PEER REVIEW
COORDINATING DRAFT

TASK ANALYSIS
FOR

PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY
(CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION 25)

AS ACCOMPLISHED BY A BATTALION TASK FORCE

Authors: LARRY KASTANEK, PRC, Inc.
WILLIAM J. MULLEN, III, BDM Federal, Inc.

Submitted by Harold Wagner, Acting Chief
Unit-Collective Training Research Unit
and
Jack Hiller, Director
Training Systems Research Division
and
Mr. Michael R. Mccluskey,
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative

U.S. Army Research Institute

Prime Contractor: BDM Federal, Inc.
W. J. Mullen, III

POC: Bartholomew J. McIlroy, Jr.,
BDM Federal Inc., (408) 372-3329

Program Director: Thomas J. Lewman
BDM Federal, Inc.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3 January 28, 1994
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

Larry Kastanek
William J. Mullen III

BDM Federal, Inc.

This report is published to meet legal and contractual requirements and may not meet ARI's scientific or professional standards for publication.

August 1996

United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: This report has been cleared for release to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirements. It has been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC and will be available only through DTIC or the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).

FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The views, opinions and findings in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
The purpose of CCF 25 is to deny enemy information about friendly dispositions, plans, intentions, and operations by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations.

The outcomes include: 1) TF identifies all threats to its freedom of action. 2) TF reduces its vulnerability to significant hostile acts, influence, and surprise during TF preparations for and execution of a mission using at least five tasks: a) TF takes advantage of cover, concealment, camouflage, noise and light discipline. b) TF counter-reconnaissance operations deny enemy direct observation of TF activities, through use of smoke and obscurants, until it is too late for the enemy to effectively react. c) Enemy is unable to intercept and exploit TF communications. d) Enemy is unable to locate TF C2 nodes and identify TF intentions through intercept and analysis of TF electronic emissions. e) TF physical security measures detect the enemy in time to be effective.
INDEX

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION 25
PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY

Preface................................................................................................................................. ii
Index of Critical Combat Functions (CCF).......................................................................... 1
Structure of Critical Combat Functions................................................................................ 2
Outcomes and Purpose of CCF 25......................................................................................... 11
Flow Charts by Battle Phase (Plan, Prepare, Execute)......................................................... 12
Other CCF Which Interact with CCF 25.............................................................................. 14
CCF 25 Key Participants by Task........................................................................................ 15
Key Inputs/Outputs to CCF 25............................................................................................. 17
Task List Summary............................................................................................................... 19
Planning Task List.............................................................................................................. 22
Preparation Task List......................................................................................................... 35
Preparation and Execution Task List.................................................................................. 37
CALL Lessons Learned Relevant to CCF 25....................................................................... 42
Lessons Learned Integrated into CCF 25 Task List............................................................. 57
CCF 25 Critical Tasks and Other Linkages......................................................................... 68
References............................................................................................................................ 71
PREFACE

This task analysis of Provide Operations Security, Critical Combat Function 25 (CCF 25), is an intermediate product of the process of developing a training strategy for the CCF. The analysis reflects tasks, products, principal participants and processes in sequence necessary to providing operations security for a heavy battalion task force. The tasks were selected as important to the analysis of the CCF from the perspective of the task force commander. Addressed are TF directed and controlled counter-reconnaissance operations, TF directed security operations, and “normal” local security. The underlying theme though, is that OPSEC must be practiced on a continuous basis by every element of the task force, from the commander to each individual soldier.

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS: The integration of related players and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

The battle phases PLAN, PREPARE, and EXECUTE relate to the entire battalion task force (TF) battle vice phasing for this particular CCF. Where relevant, OPSEC considerations have been added to tasks from CCF 18, 19, and 20.

The TF warning order should initiate planning and preparation by the Co/Co Tm being charged with counter security missions if such is the case. To that end, the TF warning order should contain sufficient information or there should be a TF OPORD, probably by message, for the counter-reconnaissance mission. The Co/Co Team Commander would most likely go directly to the CP to enable direct coordination and to save time. The analysis addresses planning and preparation for the counter-reconnaissance forces follow-on mission. Analysis is required during the TF planning to ensure that assigned tasks can be reasonably performed.
INDEX OF
CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS
Grouped by Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

INTELLIGENCE
(1) Conduct Intelligence Planning
(2) Collect Information
(3) Process Information
(4) Disseminate Intelligence

MANEUVER
(5) Conduct Tactical Movement
(6) Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver

AIR DEFENSE
(16) Take Active Air Defense Measures
(17) Take Passive Air Defense Measures

FIRE SUPPORT
(7) Employ Mortars
(8) Employ Field Artillery
(9) Employ Close Air Support
(10) Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming
(11) Conduct Battlefield PsyOps
(12) Employ Chemical Weapons
(13) Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations
(14) Employ Naval Gunfire
(15) Coordinate, Synchronize, and Integrate Fire Support

MOBILITY AND
SURVIVABILITY
(21) Overcome Obstacles
(22) Enhance Movement
(23) Provide Countermobility
(24) Enhance Physical Protection
(25) Provide Operations Security
(26) Conduct Deception Operations
(27) Provide Decontamination

COMMAND AND
CONTROL
(18) Plan for Combat Operations
(19) Direct and Lead Unit During Preparation for the Battle
(20) Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle

COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT
(28) Provide Transport Services
(29) Conduct Supply Operations
(30) Provide Personnel Services
(31) Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment
(32) Provide Health Services
(33) Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties
(34) Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations
(35) Conduct Law and Order Operations
(36) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations
(37) Provide Sustainment Engineering
(38) Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations
(39) Provide Field Services
STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTIONS
RELEVANT TO BATTALION TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

CRITICAL COMBAT FUNCTION: The integration of related players and tasks that represent a source of combat power. The synchronization of critical combat functions provides maneuver commanders at any echelon with a definable outcome that materially affects the battle.

I. Intelligence BOS — The ways and means of acquiring, analyzing and using knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain required by a commander in planning, preparing and conducting combat operations. These CCF are continuous throughout the planning, preparation and execution phases of the battle.

1. **CCF (1) Conduct Intelligence Planning** — The development and coordination of information relative to the enemy, weather and terrain prior to and during the development of the unit OPORD; the planning to collect information from battlefield sources and to acquire intelligence from other headquarters. Focus of this CCF is the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This CCF addresses:
   
a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan.
b. Integrated threat templates (doctrinal; event; input to DST).
c. Terrain and Weather analysis.

2. **CCF (2) Collect Information** — Obtaining information in any manner from TF elements and from sources outside the TF (e.g., higher headquarters; adjacent units): this CCF includes the tasks associated with managing the processes and activities necessary to collect battlefield information which may eventually be used to provide intelligence relative to the enemy, terrain and weather. This CCF addresses:
   
a. Information collected as a result of R & S plan.
b. Continuous information collection and acquisition from all sources.

3. **CCF (3) Process Information** — The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation in a continual process. This CCF addresses:
   
a. Evaluation of threat information.
b. Evaluation of physical environment information.
c. Integration of intelligence information.
d. Development of enemy intentions.
e. Development of targeting information.
f. Preparation of intelligence reports.
g. Update of situational template.
h. Provision of battlefield area reports.

4. **CCF (4) Disseminate Intelligence** — Transmission of information by any means (verbal, written, electronic etc.), from one person or place to another to provide timely dissemination of critical intelligence to all appropriate members of the combined arms team. This CCF addresses:
   
a. The sending of processed intelligence in a timely manner to those on the combined arms team who can by its receipt, take appropriate actions to accomplish the mission. This includes intelligence on the enemy, terrain and weather.
b. The sending of raw intelligence directly from those responsible for reconnaiss-
sance and surveillance to the commander should that raw intelligence be time
sensitive (and not be subject to receipt and processing by intelligence analysts).
c. Dissemination of battlefield reports.

II. **Maneuver BOS** — The employment of direct fire weapons, platforms and systems
through movement and fire and maneuver to achieve a position of advantage in respect to
enemy ground forces, in order to accomplish the mission. The direct fire weapons are: tank
guns; BFV 25mm; anti-tank guns and rockets; attack helicopter guns and rockets; small
arms; crew served weapons; directed energy weapons systems.

1. **CCF (5) Conduct Tactical Movement** — Position direct fire weapons systems
relative to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage making full use of terrain
and formations. Tactical movement occurs when contact with the enemy is likely or
imminent but direct fire engagement has not yet occurred. Units supporting maneuver
units are included. This CCF addresses:

a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
b. Preparation for movement.
c. Movement, mounted and dismounted; on and off road.
d. Closure of movement — tactical assembly area; tactical positions.
e. Navigation.
f. Force protection.
g. Air movement.

2. **CCF (6) Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver** — Entering into
ground combat with the enemy using direct fire and/or close combat in order to
destroy the enemy or cause him to withdraw. This CCF relates only to those direct fire
weapons systems associated with the Maneuver BOS. This CCF is initiated with the
OPORD at the completion of the planning phase of the battle and includes all tasks
associated with subordinate echelon planning, preparation and execution of the battle.
This CCF addresses:

a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
b. Preparation of engagement areas.
c. Rehearsals of battle plans.
d. Pre-combat prepare to fire checks.
e. Target acquisition.
f. Fire control and distribution.
g. Fratricide.
h. Conduct close combat.
i. Integration of direct fire with maneuver.
j. Control of terrain.
k. Prestocked ammunition.
l. Resupply during operations.
m. Maintenance during operations.
n. Consolidation and reorganization.

III. **Fire Support BOS** — The collective, coordinated, and synchronized use of target
acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) and other
lethal and non-lethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations
and to achieve the commanders intent and scheme of maneuver. The Fire Support BOS
addresses these weapons: mortars; field artillery; close air support; electronic measures; naval gunfire.

1. **CCF (7) Employ Mortars** — Employment of mortars by the maneuver unit to place fires on the enemy or terrain to support the commander’s concept and intent. This CCF initiates with the receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and address those tasks required during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:

   a. Subordinate element OPORD preparation and dissemination.
   b. Prepare to fire checks.
   c. Rehearsals.
   d. Pre-combat checks.
   e. Development of order to fire.
   f. Tactical movement.
   g. FDC operations.
   h. Target engagements with illumination, smoke, HE.
   i. Sustainment operations.

2. **CCF (8) Employ Field Artillery** — The ways and means employed by the maneuver unit to cause indirect artillery fires to be placed on the enemy or terrain to support the commander’s concept and intent. This CCF initiates upon receipt of an OPORD by the maneuver commander and includes tasks performed during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. The Fire Support Coordination tasks necessary to integrate the field artillery and the maneuver units are the primary focus. This CCF does not address those field artillery tasks associated directly with those actions taken by the batteries of the artillery battalion in the conduct of their support mission such as FDC operations, gun operations, etc. This CCF addresses:

   a. Fire Support — Maneuver unit rehearsals.
   b. FSE operations during the preparation and execution phase of the battle.
   c. FSO and FIST operations in coordination with their maneuver commander.
   d. Positioning and movement within the maneuver unit sector or zone.
   e. Indirect fire missions in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.
   f. Sustainment operations.
   g. Indirect fire planning as battlefield METT-T change.

3. **CCF (9) Employ Close Air Support** — Planning for, requesting and employing armed aircraft (less attack helicopters) in coordination with other fire support (lethal and non-lethal) against ground targets in support of the maneuver force commander’s concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

   a. Air-ground attack requests.
   b. Air space coordination and management.
   c. Air Liaison Officer, Forward Air Controller; other Army Fire Support Coordination Officer, USN/USMC Bde Team Commander, SALTO and FCT-O tasks that enable air to ground attacks.

4. **CCF (10) Conduct Electronic Collection and Jamming** — Actions taken to deny the enemy effective command, control and communications of his own tactical force in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent. This CCF includes jamming, deception, and collection.

5. **CCF (11) Conduct Battlefield PsyOps** — Conduct psychological activities as an integral part of combat operations to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy
forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of tactical objectives in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.

6. **CCF (12) Employ Chemical Weapons** — Employ chemical agents or other means to degrade enemy capabilities in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.

7. **CCF (13) Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations** — Suppress (e.g., using smoke or dazzling illumination) or degrade enemy direct observation, optics, radar, sensors, electronic DF equipment, and imaging systems in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.

8. **CCF (14) Employ Naval Gunfire** — The means and ends to provide naval gunfire in support of the maneuver commander’s tactical operation.

9. **CCF (15) Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support** — Coordination of all fire support means in support of the maneuver commanders concept and intent. This CCF addresses the preparation and execution of tasks necessary to integrate the fire support detailed in the OPORD. The CCF integrates CCF 7-14 in support of maneuver commander’s concept and intent.

IV. **Air Defense BOS** — The means and measures organic or assigned to the maneuver commander which when employed successfully will nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne.

1. **CCF (16) Take Active Air Defense Measures** — Application of firepower to destroy enemy air targets. This CCF addresses the coordinating tasks which enable the maneuver commander to successfully employ any attached or assigned air defense weapons system as well as the tasks necessary to employ all organic weapons systems against enemy air targets. This CCF addresses:
   b. Employment of maneuver unit weapons systems such as small arms, automatic weapons, BFV 25 mm and TOW missiles, tank main gun against enemy air.
   c. Airspace management.
   d. Early warning.
   e. Sustainment.

2. **CCF (17) Take Passive Air Defense Measures** — The protection of the maneuver force from enemy air by means other than weapons. This CCF will focus on the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:
   a. Early warning.
   b. Dispersion.
   c. Cover and concealment.
   d. Air watch.
   e. Deception.

V. **Command and Control BOS** — The way and means a maneuver commander exercises authority and direction over organic and assigned combat power in the accomplishment of the mission.

August 29, 1993
1. **CCF (18) Plan for Combat Operations** — The integration of all members of the combined arms team in the coordinated development of the maneuver unit Operations Order which will guide the activities of the combined arms team in conducting combat operations to accomplish assigned missions. The product/outcome of this CCF is a briefed, understood OPORD. This CCF addresses:

   a. Receipt and analysis of higher HQ OPORD.
   b. Issuance of Warning Order.
   c. Restated mission statement.
   d. Commander’s estimate process/troop leading procedures.
   e. Commander’s guidance.
   f. Mission analysis (includes course of action development).
   g. Decision brief to commander.
   h. Development of a synchronized OPORD.
   i. Reproduction and distribution of OPORD to all participants.
   j. Briefing of OPORD; understanding of order by participants.
   k. FRAGO planning and issue.

