United States Army Infantry Training Program
Effectiveness During the Korean War

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This study investigates the United States Army Infantry training during the Korean War (1950-1953). It surveys the United States Army training doctrine (before and during war and current), training memorandums, bulletins, periodicals, observer reports, leader and unit AAR's, unit training reports and related books to determine the training program effectiveness. The literature review suggests that the training programs and systems in place or incorporated were effective after the initial equipment, manning, and organizational shortfalls were fixed during the first part of the war. The major problems noted, after the initial equipment and manning shortfalls were fixed, were in leadership (including selection, training, and retention in combat), and infantry training execution necessary for combat effectiveness units.
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UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY TRAINING PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE KOREAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

CHRISTIAN K. JAQUES, MAJ, USA
A.A., Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, NC 1980
B.B.A., Columbus College, Columbus, GA 1986

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1996

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ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY TRAINING PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE KOREAN WAR by MAJ Christian K. Jaques, USA, 111 pages.

This study investigates the United States Army Infantry training during the Korean War (1950-1953). It surveys the United States Army training doctrine (before and during the war and current), training memorandums, bulletins, periodicals, observer reports, leader and unit after action reports, unit training reports and related books to determine the training program effectiveness.

The literature review suggests that the training programs and systems in place or incorporated were effective after the initial equipment, manning, and organizational shortfalls were fixed during the first part of the war. The major problems noted, after the initial equipment and manning shortfalls were fixed, were in leadership (including selection, training, and retention in combat), and infantry training execution necessary for combat effective units.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this thesis has been a major task that has been made possible only with the help of many individuals. I want to thank them.

First, I would like to thank my children, Brad and Traci, for their support. Any available time went to sitting in front of the computer and in the library conducting research and writing this thesis. This greatly reduced time left for them. Without their support and understanding, this thesis would not have been done.

Second, I would like to thank the members of my research committee. Doctor John Fishel, as my chair, was a cheerleader, mentor, and soothsayer, and was ultimately responsible for my completion of this thesis. LTC Jeff Shadburn, who is also a co-member in the Leadership Instruction Department, provided some solid, keen insights that helped stop me from spinning my wheels on those long lonely nights in front of the computer. As the last member, LTC Ed Kennedy provided much time, advise, and support in turning my research into words. He continually provided much of his own research on the Korean War to supplement mine.

Third, I would like to thank many other staff and faculty members that provided physical and emotional support during what felt like an eternity in completing this thesis. Of particular note were LTC Lee Kichen and LTC Bill Lockwood. LTC Lockwood’s detailed evaluation and advise was priceless. I would also like to thank Dr. Jack Gifford in Combat Studies Institute who provided much of his own time to help me in thesis research. Dr. Gifford’s first hand experiences during the Korean War were helpful in validating the actual training conducted.

Finally, are the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library and the many officers and civilians of CGSC. I give a heartfelt thanks to you all.
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<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
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<td>AFF</td>
<td>Army Field forces</td>
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<td>AFFE</td>
<td>Army Forces Far East</td>
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<td>AGF</td>
<td>Army Ground Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>Also Known As</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Army Training Program</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Army Training Test</td>
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<td>AUS</td>
<td>Army of the United States</td>
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<td>BAR</td>
<td>Browning Automatic Rifle</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Basic Combat Training</td>
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<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
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<td>CGSCOC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College Officer Course</td>
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<td>CICS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COMUS</td>
<td>Commander United States</td>
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<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Combat Support</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
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<td>CSW</td>
<td>Crew Served Weapon</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>EUSAK</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Force</td>
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<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>I&amp;R</td>
<td>Intelligence &amp; Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>LFX</td>
<td>Live Fire Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-FPL</td>
<td>Maneuver, Firepower, Protection, leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILES</td>
<td>Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MSR</td>
<td>Major Supply Route</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mission Training Program</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKPA</td>
<td>North Korean People’s Army</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
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<td>Physical Training</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>TAGD</td>
<td>The Adjutant General Department</td>
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<td>Training Bulletin</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Training Circular</td>
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<td>TIS</td>
<td>The Infantry School</td>
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<td>Training Manual</td>
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<td>Training Test</td>
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<td>World War One</td>
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<td>Zone of the Interior</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The mission of the (United States) Army is to provide field units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations.¹

--1949 edition of FM 100-5: Operations

To be successful in combat, the army must train continually to develop and maintain combat-ready soldiers, leaders, and units that can perform assigned tasks to specific standards. The requirement for training continues even during wartime (especially within the combat zone). Training builds self-confidence, promotes teamwork and esprit de corps, and increases professionalism in soldiers, leaders, and units.²


These quotations summarize the importance of training in our army. So what? As a part of the military instrument of national power, the United States Army exists to deter war. If that fails, then it must fight and win to achieve United States objectives and protect national interests.³ Training develops soldiers into winning combat organizations. It is the primary process used to prepare for the missions and tasks assigned in peacetime and war.

When General Gordon R. Sullivan became Army Chief of Staff in 1991, I remember hearing, "No More Task Force (TF) Smiths!" Knowing some Korean War history, I was familiar with the historical example he referred to. The bottom line was that the United States Army was poorly trained and not prepared to go into Korea. General Sullivan's use of the Task Force Smith example stressed the extreme importance of today's army being trained and ready.
The 1950 United States Army's situation was similar in some ways to the army of the 1990s. America had dramatically reduced the size of its military establishment after winning World War II and the Cold War forty-four years later. The United States focused its energies on domestic issues and rebuilding the global market economy. The 1950 infantryman was in an army that shrank from over 6 million soldiers and 90 divisions in 1945 to a force of just over 591,000 active duty soldiers and 10 divisions in 1950. The 1990's army has downsized from 770,000 in 1989 to a projected 495,000 active duty soldiers in 1997. Active duty divisions are programmed to go from 16 to 10 divisions.

Budget cutbacks, diverse operations other than war missions (e.g., non-combat occupation duties in Asia and Europe), and increasing civilian criticism impacted on the infantry's unpreparedness when committed to the Korean conflict. During the 1990s, the downsizing and budget cutbacks have also impacted. Recent field reports (to include some from the combat training centers) on maintenance, training, and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) indicate that downsizing has started to adversely affect training and preparedness. Many of today's military leaders use the 1950 military's unpreparedness and the early defeats in Korea as a paradigm to show what could happen to an unprepared United States military.

Numerous writers, such as T.R. Fehrenbach (This Kind of War), Roy Appleman (South to the Nakdong: North to the Yalu), and Clay Blair (The Forgotten War) have discussed and gone into great length about the unpreparedness of the United States in general, and the army specifically, for commitment to the Korean War. The lessons of the Korean War illustrate what can happen if this country's military is not prepared to deter war or, if necessary, to fight and win.

The United States Army did not prepare itself effectively for its combat tasks before the Korean War. However, many improvements increased training effectiveness up to squad and platoon level tasks with the stabilization of the United Nations (UN) forces Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) in 1951. Training then leveled off because of the rotation policy, individual replacement program, and leadership.
Have the army and infantry learned from the Korean experience. Today's smaller all-volunteer force generally has more stabilized infantry units (relative to infantry units that served in the Korean War) with soldiers and officers in the same battalions for two or more years (based on current individual replacement policy, enlistment contracts, and fiscal restraints). With good implementation of current army training doctrine (FM 25-100 and FM 25-101) today's infantry units can train on more than basic tasks and move into more advanced individual, crew, collective, and combined training tasks. Currently many leaders and soldiers are reassigned to other units after becoming effective fighting units from going through the combat training centers or combat (e.g., Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm). This is due in part, to current replacement policies. Some would say that this leader and soldier rotation instability provides greater experience throughout the service. Nonetheless, it disrupts the unit's training and combat effectiveness.  

This thesis addresses some questions relevant to today's downsized army. The United States Army, as back then, continues to compete for scarce resources. At the same time, it is required to accomplish a continually expanding range of missions that are not combat focused. These questions are: What was the status of training at the outbreak of 1950 hostilities? What did the army do to improve the infantry training? How did the army go about improving the training? How effective was the training?

Some successful training indicators, resulting from this study, suggest that they resulted from the resources being thrown into the conflict. It was not due to any changes to the training programs or program training effectiveness. Effectiveness is not measured just by whether we won or lost but how and when these resources were applied.

Answering, or at least addressing, these questions is this study's purpose; that is to determine the United States Army training effectiveness during 1950-1953 in preparing infantrymen to fight in Korea. This thesis looks at 1950 army training doctrine and how the army identified training problems and deficiencies using the same combat techniques used in World War
II. It will look at the rotation policy, the individual replacement system, leadership, and leadership training as to some reasons why training deficiencies continued throughout the war and any improvements made.

Organization

This chapter introduces the thesis and examines criteria extracted from the army training doctrinal manual used throughout the Korean War. Three criteria used are: identifying the essential subjects; training organization (individual, unit, and combined), and its preparation and administration. These criteria will determine the training effectiveness. The chapter also reviews the historical background to set the stage for United States involvement in the Korean War.

Chapter 2 reviews the Korean War era military training doctrine to provide a better understanding of the established training program. This understanding assists in using the criteria to evaluate the training. The chapter then looks at infantry training subsequent to the war in Korea, on 30 June 1950. This sets the initial stage for assessing the Korean War training.

Chapter 3 looks at training conducted after the army's entry into the Korean War in July 1950. It covers the war's dynamic period during which the army retreated to the Pusan perimeter, drove North to the Yalu River, and was pushed south of the 38th parallel.

Chapter 4 looks at the war's static or defensive phase between June 1951 and July 1953. The armistice negotiations that started in June 1951 and the relatively stable defensive line along the 38th Parallel affected the training conducted in theater and the United States. This period provides training improvement (or lack of) evidence resulting from the war's first year.

Chapter 5 is the analysis and conclusion. It surveys the recurring problems identified throughout the war and analyzes the primary training problems using the criteria identified in chapter 1. In addition, it assesses the Korean War era training effectiveness using current doctrinal training principles to reinforce the soundness of today's doctrine. It concludes with recommendations for further research.
Criteria

Training is essential to provide the United States Army with the capabilities necessary to accomplish United States strategy. Effective training is fundamental to preparedness. By looking at the United States Army infantry training during the Korean War, today's military officer can increase his understanding of current training philosophies. A previous Command and General Staff College Master of Military Art and Science Thesis on the army's training during World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) states,

While technology (training), and tactical doctrine change, certain training procedures and policies remain constant, or display a logical evolution. A knowledge of this . . . provide(s) a better understanding of the training philosophies of today and may be useful in developing future training. ⁹

To evaluate training effectiveness, this study will use the following parameters and criteria described below. This study is limited to existing documentation on infantry training, doctrine, and evaluation reports from Korea and the United States during 1950 to 1953. It focuses on individual and unit infantry training programs. It looks at officer training programs and the army education programs as they affected infantry training.

The Korean War training doctrine came from the 1950 edition of Field Manual 25-1, Military Training. Like today's doctrine, it held unit commanders responsible for individual soldier and unit training. As such, most infantry training was at battalion level and lower and there is not much documentation (unit training programs and training schedules) available today. Therefore, identifying training conducted at battalion and below must be extrapolated from higher level training programs, army publications, field reports, articles published in military journals, and books.

This paper reviews the lessons learned during the war (extracted from the evaluation reports, combat reports and military periodicals) and uses them to focus on training. These lessons learned will provide a basis to track improvements, or lack thereof, in the training programs.
Before going further, what does the term “effective” mean and what are the criteria for determining “effective” infantry training? The term, effective, is defined in The American Heritage Dictionary as, "Prepared for use or action, esp. in warfare--n. A soldier or piece of equipment that is ready for combat."\textsuperscript{10}

To evaluate the infantry training effectiveness, this study uses the doctrine in the 1950 edition of Field Manual 21-5, Military Training. This training doctrine was used throughout the Korean War. This is appropriate since modern training doctrine, as stated previously, evolved from this period. The 1950 edition states,

This manual contains the principles [to be] used in training personnel of the United States Army. It outlines the objectives of military training and it prescribes the means and methods available to the instructor for obtaining these objectives. The ultimate purpose of all military training is to prepare military personnel to carry out efficiently and expeditiously the responsibilities of the army in accomplishing its mission.\textsuperscript{11}

Field Manual 21-5 explained programs, factors that affected training, procedures, maintenance of standards, training management and how to conduct training. Other than in the introduction, there is little mention of principles. It is assumed that the areas covered by the manual are the principles. Chapter 2 will cover some of these areas in more depth.

Field Manual 21-5, Military Training evolved into the current 1988 Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force and 1990 Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training. Much of this former field manual has been incorporated into the current manuals. They reinforce the primary ingredients of leaders and leadership for insuring effective training. Chapter 5 contains these principles.

In addition, the 1949 to early 1951 editions of the FM 7- series infantry manuals and the 1949 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, established infantry tactical doctrine. These manuals also remained the same throughout the war with only minor changes posted.

This study's length does not allow examination of infantry training using all the areas contained in FM 21-5. Because training principles are used to measure or judge the effectiveness
of current training, this study will use selected areas that were, in effect, some training principles for the time period. Therefore, this paper narrows its criteria to the following doctrinal areas and the doctrinal factors that affected them.  

1. Selection of the essential subjects and their sequencing,
2. Organization for training, and
3. Preparation and administration (management and execution) of the training.

The factors are:

1. The existing state of training,
2. The time and facilities available for training, and
3. Obstacles to training (training distractors).

The first criterion examined is the essential subjects selection and sequencing. The existing state of training for individual soldiers and the unit was the starting point for this process as it is today. Much of this study is focused on how the army determined these essential training subjects and implemented them. It also looks at how they were sequenced (or prioritized). Field Manual 21-5 defines essential subjects as "those in which proficiency is needed to accomplish particular training missions." The effectiveness of this criterion is measured from numerous reports, findings, and observations from the field during the time periods reviewed.

The second criterion examined is the organization for training. Field Manual 21-5 separated training into three general overlapping phases. They are individual, unit, and combined (arms) training that are similar to today's training organization. FM 21-5 noted that individual training was to be continuous throughout all phases in order to perfect skills and techniques. Individual training included recruit training, drill, physical training, character guidance, recreation, troop information and education, citizenship training, responsibility and leadership, training noncommissioned officers, officer training, career guidance, and career management. Unit and
combined training focused on developing team work. "A most important part . . . is the conduct of exercises that apply tactical, technical, or logistical procedures and doctrine to assumed combat situation(s)."16 This training included tactical, sand table, terrain model, map, terrain, field, joint (two or more armed services), and command post exercises. It also included field maneuvers conducted under simulated combat conditions.17 Like the above criterion, this second criterion also measured from numerous reports, findings, and observations from the field during the time periods reviewed.

The third criterion examined is the preparation and administration of training. After identifying the existing state of training and essential subjects, time available and facilities were considered. Training to time was the standard. Standards were usually found in training directives issued from corps and higher headquarters. Facilities' evaluation included the locale, terrain, climate, training aids and support. The training preparation and administration insured that the right training was planned, prepared, executed, and supervised. This was the responsibility of the unit commanders.

Training preparation and administration (management and execution) involved overcoming obstacles to training. FM 21-5 classifies obstacles to training as administrative, physical, and human.18 (The 1988 Field Manual 25-100, calls them "training distractions.")19 Administrative obstacles were normal peacetime requirements such as 'fatigue' details (i.e., guard duty, kitchen police) that took soldiers away from training. Physical obstacles were limited resources that included inadequate training areas, classrooms, transportation, and weapons firing ranges. Human obstacles were defined as overcoming the soldiers' lack of motivation to train. The manual stated, "A lack of individual desire to acquire military proficiency is the primary human obstacle during peacetime, because the need for military skill is not readily apparent."20 (This may suggest a
prevailing mood of the day that the United States would not be involved in another war. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this last criterion is also measured from numerous reports, findings, and observations from the field during the time periods reviewed.

Historical Background

Since the United States Army's beginning in 1775, the infantry has been the primary combat force in American wars and conflicts. At the end of World War II however, the introduction of the atomic bomb brought the infantry's role as the primary combat force into question. There was serious debate as to whether the United States Army and especially its infantry, had a role in the United States national defense strategy. Many believed that the nuclear air delivery systems of the newly formed United States Air Force would assume this role. The army would have the secondary role of policing up the battlefield. The North Korean attack into South Korea on 25 June 1950 ended the debate. President Truman committed the United States Army ground forces to contain Communist aggression in South Korea on 30 June 1950.21

The United States and its United Nations allies were ultimately successful in accomplishing their post-World War II objective of containing world communism in Korea. The North Koreans were pushed back across the border and an armistice was signed after three years of fighting.

As in previous conflicts, the United States Army infantry contributed largely to this success. The Korean War was an infantryman's war. Though the Korean War was a United Nations effort, the United States provided the largest United Nation force. Clay Blair states in his book, *The Forgotten War*, "the United States Army furnished 86 percent of the American infantry manpower in the [Korean] war; with the Marine Corps providing the remaining 14 percent."22 Considering the infantryman's significance to the Korean War, his training was important. The Korean War was the first post-World War II limited conflict fought under the nuclear war threat.
In 1950, after five years of occupation duty and drastic cutbacks, the United States Army was a skeleton of the victorious World War II army of 1945.

The 1949 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations states, "Its [infantry] primary mission is to close with the enemy and destroy or capture him; in defense, to hold its position and repel the hostile attack."23 The United States Infantry was not prepared to accomplish this primary mission. We will review some of the political, informational, economical, and military historical background to better understand the United States infantry situation at the start of the Korean War.

Politically, the United States was on unfamiliar ground after World War II. Now a superpower, it had become the world's "de facto" protector of democracy and charged itself with postwar restoration.24 The country focused on rebuilding itself and overseas interests (first Europe then Asia). President Harry S. Truman navigated the country through these uncharted waters. The government and country's priorities were split. According to T. R. Fehrenbach, one group (including a large majority of United States citizenry--the national will) did not care about the growing communist threat and focused on domestic policy. The second group looked outward at restoring the world and containing communism.25

President Truman charted a tenuous course between these two opposing groups. Ultimately the course he charted was a compromise. He advocated group one's domestic policies and tried to execute group two's foreign policies.26 This latter group included two of the United States Army great leaders: General of the Army George C. Marshall as Secretary of State, and General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, as Proconsul (and also Commander, Far East Command) in Japan, who led the rebuilding efforts in Europe and Asia respectively. The United States Army played an important role in this by providing military governments and occupation forces in conquered countries.

