higher).

6) Time. The commander knows the amount of time available and the amount of time required, e.g.:

   a) The amount of time needed for the TF or a subordinate element to move or to accomplish a task.

   b) The amount of time before a planned event or requirement occurs.

7) The TF commander refines his running estimate of the current situation.

c. Project whether there are additional requirements to achieve the mission. The TF commander compares the current situation with his current visualization of needed end states for the current mission and with his earlier concept for achieving those end states in regard to time, space, capability, and purpose. He determines the impact or effect of change to his running estimates.

   1) Changes in the physical environment caused by effects of terrain, visible light, weather, and enemy or friendly use of obscurants, obstacles, and electromagnetic measures as they relate to the TF's and the enemy's location, maneuver, combat power, and mission.

   2) Change in the enemy situation.

January 2, 1995
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle

a) The enemy's probable purpose that will have to be defeated in order for the TF to achieve its purpose.

b) The position that the enemy must be in (in terms of terrain) for the TF to achieve its purpose.

c) Strength and capabilities that the enemy should have at the end of battle if TF is to achieve its purpose.

d) Relative disadvantages that the enemy should have in the future to be sustained and later exploited versus the advantages of the TF if the TF is to accomplish future missions.

e) Relative advantage the enemy could have in the future that the TF must constrain to an acceptable level for the TF to accomplish its future missions.

3) Change in the friendly situation.

a) The commander decides where and in what strength the TF needs to be at the end of the mission to accomplish the brigade commander's intent.

b) The commander determines the strength and capabilities the TF will need at the end of the battle to achieve its mission.

c) The commander identifies the advantages the TF will need over the enemy to accomplish future missions.

4) Change to the mission.

a) The commander anticipates a change in the present mission.

b) The commander anticipates the addition of a new mission.

c) The commander analyzes the impact of new missions from brigade.

5) The TF commander decides whether achieving the required end state that he had envisioned earlier will still accomplish the TF mission.

d) Decide on need for action or change, TF commander makes decisions on whether or not to change what has already been directed for action or is planned. The options are:

1) Decide to leave actions and plans as presently directed. Based on that, orders are given to implement plans for:

   a) Maneuver.

   b) Execution of direct fires.

   c) Execution of fire support.

   d) Resupply.

   e) Synchronization of maneuver, fires, and resupply.

2) Decide that the situation is close to that which was originally projected and that the TF can proceed with the original plan slightly modified. The TF commander
and the staff verify the original plan and estimates and, issue FRAGOs for the appropriate modifications.

a) Directs actions that force enemy into one of the enemy COAs previously prepared.

b) Issues orders for maneuver that subordinates have the time to execute before enemy actions negate the order's desired effect.

c) Orders the shifting and massing of direct fires to destroy the enemy.

d) Alters fire support in terms of time, target, amount, or priority. Priority is given to high value targets.

e) Commits his reserve.

f) Changes priorities.

g) Requests additional resources from brigade.

h) Adjusts resupply to support the main effort.

3) Determine that the assessment of the present situation and desired end state does not match the original plan but does resemble the situation addressed by a developed branch. The commander selects the branch which most closely resembles the projected future outcome and modifies it (see Task 3).

4) Create a new concept more appropriate to the assessed situation than either the base plan or one of its branches (see Task 3).

5) Order a tactical pause and begin planning a new order because the TF plan is unworkable or, brigade has directed a change to the current mission that invalidated the TF concept and plan (see Task 3).

e. Critical considerations for integration of the BOS in visualizing the battlefield:

**Intelligence**

1) Commander evaluates the effects of terrain on the friendly course of action (CCF 1, Task 3a(2) & (3)).

   a) Conduct ground/terrain reconnaissance if at all possible.

   b) Analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain:

      (1) Observation and fields of fire.
      (2) Cover and concealment.
      (3) Obstacles.
      (4) Key terrain.
      (5) Avenues of approach.

2) The TF commander evaluates the effects of weather on TF and enemy operations (CCF 1, Task 3b(1) to (4)).

   a) Visibility (including fog and cloud cover) and light data.
b) Wind speed and directions.

c) Precipitation data.

d) Temperature and humidity.

3) Information is analyzed to identify and confirm or contradict the enemy’s COA as identified during the IPB process (CCF 3, Task 2a(3)).

4) Reconnaissance elements are positioned and repositioned to find the enemy and track and report his movement and strength.
   a) Reconnaissance and surveillance measures.
   b) Counterreconnaissance battle.
   c) Main battle.

**Maneuver**

5) TF commander assesses the maneuver plan with its branches, time, current and future enemy situation when deciding on action or the need for a change to the plan.

**Fire Support**

6) The commander visualizes the uses and opportunity of massing and shifting fires and changing fire support priorities.

7) As the FSO executes the fire support execution matrix, he modifies the artillery fire support plan to conform to new METT-T factors (such as identification of a high value target) or guidance from the TF commander (CCF 8, Task 34a(2)).

8) The FSO evaluates the fire support plan, fire support execution matrix, and DST to determine that they are still relevant to guide fire support for the battle.

9) The TF commander receives reports that verify coordination between the FSO, TACP, and S3 so that task force supporting fires are coordinated and synchronized with CAS missions. (CCF 9, Task 29d(1)).

10) The TF commander verifies that indirect fires (artillery, mortars, CAS) achieve desired results (i.e., suppression, neutralization, or destruction) and intent (CCF 8, Task 34a(3)).

**Air Defense**

11) TF commander assesses the current and future TF needs for air defense assets (number, location, mission, and weapons control status) based on the current and future METT-T situation.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability

12) The TF commander analyzes friendly and enemy obstacles.
   a) Commander uses the modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO) and reports to visualize enemy obstacle patterns and derive their purpose.
   b) Commander evaluates friendly obstacles, their type, location, and effects they are known to have on friendly and enemy maneuver vis-a-vis what was anticipated.

13) TF commander calculates impact of diverting DS artillery from normal support to firing FASCAM or smoke missions.

14) The TF commander confirms that planned FASCAM missions are ready for employment.

Combat Service Support

15) The TF commander uses CSS information to update his running estimate of TF capabilities. TF staff maintains and reports combat status and informs the TF commander of significant changes. (CCF 29, Task 34; CCF 31, Task 26).
   a) Significant changes to supply (all classes) for assigned, attached, OPCON, DS/SGS units.
   b) Significant losses of weapon systems and supplies.
   c) Losses to key personnel.
   d) Significant personnel losses.

Command and Control

16) The TF commander employs decision aids such as the decision support template (DST) and the fire support execution matrix to help visualize the enemy's location, direction of movement, and purpose.

3. Determine actions, TF commander directs changes to the operation or plan (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/2/3/4/6/7/8, 3902/2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 101-5, Chap. 2, 4).
   a. TF commander decides to develop and implement a new plan, or modifies and implements a pre-planned branch of an existing plan.12
      1) TF commander determines staff availability, the magnitude of change to the plan, and the amount of time available before execution.
      2) TF commander makes a decision whether to continue operations or to have the TF take a tactical pause.
3) TF commander decides whether to use the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), Combat Decision Making Process (CDMP), or the Quick Decision Making Process (QDMP).13

a) Deliberate Decision Making Process: DDMP is accomplished before current combat operations begin, when the TF commander has the time and has the staff available to conduct a methodical estimate of the situation and explore the full range of possible enemy and friendly COAs.

b) Combat Decision Making Process: CDMP is accomplished during combat operations, the TF commander has limited time but may use the help of the staff available to modify branches developed using the DDMP.

c) Quick Decision Making Process: QDMP is accomplished during combat operations, the TF commander uses the TLP to change a branch, developing a plan with limited time and without his staff, or with limited staff assistance.

b. Commander and staff conduct the Deliberate Decision Making Process (see CCF 18 for a detailed task list).

1) Receive order from higher headquarters. TF commander receives the order or a briefing by his staff. The TF headquarters issues a warning order and develops a planning time line.

2) Conduct mission analysis. TF commander and staff identify specified, implied, and essential tasks; the commander restates the mission.

3) Issue the warning order. TF issues a warning order with time and place for leaders' reconnaissance and OPORD brief.

4) Commander issues guidance. TF commander issues guidance and his intent for the mission. He directs specific courses of action to be examined and gives his priorities for fires and support.

5) Update staff estimates. The staff updates their estimates to reflect the current situation and the new order. The S3 issues a new Commander's (Operation's) Estimate, verbally or written.

6) Staff develops a course of action. Courses of action are developed based upon the BDE order, TF situation, and enemy situation. Each COA is developed in enough detail to allow a complete analysis and its development quickly into a TF OPORD/FRAGO.

7) Staff/CDR analyze course of action. COAs are war gamed and analyzed.

8) Staff compares courses of action. The TF staff compares all of the courses of action and prepares a recommendation for the TF commander.

9) Commander announces decision. The commander makes his decision and selects a COA that will complete the mission. The commander specifies his command and support relationships, his intent, and his end state for the TF.

10) Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO. The TF issues another warning order and prepares the OPORD/FRAGO.
11) Issue the OPORD/FRAGO. The OPORD/FRAGO is issued to the TF.

12) Refine the plan. Based on subsequent information and activities, the plan is refined and improved.

c. Commander and staff conduct the Combat Decision Making Process to modify a branch or sequel (see CCF 19 for a detailed task list).

1) The commander determines the TF's desired end state and his intent.

2) The commander makes a tentative plan.

3) TF commander determines the suitability of the new plan.

4) The TF commander and staff consider the feasibility of the plan.

5) The TF commander determines the acceptability of the plan. TF commander weighs the risks of the plan to the desired outcome.

6) The Commander makes a decision to accept the plan, and provides guidance to the staff to prepare supporting documents and graphics.

d. Commander conducts the Quick Decision Making Process using the Troop Leading Procedures.

1) TF commander conducts mission analysis; appraising changes to the original estimate and plan.

   a) Analyzes the division and brigade commanders' intent.

   b) Determines the TF's mission and desired end state.

   c) Determines requirements for using a WARNO.

   d) Identifies time-critical tasks (e.g., shifting of units, resupply, requests for additional resources).

   e) Conducts a map reconnaissance.

   f) Sets time schedule using reverse planning.

2) The commander issues a warning order.

3) The commander makes a tentative plan.

   a) Reviews METT-T analysis of the changes to the mission.

      (1) Mission: Who, what, where, when, why is being accomplished in support of the higher commanders' intent?

      (2) Enemy: What is the enemy's COA, his strength, location, disposition, activity, equipment, and capability?

      (3) Terrain and weather: OCOKA, vegetation, soil type, hydrology, climatic conditions, visibility.

      (4) Troops: The commander analyzes the TF's and Co/Tms' combat power in terms of capability relative to mission.
(a) Capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of subordinate commanders and units.
(b) Weapon systems and equipment.
(c) Disposition.
(d) Supplies.

(5) Time: The commander analyzes the time available for planning, preparing, and executing the operation for both enemy and friendly forces.

b) Visualizes commander’s intent.

c) Issues planning guidance to the staff (if the staff and/or time is available).

d) Visualizes COA.

(1) Commander alone develops one or two COAs.
(2) Commander specifies a COA and directs the staff to develop it (if the staff and/or time is available).

e) TF commander quickly analyzes (war games) the COAs.

(1) Options for deploying and employing TF.
(2) Purpose of TF, end state.
(3) Decisive points.
(4) Sequence of maneuver, fires, decision points, and CCIR needed.
(5) TF commander mentally compares COAs, when there is more than one.

e. TF commander decides on COA.

f. Critical considerations for the integration of the BOS.

