U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAMIAN F. CARR, MAJ. USA
B.S., Niagara University, Niagara University, New York, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This study examines the role of U.S. Army Public Affairs during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 to see whether current public affairs doctrine was effective. The study looks at Operation Uphold Democracy in the context of Haiti's history and the global media environment while looking at changes in the military/media relationships and evaluating the need for change in Army Public Affairs doctrine. Interviews of participants and the use of primary source documents provide the basis for the subjective determination of effectiveness. Using the Department of Defense's Principles of Information and its companion Statement of DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations as de facto public affairs doctrine, the study concludes that while public affairs was effective, and the military/media relationship improved, doctrine needs revision.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to stay within the lines to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1. **Agency Use Only (Leave blank).**

Block 2. **Report Date.** Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. **Type of Report and Dates Covered.** State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. **Title and Subtitle.** A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. **Funding Numbers.** To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

- C - Contract
- G - Grant
- PE - Program
- PR - Project
- TA - Task
- WU - Work Unit
- Element Accession No.

Block 6. **Author(s).** Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. **Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es).** Self-explanatory.

Block 8. **Performing Organization Report Number.** Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es).** Self-explanatory.

Block 10. **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. (If known)**

Block 11. **Supplementary Notes.** Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. **Distribution/Availability Statement.** Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORM, REL, ITAR).

- **DOD** - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
- **DOE** - See authorities.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 12b. **Distribution Code.**

- **DOD** - Leave blank.
- **DOE** - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.
- **NASA** - Leave blank.
- **NTIS** - Leave blank.

Block 13. **Abstract.** Include a brief (Maximum 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. **Subject Terms.** Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. **Number of Pages.** Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. **Price Code.** Enter appropriate price code (NTIS only).

Blocks 17. - 19. **Security Classifications.** Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. **Limitation of Abstract.** This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.
U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAMIAN P. CARR, MAJ, USA
B.S., Niagara University, Niagara University, New York, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Damian P. Carr

Title of Thesis: U.S. Army Public Affairs During Operation Uphold Democracy

Approved By:

[Signature]
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman

[Signature]
COL Richard M. Bridges, M.A., Member

[Signature]
COL W. Stuart Towns, Ph.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 7th day of June 1996 by:

[Signature]
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY by MAJ Damian P. Carr, USA, 141 pages.

This study examines the role of U.S. Army Public Affairs during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 to see whether public affairs was effective.

The study looks at Operation Uphold Democracy in the context of Haiti's history and the global media environment while looking at changes in the military-media relationships and evaluating the need for change in Army Public Affairs doctrine. Interviews of participants and the use of primary source documents provide the basis for the subjective determination of effectiveness.

Using the Department of Defense's Principles of Information and its companion Statement of DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations as de facto public affairs doctrine, the study concludes that while public affairs was effective, and the military-media relationship improved, doctrine needs revision.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my committee; Doctor Robert F. Baumann, Colonel Richard M. Bridges and Colonel Stuart W. Towns, Ph.D. for the support, time and encouragement they provided me throughout this project. I would also like to express a special thanks to those people who allowed me to interview them for this study.

Most of all I would like to thank my family; my wife Mary Beth and my three children John, Katie and Christopher for their support, their understanding and their sacrifices.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLE</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DISCUSSION</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ANALYSIS</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. The Public Affairs Organization for Operation Uphold Democracy ........................................ 29
2. Research Model ........................................ 30

TABLE

Table

1. Public Affairs Units by Component ................. 45
### LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHAS</td>
<td>Army Historical Archive System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOC</td>
<td>Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD (PA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATSD (PA)</td>
<td>Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSOC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff Officers Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNMP</td>
<td>DoD National Media Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAH'D</td>
<td>Forces Armées d'Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIE</td>
<td>Global Information Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GII</td>
<td>Global Information Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Joint Information Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPG</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Light Industrial Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAD</td>
<td>Mobile Public Affairs Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Public Affairs Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Public Affairs Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAOC</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPA</td>
<td>Public Affairs Proponency Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPIA</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince International Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPAG</td>
<td>Proposed Public Affairs Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>Special Forces Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>Table of Distribution and Allowances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO&amp;E</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>U.S. Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, "the People" have come into their own. Mobilizing their support for a war is at least as important as the mobilization of the armed forces.

Michael Howard, The New York Times

In his book On War, Carl von Clausewitz discussed two concepts that he believed are fundamental to any discussion of "war." The first concept is the "morale" or national will.1 According to Clausewitz, war is fundamentally "a test of moral and physical forces by means of the latter."2 In a conflict each side's efforts are aimed at defeating the will of the opposition. Consequently, the importance of any factor that can influence national will is obvious.

Secondly, Clausewitz wrote that any discussion on the theory of war must include "the three elements that come into play: the government which sets the objectives for the war; the armies, which fight it; and the peoples who support it."3 Clausewitz stated that each element is deeply "rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another."4 Given the importance of these elements, it is clear that any factor that can substantially affect their variable relationship should be considered. This is particularly true of factors that affect mobilizing and maintaining the people's support for a war.
which "is at least as important as the mobilization of the armed forces."

This thesis is about public affairs activities during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and whether public affairs was effective during the operation. The primary focus is on the media relations aspect of public affairs and the part it played in achieving the U.S. Army's operational objectives in Haiti. This paper is important because Army public affairs has the potential to affect the will, and the relationship of the elements, of Clausewitz's trinity: the military, the government, and the people. This is not to say that the Army's public affairs purpose is to influence the will of the American people. It is not. Rather, its purpose is to provide information to the American people so that they can make informed decisions.

In most cases the Army must provide its information through media coverage which has had a profound impact on warfare because of its ability to alter the actions and therefore the will of the military, government, and most importantly the people. Since the American Revolution, media coverage of military operations conducted by the United States has had an effect on Clausewitz's trinity. During the American Civil War, northern newspapers influenced the President to alter a strategic campaign plan and played a key role in forming opinion on the conduct of the war while affecting national morale. Later, the Spanish-American War illustrated the ability of newspapers to create conflict where conflict did not have to exist. The media's influence has continued into this century affecting two world wars, two major conflicts, and recently Operation Desert Storm. The military's
relationship with the media plays a vital role in facilitating the media's ability to report on military operations which in turn can have an important impact on Clausewitz's trinity.

Today, the constantly expanding global media environment is subjecting military deployments, like Operation Uphold Democracy, to increased real-time scrutiny. This scrutiny has the ability to influence and even change American resolve and policy. Faced with the challenges of the information age, it is important that U.S. Army public affairs doctrine is effective in meeting these challenges and is capable of communicating the purpose behind major deployments.

In the future, major deployments may not mirror the size and scope of Desert Storm. Instead, they will probably continue to be smaller operations, like those in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. These operations appear to be the paradigm for future U.S. participation in the "new world order." The recent operation in Haiti offers an excellent opportunity to review current U.S. Army public affairs doctrine, to measure the degree of adherence to it, to measure its effectiveness, and to see whether changes in doctrine are in order. The results of this investigation can provide a basis for discussion of the credibility of current public affairs doctrine and possibly suggest change where needed.

In essence, improvements in technology, in the form of instant images, satellite communication, and international computer networks have allowed the media to play an increasing role in how the elements of Clausewitz's trinity relate to each other. This is particularly true of the media's substantial ability to mobilize, maintain, and alter the
people's support for a war. The Army and its Public Affairs doctrine must be capable, not of controlling the media's impact, but of understanding these implications in order to "anticipate adjustments to operations and plans" with increasing quickness. This thesis will discuss these issues in the context of Operation Uphold Democracy. Specifically it will address the question: Was U.S. Army public affairs effective during Operation Uphold Democracy? Secondly, has the relationship between the military and the media changed as a result of Operation Uphold Democracy? Additionally, is U.S. Army public affairs doctrine appropriate? Answering these questions will answer a final question. How will public affairs actions during Operation Uphold Democracy impact on future operations?

Background

Haiti's Historical and Political Evolution

Haiti is an extremely poor nation with seemingly insurmountable problems. As a Haitian father said to his son who was about to begin a 600-mile journey by boat to the United States, "Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti." Left in a state of turmoil after its successful war of independence with France in 1804, Haiti never fully recovered economically. After the revolution, its prosperity, due to its trade in sugar, rum, and coffee, collapsed as large plantations were mismanaged by their new owners or broken up into smaller farms by peasants. For the most part, European colonial powers stopped trading with Haiti and left the newly formed republic to fend for itself.

In 1804, the United States was beginning to face its own problems of slavery and was not about to add to its challenges by
diplomatically recognizing a country of freed slaves, particularly one that massacred the remaining white colonists on the island. So, not until 1862, when the United States had resolved itself to fight against slavery, did the United States officially recognize Haiti.\textsuperscript{12} Even so the reasons, as reported by the \textit{New York Times} on 4 June 1862, were as much commercial as political.\textsuperscript{13} Regardless of the United States's recognition of Haiti, economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries languished into the twentieth century.

In the first part of the twentieth century, U.S. relations with Haiti began to change. U.S. foreign policy interests became more important as U.S. firms sought new trading partners and wealth. Haiti became part of the expanding U.S. foreign policy and therefore increasing news media coverage. However, Haiti's instability continued. A 28 July 1915 \textit{New York Times} headline, reminiscent of more recent history, declared: "Haiti Massacre; President Flees; Zamor [an ex-president] Executed."\textsuperscript{14} The United States' intervention in 1915 with a force of Marines was ostensibly designed to establish civil order.\textsuperscript{15} However, other reasons offered for U.S. intervention include protecting the assets of a large U.S. bank and preventing the Germans from gaining influence in the region during World War I.\textsuperscript{16}

For the most part, though, the successes in Haiti were based only on the Marines' presence and their day-to-day administration of the country. While there, the Marines built schools, hospitals, roads, and trained both the police and the army. The Marines also worked to restore order to Haiti's national economy, which had never fully recovered after the European colonial powers ceased trading with Haiti.
However, with the U.S. military presence, Haiti was changed forever. With U.S. support, the Haitian Army became a means "for poor Haitians to rise to power from within the system," a potential that continues to influence Haitian politics and power.17 When the Marines departed Haiti in 1934, so did most U.S. support and interest until 1991.

For the most part, democracy in Haiti has been in name only, and Haiti has never known true political stability. In the period from 1803 to the first U.S. intervention in 1915 there were 22 revolutions or coups d'état.18 Following the U.S. departure and up to the 1950s, there were four distinct leaders, of whom two were forced from power by the military.19 Beginning in the 1950s, Haiti saw a period of relative political stability when the Duvalier family rose to power. The Duvalier family controlled Haiti for almost twenty-five years. Under "Papa Doc" Duvalier's rule, social and political unrest continued, but it was regularly repressed—often times brutally. When "Papa Doc" died in 1971, his son, "Baby Doc," became president and continued to repress the Haitian people. The relative stability in Haiti continued until economic and political unrest, brought about by high unemployment, caused "Baby Doc" Duvalier to flee the country aboard a U.S. transport plane in 1986.20

From 1986 to 1990, the country was ruled by both a military junta and an army general. In December 1990, under the watchful eye of 1,500 observers from the Organization of American States (OAS), the country held its first free elections.21 A Roman Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide from the poor coastal fishing town of Jeremie, was
elected president and the political party, Lavalas, to which he
belonged, assumed power.