2. **CCF (19) Direct and Lead Unit during Preparation for the Battle** — The ways and means to prepare combined arms task force for the battle so that the combined arms task force is ready to support the maneuver commander’s concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

   a. Commander’s activities.
   b. Communicating information.
   c. Briefbacks and backbriefs.
   d. Rehearsals.
   e. Management of the means of communicating information.
   f. Maintaining and updating information and force status.
   g. Managing information distribution.
   h. Decisions to act or change ongoing actions.
   i. Confirming IPB through the reconnaissance effort.
   j. Determining actions to implement decisions.
   k. Providing command presence.
   l. Maintaining unit discipline.
   m. Synchronizing tactical operations (e.g., execution matrix DST).
   n. TOC operations (e.g., staff integration and battle tracking).
   o. Continuity of command.
   p. Second in command (2IC responsibilities).
   q. Continuous and sustained operations.
   r. Communications (e.g., planning, installation and operation of system, management, site selection).

3. **CCF (20) Direct and Lead Units In Execution of Battle** — The ways and means to command and control in the combined arms task force execution of the battle plan (engaging the enemy in battle) to accomplish the maneuver commander’s concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

   a. Directing the conduct of the battle.
   b. Issue orders.
   c. Command presence.
   d. Information distribution.
   e. Decide on need for action or change.
   f. Maintaining unit discipline.
   g. Synchronizing tactical operations.
h. TOC operations (includes CP displacement, security, survivability).

i. Continuity of command (e.g., C2 redundancy).

j. Second in command (2IC) responsibilities.

k. Continuous and sustained operations.

l. Consolidation and reorganization.

VI. **Mobility and Survivability BOS** — The ways and means of the force that permit freedom of movement, relative to the enemy, while retaining the task force ability to fulfill its primary mission as well as the measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protection from the effects of enemy weapons systems and natural occurrences.

1. **CCF (21) Overcome Obstacles** — Enabling the maneuver force to maintain its mobility by removing or clearing/reducing natural and man-made obstacles. This CCF will initiate after receipt of the OPORD and address subordinate echelon planning as well as task force preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve the maneuver commander's concept and intent. This CCF addresses:

   a. Breach obstacle. Clearing a path or lane for personnel and equipment through a battlefield obstacle.

   b. Cross gaps. Passing through or over any battlefield terrain feature, wet or dry, that is too wide to be overcome by organic/self bridging.

2. **CCF (22) Enhance movement** — Provision of adequate mobility for the maneuver unit in its area of operations. This CCF addresses:

   a. Construction and repair of combat roads and trails.

   b. Construction or repair of forward airfields.

   c. Facilitating movement on routes. (This includes control of road traffic and control of refugees and stragglers.)

   d. Tracking status of routes.

   e. Host nation support.

3. **CCF (23) Provide Countermobility** — Delaying, channeling, or stopping offensive movement by the enemy consistent with the commander's concept and intent by enhancing the effectiveness of friendly direct and indirect weapons systems. This CCF addresses:

   a. Emplacement of mines and complex obstacles.

   b. Digging tank ditches.

   c. Creation of road craters with explosives.

   d. Terrain enhancement.

4. **CCF (24) Enhance Physical Protection** — Providing protection of friendly forces on the battlefield by enhancing the physical protection of personnel, equipment and weapons systems, and supplies. This CCF addresses:

   a. Construction of fighting positions.

   b. Preparation of protective positions.

   c. Employment of protective equipment.

5. **CCF (25) Provide Operations Security** — Denying information to the enemy about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations. This CCF addresses:
CCF 25 — Provide Operations Security

a. Analysis to determine key assets and threats to them.
b. Cover and concealment.
c. Camouflage.
d. Noise and light discipline.
e. Counter reconnaissance.
f. Smoke/obscurants.
g. Physical security measures.
h. Signal security.
i. Electronic security.

6. **CCF (26) Conduct Deception Operations** — Taking actions to mask the real objectives of tactical operations in order to delay effective enemy reaction. This CCF addresses:

a. Physical deception.
b. Electronic deception.

7. **CCF (27) Provide Decontamination** — Making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material. This CCF addresses:

a. Decontamination of individual soldiers and equipment.
b. Decontamination of weapon systems and supplies.
c. Hasty and deliberate decontamination.

VII. **Combat Service Support BOS** — The support, assistance and service provided to sustain forces, primarily in the area of logistics, personnel services and health services.

1. **CCF (28) Provide Transport Services** — Providing or coordinating for transportation which will assure sustainment support operations in support of the maneuver commander. Upon receipt of an OPORD, this CCF addresses preparation and execution tasks necessary to achieve transportation support of the maneuver force. This CCF addresses:

a. Movement of cargo, equipment and personnel by surface or air.
b. Loading, transloading and unloading material and supplies.

2. **CCF (29) Conduct Supply Operations** — Providing the items necessary to equip, maintain and operate the force during the preparation and execution phases of the battle. This CCF addresses:

a. Requesting, receiving, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating and issuing supplies to the specific elements of the force.
b. Providing munitions to weapons systems.
c. Providing fuel and petroleum products to equipment and weapons systems.
d. Reporting status.

3. **CCF (30) Provide Personnel Services** — Management and execution of all personnel-related matters to sustain the force. This CCF addresses:

   1) Replacement, casualty reporting.
   2) Awards and decorations.
CCF 25 — Provide Operations Security

3) Postal Operations.
4) Promotions, reductions.
b. Financial services.
c. Unit Ministry team.
d. Legal.
e. Public Affairs.
f. Reporting personnel status.
g. Preservation of the force through safety.
h. Management of stress.

4. CCF (31) Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment — Preservation and repair of weapons systems and equipment. This CCF includes the provision of repair parts and end items to all members of the combined arms team before, during and after the battle. Included also is doctrinal echeloning of maintenance (organization, DS, GS). This CCF addresses:

a. Preventative Maintenance.
b. Recovery.
c. Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair and return of equipment and weapons systems to the combined arms force.
d. Reporting status.

5. CCF (32) Provide Health Services — Performance, provision or arrangement for health services regardless of location, to promote, improve, conserve or restore the mental or physical well-being of individuals or groups. This CCF addresses

a. Preventive medicine.
b. Field sanitation.

6. CCF (33) Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties — Application of medical procedures on battlefield casualties beginning with "buddy aid" through trained medical personnel. The CCF includes movement of casualties from the forward edge of the battlefield back to division-level medical facilities. This CCF addresses:

a. Triage of battlefield casualties.
b. Treatment and movement of casualties to rear (medevac).
   1) Identification of levels of care and locations.
   2) Synchronization and coordination of movement of medical facilities to ensure continuity of care.
   3) Establishment and maintenance of communications with redundant means.
   4) Rehearsals.
   5) Resupply.
c. Evacuation:
   1) Ground ambulance.
   2) Aero medevac.

   3) Non-standard evacuation.
d. Handling and processing the remains of soldiers who have died of wounds.
e. Reporting status.

7. CCF (34) Conduct Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations — The collection, processing, evacuation and safeguarding of enemy prisoners of war. This CCF addresses:

a. Collecting and evacuating EPW.
b. Searching, segregating, safeguarding, silencing, and rapid rearward movement of EPW.

8. CCF (35) Conduct Law and Order Operations — Enforcement of laws and regulations and maintenance of units and personnel discipline.

9. CCF (36) Conduct Civil Affairs Operations — Conduct of those phases of the activities of a tactical commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities, and the citizens in a friendly or occupied country or area when U.S. military forces are present.

10. CCF (37) Provide Sustainment Engineering — The repair and construction of facilities and lines of communication. This CCF addresses:

   a. Rear area restoration.
   b. Construction and maintenance of lines of communication (roads, railroads, ports, airfields).
   c. Construction support:
      1) Marshaling, distribution and storage facilities.
      2) Pipelines.
      3) Fixed facilities.
      4) Drill wells.
      5) Dismantling of fortifications.

11. CCF (38) Evacuate Non-combatants from Area of Operations — The use of available military and host-nation resources for the evacuation of US forces, dependents, US government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and other). This CCF addresses:

   a. Medical support.
   b. Transportation.
   c. Security.
   d. Preparation of temporary shelters.
   e. Operation of clothing exchange facilities.
   f. Operation of bathing facilities.
   g. Graves registration.
   h. Laundry.
   i. Feeding.

12. CCF (39) Provide Field Services — Performance of service logistics functions by and for Army elements in the field. This CCF addresses:

   a. Clothing exchange.
   b. Bathing facilities.
   c. Graves registration.
   d. Laundry and clothes renovation.
   e. Bakeries.
   f. Feeding (rations supply, kitchens).
   g. Salvage.
OUTCOMES AND PURPOSE OF CCF 25

OUTCOMES

1. TF identifies all threats to its freedom of action.

2. TF reduces its vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, and surprise during TF preparations for and execution of a mission to the extent that enemy does not significantly interfere with TF freedom of action.

   a. TF takes advantage of cover, concealment, camouflage, noise and light discipline.

   b. TF counter-reconnaissance operations deny enemy direct observation of TF activities until it is too late for enemy to effectively react.

   c. TF use of smoke (and obscurants) prevents enemy direct observation of TF activities until it is too late for enemy to effectively react.

   d. Enemy is unable to intercept and exploit TF communications.

   e. Enemy is unable to locate TF C2 nodes and identify TF intentions through intercept and analysis of TF electronic emissions.

   f. TF physical security measures detect the enemy in time to prevent loss of personnel and damage to equipment and loss or compromise of plans and operations.

PURPOSE

To deny enemy information about friendly dispositions, plans, intentions, and operations by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations.
NOTE: Depending on METT-T, Co/Cr Tm CCR may not be able to leave counter-reconnaissance AO. Options are:
- CO XO or other designated rep attends TF orders brief, backsbrief rehearsal as Co/Cr Tm man after completion of counter-reconnaissance mission and,
- TF CCR should designate a leader and unit to prepare positions for Co/Cr Tm's (follow-on) mission as part of TF plan.
### OTHER CCF WHICH INTERACT WITH CCF 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCF #</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>LOGIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCF 1</td>
<td>Conduct Intelligence Planning</td>
<td>Enemy capabilities to acquire information on TF activities and to surprise the TF must be identified so that they can be countered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 4</td>
<td>Disseminate Intelligence</td>
<td>Changes to what is known about the enemy situation may drive the need to change or adjust OPSEC measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 5</td>
<td>Conduct Tactical Movement</td>
<td>TF preparation for and conduct of movement provide opportunity for enemy identification and exploitation of opportunities for counter action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 6</td>
<td>Engage Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver</td>
<td>TF preparation for and conduct of maneuver provide the best opportunity for enemy identification and exploitation of opportunities for counter action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 13</td>
<td>Conduct Counter Target Acquisition Operations</td>
<td>Degrade or deny enemy target acquisition systems. [Most of the battlefield capability resides with echelons above the TF.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 15</td>
<td>Coordinate, Synchronize and Integrate Fire Support</td>
<td>Fire support planning for smoke and suppression missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 18</td>
<td>Plan for Combat Operations</td>
<td>It is critical that OPSEC measures, e.g., Counter Recon, are fully addressed during planning. The TACSOI should identify standard OPSEC measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 19</td>
<td>Direct and Lead Unit During Preparation for the Battle</td>
<td>Rehearsals, positioning and activities of units and command posts, engineer work, leaders' reconnaissance, radio transmissions and electronic emissions, and other routine TF activities provide indications of TF intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 20</td>
<td>Direct and Lead Units in Execution of Battle</td>
<td>See 19. Also, as the battle progresses, the location of the commander and the TF reserve, the movement of units to include artillery and engineers, and radio transmissions provide indications of TF intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 23</td>
<td>Provide Countermobility</td>
<td>Possible use of FASCAM in conduct of counter-reconnaissance mission; possible passage through gaps in friendly obstacles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33</td>
<td>All TF activities provide an opportunity for enemy discovery of friendly capabilities and possible interpretation of TF intentions, as well as an opportunity to interfere with TF operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CCF 25

### KEY PARTICIPANTS BY TASK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Direct and lead TF while planning for the battle.</td>
<td>TF CDR, CSM, all members of TF. Particular responsibilities for S2, S3, S4, CESO, Chain of Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conduct mission analysis.</td>
<td>XO, S2, S3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Issue the Warning Order.</td>
<td>XO, S2, S3, CESO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Prepare staff estimates.</td>
<td>XO, TF Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Staff develops course of action.</td>
<td>XO, S2, S3, S3 Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Staff/Commander analyze course of action.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, CESO, FSO, ENGR, CMLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, CESO, FSO, ENGR, CMLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Refine the plan.</td>
<td>XO, S2, S3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. TF Command Group conducts and receives briefbacks.</td>
<td>TF CDR, S2, S3, FSO, Co/Co Tm CDR of TF Directed and Controlled Counter-Reconnaissance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. TF Rehearsal.</td>
<td>TF CDR, S2, S3, FSO, Co/Co Tm CDR of TF Directed and Controlled Counter-Reconnaissance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. TF Command Group and Command Post monitor effectiveness of OPSEC measures, supervise and direct execution of force protection operations/activities.</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S2, S3, FSO, CESO, CSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Command Post (TAC, TOC, CTCP) operations.</td>
<td>XO, S3, Opns NCO, HHC CDR, S4, All personnel assigned or visiting CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Commander/Staff receive battlefield information (CCF 20).</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S2, S3, CESO, FSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Commander synchronizes combat power (CCF 20).</td>
<td>TF CDR, S3, S2, FSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Command Group monitors, supervises, directs execution of the battle (CCF 20).</td>
<td>TF CDR, S3, S2, FSO, XO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASKS</td>
<td>PARTICIPANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Commander synchronizes combat power (CCF 20).</td>
<td>TF CDR, S3, FSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Task Force consolidates, reorganizes, and prepares to continue the mission (CCF 20).</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S2, S3, S4/S1, FSO, CESO, Co/Co Tm CDRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. TF subordinate elements maintain OPSEC</td>
<td>TF CDR, XO, S2, S3, CESO, FSO, Chain of Command; All members of TF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Receive the TF WARNO.</td>
<td>Co/Co Tm CDR, Ops NCO, XO, 1SGT Platoon Leaders, Squad Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Receive TF OPORD.</td>
<td>Co/Co Tm Cdr, XO, Co/Co Tm, 1SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Preparation for TF controlled counter-reconnaissance mission.</td>
<td>Co/Co Tm CDR, XO, Co/Co Tm, 1SG, PL, Leaders of attached elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Execute counter-reconnaissance mission.</td>
<td>TF CDR, S3, S2, FSO, Co/Co Tm CDR of TF Counter-reconnaissance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Reposition after completion of counter-reconnaissance mission.</td>
<td>TF CDR, S3, FSO, Co/Co Tm CDR of TF Counter-reconnaissance Force, Co/Co Tm CDR of units being passed through, Co/Co Tm CDR of adjacent units; leaders of units providing attachments to counter-reconnaissance force; units attached to TF counter-reconnaissance force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Preparation for local security operations.</td>
<td>Co/Co Tm CDR, 1SG, PL/PSG, Squad Leaders (as appropriate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Execution of local security operations.</td>
<td>S3, S2, FSO, Co/Co Tm CDRS, PL, Squad Leaders (as appropriate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. TF directed/supervised physical preparation of defense for follow-on mission of counter-reconnaissance force (if applicable).</td>
<td>TF Cdr, designated leader or staff officer, S3, S2, TF FSO, TF Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Counter-reconnaissance force prepares for follow-on mission.</td>
<td>Co/Co Tm Cdr, Co XO, chain of command, FIST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KEY INPUTS/OUTPUTS TO CCF 25
(W/ CRITICAL INFORMATION)