Occupation duty included Korea. The United States Army and Russia installed a military government in southern and northern Korea respectively, to replace the Japanese-run government which had been in place since 1910. To maintain control of Korea's population, the Japanese had
imposed its form of government. When the Japanese withdrew, this left a huge vacuum in the country’s infrastructure. The Koreans had no depth or experience to govern. Consequently, the United States military, against continually growing friction, kept many Japanese employed helping run the country.²⁷

Before World War II had ended, the Big Three Powers (United States, Britain, and Russia) had adopted plans and agreements for the post-World War II world. These plans included Chosun (Korea). The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 promised a free and independent Korea. The Allied Powers Conferences (ending with the Potsdam Conference) agreed on some form of international trusteeship for Korea. In 1945, while the Russians were overrunning the Japanese in Asia, American leaders became disturbed (possibly because they did not believe Russia’s promises of freedom and independence for the countries it was then liberating). Therefore the Americans came up with the idea of Russia handling the Japanese forces to the north of the 38th parallel and the United States doing the same to the south.²⁸ Russia agreed.

American objectives in Korea, after the Japanese surrender, were to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and prepare the Koreans for reunification and self-rule. As Russia signaled its ulterior motive of communist domination, the United States refused agreement to countrywide rigged elections that would give control to the communist puppet-government. The United States instead, set up elections in the south. Dr. Syngman Rhee, and his conservative parties, were elected in 1948 as the new president and government of South Korea. The North Koreans established the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic, under Premier Kim Il Sung (who died in June 1994) with Russian support, in response. Rhee had lived in exile in the United States during the Japanese occupation and Kim Il Sung was a Soviet citizen and officer.

By 1949, the American (and Russian) occupation forces withdrew. The United States Special Representative to Korea, John Muccio became the first ambassador to South Korea.²⁹ United States military and economic aid continued.³⁰ Some leaders like General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the Korean occupation forces, felt that this 45,000 soldier occupation
force should stay there to prevent North Korean and Russian aggression.\textsuperscript{31} The United States administration wanted the troops out because of the economic burden.\textsuperscript{32} By agreement, and to help prevent North Koreans from invading the South, the United States Korean Military Advisory Group (K MAG) was established to train South Korean Security Forces.

In 1950, the outgoing chief of K MAG, Brigadier General Lynn Roberts completed a positive publicity program on the Republic of Korea (ROK) army that stated they were well trained and prepared to meet any threat in Asia.\textsuperscript{33} Events proved him wrong. Fearing the South Korean government, under Rhee, might attack North Korea and not wanting to send the wrong political signals, the United States only provided out-dated defensive weapons to the South Korean army.\textsuperscript{34} In fact, the ROK army had almost no artillery and aircraft. Both North and South Korea wanted reunification of Korea, but under their own terms. The United States did not want to have an international incident if South Korea tried to take North Korea by force. The United States goal remained peaceful reunification. This South Korean buildup, however, did not match the corresponding, and much larger buildup of massive offensive North Korean People's Army (NKPA) forces north of the 38th Parallel.\textsuperscript{35}

On 12 January 1950, United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson made what many believed to have been a very significant speech, one that led the Russian and Korean Communists to believe the United States would not interfere if South Korea was attacked. This speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., did not include Korea and Taiwan in the United States' security cordon.\textsuperscript{36} This was not a change in policy, however, rather a public pronouncement of policy established in 1947. Many historians feel, in addition to previous United States actions, the speed signaled to the North Koreans and Russians, that the United States would not become involved to protect South Korea. This is a good example of where informational power to influence international events failed. Acheson's pronouncement greatly influenced the NKPA who felt confident of United States uninvolvment when they went south.
Post World War II American foreign policy focused on the strategic European Plains where the United States faced a direct communist threat. The national leadership felt that if Europe fell it would, more than any other area, hurt national interests. That policy did not change with the outbreak in Korea, "The commitment of ground troops (to Korea) supported the United States military policy to provide security for our country, and to support our national objectives throughout the world." \(^38\)

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950, President Truman sent a world signal by committing ground troops to Korea (as the largest part of a United Nations contingent). The United States policy of containing communism now included overtly resisting communism. \(^39\) The United States felt its interests in Japan, especially, would be severely hampered if North Korea conquered South Korea. This was because South Korea's geographic location puts it up against Japan and its Lines Of Communication (LOCs).

Throughout the Post World War II years subsequent to the Korean War, economics was the primary factor that influenced the army's rapid demobilization. It was down to a skeleton force of just over 530,000 by March 1948. Only the Czechoslovakian coup by the Russians and the Berlin Crisis in 1948, persuaded President Truman to build the army forces back up. After the draft was reinstated in 1948, the army had grown to 591,000 troops, 100,000 of whom were draftees in 1950. \(^40\)

The United States civilian administration and current budgeting concerns convinced the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State (CJCS) General Omar Bradley that significant increases in defense spending would wreck the United States economy. \(^41\) After retiring many years later, General Bradley regretted his concurrence with this and the impact it had on the country's readiness going into the Korean War. \(^42\)

General Bradley's new position as CJCS had been created from lessons learned from World War II and economics. In part, consolidating the different services under one department would eliminate much of the inefficient redundancy between the branches and reduce service
parochialism. Appointing a senior military advisor, the CJCS, would also help in the primary duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that of planning joint military operations and advising the executive branch. However, service parochialism and fighting over limited budget dollars continued. The renamed Department of Defense (DOD) was now the executive agency with the armed services as military departments within the DOD. This national command structure did not give the CJCS any authority or power other than being the chief military advisor. As such, he had only personal influence over the JCS whom as executive agents had great impact on military policy and budget.

These political decisions, influenced largely by economic concerns, significantly impacted on the army manning size, equipment, and its preparedness for war. It was due, in large part, to a lost focus on the army's purpose and how the army fit into United States military policy. Many senior army leaders were unclear as to what and where the army should go. Civilian leadership basically let the army leadership run their occupation territories and decide their present and future duties.

Because of the economic measures and the projected military power use for accomplishing national objectives, selective service was ended in 1947 after eight years. New programs (such as military occupational specialties (MOS) and troop civilian education) were introduced to make the army more marketable in recruiting soldiers for the largest peacetime army in American history. Recruits were allowed to pick their individual MOS or field irrespective of the army needs for specific MOSs. This definitely impacted on the combat arms, especially the infantry. This program would let the army meet its total manning numbers, but left the infantry severely understrength.46


Ibid., 21-27.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 4-10.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 23.

Ibid., 26.

20 FM 21-5,(1950), 27.

21 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, (New York: Bantam Books, 1963), 82.


24 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 1963, 38.

25 Ibid., 37.

26 Ibid., 38-39.

27 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 37-38.


29 Ibid., 43.

30 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 44-46.

31 Ibid., 40.

32 Ibid., 40.

33 Ibid., 55.

34 Ibid., 44.

35 Ibid., 45, 53.

36 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 43.

37 Ibid., 7.

38 Ibid., 6.

40 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 8. Multiple sources use the 591,000 figure. Blair uses the 667,000 personnel figure.

41 Ibid., 27.

42 Ibid., 27.


44 Ibid., 2-2 to 2-4.

45 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 7-8.

CHAPTER 2
TRAINING DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BEFORE THE WAR

The whole of military activity must relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place at the right time.1

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

The army was unprepared for combat at the beginning of the Korean War. Political and economic factors strongly influenced this result. But what was the army doing to meet the mission of "provid(ing) field units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations."2 This chapter reviews the training doctrine used before and during the Korean War and the infantry training done before the war. Reviewing the contemporary training doctrine will provide an evaluation framework for looking at infantry training throughout the war. Reviewing the infantry training, programs, and problems prior to the invasion of South Korea will set the stage.

Training Doctrine

Some of the questions that come to mind regarding the training doctrine during the Korean War are: Who was responsible for training? What was the training doctrine? What did the infantry training program include? How was it conducted? What were the standards? What type of training did the trainers get?

This section will answer some of these questions. This will help in understanding how the Korean War infantryman trained. The training doctrine established in FM 21-5, Military Training, will be reviewed first. Since officers were responsible for doctrinal training management and
programs, officers' leadership training will also be reviewed. Throughout this study of training, commanders and leadership were continually identified as key for good training and combat effectiveness.

The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), was the proponent for army training. With headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, it was responsible for the training, schools, mobilization, and training doctrine. The primary training doctrine manual OCAFF published was FM 21-5, Military Training. Training publications, except for FM 7-17, did not change during 1950 to 1953. The relevant field manuals for infantry training also remained the same except for a few minor changes. The pertinent manuals were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Manual</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-10</td>
<td>Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>October 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-17</td>
<td>The Armored Infantry Company and Battalion</td>
<td>March 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-20</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>March 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 21-5</td>
<td>Military Training</td>
<td>September 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 21-75</td>
<td>Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling</td>
<td>October 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 100-5</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>August 1949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study will review these manuals' pertinent parts, many of which were based on lessons learned primarily from the European Theater of Operations in World War II.

FM 21-5 had two primary parts. They were training management and the conduct of training. The manual also reviewed the basic techniques and methods to used for efficient training.3

Adherence to the principles set forth herein will best effect the desired training objective in the shortest possible time, . . . outline the objectives of the military training and prescribes the means and methods available . . . . The ultimate purpose of all military
training is to prepare military personnel to carry out efficiently and expeditiously the responsibilities of the army in accomplishing its mission.  

Training Management

Chapter 1 (Military Training) explained that military training needed for successive offensive operations developed the following qualities: health, strength, endurance, discipline, morale and esprit de corps, initiative, adaptability, technical proficiency, leadership, teamwork, and tactical proficiency.

Basic concepts were that:

1. The individual's dignity was not violated.
2. The average man could be turned into an efficient soldier when properly trained.
3. The applicatory (practical) system of instruction was best for military training.
4. Military training progressed from basic to advanced subjects and from individual to team training.
5. Skills were acquired through supervised practice.
6. Doctrine and techniques were standard throughout the army.
7. Responsibility for conducting training was delegated to the unit commander.

The manual emphasized three general overlapping phases of training: individual, unit, and combined training. Continuous individual level military training was emphasized throughout. Individual training consisted of recruit training, drill, physical training, character guidance, recreation, troop information and education program, citizen training, responsibility and leadership, training non-commissioned officers, officer training, career guidance and career management.

1. Recruit training familiarized the recruit with military and soldier responsibilities. Instruction included the Articles of War, local orders, military customs and courtesies, uniform regulations and rules for healthful living.
2. Drill developed control, discipline, teamwork, and execution. It primarily instilled precise, orderly habits into the soldier and built discipline. "Perfection is the only acceptable standard... Drill is a means (sic) to an end, not an end in itself." ⁸

3. Physical training (PT) insured good health, strength, and endurance in soldiers. Commanders were supposed to direct constant attention to PT. Conditioning exercises, foot marches and drills developed strength and endurance. Marches and athletics were identified to help maintain the acquired physical condition. Commanders would encourage voluntary athletics to develop soldiers mentally and physically. PT would also help increase soldier self-confidence.

4. A commander's responsibility included character guidance. Soldiers would develop, during training, the high standards of personal conduct, honesty, responsibility, an obligation towards their fellow soldiers, and concern for their unit's welfare.

5. Recreation and diversion were specifically referred to as essential for efficiency.

6. The troop information and education program's purpose was to build soldier self-respect and pride in their new profession. It encouraged educational development, particularly along army career lines. The troop information program was also the commander's responsibility. The Department of the Army education program was devoted to teaching subjects normally taught in civilian academic and vocational institutions. This was to further increase soldier self-improvement. (The soldier's average education level was at the seventh grade level in 1950.) ⁹

7. Citizenship training was considered, "One of the most important military subjects..." ¹⁰ This was part of the troop information and education program. Army leadership felt that the role of the army was to develop mature soldiers of good character. Lessons learned from World War I and World War II had shown that these soldiers of good character made the best soldiers. ¹¹

8. Leadership training was used to develop responsibility in all troops. "The development of leaders is (was) a major function of military training." ¹²
9. Commanders were to train NCOs by giving NCOs responsibilities appropriate to their grades and supporting their positions in the unit. Unit and service schools were to prepare the NCOs for "higher command."

10. Officer training was to be continuous throughout his service. An officer would continue to increase his training, knowledge, and skill through actual experience, command and staff jobs; various assignments; attending unit and service schools and through self study.

11. Career guidance (in career plans) and career management was to help commanders develop their officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers. Department of the Army (DA) directed the career plans that were administered by lower commanders. The plans provided a professional development system through assignment, training, and placement, based on individual abilities, aptitudes, and initiative.13 (Some authors have suggested that these career plans did not provide the necessary combat infantrymen but were to make the service more palatable to civilians.)

12. Unit Schools and extension courses were to standardize the doctrine and techniques for training soldiers and for soldier self-improvement.

Unit and combined training emphasized the development of military teams. A most important part of unit and combined training was the conduct of exercises that applied tactical, technical, or logistical procedures or doctrine to assumed combat situations, called tactical exercises. Combined training (combined arms training in current doctrine) was the training of different combat arms like infantry, armor, and field artillery together.14

The tactical exercises trained soldiers in team duties. They included sand table exercises, map exercises, terrain exercises, and map maneuvers. Some examples were command post exercises (CPX's), field exercises, and field maneuvers that are defined in Figure 1. These exercises were to be conducted throughout training. Tactical exercises were used often determine the combat readiness of a unit. (As the war continued, standards were developed throughout OCAFF for evaluating individuals and units.) They were to include realistic situations. Using aggressor forces was recommended to represent enemy action. Although the manual did not stress
the importance of the field exercises as an evaluation tool or the use of enemy aggressors, later training memorandums and bulletins did. Exercises would emphasize the wartime conditions and difficulties that training helped to overcome.\textsuperscript{15}

- Sand table and terrain model exercises. Tactical exercises that use sand tables, miniature ranges, and other terrain models to teach—unit tactics, tactical training of the individual soldier, occupation and selection of gun positions, observation of fire, and similar subjects.

- Map exercises. Tactical exercises where a series of related situations and individual solutions are discussed with a map as the only guide to the terrain. They are considered especially useful for Advanced Individual training (AIT), troop leading, and application of tactical doctrine for large units.

- Terrain Exercises. They are similar to map exercises except that they are done on the actual terrain by students.

- Map Maneuvers. They are tactical exercises where students (soldiers) are arranged into staffs to conduct military operations on a map. It trains decision making, order preparation, command and control and staff work.

- Command Post Exercises (CPX’s). Tactical exercises where the participants consist of all or part of the units’ command, staff, headquarters, and communication personnel. The purpose of CPX’s is to develop teamwork, improve individual skills and techniques, and to test plans, procedures, and methods for contemplated operations or maneuvers.

- Field Exercises. Tactical exercises that are conducted on the ground under simulated combat conditions. Their purpose is to train the friendly force. The enemy force is imaginary, outlined or represented.

- Field Maneuvers. Tactical exercises that are conducted on the ground under simulated combat conditions. Friendly and enemy troops and installations are actually present in whole or in part. The purpose is to train all participating units. These exercises are the closest to actual combat.

- Joint exercises are exercises where two or more armed services (Navy, Air Force, Marines) train together.

Figure 1. Tactical Exercise Definitions. FM 21-5, \textit{Military Training}, 1950.

Chapter 2 (Training Plans and Orders) defined training management as, "the planning and directing of training to accomplish the training mission in the time and with the means available..."
It is every commander's responsibility. Training management consisted of planning, directing, and supervision.\textsuperscript{16}

Commanders received their training orders from many sources (Figure 2). Training directives initiated training. They were broad policy statements or assigned training missions from division commanders and higher. DA published Training Circulars (TCs) and used them to announce interim training policies and new information, doctrine, tactics, and techniques that needed immediate dissemination to the field. Command levels authorized to publish administrative orders issued Training Memorandums (TMs). These memorandums contained permanent or semi-permanent training instructions. Training programs and schedules contained the plans and instructions used by all commanders in training. Division level and lower unit levels usually published these training programs as training memorandums.\textsuperscript{17}

FM 21-5 used the military decision making process, known as the estimate of the situation found in FM 101-5, \textit{Staff Organization and Operations} to prepare the training estimate. The manual reviewed the mission analysis, situation analysis, and how to develop training programs and schedules. The mission (analysis) was (like today) the most important step to consider. It consisted of the task and purpose to accomplish in the training program.\textsuperscript{18} The factors that affected training, according to the manual were: the existing state of training, time available, facilities available, climate, terrain, and obstacles. These factors influenced development of the courses of action (areas). These courses of action included: selection of the essential subjects and their sequencing; the organization for training; length and times for training phases; preparation and use of training facilities; and administration of the training.\textsuperscript{19}

The manual went into many pages to explain how the commander used these factors and courses of action (areas) to choose a general plan for accomplishing the training mission. From this plan, the commander developed the training programs and schedules to train his unit.\textsuperscript{20}

The unit training program was the unit training plan over a number of weeks. It is written as a training memorandum or in tabular form. When many units were listed in tabular form, it was
called a master program. If the tabular form only included subjects pertinent to one unit or a type of unit, it was called a detailed training program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Memorandum (Current Policy)</th>
<th>Training Directive</th>
<th>Training Publications (FM's, TC's, ATP's, SS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plans (Detailed Tng. Programs, Ranges &amp; Areas, Schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unit Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unit Training Schedules (Estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lesson Plan (Estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supervision (Maintain Standards, Revise Estimates, Plans, Programs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Steps in Training Management.

FM 21-5 listed a suggested fourteen week unit training program for an infantry company. Listed in Figure 3 were the subjects and total hours.  