The election created additional problems as the social and
economic elite, which represents only about 4.5 percent of the
population, clashed with the egalitarian leadership of Aristide and his
supporters.\footnote{22} Fearful of the military and wanting to redistribute the
scarce funds of government, Aristide attempted to dismantle the
military. In September 1991, in response to this threat and with the
support of the social and economic elite, an army coup removed Aristide
from power.

As Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, leader of the junta, took
control of the government, Aristide departed to the United States.
Almost immediately, Aristide began a political and media campaign to
return himself to power. The week following his ouster he addressed the
OAS and gave numerous interviews. In one interview with \textit{Time}, he
stated:

\begin{quote}
I have no doubt that, even in exile, I am President of Haiti,
and that I will be reinstalled in my rightful place, rightful
because that is where the Haitian people wanted me to be--that is
where they voted me to be . . . and the world community is simply
reinforcing their will.\footnote{23}
\end{quote}

In reality, it would take three years for the world to enforce the
Haitian people's will fully.

In response to the September 1991 coup and Aristide's requests,
the United States, OAS, and the United Nations (U.N.) began what would
become a series of economic and political moves to force the junta to
return Aristide to power. None of the economic sanctions were
successful. Instead, the media depicted the sanctions as tools to
complete destruction of an already ravaged economy. Designed to affect
the elite, the sanctions were first felt by the poor. This was made
clear by the media when they showed wealthy Haitians shopping in Florida
for the goods they were unable to buy in Haitian stores because of
shortages brought on by the economic sanctions. As international
organizations attempted to resolve the issue, the Haitian people became
impatient, and many began to flee the country to the United States
aboard makeshift boats. With increasing frequency the Haitian refugees' struggles were chronicled by the world media.

The Haitian situation became politicized and gained increasing
media attention during the 1992 U.S. presidential election. During the
campaign, candidate Bill Clinton increasingly called on the Bush
administration to create a humane refugee policy and end the crisis.
However, once elected, President Clinton reversed himself and continued
the Bush administration policy of returning the boat people to Haiti.
However, this was not before thousands of Haitians attempted to get to
the United States. It was estimated that nearly 500,000 Haitians were
prepared to make the six hundred-mile trip. All of this was occurring
under the increasing magnification of international media coverage.

In October 1993, based on the Governor's Island accord signed by
Cedras, the United Nations suspended its economic sanctions believing
Cedras would allow Aristide to return. When the May 1994 deadline to
leave the country was ignored by Cedras, the United States and other
nations began to enforce a blockade of Haiti.

The USS Harlan County fiasco came on 8 October 1993. A U.S.
Task Force, sent as part of the Governors' Island accord, was turned
back by thugs demonstrating at the Port-au-Prince harbor. The image of a U.S. warship forced to turn back because of a small group of vocal demonstrators diminished the administration's already poorly perceived foreign policy. It also strengthened FRAPH's (the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti and reported political arm of the Haitian military) determination to resist international efforts to resolve the problem.

My people kept wanting to run away, Emanuel Constant, leader of the right-wing FRAPH, later told an American journalist. But I took the gamble and urged them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! We were astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born. Before, everyone said we were crazy, suicidal, that we would all be burned if Aristide returned. But now we know he is never going to return.25

In the United States, the incident only increased calls by special interest groups, and a small but vocal element in Congress, to use force to return Aristide to power.

In 1994, with the migrant (the term was coined by the Clinton administration to identify the Haitian boat people, not as political but, as economic refugees) situation getting worse, the administration switched policy and began sending the Haitians to a camp set up in Guantanamo, Cuba. This same camp was being used to house Cuban refugees as well. The atmosphere in the camp turned ugly several times as both the Haitians and Cubans became restless for release. Again, the media attention highlighted the need for a resolution.

In early 1994, U.S. invasion planning began in earnest. The administration, clearly intent on scaring Cedras into stepping down, made public many of the preinvasion rehearsals. The New York Times reported, just prior to the invasion, that the administration was hoping
its publicity would oust the Haitian Army and scare the military leaders into leaving.²⁶ In tune with the administration's public comments, many media organizations began pre-positioning representatives in Haiti to cover the anticipated invasion.

On 17 September 1994, former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn arrived in Haiti for last minute negotiations with Cedras. The negotiations were eventually successful in getting Cedras and the military leaders to agree to step down, paving the way for Aristide's return. The forced-entry plan gave way to a permissive-entry plan and members of the 82nd Airborne Division, enroute to Haiti for the invasion, were turned back. In their place, members of the 10th Mountain Division flew into the Port-au-Prince airport aboard UH-60 helicopters for the much televised landing that came to symbolize the beginning of Operation Uphold Democracy. Hundreds of national and international media representatives were there to greet them.

Operational Beginnings

U.S. operational interests in Haiti stem from the Clinton Administration foreign policy objectives. According to the 1994 National Security Strategy, the Clinton administration was determined to focus on promoting and strengthening democracies. Anthony Lake, Clinton's national security advisor, further defined the administration's foreign policy concepts when he stated that the administration would foster humanitarian agendas as well.²⁷ Haiti, with its history of political assassinations and human rights violations, was a country where the United States could attempt to promote its democratic and humanitarian foreign policy goals. An additional concern
for the United States was Haiti's involvement in the South American drug trade. In 1992, cocaine shipments from Colombia through Haiti to the United States were estimated to be around three metric tons. Although small in comparison to the total amount of illegal cocaine shipments into the United States, much of the traffic seemed to involve the Haitian military.²⁸

When it became apparent that political and economic sanctions were not going to work, the national command authority began to look at military options. Up to that point, most planning involving Haiti stemmed from the need for noncombatant evacuation options, given the constant and considerable political turmoil in Haiti.²⁹ Beginning in late 1993 and early 1994, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) began to develop a strategy to forcefully remove the belligerent leaders from power and subjugate the power of the Forces Arm'ees d'Haïti (FAH'D).³⁰ Initially, there were three campaign objectives for military operations in Haiti. The first was to protect U.S. citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; the second, restore civil order; and the third, assist in the transition to a democratic government.³¹

In line with the objectives, there were two basic plans involving military operations in the Republic of Haiti. The first, Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 2370, called for a nonpermissive or hostile environment and the second, CONPLAN 2380, envisioned a permissive environment.³² The basic difference between environments was a difference in the actions of the de facto government. Nonpermissive entailed an entrenched de facto government while a permissive
environment meant that the leaders of the de facto government had departed or stepped down, and the legitimate government had requested military assistance. The nonpermissive plan amounted to using Special Operations Forces (SOF) including the 75th Ranger Regiment, Special Forces (SF), and other special mission units; elements of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division; and Marines to conduct an invasion. Following the invasion, and after the situation on the island stabilized, the invasion force in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien would be replaced by elements of the 10th Mountain Division while SF soldiers spread out to establish control in the countryside. It was this first plan that was called off, literally in mid-air, when Carter, Nunn, and Powell were able to negotiate Cedras' departure.

The second plan, involving a permissive environment, called for the 10th Mountain Division to enter the country peacefully, while demonstrating the capability of force, to restore order. The majority of the 10th Mountain Division's invasion force was aboard an aircraft carrier, the USS Eisenhower, and would fly ashore when requested. This plan also called for SF soldiers to move into the countryside to establish stability while the 10th Mountain Division controlled the major cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien.

The actual operation involved aspects of both CONPLAN 2370 and 2380 and became known in different circles as either 2375 or 2380+.

Although there was an actual CONPLAN 2375 prior to September and elements of the plan had been coordinated in advance, the plan executed was drawn up in reaction to the unexpected chain of events created by the last minute Carter, Nunn, and Powell arrangement. The "new" plan
made the 10th Mountain Division the first U.S. forces on the island. As a result, a large logistical problem began to emerge as ships containing material for the 82nd Airborne Division, but also containing material needed for the 10th Mountain Division, began to return to ports in the United States. This would have an eventual impact on public affairs capabilities as well.

Media Considerations

The vast majority of American media representatives consider themselves part of a fourth estate of government, which has a mandate provided by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, to play an important role in the defense of America's democratic system. Though they do not take part themselves in government decisions making or in waging war, they report on those processes and their consequences to the American people. And this information is essential if citizens are to be able to hold their elected and appointed officials accountable for the decisions they make on the people's behalf—the first premise of a democracy.34

In addition to their fourth estate belief, most media representatives subscribe to the generally accepted media standards of reporting news accurately, with balance, objectivity, and with clarity.35 In addition, there is an accepted code of ethics for journalists, although, it allows for wide interpretation and requires a large degree of self-policing by journalists.

Factors that determined the news value of Operation Uphold Democracy included those that cover all news. These considerations included: the local, national and international impact; the timeliness of the news; the prominence of the people being covered; the conflict of opinion regarding American involvement and interests; the emotion of U.S. troops in harms way, the suspense of an ousted president's arrival
in country; and finally the progress of the restoration of democratic power.36

News can be broken down into two types: hard and soft. Hard news is generally factual, serious, timely and perishable information sought out by the media. Soft news on the other hand has a longer shelf life and generally consists of entertainment or human interest and feature-type stories. For the military, "bad" news will probably be in the form of a hard news story. Likewise, soft news generally equates to good news stories.37 In Haiti, both types of news existed. For the most part the larger the media organization, the more hard news it needed. Smaller news organizations would often lean toward the soft news to fit local ties to the operation, like human interest stories on 10th Infantry Division soldiers from the nearby community of Watertown, NY. Yet even large news organizations rely on soft news items to fill their requirements.

Each news medium has its own characteristics and needs. However, the prevalent nature of news organizations is that they are businesses that are in a very competitive, time-driven environment where television is accepted as the dominating force. Television is the involving medium, images transform people from their living room to the action shown on the screen, evoking startling emotions and reactions. To be successful television needs lots of action. Television uses "talking heads" with ten-second sound bites mixed with the images to describe the action. The competitive nature of television requires that stations be first with stories or to have an exclusive source of information. Radio has moved to an alerting media with very little
analysis (Some programs such as those on National Public Radio and the British Broadcasting Corporation's radio service allow for detailed answers but generally they are the exceptions to the radio medium). Radio needs someone to describe the action with voice and usually incorporates good ten-second quotations. The print media is broadly defined as newspapers, magazines, and authors. Each segment has its own needs, yet usually provides in-depth coverage and analysis. They accomplish this through being where the action is and asking for lengthy explanations, looking for the good quotes, while seeking the story from several perspectives. Photographers also tend to need action, and look for the one picture that will tell the message that they want to transmit.36

Another media consideration is its understanding and use of the global information infrastructure (GII) which is part of the global information environment (GIE). "The global information infrastructure [GII] is an interconnection of communication networks, computers, data bases, and consumer electronics that puts vast amounts of information at user's fingertips."39 The news media are becoming increasingly important users of this infrastructure as they begin to tap the capabilities to gather and distribute news. Currently, the media have home pages and electronic bulletin boards on the Internet directed toward soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Haiti the infrastructure prevented the exploitation of this technology; however, technological advances may make it possible for a country's infrastructure to be irrelevant. In the future media organizations will be able to provide increasing amounts of news through this electronic medium. The Army's FM 100-6,
"Information Operations", currently in draft, recognizes this fact and states that "commanders and staffs at all levels will encounter or be affected by an expanding information domain."

In summary, there is no monolithic news media organization. Yet, with the Fourth Estate as an overarching theme, each organization is looking to meet the needs of its viewers, listeners, or subscribers to maximize their segment of the market. And profit remains a bottom line for the continued operation of any media organization.