Fire Support

1) During the planning process the FSO plans artillery fires and recommends necessary changes that will support the new plan to the TF commander (CCF 8, Task 32b).

2) The FSO/FSE updates the fire support matrix, and receives recommendations for future targets from the S2, S3, observers, and Co/Tms.

3) TF commander orders changes to the fire support plan based on his vision of the current battle and the required end state (CCF 15, Task 31b).

a) Diverts mortar fires, artillery fires, or CAS.

b) Changes priorities of fire.

c) Changes high payoff targets or TAI.

4) The TF commander prioritizes the TF’s direct fires, indirect fires, and smoke to suppress enemy air defense weapons (that can be engaged without interfering) in support of a CAS mission (CCF 9, Task 29b(2)).
Air Defense

5) Changes to TF air defense assets (command and support relationship, mission, location, weapons control status) are based upon the new scheme of maneuver and the current and future METT-T situation (CCF 5, Task 36a (5)).

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability

6) TF commander updates decontamination priorities (unit, equipment, location, time) (CCF 27, Task 27d).

7) TF commander uses the weather conditions, battlefield situation, past NBC usage, and the enemy's NBC capabilities to update decisions on the mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) and commander's exposure guidance, and his appraisal of NBC usage effects on the TF and its mission.

4. TF commander directs and leads subordinate forces (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3901/12, 3903/4; FM 22-9, Chap. 4; FM 22-100, Chap. 1; FM 22-103, Chap. 1; FM 101-5 (FINAL DRAFT), Appendix M).

a. Prepare plans or orders.\textsuperscript{14}

1) The TF issues another warning order.

2) Staff prepares FRAGO, or commander prepares to issues FRAGO developed by himself.

3) The staff prepares overlays and other graphic aids.

4) Commander approves FRAGO prepared by the staff.

b. Issue orders.

1) Issue the FRAGO to the TF.\textsuperscript{15} The FRAGO contains changes to the OPORD's:

a) Situation.

b) Mission.

c) Execution.

d) Service Support.

e) Command and Signal.

2) The TF commander directs TF to commence movement and preparation to execute the FRAGO.

3) The TF conducts reconnaissance (as time permits) to confirm and refutes information. The commander issues instructions to his subordinate leaders, specifying reconnaissance objectives.

4) TF commander refines the plan (as time permits).
a) War games changes found during reconnaissance that would change the facts
and assumptions made in the COA.

b) Determines changes to the task organization of the TF.

c) Develops branches and sequels to COA.

d) Completes surveillance, FS, CSS, communications, and control measures for
operations, and reviews his DST

5) The staff coordinates internally and externally to synchronize the plan, updating
the:

a) R&S Plan.

b) FS Plan and execution matrix.

c) CSS Plan.

d) Communications Plan.

e) Control measures for the operation.

f) DST.

6) Staff members supervise subordinate elements' execution of tasks within the
purview of their responsibilities and authority as established by the TF
commander.

a) As outlined in TF SOP.

b) As designated by the TF commander for the mission.

7) TF commander and staff observe/track movement and preparation of TF
elements.

8) The TF rehearses the plan (as time permits, Co/Tms at least conduct a backbrief
of their missions and plans to identify problems) using one of the following types
of rehearsals:16

a) Backbrief.

b) Radio.

c) Map.

d) Sketch map.

e) Terrain model.

f) Key leader.

g) Full.

9) Plan is refined to correct problems found during rehearsals.
c. Provide command presence, the commander positions himself where he can best lead and observe the enemy and friendly situation, command and control the battle.

1) Commander is positioned where he can physically observe and influence the TF's critical actions.

2) Commander retains the freedom to move; he does not become engaged in individual direct combat.

3) The commander takes measures to enhance his survivability from enemy fires.

4) The XO, S3, CSM, or another subordinate is positioned to observe, control, and report on critical events where the commander cannot be present.

5) The commander can communicate with the brigade commander, his subordinate commanders, and his command posts.

6) The TF commander keeps soldiers informed of the situation and makes personal contact with soldiers to increase morale and to increase his understanding of the situation and his units' and soldiers' capabilities.

7) The TF commander uses the CSM to provide a command presence where he cannot be.

d. Maintain unit cohesion and discipline; commander exercises leadership.

1) Has a moral presence.\(^1^7\)

2) Reassures subordinates by a calm presence.

3) Acts decisively.

4) Issues precise and simple orders.

5) Checks and ensures that orders are executed.

6) Emphasizes talking between subordinate commanders and supporting elements on TF command net or O&I net to coordinate their efforts, ensure mutual support, integrate effort, prevent fratricide, and increase understanding of the situation.

7) Observes subordinates for indications of shortfalls in performance and manner of performance.

8) Monitors subordinates and self for leadership degradation due to physical and mental stress of battle.

   a) TF commander monitors his own physical and mental state and gets rest.

   b) TF XO monitors the TF commander's physical and mental states and recommends rest periods.

   c) TF commander ensures that subordinate commanders are rested and prepared for battle.

9) Recognizes subordinates' achievements and efforts.
10) Uses the TF CSM to assist in maintaining unit discipline and morale.

e. TF commander synchronizes tactical operations.
   1) Orders maneuver, using the DST and synchronization matrix as an aid in the timing of orders to subordinate elements.
   2) Orders execution of direct fires, movement and/or maneuver of subordinate elements, using synchronization matrix as an aid in timing of orders to subordinate elements.
   3) Orders execution of fire support, using the fire support execution matrix, DST, and synchronization matrix as an aid in selecting targets or in timing the fires.
   4) Orders resupply, using synchronization matrix as an aid in timing of orders to CTCP and FTCP.
   5) Decides on need for a change from the last order promulgated (Tasks 1-3, CCF 20).

f. Critical considerations for the integration of the BOS in directing and leading subordinates in battle.

Maneuver

1) TF conducts a passage of lines (CCF 5, Task 40a(1); CCF 6, Task 17a).
   a) The TF commander places himself where he can best command and control the passage of lines (METT-T dependent). The passage is conducted without disrupting the stationary or moving force.
   b) The TF commander maintains control of the battle and makes positive handover of control to the stationary unit, or vice-versa. A clear responsibility for the fight is maintained.
   c) The TF commander hands-over battle, in terms of fire support, to his Co/Tm commanders.

2) TF moves tactically (CCF 5, Task 44b(1)).
   a) The TF commander monitors Co/Tm movement to ensure it is conducted in accordance with the order. The commander makes corrections to units to maintain orientation, security, and mutual support. Checkpoints are met on time.

3) The TF commander directs TF maneuver against enemy (CCF 6, Task 18b & c).
   a) Depth is achieved by the disposition of forces, obstacles, and fires. The battlefield is shaped to mass fires on the enemy.
   b) Agility is achieved by the rapid shifting of combat power to where it can be most effectively employed against the enemy force.
   c) Initiative is achieved by placing the enemy force in a continuous reactive state.
d) Synchronization is achieved by integrating and massing friendly combat power at the right place and time.

e) Indirect fires achieve the desired effects on enemy forces.

f) Fires occur at the right time and place.

4) The TF commander directs the establishment of a hasty defense on an objective (CCF 6, Task 20f).

5) The commander physically positions himself where he can observe the most critical point on the battlefield. The commander is able to see the activities of, and communicate with, subordinate forces (CCF 6, Task 16b).

6) The commander shifts his location to maintain the capability of directly influencing action at critical decision points.

Fire Support

7) TF commander approves CAS attack and receives a briefing from the TACP of the following information (CCF 9, Task 34i):

   a) Target type
   
   b) Target location
   
   c) Time of attack
   
   d) Munitions

8) The TF commander monitors fire support ensuring it is executed according to plan (CCF 15, Task 28a).

9) TF commander exercises overall control of fire support through FRAGOs to change missions/tasks for supporting fire support systems, he orders massing and shifting of fires to support the TFs maneuver (CCF 15, Task 28d).

10) The TF commander monitors BDA to appraise results of the fire support plan in terms of achieving the desired effects.

11) The FSO/FSE receives calls-for-fire from Co/Tm FSO and observers and retransmits the requests in support the execution of the scheme of maneuver

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability

12) The TF commander orders that the obstacle plan is executed (FASCAM) (CCF 5, Task 35c (4) & (5)).

13) In the attack, TF commander controls the critical actions of a breach of an enemy obstacle (CCF 21, Task 53b):
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

a) TF commander directs TF fires and maneuver. Obscuration/screening fires and supporting indirect fires are placed on the enemy positions to deny observation, isolate the point of penetration, and provide security to far side of the obstacle at the breach site.

b) The TF maintains the momentum of the attack.

c) Fires are massed.

d) Unit maintains integrity.

14) TF commander controls the critical aspects of the defense: gaps and lanes of friendly obstacles are closed in accordance with prearranged signals and/or events that support the task force scheme of maneuver (CCF 23, Task 37e).

15) The TF commander verifies that the TF is prepared for a nuclear strike. (CCF 24, Task 44a(1)).

Command and Control

16) The commander continuously synchronizes and massed combat power against the enemy force (CCF 6, Task 16c).

a) Continuously monitors decision support aids.

b) Cues pre-planned decisions to shift fires and/or forces.

c) Continuously focuses combat power at decisive points.

d) Retains the initiative throughout the battle.

17) The commander maintains continuous control of subordinate elements (CCF 6, Task 16d).

a) Maintains communications with all elements.

b) Monitors situation throughout the battlefield.

c) Ensures continuous mutual support among units.

d) Provides direct guidance as appropriate.

e) Integrates effort.

f) Monitors combat capabilities of all subordinate elements.

18) Commands are timely and responsive to the developing tactical situation (CCF 6, Task 18g(2)).

a) Direct and indirect fires are lifted and shifted.

b) Forces are repositioned and/or reoriented.

c) Counterattacks are conducted rapidly and effectively.
19) The TF commander makes checks that ensure support to the soldiers' personal readiness (CCF 30, Task 20).

a) Leaders keep soldiers informed.

b) Sleep plans are enforced.

c) As possible, soldiers receive morale, welfare, and recreational support.

5. **Task force command posts locate where they can control the battle; reestablish C² functions after the loss of command post or commander** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP; Task: 7-1-3904/1, 3035, 3036, 3913/11; FM 71-123, Chap. 1).

a. Command Posts move to maintain survivability and communications.¹⁸

1) CP OIC establishes the CP into two echelons that consist of vehicles with adequate communications equipment and personnel to provide a continuous capability.¹⁹

2) First echelon moves to new CP site.

   a) First echelon uses a covered and concealed route.

   b) First echelon arrives at new site and establishes communications with all TF elements and higher headquarters.

3) New CP starts operations.

   a) Communications are established.

   b) Maps and overlays are updated.

   c) Operations log is updated with significant events.

   d) Sections and personnel in the CP are updated on critical events that occurred while the CP was moving.

   e) CP identifies itself as operational and reassumes its command and control functions.

4) Once new CP is established, the second echelon breaks down its equipment and moves to the new CP site.

b. Command and control of the TF is maintained during the displacement of a CP.

1) CMD GRP moves, Main CP assumes CMD GRP functions.

2) Main CP moves: Jump TOC is formed to accomplish Main CP functions. If a Tactical CP is used by the TF, it assumes the Main CP functions during a move.

3) CTCP moves, Main CP assumes its functions.

c. Command post command and communications functions are reestablished after loss of CP due to enemy action or other of calamity.
1) Subordinate commanders and brigade headquarters are informed of loss and reestablishment of a TF CP.

