Annotated Bibliography: Open Sources on Africa

LaVerle Berry, Kate Bullard, Rita Byrnes, Eunice Charles, Steven Cranton, Nancy Drexler, William Eaton, Naomi Greer, Robert Handloff, Mary Louis Harmon, Greta Holtz, Linda Lau, T. Robert Lenaghan, Kenneth Libeinstein, Moses Pinkston, Patricia Rigsbee, Rachel Warner

Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, DC 20540-4840

N/A

Prepared under an Interagency Agreement

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

An annotated bibliography of open sources received. Entries on strategic military, political, and economic topics are included. Published monthly until September 1984 and quarterly thereafter.

Africa—Sub-Saharan
Military affairs
Economy

Government
Politics

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Various lengths
SAR
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY - OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA

September 1985

Prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an interagency agreement
PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are Nancy Drexler, Robert Handloff, Mary Louise Harmon, R. Thomas Leneghan, Moses Pinkston, and Rachel Warner.
**Africa General**


Chaigneau maintains that unlike the United States, which has never considered Africa as a primary geopolitical theater, the Soviet Union, since the Portuguese decolonization, has viewed sub-Saharan Africa as a fertile ground for the extension of international communism. Recent Soviet African policy has been characterized by intense activity, but this has been stalled by the signing of nonaggression accords between South Africa on the one side, and Mozambique and Angola on the other. This article analyzes Soviet goals and doctrine vis-a-vis Africa, the techniques and strategies used to gain influence, and the ability of the West to check Soviet advances. It concludes that the time factor is the trump card in Soviet African strategy.


After a brief look at the ideological justifications for Soviet involvement in Africa, this article analyzes the methods and strategies used to support that involvement. Principally, the author notes that Soviet efforts have been concentrated on the poorer, more unstable states of sub-Saharan Africa. This is seen as a result not only of Marxist ideology that regards the poor as being more "radical," but also of the fact that poorer states—because they usually are more unstable and have less secure governments—generally are more attracted by the offer of Soviet security assistance. However, despite the prevalence of Soviet military assistance and Cuban proxies on the continent, the author does not hold to the view that "Black Africa is ripe for Soviet plucking." Given the preponderant need of all African states for economic and technical assistance (particularly in agriculture), it does not seem that there is a long-term convergence of African needs with Soviet capabilities. Soviet economic and technical assistance is neither as plentiful nor as effective as Western aid—a fact African governments cannot afford to ignore. The author concludes that giving a higher priority to sub-Saharan African development would be the best way to counter Soviet influence there.


Discussion of the policies of the Socialist bloc in Africa justifiably has been dominated by the Soviet Union and Cuba, but, according to Kuhns, East Germany's involvement deserves attention because its role is growing and it may have replaced Cuba as the USSR's most important assistant in Africa. This article examines the motivations, depth, breadth, and importance of East Germany's African policies. The author provides an historical overview of the development of these policies, showing that East Germany's activities are largely determined by its roles and functions within the Socialist interstate system. He points
out that East German leaders depend on the Soviet Union not only for their political survival, as do other East bloc leaders, but also for the German Democratic Republic's very survival as a state. The article notes East Germany's specific tasks in promoting Soviet goals in Africa, including its military role. Kuhn finds that East Germany willingly cooperates with the Soviet Union because it derives psychological and political benefits that far outweigh the small financial cost involved.


This article is a somewhat simplistic attempt to detect statistical patterns in the relationship between military and political power in post-independence sub-Saharan Africa. To do this, the authors constructed a variable that measures the degree of military involvement in the political process in each of the 45 sub-Saharan African states since independence. This variable is then compared with a number of other variables that are thought to influence political stability, such as the rate of growth in per capita GNP, geographic region, colonial heritage, and the length of time that each state has been independent. The authors' main findings are that West African states seem most prone to military takeovers and Southern African states the least so; French-speaking states have higher levels of military involvement than do English-speaking ones; countries with better records of economic growth have remained freer from military involvement than countries with poorer growth records; and finally, countries that have had successful coups and several coup attempts are apt to have many more as a result of a "precedent effect." The article includes an appendix that gives a chronological list of military coups in sub-Saharan Africa from 1 January, 1956 to 30 April 1984.