KEY INPUTS

TF-1 TF OPORD

a. Counter-Reconnaissance Plan.

b. Directed local security measures.

c. Annexes:

1) Intelligence Annex.
   • R&S plan.
2) Smoke Annex.
   • Commander’s concept and intent for employment of smoke assets
     (obscure/conceal).
   • Smoke in support of the deception plan.
3) Signal annex.
   • Anti-jamming procedures.

d. Changes to TF organization.

e. Follow-on mission for TF Counter-Reconnaissance force.

f. Operational graphics/overlays:

1) Maneuver.
2) R&S Plan.
3) Engineer/obstacle.
4) Artillery/mortar.

TF-2 TF Tactical SOP

a. Security operations

1) TOC installation and security.
2) TF surveillance and reconnaissance.
3) TF requirements for security patrols, OP and LP.

b. Intelligence reporting.

c. Counter intelligence/OPSEC and security.

d. Physical security.

e. SIGSEC.

1) Brevity matrix.
2) Use of wire, messengers, RATT.
3) Use of secure communications equipment.
4) Nets to be entered.
5) Placement of antennas, to include remoting.

f. Information security.

**TF-3**

**SOI**

a. Frequencies, primary and alternate.

b. Call signs.

c. Sign and countersign; recognition signals.

d. SIGSEC

1) Procedures for changing frequencies.
2) Challenges.
3) MJI reports.
TASK LIST SUMMARY FOR CCF 25

See CCF 18, 19, and 20 for a detailed task analysis of relevant tasks.

PLANNING

1. **Direct and lead TF while planning for the battle** (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3901; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

2. **Receive order from higher headquarters** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

3. **Conduct mission analysis** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3901, 3902, 3906; ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 17-3-3014; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

4. **Issue the Warning Order** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

5. **Commander Issues guidance** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

6. **Prepare staff estimates** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

7. **Staff develops course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

8. **Staff/Commander analyze course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

9. **Staff compares course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

10. **Commander announces decision** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

11. **Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028/2, 3911/1, 3908/4, 3904/13; ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

12. **Issue the OPORD/FRAGO** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

13. **Refine the plan** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

23. **TF subordinate elements maintain OPSEC** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3905; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 71-2-0202, 0201; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
FOR TF DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE

24. Receive the TF WARNO (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

25. Receive TF OPORD (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

26. Preparation for TF controlled counter-reconnaissance mission (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

FOR LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

PREPARATION

14. TF Command Group conducts and receives briefings (backbriefs/briefbacks) (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3903, 3905, 3906; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

15. TF Rehearsals (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3903; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

31. TF directed/supervised physical preparation of defense for follow-on mission (if applicable) (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

32. Counter-reconnaissance force prepares for follow-on mission (while performing counter-reconnaissance mission) (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

PREPARATION AND EXECUTION

16. TF Command Group and Command Posts monitor effectiveness of OPSEC measures, supervise and direct execution of force protection operations/activities (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

17. Command Post (TAC, TOC, CTCP) operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3401, 3904, 3913, 3914, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

January 28, 1994
CCF 25 — Provide Operations Security

18. Commander/Staff receive battlefield information (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

19. Commander/Command Group make(s) battlefield decisions (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

20. TF Command Posts track and support the battle (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

21. TF Commander directs and leads the execution (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

22. Task Force consolidates and reorganizes (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905, 3022, 3023; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

FOR TF DIRECTED COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE FORCE

27. Execute counter-reconnaissance mission (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

28. Reposition after completion of counter-reconnaissance mission (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

FOR LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

29. Preparation for local security operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3001, 3026, 3028, 3905, 3906, 3901, 3902, 3903; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0325, 0202, 0312, 0330, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

30. Execution of local security operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3001, 3026, 3028, 3905, 3906, 3901, 3902, 3903; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0325, 0202, 0312, 0330, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY
PLANNING TASK LIST

OPSEC considerations are listed for tasks from CCF 18, 19 and 20. Key input/output and products are listed at page 17–18.

1. **Direct and lead TF while planning for the battle** (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014; ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3901; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

   a. Maintain OPSEC at all echelons of TF (includes CPs, unit [combat, CS, CSS] collective tasks and individual tasks).

   1) Many OPSEC measures are standard operating procedures and are continuously exercised by TF elements, e.g.:

      a) Physical security measures:
      
      - Camouflage and concealment.
      - Removal of vehicle markings.
      - Feeding and hygiene activities during periods of limited visibility.
      - Noise and light discipline.
      - Control of movement in and around CP and other positions.
      - Sentries and dismount points.
      - Stand-to.

      b) SIGSEC measures:
      
      - Length of FM transmissions.
      - Remote radios and other emitters.
      - Use of authentication procedures.

      c) Information security measures:
      
      - Control of documents.
      - Control of means of dissemination.
      - Destruction of classified material when no longer needed.

      d) Counter-reconnaissance measures:
      
      - SOP unit security patrols.
      - SOP OP/LP.
2) Some OPSEC measures are METT-T dependent and are directed by the TF as part of the TF counter-reconnaissance plan.
   a) TF controlled counter-reconnaissance force(s) with either a screen or guard type mission.
   b) TF directed unit OP/LP, reconnaissance patrols, and ambushes.
   c) TF directed reaction forces.

b. Evaluate effectiveness of OPSEC (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, 71-3-3014 (S3)).
   1) Request evaluation resources and evaluation of TF OPSEC from brigade.
   2) Determine effectiveness of OPSEC measures using TF and brigade resources plus reports from brigade.
   3) Monitor and appraise the TF security battle.
   4) Adjust as necessary (Task 13, CCF 18).
   5) Continuous process (Task 16, CCF 25).
   6) Assisted by S2.

2. **Receive order from higher headquarters** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

3. **Conduct mission analysis** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3901, 3902, 3906; ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)
   a. Determine major vulnerabilities to enemy intelligence operations. (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028) (S3).
      1) Develop profiles of TF elements and activities by determining signatures, patterns, and indicators. (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014).
      2) Consider enemy ground, air, EW capabilities (input from S2).
   3) Maintain profiles for following activities: intelligence operations; logistical operations; tactical operations and forms of maneuver and mission accomplishment; CP operations; communications operations; electro-optics (laser and infrared) operations. (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014) (S3).
   b. Develop essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014) (S3 with input from S2).
   c. Evaluate operational risk (make a vulnerability assessment). (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, 71-3-3014) (S3).
   d. Conduct risk analysis and select EEFI that warrant OPSEC measures for protection. (Risk analysis includes determination of priorities for protection, potential damage if
enemy is able to collect information on vulnerable aspects operation, and the "cost" in resources to accomplish OPSEC measures. (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014) (S3).

e. See CCF 1, Conduct Intelligence Planning.

1) Identify potential enemy reconnaissance routes and objectives. (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3906).

2) Determine amount of cover and concealment on routes/approaches. (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3902) (S2) (Provides basis for positioning counter-reconnaissance forces.)

f. See CCF 2, Collect Information. Appraise enemy capabilities to acquire information on TF plans and related activities by means of ground reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, EW. (S2)

g. Request that brigade obtain/furnish required resources not available in TF; information about what additional support is or is not feasible should be included in analysis.

h. Get status on assets required for extraordinary OPSEC measures, e.g., use of chemical smoke platoon, ascertain amount of smoke that smoke platoon can generate based on supplies available; re artillery delivered smoke, ascertain duration, linear length, and thickness based on ammunition and firing batteries available. (CCF 15)

i. Appraise impact of implementing OPSEC measures on other aspects of operation, e.g., impact on fire support capabilities of artillery is used to deliver smoke. (CCF 15)

4. **Issue the Warning Order** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

a. Include identified SIGSEC, information security measures, physical security measures, and counter-reconnaissance measures.

5. **Commander Issues guidance** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

a. See CCF 18, Plan for Combat Operations.

6. **Prepare staff estimates** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

a. Provide for OPSEC.

7. **Staff develops course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

a. Consider OPSEC (per Task 3, CCF 25).

b. Request, as appropriate, additional counter-reconnaissance assets from brigade, e.g., helicopters for reconnaissance and surveillance to detect enemy OP and
reconnaissance patrols; additional GSR; EW assets to intercept radio transmissions and locate enemy positions in the TF area.

8. **Staff/Commander analyze course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)
   a. During the wargame, determine for each COA, measures for SIGSEC, information security, physical security, and counter-reconnaissance.
   b. By-products of the wargame include:
      1) An operational risk assessment which incorporates OPSEC.
      2) Identification of additional resource requirements, e.g., helicopters, GSR.
   c. Treat counter-reconnaissance as a separate phase of the battle.
   d. TF controlled counter-reconnaissance force:
      1) Task organization. Allocate sufficient forces for task. Augment with artillery fire support means, mortars, GSR, engineers, et al, as appropriate. Consider TF Scout platoon as part of force (desirability to so use TF scouts depends on situation; if part of counter-reconnaissance force they are not available for other TF reconnaissance requirements).
      2) Provide for unity of effort.
      3) Mission:
         a) Intended outcome: screen or guard
         b) Area of operations. Complete coverage of avenues of approach leading to most critical aspect of TF preparations or greatest vulnerability and risk from an OPSEC perspective.
         c) Duration of mission.
         d) Follow-on mission. Mission to other units prepare positions for elements composing counter-reconnaissance force for use during follow-on mission (when appropriate).
      4) Coordinating instructions:
         a) Forward/rearward passage of lines.
         b) Battle handoff.
      5) Provide sufficient time for troop leading procedures and preparations.
   e. TF directed counter surveillance operations:
      1) Responsibilities defined.
2) NAI designated.

3) As appropriate, times, routes, etc. designated.

9. **Staff compares course of action** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

10. **Commander announces decision** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

11. **Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905, 3028/2, 3911/1, 3908/4, 3904/13; ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

   a. Direct implementation of OPSEC measures.
      
      1) SIGSEC.
      
      2) Information security measures.
      
      3) Physical security measures.
      
      4) Counter-reconnaissance measures.

   b. Request additional resources. (ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Task 71-3-3014) (S3).

   c. Plan considers, inter alia: (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028/2, 3905/1, 3911/1, 3908/4, 3904/13)
      
      1) Detection and destruction of enemy reconnaissance and appropriate passive measures.
      
      2) Strong security elements/patrols to the front and flanks (and rear, if necessary) early and continuously.
      
      3) Contingency plans to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements if the security force cannot destroy them (reaction forces).
      
      4) Command and control for security forces/patrols.
      
      5) Recovery of forward security elements in the defense while maintaining surveillance of the enemy.
      
      6) Coordination of local security by companies, command and control facilities, and CSS elements for OPs and to ambush patrols (coverage; prevention of fratricide).
      
      7) Use of covered and concealed routes.
      
      8) Conduct of preparation/movement actions during limited visibility.
      
      9) Use of GSR and REMS to assist in detection of the enemy.
10) Control to limit movement traffic in, around, and between positions.

11) Remote radios and other emitters so that enemy intercept units cannot locate CP facilities, units.

12) Designation of alternate frequencies and antijamming procedures.

13) Designation of one station to stay on the old frequency to deceive enemy.

14) Deception measures directed by higher headquarters.

15) Deception actions to make the enemy think the battalion is doing a believable action, which stops the enemy from reacting or causes him to react in a manner favorable to the battalion. Designation measures include feints, demonstrations, ruses, use of indirect fires (concentrated on decoy objectives), and use of smoke and patrols/reconnaissance in areas other than main objective area.

16) Deception plans that do not interfere with the operation.

17) Mortar and field artillery smoke planned to obscure enemy observation, screen friendly movement, and assist disengagements.

d. Task 3, CCF 25.

12. **Issue the OPORD/FRAGO** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

13. **Refine the plan** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 1)

a. Consider effectiveness of OPSEC measures especially those focused on the force security battle, i.e., counter-reconnaissance and physical security. Adjust as necessary.

b. Request additional resources.

23. **TF subordinate elements maintain OPSEC** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028, 3905; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 71-2-0202, 0201; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

a. All enemy patrols are destroyed or repelled before they can gain information on battalion disposition actions or concept/intent of operation by use of security and reaction forces. (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028).

b. Electronic security operations (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028/1).

1) Radio transmissions do not reveal unit activity, movement, and fire coordination attachment/detachment.