2) Loss of CMD GRP, to enemy action or is otherwise not available, Main CP assumes CMD GRP functions:
   a) Synchronizing the TF's combat assets in support of the close battle.
   b) Controlling close operations.
   c) Reconstituting TF CMD GRP.
      (1) Obtains replacement of essential equipment (e.g., uses what TF has on hand, and/or requests replacements from BDE on a high priority basis).
      (2) Obtains replacements for key personnel losses to the staff, e.g., S3, FSO, and TACP. An interim solution is necessary so as to sustain the accomplishment of the functions performed by these key persons. Someone must assume the functions without a break in the TF operating tempo, e.g., a company FIST or the TF mortar platoon leader could assume the role of the TF FSO. Over time a more permanent solution should be sought, e.g., a replacement FSO from DIVARTY.

3) Succession of Command. If the TF CDR is lost to enemy action or is otherwise not available, command is assumed by a subordinate who is in position to direct the battle immediately and who has been designated in advance. As soon as possible, the XO should reposition, as necessary, and take command.

4) Loss of Main CP to enemy action or other calamity, surviving staff members move to alternate Main CP (either the CTCP or TF mortar platoon's FDC) and resume Main CP functions:20
   a) Synchronization of close operations by integrating CS, CSS, and the maneuver plan.
   b) Plan future operations.
   c) Serve as alternate CMD GRP
   d) Keep higher headquarters and adjacent units informed of the situation.

5) Loss of CTCP to enemy action or is otherwise not available, Main CP assumes CTCP functions:
   a) Plan and coordinate sustainment for tactical operations.
   b) Control rear operations.

   d. Critical considerations for integration of the BOS.

**Command and Control**

1) The command group, TACP, and main CP are correctly positioned on terrain that facilitates security, provides cover and concealment (hasty or prepared protective
positions), allows observation of battle area, and permits communications with
brigade and subordinate elements.

2) Position of the command element facilitates C3 and survivability and allows the
TF commander to see and analyze the situation (CCF 5, Task 33a; CCF 24, Task
35a).

6. Task force consolidates and reorganizes (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 7-1-3022,
3023; FM 71-2, Chap. 3).

a. TF consolidates.

1) Eliminates enemy resistance.

a) Clears objective by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of all
enemy vehicles and personnel.

2) Prepares to defend against an attack or counterattack.

a) Co/Tms occupy hasty fighting positions (not the old enemy positions), prep-
are for a counterattack, or Co/Tms occupy BP and continue to defend.

b) Hasty obstacles are established, obstacles are repaired and/or reinforced; gaps
are closed.

c) The appropriate weapons/units are moved to cover avenues of approach (e.g.,
AT weapons to high speed avenues and infantry to dismounted avenues).

d) Engagement areas are prepared.

3) Establishes security, maintains enemy contact, conducts reconnaissance as part of
planning/preparing for future operations.

a) Critical TF positions and activities are identified.

b) Co/Tm OPs and patrols established to counter enemy reconnaissance and to
obtain information.

c) TF scouts maintain enemy contact and begin reconnaissance for continuing
the attack.

d) Avenues of approach into Co/Tm and TF sector are covered.

4) Plans fires.

a) TF selects TRPs, Co/Tms verify them and designate sectors of fire.

b) DPs and TAI s are designated.

c) Indirect fires are planned.

d) Observers are positioned.

5) Issues appropriate orders to TF elements; TF prepares to continue to attack, or
defend, to gain or maintain the initiative.
a) Current mission.

b) Future mission.

b. TF reorganizes.

1) TF commander assesses status and capability of TF. TF commander makes changes to TF priorities.
   a) Personnel replacement.
   b) Intelligence collection effort.
   c) Maneuver plan.
   d) Counter-reconnaissance plan.
   e) Fire support.
   f) Supply.
   g) Engineer support.
   h) Medical support.
   i) Maintenance support.

2) TF coordinates reorganization.
   a) All elements report personnel and equipment status.
   b) FRAGOs issued to the TF consolidation and reorganization plan.
   c) Locations for resupply and for evacuation of personnel and equipment are provided by the CTCP.

3) TF reports status to BDE.

4) Other actions.
   a) Replace key leaders and critical personnel; reestablish the chain-of-command.
   b) Treat and evacuate all casualties.
   c) Recover/repair/evacuate all inoperative equipment.
   d) TF resupplies and cross-levels CL III & V to minimum basic loads for all combat vehicles.
      (1) Co/Tms also cross-level CL III & V to minimum basic loads to all combat vehicles.
      (2) Basic loads of CL III, V, & IX are replenished through LOGPACs.
   e) Evacuate all EPWs, captured documents, and equipment.
f) Redistribute personnel and equipment as needed.
g) Account for all personnel.
h) Report location and status to BDE.
i) Replacements brought forward with LOGPACs.
j) Reconfigure task organization.
   (1) Return attachments to parent units.
   (2) Receive TF units detached from other TFs.
   (3) Reconfigure Co/Tms.

c. Critical considerations for integration of the BOS.

Fire Support

1) The TF commander confirms that fire support assets under TF control are reorganized and redistributed in order to provide fire support capability to all remaining TF units (CCF 15, Task 32a).

Combat Service and Support

2) The TF commander directs and sets priorities of the reconstitution of personnel functions and organizations (CCF 30, Task 21).
   a) Leaders cross level personnel and reassign responsibilities.
   b) Determine personnel and equipment status.
   c) Report status to next higher headquarters.
CALL LESSONS LEARNED RELEVANT TO CCF 20
(EXTRACTS FROM LESSONS LEARNED BULLETINS)

1. NTC Lessons Learned: Commanders Memorandum - November 85

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

The S-2 is a key player, but it is a mistake to think of IPB as strictly an S-2 function. Decision making and IPB are part of the same whole. IPB must be done by the commander and his entire staff.

IPB drives reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution. Templates must be confirmed by physical reconnaissance. Key named and targeted areas of interest must be monitored by dedicated and, if possible, redundant assets.

In the OPORD, priority intelligence requirements and the decision support template need to be explained in detail so that reporting requirements are understood by all leaders and staff. Communicating IPB during the orders process helps focus task force leaders on the commander's intent.

Templates must be updated throughout operational planning and execution with significant changes rapidly passed to the commander. All possible sources should be exploited. Besides organic assets and requests to brigade, direct queries to adjacent and forward elements, ground and airborne FACs, and Army aviation assets in the area can produce useful and timely information.

Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance

For both offense and defense, reconnaissance must be continuous over time and throughout the depth of the battle area.

Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S-2 in close coordination with the S-3 and FSO.

The S-2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio nets. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.

Fire Support

By definition, a commander's concept is both a scheme of maneuver and fires. The concept of fires needs to be expressed in terms every bit as specific as that for maneuver.

Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver.

Hitting targets requires a great deal of preparation which should not be underwhelmed. Commo between companies, FSOs, and FDCs needs to be thoroughly checked before the battle to include necessary corrective action.
Defensive Chemical Measures

Formal NBC reports should not be transmitted on battalion and company command nets due to their disruptive impact. The preferred procedure is for platoons and companies to send initial spot reports on the command net, followed by NBC reports on the admin/log net.

The TOC must temporarily switch a radio to admin/log or use one of the XO's radios if they have been removed into the TOC.

MOPP posture decisions, to include when to unmask, must be made at battalion -- the first level with the staff to make a risk assessment.

Getting NBC warnings to elements not organic or attached to companies requires the use of all battalion nets, to include admin/log and mortar FDC. Each element in the task force area must monitor at least one battalion net, regardless of the support or command relationship.

Attack Techniques

Effective reconnaissance is the key to detailed planning, but in-depth planning must begin long before much of the reconnaissance is accomplished. Plans are then refined as more is learned about the enemy.

Also, a "review the bidding" session a few hours before LD time can be very beneficial. Commanders and staff are updated on intelligence that was not available when the OPORD was briefed; modifications to the plan are explained; and final coordination is effected.

Combat Service Support

Accurate and near real time loss reporting is essential both for prompt repair and for effective synchronization of available combat power. Timely information on overall status and an indication of significant losses are passed to the TOC on the command net with details provided to the ALC shortly thereafter on admin log.

Command and Control

Command and control must be a major consideration in the planning process and simplicity is a critically important factor.

To effectively control forces, a commander must "SEE" the battle, i.e., he must know the positions, activities, and status of both enemy and friendly elements. Commanders see by positioning themselves to physically observe as much as possible without becoming personally involved in the battle; by demanding fast, accurate, concise reports; by having the TOC provide processed information, partially from nets the commander cannot monitor; and through the use of scouts, OPs, and patrols.

Negative reports and updated status are important.

A disciplined flow of information on the battalion command net is extremely important. Radios must operate properly with relays planned and established as necessary to ensure continuous communications.
TOC reflex responses should include dropping to the internal net of an unanswering company, relaying from distant stations, checking compliance with the commander's instructions, and keeping a radio on old frequencies to police up stations that have not made the change.

Cross talk between company commanders is often a prerequisite for success. Given an understanding of the intent of the battalion commander, company commanders must help each other and not depend totally on instructions and information from battalion.

The rapid distribution of well through out and complete written orders is necessary to provide time for reconnaissance, changes in task organization, rehearsals, and all of the other planning/preparation activities needed to make a solid concept workable under the stress of combat.

The liberal use of easily recognizable graphic control measures is recommended.

While warning orders, frag orders, and face to face coordination are essential, the contention that there is no requirement for written orders at battalion level is simply incorrect. Leaders should be provided a written order or, at a minimum, an annotated overlay in all but the most rapid reaction situations.

Verbal frag orders must go to everyone in the orders group, not just selected company commanders. If circumstances are such that the TF commander discusses the order with something less than the total group, the S-3 and/or TOC should provide pertinent information and specific implementing instructions to the others, e.g., mortars, ADA, engineers, S-1/S-4.

Synchronization of combat power is often best accomplished when battalion directly controls and assigns tasks to attached and supporting units.

Frequent changes in task organization should be avoided. The teamwork advantage is often more important than a slightly more desirable mix of forces. Also, the timing of a change requires careful analysis. The significant advantages of a daylight link-up and the time required to receive the OPORD and to coordinate SOPs and LOGPACs must be considered.

The consequences of a lack of synchronization are so severe that OPSEC measures should not be permitted to degrade command and control at battalion level.

COMSEC requirements which complicate command and control for marginal improvements in security, must be culled. Secure nets are wonderful. In addition to dramatically improving OPSEC, more information can be passed in less time.

2. **NTC Lessons Learned No 1: Seven Operating Systems - January 86**

A thorough terrain analysis by the S2 contributes to the production of the situational template in the IPB process.

The scout platoon is a vital intelligence gathering asset to be considered when developing the intelligence plan.
3. **NTC Lessons Learned No 2: Intelligence - May 86**

The establishment and use of an O&I net has several advantages:

- It clears the command net for critical information and instructions.
- The O&I net permits TOC personnel to analyze non-critical information from reconnaissance elements before putting in out to the task force.

There are times when units, especially the scouts, pass information directly on the command net, even if the O&I net is operational.

Reconnaissance elements pass information directly on the task force command net when it is critical to the operation and no analysis is required.

An O&I net clears the task force command net of a great deal of routine or unconfirmed information.

**Intelligence updates**

- This technique involves a preplanned assembly of the battalion orders group. At this update leaders are briefed on intelligence gained since the OPORD briefing. The task force commander briefs his subordinates on any final modifications to the original plan based on this intelligence. Final face-to-face coordination is made.