Mulira intends to review Soviet policy in Africa from an Afrocentric perspective as well as alert Africans of all political orientations that the Soviet Union, like the United States, might pose as an ally but in fact always subordinates the interests of its clients to its own perceived strategic needs. He briefly outlines Soviet African policy from Lenin to Andropov, noting in particular policy manifestations of the ongoing conflict between ideologues and pragmatists. While Soviet leadership has claimed that only the Soviet Union can offer selfless economic and technical assistance to Africa, evidence reveals that Soviet aid programs have, in most cases, been used to increase Soviet economic and political opportunities in the superpower conflict, often to the detriment of African states. Mulira concludes that this is unlikely to change under Andropov, his skills as tactful diplomat not withstanding.

Peters raises the controversial issues surrounding development of an all-African defense force and a unified African High Command as envisioned by founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The stumbling block for such an organization, according to Peters, is the fact that while all Africans agree on the need to defend their countries against aggressors, they profoundly disagree about who the aggressors are—with the solitary exception of South Africa. Lacking teeth, the OAU cannot enforce peace where it cannot be negotiated. The overriding unwillingness of sovereign states to sacrifice some of their sovereignty—which in some cases is more imagined than real—to a unified command has effectively denied the OAU any muscle and so doomed the common defense system which Peters believes is a necessity if Africa is to be truly independent.

**Angola**


This article gives the Soviet Union's view of UNITA in Angola's struggle for independence. It discusses Jonas Savimbi's role as the leader of UNITA and the support received from South Africa and other countries.

**Ethiopia**


Legum examines the international significance of Soviet involvement in Ethiopia. He notes that although the Soviet Union has lost influence in Angola and Mozambique, it has gained an even stronger ally in Ethiopia, which now has the most structured Marxist political system ever seen in Africa. According to the author, Ethiopia poses an enormous challenge to the Soviet Union but also offers the greatest opportunities since Cuba and Vietnam. The Soviet involvement in Ethiopia raises several questions of international interest—will the new Soviet theories on non-Capitalist development in the Third World, which are being tested in Ethiopia, succeed? Will the Soviets be willing to devote a substantial portion of their limited resources on Ethiopia? And if they are successful in Ethiopia, will they be able to influence political developments elsewhere in Africa? Legum argues that Ethiopia is likely to receive special Soviet consideration and aid because Soviet prestige is on the line and, more importantly, because Soviet military specialists consider Ethiopia of primary strategic importance.

Schwab depicts Ethiopia's celebration in September 1984 of the tenth anniversary of its revolution as marking both the revolution's zenith and its nadir. The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was established during the celebrations, but at the same time the extent of Ethiopia's famine, partly caused by chaos resulting from the revolution's land reform, became widely known. The author argues that despite the famine, the revolutionary model established by Mengistu will be emulated by other Third World leaders seeking to end their dependent status in the Western economic system. The Ethiopian model is novel in that a military vanguard was used to introduce a political party whose goal is the establishment of an orthodox Marxist state. In Schwab's opinion, although Ethiopia is a Soviet client state, it is not a puppet like most East European countries. He predicts that the WPE is likely to become the principal political unit in Ethiopia, but the Derg will continue to play a role until the WPE is legitimated and strong.

Horn of Africa


Makinda describes past and present Soviet policies impacting on developments in the Red Sea region. In analyzing Moscow's interests and goals in the region, the author goes beyond the usual description of East-West rivalry by discussing how other countries in the region influence Soviet actions. He also examines why certain elements in the region are willing to work with the Soviet Union. Makinda concludes that there will not be any radical changes in the Soviet Union's policies in the region in the next several years, though its presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen could be threatened if it is unwilling or unable to provide significant economic aid.

Ivory Coast


Gbagbo, an Ivorian who has been living in Paris since fleeing Ivory Coast in 1982, has written a populist critique of Ivorian Government policies since independence that also contains a reasoned, reasonable--and anything but radical--set of alternatives for the future. The key, according to Gbagbo, is an empowered and responsible citizenry, as opposed to the politically repressed and/or intimidated populace identified as the product of current Ivorian politics. Gbagbo provides repeated examples of repression, intimidation, and corruption in Ivory Coast, naming people and places. More daunting is the task of coming up with realistic alternatives for the quirky defects common to one-party democracies. There, Gbagbo begins with a call for open debate
on national objectives, taking into account the oft-neglected and legitimate aspirations of the Ivorian people. Effectively distancing himself from left-wing radicals, Gbagbo also seeks an economic program promising a more equitable and fair—as contrasted with corrupt—distribution of resources. Neither his criticism nor his reforms are novel; neither has been the response of the Ivorian Government.