Assumptions

One basic assumption is that Army Public Affairs doctrine is sound and attempts to meet the needs of both the force and the global-media environment. However, the doctrine is not thoroughly understood by service members and therefore not properly practiced. Furthermore, because it is a doctrine that is not thoroughly understood, it is not fully supported by both officers and enlisted members of the Army. In addition, many soldiers have a bias against the media, and this bias runs through the entire chain of command. As General Walter E. Boomer, commander of all Marine forces in the Gulf Conflict and former chief of public affairs for the U.S. Marine Corps said, "there is a mythology" of mistrust among commanders even though most commanders have never had much contact with members of the news media. In a media-oriented risk analysis, soldiers ask the question, "what benefits will I achieve compared to the risks associated with negative media coverage?" In most cases, if it is not a sure benefit compared to the risk, they probably will not take the risk. As a result, unless these soldiers are forced into a media experience, and that media experience is positive, they
will continue to hold the same bias. There are many examples of mid-level and senior level officers having their perceptions changed by the possibility of positive news coverage of themselves or their units. In Operation Desert Storm there was Colonel William Nash of the 3rd Armored Division, now the commanding general of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia-Herzegovina and an ardent supporter of media access. In Haiti there was Brigadier General Richard Potter, commander of the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOFT). In these cases it was the "learned" experience that reshaped their perceptions and therefore the manner in which they approach media relations.

Another assumption is that the force, with the support of many senior officers, is beginning to address the failings described above and is willing to make the necessary corrections to enhance the Army's relationship with the media. However, this does not mean that the Army will provide the proper resources for public affairs activities. The Army has not had a significant public affairs failure caused by a lack of resourcing. Until it does, public public affairs personnel will continue to respond to missions with inadequate equipment and resources.

**Limitations**

The primary limitations of this paper concerned security classification and time. Many aspects of the operation were initially compartmented for security reasons and have not been declassified. Individuals contacted for this project were sometimes unwilling or unable to discuss or provide information on parts of the operation because they were unsure of the declassification guidance. In addition, the time available to conduct the research limited the number of people
interviewed for the project. Regardless, to my knowledge, there is not any classified material that would have caused a change in the conclusions, nor is there anyone who might have been interviewed that would have had a significant impact on the course of the conclusions.

**Delimitations**

The scope of this paper is limited to the planning, deployment, and execution of Operation Uphold Democracy until the period shortly after Aristide's return. Generally, it will only look at U.S. Army public affairs operations from late 1993 through about 30 October 1994. In some cases relevant examples may be drawn from outside this period.

Doctrinally, Army Public Affairs encompasses three tracks: public information or media relations, command information, and community relations. This paper will not address the community relations track for two reasons. First, much of the community relations focus is toward garrison public affairs activities, not operational activities. Second, most activities that were germane fell under public information and command information activities.

**Conclusion**

The effectiveness of Army Public Affairs in Haiti is an indicator of whether doctrine is correctly formulated to achieve the Army's public affairs mission. By providing background on Haiti and on American involvement there, the operational beginnings of Uphold Democracy and some media considerations, the public affairs mission there can be looked at with a broader perspective. Meanwhile, certain limitations and delimitations to this paper were presented. The next
chapter will provide a review of literature and discussion of the research methodology.
Endnotes


2Ibid.

3Ibid.


5Howard, "Clausewitz: Man of the Year?," ed. sec.

6Ibid.


9Howard, "Clausewitz: Man of the Year?," ed. sec.


15Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, xi.


17Ibid., 85.

18Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, ix-xi.

19Ibid., xii.

20Ibid., xii-xiii.

21Mendel, 51.
"Ibid., 50.


*2* Mendel, 57.


*2* Mendel, 48.

*2* Ibid., 49, 57.

*2* Author's experience with plans involving Haiti while serving with the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, 1984 to 1987.


*3* Ibid.


*3* Ibid.

*3* Ibid.

*3* Ibid.


*4* Ibid., 1-1.


"Author's observations as the Task Force Raleigh PAO, Haiti, 1994."
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

Literature Review

Within the framework of this research, published sources fall within four topical categories: "environmental," the military-media relationship, doctrinal, and operational.

"Environmental" issues include background on Haiti from a political, social, economic, and historical perspective. This topic provided a greater appreciation for the public affairs challenges that the mission presented, not only from a United States Army perspective but also from a Haitian perspective. While looking at the overall Haitian environment, a necessary excursion was made to examine the mission's global media environment.

The second topic involved literature that discussed the military-media relationship, both past and present. This topic has an abundance of material, including several media generated pieces in professional journals discussing Operation Uphold Democracy from a news media perspective. The third topic of literature focused on was public affairs doctrine, both current and future. This area was notably weak, mostly because official doctrine remains in draft form and has not been approved for distribution. However, there was a considerable amount of material in professional journals, and some unpublished works, that discussed relevant doctrinal issues. The final topic was composed of military documents that were produced during the planning, execution, and post conflict or redeployment phases of the operation. Overall, there was a scarcity of literature specifically addressing public
affairs during Operation Uphold Democracy. Nevertheless, the literature discussed below was sufficient for this thesis.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned publication, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions*, provided a succinct chronology of Haitian history from which to trace the United States' involvement with Haiti. These same publications were also useful in verifying the general time line of the operation so that the public affairs chronology could be pieced together.

Sidney W. Mintz's article in *Foreign Affairs* on "Haiti's Class Warfare" was helpful because it provided a different view of United States and Haitian interaction. According to Mintz the interaction consisted mainly of United States interventionist policy brought on by Haiti's unique, yet violent history. This work provided insight to better understand some of the general media questions concerning our involvement in Haiti.

William W. Mendel's article in *Military Review* about "The Haiti Contingency" provided a rationale for the United States' involvement in Haiti as an instrument of United States foreign policy prior to the President's final decision to enter Haiti. Included in the article was a fairly accurate portrayal of the requirements to accomplish, from a military perspective, the goals established by the National Command Authority.

Of significant value was the recent publication of *America's Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship between the Media and the Military*. Published by The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University, it provided a well-balanced description of the current status of the media/military relationship. Besides providing an in-depth overview of the history of the relationship, the report provided recent survey results, interviews with high ranking Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, and some analysis of the impact Operation Uphold Democracy had on the media and the military. However, while it
was an extremely useful document, its focus was broad and did not specifically address the questions discussed in this thesis.

Obviously, other important published materials are the doctrinal manuals on which the research question is based. FM 100-5, *Operations* and FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations* (1993) establish Army Public Affairs doctrine. While the first manual only briefly addresses public affairs, its comments are relevant to the conduct of successful media operations. The second manual, written prior to FM 100-5, fails in its authority, partly because it is not current. It does not contain or address an important piece of DoD public affairs doctrine first published in 1992. Missing from FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations* are the Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations. These guidelines along with the DoD Principles of Information, which are part of DoD Directive 5122.5, are the cornerstone of current public affairs doctrine, and are part of the framework of my thesis. The FM 46-1, "Public Affairs Operations" (Coordinating Draft), dated 15 November 1994, does provide an update by including the guidelines (publication of the new manual is expected in 1996). In addition, Joint Publication (Pub) 1-07, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations" (Draft), provided a helpful discussion on the Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations.

Another important document, is the Army's FM 100-6, "Information Operations," which is currently in draft. This new manual discusses the importance of the emerging GIE and "provides commanders and their staffs with the guidelines and considerations" required to conduct information operations. The importance of public affairs is highlighted in this manual which describes information operations as providing "the Army a capability to enhance its ability to compel or deter adversaries in peace, conflict or war."

The interpretations and discussion of doctrine by public affairs practitioners, such as Colonel Richard M. Bridges, in *Army Magazine* and Charles W. Ricks in *The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking*
Forward were extremely helpful. Bridges' efforts helped to clarify the background, intent, and use of Guidelines for Coverage of DoD Operations while contributing to the analysis framework of this thesis. Meanwhile, Ricks provided an objective discussion of technology and its use in the military news media environment while offering specific suggestions to contend with media covering military operations.° In addition, both works pointed the way toward a balanced piece of literature focusing on the current military and media relations dialog, the Cantigny Conference Series. These conference reports are important because they are the basis for current DoD doctrine and they describe agreements and understandings between members of the military and the media.

Finally, although not relied on often, the Sidle Report, which was one of the first attempts to reconcile military-media differences in a post Vietnam era, was important as a baseline for doctrine development and for the many subsequent articles it generated and continues to generate.

The works mentioned above are primarily helpful as background and in understanding and interpreting doctrine. For material addressing the operation itself, transcribed oral histories of key participants and primary source documents like Operation Plans (OPLANS) published by the participating headquarters were used. In addition, Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) comments, unit after action reports and subsequent briefings such as the slides used by Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton to describe XVIII Airborne Corps participation in Uphold Democracy were used. For the most part these documents were pieces used to put together the operational picture from a public affairs perspective, therefore most were helpful in singular ways.

There was limited literature written by the media about the operation. However, there were two pieces that helped, one by Debra Gersh Hernandez "Press Pool was Ready to Go" in Editor and Publisher and another by Jacqueline N. Sharkey, "The Shallow End of the Pool?" written
for *American Journalism Review* in December 1994. Though not comprehensive, both of these works helped provide balance in viewpoints. In summary, because this research method does not rely entirely on published material, the scarcity of literature specifically addressing the public affairs aspect of Operation Uphold Democracy will have little impact on this thesis. The material found is suitable for this thesis when coupled with the sources discussed in the next section on research methods.

**Methodology**

This research consisted of three stages. For the most part the stages were sequential; however, at times activities from one stage overlapped with those of another. Stage one involved outlining the research methodology and compiling material from the sources outlined in the literature review while developing a topic list. This topic list was the basis of the question outline and formed the framework of the thesis. Additionally, during this stage data was gathered by conducting telephone interviews with primary sources. In the process of conducting interviews, additional material was acquired from the sources interviewed or from leads which they provided. Stage two involved providing the answers to the question outline by reviewing the research material, obtaining additional material, and when necessary returning to sources for clarification. Stage three consisted mainly of analyzing material written, looking for the logical conclusions and recommendations for further research.

As mentioned, much of the material used was primary source material. Therefore, initially the Army Historical Archive System, Army Knowledge Network (AHAS), and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provided access to documents. Afterward, however, contacts within the public affairs community were able to find other material such as after action reports. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs, XVIII Airborne
Corps Public Affairs, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Public Affairs and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Public Affairs all provided material when requested. Secondary source material was collected mostly through the Combined Arms Library and its interlibrary loan system.

Phone interviews played a major part in the research process. The people interviewed were broken down into three categories, public affairs personnel, commanders, and news media representatives. Identifying appropriate public affairs personnel involved diagramming the public affairs network that took part in Operation Uphold Democracy. Figure 1 is the public affairs network used. In some instances, the name of the individual involved in the Operation was already known, in other cases information from previously conducted interviews provided the identity of key players.

Commanders were identified in much the same way. Unfortunately, contacting them was not as easy. A list of contacts from the public affairs officer for the ARSOTF in Haiti provided the initial selection of media representatives to interview. In some instances, bylines of published material were used to identify people to interview.