2) All transmissions are less than 15 seconds long. (SOP)

3) Radio communications are not used when wire, messages, or visual means are available and permitted by METT-T. (SOP)
4) Authentication procedures outlined in the unit SOI or systems are used during all communications. (SOP)

5) Call signs and radio frequencies are changed as directed by SOI. (SOP) (SOI)

6) Names of persons, equipment, units, and locations are not used over nonsecure communications. (SOP) (SOI)

7) Sensitive information is transmitted by secure means (mechanical or encrypted). (SOP) (SOI)

8) NCS enforces brevity and use of SOIs. (SOP) (CCF 18, 19, 20)

9) Noncommunication emitters are placed away from friendly locations and are used only when other measures are unreliable. (SOP)

10) Emission control is used (silence, number of emitters, low power settings) to reduce signature, yet provide adequate communications. (SOP) (SOI)

11) Unnecessary transmissions are avoided. (SOP)

12) Report times are planned on a random schedule and are as short as possible IAW higher headquarters. (SOP) (SOI)

13) Sensitive information that must be transmitted by electronic means on a nonsecure net is encrypted, using an authorized crypto system. (SOP) (SOI)

c. Information security (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3028/5)

1) Controls waste and other material outlining plan, operations, combat status, or other information of use to the enemy. Limits dissemination of OPORDS/OPLANS classified. Destroys them when no longer needed. (SOP)

2) Safeguards information on unit or unit operations from civilians (refugees, displaced personnel). (SOP)

d. Counter-reconnaissance actions (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3905/4)

1) Helicopter support is requested and used to locate enemy OPs, patrols.

2) Reaction force is forward and prepared to defeat enemy reconnaissance elements.

3) TF OPs and patrols are emplaced and active.

4) TF destroys 60 percent of enemy reconnaissance elements during offensive and defensive operations.

e. SIGSEC (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3401/3) (SOP)

1) Only approved radiotelephone procedures are used.

2) TF encodes all critical messages without error.

3) TF decodes all messages without error.
4) TF keeps transmissions to 15 seconds.

5) TF uses challenge and reply authentication IAW SOI without error.

6) Radio listening silence is observed as directed.

7) Lowest possible power setting and directional antennas are used when possible.

f. Same as Command Post (Task 19, CCF 25).

g. Local security.

1) OP/LP, reconnaissance patrols, ambush patrols.

2) Sufficient time allotted for OP/LP and patrol troop leading procedures and preparation.

3) Coordination to preclude fratricide by direct and indirect means.

4) Debriefs and reports to TF S2.

5) Spot reports of enemy activity sent immediately to TF S2.

6) Aggressive action to destroy enemy reconnaissance.

FOR TF DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE FORCE

24. Receive the TF WARNO (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

a. Initiate troop leading procedures.

1) Coordination with S3 re:

a) Probable mission start and end times.

b) Probable area of operations.

c) Ongoing TF security operations.

d) Screen or guard mission.

e) TF dispositions, activities, and planned activities (relevant to planning passage(s) of lines, battle hand-off, etc.

f) Non-TF units that might be involved in passage of lines, support.

g) Assessment of TF vulnerabilities to enemy reconnaissance.

h) Priorities of EEFI to be denied to enemy.
i) Tentative additions to Co./Co Tm for counter-reconnaissance mission, e.g., scouts; mortars; GSR; CSS.

j) Time/place of attachment.

k) Probable time of issuance of TF OPORD.

2) Coordination with S2 re:

a) Avenues of approach into area.

b) NAI and TAI.

c) Enemy reconnaissance forces and tactics.

d) Enemy activities, ground and air.

e) See CCF 1, 2, 3.

3) Coordination with FSO re:

a) Artillery support and coordination (see CCF 15).

4) Alert subordinates.

5) Leaders reconnaissance (time permitting:)

a) Route.

b) Area of operations (use helicopter if available).

6) Coordination visit with commander of unit through which will pass (forward and/or rearward) (time permitting).

b. Subordinates commence troop leading procedures.

c. Co/Co Tm CDR develops tentative concept of operation.

1) Screen (surveillance belt).

2) Guard (detect/destroy) belt or belts.

d. See CCF 5.

25. Receive TF OPORD (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

a. Analyze mission.

1) Constraints.

a) Time/distance to occupy counter-reconnaissance area of operations.
b) Time to assume counter-reconnaissance mission.

c) Follow-on mission.

2) Task organization.
   a) How effect attachment.
   b) Status of units to be attached.

3) Area of operations, IPB
   a) Enemy avenues of approach.
      - Cover and concealment.
      - Mobility corridors, foot; vehicle.
      - Mobility corridor, choke points.
   b) Limited visibility operations.
   c) Friendly observation points.
   d) High speed movement corridors.
   e) Potential ambush sites.

4) Screen/detect aspect of mission.
   a) Forces available.
   b) Capabilities.
   c) Limitations.

5) Guard/destroy aspect of mission
   a) Forces available.
   b) Capabilities.
   c) Limitations.
      - GSR security requirements.
      - Portions of area of operations not covered by TF DS artillery.

6) Command and control.
   a) Unity of command.
   b) Clearly defined operation areas for platoons.
c) Communications to TF TOC.

7) Options for organizing a screen capability to detect enemy reconnaissance elements and report them.
   a) Troops available.
   b) Space (depth and width).
   c) Organized in a belt with own area of operation.

8) Operations for organizing a guard capability.
   a) Troops available.
      - Dismounted capability (ambushes, hunter-killer teams, search for enemy OP, pursuit.)
      - Direct fire capability.
      - Indirect fire capability (organic, DS, GS) (availability of FIST)
   b) One guard belt or two guard belts.
      - Width/depth of sector.
      - Number, dispersion of high priority TF activities to protect.
      - Span of control for platoon leaders.
      - Number of maneuver platoons.
      - Two guard belts deepen the counter-reconnaissance battle in that second belt provides a capability under direct control of Co/Co Tm CDR to destroy “leakers” and in general, backstop the first guard belt which has the primary capability and responsibility for destroying the enemy reconnaissance elements.
      - If use two guard belts, consider positioning tanks in second belt (or deep in position) to minimize vulnerability to AT fires (METT-T dependent).

9) Activities of TF, other units adjacent to counter reconnaissance area of operations, locations of units.
   a) Battle positions and obstacles.
   b) Passage of lines.
   c) Closure of gaps.
   d) Battle hand-off.
   e) Support.
— Direct fire.
— Indirect fire.
— CSS (maintenance and medical; see CCF 31, 33).
— Hand-off of destruction of "leakers" and other enemy elements who escape counter-reconnaissance force.

10) Activities of other brigade or divisional elements engaged in adjacent counter-reconnaissance operations.
   a) Exchange of information.
   b) Direct or indirect fires into sector.

26. Preparation for TF controlled counter-reconnaissance mission (ARTEP 7-247-11-MTP, Task 7-3/4-4040, 4041, 4042, 4043, 4044, 4045, 4057, 4059; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0306, 0309, 0310, 0326, 0311, 0312, 0330, 0401, 0402, 0201, 44-2-C001; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
   a. Backbriefs to TF CDR.
   b. Participation in TF rehearsal. (Time dependent; may be necessary to send XO). Particular interest:
      1) Follow-on mission.
      2) Passage of lines and movement to designated position after counter-reconnaissance mission.
      3) TF scheme of maneuver as might affect counter-reconnaissance mission, subsequent passage of lines, or repositioning.
   c. Co/Co Tm rehearsal of counter-reconnaissance mission.
   d. Subordinate leader reconnaissance.
   e. Subordinate leader backbriefs to Co/Co Tm CDR.
   f. Receipt of attachments.
      1) Time/place of "chop".
      2) Effective time to change frequencies.
      3) Status of attachment:
         a) Primary vehicles or personnel. Numbers, condition.
         b) Special equipment.
         c) Class III and Class V.
d) Recovery capability.

4) Issue:
   a) Commander’s guidance.
   b) Co/Co Tm OPORD with graphics.
   c) Co/Co Tm SOP (minimum: those items not included in TF SOP, e.g.,
      recognition signals).
   d) Maps.

5) Further cross attachments as required.

6) Leader’s reconnaissance.

7) Backbriefs.

8) Rehearsals.

g. Communications.
   1) To TF.
   2) Within counter-reconnaissance force across sector.
   3) Use one frequency.

h. Position forces quickly. Desirable to accomplish this prior to entry into area of enemy
   reconnaissance.

i. Control movement so as to reduce opportunities for detection.
PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY
PREPARATION TASK LIST

14. **TF Command Group conducts and receives briefings (backbriefs/briefbacks)** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3903, 3905, 3906; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 3)
   
   a. Commander of TF countersurveillance force formed for this mission (if applicable) briefs on his mission, concept, maneuver, fire support, EW, task organization and coordination.
   
   b. S2 briefs details of countersurveillance missions directed for execution by TF subordinate elements.
   
   c. See CCF 19, Task 1.

15. **TF Rehearsals** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3903; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
   
   a. Includes TF countersurveillance force to degree feasible.
      
      1) Passage of lines.
      
      2) Battle hand-off from/to TF counter-reconnaissance force.
      
      3) Fire support.
      
      4) Reconstitution.
   
   b. See CCF 19, Task 5.

31. **TF directed/supervised physical preparation of defense for follow-on mission of counter-reconnaissance force (if applicable)** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)
   
   a. Since counter-reconnaissance force may not have time or troops available to plan and/or prepare positions for follow-on mission and/or, supervise others doing actual preparation work. Although there are trade-offs TF commander has options:
      
      1) Planning and supervision by a staff officer; preparation work by another unit.
      
      2) Planning and execution of position preparation by another unit.
      
      3) Acceptance of a decrease in counter-reconnaissance force’s mission capability so that counter-reconnaissance force could plan and prepare for follow-on mission.
      
      4) Spread impact on any one company team by task organizing counter-reconnaissance force from more than one company team. Subordinate elements
from the company headquarters leading the counter-reconnaissance force would therefore be available to prepare that unit for the follow-on mission.

b. Each of the foregoing would normally result in dilution of someone’s planning and preparation roles.

32. **Counter-reconnaissance force prepares for follow-on mission (while performing counter-reconnaissance mission)** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

a. See CCF 6.

b. Impact would be dilution of counter-reconnaissance effort.

c. Co XO could plan and direct follow-on mission preparations leaving commander able to concentrate on counter-reconnaissance mission or vice versa.
PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY
PREPARATION AND EXECUTION TASK LIST

16. **TF Command Group and Command Post monitor effectiveness of OPSEC measures, supervise and direct execution of force protection operations/activities** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3028, 3905; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

   a. SIGSEC.
   
   b. Information security measures.
   
   c. Physical security measures.
   
   d. Counter-reconnaissance measures.
      
      1) TF controlled missions.
      
      2) TF directed missions.
      
      3) Security missions IAW SOP.
      
   e. See CCF 19, Task 2.

17. **Command Post (TAC, TOC, CTCP) operations** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3401, 3904, 3913, 3914, 3028; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

   a. Local security.
   
   b. Passive measures, e.g.:
      
      1) Camouflage and concealment.
      
      2) Removal of vehicle markings.
      
      3) Noise and light discipline.
      
      4) Use of challenge and passwords.
      
      5) Control to limit movement in and around command post.
      
      6) Passive air defense.
   
   c. Countersurveillance measures, e.g.:
      
      1) Use of smoke.
      
      2) Security patrols.
      
      3) OP/LP.
d. SIGSEC, e.g.:
   1) Net discipline re length of transmissions, authentication procedures.
   2) Remote siting of transmitters; mask emitters from enemy.
   3) Communication means other than radio, e.g., wire, messenger.
   4) Use of secure means to transmit sensitive information.
   5) Control of number and activity of emitters.

e. Information security, e.g.:
   1) Control of classified material.
   2) Controlled destruction of classified waste.

f. Site command posts (and field trains) off of main enemy avenues of approach when feasible (CCF 29).

g. See CCF 19, Task 7.

18. Commander/Staff receive battlefield information (CCF 20) (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
   a. TF counter-reconnaissance force operates, reports as would any other TF subordinate element.
   b. See CCF 20.

19. Commander/Command Group make(s) battlefield decisions (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
   a. Changes in mission are defined and provided for TF countersurveillance force as would be for any other TF subordinate element.
   b. See CCF 20, Task 6.

20. TF Command Posts track and support the battle (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
   a. Actions and status of TF countersurveillance forces are tracked and acted upon similarly to any other TF subordinate element.
   b. See CCF 20, Task 4.

21. Commander directs and leads the execution (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)
a. TF countersurveillance force is an element of combat power. So too, is the artillery, EW, engineer, TAC air, attack helicopter support that may be needed to accomplish countersurveillance effort.

b. See CCF 20, Task 3.

22. **Task Force consolidates and reorganizes** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3901, 3902, 3904, 3905, 3022, 3023; FM 71-1, Chap 2; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

   a. Countersurveillance elements may need reconstitution.

   b. Countersurveillance elements should have follow-on missions when their counter-surveillance mission is complete.

   c. TF maintains OPSEC after mission is completed. (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3023-1)

      1) Places security elements forward of perimeter (OPs, scouts, patrols) to provide early warning company-size mounted approaches.

      2) Performs reconnaissance of objective/sector with local patrols and scouts.

   d. See CCF 20, Task 7.

**FOR TF DIRECTED COUNTER RECONNAISSANCE FIRE**

27. **Execute counter-reconnaissance mission** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

   a. Timeline will probably be tight.

   b. Continuous exchange of information with TF S2 to enable him to “see” the enemy reconnaissance effort in terms of forces committed and areas of activity, and to track the capability of the enemy reconnaissance force as it is destroyed.

   c. Careful hand-off of detected enemy elements from “detector” to “killer.”

   d. Careful tracking by Co/Co Tm CP of sighting enemy reconnaissance until destroyed; careful determination of location and type of vehicles destroyed and soldiers killed.

   e. Reporting of same to TF S2 to permit assessment of remaining capability.

   f. Control on one frequency, the Co/Co Tm frequency.

   g. Reposition forces to alternate positions after engagements so as to maintain OPSEC.

   h. Control movement of vehicles and personnel so as to reduce enemy opportunities to detect counter-reconnaissance elements.

   i. Use of helicopters.
1) To detect enemy elements day and night (OH-58D)

2) To move dismounted elements for attack or pursuit of enemy elements.

j. Reporting of all friendly locations to preclude fratricide.