In an implicit warning to the ruling elite of Ivory Coast, Toure contrasts what the state promises to the majority of its citizens and what it actually delivers. Toure posits two options for the current ruling elite: either selfless devotion to the higher interests of the nation—in effect functionaries acting against their own short-term pecuniary interests, inevitably resulting in dissatisfaction and disorder, or an orderly but unjust system. The bureaucracy, the embodiment of the state, has chosen the latter and attempted to sweeten the bitter medicine by creating what Toure labels the political folklore of a partnership between "the brave peasantry" and the ruling elite. However, Toure ominously warns, the choice of injustice over potential political discord within the ranks of the ruling elite is self-defeating in the long run—over time injustice will lead to wider disorder.

Mozambique


The author, the Mozambican Minister of Information, outlines the reasons for impediments to objective reporting from Mozambique. These include economic underdevelopment resulting in poor communications systems, the paucity of internal media institutions, the difficulty of organizing the flow of information from the countryside where the majority of the population lives, and the shortage of qualified staff to speak officially for the government. American journalists, he contends, can remove other impediments by not allowing South African propaganda to color their articles and by ceasing to rely on third parties for information.


The author reviews the events and negotiations that led to the signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique. He claims hardline members of the South African military and security forces never had any intention of living up to the agreement to withdraw
South African support to the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). Thus, Mozambique has continued to suffer serious problems since the signing. South Africa, too, faces grave problems since its failure to enforce the nonaggression pact has created political difficulties at home and has undercut South Africa's credibility in the international community. Most important, powerful industrial and financial interests see increased trade and investment possibilities with Mozambique as a way to reverse South Africa's deteriorating economic situation.


Despite setbacks for the Soviets like the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa and the insurgency in Angola, the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives in southern Africa remain unaltered, although its short-term tactics have changed dramatically. This is most evident in Moscow's new emphasis on foreign economic policy rather than on ideological purity. For the first time, the Soviet Union is employing food aid in Mozambique as an instrument of policy. The author concludes that the Soviet Union does not expect to acquire decisive influence over the institutions, policies, or elites in southern African nations in the foreseeable future, but seeks strategic dividends such as military support facilities. Mozambique, with its long coastline and excellent harbors, continues to attract Soviet overtures for naval and air facilities.

Nigeria


Having achieved a certain preeminence--at least during the glory days of OPEC--as a regional economic power, Nigeria's leaders have expressed an interest in concomittantly developing Nigeria's military strength. Okolo has unofficially taken the first step by assessing Nigeria's current military capabilities. He first looks at those factors seen to have an impact on defense needs, including Nigeria's relations with its neighbors, geostrategic considerations having to do with oil, and the importance of the ECOWAS mutual defense pact. Okolo then examines Nigeria's order of battle and manpower resources and concludes that Nigeria's armed forces do not have the teeth that some gratuitously and erroneously believe they possess. His analysis also introduces the implicit contradiction that vexes almost all states of sub-Saharan Africa: leaders believe that the survival of the state--the realization of its national interests--requires security. For that, they acquire arms. The perceived threats to security, however, are rarely external, but rather internal and structural, and more responsive to political solutions than to costly and wasteful military ones. Since arms spending must be justified, leaders create enemies--and the spending continues.
Senegal


This article is a reprinted tract issued by elements of the nationalist/separatist movement in the Casamance. It seeks to establish the case for a separate "casamancais" identity apart from Senegal by referring to historical, cultural and geographical forces that set the Casamance apart from the rest of the country. Central to the tract's theme is asserting the existence of a pan-ethnic "casamancais" community that extends over the whole range of "historical Casamance"—meaning the present-day regions of Casamance and Senegal Oriental. However, its cultural and historic references are limited to the Diola ethnic group which occupies only the area between Ziguinchor and the ocean. The article also alleges instances of police torture and forced confessions after the Christmas 1982 disturbances in Ziguinchor. Though independence is never explicitly mentioned, the authors threaten to wage a "war of liberation" if Senegal delays granting "emancipation."