Research Model

In order to follow the three stage research plan while keeping oriented toward answering the research question a research model was developed. Figure 2 portrays the model used. The outer circle represents the global media environment in which we are now living in. The middle circle describes Haiti's political, social, economic and historical environment. Looking at Haiti in this way provided a basis to examine the United State's involvement and therefore the media's interest in Haiti. Operating inside, and subject to the outer environments, is an inner circle that depicts Operation Uphold Democracy
Figure 1. The Public Affairs Organization for Operation Uphold Democracy
Figure 2. Research Model
from 19 September 1994 through the United Nations' assumption of the mission on 31 March 1995.5

The center ray, labeled mission, is the principal subject of research and provided the means, through analysis, to answer the research question: Was Army Public Affairs effective during Operation Uphold Democracy? Effective, as defined in this paper means that the desired objectives or results were achieved. While the model recognizes that many variables affected the mission, it looks at how the mission was affected by two topic rays, the public affairs force and the military-media relationship. These two topic rays, variable in their own relationship, were affected by the mission while they moved through the Haitian and Operation Uphold Democracy environments. The degree that these two topical rays were affected by each other, by the environment, and by the mission provided data to analyze in drawing supporting conclusions, recommendations and answering the research question.

Looking at the Army Public Affairs force topic provided answers to a series of questions. First, what is Army Public Affairs Doctrine? Second, what is the composition of the Army Public Affairs force? Third, how are Army Public Affairs soldiers trained and how does the rest of Army get trained regarding public affairs? The second topic addressed was the military-media relationship. In U.S. history, the military and the news media have experienced periods of cooperation and agreement with each other. At times, they have also experienced periods of great animosity and suspicion toward each other. In order to understand public affairs activities in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy it was necessary to provide an understanding of the evolving relationship between the military and the media and its status at the outset of the operation. This last topic addressed that need.
Criteria

It is difficult to objectively measure the extent that public affairs doctrine, as defined by DoD Directive 5122.5, had in the success of Operation Uphold Democracy. Therefore, suggestive indicators were used as the criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of public affairs doctrine. The suggestive indicators used included the following sources:

The personal opinions of media representatives who covered the operation including Tom Ricks, the Wall Street Journal; John Harris, the Washington Post; Andrew Schneider, Scripps-Howard News Service.

Opinions of key public affairs personnel involved in the operation. Included in this list are Lieutenant Colonel Tim Vane, the Joint Task Force (JTF)-180/XVII Airborne Corps Public Affairs Officer (PAO); Colonel Barry Willey, Joint Information Bureau (JIB) Director; Major Marty Culp, 10th Mountain Division/JTF-190 PAO; myself, who served as the Task Force (TF) Raleigh PAO; Major Warren Otuka, 52nd Public Affairs Detachment (PAD) Commander; Captain Rick Kirk, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) Commander. The perspectives of commanders to include Brigadier General Richard Potter, Commander, TF Raleigh, Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG); Colonel Michael Sullivan, Commander, 16 Military Police (MP) Brigade; and Lieutenant General Henry Hugh Shelton, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps.

The purpose of this research methodology was not to develop a minute by minute account of the public affairs activities in Haiti. Rather, the methodology had three purposes. The first was to understand the public affairs force in Haiti, at the time of Operation Uphold Democracy, relative to the military-media relationship. The second intent was to analyze the general actions and reactions of key public affairs participants in the operation. Finally, it was to evaluate subjectively the effectiveness of public affairs during Operation Uphold
Democracy. The three stages of research coupled with the guiding model developed enabled the acquisition and analysis of data to reach the general conclusion that public affairs, was to a large extent, effective during Operation Uphold Democracy.
Endnotes


2U.S. Army. FM 100-6, "Information Operations" (Working Draft). (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 8 July 1995), 0.

3Ibid.


CHAPTER 3
DISCUSSION

Introduction

Before discussing the public affairs mission during Operation Uphold Democracy, it is necessary for a general understanding of two subject areas that affected the mission: The public affairs force and the military-media relationship. The discussion of the public affairs force provides background on the origins of current public affairs doctrine as well as the status of future doctrine. Additionally, this section describes how the public affairs force is structured while including a brief description of the Army's public affairs education and training process. This becomes important, later, when analyzing the operation.

The second section, the military-media relationship, highlights the importance of previous experiences on the status of this relationship going into Operation Uphold Democracy. The short history provides an understanding of why the military was careful to consider the media, both in the planning and the execution of the operation. In summary, in addition to the general background, which was already addressed, these two topics provide the context in which the public affairs mission was carried out.

The last section of the chapter discusses Operation Uphold Democracy from a public affairs perspective. The sequence of the discussion follows that of the operation. It begins with a description of how the three major army components: XVIII Airborne Corps, USASOC, and 10th Mountain Division, went about planning the public affairs portion of the operation. Finally, there is a description of how the
major elements executed the public affairs mission while in Haiti. The major elements examined are JTF 180, JTF 190, TF Raleigh, and the JJB.

An understanding of the first two topics of the chapter will help in understanding the public affairs mission in Operation Uphold Democracy as well as help answer the research question: Was Army public affairs effective during Operation Uphold Democracy?

The Public Affairs Force

Public Affairs Doctrine

Doctrine is defined in FM 100-5, Operations, as "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application." An Army Command and General Staff College description is that doctrine should be comprehensive and integrated from the individual soldier to the highest echelons of the military. Additionally it should take into account leadership, material, organizations, training, and soldier quality. Meanwhile it should remain versatile not rigid, be authoritative not directive, be descriptive not prescriptive, and describe how to think not what to think. Doctrine should draw heavily on lessons learned while taking into account the factors described above in order to turn theory into practice. Finally doctrine is only effective when written doctrine is taught in institutions and is practiced by soldiers and leaders in the field.

Army public affairs doctrine is derived from three distinct sources: first, doctrine published by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD (PA)), second, the broad doctrine written by the Department of the Army for the general force, and third, doctrine developed by the Public Affairs Proponency Activity (PAPA), for the Chief of Army Public Affairs, to support Army doctrine. In writing doctrine, the content of lower level doctrine should take into account the authority of the higher level doctrine. Meanwhile, if there is a conflict involving
joint and service doctrine the joint doctrine takes precedence in
situations involving joint forces.¹

The bulk of present DoD public affairs doctrine stems from two
documents. First, a Department of Defense Directive (5122.5) signed by
then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, that "establishes
the position of ATSD [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense] (PA), with
responsibilities, functions, and authorities of the ATSD (PA)" pursuant
to the authority given in Title 10, United States Code (DoD Directive
5122.5 is a fundamental document for the operation of ASD (PA) and has
been amended several times).⁵ Second, Joint Publication 1-07, "Doctrine
for Public Affairs in Joint Operations" (First Draft) which addresses in
detail the principles of information and guidelines for coverage of
military operations spelled out as enclosures 2 and 3, respectively, to
DoD Directive 5122.5.

The Principles of Information, established on 1 December 1983,
were an initial response by the Secretary of Defense to criticism of the
military's handling of the media during Operation Urgent Fury.² The
principles were not new and they were consistent with public statements
made by previous secretaries of defense. However, the principles were
expanded by the Sidle Panel (Panel on the Military-Media Relations), in
its recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
and reaffirmed by following secretaries of defense.³ The Sidle Panel,
made its recommendations, at the request of CJCS, General Vessey, to
answer the question, "How do we conduct military operations in a manner
that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of
the operation while keeping the American public informed through the
media?"⁴ The current DoD Principles of Information as stated in DoD
Directive 5122.5 and Joint Pub 1-07 are below.

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available
timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and
the news media may assess and understand the facts about national
security and defense strategy. Requests for information for
organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely
manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles of information will apply:

1. Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification [also known as "maximum disclosure with minimum delay"]. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

2. A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

3. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

4. Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threatened the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

5. The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordinations within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs."

The other major piece of DoD doctrine is the guidelines for the coverage of U.S. military operations. These guidelines were developed after Operation Desert Shield/Storm, through a series of meetings between the media and the military. In April 1992, senior combat commanders and media representatives that took part in or reported on the operation met in a conference setting sponsored by the Robert R. McCormick Foundation. During these meetings, referred to as the Cantigny Conference Series, the participants discussed the future of the military-media relationship.16

The focus of the conference was ten proposed principles for news media coverage of military operations that had been developed through the previous meetings between both parties. Of the ten principles, they agreed on nine. The sole principle that was not agreed to was security review. The media believe that security reviews can be established internally by the media, while the military believe that lives and national interest are too important not to have a system in place to review reports to prevent "inadvertent disclosures."17
The Department of Defense, acting on the conference recommendations, adopted "the principles as the Department of Defense principles for news media coverage of DoD operations, which are set to appear formally in Joint Publication (Pub) 1-07, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, currently in draft." The principles for News Coverage of DoD Operations as stated in DoD Directive 5122.5 and as addressed in Joint Pub 1-07 are below.

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filling independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalist will, as always, file by any means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battle field situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.
The next source of doctrinal guidance is that doctrine written by the Department of the Army. The U.S. Army's keystone doctrine manual, FM 100-5, Operations recognizes "the increasingly important impact on military operations" caused by "instant communication" and the increased "capabilities" of the world media. The manual goes on to state that even the principles of war, one of the Army's doctrinal foundations, are affected. "Rapid advances in mass communication" make surprise an "increasingly difficult" principle to control. The ASD-PA recognized this when they met with the network bureau chiefs in Washington and held a conference call with network vice-presidents, several days before the planned invasion of Haiti to request assistance in maintaining surprise.

Army Doctrine also recognizes that as America moves further toward a force projection Army, planners and executors must move to consider the media impact in other ways. "The importance of understanding the immediacy of the impact of raw television coverage is not so that commanders can control it, but so they can anticipate adjustments to their operations and plans." The raw footage of a dead U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, filmed by a Somali using a personal camera and later broadcast worldwide on CNN, illustrates the enormity of the impact. As a result of that Mogadishu footage, raw footage of captured Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, and the other casualties of the Battle of the Black Sea, U.S. policy in Somalia changed.

The last source of public affairs doctrine to consider is that level which is written for the Army by the PAPA. The current capstone public affairs manual for the U.S. Army is FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations dated July 1992. Part One of the manual describes the Army public affairs mission. It states:

The mission of Army public affairs is to strengthen the Army's deterrence and warfighting powers by timely, accurate and truthful communication about our Army to soldiers, their families, and to the U.S. and foreign publics. Effective public affairs
efforts produce motivated soldiers and support from the American public, while deterring potential enemies.17

Currently, Army Public Affairs doctrine is being rewritten to correspond to Directive 5122.5 and the latest version of FM 100-5, Operations. Meanwhile, a new mission statement was drafted by the Army's Chief of Public Affairs and published as part of a vision paper released in April 1994. The "Vision 2000" document describes the public affairs mission this way:

Public Affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war.18

Presently, the Army conducts its public affairs mission through three types of programs: command information, public information and community relations programs. The command information program is targeted toward the Army's internal audience such as soldiers, their families and Department of the Army civilian employees. Public information programs provide information to American and foreign publics through the local, national and international media. Community relations programs provide a means to enhance relationships with local communities by fostering contacts between civilians and their military.19

Often the line between command information and public information becomes blurred, as when an installation commander publishes a newspaper and the news reports, editorials, and advertisements are read by people other than the intended audience, such as local civilians. More often than not it is the other way around. Media coverage of a military operation provides the Army's internal audience an additional means of receiving information.