Service schools normally developed subject schedules that gave detailed suggestions for conducting training in particular subjects. They were normally prepared from official training publications and appeared as appendices in many field manuals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECTS</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
<th>SUBJECTS</th>
<th>TOTAL HOURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic and General (entire company)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank and antipersonnel mines; booby traps</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Entire Company:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat intelligence and counterintelligence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bayonet</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical warfare training</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Carbine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismounted drill and ceremony</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rifle, cal. 30</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary map and aerial photograph reading</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Subtotal--technical, entire company</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of clothing and equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Subtotal--technical, platoon HQ sections, selected personnel</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended order</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Total--technical</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Automatic rifle, cal. 30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of friendly armored vehicles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bayonet</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of friendly aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rifle, cal. 30</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Operation of patrols, day and night</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior guard duty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Scouting &amp; observing, day and night</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military courtesy and customs, articles of war</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Subtotal, technical, rifle platoon</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical subjects, basic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Weapons platoon:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Entire platoon:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gun, machine, light, cal. 30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor movement, entrucking and detrucking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mortar, 60-mm</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Subtotal--technical, entire weapons, platoon</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation course</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Subtotal--technical, sections</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal affairs of military personnel and their dependents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Total--technical weapons platoon</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical training, obstacle course; hand-to-hand fighting; disarming tactics</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Light machine gun section:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gun, machine, light, cal. 30</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches and bivouacs</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Gun, machine, cal. 50, M2, HB, flexible</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander's time</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Subtotal--technical, light machine gun section</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical training of the infantry soldier</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics of the squad, section, and platoon, day and night</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics of the company</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics of the battalion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training tests, individual, by army or corps</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal—basic and general</td>
<td>398</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal—technical</td>
<td>218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Unit training Program, Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment.

These hours were modified to fit the unit training program. The references were field or technical manuals, training circulars, and sample subject schedules mentioned above. These subject schedules were primarily guides for the commander.23

The unit training schedule was prepared from the training program and gave the specifics for each period of training. They were basically the same as those used in today's army.

FM 21-5 provided the following suggestions in preparing programs and schedules. The following were addressed as principles:24

1. Publish training programs and schedules as early as possible to give the maximum amount of planning time and preparation to the trainers.

2. Schedule subjects such as military courtesy, basic medical subjects and the Articles of War early in the program.

3. Schedule drill and physical training throughout the training phase.

4. Insure that all army training is progressive.

5. Provide variety and balance in scheduling training subjects.
6. Plan the training periods to suit the method of instruction and subject. (For example, lectures should not exceed 50 minutes; training films about 30 minutes . . . A tactical exercise for a rifle company requires at least half a day.)

7. Plan concurrent training when training resources can only train a selected number of soldiers at a time.

8. Use training schedule notes to apply past training to the planned training. This would help tie in previous training to the current training.

9. Integrate time off during the next duty day after night training.

10. Insure that the training schedule accounts for all training time (including meals).

11. Insure Commander's time is included in the training program. This is time for additional training, correcting training deficiencies, make-up time for essential training missed, and other requirements.

12. Plan rest periods into the training schedule.

13. Avoid scheduling subjects that require uniform changes consecutively on the same day.

14. Plan a workable training schedule that can accomplish the training activities in the allotted time.

Chapter 3 (Maintenance of Training Standards) reminded commanders that they were time responsible for all training within their units. It clearly stated,

Every commander is responsible for all training conducted in his unit. He retains his responsibility over tasks that he has delegated to his unit leaders. He personally supervises the planning and checks the execution of the plan to make sure that the training is conducted according to the correct standards.

Methods of maintaining training standards were careful selection of and leader teaching, conducting (good) training and tactical inspections, and daily observation and analysis. The following is a brief overview of these areas.
The manual stated that one of the Army Career Plan's (ACP) purposes was to ensure effective use of personnel. Commanders were to use the ACP in helping him assign personnel within his unit. The commander was to take soldiers with demonstrated potential and develop them. He would use on-the-job (OJT) training to develop specialists not provided by the ACP.

"Good training and good administration are inseparable in a military unit."\(^{28}\)

Good practical instructor training ensured effective training. Conducting this training prior to the training cycle was best. In addition, refresher training throughout the training cycle corrected training deficiencies and qualified new NCOs. There was a recommended check list and time schedule (similar to what is used today).\(^{29}\)

Tactical and training inspections evaluated training, unit readiness and helped remove obstacles to training. Tactical inspections simply put, were done under realistic situations (maximum unit strength, equipment, and transportation). Normally this was done at the end of the training cycle. It was stressed that training inspections not interrupt the training unless serious deficiencies were found.

Daily observation and analysis included testing by the instructor and evaluation tests directed by the commander to determine training progress, training deficiencies and to prepare for higher commander tactical inspections like the Expert Infantryman Test (EIB).\(^{30}\) It also included daily training supervision through informal inspections by the commander or his representative. General rules for supervisors (training officers) were given to assist making training inspections beneficial. The ultimate concern focused on good effective training. (Some of these rules are just as applicable today.) These rules were:

- Do not distract the training class.
- Try to maintain the training situation the same as before the supervisor arrives.
- Note the general impression of the class.
- Avoid taking notes where the students and the instructor can see him.
- Refrain from interrupting the instructor unless a serious deficiency is observed.
- Observe the entire training period when possible.
- Maintain an attitude of assistance.
- Conduct constructive criticism (modern day after action reviews-AAR's-) afterwards with the instructors.\(^{31}\)
Conduct of Instruction

The length and focus of this study do not allow us an in-depth look into the actual conduct of instruction. Much of this portion is evidenced in the current FM 21-6, How to Conduct Performance Oriented Training. Other current training literature is also closely aligned (and used) in military training. FM 21-5 and the other doctrine surveyed did not have any major training doctrine deficiencies (using today’s doctrine as the benchmark), once equipment and personnel shortages were overcome after the first months of the war.

FM 21-5 devoted seven chapters (4 through 10) in Part two, over half of the manual, to the conduct of instruction. It reviewed the fundamentals of military instruction, effective instructor traits, instructor preparation, lesson plans, presentation techniques (lectures, conferences, and demonstrations), practical application (called performance oriented training or hands-on-training today) by individual and team practice, and examinations to show progress made by oral, written, and performance tests.

Military Training

Some historians suggest the United States Infantry resembled the colonial armies of the nineteenth century in their style of living and mission in post World War II Japan. This section reviews the existing state of military training for the occupation soldiers in Japan prior to the Korean War. It focuses on these soldiers essentially because they provided the bulk of the combat soldiers for the opening phase of the Korean War.

Many factors influenced the existing state of training. This paper focuses on the following factors: personnel; stateside and Eighth Army training; changing Far East Command (FEC/FECOM) mission policies; Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) changes; the equipment situation; and army leadership during this period.

The combat arms, especially the infantry, were severely under strength in FEC. Three of Eighth Army's four infantry divisions were at 69 percent of authorized war strength on 25 June
1950; FEC was at 93 percent overall strength. The FEC was the parent organization for the Eighth Army. As mentioned in chapter 1, the under strength infantry was due to the army's attempt to make the army more attractive to the civilian population as a career. This effort was necessary with the end of the draft in 1947. The draft was reinstated for two years with the Selective Service Act of June 1948. The budget struggle however increased the army size by only 100,000 soldiers. Three hundred thousand soldiers were drafted by this act before the Korean War. This was a significant slice of the overall force. Enlisted soldiers were, for the most part, allowed to pick their choice of branch creating an imbalance between non-combat and combat soldiers. The infantry did not help by doing a poor job of attracting enough of these men.

In addition, deficient stateside training contributed to this shortage of trained infantry soldiers. Post World War II United States training bases were inadequate. The training divisions responsible for conducting the 14 week basic training were severely undermanned. In an attempt to help alleviate this problem in June 1951, Congress extended the draft by passing the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This helped the training divisions and service schools by augmenting them with recalled soldiers, national guard, and reservists. However, they too, received inadequate train up. Some training units were lucky if they had a core cadre of regular army soldiers. After 1950, there was a push to fill these training units with Korean War combat-experienced soldiers to overcome this problem. The soldiers sent to the FEC hence had incomplete basic training.

Adding to this training problem were recruits that lost much of what they had learned in the long personnel pipeline to FECOM. This pipeline included sending soldiers back to stateside service schools for further training in functional or job-related duties. Hence, they were not readily available for the combat units, except for specialists who, for the most part were in the non-combat jobs. Compounding this was the very high percentage of replacements arriving at FECOM with low intelligence ratings and soldiers with questionable character. In April 1949, 43 percent of army enlisted personnel in FEC rated in Class IV and V on the Army General Classification Test.
This was reflected in increased unit discipline problems, administrative problems and individual incidents. As stated earlier, World War II lessons had demonstrated that soldiers in the higher test categories became better soldiers. The average soldier was also several years younger (and generally less mature) than his peer in World War II. It also reflected in the inadequate training and what FM 21-5 referred to as human obstacles to training.\textsuperscript{40}

In addition to the combat units being under-strength, there was a large soldier turnover each year. In 1949, FEC turnover was 43\%.\textsuperscript{41} Training focused on the basics (rudiments), as a result. It emphasized discipline, courtesy, and conduct.\textsuperscript{42} Minimal combat training was conducted.

The existing state of training for the Eighth Army in 1949 was poor to say the least. The Eighth Army and FEC's primary responsibility had been on occupation duty for four years. These duties had focused on administrative support, infrastructure support and not combat duties. Some have suggested that these duties did not allow time for combat training. This situation improved somewhat in 1949.

General MacArthur, changing policy, issued a directive that shifted the army's occupation duties from rigidity (strict enforcement of American occupation laws and regulations by the army) to one of "friendly protective guidance."\textsuperscript{43} (Some would say that General MacArthur was allowing the country to start running itself.) The Eighth Army was gradually relieved of many occupation duties and undertook an intensified (relatively speaking) combined arms training program.

Roy E. Appleman in his book \textit{South to the Naktong: North To The Yalu} reviewed the troop training program started in the Eighth Army, in Japan, by its commander, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. This program started in the summer of 1949 and continued until its commitment to Korea. Its purpose was to give the army "some degree of combat readiness after their long period of occupation duties in Japan."\textsuperscript{44} On 10 June 1949, General MacArthur directed that the combined arms (Army, Navy, and Air Force) train in combined and joint training to meet its primary combat mission.

Divisions were directed to complete Regimental Combat Team (RCT) field exercises, develop, effective air-ground procedures prior to 31 July 1950... (and) complete amphibious 32
landing exercises for one battalion of each division by 31 October 1950. Minimum proficiency level (to be) attained were (1) company (battery) levels by 15 December 1949; (2) Battalion (Squadron or task force) level by 15 May 1950; (3) regimental (group or task force) level by 31 July 1950; (4) division (air force or task force) level by 31 December 1950; and (5) combined and joint operations training to include amphibious exercises concurrently with RCT and division level training. 45

Most units had progressed through battalion level training by the start of the war. All battalions reported achieving the 15 May minimum proficiency training target date. 46 However, most of the units failed their (minimum proficiency training level) tests, when tested. 47

The lack of suitable training areas in Japan was a major contributor to the lack of regimental and higher levels achieving FEC training missions. To help alleviate this lack of training space, on 8 August 1949, a division size training area was acquired in the vicinity of Mount Fuji. 48 Japan was (even then) a heavily populated country. With so much of its economy then agricultural, it left little land available for training areas. Fighting for the limited training areas were the four under strength infantry divisions and seven antiaircraft artillery battalions (as of June 1950). 49 Eighth Army could not conduct regimental, divisional, or army exercises. Because there was not space to conduct this training, the infantry and artillery had to conduct their training separately. The Eighth Army's two Corps headquarters were deactivated in April 1950 because they could only conduct CPX's and not be exercised as tactical control headquarters. They became re-activated after units were committed to Korea.

The 21st Infantry of the 24th Infantry division is illustrative of the problems in Japan during this time. As stated in Brigadier General Roy K. Flint's "Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division" in America's First Battles: 1776-1965, "the lack of training areas where units could shoot and maneuver led to (some) organizational changes (in their TOE)." 50 Organic tank companies were eliminated from the unit TOE's because of limited training areas, repair parts and trained personnel. Many of the tanks were stored in warehouses. As a consequence, the 21st Infantry "... never maneuvered with live artillery and had no experience with tanks. 51 Live fire
exercises were severely constrained because of the limited training areas. The 52d Artillery, for example, could only fire its 105-mm artillery once a year.

To determine the personnel strength needed, the army used the TOE to identify the different types of equipment, MOS's, leaders, required personnel numbers, and all army's unit weapons. After World War II, the army underwent a detailed self-evaluation of its organization and equipment. This resulted in several recommendations and changes that impacted on the divisions that served in Korea. The army made armor organic, not just attached, to the infantry division. This reversed previous doctrine where antitank guns and tank destroyers had been the primary infantry division tank killers. Each infantry battalion received recoilless rifles while losing their regimental cannon companies and antitank companies. Each infantry regiment was authorized a tank company and the division acquired an additional tank battalion. Other changes included making self-propelled antiaircraft guns and 4.2-inch mortars organic to the division. The infantry squads went from 12 to 9 men in order to help the squad leaders better their span of control. The reduced squad size made additional personnel available to man a light machine gun and an antitank rocket in the new weapons squad for each rifle platoon. This reorganization allowed for greater fire and maneuver.\(^\text{52}\)

These improvements were welcomed but not implemented, except on paper, due to the postwar demobilization, funding cutbacks and the leadership's dependency on the United States nuclear monopoly. All four infantry divisions in 1950 Japan were at two thirds of their authorization in personnel and equipment. "Each of these divisions had only one tank company an one antiaircraft battery and was missing one out of every three infantry battalions and artillery batteries."\(^\text{53}\)

The above mentioned problems deprived battalion and higher commanders of much-needed combat power and the ability to execute their tactical doctrine. Regimental commanders did not have their primary tank killers, the tank. Their only short range antitank weapon was the "obsolete" 2.36" rocket launcher that had already been proven ineffective but not exchanged for the
3.5" rocket launcher (bazooka). Regimental commanders tried conducting operations with only two battalions, not the authorized three, prohibiting them from employing their normal tactical doctrine utilizing the triangular organization.  

The Eighth Army's old and worn weapons and equipment dated from World War II. There were also ammunition shortages. The infantry divisions were short 1,500 rifles, one hundred 90-mm anti-tank guns; three rifle battalions, six heavy tank companies, three 105-mm field artillery batteries, and three antiaircraft artillery batteries each.  

Much of this World War II vintage equipment had seen combat. In fact, the FEC scrounged much of its equipment (e.g. vehicles) from the many islands located in the FEC Area of Responsibility (AOR). FEC reclaimed this valuable equipment to make up for their many shortages. This somewhat successful operation, named Operation ROLL-UP, had the purpose to support equipping of the Eighth Army's infantry divisions. The budget severely constrained the logistical situation resulting in a strong dependence on locals in Japan in this operation. Operation ROLL-UP's tentative completion date was set at 30 June 1950. Sadly, it was not accomplished due to a shortage of supervisory personnel. On 25 June 1950, eighty percent of the army's armament equipment reserve was still unserviceable. This shortage of equipment extended to ammunition shortages. FEC had only a 45 days of depot supplies and the ammunition basic loads at the units.

**Leadership Training**

As stated before, leadership, especially unit commanders, were responsible for unit training. These leaders were key to ensuring effective training. Army leadership was adversely affected by the army's Career Guidance Program. This structured and enforced career path program prevented many potentially qualified and experienced officers from commanding troops where they were most needed. Additionally, it also denied the FEC from transferring enlisted
soldiers from inactivated service units from one Military Occupational Specialty to another in an attempt to fill the combat units. According to officers on the FEC staff, the classification and assignment procedures had placed in battlefield command officers and noncoms lacking experience and proficiency. This kind of assignment had often resulted in poor leadership, especially at the regimental and lower levels. The observers concluded bluntly that the career program had been detrimental to combat efficiency.59

To better understand leadership training, a review of the army’s officer selection and training program is needed. Generally, to qualify for an officer’s commission, the candidate had to have an equivalent of a high school education, pass a physical examination and intelligence test, be between 18 1/2 and 28 years old, and submit proof of good moral character.60 The three primary sources of officers were the Service Academies (USMA), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC, known today as the Reserve Officer Training Corps or ROTC). Direct commissions provided a small fourth source.

When officers came on active duty they became members of the Army of the United States (AUS) for promotions, schools, and assignments. During wartime, the primary source of officers, was the OCS program. According to policies in effect during wartime, all officer training was identical to "provide the maximum amount of training for wartime assignments in the shortest possible time."61 The training program consisted of on-the-job (OJT), supplemented by formal schooling and staff and command positions. Well-rounded officers were developed by planned rotations of assignments and duties. Each service and branch established career patterns to produce the needed numbers of officers. Successful officer training programs primarily depended on the local commanders than the centralized career management program used today.62

To insure officers were well-rounded during the early 1950's, all regular army officers were required to serve their first two years in the combat arm branches. Prior to duty with troops, officers normally attended their respective branch. An infantry officer typically spent his three year initial tour in a regiment. He served up to one year in a rifle company, one year in a weapons
company, and one year in the battalion or regimental staff. Constant officer movement within combat units however, disrupted this peacetime system.

After the initial OJT tour with troops, these young officers were scheduled to attend their basic branch schools. Advanced Course attendance was scheduled between an officer's 5th to 12th year. Subjects taught ranged from small unit tactics and techniques to combined arms and division level command and staff operations. The Command and General Staff College, for those selected, was usually between the officer's 8th to 15th year. Figure 4 is a typical infantry or combat arms officer military education flow chart.

With the exception of the Army War College, each school conducted associate and army extension courses. These associate courses were shortened resident courses. The extension courses were non-resident correspondence courses covering the same material. Many National Guard and reserve officers enrolled in these associate and extension courses.

This career management system provided the officer corps with a high caliber military education, but many company level combat leaders in Korea had not attended these courses (especially during the first year). As noted earlier, OJT was the primary focus for junior leaders in combat. Numerous leadership courses were implemented or expanded to improve the officer leadership and training in the United States throughout the war. A continuing problem for the Eighth Army was getting these proven combat promoted officers out of Korea and into the formal school system in part because of the rotation policy point system.