- Actual assembly of the orders group for the intelligence update is beneficial, especially:
  - When plans must be modified and new graphics are required.
  - To facilitate final face-to-face coordination after subordinates have finalized their plans.

4. **CALL Bulletin, No 1-86 - July 86**

The 24 hours a day war demands that TOC personnel be trained in all aspects of the TOC operation.

Shift changeovers can cause a loss of continuity during an operation. No matter how good the changeover briefing is, there will be something lost. The shift schedules also gets disrupted because of TOC displacements which should occur frequently.

There aren’t going to be any breaks in the battle, especially where TOCs are concerned. The planning, coordinating and controlling of the battle will always be occurring.

All TOC personnel must understand the commander’s concept and intent and what is supposed to happen at TAIIs and NAIs. Supervisory personnel must be able to make basic tactical decisions, based on the situation, in the absence (for whatever the reason) of key leaders.

It is important to allocate time in the troop leading procedures/preparation for combat operations sequence for test firing weapons, especially small arms.
5. **Lessons Learned by/for Division Commanders - September 86**

**Ethics**

Set the example for standards and early on issue clearly defined guidance on standards of conduct.

Develop a forum where you, your commanders, staff, and sergeants major come to a consensus on a set of values which can be publicized to the lowest level.

Don't set a standard of 100% all the time. You'll generate and perpetuate unethical situations to "meet" this standard.

6. **CALL Bulletin No 3 - September 86**

Exchanges of unit SOPs or SOP extracts are essential to close coordination between supporting and supported units.

The task force S2 section must continuously anticipate "tomorrow's battle" requirements to facilitate future planning.

The BICC performs the preliminary analysis for future operations. The S2 receives, analyzes, and disseminates current battle information to the commander. The next battle is an extension of the current operation. The BICC continues to develop the IPB to support the next operation.

7. **NTC Lessons Learned CALL Bulletin No 4: Command and Control System - February 87**

Offensive IPB enables the commander and his staff to maintain the initiative with all available combat power by focusing the reconnaissance and surveillance effort.

Proper reporting and dissemination of collected combat information is essential to success of the reconnaissance effort.

Once the Decision Support Template (DST) is complete, a copy is provided each commander so that if the task force commander, S3, or XO are out of the battle, the next senior officer can continue the fight or modify the plan, as necessary.

The Admin/Log Center (ALC) assumes TOC operations when the TOC is destroyed or incapacitated, and continues until the TOC becomes operational or a replacement headquarters assumes control of task force operations. Criteria for assumption of this on-order mission must be specified in the unit tactical SOP.

Destruction of the TOC, while a catastrophic loss, must not prevent the task force from continuing its mission.

Staff personnel from the ALC must be cross-trained to perform TOC functions with minimal loss of continuity of command and control.

Situation maps and unit status boards reflecting the current tactical status of each company/team are examples of the equipment that must be available in the ALC for immediate use upon assumption of the TOC mission.
ALC personnel must track the battle and keep abreast of the current tactical situation at all times.

At a minimum, the ALC must have all friendly situation information posted, the most recent intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) update, the most current doctrinal and situational templates of suspected enemy locations, and known enemy locations. Both the obstacle plan and target overlay must be posted and kept current.

Communications equipment must be available to provide the ALC with an equivalent capability to exercise command and control over subordinate elements as well as communicate with higher headquarters (brigade) and attached or supporting elements.

The commander must ensure everyone understands how he intends to fight the battle.

The task force commander must have an effective TOC to react to the fast pace on the AirLand battlefield.

The TOC should analyze all sources of information and make recommendations to the task force commander. The TOC must keep abreast of adjacent units and advise the commander, companies and separate platoons accordingly. The TOC should be able to plan for the next battle and direct functions for the commander which he is too busy to personally direct.

TOCs should:

- Track the Battle. This consists of monitoring current location, activity and combat power of task force elements; monitoring the progress of adjacent and supporting units and updating templates.

- Analyze Data. The TOC must analyze all incoming reports from the company/teams, other task force elements, higher headquarters, adjacent units and supporting units. After the TOC analyzes these reports they pass the results to the task force commander and recommend any changes to the present course of action.

- Plan for Future Operations. The significant activity in adjacent and higher units or receipt of the warning order initiates planning. The TOC staff must immediately begin to consider possible courses of actions, probable enemy actions, support requirements, etc. The TOC must also initiate a task force warning order and ensure the S1-S4 are immediately brought in on the planning.

- Disseminate information. The TOC should keep the battalion/task force informed of any action or development that might influence the battle. One technique is to provide an intel summary from analyzed reports off of the O&I net. This summary should be concise and given periodically over the battalion net. This summary could also be used to inform higher headquarters.

The most important consideration when selecting a location to position the TOC is communication with the brigade TOC and with forward elements of the task force.

The TOC must be able to break-down, move and set-up quickly and with the minimum disruption to its operation.

The TOC must be able to write and produce overlays in the field under all conditions.
8. **CTC Lessons Learned No 88-2 - May 88**

   Dedicate redundant communications to all recon assets.

   Disseminate intelligence using "eavesdrop" and intelligence updates. Subordinates monitor (eavesdrop) the scout's report on the CP.

9. **CALL Compendium, Vol 1: Heavy Forces - Fall 88**

   **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**

   Physical reconnaissance, on the ground, is necessary to confirm or refute the situation template.

   The recon mission is to find the enemy and report this to the commander and S2. Any and all elements of the task force or brigade can fill in missing elements of combat information through the reporting system, SALUTE, spot reports, etc.

   All key leaders and staff must realize that the IPB process never stops. Templates require continuous updating throughout all aspects of operational planning and execution. Notifying all key personnel of all significant changes is critical to the process. IPB is not a process separate and distinct from all the other staff processes. It applies staff actions to gathering information toward answering certain questions relative to ongoing mission.

   The Avn LNO must track crew and equipment status and relay this information to the ground maneuver commander.

   MOPP decisions, to include unmasking, should be made at the task force TOC after a thorough risk assessment.

   Information flow must be lateral as well as vertical. Commanders of separate support companies must keep each other informed of tactical developments.

   **Command and Control**

   Adhere to a disciplined system of time management. Someone must establish a timed critical list based on each mission and enforce it. The 1/3-2/3 rule is a guide but METT-T dependent.

   One of the best forms of commander's guidance is rough maneuver and fire support graphics drawn by the commander and given to the staff to focus staff planning.

   Employ clear/concise written orders:

   Clear written orders greatly reduce the fog of war to tired leaders. They provide a checklist for exhausted leaders to remind themselves what their mission and the commander's intent really is.

   The limiting factor on the conciseness of the order is how well the unit understands the commander's intent.

   Use backbriefs:
Immediately after the commander issues the order, his subordinates backbrief the commander on their tentative concepts of operations. If these are in line with the commander's intent, his subordinates understand the order. If not, the commander clarifies the plan. Ensure all slice elements backbrief.

During preparation, the commander meets subordinates individually or together on the battlefield. Here, his subordinates backbrief their concept based on their actual recon. This ensures that any minor changes a subordinate implemented to make the plan fit ground truth still support the commander's intent.

**Rehearsals are critical to the successful execution of the operation.**

Commanders must visualize the battlefield:

- Study enemy order of battle, doctrine, and tactics. A thorough knowledge of the enemy will allow the commander to visualize enemy actions as certain cues are seen or reported.

- A thorough IPB to include verification of the situation template by recon assets will add to the mental picture.

- Detailed, yet concise reports from trusted agents or subordinates regarding both friendly and enemy movements or activities throughout the course of the battle is a necessity.

- The unit tactical operations center must forward concise reports to the commander on information gained from higher and adjacent units. This must include both friendly and enemy activities.

- Personal reconnaissance of the battlefield must be done for each new mission regardless of previous familiarity with the terrain.

- Backbriefs and rehearsals provide the commander a visualization of what his subordinate units are/or should be doing at any point in the battle.

- The commander must plan and rehearse his own position and movement on the battlefield as carefully as is done for the overall TF plan. He must be forward to personally see critical points in the battle, yet protected in order to survive.

- Finally, practice and more practice is a necessity in learning to "see" or visualize the battlefield. No opportunity can be wasted to gain experience in this most critical warfighting skill.

10. **CALL 89-1: Non-Mechanized Forces - Spring 89**

Commanders must demand that key leaders discipline themselves to obtain a minimum level of rest.

Command and control elements are the first to feel the effects of CONOPS. Judgment abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.

Leaders must give the greatest amount of available time to subordinate leaders. Use no more than 1/3 of the available time for planning and preparation of the order. Provide no less than 2/3s of the available time for subordinate units to prepare for combat.
Prioritize critical tasks and use available time to concentrate on those tasks.

Use daylight hours for preparation of operations. Preparation (i.e. selection of defensive positions, inspection of soldiers, reconnaissance, etc.) requires more visibility than execution or planning.

Time available dictates the amount of detail allowed in planning.

Reverse planning is an indispensable technique for time management. Begin with the time an event must take place (i.e. LD time) and estimate the time each prior event will take.

Attachments and OPCON units require lead time to conduct operations to support the task force (i.e. time to develop fire support plans or emplace obstacles to support the scheme of maneuver). Commanders and staff officers must make these needs known and integrate these times into the task force plan.

The task force Command Sergeant Major is a critical asset to the task force commander. He knows the standards the commander expects and needs. A task force, like any unit, needs to have high standards, tight discipline and loyalty to one commander. Establishing and maintaining loyalty and standards in a task force is a unique challenge, and the task force Command Sergeant Major is the soldier best suited to perform this task.

On the battlefield the Command Sergeant Major can position himself where leadership is most needed.

The Command Sergeant Major has the maturity, the wealth of experience and the rank to significantly and positively influence these missions. Commanders must consider METT-T and decide where this valuable asset can best be employed to affect the battle.

11. CALL 89-2: Heavy-Light Lessons Learned - August 89

A brief order that clearly defines the intent of the commander requires less effort to execute. It is better to provide a good plan quickly and to refine it later, than to delay preparation until the best plan is completed and time limited.

12. CALL: NCO Lessons Learned - October 89

All the NCOs, and even some of the more experienced soldiers of lower rank, must stay aware of the tactical situation and be prepare mentally to take charge.

The Command Sergeant Major

The Command Sergeant Major is the "ramrod" of the battalion. He makes sure things happen.

He advises the battalion commander on troop and logistical welfare and discipline manners.

NCOs must help set priorities of work by clarifying through the chain of command what must be done.

The troops must be kept informed and the NCO must do it.
The NCO must know and understand the commander's intent if he is to be effective and accomplish the unit's mission.

TACSOPs are critical in keeping the NCO chain, and thus the soldiers, informed of the right information at the right time.

Without precombat checks and follow-up, no one knows if the unit is ready for battle. Ensure soldiers and units are tasked evenly. Over-tasking soldiers degrades combat performance. It is more than a question of combat effectiveness.

NCOs must insist and enforce field discipline in themselves first.

Ensure the TACSOP is complete, includes standards, is understood, and is used every time the trooper goes to the field. NCOs ensure compliance with the TACSOP.

**Command Sergeants Major Assist the Task Force Commanders**

The CSM is a vital source of information to the commander and is a key leader in dealing with NCOs.

The command sergeant major has a tremendous impact on the soldier's performance, team cohesion, and unit effectiveness. He looks out for the welfare of their men and can foster a positive command climate.