This blurring of lines has led to the argument that PA personnel "must design and implement coordinated information communication strategies that address different channels of communication . . . , and avoid the artificial boundaries and distinctions associated with the
terms Command Information (CI), Public Information (PI), and Community Relations (CR).”

Even though there is discussion over the terminology used to describe the means to accomplish the public affairs mission, it remains that Army Public Affairs principles flow from the guidance and understanding of higher doctrine. As FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations states, "the Principles of [Army] Public Affairs are rooted in DoD's Principles of Information." The new FM 46-1, "Public Affairs Operations," currently in draft and set to be published in April 1996, states that the two sets of DoD principles provide the "overarching guidelines for [Army] Public Affairs Operations."

This continuing use of the DOD principles is important for two reasons. First, it acknowledges that the principles are the cornerstone of Army Public Affairs Doctrine. Second, it enables a timely analysis of the Army's Public Affairs Doctrine during Operation Uphold Democracy even as that doctrine is being rewritten. It was this de facto public affairs doctrine that Shelton, the JTF 180 commander, used to define the parameters for media coverage of the operation.

Another important part of public affairs doctrine is the development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG). As the current FM 46-1 states, "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) is the operational tool that guides commanders and their public affairs officers in the application of doctrine and policy during major military operations." DoD Directive 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG) prescribes the procedures to develop PPAG. Under this directive USACOM had the responsibility to develop, coordinate, and submit the PPAG to ASD(PA) for approval as part of the planning process for Operation Uphold Democracy.

Public Affairs Structure

The Army's public affairs structure is derived from both Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and Tables of Distribution and
Allowances (TDA). TO&E organizations reflect the "tactical" aspect of public affairs while the TDA organizations reflect the installation and Major Commands (MACOMs) aspect. Approximately 65 percent of uniformed PA professionals are assigned to TDA authorizations.²⁶

For the "tactical" side, doctrine, as described in FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, is the driving factor in determining the shape of the force. The TDA structure is driven by work loads, dollar constraints, the limited number of military public affairs personnel, and in some cases the level of importance given public affairs by commanders. To make up for the lack of military public affairs personnel, most TDA organizations have a large number of civilian professionals working for them. For example, as of August 1994 just prior to Operation Uphold Democracy, the USASOC (considered an Army MACOM) had four military positions, one lieutenant colonel, two majors and one staff sergeant. Of the three officer positions, the Department of the Army would only support the two majors with their officer distribution plan (the Army's method for allocating officers to authorized positions). In reality the two military positions filled were the lieutenant colonel and one of the majors. In addition to the military, nine civilian positions were authorized.²⁷

Increasingly, because of military manpower shortages, TDA manpower is used to augment "tactical" public affairs units during deployments. For example, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) public affairs sent several military personnel to support Operation Uphold Democracy, to include the command's public affairs sergeant major. Besides the obvious disruption to normal office manning in these TDA organizations, it also increases what is termed the military's "personnel tempo"; which is an indicator of the amount of time soldiers are deployed from home station conducting normal training or contingency operations.
Even though there is a willingness on the part of some civilians to deploy in support of contingency operations there are a host of reasons given for not deploying them. Right or wrong, the justifications often given include medical, legal, and perceptions by some that they do not provide the necessary visual "image" or will not be able to establish the correct rapport with the soldiers they represent.

Because of the shortage of Active Component (AC) public affairs manpower, and until recently the unwillingness to call on the reserve component (RC) for contingency support (the 1995 peacekeeping mission in Bosnia Herzegovina has a significant RC public affairs contingent), "tactical" public affairs units have also experienced an increase in their personnel tempo. The 50th PAD from Fort Stewart, Georgia, which returned in August 1994 from a scheduled three-month rotation in support of Operation Intrinsic Action in Kuwait was immediately called in September 1994 to support Operation Uphold Democracy. Major Warren Otsuka, commander of the 50th PAD, estimated that his unit was deployed for 250 days in 1994.30

As mentioned earlier, the Army's public affairs force includes RC units. In fact the bulk of the Army's tactical public affairs force is in the RC.31 With force structure changes occurring frequently, as part of the drawdown, the number of units in table 1 may change; however, it is safe to assume that as a percentage of the total the majority of the force will remain in the RC.

Public Affairs Education Process

The public affairs education process consists of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. The institutional portion includes special training for public affairs practitioners and general training for both officers and noncommissioned officers. General public affairs training for the latter group occurs as they cycle through courses such as officer and noncommissioned
Table 1
PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNITS BY COMPONENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Active Army</th>
<th>Army National Guard</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PADs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPADs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCHs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPADs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Army, author's lecture notes Command and General Staff Officers Course, "Public Affairs in Operational Planning - A753," Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, January 1996.

Officer advanced courses, the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), and precommand courses.

The amount of instruction varies with each school. For example, the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School provides a one hour block of public affairs instruction to officer, warrant officer, and NCO students enrolled in the Special Forces Qualification Course, the warrant officer course, and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANOC). Meanwhile, the CGSOC gives a mandatory three hour block of instruction to all students in their first term and then offers two elective courses to students later in the year. However, not all of the Army's branch schools include public affairs instruction in their curriculum. For example, according to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Infantry Center and School does not provide media courses. Like most courses, public affairs constantly vies for classroom hours and justification for the instruction provided. Interestingly, when TRADOC was asked for the number of branch schools providing media training they could not provide an exact answer. However, they are in the process of gathering the information for the
Chief of Army's Public Affairs to use. In addition, PAPA has been able
to get TRADOC to approve a core public affairs course designed for all
TRADOC leadership schools. While the program of instruction has not
been designed, two core tasks have been identified: participate in an
interview and implement a public affairs plan. This is a step in the
right direction toward fixing a significant training shortfall.

Special training usually begins at the Defense Information
School (DINFOS) located at Fort Meade, Maryland where "DINFOS provides
entry-level training for U.S. military public affairs professionals."
Two levels of instruction are taught at the school. The first level is
oriented toward officers and civilians in or going to public affairs
positions and the other toward the enlisted soldiers and civilians. The
enlisted soldiers focus on accomplishing the command information
function of public affairs.

This is accomplished by teaching basic journalism and
broadcasting skills to new recruits and civilians working in command
information positions at units, MACOMs, and installations. This initial
public affairs education is followed up later by the ANOC and similar
courses for civilians. During this two-week course, NCOs are given
instruction focused on media relations in addition to the command
information. A normal course provides nine hours of media relations
instruction as part of the curriculum.

According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, "officers
are accessioned into FA (Functional Area) 46 between their fifth and
eighth year of commissioned service." By taking in officers at this
juncture in their career, the Department of the Army hopes to attain
what it considers its primary requirement for military spokespersons:
credibility. Credibility stems from a thorough mastery of an officer's
basic branch coupled with experiences and demonstrated abilities. The
Public Affairs Officer Course (PAOC) is mandatory before being assigned
to an officer's first public affairs position. The "PAOC is a 10 week
course designed to provide instruction and comprehension of the theory concepts, polices, and principles of public affairs within a military environment. This includes instruction in the three functional areas of public information, command information, and community relations. Since it is a Department of Defense School, the bulk of the course is taught using "joint" material and doctrine. Of the ten weeks (actual time is nine weeks and four days), nineteen hours are allotted to army personnel for service instruction based on unique army requirements, regulations, and procedures. Army officers and senior civilians are afforded additional public affairs training later in their careers, including the Senior Public Affairs Officer Course, Army Advanced Public Affairs Course, the Air Force Short Course in Communications, and for selected officers graduate school and Training with Industry. Also, later in their careers, officers may decide to "single-track" in public affairs. This means that officers forgo assignments in their basic branch in lieu of public affairs assignments. The Army's requirement for credibility means that this usually will occur after selection to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The priority of public affairs training for soldiers in units varies from commander to commander, from PAO to PAO, and from post to post. Often the shortage of public affairs personnel leaves little time for PAOs to provide instruction on dealing with the media. However, if a unit requests training assistance from an associated public affairs office, they will usually receive it.

Often, however, the request occurs just prior to a combat training center deployment or an actual contingency operation. In 1990, Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vouno, directed that media training be set up "to be integrated into scenarios at our combat training centers [CTCs]." According to public affairs officers at both the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center, media
training is now a routine and significant part of a unit’s experience while rotating through a CTC.44

According to Major Marty Culp, 10th Infantry Division PAO, he and his public affairs staff conducted media training as part of the division’s predeployment training in August of 1994. The training entailed briefings, classes and mock interviews designed to permit soldiers interview experience before an actual media encounter. Culp stated that he believed that the training was a significant enabling factor in how the division soldiers later dealt with the media.45

Meanwhile, part of the program of instruction for National Guard SF soldiers receiving Haitian Orientation Training (HOT) prior to deploying to Haiti in 1995, was a two hour block of instruction on media relations. The classroom instruction was followed up when national and international media representatives were worked into later training. For example, the culmination of HOT entailed the SF soldiers reacting to various situations already encountered or possible in Haiti, like dealing with large demonstrations or "manifestations," as they are called in Haiti, and reacting to snipers. In these cases the media became an active part of the soldier’s training as they gathered news, in much the same way the media did in Haiti.

A problem facing units, as they train, is that there are no TRADOC approved tasks, conditions, and standards to apply toward public affairs training. Each CTC, each installation, and each unit goes about training differently. While there is a move to establish a common set of tasks, they have not been agreed to yet, and when they do it will take time to get them distributed to units.

Military-Media Relationship

The military-media relationship in the United States has been a long and sometimes controversial one. During the American Revolution, "patriot newspapers cooperated with the revolutionary military, publishing proclamations and orders, and spreading any desirable
information." In most cases the newspapers did not have reporters with the troops so "sources for war news were other publications, official proclamations and letters from eyewitnesses." These news sources did not require any security reviews because the reports "arrived too late to be of any use to the enemy." "

However, in the 1850s correspondents began to use the telegraph to transmit dispatches from the field to their newspaper offices. Since news gathering could now affect the outcome of future conflicts, the War Department began efforts to censor news reports. For example, after the Union defeat at First Manassas, General Winfield Scott, commander in chief of the Union Army, in an attempt to prevent the word of defeat from spreading, imposed a "strict censorship on the telegraph."

Although mostly in a haphazard fashion, this process continued through both the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. In some cases, however, as during the civil war, censorship was self imposed. Because, as Cutler J. Andrews wrote in *The North Reports the Civil War*, "complete objectivity from reporters was too much to expect, since the building of both civilian and military morale generally was considered an essential part of their work." In general, the relationship between military leaders and the press became a bitter one as the "inherent tensions between the aims of journalists and the aims of soldiers in wartime" became evident.

World War I, World War II, and the Korean Conflict each brought additional efforts to control the media and their reporting. The Espionage Act, enacted in 1917 during World War I, outlawed publication of any material that might benefit the enemy. Along with the Sedition Act of 1918, which prohibited the criticism of government "conduct or actions," the Espionage Act was used as a justification for media censorship. In addition to public laws, the government and the military relied on the media to accept voluntary censorship. Of course the voluntary nature of the censorship was questionable.
To report on the war, each correspondent had to be certified as an accredited or a visiting correspondent. . . . swear an oath, put up a $10,000 bond, and sign an agreement to submit all correspondence, except personal letters, to the press officer or his assistant (Personal letters were censored elsewhere with the regular mail). 53

During World War II the military-media relationship was similar. At the outset of America's involvement in World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of War Information and the Office of Censorship. Even though censorship was in place, the media, responding to the general patriotic mood, accepted the censorship with little argument. As in previous wars, access to the military was very much controlled by both the government and military. 54

The Korean Conflict was unique in that initial reporting was governed by guidelines established by the media themselves. However, after receiving criticism for the tone of their reporting, members of the press actually called on the government to institute censorship. 55 Once in place the "censorship extended well beyond security concerns" to include prohibiting the media from portraying negative images of the military or its operations. 56 The relationship at the end of the Korean Conflict was not necessarily bad, but it was also not very good and did not bode well for the next conflict.