Numerous unit leadership schools established in the Zone of the Interior (ZI) after the front stabilized in 1951 helped to improve combat NCO leadership deficiencies too.
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
10 Month Course
Selective Attendance
18-25 years service
Scope: Joint high level policy. Command and Staff functions. Strategic Planning.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE
10 Month Course
Selective Attendance
13-21 years service
Scope: Command and staff above field army and army high level policy.

COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE
10 Month Course
Selective attendance
8-15 years service
Scope: Commander and general staff from division to field army.

BRANCH SCHOOL
ADVANCED OFFICERS' COURSE
10 Month Course
Mandatory Attendance
5-12 years service
Scope: To include combined arms and functions of staffs.

BRANCH SCHOOL
COMPANY OFFICERS' COURSE
11 Month Course
Mandatory Attendance
2-5 years service
Scope: Company and battalion level.

Summary

General Joseph Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army visited the FEC during the autumn of 1949 and was satisfied overall with the Eighth Army's training program. In a report to the Secretary of the Army on his findings, General Collins said:

As a result of the reductions in strength of personnel . . . and because our troops were primarily engaged in occupation missions until recently, the troops of the Eighth Army are not now in fighting condition. However, they have recently been brought back up to strength, are making excellent progress with realistic field training and are planning exercises with close fighter-bomber support by the early spring of 1950. Given another six months the divisions I inspected should be in excellent shape. 66

This synopsized the army's impression of Eighth Army's status. Status reports sent to Department of the Army in May 1950 reported estimated training status's ranging from 65 percent to 84 percent proficiency and personnel strength for the four infantry divisions. 67


4Ibid., 1.

5Ibid., 2.

6Ibid., 4.

7Ibid., 5-10.

8Ibid., 5.

9Interview by author notes, 6 January 1993, with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Interview by author notes, 6 January 1993, with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Citizen training seemed strange to have as an individual program for a doctrinal manual. Some light was shed on why this subject was taught by Dr. Jack J. Gifford who was an enlisted soldier and prisoner of war during the Korean War. The typical age of soldiers during this time frame was 18 to 21 years. Many were high school drop outs and of the lower categories in intelligence tests. Many, in fact, had "chosen" the army as a form of alternative sentencing in civilian court.


Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 17-18.

Ibid., 21.

Ibid., 22.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid., 31-37.

Ibid., 28.

Ibid., 38.

Ibid., 39-44.

Ibid., 42.

Ibid., 45.

Ibid., 45.

Ibid., 45-46.

Ibid., 46-47.
30Ibid., 49.

31Ibid., 51-53.


34Russell F. Weigley, History Of The United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 1984, 501.


36Russell F. Weigley, History Of The United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 1984, 509.

37Interviewed by author notes, 6 January 1993, with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, K.S.


41Ibid., 54.

42Ibid., 54.

43Ibid., 55.


46Ibid., 57.


49Ibid., 54.


51Ibid., 273.


53Ibid., 149.


55Ibid., 54.

56Ibid., 58.

57Ibid., 59.

58Ibid., 59.

59Ibid., 56.


61Ibid., 188.


64Ibid., 191-192.


CHAPTER 3
TRAINING DURING THE WAR
JULY 1950 TO MAY 1951

Training is the cornerstone of success. It is a full-time job for commanders in peacetime, and it continues in wartime combat zones as well. On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they were trained in preceding days.¹

U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, 1986

On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or poorly as they are trained. Training to high standards is essential in both peace and war; never can the Army forces afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. Every commander, every soldier, every unit in a force-projection army must be trained and ready to deploy. Leaders have the responsibility to train subordinates. This may be their most solemn responsibility.²

U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, 1993

The United States military policy in 1950 seeks to provide security for our country and to support our national objectives of peace throughout the world . . . we must have greater defenses, providing more military power which can be applied wherever necessary. In addition we must produce the military means to solve the Korean situation.³

General Omar N. Bradley--
first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950

Introduction

What United States Army procedures captured lessons learned, training, and doctrine deficiencies in 1950? The Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces (OCAFF) followed much the
same lines as its predecessor Army Ground Forces (AGF) had done from 1943 to the end of World War II. The AGF had kept close tabs on battle performance through observer teams, interviews with unit commanders, and interviews with participants returning from overseas. The lessons learned were used to prepare guidance for commanders training new divisions and at the training centers. OCAFF used the techniques AGF had used, as well as: Training Memorandums (TM's), Training Bulletins (TB's); Combat notes; replacement unit training (in Japan); division in-country training (Korea); individual and unit periodicals; After Action Reports (AAR's); and by assigning combat veterans to training centers and mobilized National Guard units.

With this understanding of how the army went about improving its training deficiencies and combat readiness, this chapter looks at the period of July 1950 to May 1951. It surveys the infantry training by examining the initial problems in Korea and chronologically looking at the TM's, TB's, AAR's, military articles, and OCAFF/FEC observer reports. These will provide an effective measure to see what effects the battle reports made on selecting essential subjects for individual, unit and combined arms training.

Initial Problems

The North Korean early morning attack on 25 June 1950, committed the United States to kicking the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) out of South Korea and re-establishing the pre-invasion border in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. What was initially thought would be a short police action to show the American flag and prevent further aggression by the NKPA, evolved into a protracted war because the United States Army was not willing to possibly engage China in a full scale conventional war. It became a limited war with a limited purpose.
The first combat unit selected to stop the flow of NKPA and help the ROK was the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (the Gimlets), 24th Infantry Division, then on occupation duty in Japan. A task force was formed around the 1st Battalion. It became known as Task Force Smith after its battalion commander, LTC Charles B. Smith. The battalion was reinforced by the 75-mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon (two guns) from Company M and two mortar platoons from the Mortar Company of the regiment. It received officer, non commissioned officer and specialist fillers from the 3d Battalion and other regimental and divisional units to bring it up to strength. This last minute unit augmentation detrimentally impacted the unit combat readiness and effectiveness. There was a lack of small unit cohesiveness and teamwork when it engaged the NKPA.5

On 3 July 1950 TF Smith found itself sitting astride a road heading south into Osan, South Korea to stop the enemy tanks' onrush that was driving the South Koreans back on their heels. Inadequately trained and equipped, TF Smith was overrun and within weeks, the rest of the 24th Infantry Division was pushed back to the Pusan perimeter.

When the 1st Battalion and the rest of the Eighth Army deployed to Korea it was unable to fight in accordance with (IAW) its doctrine and TOE. "In truth, the poor performance of the 24th was more the result of inadequate preparation during the prewar years in Japan than any specific lapse on the battlefield."6 With each regiment having just two battalions instead of its authorized three battalions, the doctrinal defensive pattern with two battalions in line and one in the reserve were not possible. Units had trained expecting to have all three battalions in combat. It was near impossible to provide for their own flank and rear security and the onrushing NKPA did not allow United States forces any flexibility.

General of the Army MacArthur was well aware of the problem. He appealed to the Department of the Army on July 8th saying,
In order to provide balanced means for tactical maneuver, fire power, and sustained operations, it is urgently required that infantry divisions operating in this theater be immediately expanded to full war strength in personnel and equipment.\textsuperscript{7}

He repeated this request two days later. Additionally, he asked for completely manned and equipped battalion size units from the United States wherever possible. If they could not be sent fully trained and ready, then he wanted trained cadre followed up by filler replacements. Finally he asked that if Department of the Army could only send under-manned organized units first, he would fill them with FECOM personnel.

FECOM could not supply trained cadre for new units. FECOM had only 60% of the first three non-commissioned officer grades authorized for its units. Taking non-commissioned officer's from these units would seriously aggravate an already bad situation. MacArthur's demands seriously stripped the United States General Reserve, adversely affecting the combat readiness of the United States units, and hurting the mobilization base for the later Army Reserve buildup.\textsuperscript{8}

The primary considerations in the war's early months for selecting infantry units for Korea were early arrival and combat effectiveness.

Army authorities could have sent eleven cadres for new infantry battalions, but new battalions, even with full cadres and basic-trainee fillers needed six months to become combat ready. Only in the case of the 7th Division, still in Japan, were three battalion cadres substituted for ready-to-fight units.\textsuperscript{9}

Ultimately Department of the Army sent Far East Command two full battalions and three battalion cadres from the 14th RCT and the 5th RCT (three battalions) in Hawaii. Two battalions from the 29th RCT were also sent but, since they belonged to FECOM already, they did not drain the General Reserve. It is worth mentioning again that the United States primary military focus was still Europe and the General Reserve had an essential role. The United States training and mobilization base was reduced one-sixth and effectively took the 3d Infantry Division, 2d Armored
Division, and the 14th RCT off-line for combat deployment for twelve to fourteen months of rebuilding.\textsuperscript{10}

The need for front-line infantry soldiers was so bad in August, that General MacArthur eliminated the short intensive replacement training course that had just been established at Camp Drake, Japan on July 14th. The replacements arrived and stayed at Camp Drake only long enough to receive their individual equipment. They were not even given enough time to fire their individual weapons. As a result, many soldiers arrived in Korea without having even set their individual weapon battle sight zeroes.\textsuperscript{11}

In July and August 1950, these American soldiers arriving in the Pusan perimeter were physically unprepared for negotiating the hot, humid steep hills and ridges. The soldiers lacked physical discipline and road marching fitness. The terrain did not allow motorized and mechanized movement except on the roads. This allowed the infantry intensive NKPA to use the high ground putting the United States soldiers at a disadvantage by interdicting the UN forces. If the vehicles could not make it, the United States soldiers did not either. Lacking water discipline, the troops drank from paddies and ditches causing sickness, non-battle casualties, and reducing combat effectiveness.\textsuperscript{12} American soldiers had become unaccustomed to the combat hardships. The occupation duties focus before the Korean conflict and the attempt to make the army more acceptable to the civilian population had not allowed discipline and realistic hard combat training needed for combat.

The Far East Air Force (FEAF) took command of the air and the NKPA, who could not move during the day without taking severe losses, became adept at moving and attacking at night and during limited visibility.\textsuperscript{13} United States forces, on the other hand, were trained to fight during the day. It is assumed that with day visibility, their combined arms integration of close air support (CAS) was much more effective.
After the Eighth Army's arrival and consolidation within the Pusan perimeter, commanders were able to use the army tactical doctrine and organization they had trained for. Friendly units were now on each flank; the battlefield did not have large enemy units in the rear; logistics support stabilized, and units were filling up to strength permitting the formation of reserves. By late 1950, the United States divisions had built up to their full tables of organization.¹⁴

Training Changes In 1950

OCAFF published Training Bulletin #1 on 8 September 1950 based on observations made from 14 July to 13 August 1950. Its purpose "convey(ed) to the field, with the least practicable delay, the lessons learned as a result of operations in Korea." It was published, as required, to insure training personnel were up-to-date on Korean War combat experiences. OCAFF was responsible for overall army training and programs OCAFF was to, "revise training methods and programs, organization, and equipment where such changes are clearly indicated in special or general situations." These Training Bulletins (TB) sent the lessons learned without undue delay to armies, schools, training centers, and boards. OCAFF messages to the field were also used for matters of utmost urgency when timeliness was critical.¹⁵

Some observations reflected poorly on the combat units. Nevertheless, the TB lessons needed dissemination to unit commanders to assure stressing the essential subjects for training.¹⁶

Observation: "Like all green troops, they (United States combat forces) magnified the strength of the enemy and tended to become panicky and stampede when small hostile groups got in their rear." OCAFF felt that unquestioned leadership, realistic training including battle indoctrination, and discipline would overcome this. Later, OCAFF would stress all-around (perimeter) defense.

Observation: "In general the morale of the troops was fair considering the natural depression... expected of green troops engaged in defensive warfare and in retrograde movements. However there was a noticeable absence of combat aggressiveness in most infantry units." OCAFF attributed the morale to the piecemealing of troops to combat against an aggressive well-led and trained foe and units not conducting 'special preparatory training' for Korea. It again stressed effective leadership by all officers and non commissioned officers and by training
on the physical, psychological, and moral toughening of individuals to increase combat aggressiveness.

Observation: Infantry troops weren't aggressive in counterattacks. OCAFF asserted that a lack of confidence in training, weapons, and battle indoctrination courses were the causes. Training improvements were being worked on to improve this confidence.

Observation: Combat units committed to Korea had incomplete training especially on following orders in combat, in cover and concealment, maintaining signal communications, use of mines, and night operations. OCAFF blamed this on obstacles to training in theater and 'from time to time' in the Continental United States. However, with the (then) current circumstances, the obstacles were gone or in the process of disappearing.

Observation: Much of the training included non-essential subjects and combat realism training was lacking. OCAFF stated that it was reducing the nonessential classes in the troop information program, like character guidance and army traditions, to the bare minimum in order to allow more time and emphasis on combat subjects. It stated that the current AFF programs for emphasizing battle indoctrination were infiltration, combat-in-cities, close combat, and over-head artillery course.

Observation: Air-ground training lacked realism. OCAFF published a letter describing how to conduct close tactical air support training to improve this vital area.

Observation: Equipment was old, worn, marginally functional and continually broken. OCAFF attributed the equipment problem with the lack of properly trained personnel and maintenance.

Observation: Engineer training was bad. OCAFF stated it was a problem of not following doctrine.

Observation: "The carbine was universally condemned for infantry use. All ranks preferred the M-1 rifle, in spite of its additional weight ..." OCAFF was not convinced that the M-1 should be substituted throughout the army and asked for recommendations from the Infantry School, test boards and General Officers by 15 October 1950.

Observation: Infantry soldiers "were deficient in basic combat technique(sic) such as scouting and patrol, outposting, selection and preparation of firing positions for weapons, and small arms fire control." OCAFF sent a message to the field on 28 July 1950 directing all commanders to intensify basic and small unit training in these areas and include concealment and camouflage, techniques of fire, squad and platoon tactics, and night training.

Observation: Cross country movement and combined arms training needed work.

These observations drew an existing training picture of ineffectiveness. These were the essential subjects that needed training. OCAFF described the causes and solutions to correct
them. Leadership and training were identified as the primary solutions. Using these observations, let us look at how the infantry training changed. Identifying the improvements, changes in training, and the amount of time to affect these changes will provide additional insight.

The primary training document, in addition to FM 21-5, during the war's first months was Training Memorandum (TM) No. 1 (dated 9 August 1950). It went to all commanders down to battalion level and to the United States Marine Corps Commandant. It was a sizable document of 17 pages with annexes. The contents demonstrated numerous areas (already noted above) needing attention to improve the United States Army's combat units readiness. Additional TM's through TM #5 made changes that superseded small portions of TM #1. The TM series publication continued throughout the war and to get an idea of the training areas covered, the contents are listed in Figure 5.

Explaining some of these paragraphs is helpful in evaluating infantry training. The TM's 1 September effective date rescinded the 9 August 1949 TM No. 1,. Its stated purpose "enunciates the training policy of the Chief of the Army Field Forces and furnishes guidance for the accelerated and intensified training of individuals and units utilized by the army in the field .. ."17 This new TM #1 spelled out the training objectives, standards, and principles much more clearly than FM 21-5. These objectives and principles are reviewed in Figures 6 and 7.
<table>
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<th>Section I. General</th>
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<td>Purpose, Objectives, Standards of Training, Training Principles, Training Policy,</td>
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<td>Inspections</td>
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<td>Section II. Conduct of Training</td>
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<td>Training Doctrine, Cycle, Phases, Time, Program, Schools, Tests, progress Charts,</td>
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<td>Safety</td>
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<td>Section III. Special</td>
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<td>Physical and Mental Conditioning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle Indoctrination</td>
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<td>Combined Arms Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion Combat team Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidation of the Objective</td>
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<td>Night Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Mechanized Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Infiltration Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air-Ground Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training in Movement by Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cadre Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in Chemical, Biological, &amp; Radiological Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training in the use of Army Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Training Exercises and Maneuvers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of Unit Tactical Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of Aggressor, Maneuver Enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training in Overseas Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandatory Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength and Training Status Reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Training Memorandum #1 Contents, 9 August 1950. Source: Headquarters, DA, OCAF,
9 August 1950, 3-4.
Objectives:

The objectives to be attained in training are:

1. To prepare each soldier psychologically by instilling in his heart the spirit of the offensive accompanied by the will to kill a ruthless and savage enemy who adheres to no established rules of warfare and win over him on the battlefield despite any and all odds.

2. To train every male soldier to take his place in combat operations and to fight as an (I)nfantry (sic) soldier if the need arises.

3. To develop leadership and discipline as a prerequisite for training.

4. To develop and maintain units capable of operating effectively in the field, either at their currently authorized or table of organization strengths.

5. To conduct training as to facilitate rapid expansion to mobilization training.

6. To indoctrinate all individuals and units of the Army with the importance of effective cooperation with the Navy and the Air Force.

Figure 6. Training Objectives. Source: Training Memorandum #1, 9 August 1950.¹⁹

Training Principles:

The following well-established principles will be adhered to in the conduct of all training:

1. Training, as a function and responsibility of command, carries with it the necessity for close supervision and thorough inspection by all commanders.

2. Both leadership and unit teamwork are substantially fostered when the unit commander is held directly responsible for the conduct of the training in his unit.

3. The teamwork and morale of a unit are materially enhanced when its organizational integrity is maintained, whether undergoing training or performing administrative functions.

4. The basic skill of the individual and of small units is the foundation of the efficient performance of large units.

5. Maximum benefits accrue from training time when training schedules are carefully prepared and adhered to.

6. Maximum integration of training subjects by concurrent training gives each individual a better understanding of the practical application of his job and its relationship to the functions of his team and saves training time.

7. Combat exercises in the field enable units to test knowledge and techniques learned in garrison training and to develop teamwork.

8. Teamwork between the arms and services is promoted when their units participate together in combat exercises in the field.

9. A sound critique of each combat training exercise enhances the training value of each such exercise.

Figure 7. Training Principles. Source: Training Memorandum #1, 9 August 1950.²⁰
The standards of training stated:

Battle experience has proved the soundness of our tactical doctrine and has emphasized the importance of maintaining the highest standards of leadership, discipline, physical fitness, training, and maintenance. These standards must be achieved and maintained in all training.\textsuperscript{21}

With these TM #1 standards setting the stage, training policy reemphasized the FM 21-5 training program more clearly. Inspections by the Commanding Generals of the Continental Armies and Chiefs of Technical and Administrative services would continue as they deemed necessary to determine the effectiveness and training status of their commands.