The CSM can greatly assist by:

- Identifying, correcting, and bringing to the commander's attention NCO leadership problems.

- Moving with the commander to assess unit morale and logistics problems.

13. **CALL: Corps-Division Lessons Learned - November 89**

Control of FRAGO's and Warning Orders. Many units are running into difficulty when the TAC, Rear, and the Main issue FRAGO's and Warning Orders, especially when duplicate numbers are issued.

Hard copy follow-up on verbal orders/decisions. Many decisions are made in face to face discussions are made in face to face discussions between commanders. Sometimes problems arise when these discussions are away from the CP. This causes problems for the staff in synchronizing the various aspects of the operation as well as keeping the other players informed. Hard copy back up needs to be generated to assist in this process.

14. **CALL 90-1: Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander - February 90**

The maneuver commander must state the role that fire support is to play in the overall operation.

The commander defines the areas where indirect fires are to be planned, engagement areas where fires must support maneuver, and any areas critical to the battlefield that require fire support.
Only after the commander's guidance and intent is clearly defined and understood can the FSO conduct planning, war gaming, and rehearsing of the operation with the commander and his battle staff.

15. CALL 90-6: The Musicians of Mars - June 90

Establish a time line that includes all critical events. Stick to it religiously. Time management is essential to effective planning and preparation.

Doing all oneself simply will not work. There may be short-term success; but in the long run only disaster will result. Give subordinates responsibilities, train them to standard, give them authority, and hold them accountable.

Plan for contingencies. Have redundant systems in place, and rehearse their use before the battle starts. If you are not prepared you are doomed to fail.

16. CALL Newsletter No. 90-8: Winning in the Desert II - September 90

There are many factors that can create stress in combat operations: fatigue, anxiety, time, intense heat, battlefield uncertainty, et. Reactions to stress are varied, but there are clear indications, from combat experience and less stressful research and training environments, that soldier performance in command and control C2 operations can suffer.

Maintain a realistic, balanced perspective on enemy capabilities. Plan ahead. The reality of violent combat can cause commanders and staffs to concentrate on just the immediate battle.

Eliminate future surprises by planning for the next battle during the current fight. See the entire battlefield. Under stress it is more comfortable to narrow your focus to your immediate control and within your own boundaries.

Commanders and staffs must consider the bigger picture when planning and conducting their operations. Decide early, then plan in detail.

Keep plans simple, but plan them in detail. Achieving synchronization depends on working out the time, space, and force details.

Situation assessment is not something you do just during mission analysis. It must be a continuous activity to avoid delays in comprehending important changes and events and to maintain the ability to respond rapidly.

Good communications is always difficult, but stress and fatigue will greatly increase misunderstandings. Just because something is very clear to you, do not assume that it is clear to everyone else. Double-check communication. Use backbriefs and rehearsals. Staff visits and follow-ups also foster good communication and can keep problems from recurring.

Widespread agreement among the staff is not necessarily a healthy sign. It could mean that the desire to find an agreement is overriding critical thinking.
17. **CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume I (Soldiers and Leadership) - October 90**

Every soldier must know the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and have the discipline and training to apply these rules in the absence of supervision.

Training and discipline are key when the ROE change, becoming more restrictive on the use of force and leaders are unable to direct the actions of individual soldiers.

U.S. soldier conduct must be of the highest standard. It will influence how the world and U.S. public view the operation.

18. **CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume II (Operations) - October 90**

Leaders/soldiers must conduct detailed reconnaissance whenever possible.

Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders' understanding of the overall plan and the commander's intent.

Understand the commander's intent two levels up.

Use troop-leading procedures effectively. Planning and rehearsals are often much more important than trying to create a perfect plan at the higher headquarters.

Exchange LOs. They are critical to successful operations.

Plan to provide LO support staffed for a 24-hour capability for continuous operations.

Provide adequate communications packages to LOs to maintain communications with parent headquarters and units.

19. **CALL 90-9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume III (Intelligence, Logistics & Equipment) - October 90**

Unit S2s must conduct a thorough review and prioritization of each piece of information. Commanders must develop command post exercises (CPX) scenarios that tax the reporting system to allow realistic exercise play. Make unit SOPs explicit in reporting requirements and formats; adherence to these directives will help keep reporting nets open. Subordinate commands must also stay apprised of the first echelon collection, management and dissemination (CM&D) plan.

Information overload on the operations and intelligence net may occur quickly. Unit S2s must screen and prioritize incoming information. Attach time limits to even high priority information which will expire after a certain point.

A periodic review and re-prioritization of battlefield information ensures that only pertinent data is acted on. As time permits, secondary information must be reviewed.

Subordinate elements must understand the priority intelligence requirements, and intelligence requirements and be updated when friendly units operate within their areas of operations (AO). This will deconflict reporting and negate duplicative traffic.
20. CALL Newsletter No. 91-1: Rehearsals - April 91

If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

21. CALL 92-5: Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield - November 92

The essence of planning is to anticipate events. This includes sustainment planning. Anticipating support requirements means synchronizing support actions so that combat power is sustained or reconstituted in concert with the tactical plan.

Commanders also need to know the duration of their units’ sustained combat power for the mission at hand, as well as the projected profile of the unit's fighting strength on the objective and for the "Be prepared ..." mission. They need to know how long fuel and ammunition supplies will allow them to fight - how and when combat power will be sustained or reconstituted.

22. CALL Newsletter No. 93-3: The Battalion and Brigade Staff -July 93

Staffs must collect and organize information to provide the commander with necessary details he needs to analyze the situation.

Commanders and staffs must analyze and plan the use of available time in detail and not waste planning and preparation time.

Time Management Lessons:

Commander: Preserve subordinate commander’s time.

Commander and staff: Develop a planning and preparation timeline.

Commander and staff: Refine the timeline by listing tasks to be accomplished during planning and preparation and the person responsible to complete the task.

Commander and staff: Use the timeline to track the progression or preparation.

Commanders and staffs must be organized and prepared to produce operations orders quickly.

23. CTC Bulletin No. 93-4 - July 93

Each staff officer and LO must properly advise the staff to ensure the proper employment of his assets as well as the focusing of combat power.

Units should establish planning and TOC operational procedures that promote staff cross-talk.

Staff members need to work together to analyze information and provide updated estimates to the staff and commander to support the current battle and plan for future operations.

Commanders and staffs must schedule rehearsals to allow subordinate units time to complete their orders process.
Failure to render complete and accurate reports often results in the commanders not having the information they need to make informed decisions regarding tactical maneuvers and the allocation of combat power. The consequences could mean complete mission failure, or the unnecessary loss of lives and resources. Often a reporting system is contained in the unit SOP, but it is not properly trained or used.

24. **CALL 93-9: Force Protection - December 93**

Risk management, in theory, is a five-step process that is easily integrated into the decision making process.

RISK ASSESSMENT is a part of risk management. A risk assessment causes leaders to identify hazards and threats and place them in perspective relative to the mission or task at hand.
LESSONS LEARNED INTEGRATED INTO CCF 20 TASK LIST

1. **Task force command posts acquire and communicate information and maintain status** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 71-1-3401, 3901/12/14, 3902/1/3, 3903/7/8, 3904/1/3/5/15, 3912, 3913; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; Battle Command (Draft)).

   **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**

   The S-2 is a key player, but it is a mistake to think of IPB as strictly an S-2 function. Decision making and IPB are part of the same whole. IPB must be done by the commander and his entire staff.

   IPB drives reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution. Templates must be confirmed by physical reconnaissance. Key named and targeted areas of interest must be monitored by dedicated and, if possible, redundant assets.

   In the OPORD, priority intelligence requirements and the decision support template need to be explained in detail so that reporting requirements are understood by all leaders and staff. Communicating IPB during the orders process helps focus task force leaders on the commander's intent.

   Templates must be updated throughout operational planning and execution with significant changes rapidly passed to the commander. All possible sources should be exploited. Besides organic assets and requests to brigade, direct queries to adjacent and forward elements, ground and airborne FAC's, and Army aviation assets in the area can produce useful and timely information.

   **Defensive Chemical Measures**

   Formal NBC reports should not be transmitted on battalion and company command nets due to their disruptive impact. The preferred procedure is for platoons and companies to send initial spot reports on the command net, followed by NBC reports on the admin/log net.

   The TOC must temporarily switch a radio to admin/log or use one of the XO's radios if they have been remoted into the TOC.

   MOPP posture decisions, to include when to unmask, must be made at battalion — the first level with the staff to make a risk assessment.

   Getting NBC warnings to elements not organic or attached to companies requires the use of all battalion nets, to include admin/log and mortar FDC. Each element in the task force area must monitor at least one battalion net, regardless of the support or command relationship.

   **Combat Service Support**

   Accurate and near real time loss reporting is essential both for prompt repair and for effective synchronization of available combat power. Timely information on overall status and an indication of significant losses are passed to the TOC on the command net with details provided to the ALC shortly thereafter on admin log.
Command and Control

Negative reports and updated status are important.

A disciplined flow of information on the battalion command net is extremely important. Radios must operate properly with relays planned and established as necessary to ensure continuous communications.

TOC reflex responses should include dropping to the internal net of an unanswering company, relaying from distant stations, checking compliance with the commander's instructions, and keeping a radio on old frequencies to police up stations that have not made the change.

COMSEC requirements which complicate command and control for marginal improvements in security, must be culled. Secure nets are wonderful. In addition to dramatically improving OPSEC, more information can be passed in less time.

The establishment and use of an O&I net has several advantages:

It clears the command net for critical information and instructions.

The O&I net permits TOC personnel to analyze non-critical information from reconnaissance elements before putting in out to the task force.

There are times when units, especially the scouts, pass information directly on the command net, even if the O&I net is operational.

Reconnaissance elements pass information directly on the task force command net when it is critical to the operation and no analysis is required.

An O&I net clears the task force command net of a great deal of routine or unconfirmed information.

Intelligence updates

This technique involves a preplanned assembly of the battalion orders group. At this update leaders are briefed on intelligence gained since the OPORD briefing. The task force commander briefs his subordinates on any final modifications to the original plan based on this intelligence. Final face-to-face coordination is made.

Actual assembly of the orders group for the intelligence update is beneficial, especially:

When plans must be modified and new graphics are required.

To facilitate final face-to-face coordination after subordinates have finalized their plans.

The 24 hours a day war demands that TOC personnel be trained in all aspects of the TOC operation.

Shift changeovers can cause a loss of continuity during an operation. No matter how good the changeover briefing is, there will be something lost. The shift schedules also gets disrupted because of TOC displacements which should occur frequently.
There aren't going to be any breaks in the battle, especially where TOCs are concerned. The planning, coordinating and controlling of the battle will always be occurring.

All TOC personnel must understand the commander's concept and intent and what is supposed to happen at TAsIs and NAsIs. Supervisory personnel must be able to make basic tactical decisions, based on the situation, in the absence (for whatever the reason) of key leaders.

Proper reporting and dissemination of collected combat information is essential to success of the reconnaissance effort.

The task force commander must have an effective TOC to react to the fast pace on the AirLand battlefield.

The TOC should analyze all sources of information and make recommendations to the task force commander. The TOC must keep abreast of adjacent units and advise the commander, companies and separate platoons accordingly. The TOC should be able to plan for the next battle and direct functions for the commander which he is too busy to personally direct.

TOCs should:

Track the Battle. This consists of monitoring current location, activity and combat power of task force elements; monitoring the progress of adjacent and supporting units and updating templates.