Somalia


Somalia's domestic politics in recent years have been characterized by growing opposition to President Siad Barre's rule. According to the author, opposition has taken three forms—a coup attempt, defections of government officials and military officers, and the emergence of political organizations. Tactics used by the opposition include guerrilla operations, propaganda radio broadcasts, and diplomatic campaigns. Barre's responses to opposition have included granting some citizen participation in government through a new constitution in 1979 and restoration of the People's Assembly (though the Assembly soon became little more than a rubber stamp for Barre's decisions); declaring a state of emergency; and shaking up the government and party hierarchies. But more detrimental to the opposition are its lack of unity and ideological fractionalization. The author also summarizes major features of Somalia's foreign relations since 1978. Despite the publication date, the article appears to have been written in early 1983.

South Africa


This book, written by an academic from the University of the Witwatersrand, is the first comprehensive study of civil-military relations in South Africa. In Frankel's view, a military coup is not
likely to occur in the country, but the "total national strategy" is all-pervasive and leading to a progressive militarization of South Africa. He foresees a militarized climate where order is valued over change, resulting in a retreat into an authoritarian system of government. He also includes a section on White attitudes to conscription. The strength of this book is in the factual foundations it lays for future studies. It records the evolution of the South African Armed Forces up to 1983 and includes statistics of manpower strengths and defence expenditures.

Gann, L.H. "The USSR, the West and South Africa." ISSUP Strategic Review, September 1984, pp. 18-29.

The author points out the factors that make South Africa important to the international community, including its geographic position and its role as a supplier of strategic minerals. The Soviet Union's aim, encompassed in the more general goal of destroying capitalism, is to deny the NATO powers access to South African resources. Since the Soviet Union and South Africa are major sources of a number of vital minerals, Soviet control over South Africa would result in a staggering addition to Soviet economic power. The author concludes that the United States must safeguard South Africa from Soviet influence by reshaping its policies regarding South Africa to conform to American national interests as well as to the strategic needs of the West.


This book describes the history of South Africa's armed forces, outlining their roles in the two World Wars and in Korea. The weapons, organization, and training of each of South Africa's armed services are described with sections on elite formations like 1 Reconnaissance Commando and 44 Parachute Brigade. The campaigns in Namibia against SWAPO are fully described as are the various operations in Angola since the initial intervention in 1975. The author gives an authoritative and comprehensive description of the armed forces which is supplemented by illustrations, many of them never previously published.


This book, written after a 4-year journey through Southern Africa, presents personal descriptions and observations of the people of the region. The author provides a political and historical context for what he observed and the opinions expressed to him. He also reports extensively on the conditions in the homelands and on the problems of South African writers, both Black and White.

This short book presents an eyewitness account of the violence that erupted in the Vaal townships in September 1984. The author spent 3 weeks in detention and the book was initially banned. His description of events evokes the horror of the burning, looting, killing, teargas, and rubber bullets during the 4 days of violence which resulted in the deaths of at least 30 people.

Southern Africa


In May 1978 South African airmen and soldiers launched Operation Reindeer and inaugurated a new South African policy of attacking neighboring territories that harbor insurgents planning to infiltrate South Africa or Namibia. This book gives a detailed and comprehensive description of this incursion and the subsequent operations, such as Sceptic of 1980. It is written from the point of view of the South African Government and is characterized as war reportage. It contains graphs and illustrations that aid the reader's understanding of South Africa's chain of command structure and the materiel at its disposal.

Togo


The "conjunctures" are the young, educated, and unemployed who have unhappily fallen victim to economic recession. Though potentially a volatile political force, especially in a small state like Togo, Toulabor shows that the "conjunctures" have in fact displayed apathy or at most leveled only mild criticism toward the privileged of Togo. To explain their apathy, Toulabor points to intimidation by the regime, fatalism, social constraints from within the family, and the somewhat optimistic belief that one's fortune will change, so best not disrupt the consumerist society. At the same time, apathy is described as a political option in a country like Togo where the regime constantly exhorts the populace to mobilize.

Zimbabwe

This short article gives a concise description of the political events that have occurred in Zimbabwe since 1979. It discusses the various political parties which contested for power against Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF and looks at the power structure within the ruling party itself. It also briefly discusses Zimbabwean relations with other African countries, China, and the United States.


Weitzer examines the changing balance of forces during and after the decolonization process in Zimbabwe, and the internal dynamics and interests of the post-colonial state. He finds that since independence Zimbabwe has displayed a coercive disorder, striking in similarity to that of its settler-colonial predecessor. Repressive powers and political institutions have been built up and strengthened in contrast to the reordering of social relationships thought to occur as a result of guerrilla struggle.