The training cycle and phases were amended in TM #5 (25 September 1950). The amendments emphasized a more balanced and proportioned progression for essential training phases. Training cycle lengths would vary according to the army training programs used. This was a change from the original TM that set 36 weeks for all training cycles with specified times for each phase and separated by testing before moving to the next phase (see Figure 8). National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps units were subjected to the same programs upon entering active duty (with few exceptions). The boundaries between individual, unit, and combined training acted only as guides with the training being continuous and progressive. Standards, once achieved were maintained through concurrent training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Military Training</td>
<td>Advanced Military Training</td>
<td>Unit Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoctrination of individual without prior military service with common background of fundamental military knowledge</td>
<td>Individual, technical, and specialist training</td>
<td>Unit training Additional concurrent, individual, technical and specialist as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Training Cycle and Phases.\textsuperscript{22}
The average training week increased to 44 hours not including field exercises, range firing, fatigue duties, and special occasions or ceremonies. Available Army Training Programs (ATPs), Army Forces Training Programs (AFF TP's), and Army Mobilization Training Programs (MTP's) formed the base for training programs and schedules (This was a reiteration of FM 21-5).

The training tests provided the means to evaluate the various units and individual training, insure uniformity of training, determine the adequacy of training, and adjust training to meet the standards. However, the available AFF training tests were primarily oriented on measurable, easily quantifiable areas such as weapons qualifications. An extract of available infantry related training tests demonstrates this in Figure 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFF TT</th>
<th>AFF TRAINING TESTS</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>Rifle Squad Firing</td>
<td>27 Sep 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon &amp; 57-mm Rifle Squad Combat Firing</td>
<td>27 Sep 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3</td>
<td>60-mm Mortar Section Combat Firing</td>
<td>27 Sep 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>Heavy Mortar Platoon Combat firing</td>
<td>1 Jul 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-12</td>
<td>Reinforced Infantry Battalion combat Firing</td>
<td>30 Sep 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>Basic Medical Subjects</td>
<td>undated (1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-1</td>
<td>Physical Fitness Test</td>
<td>15 Jul 1948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Army Field Forces Training Tests.

In exercising these tests and training, safety without sacrificing realism was a stated necessity. Proper supervision, inspections, and common sense would prevent accidents. Section III (Special) of TM #5 covered areas specifically related to lessons learned (or relearned) during the past month of fighting in Korea and during World War II. These areas easily broke into the FM 21-5 organization for training phases of individual, unit and combined arms training. OCAF F further defined some sub-elements of these in their stateside training cycle phases that were (1)
basic military training; (2) advanced individual training; (3) unit training; (4) combined arms
training, and (5) field exercises and maneuvers. It should be remembered that in both FM 21-5 and
TM #5 these phases overlapped. Sustainment training would continue throughout the different
phases. Phases provided training schedule and resource allocation focus.

The first individual training area mentioned was physical and mental conditioning. It
emphasized discipline and conditioning through realistic combat training. Continuous physical
training included road marches, cross-country marches and obstacle courses to harden soldiers.
FM 21-5 had emphasized organized athletics but not the combat related physical training.

The second individual training area was soldier hardening through battle indoctrination
required for all male soldiers in the field.

Four courses reinstated from World War II training were the (1) Infiltration, (2) Overhead
Artillery, (3) Close Combat and (4) Combat-In-Cities Courses. The infiltration course exposed the
soldiers to the sounds, sights, and sensations of close machine gun fire going overhead as they
advanced as part of a fire team. Overhead Artillery Fire Courses indoctrinated soldiers to "the
purpose, sound and sensations of overhead artillery fire while moving thereunder"24.

In Close Combat Courses, all combat arms and combat support soldiers would learn how
small fire teams mutually support each other maneuvering against the enemy using "initiative and
speed" which in turn would develop individual self-confidence and confidence in their weapons and
teammates. Combat arms and combat support soldiers would also train to fight in villages and
cities and learn how to clear streets and buildings using flame throwers, hand grenades and quick
firing techniques.

Unit and combined arms training guidance provided the rest of TM #1s message to
commanders. Like the guidance given for individual training, each paragraph stressed the need for
training in the respective areas and what should be accomplished. Lessons learned from World War II, in addition to the current conflict, were used to justify the training subjects. Numerous specialized paragraphs, such as night training, defense training, anti-mechanized training and anti-infiltration stressed the same things.

TM #6, dated 24 October 1950, superseded the Troop Information and Education guidance then under revision. As discussed previously, this program focused on such things as citizenship building and not on combat related subjects. The revisions in figure 10, show the subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hr's</th>
<th>Instruction Presented</th>
<th>Essential Study References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Troop Information 6 Week Program</td>
<td>The Soldier's Mission--Basic Tng Talk; World Communism; Life under Communism; American Way of Life; Korea; The Soldier &amp; his Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adaptation and Group Living</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Employment of The Armed Forces</td>
<td>The Army in Combat; The Armed Forces as a Combat Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The 14 week program added the following subjects references to Troop Information for a total of 14 hours</td>
<td>Communism in the United States.; World Hot Spots; Our greatest asset- The People; American Democracy and the Individual; Europe; Defense against Communism; The Price of Freedom; Keeping Informed;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. Basic Troop Information Program. Source: TM #6, 24 Oct 50.²⁵

In the November 1950 issue of Military Review the army published a short article in its "Military Notes around the World" section. It stated an important (my emphasis) change to basic training. It was intensifying its basic training "with realistic combat exercises--including the use of live ammunition."²⁶ These had been banned since World War II because of costs and accidents, but experience showed accidents were minimal. Trainees would once again crawl under barbed wire with machine gun fire going overhead. The lives saved in combat outweighed the hazards and was "imperative" to prepare the soldiers psychologically for combat.²⁷ This wasn't a new lesson
learned. During World War II, Army Ground Forces (AGF) had found a major weakness in infantry training—combat firing—that had hobbled the soldiers' combat effectiveness. They had corrected this problem by the later stages of the war.28

On 19-20 December 1950, OCAFF held a conference on Individual Testing and Evaluation Procedures for Individual Training. At this conference were representatives from Department of the Army Staff, OCAFF, the CONUS Armies, the training divisions, and training groups. This conference's purpose was to help standardize the individual training phase common to all branches and exchange ideas. Its emphasized the end of training testing. The conference findings were:29

A test is not a substitute for good instruction.

Performance tests are best for weapons and material. In training divisions the performance test is best given at the end of the 6-week and end of the 14-week training (for longer courses).

Test failures should be boarded and retested to determine whether to keep the soldier at the training site, "ship" him with his unit, or discharge him.

Standardized MOS performance tests prepared by Technical and Administrative (T&A) Services and OCAFF (using the different examples offered from the conferees) would become the standard.

Instruction itself should be tested.

Getting sufficient testing personnel for conducting the tests needed further examination.

Training Changes in 1951

The United Nations forces met many successes and setbacks in the war's first months from the successful breakout north from the Pusan Perimeter and Inchon Landings in September 1950 to the December retreat from the Yalu. Compounding the situation was the death of the Eighth United States Army Commander, General Walker on December 23d. This brought in a new dynamic commander by the name of General Matthew Ridgway. Having come from the Department of the Army, he spent the first few days assessing his new command. One thing he
verified was the low morale, improper training, and combat execution already identified by OCAFF.

Continual training program refinements brought more changes in the 31 January 1951 OCAFF TM #1, such as increasing training week to 48 hours in a 5 1/2 day week (with a continued focus on combat essential subjects). This TM incorporated the previous 1950 TMs mentioned above. It also added a few essential subjects to train on. Figure 11 shows the additional subjects and guidance changes covered in this TM.

One TM objective amplified the 1950 TM for training soldiers.\(^{30}\)

To train every able-bodied male soldier except those ordered into the active military service under Selective service and classified as 1-A-O to take his place in combat as an infantryman: to fight as a member of a rifle squad when the need arises; and, using his personal resources of weapons, initiative, and courage, to withstand successfully the tremendous pressure imposed upon him by enemy infiltration tactics, guerrilla operation, and unorthodox methods operations and to fight as an Infantry soldier if the need arises.

Required training inspections were increased with battalion size forces being inspected at least once a year, training divisions and centers at least twice a year, and the army colleges and service schools once a year. Increased inspections were intended to improve the training effectiveness, uniformity, and operational readiness of units and the suitability of OCAFF policies.

Commanding Generals, on behalf of Chief Army Field Forces (AFF), were now specifically required to inspect and review individual and unit training. ATP's and ATT's revised to reflect a stronger focus on combat related skills and testing standardization by OCAFF.

In February 1951, General Mark W. Clark, chief of AFF, went to Korea to get a first hand view on what was needed to help improve recruit training. He emphasized the need for increasing night and inclement weather training.\(^{31}\) This visit helped speed up these training deficiencies incorporation in the training program and cycles noted previously for basic, AIT and unit training.
Section II. Conduct of Training

Training Time, Training Program, Responsibilities and Training Inspections, Tests,
Section III. Special & Section IV. Miscellaneous

Defensive operations
Hasty field fortifications
Obstacles
Camouflage
Tank-killer training
Counter-infiltration training
Counter-guerrilla training
Security
Training in off-road movement
Infantry-tank cooperation
Maintenance, Supply procedures, and supply economy
Army-wide and Joint exercises & Maneuvers
Signal communications
Psychological Warfare Orientation
Preparation of local field exercises and CPX
First aid and Cold Weather Clothing

Figure 11. Changes to TM Contents from 1950 to 1951. Source: Training Memorandum #1
Contents, 31 January 1951.32

The 1951 post-cycle training program was published in TM #2, 17 February 1951. It
enunciated OCAFF's guidance for post-individual training and units after completion of
mobilization. It delineated required versus suggested training noted in TM #1 of January 31, 1951.
The required subjects were: retraining; instructor training; cadre training; use of schools; troop
information and education; maintenance, supply procedures and supply economy; Preparation for
Movement (POM) training; air-ground and air-movement training; Army-wide and Joint exercises;
physical conditioning; tactical training for artillery and service type units; and night operations.
The other subjects mentioned in the previous TM's from 1950 and 1951 were labeled as suggested
or strongly emphasized for respective commanders to incorporate. The hours devoted to the
required and suggested training were left to the major commanders' discretion.

TM #3, 13 March 1951, primarily focused on observations from Korea. It stated, again,
that the basic training doctrine and techniques were sound but serious deficiencies still existed
resulting in high casualty numbers. Deficiencies not already covered above needing work were: to continue improving junior leadership by increasing the junior leader responsibilities; to enforce troop discipline; to improve hand signals use; to use bayonet training and gain the psychological advantage over the enemy; to continue improvement on day and night patrolling "to standards"; to conduct more road discipline to overcome the congestion of the few MSR's serving the front lines; to practice camouflage and dispersion of men, equipment and material to eliminate being such easy targets; and the need for proper weapons maintenance (poor maintenance had caused unnecessary casualties).

OCAFF published Training Bulletin #1, 12 March 1951, with the express intent of distributing it to company level throughout the army, along with all future issues. It went into G2 and G3 fields addressing matters relevant to company level leaders. G2 intelligence summaries detailed NKPA tactics on infantry, armored, and artillery operations to include ruses and ambushes.

The G3 extracts came from reports and sources in Korea. Many areas referenced unit and combined arms subjects such as: United States artillery operational procedures practiced in Korea; United States defenses against hostile infiltration of field artillery positions; and United States naval gunfire support.

TB #1 included a December 1950 letter from a former Infantry School instructor. It related his experiences against the Chinese and lessons learned about Chinese and American fighting men. OCAFF provided United States deficiency countermeasures to train and practice in combat. They reinforced close combat and bayonet training, better patrolling, better use of battlefield illumination, prearranged artillery fires, better night training and 'Kill(ing) by fire.' In summary they reinforced areas that infantrymen continued to need training in.\(^\text{33}\)

TB #2, 11 April 1951, took on a new flavor for its audience. It became a vehicle for disseminating "combat information." It had this critical observation.
As Originally conceived, this publication (TB) was to be the vehicle of "lessons learned" in Korea. Actually, the fighting in Korea has provided few items that could be so described. The mass of material from Korea reaffirms the soundness of United States doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, and equipment. The one great lesson . . . is that these must be applied with vigor, imagination, and intelligence to the situations encountered there . . . as illustrative anecdotes in the lectures, talks and discussions of trainers . . . For every weakness reported against some small part of our troops, there is somewhere in our training literature a guide for its correction; for every strength reported for the enemy, an indicated countermeasure is already provided . . . 34

Most, if not all, of the lessons that the army had learned by this time were reflected lessons learned but not incorporated from World War II. Partly responsible were the severe post-World War II budget cutbacks and demobilization mentioned earlier.

Even though the TM's and TB's provided substantial guidance and Army policies, this was not a change to doctrine. FM 21-5 had made the point that these publications would provide the more current field army policies and guidance.

In addition, the TB lessons on the tanks and infantry combined use reinforced not having infantrymen getting caught on tanks when under fire; insuring that subordinates had adequate planning, coordination, and reconnaissance time; and that alternate communication means were needed when working together. TM #6, 23 May 1951, gave the guidance and standards for this infantry-tank training.35

Though there were continuing training program refinements and modifications, the doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, and equipment basics were solid. Like any organization, continual refinements, when needed, are essential for success. Some units, such as the 5th Cavalry Regiment, incorporated three to five day unit battle indoctrination courses to overcome the loss of soldier perishable skills and lessons learned in Korea. However, this was not being done throughout the Korean combat units. This was one failure in the system--the lack of uniform training programs within Eighth Army combat units.

United States Corps memorandums and observer reports from March to May 1951 were in TB #3, 17 July 1951. The TB provided valuable information on CCF tactics, doctrine, and procedures to better prepare United States soldiers. United States operations combat examples
reinforced lessons on task organization, prior planning and preparation, and communications mentioned in earlier TB's.\textsuperscript{36}

TB #4, 11 August 1951, included an extract from a EUSAK Memorandum in May 1951 on tactical observations by the new Eighth Army Commanding General, General Van Fleet. His comments on a recent offensive relevant to leadership and infantry training were.\textsuperscript{37}

The need for available supporting weapons immediate use by commanders to gain fire superiority.

The lack of commanders' initiative to develop the combat situation. Instead, they let adjacent units develop the situation .

A continuing tendency to overload infantrymen with other than "fighting" combat equipment.

Also included in this Training Bulletin were combat veterans' hints such as using empty C-ration cans for early warning devices; new soldiers disciplining themselves to always keep their weapons close since many soldiers had been captured by enemy infiltrators; and the importance of vehicle maintenance by drivers.

**Summary**

This Chinese evaluation, in the CCF intervention early months, of the American foot soldier is quoted from On Infantry, by John A. English,

Their infantrymen are weak, afraid to die, and haven't the courage to attack or defend. They depend on their planes, tanks, and artillery. At the same time, they are afraid of our fire power. They will cringe when fired on the advance, they hear firing. They are afraid to advance further . . . . They specialize in day fighting. They are not familiar with night fighting or hand to hand combat . . . . If defeated, they have no orderly formation. Without the use of their mortars, they become completely lost . . . . they become dazed and completely demoralized . . . . they are afraid when the rear is cut off. When transportation comes to a standstill the infantry loses the will to fight.\textsuperscript{38}

The training program modifications discussed focused on changing this perception. In 10 months (July 1950 to May 1951), the United States Army underwent a large remobilization from a 560,000 soldier total to 1,000,000.\textsuperscript{39} It survived a major retrograde to the Pusan Perimeter, established a defense, conducted a classic envelopment at Inchon to cut off the NKPA LOCs,
attempted to reunite Korea by attacking north to the Yalu, been badly mauled by the intervention of
the CCF, retreated with what became known as "bug-out fever," and established a coherent defense
in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel along what became known as the "Kansas Line." This set the
stage for the future armistice negotiations at the end of June 1951.

The individual, unit and combined arms training emphasis throughout this period was quite
apparent. Essential subjects had been identified. Emphasis in training and resources, to include
LFX's and realistic combat training courses had been provided. Eliminating non-essential subjects
had become the primary focus in preparing and administering training in both the United States and
in theater. This was notwithstanding the stated higher national interests of European and Global
security first and Korea second.

Continuing infantry training problems were identified. These included training effective
leaders, improving the individual front line replacement and filler problems, training ammunition
shortages that cut back on the battle indoctrination courses and type units that could train in them,
 Improved realistic combat training, mobilizing, and training the stateside units to meet the global
requirements.

With the large reshuffling of incompetent and/or physically unfit leaders out of theater in
1951, there was a large influx of or key leader promotions of leaders who believed in an aggressive
offensive spirit, initiative, and realistic combat training. This was helped, in part, by shortening
CGSOC one month to provide the additional competent leaders needed in Korea. Finally, the
American soldier and combat units were starting to show some of their old competence and
confidence.

Training replacements and individual fillers to combat standards and getting trained and
qualified non commissioned officers and officers to the units was a continuing problem. The
average soldier's education was still below fourth grade completion and emphasis was still needed
on education programs. One of the lessons learned from World War II had been that an educated
soldier was a better trained soldier.
Obviously, the United States infantryman still had a way to go to become a more effective soldier. Training doctrine, the newly arrived equipment, and tactical doctrine were not the problem according to the regimental and higher leaders in the army. The problem was in the planning, preparation and execution of training.

Like any organization, continual refinements, when needed, are essential for success. As mentioned earlier, some units, had incorporated three to five day unit battle indoctrination courses to overcome soldier perishable skills loss and teach lessons learned in Korea. However, this was still not being done throughout the combat units in Korea. This was failure in the system—the lack of uniform training programs within the Eighth Army combat units. This chapter’s observations and numerous military periodicals help reinforce this.