Analyze Data. The TOC must analyze all incoming reports from the company/teams, other task force elements, higher headquarters, adjacent units and supporting units. After the TOC analyzes these reports they pass the results to the task force commander and recommend any changes to the present course of action.

Plan for Future Operations. The significant activity in adjacent and higher units or receipt of the warning order initiates planning. The TOC staff must immediately begin to consider possible courses of actions, probable enemy actions, support requirements, etc. The TOC must also initiate a task force warning order and ensure the S1-S4 are immediately brought in on the planning.

Disseminate information. The TOC should keep the battalion/task force informed of any action or development that might influence the battle. One technique is to provide an intel summary from analyzed reports off of the O&I net. This summary should be concise and given periodically over the battalion net. This summary could also be used to inform higher headquarters.

The TOC must be able to write and produce overlays in the field under all conditions.

Dedicate redundant communications to all recon assets.

Disseminate intelligence using "eavesdrop" and intelligence updates. Subordinates monitor (eavesdrop) the scout's sport reports to the CP.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Physical reconnaissance, on the ground, is necessary to confirm or refute the situation template.
The recon mission is to find the enemy and report this to the commander and S2. Any and all elements of the task force or brigade can fill in missing elements of combat information through the reporting system, SALUTE, spot reports, etc.

All key leaders and staff must realize that the IPB process never stops. Templates require continuous updating throughout all aspects of operational planning and execution. Notifying all key personnel of all significant changes is critical to the process. IPB is not a process separate and distinct from all the other staff processes. It applies staff actions to gathering information toward answering certain questions relative to ongoing mission.

The Avn LNO must track crew and equipment status and relay this information to the ground maneuver commander.

MOPP decisions, to include unmasking, should be made at the task force TOC after a thorough risk assessment.

Information flow must be lateral as well as vertical. Commanders of separate support companies must keep each other informed of tactical developments.

Exchange LOs. They are critical to successful operations.

Plan to provide LO support staffed for a 24-hour capability for continuous operations.

Provide adequate communications packages to LOs to maintain communications with parent headquarters and units.

Unit S2s must conduct a thorough review and prioritization of each piece of information. Commanders must develop command post exercises (CPX) scenarios that tax the reporting system to allow realistic exercise play. Make unit SOPs explicit in reporting requirements and formats; adherence to these directives will help keep reporting nets open. Subordinate commands must also stay apprised of the first echelon collection, management and dissemination (CM&D) plan.

Information overload on the operations and intelligence net may occur quickly. Unit S2s must screen and prioritize incoming information. Attach time limits to even high priority information which will expire after a certain point.

A periodic review and re-prioritization of battlefield information ensures that only pertinent data is acted on. As time permits, secondary information must be reviewed.

Subordinate elements must understand the priority intelligence requirements, and intelligence requirements and be updated when friendly units operate within their areas of operations (AO). This will deconflict reporting and negate duplicative traffic.

Staffs must collect and organize information to provide the commander with necessary details he needs to analyze the situation.

Each staff officer and LO must properly advise the staff to ensure the proper employment of his assets as well as the focusing of combat power.

Units should establish planning and TOC operational procedures that promote staff cross-talk.
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle

Staff members need to work together to analyze information and provide updated estimates to the staff and commander to support the current battle and plan for future operations.

Commanders and staffs must schedule rehearsals to allow subordinate units time to complete their orders process.

Failure to render complete and accurate reports often results in the commanders not having the information they need to make informed decisions regarding tactical maneuvers and the allocation of combat power. The consequences could mean complete mission failure, or the unnecessary loss of lives and resources. Often a reporting system is contained in the unit SOP, but it is not properly trained or used.

2. **Assess situation, the TF commander visualizes the battlefield** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 71-1-3901/11/14, 3903/1/4/7; FM 71-100, Chap. 1, 6; FM 100-5, Chaps. 2, 6; Battle Command (Draft)).

**Command and Control**

Command and control must be a major consideration in the planning process and simplicity is a critically important factor.

To effectively control forces, a commander must "SEE" the battle, i.e., he must know the positions, activities, and status of both enemy and friendly elements. Commanders see by positioning themselves to physically observe as much as possible without becoming personally involved in the battle; by demanding fast, accurate, concise reports; by having the TOC provide processed information, partially from nets the commander cannot monitor; and through the use of scouts, OPs, and patrols.

The task force S2 section must continuously anticipate "tomorrow's battle" requirements to facilitate future planning.

The BICC performs the preliminary analysis for future operations. The S2 receives, analyzes, and disseminates current battle information to the commander. The next battle is an extension of the current operation. The BICC continues to develop the IPB to support the next operation.

Commanders must visualize the battlefield:

- Study enemy order of battle, doctrine, and tactics. A thorough knowledge of the enemy will allow the commander to visualize enemy actions as certain cues are seen or reported.

- A thorough IPB to include verification of the situation template by recon assets will add to the mental picture.

- Detailed, yet concise reports from trusted agents or subordinates regarding both friendly and enemy movements or activities throughout the course of the battle is a necessity.

- The unit tactical operations center must forward concise reports to the commander on information gained from higher and adjacent units. This must include both friendly and enemy activities.
Personal reconnaissance of the battlefield must be done for each new mission regardless of previous familiarity with the terrain.

Backbriefs and rehearsals provide the commander a visualization of what his subordinate units are or should be doing at any point in the battle.

The commander must plan and rehearse his own position and movement on the battlefield as carefully as is done for the overall TF plan. He must be forward to personally see critical points in the battle, yet protected in order to survive.

Finally, practice and more practice is a necessity in learning to "see" or visualize the battlefield. No opportunity can be wasted to gain experience in this most critical warfighting skill.

Maintain a realistic, balanced perspective on enemy capabilities. Plan ahead. The reality of violent combat can cause commanders and staffs to concentrate on just the immediate battle.

Eliminate future surprises by planning for the next battle during the current fight. See the entire battlefield. Under stress it is more comfortable to narrow your focus to your immediate control and within your own boundaries.

Situation assessment is not something you do just during mission analysis. It must be a continuous activity to avoid delays in comprehending important changes and events and to maintain the ability to respond rapidly.

The essence of planning is to anticipate events. This includes sustainment planning. Anticipating support requirements means synchronizing support actions so that combat power is sustained or reconstituted in concert with the tactical plan.

Commanders also need to know the duration of their units' sustained combat power for the mission at hand, as well as the projected profile of the unit's fighting strength on the objective and for the "Be prepared..." mission. They need to know how long fuel and ammunition supplies will allow them to fight - how and when combat power will be sustained or reconstituted.

3. **Determine actions, TF commander directs changes to the operation or plan**
(ARTEP 71-2-MTP, TASK: 7-1-3901/2/3/4/6/7/8, 3902/2; FM 71-123, Chap. 1; FM 71-2, Chap. 2; FM 101-5, Chap. 2, 4).

**Fire Support**

By definition, a commander's concept is both a scheme of maneuver and fires. The concept of fires needs to be expressed in terms every bit as specific as that for maneuver.

Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver.

Hitting targets requires a great deal of preparation which should not be underwhelmed. Commo between companies, FSOs, and FDCs needs to be thoroughly checked before the battle to include necessary corrective action.
Attack Techniques

Effective reconnaissance is the key to detailed planning, but in-depth planning must begin long before much of the reconnaissance is accomplished. Plans are then refined as more is learned about the enemy.

Also, a "review the bidding" session a few hours before LD time can be very beneficial. Commanders and staff are updated on intelligence that was not available when the OPORD was briefed; modifications to the plan are explained; and final coordination is effected.

A thorough terrain analysis by the S2 contributes to the production of the situational template in the IPB process.

The scout platoon is a vital intelligence gathering asset to be considered when developing the intelligence plan.

Once the Decision Support Template (DST) is complete, a copy is provided each commander so that if the task force commander, S3, or XO are out of the battle, the next senior officer can continue the fight or modify the plan, as necessary.

Command and Control

Adhere to a disciplined system of time management. Someone must establish a timed critical list based on each mission and enforce it. The 1/3-2/3 rule is a guide but METT-T dependent.

One of the best forms of commander's guidance is rough maneuver and fire support graphics drawn by the commander and given to the staff to focus staff planning.

Time available dictates the amount of detail allowed in planning.

Reverse planning is an indispensable technique for time management. Begin with the time an event must take place (i.e. LD time) and estimate the time each prior event will take.

Attachments and OPCON units require lead time to conduct operations to support the task force (i.e. time to develop fire support plans or emplace obstacles to support the scheme of maneuver). Commanders and staff officers must make these needs known and integrate these times into the task force plan.

A brief order that clearly defines the intent of the commander requires less effort to execute. It is better to provide a good plan quickly and to refine it later, than to delay preparation until the best plan is completed and time limited.

The maneuver commander must state the role that fire support is to play in the overall operation.

The commander defines the areas where indirect fires are to be planned, engagement areas where fires must support maneuver, and any areas critical to the battlefield that require fire support.

Only after the commander's guidance and intent is clearly defined and understood can the FSO conduct planning, war gaming, and rehearsing of the operation with the commander and his battle staff.
Establish a time line that includes all critical events. Stick to it religiously. Time management is essential to effective planning and preparation.

Doing all oneself simply will not work. There may be short-term success; but in the long run only disaster will result. Give subordinates responsibilities, train them to standard, give them authority, and hold them accountable.

Plan for contingencies. Have redundant systems in place, and rehearse their use before the battle starts. If you are not prepared you are doomed to fail.

Commanders and staffs must consider the bigger picture when planning and conducting their operations. Decide early, then plan in detail.

Keep plans simple, but plan them in detail. Achieving synchronization depends on working out the time, space, and force details.

Commanders and staffs must analyze and plan the use of available time in detail and not waste planning and preparation time.

Time Management Lessons:

Commander: Preserve subordinate commander's time.

Commander and staff: Develop a planning and preparation timeline.

Commander and staff: Refine the timeline by listing tasks to be accomplished during planning and preparation and the person responsible to complete the task.

Commander and staff: Use the timeline to track the progression or preparation.

Commanders and staffs must be organized and prepared to produce operations orders quickly.

4. **TF commander directs and leads subordinate forces** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 71-1-3901/12, 3903/4; FM 22-9, Chap. 4; FM 22-100, Chap. 1; FM 22-103, Chap. 1; FM 101-5 (FINAL DRAFT), Appendix M).

Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance

For both offense and defense, reconnaissance must be continuous over time and throughout the depth of the battle area.

Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S-2 in close coordination with the S-3 and FSO.

The S-2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio nets. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.

Command and Control

Cross talk between company commanders is often a prerequisite for success. Given an understanding of the intent of the battalion commander, company commanders must help each other and not depend totally on instructions and information from battalion.
The rapid distribution of well through out and complete written orders is necessary to provide time for reconnaissance, changes in task organization, rehearsals, and all of the other planning/preparation activities needed to make a solid concept workable under the stress of combat.

The liberal use of easily recognizable graphic control measures is recommended.

While warning orders, frag orders, and face to face coordination are essential, the contention that there is no requirement for written orders at battalion level is simply incorrect. Leaders should be provided a written order or, at a minimum, an annotated overlay in all but the most rapid reaction situations.

Verbal frag orders must go to everyone in the orders group, not just selected company commanders. If circumstances are such that the TF commander discusses the order with something less than the total group, the S-3 and/or TOC should provide pertinent information and specific implementing instructions to the others, e.g., mortars, ADA, engineers, S-1/S-4.