Much has been written about the military-media relationship during the Vietnam Conflict in the 1960s and early 1970s. In general, the media were content with the manner in which they were able to report. As Peter Braestrup wrote in the introduction to John Fialka's Hotel Warriors, "many prominent journalists" invoke "the Vietnam experience--as a kind of a Golden Age." 57 They believed that the reporting during this period was "free and independent." In fact they are correct, no censorship was imposed and they were allowed to report unimpeded. 58 On the other side, however, the military was distressed with what was reported. Many in the military still believe that reporting was too free, independent, and negative. In a recent Freedom Forum First Amendment Center survey, 64 percent of those polled
believe "somewhat" or "strongly" that media coverage harmed the military efforts in Vietnam. As a result, the military-media relationship deteriorated to a level resembling the animosity of the American Civil War.

When the United States invaded Grenada in 1983, relations between the two sides were still poor. Citing operational security reasons, the military was able to get the administration to go along with a news blackout of Operation Urgent Fury, not allowing media to cover the operation until the third day. By the time reporters were able to get on the island most assault troops were back in the United States. The media were furious over being shut out of the short-lived operation and not being able to provide independent accounts. John Chancellor's NBC News Commentary provides a summation of the media's concerns.

The American Government is doing whatever it wants to do in Grenada without any representative of the American public watching what it's doing. No stories in your newspapers or magazines, no pictures in your living room.

Recognizing the need to fix a major problem and avoid similar controversy in the future, the CJCS, General John W. Vessey, Jr., empaneled a commission (The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Panel on the Military-Media Relations) of military officers and journalists to investigate the Grenada curbs and to formulate guidelines for press coverage of future actions.

After Grenada and before Operation Uphold Democracy there have been several opportunities for the military and the media to accommodate each other as the Siddle Panel recommended, or in some cases to confront each other. Two significant ones were Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. During Operation Just Cause the military made a good faith effort to fix problems encountered in Grenada and employ the recommendations of the Siddle Panel. However, the efforts fell short of success as they employed one of the recommendations of the Siddle Panel for the first time, the DOD National Media Pool (DNMP). The
DNMP allows a small number of news media representatives, mobilized by the ATSD (PA), to represent a larger group of media organizations for news gathering and sharing who, because of operational security reasons or space limitations, cannot cover the first stages of a contingency. "Because of the coordination and support problems, General Colin Powell, CJCS, acknowledged that the pool "was unable to cover the military actions until the second day and, consequently, did not perform as planned."

In addition to the pool problems, Powell stated, military assets were overwhelmed by the more than 800 reporters who arrived to cover the operations.

In a May 1990 directive, Powell reminded the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) that "military actions in Grenada and Panama demonstrated that otherwise successful operations are not total successes unless the media aspects are properly handled." It was with this directive that the Army launched into Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

There were a multitude of reasons for problems between the military, particularly the Army, and the media during the "Gulf War." Two of the main ones were space and time. The distances between field units and communication nodes capable of sending media reports were immense, yet the likelihood of any media transmission being immediately available to the Iraqis was just as great. Therefore, the Army, for security reasons and a general lack of trust in the media, forfeited the opportunity to have its story told. However, in looking at postwar polls, most Americans did not feel that the media or they themselves were shortchanged by the military's media policy and were content to receive war news directly from Central Command and Pentagon briefers. Nonetheless, the Army, concluding that the Marines gained an inordinate amount of media attention for their part in the offensive, began to look closer at the way in which the media were treated.

Hoping to get favorable coverage of U.S. efforts to provide food to thousands of starving Somalis in 1992, the military overplayed media.
opportunities. The media were given the locations where Marines would be landing in Somalia, including the location of an initial reconnaissance element making a landing during early morning darkness. From the public's point of view, the result was to make both sides look bad. The military looked bad for providing too much information on future operations and the media looked bad for endangering Marines by using bright camera lights to cover the event.

Another low point during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia occurred with the coverage of the Battle of the Black Sea when both the military and the media failed in their responsibilities. Fearing for their lives, after the Somalis killed several journalists covering the operation during 1993, most journalists left Somalia. This left one western reporter, from the Toronto Star, to cover events in Somalia and the battle. On the military side, in a scenario similar to Operation Desert Storm, the military failed, initially, to allow full reporting about U.S. Army Rangers after they conducted, perhaps, the most fierce fire fight since the Vietnam conflict. Because of security concerns, very little of the story was made public until it became apparent that the American people, hearing only the media conducting post conflict analysis, were not fully aware of the heroic story.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S. McGraw, the USASOC PAO, likened the coverage of the battle to that of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. The Rangers won a tremendous victory but the message transmitted by the media was one of failure and debacle. Had the military been more forthcoming on the results of the fire fight the message may have been transmitted differently. It was after this last episode in the military-media relationship that the planning for Operation Uphold Democracy began.
Mission
Planning

Plans for the invasion of Haiti were in existence as far back as 1983, with CONPLAN 2367, which entailed the 82nd Airborne jumping into Port-au-Prince to restore civil order and conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). In September 1993 the old plan was taken off the shelf and corps planners began to rework the plan to fit Shelton's guidance. The key planning headquarters during the initial planning, which began in November 1993, were XVIII Airborne Corps and USASOC. To conduct the operation USACOM stood up Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 which was formed around XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters. USASOC contributed an ad hoc Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) and prepared to provide forces to TF Raleigh, which was the primary USASOC contribution to the operation. Task Force Raleigh was in turn formed around the 3rd Special Forces Group. Later, as part of OPLAN 2380, the permissive entry plan, 10th Mountain Division became JTF 190. The Army's public affairs planning for the operation took place at different levels, in different locations, with different start times, and with very different ideas of what was being planned. The XVIII Airborne Corps conducted planning under assumptions that called for them to control the mission's execution and then to hand over responsibility to a stay behind force. Under OPLAN 2370 that force was TF Raleigh under Brigadier General Richard Potter. Under OPLAN 2380 that force became the 10th Mountain Division. Therefore, XVIII Airborne Corps PA mission remained relatively constant while TF Raleigh's varied in size and scope, depending on the OPLAN executed. Meanwhile, the 10th Mountain Division PA developed their OPLAN 2380 public affair annex under the assumption that they were the main force and that they would have responsibility for all PA activities in Haiti. To them this also included manning the JIB.
XVIII Airborne Corps Planning

The XVIII Airborne Corps PAO, Colonel Grubb, was involved in the planning process in December 1993 and was responsible for writing a large portion of the corps' public affairs annex before he was transferred to a new assignment (commandant of DINFOS). Initially, Grubb and his deputy, Mr. Gene Sexton, were the only corps PA staff members "read on" to or authorized knowledge of the top-secret compartmented plan. Grubb was replaced in May 1994 by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Vane, an artillery officer with several years of public affairs experience who had just finished a year of training with a civilian public relations firm. In the switch over, between Grubb and Vane, there was a lapse in planning before Vane was read on to the still compartmented plan.

This compartmentalization led to coordination problems between PA planning agencies, specifically between USACOM, XVIII Airborne Corps, USASOC, 82nd Airborne Division, and 10th Mountain Division. In fact before Vane took over in May, there was no planning coordination between Corps PA and USASOC PA. The one earlier attempt by USASOC to coordinate with XVIII Airborne Corps before Vane was read on created a security "situation." The code words and procedures used that would allow individuals to talk about the plan were not the same at Corps as at USASOC. So both PA parties could only stare and nod knowingly at each other. To increase the coordination problems, USACOM was also switching out its PAO. Captain Zackum, U.S. Navy, was replaced by Colonel Tyrel, U.S. Air Force. Furthermore, the 82nd Airborne Division PAO, Major Hinnant did not have a top secret clearance, so he was not aware of the details of the plan until about "10 days to two weeks" before the operation. Likewise, the 10th Mountain Division PAO, Major Marty Culp, was unaware of the details of OPLAN 2370.

After being "read on" Vane began to pick up where Grubb had left off. By August, Vane and three other members of the corps PA staff (Mr.
Gene Sexton, Deputy Corps PAO; Major Ken Fugget, Corps Media Relations Officer; and Major Scott Peterman, 22nd MPAD Commander), who were "read on" to the program, continued to develop the annex with the focus toward identifying public affairs structure necessary to accomplish the mission. Included in the analysis were requirements for CI programs, media escorts, and the JIB.77

Working with USACOM and after several days worth of discussion, the JIB was designed to have three sections: a planning cell, a media operations cell and an administration cell. The actual manning was determined at USACOM. In an effort to provide a "joint flavor," USACOM requested the bulk of the personnel from the other services, even though the mission was primarily an army one. In the end there was only one army officer assigned to the JIB.80 However, as they went through the planning process it became obvious that there was not a doctrinal document that they could refer to that would provide guidance on what the JIB organization should look like.

As Vane stated, "everybody says JIB, but what they really mean is 'ad hocary'."81 This lack of joint doctrine lead to problems with the operational planners because what Corps PA was requesting was a best guess with no doctrinal basis. Another part of the planning problem concerned the JIB's equipment. Since JIBs are not standing organizations, the equipment necessary to operate one has to be requested every time you want to use one. But, because of the plan's compartmentalization, corps could not request the JIB equipment requirements early enough to ensure they would have it. Therefore, when the requirements did go out they were pitted against the requirements of the operational forces. Corps PA faced additional problems when it requested resources through USACOM. Instead of supporting the request, USACOM would state "well, look, you're the bulk of the joint task force, the XVIII Airborne Corps, you get it from your own sources, we're not
going to get it for you." Whether this was a personality problem at USACOM or whether it is an institutional problem is problematical.

Meanwhile, in mid-August, Corps requested USACOM to send JIB representatives to Fort Bragg to conduct a rehearsal and work out some of the internal organizational issues. While some representatives did arrive, the plan's classification level prevented most JIB members from participating in the gathering. In reality, with the exception of the XVIII Airborne Corps personnel, the rehearsal participants were not the same people who actually took part in the operation or manning of the JIB. And although there were efforts to rehearse JIB operations and work issues once the JIB arrived at Fort Bragg several days before the operation, the reality was that those efforts were overcome by the multitude of tasks necessary to ready JIB members to deploy to Haiti.

In the July/August time frame, as the expectation of executing the mission began to increase, Corps PA began focusing on accommodating the media. According to Vane, the initial USACOM public affairs plan, developed under Zackum, called for the DNMP to arrive after the planned invasion had already taken place. However, a major lesson learned from previous operations demonstrated the importance of the timely arrival of the DNMP. The new planners recognized very early that they needed to plan for including the DNMP early in the operation.

In previous contingency operations, most notably Operation Urgent Fury in Panama, the timing of the pool's arrival was not well coordinated. Commanders on the ground were not aware of DNMP requirements and were therefore not prepared to provide the necessary support to make the pool's operation work. Tyrel and Vane made it a priority to ensure the pool was properly coordinated.