T. R. Fehrenbach writes about the army infantrymen on or about Thanksgiving, 1950,

In ninety days all the faults of the American Army had not been corrected—there were still men in the ranks who were poorly trained, and replacements who had no stomach for Korea, north or south. The old men had learned, the hard way, but many of the older men were gone. . . the pool from which replacement came was the same as that which had furnished the first men into Korea. Because the fighting had lessened in the last few weeks, because all believed the war was ending, the hard-won discipline in the ranks had lessened too. Men discarded their helmets, because they were heavy and awkward over their pile caps. Disdaining their use, most men of the 9th Infantry tossed aside their bayonets. Few carried grenades, or much ammunition. There were few entrenching tools, and not much food, because in these goddamn hills, man, you had to go light.43

Whatever its skill or courage, it cannot be argued that the United States Army still suffered (in December 1950) from deficiencies in discipline and training. A "fair weather" attitude cannot be wiped out in a day. It was not until the Korean War was many months old that the new army trainees began to live half their time in the field, and undergo a third of their training by night.44

In a training memo from Lieutenant General F.W. Milburn, Commander, I Corps to the CG, AFF, dated 20 February 1951, some specific issues were addressed. A major contributing factor to success was combat discipline that he felt was overlooked in training and could be overcome through better training, "effective leadership, and battle indoctrination." Some steps recommended to help overcome these deficiencies were: increased night training against CCF type
Opposing Force (OPFOR) to include the mass attacks, noises and sounds; night perimeter defense and offensive tactics; hot and cold weather training; focus on all soldiers training to be infantrymen first, use of the bayonet; and dispersion in movement and in the defense. Again, these areas were being addressed, but training execution was scattered within the ZI and AFF.

1Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, 1986, 6.

2Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 1-5.


6Ibid., 266.


8Ibid., 89-90.

9Ibid., 90.

10Ibid., 90.


12T. R. Fehrenbach, 150.

13Ibid., 150.

15 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OCAFF, Training Bulletin No. 1. (Fort Monroe, VA), 8 September 1950, 2.

16 Ibid., 7-18.

17 Ibid.

18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 1, (Fort Monroe, VA), 9 August 1950, 3-4. found in OCAFF, 31st and 47th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 28-29 December 1950, Tab 5.

19 Ibid., 2-3.

20 Ibid., 3.

21 Ibid., 3.


24 Ibid., Tab 5, 9.


27 Ibid., 64.


30 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 1. (Fort Monroe, VA), 31 January 1951, Inclosure 2. found in OCAFF, 37th and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951, Tab E.


32 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 1. (Fort Monroe, VA), 31 January 1951, 1-2. found in OCAFF, 37th and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951, Tab E.

33 Headquarters, Department of the Army OCAFF, Training Bulletin No. 1, 12 March 1951, 5-12.

34 Headquarters, Department of The Army, OCAFF, Training Bulletin No. 2. (Fort Monroe, VA), 11 April 1951, 1.

35 Headquarters, Department of the Army, OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 6. (Fort Monroe, VA), 31 23 May 1951, Inclosure 2. found in OCAFF, 37th and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951, Tab E.

36 Headquarters, Department of The Army, OCAFF, Training Bulletin No. 3. (Fort Monroe, VA), 17 July 1951, 1-17.

37 EUSAK Memorandum, (May 1951) cited in Headquarters, Department of The Army, OCAFF, Training Bulletin No. 4, (Fort Monroe, VA), 11 August 1951.


39 Headquarters, Department of the Army Statistical & Accounting Branch, ASD, TAGO, 27 Jan 54, Estimated Number of US Army Personnel who entered on Active Duty From Civil Life and who Served On Active Duty during the Period of Korean Hostilities.

40 Clay Blair, 80-587.


42 Interview by author notes on 6 January 1993 with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


44 Ibid., 317.
CHAPTER 4
TRAINING DURING THE WAR
JUNE 1951 TO JULY 1953

It is admittedly terrible to force men to suffer during training, or even sometimes, through accident, to kill them. But there is no other way to prepare them for the immensely greater horror of combat . . . Except in holy wars, or in defense of their native soil, men fight well only because of pride and training.¹

T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

Introduction

On 11 April 1951, President Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Far East Command and General Ridgway, Commander of the Eighth Army, succeeded him. General Matthew Ridgeway had successfully instilled an aggressive senior leadership command climate that had pushed the CCF and NKPA forces back up the Korean Peninsula north of Seoul and in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel along what was known as the Kansas Line.² In his place General James Van Fleet assumed command of all the UN forces. General Van Fleet came from the CONUS command of the 2d (paper) Army. This was after his highly successful tour as Commander of the Military Mission to Greece fighting the communist insurgency of 1948-1949.

General Van Fleet inherited an army that was finding its confidence and offensive spirit. Much of the Eighth Army's senior leadership had been rotated home by General Ridgeway in his efforts to reinvigorate the Eighth Army. OCAFF had provided replacements and fillers to bring the units up to the 80 to 85 percent fill in infantrymen. Within two weeks after Van Fleet assumed
command, the Chinese-North Korean 5th Phase Offensive kicked off (first effort—22-30 April; Second effort 16-22 May 1951). The Eighth Army defended Seoul successfully, but the UN line was pushed back northeast of Seoul along the Han River. This was reversed with the UN counterattack and counteroffensive during which United States and ROK infantrymen regained the Kansas Line by 30 May 1951. T.R. Fehrenbach suggested that,

For all practical purposes the Korean War ended 30 June 1951, when United Nations Supreme Commander Matthew Ridgway radioed his willingness to discuss truce terms with the Communist forces to end the conflict.\(^3\)

By 1 July 1951, the battle lines had pretty much stabilized along the armistice line (also known as the Wyoming Line).

In November 1951, the United Nations and the North Koreans agreed to a demarcation line for the armistice then currently being negotiated. After this agreement there was little opportunity for the United States to conduct maneuver attacks. The war became primarily a static war of positional defense. In many ways some have suggested that this phase compared to World War I trench warfare. The United States forces however, were stretched thinly along strong points on the high ground.\(^4\) Increasingly bothersome guerrilla operations, especially in the mountainous areas on the eastern side of the peninsula, continually hampered rear area operations. With the exception of some small UN offensive operations to straighten out the armistice line, secure more defensible terrain, and destroy the guerrilla rear area threat, this line did not change much and, on 27 July 1953, became the cease-fire line which is still in place today.

This chapter will continue as in Chapter 3 by surveying continuing combat infantry unit problems, and chronologically look at the available literature. This literature continues to provide us an effective gauge to see changes made in selecting subjects for individual, unit, and combined arms training and its preparation, administration, and effectiveness.
Continuing Problems

There were continuing problems in three major areas during the rest of the war. They were replacements and fillers for the combat units, the rotation policy, and finally leadership.

To fill the demand for replacements and fillers of combat units, Congress passed the Universal Military Training and Service Act in June 1951 that extended the draft. This helped the undermanned training divisions and service schools by augmenting them with recalled soldiers, national guardsmen, and reservists. Although training and standards were improving, these augmentees received inadequate entry training. Many of these soldiers brought back on active duty, reverted to their World War II experiences. Though this was better then having no experience at all, the previous war's experiences needed adaptation to a different army and environment. Some training units felt very lucky if they had a cadre core of regular army soldiers to start with. By the beginning of 1951, there was a push to fill these training units with Korean War combat experienced soldiers to overcome this problem.

By late 1952 and 1953, most recalled reservists, along with the 40th and the 45th NG Divisions, had rotated back home. The massive vacuum cleaner that had sucked up these thousands of soldiers early in the war had been undiscriminating. It had conscripted up college students, teachers, and men from all parts of American society. Now however, many joined other services to avoid the infantry. Others still, had been able to get school exemptions or become parents thus disqualifying them from service. With the war becoming more and more unpopular at home, the young draftees being brought into the infantry were the ones who could not get out of the commitment and quality suffered. For example in May 1952,

of over 5,000 soldiers entering the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas slightly over half had Army General Classification Test Scores of 80 or under—by Army standards unfit for training at any Army school, including cooks and bakers.

These soldiers did prove that they could fight and fight well, with good training. It just took better training to achieve the same effect than for soldiers with higher scores.
The rotation system implemented was an attempt to alleviate problems that resulted from an unbalanced mobilization system. The old system had placed an undue burden on recalled units because of their geographic location. Deferments, exemptions, and various disabilities had helped the more affluent avoid service.

This system was implemented in September 1951, when the war looked like it could last for an undetermined time. Under this rotation plan, individuals drafted or called to active duty from the Army Reserve and National Guard would rotate to Korea for a short period of time (based on a point system discussed below), then back to units not in combat and eventually out of the active army and into the Reserve Pool. Many of the military leaders in Korea had asked for this rotation system since early in 1951. COL S.L.A. Marshall reinforced this endorsement in his Notes on Combat in Korea in April 1951.9 A point system was used to implement this program. Though the points earned were adjusted a few times during the last year and one half of the war, it worked like this.

A soldier who had earned 36 points rotated out of Korea. A man received four points a month for service in the battle line, three a month for service anywhere in the combat zone, and two a month anywhere in Korea. By rotation the Army . . . distributed the burden of Korean Service . . . built a steadily growing pool of manpower that not only was trained but possessed combat experience. This pool would be invaluable if the Communists would provoke a larger war.10

This system allowed the combat experienced officers and NCO unit staffs to stay in place by not rotating whole units back to the states. However, the disadvantage was the negative impact on the training efficiency and combat readiness. With the increased rotation of personnel based on points, when soldiers were becoming well trained experienced soldiers and leaders, it was time for them to rotate out.11

A young soldier would arrive in a line unit, such as the 5th Cavalry Regiment, and go through a five to nine day indoctrination course. At four points a month, he would have reached 36 points making him eligible for rotation in nine months. (In 1952 and 53, it was usually about 6 months when soldiers became eligible. Commanders were required to meet a minimum 85 percent
manning level. This necessitated keeping some soldiers longer.) When soldiers were getting close to their rotation off the line, they lost their combat effectiveness.

This problem lasted until the war's end with continuing debate as to the policy's wisdom within combat units and leaders. In the opinion of LTG (retired) David E. Grange, Jr., it was great morale booster for the combat arms but depended on the unit leadership as to the effects on unit cohesiveness, training, and effectiveness. In 1952, the points needed to rotate out of Korea were increased. Manning problems continued in the combat units until the signing of the armistice.

Probably most important was the need for quality leadership. Without good leaders at the squad level and above, it did not matter what was tried to improve training and combat effectiveness. Leadership was key to insuring that training and combat were properly planned, coordinated, and executed. Additionally, the personnel replacement system very often had officers that served shorter combat tours than their men.

With the leadership replacement dilemma in the beginning of 1951, recalled reservists filled junior officer vacancies within the combat divisions. Many were overaged lieutenants in their thirties and captains in their forties. Most had not been in uniform since World War II. By late 1952, many of these reservists had served their 17 months and were rotating home. To help alleviate this problem, Officer Candidate School (OCS) course sizes greatly expanded in 1951. Essential tasks identified from World War II and Korea were incorporated. This extended the course length while still eliminating many non-combat tasks. It took six to eight months however, to get these new second lieutenants into combat units in Korea. These new officers started showing up during the spring of 1951.

To help improve leadership shortages, the Army conducted a staff study in FECOM and Korea between April and July 1951 to help identify and select good combat leaders. It was felt that a better identification and selection process could help reduce or eliminate the high number of incompetent leaders senior officers had observed. NCOs interviewed had little difficulty indicating effective infantrymen—"combat quickly distinguishes the good from the poor." Experimental
testing did not identify the outstanding infantrymen but did identify the soldiers lacking the effective infantrymen 'aptitude.' Officers generally agreed that effective combat area NCOs identified were good. Selection techniques for these NCOs differed among the various officers and commanders interviewed. However all agreed that the NCOs must be given increased responsibilities and be observed in stress situations.¹⁴

To help illustrate the efforts at improving infantry officer and NCO leadership many courses, in addition to OCS, were started or expanded. The Infantry School (TIS) Quarterly (July 1951) stated:

With the Korean War now many months old, The Infantry School has not yet swung into high gear but it has stepped up its activities enormously and is prepared to go all out whenever it receives the word to do so. Student enrollment has more than tripled during the last several months; and Infantry OCS is again in operation; sound ranging, I&R and Operation Chiefs courses have been added; and most of the new training publications have been distributed. The School has met all its commitments thus far and stands ready for what may come.¹⁵

The Infantry School at Fort Benning published in its Infantry School Quarterly (July 1951) the following list of courses it was teaching to improve the leadership problem:

For Officers:

Officer Advanced Course (30 weeks) provides advanced infantry training to insure that the officers are thoroughly grounded in the duties and responsibilities appropriate to a field grade officer.
Associate Advanced Course (a 15-week condensed course) primarily for officers from the guard and reserve.
Associate Infantry Company Officer’s Course (15 weeks) to produce company grade officers well-grounded in the fundamental and techniques needed to become company commanders.
Motor Transportation Course (10 week course) to training company grade officers and warrant officers as maintenance and transport officers in a regiment.
Field Grade Refresher Course (4 weeks).
Company Officer’s Refresher Course (4 weeks).

Enlisted Men Courses:

Officer Candidate Course (22 weeks).
Light and Heavy Weapons Infantry Leader Course (14 weeks).
Intelligence and Reconnaissance and Operations Chiefs Course (11 weeks).
Unit Automotive Supervision Course (10 weeks).
Infantry Enlisted Communication Course (17 weeks).
Infantry Sound Ranging Course (5 weeks).
Infantry Radio Maintenance Course (18 weeks).

For Officer's and Enlisted Men:

Airborne Course (3 weeks).
Pathfinder Course (5 weeks).
Twenty-four individual weapons courses. 16

To develop and execute so many leadership courses within a year shows some positive training system trends within the army. However, the problems with replacements, fillers, the rotation policy, and leadership were to continue throughout the war as documented throughout this study.

Continued Training Changes in 1951

In a staff study conducted between April and July 1951, fifty seven Korea combat veterans of all grades identified the most valuable training they had received for combat as: weapons training and small unit training (more intensive and longer training was recommended); physical training (comments suggested it took two to four weeks before replacements could keep up in the combat zone—many casualties resulted from poor physical conditioning); replacement soldier training was adequate but needed more emphasis on its importance (See figure 12). These veterans were also asked what they had learned in combat that should have been learned in training. Their summarized answers were: greater knowledge and uses of all types of infantry weapon systems; how to maneuver in small groups; and to stress the objective of training that is "to kill" because many replacements felt that training was a game and were shocked by the reality of combat. 17

Depending on the training stations and MOS, training increased to 16 weeks by October 1951. This gave soldiers more practice in combat skills, individual weapons and physical conditioning. 18 Normally it was divided into basic and advanced individual training.
In addition to the above study, combat information was continually passed to all companies and above in the Army by using the TB's with the focus on the G2 and G3 fields. Enemy tactics were continually brought up to prepare combat soldiers better for combat. Continued lessons learned on the employment of infantry with tanks, artillery, and engineers reinforced the techniques that were working in the field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by 57 interviewees in Korea</th>
<th>Training judged most valuable in combat</th>
<th>Knowledge acquired that should have been learned in training</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge of Weapons and Tactics:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Use and care of all types of infantry weapons</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>How to maneuver in small groups</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>How to maintain effective fire</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of compass and map reading</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Familiarity with combat</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>How to climb hills</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Night operations</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Orientation on enemy tactics</td>
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<td><strong>How to care for oneself in combat:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>How to dig in and take cover</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Physical conditioning</td>
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<td>Personal hygiene</td>
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<td>Supply discipline</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Habits important for combat effectiveness:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and military courtesy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alertness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. Training Judged most valuable and should have been learned in training.¹⁹

TM #8, 29 Aug 1951 superseded the 1951 TM #1 guidance for training tests. Units would have at least 85 percent of their personnel available for duty for the individual and unit tests. Units failing this were required to submit reports immediately to OCAFF in order to take appropriate action.²⁰ Though "appropriate action" isn't explained, it is assumed to mean that
commanders understood the importance of getting their soldiers and units tested and to eliminate obstacles to training.

The increasing guerrilla actions in the rear areas induced OCAFF's reemphasis on counter-infiltration and counter-guerrilla training for post cycle training in September 1951. Defense against airborne attack was emphasized during training cycle training and post cycle (unit) training. These subjects applied to all units, and not just combat line units. ATPs had their Basic Troop Information Program subjects updated with the subjects of "Europe" and "More Sweat and less Tears" for their ninth through sixteenth week of AIT. The latter subject focused on better and harder training to prepare for combat.

TB #6, 18 October 1951 included more Korean combat commanders' comments. This resulted in officers being required to supervise the actual foot bathing and massaging in training and combat that, in turn, dramatically reduced the cold weather injuries.

Reconnaissance and aggressive patrolling continued to need work. Company commanders and platoon leaders were continuing to lead squads instead of controlling their companies. This demonstrated that NCO development and soldier discipline were still unit problems. Enemy guerrilla operations demanded gaining and maintaining contact to bring firepower to bear and defeat them. All around security was a necessity. Units needed continued work on communications (when wire was laid, there was a tendency to close the FM communication net, leaving no redundant communications if the wire was cut). Fire and maneuver training was needed even for two and three man groups.