28. **Reposition after completion of counter-reconnaissance mission** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3026, 3028, 3905, 3906; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0202, 0201, 1021, 0312, 0330; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 3)

   a. Coordination with elements to rear.
   
   b. Passage of obstacles and closure of gaps.
   
   c. Battle hand-over.
   
   d. Assistance, CSS (CCF 31, 33), CS (CCF 15)
   
   e. Passage of lines.
   
   f. Status report with reconstitution requirements; include specific requirements of attached units. (Done as early as possible.)
   
   g. Movement to new position.
   
   h. Release of attached units.
   
   i. Reorganization and refit as required. (CCF 29, 31, 33)
   
   j. Assumption of new mission.

FOR LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

29. **Preparation for local security operations** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3001, 3026, 3028, 3905, 3906, 3901, 3902, 3903; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0325, 0202, 0312, 0330, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

   a. Troop leading procedures.
      
      1) Night observation devices.
      
      2) Communications.
   
   b. Analyze mission.
      
      1) Enemy avenues of approach.
      
      2) Friendly vulnerabilities.
      
      3) Indirect fire support.
      
         a) Preplanned.
b) Emergency.

4) Knowledge about friendly activities in area of operations.

5) Insure other units’ awareness of times, routes, positions of own local security patrols, OP/LP.

6) Recognition signals; passwords and challenge.

7) Procedures to exit, reenter positions.
   a) Advance coordination.
   b) Place(s).

8) If TF directed:
   a) NAI and TAI.
   b) Reporting requirements.

c. Plan.

d. Backbriefs.

e. Rehearsal.

f. Coordination with:
   1) Units to pass through.
   2) Indirect fire support with FIST.

30. **Execution of local security operations** (ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Task 7-1-3001, 3026, 3028, 3905, 3906, 3901, 3902, 3903; ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Task 17-2-0325, 0202, 0312, 0330, 0201; FM 71-2, Chap 2; FM 71-1, Chap 2, 4; FM 71-123, Chap 2)

a. Oriented to prevent enemy reconnaissance of designated friendly activities.

b. Continuous exchange of information on security elements’ location so as to prevent fratricide.

c. Timely and accurate reports to TF S2.
CALL LESSONS LEARNED RELEVANT TO CCF 25
(EXTRACTS FROM LESSONS LEARNED BULLETINS)

1. **NTC Commanders Memorandum — Nov 1985**

**Reconnaissance and Counter-reconnaissance**

The importance of reconnaissance cannot be overemphasized. There is typically a battle which precedes the battle — a confrontation of opposing reconnaissance units — and the winner of that preliminary battle is most often the victor in the main event.

For a deliberate attack, just knowing that the enemy is on a particular hill is not sufficient. You must know how he has prepared the ground — obstacles and fire bags. You must know the locations of his weapons systems so that you can isolate and/or suppress the vast majority and gang up on just a few. For the present, the detailed intelligence needed at task force level will not come from sophisticated devices but from skilled scouts and infantrymen.

In the defense, you must deny the enemy the knowledge of your concept of the operation. It is important for counter-reconnaissance to begin before initial occupation and to continue throughout the time and depth of the defense. The defender must both detect and kill enemy reconnaissance elements. This requires dedicated assets — scouts, infantry, tanks, and TOWs. During daylight, helicopters can be very effective at locating reconnaissance elements hiding in the task force sector. Challenge and password procedures should be used by everyone, not just TOC guards. Protection of obstacles is of particular importance. They are always a prime target and must be guarded at night. First light sweeps should be made to clear the area and check the integrity of defensive preparations. OPSEC and deception are also important. Reverse slope positions, use of screening smoke, frequent repositioning of vehicles, and late occupation of positions are all useful techniques.

For both offense and defense, reconnaissance must be continuous over time and throughout the depth of the battle area. If the enemy is moving, we need to know. We must use the high ground for observation and deny its use to the enemy.

Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S2 in close coordination with the S3 and FSO. Company patrols (except local security) should be on a single battalion net. The S2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio relays. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.

**Smoke**

Smoke is a far more significant battlefield factor than I used to believe. It simply must be a major planning consideration in terms of both friendly employment and reaction to enemy use. An antitank position that seems very attractive in the middle of a sunny afternoon may not be very desirable when the attack comes in dense smoke early the next morning. If that weapon has not rehearsed movement to prepared alternate positions, it will likely be irrelevant to the outcome of the battle.

The effectiveness of smoke varies markedly with weather. During the periods of temperature inversion which often follow BMNT, it is possible to rapidly cover a very large area with dense smoke. Conversely, smoke rises so fast in the middle of a hot summer day that
even the use of a great deal of generating capacity will have only a marginal impact. Also, a
wind blowing generally in the direction of the enemy can be a great asset.

There is an obvious similarity in the impact of smoke and fog on the battlefield and inten-
sive training is required to deal with both.

Offensive operations in smoke required tighter formations, slower speeds, and easily recog-
nized routes.

Defensive operations in smoke required prepared and rehearsed alternate positions and OPs
that are generally much closer to the high speed avenues of approach, increased patrolling
along obstacles to preclude breaching, and use of attack helicopters to find and exploit
windows in the smoke. Although smoke does provide protection, it can turn on an attacker.
If it blows away or when an open area is encountered, the attacker is suddenly exposed. A
massed formation silhouetted against smoke is a great target. The attacker's need for closed
formations, slower speeds, and routes which facilitate navigation makes IBP easier and
results in vulnerability to counterattacks. Surveillance which tracks enemy movement and
rehearsed counterattack plans are vital.

Jeep transported smoke is vulnerable, but not to a degree that it cannot be successfully
employed. Use of wadis and other defilade, movement, and screening with smoke pots
prior to startup all reduce vulnerability. Generators can run for an hour before refueling.
Hence, it is not necessary for operators to remain in the area.

Smoke at night causes great confusion. Employment on the enemy as he is moving to attack
positions in darkness can be very disruptive.

Smoke is a useful deception measure; it almost always draws attention and reaction.

Effective employment of the smoke generating capability of tanks requires a considerable
amount of control and judgment. It is important to avoid premature use which gives away
positions that otherwise would not have been seen and to be sure that the smoke ends up
between the enemy and vehicle. Smoke behind vehicles only makes them better targets.

The timing and placement of smoke to produce the desired result requires knowledge and
experience. It is more of an art form than a mechanical process. A plan which integrates
artillery and mortar delivered smoke, smoke pots, and smoke generators must be developed
with a knowledge of the peculiarities of each. Smoke is fickle — pots 100 meters apart can
send smoke in different directions. The initial plan will often require adjustment due to
unexpected effects of wind, inversion, and slope. We must have personnel with the requisite
skills and they must begin smoke operations early enough to achieve sufficient buildup and
make adjustments.

**Tank Positioning**

Correct positioning allows tanks and TOWs to both survive and kill. Surviving is key and is
a function of two factors: (1) avoiding detection by the enemy; and (2) if detected, moving
securely to a different firing position. "What can be seen can be hit, . . ." is not just a trite
phrase.

A few suggested positioning principles and techniques are outlined in the following para-
graphs. They all apply to tanks. Some are also applicable for ITVs.
Use a full hide position if at all possible and stay in it until the enemy is in the area where you plan to kill him. A prone or dug-in observer forward gives a much smaller signature than a tank, even one that is in a good dug-in position.

Have a backdrop and avoid anything that catches the eye. Hill tops are death traps. Likewise, if you position a tank in the vicinity of a large boulder or other prominent terrain feature, it will almost certainly be detected.

Position to the flank of an enemy approach and behind frontal cover. It is far easier for an attacker to acquire and kill targets to his front than those to his flank or rear. Despite the fact that MILES does not accurately reflect the vulnerability variance in frontal and flank armor, most kills at the NTC are from the flank.

Have covered routes into and out of firing positions. Experienced crews often put as much priority on covered routes as on the quality of firing positions. Weapons must move carefully. "Hot rodding" produces diesel and dust signatures.

One of the most successful techniques is the "window" or "keyhole" position. Simply stated, the basis for this technique is to limit exposure by deliberately restricting a tank's sector of fire. The tank is exposed only to the targets at which it is firing. It then shifts to other firing positions as targets are destroyed.

Valley floor/open field positions are often very successful. Tank platoons have taken out battalions using this technique. The position must be well constructed with at least one hull down firing location for each tank and a covered route to full defilade. Very little of the tank is exposed in the firing location and there is normally a wide sector of fire. Such positions allow grazing fire analogous to effective machine gun emplacement. They often achieve surprise and it is difficult for one enemy element to point the position out to another or to accurately adjust indirect fires. The technique is often used with obstacles in such a way that neither the obstacles nor the tanks can be seen until the enemy crests a hill. The biggest disadvantage is the absence of a covered route of withdrawal. However, it is frequently possible to achieve security by killing all of the enemy within range before moving.

The guideline of 75 meters or more between primary and alternate tank positions is clearly correct. Dispersion is also needed between wingmen. The greater the separation, the less likely that both will be suppressed and that the detection of one will give the other away. Depth is also critical. Linear deployment almost always loses.

Do not construct berms. More than 20 feet of dirt is needed to be effective against a modern APFSDS around — clearly impractical. They also make it easier for the attacker to spot the position.

Like almost everything else on the battlefield, the number of rounds a specific tank should fire from a given fighting position as a function of METT-T. As a general rule, movement to cover before or immediately following detection is the best course of action. Enemy turrets traversing in your direction or a round impacting nearby are indicators that it is probably time to go. However, there are situations when it is best to stay and fight, e.g., there are lots of them and only a few of you; they are moving and you are in high quality positions; and they are headed in your direction. If you employ what is commonly known as the "rock and roll" technique of frequent moves in and out of firing positions, your volume of fire is likely to be insufficient to blunt the attack. Also, a bound back to the next terrain feature requires a significant mobility differential. Either your equipment has to be a lot faster or you must slow him down with something. The odds of survival are sometimes better if you stay in position and slug it out until you cause a break in the flow, i.e., kill.
whole bunches of them quickly. Obstacles which slow his rate of advance obviously lessen the dilemma.

2. **NTC Lessons Learned Bulletin — January 1986**

**Counter-Reconnaissance Plan (FM 71-2J, App I; FM 34-80, Ch 4)**

OPFOR reconnaissance elements at the NTC are experts in determining the disposition and composition of task force defenses. In units which successfully thwart the enemy reconnaissance effort, the task force S3 develops a comprehensive counter-reconnaissance plan based on the S2s recommendations. The goal of this plan is to defeat the enemy’s scouts before they reach the task force’s defenses. The principal aspects of this counter-reconnaissance plan:

- Are that reconnaissance and screening elements are positioned forward of the task force obstacles and defensive positions, especially prior to completion, to protect engineer elements.
- Provide specific commander’s guidance to the scouts on selective engagement criteria.
- Augment the scout platoon with infantry and armor elements to provide adequate long-range firepower to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.
- Develop named areas of interest and assigns responsibilities for observation in the engagement area.
- Provide for continuous surveillance.
- Incorporates the use of aviation assets to detect OPFOR infiltration.
- Include specific responsibilities for security of obstacles. One technique is to assign the unit commander responsibility to secure all obstacles in his engagement area.

3. **CALL Bulletin 1-86 — July 1986**

**Synchronizing Obstacles with OPSEC, Deception, and Fires**

Recent after action reports indicate that the synchronization of obstacles, fires, deception, and OPSEC during defensive operations needs to be improved. Several recurring synchronization problems have limited the ability of maneuver commanders to make the terrain work to their advantage during a battle. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Chap. 2) shows that battles are won or lost by the way in which combatants use the terrain to protect their own forces and to destroy those of the enemy. Effective deception and tight security operations can enhance combat power by confusing the enemy and reducing his foreknowledge of friendly actions. With those thoughts in mind, let’s review some of the common recurring problems.

**Use of OPSEC and Deception**

Defending commanders are not consistently mounting active deception and counter-reconnaissance operations to mask their defensive preparations. The Soviet commander has sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition means available to him. Commanders that successfully masked their defensive preparations have:
Conducted aggressive counter-reconnaissance operations to prevent or limit enemy reconnaissance elements from directly observing obstacle emplacement and the construction of unit positions.

- Emplaced decoy and dummy obstacles to deceive reconnaissance elements and attacking units.

- Avoided obvious obstacle emplacement patterns by varying the type, design, and location of obstacles.

**Use of Obstacles to Enhance the Effects of Friendly Fires**

In most exercises, obstacle and fire support plans have not been synchronized throughout the depth of the battlefield. Maneuver commanders have efficiently integrated obstacles with direct and indirect fires in task force engagement areas. However, obstacles often are not used to enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires in enemy-held areas and along flank and major avenues of approach into defensive sectors. Commanders, when developing their concept of operations, should consider:

- Integrating point minefields and other obstacles with indirect fires and close air support along flanks and across major avenues of approach to delay, disrupt and impose losses in personnel and equipment on enemy forces.

- Placing air and artillery delivered scatterable minefields in enemy-held areas. This will delay, disrupt and disorganize the target (follow-on forces, lines of communications, or command and control systems), thus enhancing the effectiveness of the fire support system(s) selected to attack the target.

**The Third Dimension of the Battlefield**

Don’t forget that critical vertical dimension of the battlefield. What seems like a good idea from the ground perspective could be fatal when viewed from the air.

**Vehicle Smoke Systems**

- Use of vehicle on-board smoke systems is very effective in concealing movement from ground observation when used properly (to augment other types of smoke). FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Teams*, Appendix G, discusses uses of various kinds of smoke in many different situations. However, the negative effects of the vehicle engine exhaust smoke system (VEESS), from the perspective of the enemy air threat is not mentioned. Pilots of fixed and rotary wing aircraft report that they are able to easily identify and fix on vehicles employing this type of smoke, especially when used alone. Consider not using or shutting off board smoke systems when high performance aircraft or enemy helicopters appear or are likely to appear. Your smoke plan should integrate a variety of smoke delivery means, based on METT-T, and shouldn’t depend too heavily on any one method.

**Vehicle Camouflage**

There is plenty of guidance on camouflaging vehicles. FM 90-3, *Desert Operations*, Appendix E; FM 5-20, *Camouflage*, Ch 6; and TC 5-200/TB 43-0209 (for specific vehicle patterns) all contain useful information. Siting, texture, camouflage nets, shadows, and paint patterns are all part of the overall camouflage strategy. If possible, you should check your position from the air as well as from the enemy ground view.
Aircraft, either fixed wing or helicopters, can easily detect unpainted beds of trucks, open cargo hatches and dropped ramps of personnel carriers or the undersides of raised vehicle hoods. Be sure to paint those surfaces that aren’t so obvious from the ground. Failure to get these forgotten areas under control can ruin your entire survivability plan.