Synchronization of combat power is often best accomplished when battalion directly controls and assigns tasks to attached and supporting units.

Frequent changes in task organization should be avoided. The teamwork advantage is often more important than a slightly more desirable mix of forces. Also, the timing of a change requires careful analysis. The significant advantages of a daylight link-up and the time required to receive the OPORD and to coordinate SOPs and LOGPACs must be considered.

The consequences of a lack of synchronization are so severe that OPSEC measures should not be permitted to degrade command and control at battalion level.

Ethics

Set the example for standards and early on issue clearly defined guidance on standards of conduct.

Develop a forum where you, your commanders, staff, and sergeants major come to a consensus on a set of values which can be publicized to the lowest level.

Don't set a standard of 100% all the time. You'll generate and perpetuate unethical situations to "meet" this standard.

The commander must ensure everyone understands how he intends to fight the battle.

Employ clear/concise written orders:

Clear written orders greatly reduce the fog of war to tired leaders. They provide a checklist for exhausted leaders to remind themselves what their mission and the commander's intent really is.

The limiting factor on the conciseness of the order is how well the unit understands the commander's intent.

Use backbriefs:

Immediately after the commander issues the order, his subordinates backbrief the commander on their tentative concepts of operations. If these are in line with the
commander's intent, his subordinates understand the order. If not, the commander clarifies the plan. Ensure all slice elements backbrief. During preparation, the commander meets subordinates individually or together on the battlefield. Here, his subordinates backbrief their concept based on their actual recon. This ensures that any minor changes a subordinate implemented to make the plan fit ground truth still support the commander's intent.

Rehearsals are critical to the successful execution of the operation.

Commanders must demand that key leaders discipline themselves to obtain a minimum level of rest.

Command and control elements are the first to feel the effects of CONOPS. Judgement abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.

Leaders must give the greatest amount of available time to subordinate leaders. Use no more than 1/3 of the available time for planning and preparation of the order. Provide no less than 2/3s of the available time for subordinate units to prepare for combat.

Prioritize critical tasks and use available time to concentrate on those tasks.

The task force Command Sergeant Major is a critical asset to the task force commander. He knows the standards the commander expects and needs. A task force, like any unit, needs to have high standards, tight discipline and loyalty to one commander. Establishing and maintaining loyalty and standards in a task force is a unique challenge, and the task force Command Sergeant Major is the soldier best suited to perform this task.

On the battlefield the Command Sergeant Major can position himself where leadership is most needed.

The Command Sergeant Major has the maturity, the wealth of experience and the rank to significantly and positively influence these missions. Commanders must consider METT-T and decide where this valuable asset can best be employed to affect the battle.

All the NCOs, and even some of the more experienced soldiers of lower rank, must stay aware of the tactical situation and be prepare mentally to take charge.

The Command Sergeant Major

The Command Sergeant Major is the "ramrod" of the battalion. He makes sure things happen.

He advises the battalion commander on troop and logistical welfare and discipline manners.

NCOs must help set priorities of work by clarifying through the chain of command what must be done.

The troops must be kept informed and the NCO must do it.

The NCO must know and understand the commander's intent if he is to be effective and accomplish the unit's mission.

TACSOPS are critical in keeping the NCO chain, and thus the soldiers, informed of the right information at the right time.
Without precombat checks and follow-up, no one knows if the unit is ready for battle.

Ensure soldiers and units are tasked evenly. Over tasking soldiers degrades combat performance. It is more than a question of combat effectiveness.

NCOs must instill and enforce field discipline in themselves first.

Ensure the TACSOP is complete, includes standards, is understood, and is used every time the trooper goes to the field. NCOs ensure compliance with the TACSOP.

Command Sergeants Major Assist the Task Force Commanders

The CSM is a vital source of information to the commander and is a key leader in dealing with NCOs

The command sergeant major has a tremendous impact on the soldier's performance, team cohesion, and unit effectiveness. He looks out for the welfare of their men and can foster a positive command climate.

The CSM can greatly assist by:

  Identifying, correcting, and bringing to the commander's attention NCO leadership problems.

  Moving with the commander to assess unit morale and logistics problems.

Control of FRAGO's and Warning Orders. Many units are running into difficulty when the TAC, Rear, and the Main issue FRAGO's and Warning Orders, especially when duplicate numbers are issued.

Hard copy follow-up on verbal orders/decisions. Many decisions are made in face to face discussions are made in face to face discussions between commanders. Sometimes problems arise when these discussions are away from the CP. This causes problems for the staff in synchronizing the various aspects of the operation as well as keeping the other players informed. Hard copy back up needs to be generated to assist in this process.

There are many factors that can create stress in combat operations: fatigue, anxiety, time, intense heat, battlefield uncertainty, etc. Reactions to stress are varied, but there are clear indications, from combat experience and less stressful research and training environments, that soldier performance in command and control C2 operations can suffer.

Good communications is always difficult, but stress and fatigue will greatly increase misunderstandings. Just because something is very clear to you, do not assume that it is clear to everyone else. Double-check communication. Use backbriefs and rehearsals. Staff visits and follow-ups also foster good communication and can keep problems from recurring.

Widespread agreement among the staff is not necessarily a healthy sign. It could mean that the desire to find an agreement is overriding critical thinking.

Leaders/soldiers must conduct detailed reconnaissance whenever possible.

Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders' understanding of the overall plan and the commander's intent.

Understand the commander's intent two levels up.
Use troop-leading procedures effectively. Planning and rehearsals are often much more important than trying to create a perfect plan at the higher headquarters. If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

RISK MANAGEMENT is a tool that helps leaders make sound logical decisions.

Risk management, in theory, is a five-step process that is easily integrated into he decision making process.

RISK ASSESSMENT is a part of risk management. A risk assessment causes leaders to identify hazards and threats and place them in perspective relative to the mission or task at hand.

5. **Task force command posts locate where they can control the battle; reestablish C2 functions after the loss of command post or commander** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 71-1-3904/1, 3035, 3036, 3913/1i; FM 71-123, Chap. 1).

The Admin/Log Center (ALC) assumes TOC operations when the TOC is destroyed or incapacitated, and continues until the TOC becomes operational or a replacement headquarters assumes control of task force operations. Criteria for assumption of this on-order mission must be specified in the unit tactical SOP.

Destruction of the TOC, while a catastrophic loss, must not prevent the task force from continuing its mission.

Staff personnel from the ALC must be cross-trained to perform TOC functions with minimal loss of continuity of command and control.

Situation maps and unit status boards reflecting the current tactical status of each company/team are examples of the equipment that must be available in the ALC for immediate use upon assumption of the TOC mission.

ALC personnel must track the battle and keep abreast of the current tactical situation at all times.

At a minimum, the ALC must have all friendly situation information posted, the most recent intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) update, the most current doctrinal and situational templates of suspected enemy locations, and known enemy locations. Both the obstacle plan and target overlay must be posted and kept current.

Communications equipment must be available to provide the ALC with an equivalent capability to exercise command and control over subordinate elements as well as communicate with higher headquarters (brigade) and attached or supporting elements.

The most important consideration when selecting a location to position the TOC is communication with the brigade TOC and with forward elements of the task force.

The TOC must be able to break-down, move and set-up quickly and with the minimum disruption to its operation.

6. **Task force consolidates and reorganizes** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task: 71-1-3022, 3023; FM 71-2, Chap. 3).
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

CCF 20
CRITICAL TASKS AND OTHER LINKAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>OTHER LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Task Force command posts acquire and communicate information and maintain status.</td>
<td>TF elements send SALUTE reports, personnel reports, and equipment reports to the Main CP and CTCP (STP 21-1-SMCT, 071-331-0802)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide Unit Supply Support (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish Radio Communications (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish/Maintain Radio TeletypeWriter Comms (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control Maintenance Operations (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare Maintenance Estimate (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perform Logistics Planning (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 17-2-0701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control the Battalion Task Force (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3901)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perform S3 operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command Group Operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operate Main Command Post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain Communications (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operate FTCP (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operate CTCP (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3913)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>OTHER LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operate Fire Support Section (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3908)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Enemy Information (STP 21-1-SMCT, 071-331-0803)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send a Radio Message (STP 21-1-SMCT, 113-571-1016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use an Automated SOI (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-573-8006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmit a Voice United States Message Text Form (USMTF) Message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-4008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive a USMTF Message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-5005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write a USMTF Message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-6005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read a SMCT Message (STP 21-24-SMCT, 113-572-6006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect Classified Information and Material (STP 21-24-SMCT, 301-348-6001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare a Battalion SITREP (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-332-5002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate Air Defense Artillery Activities with Battery/Battalion Staff (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform as ADA Liaison Officer (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.31-0019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate Effectively (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.12-0002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate Effectively as a Commander or Staff Officer (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.12-0003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform Duties as TOC Shift Officer (STP 17-12II-MQS, 01-1250.00-0006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Communications Support Using FM Voice Communications (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5704.04-9001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>OTHER LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manage Secure Voice Communications Systems (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5735.04-0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct a Net Control Station Operation (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5704.04-0003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze Battlefield Spectrum Management (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5701.07-0003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Communications Requirements for a Heavy Light or Light Heavy Integrated Task Force (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5840.07-0002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Communications System of a Maneuver Brigade or Battalion (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5841.07-0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate Engineer Intelligence for Dissemination (STP 5-21II-MQS, 01-2250.20-1005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Input to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (STP 5-21II-MQS, 01-2250.20-1006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Asset Management (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-4007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record Intelligence and Combat Information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.39-4003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze Intelligence and Combat Information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.39-4004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief and Debrief R&amp;S Assets (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-4012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Asset Management (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.06-5001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Analysis and Dissemination of Information (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.41-5002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Intelligence Liaison (STP 34-35II-MQS, 01-3381.16-5001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Assess situation, the TF commander visualizes the battlefield.

3. Determine Actions; TF commander directs changes to the operation or plan

TF Elements Maintain Contact with the Enemy and Report: Perform a Route Reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1017)

Perform an Area Reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1019)

Conduct a Screen (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1023)

Execute a Dismounted Patrol (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1024)

Establish an Observation Post (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-3-1039)

Perform Reconnaissance (ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, 17-2-0202)

Perform in IPB (all staff officers, e.g., ADLNO: Perform in intelligence preparation of the 3d dimension battlefield activities [STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0013])

Analyze Air Defense Artillery Perspective of Terrain (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0002)

Advise the Commander on the Use of Terrain for Combat Operations (STP 50-111-MQS, 01-2250.20-1008)

Advise Maneuver Commander on Employment of Available of Fire Support Assets (STP 6-131I-MQS, 01-2999.94-0106)

Advise the Commander on NBC Threat (STP 3-741I-MQS, 01-5090.02-2044)

TF Subordinate Elements Execute Troop Leading Procedures: Prepare for Combat (ARTEP 71-1-MTP, 17-2-0101)

Prepare Battalion Combat Orders (STP 21-II-MQS, 01-3303.03-0013)

Prepare an Oral OPORD (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-326-5626)

Prepare an Operations Overlay (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-332-5000)
4. **TF Commander directs and leads subordinate forces**

   - The TF Staff and Subordinate Commanders Lead and Direct Their Sections and Companies: Build a Cohesive Unit or Organization (STP 21-II-MQS, 01-9001.17-0003)
   - Establish a Positive Command Climate (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.11-0002)
   - Conduct Company and Battalion Operations According to the Law of War (STP 21-II-MQS, S1-9060.10-3000)
   - Supervise Construction of a Fighting Position (STP 21-24-SMCT, 071-326-5704)
   - Supervise PMCS (STP 21-24-SMCT, 091-309-0710)
   - Motivate Subordinates to Accomplish Unit Missions (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.14-0002)
   - Apply the Ethical Decision-Making Process as a Commander or Staff Officer (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9001.10-0004)
   - Administer Military Justice at Company and Battalion Level (STP 21-II-MQS, 03-9080.10-3001)
   - Inspect Personnel/Equipment (SPT 21-24-SMCT, 071-328-5301)

5. **Task force’s command posts locate where they can control the preparation for and transition to battle**

   - Perform Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (ARTEP 7-94-MTP, 7-3-1711)
   - Move a Command Post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3035)
   - Establish a Command Post (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, 7-1-3036)
   - Operate Battery/Platoon Command Post (STP 44-14II-MQS, 01-0401.21-0018)
   - Implement Displacement of Communications Nodes (STP 11-25II-MQS, 01-5754.04-0002)
   - Direct Command Post and Tactical Operations Center Internal Security Operations (STP 3-74II-MQS, 01-3761.00-1103)
6. Task force consolidates and reorganizes.