The plan they developed called for the media to gather at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland and receive a classified briefing, fly to Fort Bragg where they would receive another classified briefing, be outfitted with limited military equipment (flak jackets, Kevelar
helmets, etc.), and then be transported to the units they were to accompany during the invasion. Although XVIII Airborne Corps agreed to outfit the media, it was not without some reservation. Corps' reservation was, in part, due to the limited amount of time and personnel available to handle the media and also because the individuals who were to conduct the sizing and issuing of equipment were the same soldiers preparing for a combat parachute assault.

Two key initiatives were supposed to help the execution of the plan. First, the pool was to be broken down into manageable numbers and assigned to units that would have the responsibility to provide access and house them. Second, Tyrel wanted to assign pool members to units according to the type media they represented and their unique needs. For example, radio representatives were given the opportunity to fly with the 82nd Airborne's aircraft because audio could help describe the story.

This plan was briefed to ASD (PA) personnel and eventually to White House communication personnel, including David Gergan. The White House personnel basically said, "we've looked at your plan and that makes sense to us." Much more than any annex could, the briefing laid out how the XVIII Airborne Corps saw, not just the DNMP portion of the operation, but the entire public affairs mission in Haiti. The briefing outlined historical problems and the anticipated "story" phases of the operation. In addition it outlined PAO actions involving specific phases with the media's reactions and PAO responses to media reactions. And, finally, it described how to win the information war while providing definitions of success. In essence the briefing stated that "Access + Perception = Victory for the public affairs force."

As noted earlier, another important part of the planning process entails the development of PPAG. While each subordinate unit develops PPAG, USACOM had the ultimate responsibility to develop, coordinate, and submit the PPAG to ASD(PA) for approval. However, the PPAG developed
by XVIII Airborne Corps and USACOM was never sent up to DoD for approval. According to Lieutenant Colonel Baxter Enis, at USACOM public affairs, the reason the PPAG was not sent to ASD (PA) was the misguided desire for a 100 percent rather than an eighty percent solution. Brian Kilgallen, ASD (PA), attributed this to the fact that USACOM was apparently unaware that they were supposed to get it up to DoD for approval so that DoD could send it out in the form of a message. Kilgallen also stated that USACOM failed to provide the guidelines and ground rules requested by ASD (PA). In the absence of USACOM's recommendations, DoD published the guidelines and ground rules themselves. Kilgallen also attributed much of the confusion to newly arrived PA practitioners at both DoD and at USACOM who did not have a grasp of the proper procedures for such operations. This left Culp and Vane without approved guidance to deal with the media representatives who began to appear at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg.

Another area that received attention by Vane was media training for commanders. The purpose of this preparation was to get the commanders mentally ready to handle the media. Vane thought that to prepare commanders would require providing them an understanding of the technical sophistication reporters possessed, knowledge of the large numbers they could expect to face, and an understanding that hoping would not make the media will go away. With the support of Shelton, Vane was given thirty minutes at the 8 September commander's conference to provide this and other material in a briefing called "Fighting the Information War."

In his briefing "Winning the Information War," Vane laid out a fairly accurate prediction concerning the evolution of the Operation Uphold Democracy "story." Not only was the briefing instructive for commanders, Vane relied on it as the operation unfolded. Vane often referred back to it to guide his reactions and recommendations to the
Shelton as a new phase of the operation approached. The phases as Vane saw them were:

Phase I - Development. World crises, official statements and leaks start major stories. Military aspects considered.

Phase II - Momentum. Rhetoric builds, tension mounts, speculation increases. Queries to Fort Bragg begin.

Phase III - Speculation/tension increase. If deployment orders given, local media will see signs and pass to networks; the result is instant national exposure and loss surprise.

Phase IV - Execution. If U.S. forces used, the media crush will be heavy. Be prepared for live-reports, instant analysis and judgement of performance. This phase will last as long as U.S. force are active combatants.

Phase V - Judgement. Media will scrutinize the plan, the execution and the repercussions. They'll determine how well or poorly the Corps performed and look for discrepancies between official statements and ground truth. Demands on Corps for info and other support still heavy.

Phase VI - Sustainment. Pace will slow as media begins to pull the A-Team out and put in second stringers as other stories develop. If trouble flairs, be prepared for increased media coverage. Chance here for good stories on soldiers.

Phase VII - Story Fatigue. Coverage eventually dies out as the public and the media lose interest. Intermittent stories.

Vane's briefing also stressed JTF 180 getting out three key messages to the public. However, it was the first message, which concerned the purpose behind the operation that proved most important.

To assist the soldiers in informing the public of the purpose behind the operation, Vane had the four points of the JTF's mission statement printed on small cards and distributed to the members of the JTF.

Your mission in Haiti is:

a. Neutralize Haitian armed forces and police to protect U.S. citizens and interests, designated Haitians and third country nationals
b. Restore civil order
c. Conduct nation assistance to stabilize internal situation
d. Assist in the transition to a democratic Haiti

After the invasion was cancelled, the JTF's mission in Haiti, obviously, no longer involved the neutralization of the Haitian armed forces and its police force.
Vane also had printed on the cards generic media guidelines for JTF 180 participants. Two key points on the cards highlighted the good faith effort made by the Corps to ensure open and independent coverage of the operation:

For the first 48 hours in country [Haiti], there will be more media than PAO's. They may record your actions and activities. Politely ask them to stay out of your way, but you may not interfere with their news-gathering activities. If there is time and it doesn't interfere with your mission you may answer their questions to the best of your ability as long as you follow the guidelines on this card.

After the first 48 hours, reporters may come to your unit. If they do not have a PA escort or a JTF 180 accreditation badge, you do not have to answer their questions or assist them in any manner. Tell them to go to the Joint Information Bureau (at the USIS [United States Information Service] facility near the American Embassy) to get accredited. If they are escorted or if they do have a badge, you may answer their questions to the best of your ability, but inform your chain of command after you are done."

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Planning

Meanwhile at USASOC, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S. McGraw was brought into USASOC's planning process in February 1994. Although USASOC was involved prior to that time it was not until the February time frame that USASOC formed a JOCPG consisting of USASOC staff members with augmentation from USSOCOM. And although McGraw was aware that planning was being conducted, he was not aware of the details until he was "read on" to the program. When McGraw, saw the scope of the planning required he had Staff Sergeant Keith Butler, the only enlisted member on the USASOC PA staff, read on to the program as well. 100

The initial OPLAN 2370 guidance to the joint operational planning group (JOPG) had Potter as the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander and later becoming the Commander, U.S. Forces Haiti (COMUSFORHAITI). Since Potter's staff would be an ad hoc organization the requirement was to build a public affairs structure from the ground up capable of supporting both a JSOTF and later COMUSFORHAITI. In March, after recognizing additional requirements, McGraw had Major Damian Carr "read on" to the program. 101 USASOC
conducted several planning sessions, lasting for several days, at Fort Bragg. In addition to the several day ventures, USASOC created a small full-time staff to coordinate the part-time efforts of the other members of the JOPG.

USASOC's initial PA efforts went toward identifying equipment, personnel, and space requirements to conduct media center operations. In the process it was discovered that very little documentation was available to help determine those requirements. Documents that were available included a draft copy of Joint Pub 1-07, course handouts from the DINFOS JIB exercise, as well as PA documents from U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR) 50th anniversary of D-Day commemoration. Again, because of the secrecy involved, there was some concern about externally requesting information that might provide an indication of USASOC's planning efforts.

The other part of USASOC's planning entailed how and when to get the media to cover the SF mission in Haiti. Because of security concerns about the units and tactics involved, TF Raleigh did not support the idea of media accompanying the SF units on the initial assault. While there was discussion about the possibilities and who might be invited to cover the assault, in the end the ideas did not have the commander's support. The question then became how to link the media up with the SF in the country, a question that went unanswered throughout the planning process.102

The JOPG continued planning until Lieutenant General J.T. Scott, the commanding general of USASOC, realized that the way the plan was being developed a sizable portion of his "nondeployable" staff was being tasked to support the JSOTF. From then on, he directed that, while the JOPG could develop the plan, 3rd SFG would be the primary force to execute it. Once 3rd SFG assumed control and began their own detailed planning, the USASOC PA staff limited its input. The result was that, in the end, the input that had been provided in the form of the PA annex
was forgotten. Not having a PA staff member continue the planning and address and resolve manpower and equipment issues left a void in the PA portion of the plan. It also killed any remaining chances to incorporate media on the initial assaults. The acting 3rd SFG personnel officer, Major Mark O'Neill, made efforts to follow up on the initial planning. When 3rd SFG began to look at OPLAN 2380, O'Neill was able to use portions of the OPLAN 2370 PA annex to identify the required PA assets needed to support the task force under the new plan. At one point members of the 22nd MPAD, the Army’s only AC MPAD, arrived at 3rd SFG for an operational briefing and inprocessing. As it turned out these were the same individuals scheduled to support corps as part of OPLAN 2370. The PA personnel to support the group during OPLAN 2370 were not identified until the group had already departed for Haiti.15 Meanwhile, O’Neill was unable to do much to correct the problems he encountered because he was soon moved to command one of the group’s companies. His departure broke the last link in the continuity chain, since 3rd SFG was unable to fill his vacated position until after the start of the operation. The lack of PA involvement from the USASOC staff and the departure of O’Neill was the end of any public affairs activity in TF Raleigh until 14 September 1994, four days before the invasion.

10th Mountain Division Planning

In August 1994 the 10th Mountain Division PA was notified that the division would be taking part in a permissive entry operation involving Haiti. The division PAO, Major Marty Culp, an Army aviator with JTF PA experience in both Somalia and Florida (Hurricane Andrew), was told that he would be responsible for running a JTF PA operation in Haiti.

His immediate problem was that “there is not a book you can open and say, here is what a JTF public affairs office looks like.”124 So Culp had to borrow from his previous PA experiences to plan a JIB
structure that he thought would meet the JTF's needs. Along the way he asked for and received guidance from other PAOs to include Colonel Rausch, the FORSCOM PAO, and Colonel Barry Willey, soon to be the JIB director in Haiti. Both had extensive operational experience as PAOs. During the planning process Willey went up to Fort Drum and consulted with Culp face to face on the JIB structure. According to Culp, Willey "massaged" the plan a bit and provided some additional input. Soon after that the requirements were validated by the division operations officer and sent up to USACOM for approval. To Culp's surprise, most of the requirements that they had identified and requested arrived before the division deployed. However, in a situation similar to the one faced by TF Raleigh, the 10th Mountain plan called for PA augmentation from the 22nd MPAD, which was the same MPAD being used by XVIII Airborne Corps for OPLAN 2370.

After developing the JIB structure Culp flew down to Washington with Willey to meet with representatives of ASD (PA) and attend a briefing that DoD gave to White House representatives. The briefing, titled, "Winning the Information War," outlined the media's needs and the military's plan to accommodate those needs while providing information to the American public during the different phases of the operation. There were no significant issues raised during the brief and it appeared as if the White House approved of the concepts as briefed.

According to Culp, his understanding of the plan was that the division would be working directly for USACOM and that Willey would become the USACOM's spokesman at the JIB. At one point, the planners were considering infiltrating Willey into Haiti prior to the invasion so that he would be in place at the USIS building to provide information to the media as the spokesman. However, the Joint Staff canceled the plan a few days before execution "because of security concerns" and Willey accompanied the DNMP down to Guantanamo Bay before arriving in Haiti on 20 September.
Culp spent the remaining time before deploying preparing the soldiers of the division to deal with the media. As stated previously the training incorporated briefings, classes, and mock interviews conducted by 27th PAD personnel.