4. **CALL Bulletin 1-87 — April 1987**

**Rear Operations and Personnel Services Support**

This article by the Soldier Support Center was written for Personnel Services Support (PSS) units, but it applies equally to all units operating in rear areas.

All units in the rear area must perform self-protection tasks. PSS units don’t normally do this very well. PSS leaders must be tactically proficient in the planning and execution of the defense of their units. The defensive capabilities of PSS units are restricted by the limited number and types of weapons available. Using a Personnel Services Company (PSC), TOE 12 467L100, as an example; some key considerations to conducting successful base defense are:

*The Threat*

- A PSC is a target for intelligence collection efforts. PSS units normally have available to them information (on at least division level) regarding their supported units’ task organizations, locations, and strengths. There are numerous agents already positioned throughout Western Europe. There will also be significant numbers of SPETZNAZ type forces and the reconnaissance units of motorized rifle/tank divisions and regiments in our rear areas. The primary focus of all these forces is the collection of intelligence. This includes intelligence gained by raiding installations and conducting ambushes.

*Security Tips*

- Persons and vehicles entering the base must be subjected to control procedures, e.g., positive identification/restricted movement near “sensitivity zones.” They lessen the possibility of covert intelligence collection.

- Specified points of entry and exit into your base (wooded area or city block) must be established and entry or exit at any other location prevented.

- Crew-served weapons support (M60 machine guns) must be provided at each point of entry or exit. Entry/exit points are the most likely to be attacked.

- Establish a centrally located “on order” reaction force with radio communications capability if possible (example PSC only has two AN/VRC-46 radios).

- Provide wire communications to critical points (entry/exit, LP/OP, and crew served weapon positions) around the perimeter.

- Perimeter security positions must be well prepared camouflaged, and positioned to detect any enemy activities on or adjacent to perimeter boundaries. FM 71-25 and FM 90-10-1 give guidelines for field and urban terrain.

- Guards should not be obvious to outside observers.
— Rehearse your security plans and reaction forces repeatedly.

Training Tips

— When you start to train your unit for self defense, there is a lot to be said for the philosophy of "every soldier a rifleman." FM 7-70 gives the basics of light infantry platoon and squad operations (the example PSC has roughly the strength of two light infantry platoons). FC 7-15 establishes battle drills for light squads and platoons. The Common Task and Infantry Soldier's Manuals should be the basis for tactical training.

— Train yourself and subordinate leaders in the fundamentals of terrain analysis, site selection, and preparation of defensive positions in urban and field locations.

— Understand the capabilities and employment of your assigned organic weapons (M-16s, M-203s, M-60s, M-249s) and other systems which may reasonably become available to the unit during operations (i.e., M72A2 LAWs, M202s, AT and AP mines, etc.).

5. NTC Lessons Learned — July 1987

Local Security — A Leader's Challenge (FM 71-2, Appendix L; FM 22-100, Chap. 2; FM 17-98, Chap. 4; FM 22-9)

Local security for platoon and company teams is an ongoing challenge due to limited assets, competing battlefield tasks, and individual soldier perceptions. Activities such as providing early warning, securing obstacles, perimeter security, manning observation posts/listening posts, and patrolling all compete for any element's manpower. Successful units plan security and execute counter-reconnaissance actions. Even so, OPFOR mounted and dismounted patrols continue to penetrate friendly forces. The following lessons provide units an insight into this challenge.

Threat Perception

During training at home station, few units can resource a large OPFOR or keep up the pace of the battle they will encounter at the NTC. Soldiers get used to going through the motions of occupying OPs, but no enemy ever arrives and nothing happens. At the NTC, they have a difficult time changing from this mindset to actively searching for an aggressive, stealthy enemy. Countering this threat perception is difficult but not impossible. It requires constant attention by leaders at all levels.

— Scouts or dismounted infantry can attempt to penetrate a company team's defense. This reinforces the need for young soldiers and junior NCOs to be alert to the real threats to their positions and obstacles.

— When moving to or occupying a new position, the soldier interprets lulls in the battle as administrative time. This is not the case, as enemy reconnaissance is out in force observing and reporting all activities.

— Soldiers must challenge and take action when they observe any movement in their area. Soldiers often see enemy vehicles or soldiers but fail to properly report or challenge them. They often fail to take appropriate action when given an incorrect response to the challenge.
Conops

- Digging in, laying mines, stretching wire, and filling sand/bags are tiring activities under the best of circumstances. When combined with the effects of heat, cold, sustained/fast paced operations, and MOPP, they become even more exhausting. Soldiers and leaders fall asleep and the enemy penetrates the unit.

Sleep Plan

- Junior leader initiative must be planted and nurtured if a unit is to beat fatigue. Everyone must sleep sometime, at least four hours daily. Junior leaders and soldiers must be able to make decisions and take action in the absence of more senior leaders. A sleep plan must be established and used if the unit is to maintain a 24-hour capacity.

Aggressive Patrolling

- Use small patrols of three to four personnel from the infantry platoon of each company to check obstacles for breaks and cover dead spaces between units. These patrols are usually sufficient to detect the enemy. They should be prepared for possible contact by having a direct and indirect fire plan.

OPs

- A minimum of two men should be used for each observation post. One soldier observes the area while the other provides local security, records information and sends reports to the section leader or platoon leader. Experience has shown that allowing soldiers to sleep while on the OP does not work. A better technique is to have the soldiers on the OP alternate jobs every 20 or 30 minutes because the effectiveness of the observer decreases quickly after that time. OP personnel should rotate out at least every two hours for continuous operations purposes.

Power down

- Establish responsibility for checking security. Make sure the squad/crew leaders understood and reinforced, the junior leadership will take charge and execute the plan well.

- OP duty is tedious and requires the constant attention of junior NCOs in combat arms, combat support and combat service support units. They must be trained and developed so they fully understand the criticality of security and how much the unit’s safety depends on them and their soldiers executing that responsibility.

6. NTC Lessons Learned — May 1988

Obscure

“To hamper enemy observation and target acquisition or conceal activities or movement.” (FM 101-5-1)

Clever use of terrain or weather is the best obscuration method. Alternately, employ screening smoke between enemy and friendly forces. Don’t employ screening smoke on or near the breach site because this:
• Creates command/control problems.
• Silhouettes the assault force.
• Identifies the breach site.

Units employ obscuration smoke on or near the enemy. It is a means of suppression and is most effective when breaching protective minefields. Don’t assume obscuration is totally effective, reinforce it with suppression.

**Mortars Initiate Artillery or Smoke Platoon Sustains**

Mortars are a superb means with which to initiate obscuration. Mortars are under task force control. Mortars only have white phosphorus (WP) and this rapidly builds up smoke.

Mortar obscuration consumes enormous quantities of WP so plan to sustain smoke with other assets:

• Chemical smoke platoon.
• Field artillery.
• Smoke pots.
• Vehicle, on board, smoke.
• Vehicle engine exhaust, smoke.

When available, a chemical smoke platoon is effective if:

• Wind/weather is correct.
• Time is available to build up the smoke screen.

Field artillery has both WP and HC (smoke). The latter sustains obscuration a long time while consuming relatively few rounds. Artillery basic loads include few HC rounds and artillery has numerous other missions. Priority of fires and close prior coordination are prerequisites for dependable artillery smoke. This ensures availability of fires and a prestocked mission load of HC.

7. **CALL Bulletin 3-88 — July 1988**

**OPSEC Is Mandatory**

No deception events were more important to the Byelorussian offensive than those hiding redeployment. Radio deception began when radio silence was imposed upon shifting to the defensive. The Soviets had learned that their units had been pinpointed by German listening and direction finding. As a result, the Soviets closed down radio traffic over large stretches of the front while changing communications systems and methods.

**Operations Security**

OPSEC is an integral aspect of overall combat operations. It and deception are mutually supporting activities. OPSEC supports deception by eliminating or reducing the indicators that reflect real intentions or which display deceptive intent.
8. CALL Compendium — Fall 88

Maintain Security as the First Defensive Priority

Security is the basis for successful defenses. Seventy-five percent of units which maintain security, win. Ninety-three percent of those that don't lose. Security involves defeating both mounted and dismounted enemy recon elements as well as good COMSEC. The dismounted elements (OPs) report the eight-digit grid for every major anti-tank system in the task force through triangulation. So long as these OPs survive, the enemy commander easily sees the task force's weak point, and exploits it. The enemy mounted elements confirm these positions during the final hours before the attack, since the enemy OPs don't have sophisticated night vision devices and can't track any repositioning during periods of reduced visibility.

Successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Security must be a state of mind. Everything that moves or acts/looks suspicious must be challenged or checked.

"Until we actually faced the NTC OPFOR recon we had not spent the time to train a fully effective counter-recon force. Our home station OPFOR recon was not as effective as the NTC OPFOR recon," to quote a recent NTC battalion commander. Units employ minimal security because they don't understand the criticality of the task. All units must continually provide their own local security throughout the TF sector.

Screen (identify/track) mounted enemy recon with dismounted OPs in depth and kill with indirect fire, if possible.

Guard (destroy) mounted recon with tanks or BFVs.

To stop enemy mounted recon elements you must identify, track and destroy them. Normally, the scouts and ground surveillance radars screen while a "guard" force destroys. Screening in depth with two thin screen lines is much more effective to identify and track than one screen line. Scout platoons employ a mix of dismounted and mounted (thermal) OPs. In some cases, a BFV scout platoon can perform both the screen and guard mission.

Commanders use varying sized guard/destruction elements based on METT-T. In general, these guard elements trade off combat power available to fight the main battle with certainty of destroying the enemy recon. A company/team, platoon, or reaction platoon all will work so long as the screen-guard coordination is strong. If possible, make engagement areas into free fire areas. Units tend to hold fire given excess movement in the task force area. The key is an integrated effort on a single net.

Report of enemy recon on one avenue of approach should alert the commander that the remainder of his sector is also being reconnoitered.

Locate dismounted enemy recon in the sector using aviation, electronic warfare support measures (ESM), and R/S patrols.

Destroy dismounted recon elements (OPs) with artillery and reaction forces.

The combination of helicopters, ESM, and local security patrols best identifies dismounted recon (OPs). Units must employ all three means and rapidly respond to enemy
OP sightings. All company/teams and the task force maintain reaction forces on five minute standby. Slow reaction allows the enemy ESM to alert and move the OPs before the reaction force arrives.

9. CALL Bulletin 1-89 — April 1989

Train Rear Area Security

Emphasize rear area security operations during FTX, AT, or weekend drill. The personnel involved in these operations will work as a team if given the opportunity to train together.

10. CALL Bulletin — Spring 89

Security

Comprised of combat arms, combat support and combat service support units, the non-mechanized battalion operating in a non-linear, low intensity battlefield faces unique security problems.

Commanders can provide security to the force by countering the enemy’s reconnaissance efforts and maintaining aggressive local security

Countering Enemy Reconnaissance

Enemy units place high value on reconnaissance to identify the location, size and intention of the friendly forces. To protect the force, and keep the enemy off balance, a battalion commander must find the enemy reconnaissance effort and kill it.

A tool to finding the enemy’s reconnaissance effort is the counter-reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

Lessons Learned

Detect enemy reconnaissance efforts by employing multiple security elements and systems to provide depth to the counter-reconnaissance effort. Place more than one surveillance asset on each expected enemy avenue of approach. For example, cover an avenue of approach with an OP, and back it up with a Ground Surveillance Radar. This provides redundancy, capitalizes on the strengths of each system, and reduces the possibility of the enemy by-passing a single system without being detected.

Avoid having two reconnaissance patrols cover the same area. False reports and fratricide may result.

Once an enemy reconnaissance element is located, act quickly to kill it. This may be accomplished through observed fires, attack helicopters, or a counter-reconnaissance combat patrol on-call for that mission.

Avoid using scouts to perform counter-reconnaissance combat patrols, since it risks the loss of this unique and highly trained asset.
Historical Example

A counter-reconnaissance force used in Vietnam employed three to four Cobras and an infantry platoon on strip alert. When the battalion observed enemy reconnaissance elements, the reaction force, working as a team, engaged them via an air assault with fire support from the Cobras. When the ground element either killed or forced the enemy reconnaissance to displace, the reaction force returned to the airfield and prepared for the next insertion. This technique provided intelligence, force security and allowed the battalion to retain the initiative.

Local Security

Local security is comprised of effective perimeter security and aggressive patrolling in the vicinity of your position. These actions must be taken by combat support and combat service support as well as combat units.

Lessons Learned

Be careful of task force units, including combat support and combat service support units, becoming complacent about local security due to perceived safety provided by security and reaction forces “out front.”

Ensure that individuals pick fighting positions which make the most of natural cover and concealment and offer good fields of fire. Leaders at all levels should double check these locations. Once a suitable site is selected, the priority goes to concurrently digging, clearing fields of fire, and camouflaging. Overhead cover and connecting trenches are added as time permits.

Do not allow soldiers to put up sleeping shelters adjacent to their positions. This practice negates any camouflage they put on their position.

At least one claymore should be emplaced for each fighting position.

Require each platoon to emplace one listening post no less than 100 meters to their front and an ambush site 300-500 meters forward.

Identify, by SOP the type security you want for a specific circumstance. This will tell soldiers exact requirements and will provide a basis for inspecting local security. For example, during a halt in a road march, the SOP may state that every other soldier will face in opposite directions with weapons ready. This SOP is easy to implement and enforce.

11. Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned — October 1990

An existing plan was modified and used for JUST CAUSE. It was reviewed in detail prior to the operation and backbriefed and rehearsed at every level which made both leaders and soldiers confident and competent during every phase of the operation. Freedom-of-movement exercises, which closely mirrored portions of the actual plan, served as rehearsals for the D-Day plan. Due to operational security (OPSEC), soldiers were not told the true intent of these rehearsals until hours before the actual operation. Personal reconnaissance of the objectives was conducted by subordinate leaders. This reconnaissance assisted commanders in developing their intent, which was critical since the majority of operations were decentralized and executed at platoon and squad level. Redundancy in equipment and
personnel was built into the plan and was evidenced in all units participating in the operation. This redundancy gave units the flexibility to handle the unexpected.