Even though OCAFF and other senior leaders had required tank-infantry training for the last year, some comments from a tank company commander brought out the lack of armor infantry training in-country,

Infantry must train with armor. They don't know that there is a way to talk to the tank commander through the external inter-phone. They will not stay clear of the tank on the offensive and by bunching around the tank they restrict its movement. More important, when the tank hits a mine, the flying suspension and track can be more dangerous than the enemy.
When crossing a river, riflemen were all around the tank on the sandy beach. They wouldn't spread out and dig-in for protection, but would crawl under the tank. We ran over some because when the fire was heavy we would pull our heads in and could not see them get under the tank. When their officers tried to tell us about targets to fire at, they would hold down on the butterfly switch on the external phone and then wonder why we didn't answer them. There is no system for working infantry and tanks, no teams formed, and no thought given to use of tanks until the situation developed. Then there wasn't sufficient time to brief platoon leaders, let alone company commanders. There is a complete lack of understanding as to the fine communications the infantry commander had available through the tank company and Platoons.24

These comments demonstrated that in-theater training was still sub-standard in some areas and possibly in the states. At the same time, this Training Bulletin included comments from other commanders on successful unit operations, bayonet and hand to hand fighting. One example had a company commander order a bayonet charge over a hill that resulted in a total of 97 enemy killed with almost half killed by bayonets. Another demonstrated the successful perimeter defense and firepower use that resulted in over 5,000 CCF casualties. Still another combat commander talked of conducting a live fire demonstration with enemy and friendly weapons to demonstrate friendly fire superiority which resulted in greatly increasing soldiers' confidence."25

LTG William H. Hoge, Commander of IX Corps in 1951, published combat notes for the same reasons as OCAFF. In his notes, he reviewed a successful tank-infantry combat operation, due primarily to prior planning, coordination, and execution by the commander and his platoon leaders. This again shows how leadership was key for training and success.26

An AFF Observer Team report from 17 August 1951, provided additional insights into the training in-theater and recommendations for improving training. Figure 13 is an extract of the commanders' comments.

Lieutenant General Frank W. Milburn (previously I Corps Commander in the Eighth Army) was the Inspector of Infantry on the Chief of AFF staff in October 1951. He reinforced many of the problems previously mentioned by having the following remarks briefed at the orientation conference for the activated 37th and 44th Infantry Division (ARNG) on 8 to 9 October 1951.
1. Officers who have received battlefield commissions in Korea are being rotated to the Zone of the Interior (ZI). While they are proven combat leaders, they need to be sent to the associate Company Officers course of their arm. Special consideration should be given to them.

2. Non-commissioned Officers returning from Korea are in many instances not trained in methods of instruction and the garrison duties of NCOs. Special attention should be given to them by the units to which assigned in order that this void in their education can be rapidly filled.

3. There is a need to develop a doctrine or techniques in infantry that will insure positive coordination, contact, and strength along unit boundaries. Invariably attacks come along these boundaries—lip service coordination is not enough.

4. Our officers need more training and experience in map reading. They know how to use it on a desk but lack facility in relating ground forms to the map.

5. Tank-infantry training should be emphasized at TIS (The Infantry School) at NCO and company officer level.

6. Night training in all its aspects needs to be given a larger part of out training time.

7. Training in the deployment of the AAA Battalions at TIS should emphasize their use in the ground role.

8. Tactical use of communication must be taught to a larger extent in units and service schools.

9. The Training Committee at TIS should emphasize to all officer classes that commanders must school their officers and NCOs at all times, even in combat. You cannot assume that they know the book or proper methods—schooling must be continuous.

10. There is a need to incorporate into our school program some instruction in the problems involved in working with foreign armies, maintaining liaison, supporting them, and in general, how to utilize them effectively.

11. Instruction in use of supporting weapons and control of their fires should be emphasized. Practical exercise in which student (sic) actually plans, communicates, and finds problems, are needed.

Figure 13. Commanders' comments from Korea, August 1951.27

We have observed that newly activated units have not exploited certain fundamentals to their maximum extent. Standardization of administrative procedures over which some control can be exercised will, when rigidly enforced, be a distinct contribution to improved standards of discipline. Intelligent and continuous supervision of the execution of orders has not reached desired standards. For example, in training involving progressive marksmanship, it has been observed during trigger squeeze training that many instructors failed to correct faulty positions and improper sighting technique. Insufficient stress has been placed on physical conditioning and confidence courses. These programs are essential to insure success during close combat. The caliber of the instruction with the use of the bayonet has been mediocre . . . Leadership throughout the chain of command must be strong.28
Training Changes in 1952 and 1953

To help compensate for the lack of adequate and or realistic training within all army divisions, specifically in scouting and patrolling, ranger training at Fort Benning began in order to produce more qualified and confident leaders. These trained cadre then returned to their units and conducted ranger type training within their divisions.39

Additional experience was provided by combat veterans earmarked for assignment to two National Guard divisions being activated in 1952 in order to improve their combat effectiveness. In the past year, returning veterans had spread throughout the army, but with the continuing shortage of combat tested soldiers, this was seen as a good fix.30

By 1952, replacements normally processed through Camp Drake, Japan (the FECOM replacement depot) on their way to Korea within 72 hours. This speed reflected limited training, orientation and some mal-assignments.31

AFF Observer Team #6 visited FECOM during February to March 1952. While there they visited Camp Drake Replacement Depot in Japan, Eighth Army; I, IX, X Corps Headquarters, and all United States infantry divisions in Eighth Army except the 40th. Morale of the Eighth army was termed "superior" and military courtesy in the front line units was "outstanding." Replacements' physical conditioning, quality and training were "excellent." These comments located forward in the report obviously came from the repeated comments over the past year of these being weak areas.

To reinforce the basic soundness in the current organization, minor changes were made by adding a BAR in each rifle squad, another light MG to the weapons squad, and a rocket launcher team to each rifle platoon headquarters. A recommendation was forwarded for an additional four-man communication crew to supplement the infantry rifle company. This would help alleviate the communication problems and maintain wire communication "to direct and coordinate supporting weapons of the battalion and regiment."32
According to a consensus of the 2d, 7th, 25th, and 45th Division Commanders, in the Observer Team #6 report, the replacements' individual training was "satisfactory." This suggests that training effectiveness was improving. Some reports about AFF training programs however, continued to say that many non-essential subjects were still being trained.

The report recommended that: infantry trainees learn to attack CCF type fortified bunkers, and to construct and organize fortified positions based on the static combat lines; since most other combat missions were day and night reconnaissance patrols (squad and platoon size) soldiers should practice more terrain association in unfamiliar terrain. It was further recommended that specific night training tasks be required and not just the one third time guidance given by OCAFF. Also more training in mine marking was recommended.33

Although senior leaders were satisfied overall with replacement training, a problem existed with basic battle sight zeroing of soldiers' weapons. During the period of 1 to 29 February 1952, the average replacement received just 4.4 rounds to zero his weapon. It is not known whether this was due to ammunition shortages. Aside from this, 4.4 rounds were proved insufficient and GEN Van Fleet and his Eighth Army units established improvised zero ranges in Korea. GEN Van Fleet was satisfied with this, nevertheless, the Observer team recommended improving this situation to insure all soldiers arriving in Korea have zeroed weapons.34 Additionally, these replacements received about 7 and one-half training hours in the 72 hours they processed through Camp Drake, Japan. This training consisted of:35

1. Physical training by road marching to and from the rifle ranges and off-duty athletics. (It was noted that their overall physical condition was generally good in spite of the deterioration based on time from graduation to arrival in the ZI. This contradicted other reports that it took two to four weeks for replacements to physically adjust to climbing the hills).

2. Scheduled weapons training of about 2 and one-half hours, averaging 20 minutes per soldier, to zero their weapons issued them at Camp Drake.
3. Orientations on wet-cold weather and individual protection (1 and one-half hours); Korea-Land and People (1 hour); The United Nations in Korea (1 hour); evasion and escape (one-half hour); supply discipline (one-half hour); Camp Drake procedures (one-half hour).

According to FM 100-10: Administration (1948), the Division Replacement Companies provided additional limited training and orientations. These training responsibilities were passed to the regiments because the overloaded companies were equipped to handle only 400 soldiers at a time but were handling 1,000.36

Now that Eighth Army occupied static battle lines with units filled up to their doctrinal organization, infantry regiments spent up to one third of their time in the rear conducting training. The following extract provides a good summary:

Currently infantry units spend as much as one-third of their time in this behind-the-line training which consists of weapons training, offensive and defensive tactics of the squad and platoon, tank-infantry training, map reading, terrain appreciation, and reconnaissance and patrol techniques. Practically all night patrols are rehearsed in the rear area prior to the actual operation. The 2d Infantry Division conducts a Squad Leader's and Platoon Sergeant's School of ten day's duration for the noncommissioned officers of the three infantry regiments who have completed two months on the front line. One hundred seventy-one noncommissioned officers are currently attending this school. Many of these students are graduates of the Leaders Courses (given in the United States). The enthusiasm and interest of these noncommissioned officers is outstanding.37

Problems in getting shortage specialties from the replacement flow for the units caused FEC to establish in-theater schools. This impacted on combat units because they provided soldiers to conduct the training and fill these specialties. The FECOM schools for shortage MOSs were: 29 courses at Eta Jima, Japan for Adjutant General, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and other miscellaneous MOSs; FEC Chemical School (1 course); Far East Medical Service Specialist School (6 MOS courses); and Far East Command Intelligence School (6 courses). These courses ran from two to 12 weeks in various locations throughout Japan.
In March 1952, Eighth Army even planned on establishing a school for some combat support and combat service support MOSs they needed. All combat arms MOSs were trained in division or lower unit schools or by OJT. Normally the regiments conducted the combat arms training as stated in Chapter 3.

Many articles and after action reports in the Training Bulletin's and combat notes were from actions that had taken place over the last four to 12 months. It seems that examples from different combat actions were picked to enforce or reinforce training needed or techniques needed. These were not just successful operations but failures as well. An enduring common theme was continued focus on CCF tactics and techniques.

Summary

The unit commanders' problem from the war's battle lines stagnation was the degradation of training, fitness, and morale normally found in trench warfare. With soldiers knowing that a negotiated peace could come at any time, leaders were challenged to conduct realistic training.

This challenge was influenced by leadership training and quality leaders in the field. Many World War II and early Korean War experienced leaders were gone (from promotions, rotations, or casualties) in the companies. The newer OCS and ROTC officers went through a much better training program in the states and now were required to get at least 90 days of troop duty before reporting to the Zone of the Interior. The 90 days of troop duty only helped somewhat, depending on where it was done. Senior field commanders commented on the improved difference between the officers who had done their 90 days with United States based combat organizations and ones who had done their troop duties in a training division.

These new officers were more informal then their World War II predecessors. They had problems implementing what they had learned due to lacking self confidence, and not wanting to disturb the status quo. Senior leaders had to devote more time to teaching and coaching their
subordinates. Today we would think this was normal, but back then these senior leaders had been used to more mature and experienced subordinates.

After the establishment of relatively static battle lines in 1951, the American infantryman's combat quality and effectiveness remained constant. They had developed better individual and team skills and combined arms coordination. However, the rotation policy mentioned before continued to disrupt infantry units. In March 1952 it was estimated that combat units had, on average, rotated or lost two times their strength through rotation, combat, and non-combat attrition. Some units, with a heavy preponderance of new soldiers and leaders coming in at the same time for various reasons, remained substandard. The CCF did not have this problem since they did not rotate their units and soldiers out of combat units.


3T.R. Fehrenbach, 485.

4Jonathan M. House, 152.

5Russell F. Weigley, History Of The United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 1984, 509.

6Interview by author notes on 6 January 1993 with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

7T.R. Fehrenbach, 595.

8Ibid., 595.


This was an earlier version of the rotation system used during the United States military conventional involvement in Vietnam from 1965 to 1974. Similar. Many similar problems occurred during the Vietnam War with the 12 month rotation policy. According to General Westmoreland, Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUS MACV), United States military leadership felt that the rotation policy was a strong morale booster. It gave soldiers focus and outweighed the negative effects reiterated from the Korean War rotation policy. In a prolonged conflict with no end in sight, this point needs to be weighted against combat effectiveness.

Interview by author notes, with LTG(R) David E. Grange, Jr., on 9 February, 1995 at Fort Indian Town Gap, Pennsylvania. LTG (RET) Grange was a rifle company commander in the 17th Infantry Regiment during the war.


Ibid. 38-39.


Military Notes Around the World, Military Review, October 1951, 68.


OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 8, (Fort Monroe, VA), 29 August 1951, 1-2. found in OCAFF, 37st and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951, Tab E.

OCAFF, Training Memorandum No. 9 and 10, (Fort Monroe, VA), 4 and 18 September 1951, 1-2. found in OCAFF, 37st and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951, Tab E.

OCAFF, Training Bulletin #6, (Fort Monroe, VA), 18 October 1951, 9-15.

Ibid., 9-15.

OCAFF, Training Bulletin #8, (Fort Monroe, VA), 16 Nov 1951, 5.
25 OCAFF, Training Bulletin #8, (Fort Monroe, VA), 16 Nov 1951, 12-14.

26 Headquarters, IX Corps, Combat Notes # (missing), (APO 264 US Army, Korea), April 1951, 5-8.

27 OCAFF Observer Team #5, Report and Agenda Prepared by AFF Observer Team #5, 17 August 1951, (Fort Monroe, VA), 17 August 1951, 1-5.

28 OCAFF, 37th and 44th Inf. Div. Commanders Training Conference, (Ft. Monroe, VA), 8-9 October 1951 (Fort Monroe, VA), Tab P.


30 Ibid., 66.

31 OCAFF Observer Team #6, Report of Army Field Forces Observer Team #6 to FECOM, (Fort Monroe, VA), February-March 1952, Tab P, 3-4.

32 Ibid., Tab E, 1-2.

33 Ibid., Tab E, 3-4.

34 Ibid., Tab E, 4.

35 Ibid., Tab P, 4-5.

36 Ibid., Tab P, 6-7.

37 Ibid., Tab E, 4

38 Ibid., Tab I, 7-16.

39 Ibid., Tab K, 1-2.

40 T.R. Fehrenbach, 601.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

Let us remember the great part that is played by the infantry soldier in war. The artillery help us, the cavalry help us, and the engineers are there to confirm our success and overcome obstacles, but it is the infantry soldier, officer and men, who must bear the great stress of battle... his training in the correct use of ground and of his rifle, in the dire stress of battle, is more complicated and more difficult than that of any other arm of the service.¹

-- R.C.B. Haking, Company Training (1917)

The training of the infantry company for war, considered by the uninitiated as one of the simplest things in the world, is in reality the most complex; it is one constant struggle against human nature and incessant variations of the tactical situation and of the ground, to say nothing of the frequent changes in the company as regards the junior officers and noncommissioned officers.²

-- R.C.B. Haking, Company Training (1917)

Before drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of infantry training during the Korean War, consider looking at some recommendations and changes made as a result of World War II lessons. During June 1946, the Infantry Conference held at Fort Benning, Georgia reviewed personnel policies and procedures. Their recommendations clearly demonstrated that many lessons learned during the Korean War were in fact, just relearned as shown in figure 14.

Many of these World War II lessons were not corrected by the beginning of the Korean War as much as we like to think the United States Army learns from its past. Nevertheless, with the exception of producing a specific field manual covering the replacement training system, the weight of evidence suggests that the above recommendations were implemented and or addressed during the Korean War.

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1. All recruits be basically trained initially as basic riflemen and that all replacements be indoctrinated to expect reassignments from noncombat to combat duty.
2. A field manual be prepared and published covering the replacement training system.
3. Training given replacements while passing through the system emphasize physical conditioning, indoctrination, orientation and individual weapon instruction.
4. Adequate and qualified personnel be furnished the replacement training system to meet training requirements.
5. Training personnel referred to in #4 above be replaced by qualified combat experienced personnel at the first available opportunity.
6. The replacement command within the theater be designated as a major command of the respective theater Commander.
7. No replacement be entered into actual combat with the enemy prior to a minimum one (1) week period of training in orientation, adjustment, an indoctrination with his Division.
8. An indoctrination unit composed of combat, experienced officers and NCO's be formed within the division to conduct the training referred to in #7 above.

Figure 14. 1946 Infantry Conference Recommendations for Improving Personnel, Policies, and Procedures.\(^3\)

This study demonstrates that identifying problems and essential subjects from experience was not an army problem. The problem was implementing the proper changes and rigorously enforcing them. This paper has surveyed the training program before and during the Korean War. This chapter reviews the recurring problems during the war to draw some conclusions using the criteria established of identifying essential subjects, their training organization, and preparation and administration for the training used. It will end by drawing some comparisons with today's FM 25-100, Training The Force and recommendations for further study.

**Recurring Problems**

This literature review demonstrates that essentially there were no new lessons learned or training program deficiencies during 1950-1953 in Korea. However many lessons were re-learned like those mentioned before. Major problems noted, after initial equipment and manning shortfalls were fixed, were in the leadership and its infantry training execution necessary for combat effective
units. The training programs used were valid and evolved into essentially the same ones used today.

Attaining and maintaining a sufficiently large enough personnel base throughout the war affected getting qualified training cadre in theater and stateside. Ultimately the army mobilized about 2,834,000 men and twenty divisions. Eight army divisions and one marine division were committed to Korea. The other divisions formed a Reserve Pool and guarded against the possibility that the Soviets might take advantage of the American preoccupation with Korea and attack elsewhere. On the eve of the Korean conflict, Congress had extended the Selective Service Act. Through the first war months, the army cannibalized numerous units to provide the needed manpower in Korea.

In September 1950, four National Guard divisions were activated and filled with draftees. Four more National Guard divisions were activated after the Chinese entered the war. The first two activated divisions shipped to Korea. Two were sent to Europe and the final four became personnel and training stations. Ultimately, the National Guard provided some 138,600 soldiers composing some 34% of the total National Guard. The Army Reserve eventually provided an additional 244,300 soldiers in addition to the 43,000 officers already on active duty when the conflict started.4 (See Figure 15.)

These figures represent the tremendous amount of soldiers involved. To develop an infantry training program to handle these numbers, without a national mobilization, was a significant feat for the United States.

Throughout the latter part of the Korean War some leaders pushed for a unit replacement program, much like the British regimental system.5 It is suggested, but can not be proved, that this type program was deemed cost prohibitive and too hard to maintain. The United States Army experimented with this during the 1980's. Today we have unit replacement up to company level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>By Identity</th>
<th>By component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number who entered active duty from civil</td>
<td>2,241,100</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1951</td>
<td>1,071,600</td>
<td>54,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1952</td>
<td>433,200</td>
<td>23,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1953</td>
<td>692,800</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-53</td>
<td>43,500</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER WHO SERVED ON ACTIVE DUTY</td>
<td>2,834,200</td>
<td>171,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER WHO SERVED OUTSIDE CONUS</td>
<td>1,863,800</td>
<td>131,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. FEC</td>
<td>1,153,000</td>
<td>81,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Elsewhere</td>
<td>710,800</td>
<td>50,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number who served within CONUS only</td>
<td>970,400</td>
<td>39,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--Above figures represent army command strength as of 30 June 1950 plus gains from 1 July 1950 through 31 July 1953.
--Total gains during the period exclusive of 62,100 personnel returned from dropped from rolls as AWOL and as missing or captured, 17,500.
--Appointments and 19,000 enlisted personnel accepting commissions and Warrant officer appointments.
--Regular Army officers exclude 1,100 USMA appointments; enlisted personnel exclude 224,900 reenlistments.
--For this report FEC includes United States Army personnel stationed in Japan, Philippines, Ryukyus, and Marianas Islands under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General AFCE.