**OTHER LINKAGES**

ARTEP 71-1-MTP, 17-2-0704 (CO/TMs Consolidate and Reorganize: Consolidate on the Objective)

- Reorganize on the Objective (17-2-0706)
- Integrate Replacements (12-2-C007)
- Provide Medical Evacuation and Treatment of Casualties (17-2-0705)
- Process Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) (19-2-C004)
- Perform Combat Service Support Operations (7-1-3912)

January 2, 1995
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle

DIRECT AND LEAD UNITS IN EXECUTION OF BATTLE
REFERENCES

FMs
22-9  Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations, 12 December 1991
22-100 Military Leadership, 31 October 1991
22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, 21 June 1987
71-1  Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, 22 November 1988
71-2  Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, 27 September 1988
71-100 Division Operations, 16 June 1993
71-123 Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored
       Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company Team; 30 September 1992
100-5 Operations, June 1993
101-5 Staff Organization and Operations, May 1984
101-5 Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Final Draft), August
       1993

ARTEPs
7-94-MTP  Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion Headquarters and
Headquarters Company and Combat Support/Combat Service Support
Platoons, 12 October 1989
71-1-MTP  Mission Training Plan for The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company
and Company Team, 3 October 1988
71-2-MTP  Mission Training Plan for The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion
Task Force, 3 October 1988

STPs
21-II-MQS  Military Qualification Standards II, Manual of Common Tasks for
Lieutenants and Captains, 31 January 1991
21-1-SMCT  Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks: Skill Level 1, 1 October 1987

January 2, 1995
Periodicals


Center for Army Lessons Learned

NTC Lessons Learned: Commanders Memorandum – November 85
NTC Lessons Learned No 1: Seven Operating Systems – January 86
NTC Lessons Learned No 2: Intelligence – May 86
CALL Bulletin, No 1–86 – July 86
Lessons Learned by/for Division Commanders – September 86
CALL Bulletin No 3 – September 86
NTC Lessons Learned CALL Bulletin No 4: Command and Control System – February 87
CTC Lessons Learned No 88–2 – May 88
CALL Compendium, Vol 1: Heavy Forces – Fall 88
CALL 89–1: Non–Mechanized Forces – Spring 89
CALL 89–2: Heavy–Light Lessons Learned – August 89
CALL: NCO Lessons Learned – October 89
CALL: Corps–Division Lessons Learned – November 89
CALL 90–1: Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander – February 90
CALL 90–6: The Musicians of Mars – June 90
CALL Newsletter No. 90–8: Winning in the Desert II – September 90
CALL 90–9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume I (Soldiers and Leadership) – October 90
CALL 90–9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume II (Operations) – October 90
CALL 90–9: Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned, Volume III (Intelligence, Logistics & Equipment) – October 90
CALL Newsletter No. 91–1: Rehearsals – April 91
CALL 92–5: Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield – November 92
CALL Newsletter No. 93–3: The Battalion and Brigade Staff – July 93
CCF 20 — Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

CTC Bulletin No. 93–4 – July 93
CALL 93–9: Force Protection – December 93

ARI Publications
Commander's Battle Staff Handbook: With Garrison Duties, 15 May 1993

Battle Command Battle Laboratory:
Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War, DRAFT, 11 April 1994

Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet
11-9 Blue Print of the Battlefield, 10 May 1991

Student Text
101-5 Command and Staff Decision Process

January 2, 1995
END NOTES

1. CCIR are information that has been specified by the TF commander to be critical for his fighting the battle. They are specified by the commander during the planning sequence and are different for each mission. The TF information manager, staff, and subordinate commanders are especially conscious of this information for it may have severe consequences for the TF. Examples of this type of information are:

   Intelligence information on the enemy and his location, direction of movement, and strength relevant to a decision point.

   The current capability of Co/Tms to execute assigned missions.

   Status of fire support and its capability to fire targets.

   The execution and clearing of obstacles.

   Problems with the availability of critical supplies to Co/Tms.

   The status of command posts and their capability to communicate.

   Can the unit still meet the higher commander's intent?

   What is the posture of friendly forces in the next planning time window?

   How can friendly forces exploit the enemy's problems?

   What are the enemy and friendly forces opportunities?

   What are the enemy and friendly forces problems?

2. Pipeline information is information transmitted according to an established format. "Routine reports such as the commander's situation report, logistic status report, and personnel status report move through the pipeline. Pipeline information contributes to the collection and analysis of information that is generally not time-sensitive in terms of decision making. It helps anticipate, identify, and solve problems." (Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War, DRAFT, p. 19)

3. Tree mode information is a response to specific demands for information. These demands for information arise from previously supplied information, normally pipeline information. E.g., a logistics report shows a low level of ammunition in a Co/Tm, the commander requests further information (tree) on what is being done to replenish the ammunition. (Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War, DRAFT, p. 20)

4. "The alarm mode signals the occurrence of one or more exceptional events. Alarms are those pieces of information that alert the commander that his plan is not going as he envisioned and an immediate corrective action or a quick decision is required. Alarms are generally time-sensitive and a priority of action for the staff and subordinate commanders." (Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operation Other Than War, DRAFT, p. 20)

5. The commander must explicitly designate an information manager. It may be the XO or the battle captain in the operations center. The information manager outlines and monitors the
performance and responsibilities of the staff in processing information to support the operation and flow that feeds the commander's requirements.

6 Critical information identified by the TF commander as necessary to the accomplishment of the mission are called the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). CCIR are developed during wargaming and production of the DST; the CCIR will change as the battle progresses.

7 The Command Net is used for command and control of the TF. During the execution of the mission, predominately only commanders transmit; all others monitor and transmit only essential information. The primary users of the command net are: TF commander, XO, S3, CO/TM Commanders, and the scout platoon leader.

8 The O&I net is used to allow the TF to receive routine information concerning operations and intelligence without cluttering or interfering with the TF Command Net. The primary users of the TF O&I net are: the S2, the scout platoon, and the GSR section.

9 The TF A/L Net is used to send and receive the administrative and logistics requirements of the TF. All organic and attached units operate on the A/L Net for that purpose.

10 While the CMD GRP CP is small it should include the commander and representatives from the S2, S3, FSE, and the TACP.

11 Visualization of the battlefield is directly related to being aware of the situation. "Situational awareness is a skilled behavior that encompasses the process by which task-relevant information is extracted, integrated, assessed and acted upon. In a battlefield environment, rapid and correct action selection depends on the application of this cognitive skill." [underline added] (Kash, Herschler and Companion; "Training Situational Awareness Through Pattern Recognition in a Battlefield Environment," Military Psychology; Volume 3, Number 2, 1991; p. 105) The commander will never have perfect situational awareness. The commander synthesizes a sense or picture of the battlefield. This picture is a merging of what he brings with him (his natural ability, training, and experience), the reports he receives, and what he can see on the battlefield. The assimilation of information to achieve situational awareness of the current battlefield situation occurs during all three phases of the battle. It involves a continuous assessing and reassessing of all interrelating factors and the commander's intuition of what will occur based upon the facts. This running assessment is part of the conceptualization process in which the commander is always engaged.

12 The tactical situation may allow the commander and staff sufficient planning time to conduct planning as outlined in FM 101-5, FM 71-2, and CCF 18. However, it is normal that the TF will not have time to conduct a Deliberate Decision Making Process nor the personnel to perform the Combat Decision Making Process once an operation has commenced. The staff does anticipate the commander's planning needs by analyzing the battle and orders, recommending courses of action to the commander, and helping to implement plans and orders. The TF commander takes the brigade commander's orders, reports from his subordinate commanders, his observations of the battlefield, and his staff's recommendations from which he develops a course of action. The situation modeled below is one where the staff is unavailable to the TF commander to help in developing a course of action. When there is time, the commander can give his staff a COA to develop while he continues to fight the battle. Events where the TF commander would give his staff information have been included as subtasks.

13 At the time this task analysis was developed, the Army's doctrine and technique for planning are under review. The decision making process, outlined in the 1993 publication of FM 101-5 and
the 1994 publication of ST 101-5 is the basis of the processes described in the task analyses of CCFs 18, 19, 20.

14The commander can issue several types of orders: a OPORD, FRAGO, OLORD, or MSNORD. Orders should be issued verbally (over looking the terrain) to his subordinate commanders with the staff preparing overlays and written orders as time permits. In this example the commander has decided to issue a FRAGO.

15A FRAGO addresses those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. All five paragraph headings of an OPORD are required; each paragraph will contain either a notation of "No Change" or the new information, FM 101-5.

16FM 101-5, Command and Control for commanders and Staff (Final Draft), p. 4–25.

17Moral Presence—1. The commander's impact on the character or will of his subordinates. Results in a business like attitude that permeates the command despite enemy contact and pressures. 2. The manner or demeanor the commander conveys to his troops and outsiders. Battle Command: Leadership and Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War (Draft), p. G–11.

18A TF normally operates three CPs: the main CP, command group, and combat trains CP. The main CP is used to monitor and assist in command and control by maintaining contact and coordination with higher and adjacent units, continuously updating the enemy and friendly situations, planning operations, seeking, analyzing, and disseminating tactical information, maintaining situation maps, and requesting and synchronizing additional CS and CSS for the battle. Factors that have immediate operations impact must be identified by the main CP and communicated to the commander. The command group consists of the commander and those whom he selects to go forward to assist him in controlling maneuver and fires during the battle. This normally includes the FSO, FAC, and the S3. The composition, nature, and tasks of the command group are determined by the commander to facilitate the command and control of his unit during the battle. The CTCP is the coordination center for combat service support for the TF.

Along with these three CPs, a TF may also employ a tactical command post, and a field trains command post. The TAC is established during fast-moving operations to maintain communications and facilitate the movement of the main CP. In such circumstances the commander may designate one of the command post vehicles from the main CP to act as the TAC. Some or all of the command group may locate at the TAC at various times. See FM 71-2 for descriptions.

19The functions of each CP must continue during movement. This is accomplished in several different manners. Split operations occur when an echelon of a CP moves while the other echelon maintains limited operations. Hand-over operations occur when another CP assumes the functions of a moving CP. Operating on the move describes a CP maintaining limited C3I functions while moving. A CP is located where it can communicate with the TF and brigade, is accessible to TF vehicles, and survivable.

20The mortar platoon's FDC would require a substantial reinforcement of personnel and equipment to function effectively as a Main CP for a significant period.

January 2, 1995