**Lessons Learned — Planning and Preparation**

OPSEC is a critical factor in contingency operations. Ensure leaders have proper clearances to review plans. Little time exists to request clearances and background investigations.

Incorporate redundancy of systems, capabilities and plans in every aspect of a contingency operation. Overlapping forces or time sequencing provided backup without requiring more forces to be committed to the overall operation.

Leaders/soldiers must conduct detailed reconnaissance wherever possible. Crews saw their positions, ingress and egress routes, limits of fire and obstacles that allowed detailed planning and accurate rehearsals.

OPSEC dictates that some rehearsals can be conducted off-site. Rehearsal sites must be accurate to the smallest detail. This allows refining of the plan and building soldier confidence.

Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders’ understanding of the overall plan and the commander’s net.

12. **CALL Newsletter 91-5 — December 1991**

**Survivability**

Several survivability areas have established trends. The use of camouflage and cover and concealment has shown improvements. Units are making better use of available terrain to hide vehicles, tents and equipment. Camouflage net techniques have shown improvements as well. CSS units are becoming better at blending in with the surrounding terrain and using the camouflage net support systems to break up the outline of vehicles and equipment. Construction of fighting positions and bunkers is still a weak area. The average soldier in a CSS unit does not know how to construct a safe and sturdy fighting position. Survivability positions seldom progress beyond the hasty fighting position stage. Even after 4–5 days in a BSA location, the positions are nothing more than shallow graves with a small parapet of dirt or rocks piled in front.

The individual soldier still does not have a good understanding of how to react to hostile artillery and air attack. Too often the reaction is to leave the tents, seek high ground and stand up to watch the show. It is arguable that in a real situation, soldiers will disperse and seek cover. This may be true, but when positions with overhead cover have not been built to standard, there is no cover to seek. If soldiers are not aware that they should disperse and at least fall to a prone position, they will become casualties to the first few rounds. Unfortunately, many times logistical soldiers are at a loss on what to do when under attack. We don’t build fighting positions, execute dispersal plans, or fight back well. We are normally too busy executing our logistical mission to think about the possibility of fighting. This has to change. It all comes down to training and discipline. There is no substitute for gut-wrenching, mind-numbing training that literallyprograms soldiers to take key actions automatically. We do not conduct this type of training well.

January 28, 1994
Techniques

Battle drills are an excellent technique to make reaction to air threat or ground attack second nature. A battle drill is a series of steps taken without direction, anytime a combat-related event occurs. A battle drill for actions on enemy air attack might consist of:

- Sounding an alarm.
- Seeking cover.
- Occupying fighting positions and bunkers.
- Returning Fire.

These actions occur whether or not a leader is present.

Survivability is a commander’s responsibility, but NCOs execute. Review FM 5-103, Survivability Standards, for tips on constructing a proper fighting position. Practice this life-saving skill at every opportunity.

Train intensively on:

- Cover and concealment.
- Construction of fighting positions.
- Reaction to enemy attack.
- Proficiency/qualification with crew-served weapons.
- Fields of fire.
- Perimeter defense.
- Entry control points.

Trash

All support battalions rotating through the CTCs experience difficulty with the issue of trash collection and trash disposal. There is no clear doctrinal solution. A major problem seems to be in fixing responsibility for this mission, then resourcing that unit to accomplish it.

Trash on the battlefield gives off a tremendous signature to unit locations. Field trash disposal techniques are ineffective. While ideas exist to solve this problem in the future (mobile incinerators), units need more definitive guidance for the present. An added burden on units is the introduction of T-rations for field messing. This ration greatly increases the trash burden on the unit.

Techniques

A mobile trash collection point has been used successfully. An empty Stake and Platform (S&P) trailer is spotted in a central location in the BSA. All trash is deposited on that trailer. S&P trailers come daily from the DSA loaded with cargo. The DSA drops off the trailer with cargo and backhauls the trash-filled trailer back to the DSA. Cargo is then off-loaded from the DSA trailer, and the empty trailer is used for trash until the next day’s pickup.

Overview

Class I and III (Bulk) operations generally hamper BSA security. FSBs must perform these missions outside the BSA.
Class I
Supply companies show serious deficiencies in the area of tactical survival skills. Units experience difficulty in maximizing dispersion techniques. One area of concern is the Class I ration breakdown point (RBP). Units persist in breaking down rations inside the BSA at uncamouflaged RBPs. Class I operations increase BSA signature.

Techniques
Move Class I operations outside the BSA to increase survivability of the BSA. Change the location of the RBP daily to increase Class I RBP security.
LESSONS LEARNED INTEGRATED INTO CCF 25 TASK LIST

Planning Tasks

1. Direct and lead TF while planning for the battle
   a. OPSEC is an integral aspect of overall combat operations. It and deception are mutually supporting activities. OPSEC supports deception by eliminating or reducing the indicators.
   b. Security is the basis for successful defenses. Seventy five percent of units which maintain security, win. Ninety three percent of those that don't lose. Security involves defeating both mounted and dismounted enemy recon elements as well as good COMSEC.
   c. Commanders can provide security to the force by countering the enemies reconnaissance efforts and maintaining aggressive local security.

2. Receive orders from higher headquarters

3. Conduct mission analysis
   a. In the defense, you must deny the enemy the knowledge of your concept of the operation. It is important for counter-reconnaissance to begin before initial occupation and to continue throughout the time and depth of the defense. The defender must both detect and kill enemy reconnaissance elements. This requires dedicated assets — scouts, infantry, tanks, and TOWs.
      1) During daylight, helicopters can be very effective at locating reconnaissance elements hiding in the task force sector.
      2) Protection of obstacles is of particular importance. They are always a prime target and must be guarded at night.
      3) OPSEC and deception are also important. Reverse slope positions, use of screening smoke, frequent repositioning of vehicles, and late occupation of positions are all useful techniques. For both offense and defense, reconnaissance must be continuous over time and throughout the depth of the battle area. If the enemy is moving, we need to know.
      4) Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance actions are most effective when controlled at battalion level, normally by the S2 in close coordination with the S3 and FSO. Company patrols (except local security) should be on a single battalion net. The S2 and commo officer must provide for continuous communications with patrols, to include liberal use of radio relays. A reporting schedule and negative reports are essential.
   b. Smoke. Clever use of terrain or weather is the best obscuration method. Alternately, employ screening smoke between enemy and friendly forces.
1) Smoke is a significant battlefield factor. It must be a major planning
c consideration in terms of both friendly employment and reaction to enemy use.

2) The effectiveness of smoke varies markedly with weather. During the periods of
temperature inversion which often follow BMNT, it is possible to rapidly cover a
very large area with dense smoke. Conversely, smoke rises so fast in the middle
of a hot summer day that even the use of a great deal of generating capacity will
have only a marginal impact. Also, a wind blowing generally in the direction of
the enemy can be a great asset.

3) Jeep transported smoke is vulnerable, but not to a degree that it cannot be
successfully employed. Use of wadis and other defilade, movement, and
screening with smoke pots prior to startup all reduce vulnerability. Generators
can run for an hour before refueling. Hence, it is not necessary for operators to
 remain in the area.

4) Smoke at night causes great confusion.

5) Smoke is a useful deception measure; it almost always draws attention and
reaction.

6) Effective employment of the smoke generating capability of tanks requires a
considerable amount of control and judgment. It is important to avoid premature
use which gives away positions that otherwise would not have been seen and to
be sure that the smoke ends up between the enemy and vehicle. Smoke behind
vehicles only makes them better targets.

7) Mortar obscuration consumes enormous quantities of WP so plan to sustain
smoke with other assets:
   a) Chemical smoke platoon.
   b) Field artillery.
   c) Smoke pots.
   d) Vehicle, on board, smoke.
   e) Vehicle engine exhaust, smoke.

8) A chemical smoke platoon is effective if:
   a) Wind/weather is correct.
   b) Time is available to build up the smoke screen.

9) Field artillery has both WP and HC (smoke). The latter sustains obscuration a
long time while consuming relatively few rounds. Artillery basic loads include
few HC rounds and artillery has numerous other missions. Priority of fires and
close prior coordination are prerequisites for dependable artillery smoke. This
ensures availability of fires and a prestocked mission load of HC.
c. Measures for masking defensive preparations:
   1) Counter-reconnaissance operations to prevent or limit enemy reconnaissance elements from directly observing obstacle emplacement and the construction of unit positions.
   2) Decoy and dummy obstacles emplaced to deceive reconnaissance elements and attacking units.
   3) Obvious obstacle emplacement patterns avoided by varying the type, design, and location of obstacles.

d. Counter-reconnaissance planning
   1) A centralized counter-reconnaissance plan is critical to success.
   2) Avoid using scouts to perform counter-reconnaissance combat patrols, since it risks the loss of this unique and highly trained asset.
   3) Employ multiple security elements and systems to provide depth to the counter-reconnaissance effort.
   4) Avoid having two patrols cover the same area. False reports and fratricide may result.

4. Issue the Warning Order

5. Commander issues guidance

6. Prepare staff estimates

7. Staff develops course of action

8. Staff/Commander analyze course of action
   a. The principal aspects of the counter-reconnaissance plan:
      1) Reconnaissance and screening elements positioned forward of the task force obstacles and defense positions, especially prior to completion.
      2) Specific commander’s guidance provided to the scouts on selective engagement criteria.
      3) Counter-reconnaissance force provided adequate long-range firepower to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.
      4) Named areas of interest and developed responsibilities assigned.
5) Continuous surveillance provided.

6) Aviation assets used to detect OPFOR infiltration.

7) Specific responsibilities designated for security of obstacles. One technique is to assign the unit commander responsibility to secure all obstacles in his engagement area.

9. Staff compares course of action

10. Commander announces decision

11. Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO

OPFOR reconnaissance elements at the NTC are experts in determining the disposition and composition of task force defenses. In units which successfully thwart the enemy reconnaissance effort, the task force S3 develops a comprehensive counter-reconnaissance plan based on the S2s recommendations. The goal of this plan is to defeat the enemy's scouts before they reach the task force's defenses. The principal aspects of this counter-reconnaissance plan:

- Are that reconnaissance and screening elements are positioned forward of the task force obstacles and defensive positions, especially prior to completion, to protect engineer elements.
- Provide specific commander's guidance to the scouts on selective engagement criteria.
- Augment the scout platoon with infantry and armor elements to provide adequate long-range firepower to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.
- Develop named areas of interest and assigns responsibilities for observation in the engagement area.
- Provide for continuous surveillance.
- Incorporates the use of aviation assets to detect OPFOR infiltration.
- Include specific responsibilities for security of obstacles. One technique is to assign the unit commander responsibility to secure all obstacles in his engagement area.

12. Issue the OPORD/FRAGO

13. Refine the plan
FOR TF DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE FORCE

23. TF subordinate elements maintain OPSEC

a. Tank Positioning

Correct positioning allows tanks and TOWs to both survive and kill. Surviving is key and is a function of two factors: (1) avoiding detection by the enemy; and (2) if detected, moving securely to a different firing position. A few suggested positioning principles and techniques are outlined in the following paragraphs. They all apply to tanks. Some are also applicable for ITVs.

1) Use a full hide position if at all possible and stay in it until the enemy is in the area where you plan to kill him. A prone or dug-in observer forward gives a much smaller signature than a tank, even one that is in a good dug-in position.

2) Have a backdrop and avoid anything that catches the eye. Hill tops are death traps. Likewise, if you position a tank in the vicinity of a large boulder or other prominent terrain feature, it will almost certainly be detected.

3) Position to the flank of an enemy approach and behind frontal cover. It is far easier for an attacker to acquire and kill targets to his front than those to his flank or rear.

4) Have covered routes into and out of firing positions. Weapons must move carefully. Hot rodding produces diesel and dust signatures.

5) One of the most successful techniques is the “window” or “keyhole” position. Simply stated, the basis for this technique is to limit exposure by deliberately restricting a tank’s sector of fire. The tank is exposed only to the targets at which it is firing. It then shifts to other firing positions as targets are destroyed.

6) Valley floor/open field positions are often very successful. The position must be well constructed with at least one hull down firing location for each tank and a covered route to full defilade. Very little of the tank is exposed in the firing location and there is normally a wide sector of fire. Such positions allow grazing fire analogous to effective machine gun emplacement. They often achieve surprise and it is difficult for one enemy element to point the position out to another or to accurately adjust indirect fires. The technique is often used with obstacles in such a way that neither the obstacles nor the tanks can be seen until the enemy crests a hill. The biggest disadvantage is the absence of a covered route of withdrawal. However, it is frequently possible to achieve security by killing all of the enemy within range before moving.

7) The guideline of 75 meters or more between primary and alternate tank positions is clearly correct. Dispersion is also needed between wingmen. The greater the separation, the less likely that both will be suppressed and that the detection of one will give the other away. Depth is also critical. Linear deployment almost always loses.

8) Do not construct berms. More than 20 feet of dirt is needed to be effective against a modern APFSDS around — clearly impractical. They also make it easier for the attacker to spot the position.
b. Firing rate:

The number of rounds a specific tank should fire from a given fighting position as a function of METT-T. As a general rule, movement to cover before or immediately following detection is the best course of action. Enemy turrets traversing in your direction or a round impacting nearby are indicators that it is probably time to go. However, there are situations when it is best to stay and fight, e.g., there are lots of them and only a few of you; they are moving and you are in high quality positions; and they are headed in your direction. If you employ what is commonly known as the "rock and roll" technique of frequent moves in and out of firing positions, your volume of fire is likely to be insufficient to blunt the attack. Also, a bound back to the next terrain feature requires a significant mobility differential. Either your equipment has to be a lot faster or you must slow him down with something. The odds of survival are sometimes better if you stay in position.

c. Vertical Dimension of the Battlefield

1) Vehicle Smoke Systems

Use of vehicle on-board smoke systems is very effective in concealing movement from ground observation when used properly (to augment other types of smoke). FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Teams*, Appendix G, discusses uses of various kinds of smoke in many different situations. However, the negative effects of the vehicle engine exhaust smoke system (VEESS), from the perspective of the enemy air threat is not mentioned. Pilots of fixed and rotary wing aircraft report that they are able to easily identify and fix on vehicles employing this type of smoke, especially when used alone. Consider not using or shutting off on board smoke systems when high performance aircraft or enemy helicopters appear or are likely to appear.