Figure 15. Estimated Number of Personnel of U.S. Army Personnel who entered On Active Duty. From Civil Life and Who Served On Active Duty During the Period Of Korean Hostilities.
Evidence suggests that a replacement system of buddy teams, squad and platoon size elements would be more combat effective than the current individual replacement system for combat arms branches. The improved training, unit cohesion, and increased combat effectiveness would probably outweigh the budget and casualties costs during war and should be considered for future implementation.

The Korean War's individual replacement system demanded an equitable system for providing the combat soldiers on the front lines. As addressed earlier, the rotation point policy came into being during the fall of 1951. Overall, soldiers and senior leaders felt this system improved morale within the units. It was a continuing administrative headache and training distracter, however. In many cases, after the fall of 1951, leaders rotated in and out of units faster than their soldiers. With the individual replacement and rotation program in place, units never achieved the high level of combat and training efficiency needed for a high performance combat effective unit.\(^6\)

A key problem in improving training and infantry combat effectiveness was effective leadership. With the inherent issues caused by the replacement and rotation policy, leadership provided the glue, with training, to mold their units into combat effective units.

Providing effective leaders demanded good leader training programs. The army and the infantry training system focused on identifying and implementing changes to its leadership training. Before 1950, leadership training focused on On the Job Training (OJT) in the unit assigned. Officers attended their respective basic course after two to four years of service. As the war continued, officers were required to have 90 days troop unit experience prior to reporting to combat line units in Korea. This helped somewhat, depending on where they got this experience.

World War II provided many combat-experienced leaders that were this above-mentioned glue during the initial leader replacement call up. By late 1951, however, many older veterans were heading home or providing combat experienced cadre necessary in the training centers and training divisions. The greatly increased Officer Candidate Course graduates filled the combat units in Korea. The improved schooling provided them with a good base for assuming their leadership positions. Many battalion and regimental commanders commented on the new officers' lack of self
confidence and their tendency to go with the unit status quo rather than use their training. The June 1954 edition of Military Review mentioned a need to have an army program to stress leadership in the officer corps and help resolve this problem. It would require all combat arms Regular Army appointees to take the Airborne or Ranger Course during their first year of training. Today, while not required, these courses are highly stressed, even before commissioning for all officers. The Ranger Course expanded in the late 1980's to increase the number of ranger qualified leaders throughout the army.\(^7\)

Studies conducted in the combat zone also attempted to determine which soldiers became good leaders (officer and NCO). They were unsuccessful. However, the studies did indicate some soldier types did not make good leaders. Senior NCO's, officers, and commanders participating, for the most part, identified prospective good leaders by their actions in the field. Competence and individual proficiency were common denominators for effective leadership.

**Essential Subjects**

The first criteria examined was the *selection of essential subjects and their sequencing*. The existing training state for individual soldiers and the unit was the start point for this process as it is today. This determined essential subjects that needed training and how to sequence (prioritize) them.

This study reinforces the importance of using observer teams, after-action reviews (AARs), and questionnaires to provide timely feedback on lessons learned, training strengths, weaknesses and recommended essential subjects. This is done today through Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) agencies like the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Today's army has also institutionalized AARs throughout all organizational levels.

It reinforces the relevancy of studying military warfare to provide effective current training doctrine. It also reinforces the importance of identifying essential tasks that indoctrinate soldiers in realistic combat training in order to overcome the psychological and physical combat hardships.
"One of the biggest reasons for failure on the field of battle is not knowing what to do next and, in most cases, this is a result of not having been trained thoroughly in what to expect on the battlefield."8

Overall training effectiveness suffered in identifying the essential subjects and their implementation without sound effective leadership to actually plan and execute training to standards. Even in the fall of 1951, after establishing standards, training centers and training divisions had instances where minimal training had been done at night (one-third had been directed by AFF) or OPFOR had been used. The material resources were available but the determination of leaders, instructors, and the emphasis on realistic training were missing. Unlike today with the army-wide use of MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) to enhance realism, many leaders and trainers still tried to just "check-the-block" and did not insure training was to standards and realistic according to some sources.9 During the Korean War more and more emphasis focused on leadership training to improve combat effectiveness.

On the basis of the research used in chapters 2, 3, and 4, figure 16 provides a general review of many recurring training deficiencies identified.

Along these same lines, an article published in The Infantry School Quarterly (October 1953), called "What has Korea Taught Us?" by Colonel Frank T. Mildren, a Korean War veteran, stated,

Why is it, we still find so many deficiencies in Korea? After digging through more reports . . . and confirming personal experience . . . It is "Improper technique in the application of our doctrine and in many cases the complete absence of technique." . . . While our mistakes are many, our major deficiencies are few.10

Colonel Mildren's major deficiencies impetus provides us some additional insights to the training program effectiveness. These comments reinforce many deficiencies identified in Figure 16. He considered the infantry's major deficiencies in: fire support (The artillery did it well, but the infantry consistently did not maximize the support weapons available in the unit and higher
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Deficiencies Identified</th>
<th>Battlefield Operating System</th>
<th>Training Level: Individual (I), Unit (U), Combined (C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Mechanized Training</td>
<td>Maneuver</td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Combat</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Arms Training &amp; LFX’s</td>
<td></td>
<td>U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emplacement, use of CSW</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map reading &amp; Terrain association</td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marksmanship and Weapons training</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night training</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Conditioning</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank-Inf Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
<td>Fire Support</td>
<td>U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry-Artillery Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Fortifications</td>
<td>M/CM/5</td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>I, U, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold Weather Training</td>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Marches</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle &amp; Weapons Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
<td>I, U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16. Recurring Training Deficiencies Identified During Korean War.

levels.); planning (A high propensity to act first—speed— with little or no prior planning ); terrain (Using it to our advantage, instruction needed improvement and incorporation into tactical problems); triangular concept (Using fire and maneuver in relation to the unit organization); night operations; attacking prepared positions (With the CCF and NKPA developing their positions into fortified positions with communication trenches and bunkers, the United States Army needed to continue improving its individual and unit training for attacking them); conducting assaults (Synchronizing combat power in combat and training); organizing on the objective; extended fronts (Many times units fought on fronts larger then previously considered normal); retrograde operations; and patrol bases (using perimeter defenses).11
Many times these essential tasks were not trained on well during the initial months of the war. Unit leadership determined whether it was done to standard or as hit and miss training. By the end of 1951, with the battle lines stabilized and the start of negotiation talks, units rotating off the lines conducted intensive unit training as part of their reserve mission. Stateside training also improved as Korean War veterans were assigned as training cadre during the rotation process.

Research documented in chapter 2 and 3 reinforce the importance of indoctrinating soldiers in realistic combat training to help soldiers overcome the psychological and physical hardships of combat. "One of the biggest reasons for failure on the field of battle is not knowing what to do next and, in most cases, this is a result of not having been trained thoroughly in what to expect on the battlefield."

Training Organization

The second criteria examined was the organization for training. As stated in earlier chapters, numerous authors and reports strongly suggested that army training doctrine and organization were sound. Only minor refinements were made as to the subjects and how they were taught. Most changes were techniques and procedures, not doctrinal. They were incorporated into stateside and Zone of the Interior (ZI) training.

As stated in chapter 2, FM 21-5 separated training into three general overlapping phases. They were individual, unit, and combined training. This basic organization did not change during the war and is similar to today's training organization. FM 21-5 noted that individual training was continuous throughout all phases in order to perfect skills and techniques. Unit and combined training focused on developing teamwork. "A most important part . . . is the conduct of exercises that apply tactical, technical, or logistical procedures and doctrine to assumed combat situation(s)."

This study has emphasized the importance of training (in all three phases) and its execution in the combat theater. It shows that training in combat zones was essential to insuring new soldiers
and old indoctrinated themselves in the combat lessons learned. Without the training conducted by the divisions and regiments during the last year and one half in Korea, it is doubtful that much of the unit and combined training would have improved as they did.

This was especially important considering the individual and leader rotation policy in effect in the fall of 1951. The study demonstrates that leadership and it’s training are key to this training and therefore combat effectiveness. The current officer and NCO education system has evolved from many lessons learned during the Korean War (and other conflicts since then too).

At the same time, this study furnishes good examples of how rotating personnel and leaders every six to nine months hurt training. It did not allow infantry and other combat units to reach the higher levels of combat effectiveness measured by the cost of mission success, be it casualties, loss of equipment, resources available, or providing overwhelming combat power at the decisive point.

Preparation and Administration

The third criteria examined from FM 21-5 was the preparation and administration of training. Time available and facilities were considered after identifying the existing state of training and essential subjects. Facilities' evaluations included the locale, terrain, climate, training aids and support. The preparation and administration of training insured that the right training was planned, prepared, executed and supervised.

This study demonstrated and reinforced that the training programs, techniques, and systems used were effective. Many are still used today. It also reinforces the training doctrine soundness and the importance of execution for effective doctrine.

This study's research reflected sound training preparation and administration doctrine. Improvements were made in the leadership responsible and their applying the doctrine. The numerous TM's, TB's, Combat Notes, and observer teams consistently demonstrated these
improvements. The 1954 edition of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, reflected the preparation and administration importance by refining the overall army forces broad mission:

(It) is to bring to bear upon enemy's military capacity sufficient power at decisive points and times to render it ineffective. During time of peace, the mission of the army forces is the preparation, by organization, training, and equipment, and indoctrination, of field units capable of performing their wartime missions. This included establishing uniform standards to insure the overall Army success in the decentralized United States and the Zone of the Interior training environment.

Current Doctrine

Today's army training system has three main components--institutional training, forces training, and training support--that reflect the mutually supporting roles and close balance within the system. They are similar in context to what was used from 1949 through 1953 and reviewed in this paper. Today's army's ultimate purpose is to prepare combat-ready units that can mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. The goals and standards incorporated in the army training system apply equally to the Total Army Active and the Reserve components.

Looking at each current training principle found in FM 25-100 (1988), we find references to leadership and commanders who are primary glue that makes effective training and combat effective units. (See figure 17.)

Let's compare some of these principles to the infantry training conducted during the Korean War.

Training as a combined arms and services team slowly improved throughout the conflict. With the continual rotation of personnel and leadership however, high training levels weren't achieved.
1. **Train as a combined arms and services team**: When committed to battle, each unit must be prepared to execute combined arms and services operations without additional training or lengthy adjustment periods. Combined arms proficiency develops when teams train together. Leaders must regularly practice cross attachment of the full wartime spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Peacetime relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible.

2. **Train as you fight**: The goal of combat-level training is to achieve combat-level standards. Every effort must be made to attain this difficult goal. Within the confines of safety and common sense, leaders must be willing to accept less than perfect results initially and demand realism in training.

3. **Use appropriate doctrine**: Training must conform to army doctrine. FM 100-5, *Operations*, and supporting doctrinal manuals describe common procedures and uniform operational methods that permit commanders and organizations to adjust rapidly to changing situations. In units, new soldiers will have little time to learn nonstandard procedures. Therefore, units must train to the army standards contained in MTP's, battle drill books, soldier's manuals, regulations, and other training and doctrinal publications.

4. **Use performance-oriented training**: Units become proficient in the performance of critical tasks and missions by practicing the tasks and missions. Soldiers learn best by doing, using a hands-on approach. Leaders are responsible to plan training that will provide these opportunities. All training assets and resources, to include simulators, simulations, and training devices, must be included in the strategy.

5. **Train to challenge**: Tough, realistic, and intellectually and physically challenging training both excites and motivates soldiers and leaders. It builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills. Challenging training inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn. Successful completion of each training phase increases the capacity and motivation of individuals and units for more sophisticated and challenging achievement.

6. **Train to sustain proficiency**: Once individuals and units have trained to a required level of proficiency, leaders must structure collective and individual training plans to repeat critical task training at the minimum frequency necessary for sustainment army units must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions by frequent sustainment training on critical tasks; they cannot rely on infrequent "peaking" to the appropriate level of wartime proficiency.

7. **Train using multiechelon techniques**: To use available time and resources most effectively, commanders must simultaneously train individual, leaders, and units at each echelon in the organization during training events. Multiechelon training is the most efficient way of training and sustaining a diverse number of mission essential tasks within limited periods of training time.

8. **Train to maintain**: Maintenance is a vital part of every training program. Maintenance training designed to keep equipment in the fight is of equal importance to soldiers being expert in its use. Soldiers and leaders are responsible for maintaining all assigned equipment in a high state of readiness in support of training or combat employment.

9. **Make commanders the primary trainers**: The leaders in the chain of command are responsible for the training and performance of their soldiers and units. They are the primary training managers and trainers for their organizations. To accomplish their training responsibility, commanders must--Base training on wartime mission requirements; Identify applicable army standards; Assess current levels of proficiency; Provide the required resources; Develop and execute training plans that result in proficient individuals, leaders, and units.

Figure 17. FM 25-100, *Training The Force*, Training Principles.¹⁸
Today, there is a continual focus on training as you fight. After World War II, live fire exercises stopped. This adversely affected combat realism in the training centers and the units prior to the outbreak of the war. This changed by the fall of 1950. Command Field Exercises (CFX's) became an integral part of individual, unit and combined arms training.

Using appropriate doctrine in the prewar years was a problem. The units did not have the equipment and personnel to fill the triangular organizations. Doctrine must work, be affordable, integrated, and flexible. It must address tactics, operational art, strategy and be forward thinking. It is not SOPs, drills, and techniques. The tactical doctrine and organization did not match the hollow forces reality. After the emergency fillers and mobilization in the summer and fall of 1950 brought organizations up to strength, this was not a major problem. Leader education was (and is) the key.

Using performance-oriented training. Poorly done back in 1950, there was a heavy reliance on lectures, films, and classroom style teaching (even in the field). Hands-on training had not evolved to where it is today (using tasks-conditions-standards) on actual equipment and in realistic environments. Training to challenge soldiers suffered as a consequence. Realistic training that challenges soldiers was (and is) heavily dependent on leadership and maximizing resources available.

Training to sustain proficiency was addressed throughout the war years. Much of the 1950 training was sequential as evidenced by the phases in the training programs. Understood, but not implemented, overlapping sustainment training was hit and miss during the war's initial months. As the regiments and divisions developed their reserve unit training programs in theater however, sustainment training improved.

Training using multiechelon techniques is advocated today but was not used to best effect then. This is an area that current doctrine and practice has maximized more and more. With today's comparatively less personnel and leadership turbulence, it is easier to conduct training at
several levels simultaneously. It must be remembered that back then, the training depth throughout the army was low. Leaders were needed to focus their attention on subordinate training.

Training to maintain equipment readiness initially suffered due to lack of equipment (in the beginning) and proper schooling for the soldiers and leadership on its importance. Battlefield experience more than justified the need to stress this in the stateside training and throughout the combat zone. Like, everything else though, leadership, discipline, and supervision were the keys to improving maintenance. Though this principle focuses on equipment maintenance, I include personnel maintenance here. Throughout the war, this area was addressed as needing improvement. Physical training and personnel maintenance did improve. Today's infantry and combat arms branches especially, stress these areas for combat readiness.

Making commanders the primary trainers is an area that has not changed. As stated earlier, commanders were (and are) held responsible, by doctrine and policy, to execute the army's training programs. For many reasons already mentioned in this study, many commanders failed as trainers. As the Korean War continued, combat experience demonstrated the need for better commanders who understood and could execute training within their units.

Summary

Current doctrine defines combat power as the ability to fight. It consists of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. The most important part is leadership. Leadership applies the other three parts to effectively generate the combat power at the decisive time and place to win on the battlefield. Effective leadership must conduct combat training to succeed. Infantry training effectiveness was not (and is not) so much a result of the doctrine, culture, economy, or time as it was (and is) of leadership.

Leadership training in the officer and NCO corps is an essential ingredient for the successful application of combat power. Non-commissioned officers are an extremely important
part of this training process. They are the leaders directly responsible for the individual and crew training within their units. Therefore, the time spent on developing future leaders and commanders in the infantry will pay direct dividends to its combat readiness.

When the blood and sweat of training is determined to be tougher than combat, we have reached a high level of training and effectiveness. Today's army, and the infantry specifically, must learn from the Korean War. We must insure that we do not allow our forces to be hollowed out and lose our focus on training and quality soldiers.

The 1993 version of FM 100-5; *Operations* summarizes the training and readiness challenge well.

On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they have trained. Training to high standards is essential in both peace and war; there is never a time when army forces can afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. Every commander, every soldier, every unit—combat, combat support, combat service support—in a force projection army must be trained and ready to deploy. Each leader takes upon himself the responsibility to train his subordinates down to the last soldier and ensure their readiness to accomplish the mission; that may be the most solemn responsibility of leadership.21

**Recommendations for Further Research**

1. Institutional leadership training and applications in active and reserve forces.

2. Individual replacement and rotation policy.

3. Unit replacement feasibility (buddy team, squad, platoon, and company).

4. Interviews with actual participants and different levels of leadership in reference to training effectiveness during the Korean war.

5. Combat training in combat or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) theater effectiveness.

6. Infantry training program effectiveness during the Vietnam War Period (based on Korean War lessons learned).


2Ibid., 155-156.


6Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 350-352.


9Interview by author notes, in March 1993, with Dr. Jack J. Gifford, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


11Ibid., 7-12.

12Orlando Ward, iv.


14Ibid., 11.


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1. Certification Date: 28 / NOV / 1995

2. Thesis Author: MAJOR Christian K. Jaques

3. Thesis Title: United States Army Infantry Training Program
   Effectiveness During The Korean War

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