2) Vehicle Camouflage

There is plenty of guidance on camouflaging vehicles. FM 90-3, *Desert Operations*, Appendix E; FM 5-20, *Camouflage*, Ch 6; and TC 5-200/TB 43-0209 (for specific vehicle patterns) all contain useful information. Siting, texture, camouflage nets, shadows, and paint patterns are all part of the overall camouflage strategy. If possible, you should check your position from the air as well as from the enemy ground view. Aircraft, either fixed wing or helicopters, can easily detect unpainted beds of trucks, open cargo hatches and dropped ramps of personnel carriers or the undersides of raised vehicle hoods. Be sure to paint those surfaces that aren’t so obvious from the ground.

d. Rear Operations

1) All units in the rear area must perform self-protection tasks. The defensive capabilities of CSS units are restricted by the limited number and types of weapons available.

a) Persons and vehicles entering the base must be subjected to control procedures, e.g., positive identification/restricted movement near "sensitivity zones."

b) Specified points of entry and exit into your base (wooded area or city block) must be established and entry or exit at any other location prevented.
c) Crew-served weapons support (M60 machine guns) must be provided at each point of entry or exit. Entry/exit points are the most likely to be attacked.

d) Establish a centrally located “on order” reaction force with radio communications capability if possible (example PSC only has two AN/VRC-46 radios).

e) Provide wire communications to critical points (entry/exit, LP/OP, and crew served weapon positions) around the perimeter.

f) Perimeter security positions must be well prepared camouflaged, and positioned to detect any enemy activities on or adjacent to perimeter boundaries. FM 71-25 and FM 90-10-1 give guidelines for field and urban terrain.

g) Guards should not be obvious to outside observers.

h) Rehearse your security plans and reaction forces repeatedly.

2) Training Tips

a) When you start to train your unit for self defense, there is a lot to be said for the philosophy of “every soldier a rifleman.” FM 7-70 gives the basics of light infantry platoon and squad operations (the example PSC has roughly the strength of two light infantry platoons). FC 7-15 establishes battle drills for light squads and platoons. The Common Task and Infantry Soldier’s Manuals should be the basis for tactical training.

b) Train yourself and subordinate leaders in the fundamentals of terrain analysis, site selection, and preparation of defensive positions in urban and field locations.

c) Understand the capabilities and employment of your assigned organic weapons (M-16s, M-203s, M-60s, M-249s) and other systems which may reasonably become available to the unit during operations (i.e., M72A2 LAWs, M202s, AT and AP mines, etc.).

e. Local Security

1) Local security for platoon and company teams involves activities such as providing early warning, securing obstacles, perimeter security, manning observation posts/listening posts, and patrolling.

2) Home station training

a) Scouts or dismounted infantry should attempt to penetrate a company team’s defense. Soldiers must challenge and take action when they observe any movement in their area.

b) Conduct OPFOR reconnaissance activities when unit is moving to or occupying a new position.

3) Patrolling

a) Use small patrols of three to four personnel from the infantry platoon of each company to check obstacles for breaks and cover dead spaces between units.
These patrols are usually sufficient to detect the enemy. They should be prepared for possible contact by having a direct and indirect fire plan.

b) Enemy OP must be detected and destroyed. The enemy dismounted elements (OPs) report the eight digit grid for every major anti-tank system in the task force through triangulation. So long as these OPs survive, the enemy commander easily sees the task force’s weak point, and exploits it. The enemy mounted elements confirm these positions during the final hours before the attack, since the enemy OPs don’t have sophisticated night vision devices and can’t track any repositioning during periods of reduced visibility.

4) OPs

a) A minimum of two men should be used for each observation post. One soldier observes the area while the other provides local security, records information and sends reports to the section leader or platoon leader. A technique is to have the soldiers on the OP alternate jobs every 20 or 30 minutes because the effectiveness of the observer decreases quickly after that time. OP personnel should rotate out at least every two hours for continuous operations purposes.

b) OP duty is tedious and requires the constant attention of the chain of command leaders and soldiers must be trained and developed to understand the criticality of security.

5) Establish responsibility for checking security. Make sure the squad/crew leaders understood and reinforced, the junior leadership will take charge and execute the plan well.

f. Camouflage, concealment and cover.

1) Several survivability areas have established trends. The use of camouflage and cover and concealment has shown improvements. Units are making better use of available terrain to hide vehicles, tents and equipment. Camouflage net techniques have shown improvements as well. CSS units are becoming better at blending in with the surrounding terrain and using the camouflage net support systems to break up the outline of vehicles and equipment. Construction of fighting positions and bunkers is still a weak area.

g. Trash

1) Trash on the battlefield gives off a tremendous signature to unit locations. Field trash disposal techniques are ineffective. A mobile trash collection point has been used successfully. An empty Stake and Platform (S&P) trailer is spotted in a central location in the BSA. All trash is deposited on that trailer. S&P trailers come daily from the DSA loaded with cargo. The DSA drops off the trailer with cargo and backhauls the trash-filled trailer back to the DSA. Cargo is then off-loaded from the DSA trailer, and the empty trailer is used for trash until the next day’s pickup.

24. Receive the TF WARNO

25. Receive TF OPORD

January 28, 1994
26. Preparation for TF controlled counter-reconnaissance mission

FOR LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

29. Preparation for Local Security Operations

Preparation Task List

14. TF Command Group conducts and receives briefbacks
   a. Utilize backbriefs to check subordinate leaders’ understanding of the overall plan (for OPSEC) and the commander’s net.

15. TF rehearsal
   a. OPSEC dictates that some rehearsals be conducted off-site.

31. TF directed/supervised physical preparation of defense for follow-on mission (if applicable)

32. Counter-reconnaissance force prepares for follow-on mission

Preparation and Execution Task List

16. TF Command Group and Command Posts monitor effectiveness of OPSEC measures, supervise and direct execution of force protection operations/activities
   a. The timing and placement of smoke to produce the desired result requires knowledge and experience. It is more of an art form than a mechanical process. A plan which integrates artillery and mortar delivered smoke, smoke pots, and smoke generators must be developed with a knowledge of the peculiarities of each. Smoke is fickle — pots 100 meters apart can send smoke in different directions. The initial plan will often require adjustment due to unexpected effects of wind, inversion, and slope. Personnel with the requisite skills must begin smoke operations early enough to achieve sufficient buildup and make adjustments.

17. Command Post (TAC, TOC, CTCP) operations

18. Commander/Staff receive battlefield information (CCF 20)
19. Commander/Command Group make(s) battlefield decisions (CCF 20)

20. TF Command Posts track and support the battle (CCF 20)

21. Commander directs and leads the execution (CCF 20)

22. Task Force consolidates, reorganizes, and prepares to continue the mission (CCF 20)

FOR TF DIRECTED COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE

27. Execute counter-reconnaissance mission

a. Once an enemy reconnaissance element is located, act quickly to kill it. This may be accomplished through observed fires, attack helicopters, or a counter-reconnaissance combat patrol on-call for that mission.

b. Screen (identify/track) mounted enemy recon with dismounted OPs in depth and kill with indirect fire, if possible.

c. Guard (destroy) mounted recon with tanks or BFVs.

1) To stop enemy mounted recon elements you must identify, track and destroy them. Normally, the scouts and ground surveillance radars screen while a “guard” force destroys. Screening in depth with two thin screen lines is much more effective to identify and track than one screen line. Scout platoons employ a mix of dismounted and mounted (thermal) OPs. In some cases, a BFV scout platoon can perform both the screen and guard mission.

2) Commanders use varying sized guard/destruction elements based on METT-T. In general, these guard elements trade off combat power available to fight the main battle with certainty of destroying the enemy recon. A company/team, platoon, or reaction platoon all will work so long as the screen-guard coordination is strong. If possible, make engagement areas into free fire areas. Units tend to hold fire given excess movement in the task force area. The key is an integrated effort on a single net.

d. Report of enemy recon on one avenue of approach should alert the commander that the remainder of his sector is also being reconnoitered.

e. Locate dismounted enemy recon in the sector using aviation, electronic warfare support measures (ESM), and R/S patrols.

f. Destroy dismounted recon elements (OPs) with artillery and reaction forces. The combination of helicopters, ESM, and local security patrols best identifies dismounted recon (OPs). Units must employ all three means and rapidly respond to enemy OP sightings. All company/teams and the task force maintain reaction forces on five minute standby. Slow reaction allows the enemy ESM to alert and move the OPs before the reaction force arrives.
28. **Reposition after completion of counter-reconnaissance mission**

FOR LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

30. **Execution of local security operations**

   a. Train rear area security. Emphasize rear area security operations during FTX, AT, or weekend drill.

   b. Local Security. Local security is comprised of effective perimeter security and aggressive patrolling in the vicinity of your position. These actions must be taken by combat support and combat service support as well as combat units.

      1) Be careful of task force units, including combat support and combat service support units, becoming complacent about local security due to perceived safety provided by security and reaction forces “out front.”

      2) Ensure that individuals pick fighting positions which make the most of natural cover and concealment and offer good fields of fire. Leaders at all levels should double check these locations. Once a suitable site is selected, the priority goes to concurrently digging, clearing fields of fire, and camouflaging. Overhead cover and connecting trenches are added as time permits.

      3) Do not allow soldiers to put up sleeping shelters adjacent to their positions. This practice negates any camouflage they put on their position.

      4) At least one claymore should be emplaced for each fighting position.

      5) Require each platoon to emplace one listening post no less than 100 meters to their front and an ambush site 300-500 meters forward.

      6) Identify, by SOP the type security you want for a specific circumstance. This will tell soldiers exact requirements and will provide a basis for inspecting local security. For example, during a halt in a road march, the SOP may state that every other soldier will face in opposite directions with weapons ready.
CCF 25 — Provide Operations Security

CCF 25
CRITICAL TASKS AND OTHER LINKAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>OTHER LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Direct and lead TF while planning for the battle.</td>
<td>NOTE: Tasks important to training OPSEC are integrated into all the collection and soldier’s manuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conduct mission analysis.</td>
<td>1. Each MTP applicable to the companies and platoons of the TF contains tasks and subtasks relevant to OPSEC, e.g. the variety of tasks varies from assembly area activities to the use of smoke to obscure maneuver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Staff/Commander analyze course of action.</td>
<td>2. Individual tasks relevant to OPSEC range from common tasks (e.g., individual concealment, radio telephone procedures) to MOS specific tasks (e.g., Maintain Classified Documents Register [Skill Level 1 for MOS 96B]).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Staff prepares OPORD/FRAGO.</td>
<td>3. Leader tasks are specified for the staff (e.g., Supervise Destruction of Classified Documents/Material [Skill Level 3 for MOS 96B]) and for the units (e.g., Installation Planning and Installation of a Platoon Early Warning System ANTRS2 [Skill Level 4 for MOS 19E and 19K]).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. TF Command Group and Command Posts monitor effectiveness of OPSEC measures, supervise and direct execution of force protection operations/activities.</td>
<td>4. Tasks from STP 21-1-SMCT are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Execution of local security operations.</td>
<td>- Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft (878-920-1002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. TF directed/supervised physical preparation of defense for follow-on mission of counter-reconnaissance force (if applicable).</td>
<td>- Perform Search and Scan Procedures (441-091-1101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Estimate Range (071-326-0512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Identify Topographic Symbols in a Military Map (071-329-1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Identify Terrain Features on a Map (071-329-1001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Orient a Map to the Ground by Map Terrain Association (071-329-1012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CCF 25 — Provide Operations Security

5. Tasks from STP 21-II-MQS (all officers)
   - Reorganize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicle and Aircraft (04-8955.00-0001)

6. Task from STP 21-24-SMC7 (NCOs/Officers)
   - Use an Automated SOI (113-573-8006)
   - Use a Map Overlay (071-329-1019)
   - Establish an OP (071-326-5705)
   - Analyze Terrain (071-331-0820)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>OTHER LINKAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Protect Classified Information and Material (301-348-6001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct an Area Reconnaissance by a Platoon (071-720-0015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prepare an Oral OPORD (071-326-5626)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prepare a SIRTEP (071-332-5022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prepare an Operation Overlay (071-332-5000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct OPSEC Procedures (113-573-0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Integrate Risk Management in a Platoon Mission (850-001-4001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROVIDE OPERATIONS SECURITY

REFERENCES

ARTEPs
3-7-10 MTP  Mechanized Smoke Platoon, 30 Jan 1990
3-447-10 MTP  Motorized Smoke Platoon, Jul 1991
17-57-10 MTP  Scout Platoon, Dec 1988
34-245-10-DRILL  Drills/Procedures for the Intelligence Section, Dec 1987
34-268-15 MTP  Ground Surveillance Platoon, Military Intelligence and Surveillance
Company Military Intelligence Battalion, Sep 1991
71-1 MTP  Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team,
Oct 1988
71-2 MTP  Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Oct 1988
71-3 MTP  Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff, Oct 1988

FMs
3-50  Smoke Operations, Dec 1990
5-103  Survivability, Jun 1985
7-20  The Infantry Battalion, Apr 1992
7-90  Tactical Employment of Mortars, Jun 1985
17-98  Scout Platoon, Oct 1987
34-80  Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,
Apr 1986
71-1  Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Nov 1988
71-2  The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, Sep 1988
71-3  The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, May 1988
71-123  Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Combined Arms Heavy Forces,
Sep 1992
90-2  Battlefield Deception, Oct 1988
100-5  Operations, Jun 1993

January 28, 1994
### STPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-1-SMCT</td>
<td>Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (Skill level 1), Oct 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-II-MQS</td>
<td>Military Qualification Standards II Manual of Common Tasks, for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenants and Captains, Jan 91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CALL Products

- NTC Commander's Memorandum, November 1985
- NTC Lessons Learned Bulletin, January 1986
- CALL Bulletin 1-86, July 1986
- CALL Bulletin 1-87, April 1987
- NTC Lessons Learned, July 1987
- NTC Lessons Learned, May 1988
- CALL Bulletin 3-88, July 1988
- CALL Compendium, Fall 1988
- CALL Bulletin 1-89, April 1989
- CALL Bulletin, Spring 1989
- Operations Just Cause Lessons Learned, October 1990
- CALL Newsletter 91-5, December 1991