Predeployment Activities

The execution of the public affairs plan began with Secretary of Defense Perry authorizing the predeployment of invasion forces during the first week of September 1994.\textsuperscript{10} For both JTF 180 and JTF 190 the predeployment public affairs activities included reception and integration of JIB augmentees and conducting the unit deployment preparations. At Fort Bragg and Fort Drum, however, a great effort also focused toward handling the expected increase in media queries and reception of the media pools.\textsuperscript{11}

Proposed Public Affairs Guidance

The XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate commands were careful to let DoD and DA answer media queries on the subject of possible deployment. In response to a media query, Joan Malloy, deputy media relations officer for XVIII Airborne Corps stated to The Charlotte Observer:

I can give you the same line we give everybody else. We do not discuss the alert status of our soldiers, nor do we discuss possible deployments. Any announcements of possible deployments will be made at the Department of Defense level.\textsuperscript{12}

Meanwhile, DoD was more than willing to talk about possibilities of an invasion. Many senior leaders talked openly about how the invasion buildup was "designed to be transparent" in an effort to coerce the generals out of Haiti right up to "D-Day."\textsuperscript{112} For example, a Washington Times report, describing the psychological warfare campaign, referred to a Pentagon official who said, "What we're doing is clearly letting Cedras and his boys know that time is very short."\textsuperscript{113}

However, one reason DoD was the sole voice was that USACOM had not sent the PPAG to ASD (PA) in timely manner. Therefore, when the
media did arrive at Fort Bragg and Fort Drum the public affairs offices did not have the appropriate PAG to respond with. Therefore units were involved in very obvious deployment activities but installations were unable to address them in an intelligent manner because of a lack of PAG. At DoD, this tactic might have been acceptable because it allowed DoD to answer all queries. However, at the installation public affairs level it made the process of doing business difficult and reduced the installation's credibility with local and national media. Giving even a limited amount of PAG in a timely manner would have alleviated some of the problems for the installations.

Media pools

Before the invasion planes left for Haiti, Vane had overseen the arrival of not only the DNMP but also a pool of independent reporters. This second pool of reporters became known as the unilateral pool, because while the DNMP was working under rules that required it to pool its material, the second pool did not have the same restrictions and could report unilaterally. The unilateral pool was put together about 48 hours before execution time. It appears that as soon as the secrecy of the invasion plan was lifted the military services began individual attempts to garner media coverage. Lead by the Navy's Chief of Information, Rear Admiral Kendal Pease, the services assembled the second pool of about 50 media representatives. At Fort Bragg, the additional pool members were distributed among the units participating. While some remained at Fort Bragg, other media representatives boarded an aircraft headed toward Guantanamo Bay to link up with the units they were being assigned to.

While the last minute attempt by the services to add a number of media to cover the mission was a great idea on the surface, underneath it resulted in turmoil. The "unilaterals" usurped DNMP events, resulting in pool's escorts losing credibility. Also commanders were
not at all pleased to have the additional media thrown at them in the last moments before execution.\footnote{117}

The lack of notice that DoD had about the operation, due to its compartmented nature, precluded DoD from briefing media escorts on the mission and completing much coordination.\footnote{119} People were tasked at the last moment and had very little understanding of the mission. The DoD media escort team consisted of Commander Alan Dooley, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Wood, Lieutenant Colonel Susan Hoene, Lieutenant Commander Jeff Gradik and Major Nelson McCouch, none of whom had any prior knowledge of the operation. McCouch was notified on 14 September of the escort mission. On 16 September, he arrived at Fort Bragg and on 18 September he arrived at Guantanamo Bay with the DNMP.\footnote{117} According to Dooley, the escorts had three tasks. "Our concern was to get the media to the right place, ensure their equipment got to the right place and, third, to establish communications to ensure that the media could file their stories."\footnote{120}

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Doble, the senior media escort for the unilateral pool was in the same situation. On 16 September, three days before the scheduled invasion this other group of escort officers were being notified that they were going to accompany an ad hoc group of reporters into Haiti. This "son of the DoD media pool was hastily arranged to assist major news organizations in covering our entry into Haiti. All the networks, weekly news magazines and wire services were represented."\footnote{121} Some PA planners at DoD wanted the unilateral to go in a day after the DNMP: "the powers that be agreed that they could go the same day but that they would go four hours after the DNMP had left."\footnote{122} However, because of the limited time available little if any coordination at the unit level was conducted for this second media pool.

One good point of the second pool was that it allowed local media to accompany home town units. Fayetteville, home of the XVIII Airborne Corps and 3rd SFG, was well represented with media. The
The Fayetttville Observer Times, alone, had four slots, two initially and two at the last minute when another media organization failed to show. This single action helped solidify long standing relationships between local media and the military they report on. As Steve Devane, a reporter for the Fayetteville Observer Times and member of the unilateral pool stated, "the whole thing was a jewel."123

While the merit of a second pool is open to debate, its formulation was certainly contrary to the rationale of establishing the DNMP in the first place. By pooling media they can accompany initial assaults, that otherwise due to operational security, space, and time limitations they would not be allowed to cover.124 To be part of the pool the different news organizations on the DNMP representing national audiences agree to share the products they produce. The argument for the unilateral pool was stated by Clifford H. Bernath, Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Bernath stated, "the reason we wanted unilateralals there was because the services wanted them to cover each of the services' elements of the mission--not the operation, not the actual combat assault, because that's the media pool."125 However, that is mistaken. Some of the unilateral pool members were going to take part in the initial phase of the operation with no requirement to pool their material. Steve Devane of the Fayetteville Observer Times was one of them.126 Tom Ricks of the Wall Street Journal was another. As Ricks said about being invited to cover the invasion, "I was part of Kendell Pease's pool, you know; we're going to invade Haiti it would be an awful shame if you weren't with us type of phone calls."127

Perhaps, the greatest public affairs failure during the operation involved the lack of coordination involving the DNMP and the unilateral pool. As one DNMP escort wrote in an after action report, "throughout the operation it was painfully evident that DoD/PA did not task for support. Everywhere the DoD media pool went it was the same
story: "We didn't know you were coming!" At Fort Bragg, with the full weight and support of a media conscious corps commander, the lack of coordination was a relatively easy fix. In addition, Colonel Mark A. Brzozowski, director of plans for ASD(PA) and Enis, deputy USACOM PAO, arrived at Fort Bragg to assist in sorting out the anticipated problems. However, at Guantanamo Bay, aboard ships, and in Haiti, the situation was not the same.

Pool coordination at Guantanamo Bay was poor at best. The flight operations at Guantanamo Bay and SOF had no idea that the DNMP and unilateral pool would arrive at this particular initial staging base (ISB). Once there the DNMP was held up because the base's flight operations personnel wanted message traffic requesting transportation support.

Another example of the lack of coordination was the unique channels through which public affairs information flowed. Public affairs messages concerning the deployment of the DNMP were sent to the Guantanamo Bay PAO and JTF 160 (the JTF responsible for handling Haitian and Cuban refugee crisis). It appears that part of the problem rested in ASD(PA)'s lack of knowledge of OPLAN 2370. Brian Kilgallen, an ASD(PA) plans officer stated during an interview that he was unaware that SOF were staging at Guantanamo. Therefore, instead of coordination with SOF PAOs, coordination was being conducted with two other PAOs at Guantanamo, the JTF 160 PAO and the Navy's PAO stationed at Guantanamo Bay. Both had limited knowledge of OPLAN 2370 but no knowledge, at least initially, of PAOs being with the SOF. This apparent lack of coordination is even more troubling given that the DNMP was activated and flown down to Guantanamo Bay in July, ostensibly to cover Cuban and Haitian refugees as part of DoD pool rehearsal.

As the invasion date neared, a JTF-188 counter intelligence officer who had established a working relationship with the Navy's PAO at Guantanamo Bay (he had the PAO "read onto" OPLAN 2370) was informed
by the PAO that two groups of media representatives were going to arrive at the Guantanamo Bay airfield. Obviously, this agitated the counter intelligence officer and the other SOF planners working out of the hanger at the airfield. The Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) PAO and the TF Raleigh PAO were directed by their superiors to get the media out of the area as quickly as possible while ensuring they saw very little of the SOF preparations. Unaware that there was a difference between the two groups of media that were arriving, the two PAOs began to work with the navy’s flight operations officer to transport the media elsewhere. Once the unilateral pool arrived, its escorts, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Doble, took over coordinating transportation for the pool. However, even then it was evident that things were not going according to any plan.

In the meantime an air conditioned planning facility was found to temporarily house the unilateral pool. The location did not allow easy access to the SOF and the media could not observe much of the preparations and specialized equipment. Unfortunately, one of the SOF planners, an air force colonel exhibiting little common sense, directed that the air conditioning be turned off in the building where the unilateral pools were sequestered. He contended that if the media were in Guantanamo Bay they ought to suffer in the heat and humidity like the invasion force. This had the effect of driving the media out of the stifling building to where there was a breeze and therefore could observe SOF preparations and equipment.

In the meantime the PAOs on Guantanamo received word that the second group of media had arrived aboard a C-141 cargo aircraft. This was the delayed DNMP. Their arrival created an even larger problem when the DNMP escorts stated that the two groups of media, the DNMP and the unilateral pool, had to be kept separate from each other. The DNMP escorts were concerned that since the DNMP had received classified briefings, information would be exchanged between the two groups. This
was actually a groundless concern because the unilateralis were also privy to top secret plans. The real reason probably rests with an attempt to prevent the DNMP from becoming upset over the unilateral pool's presence. To solve the problem the DNMP was kept in front of the hanger while the unilateralis were toward the rear of the hangar near the planning facility.

Shortly after the DNMP arrived the unilateralis were transported to ships. What is unclear, and remains debated at ASD (PA), USACOM, and XVIII Airborne Corps, is whether the unilateralis were given the DNMP's transportation assets or whether the helicopter transportation was gathered specifically for the unilateralis. What is known is that there was much confusion concerning the two pools and whether one group had a higher priority for lift assets.

Regardless, the DNMP was in front of the hangar at Guantanamo Bay as the unilateralis boarded helicopters for the USS Wasp and USS Mount Whitney. Aboard ship the PAOs who were partially aware of the DNMP requirements, were surprised to hear that additional media were being assigned to their unit and that additional spaces were going to be needed to get them ashore to cover the operation.

Because of naval restrictions concerning night flights, the DNMP was forced to remain at Guantanamo Bay until the next morning. To placate the DNMP "an impromptu press conference with Secretary of Defense Perry," who had just arrived for a briefing, was arranged by one of the DNMP escorts. After spending the night aboard the USS Comfort, the pool members were linked up with their respective units.

Fortunately, as doctrine calls for, after the invasion was called off, the DNMP and the unilateral pools were disbanded. The disbanding of the pool meant that media representatives could remain with the units they were assigned to or choose to cover the operation from a different angle. Some stayed with units while others took off on their own in search of a story. In one particular case, Lieutenant
Colonel Edward Sullivan, a battalion commander in the 10th Mountain Division, took a "48 Hours" crew "under his wing aboard the carrier and let them follow the unit (and one of his sergeants in particular) on in to Haiti. The excellent piece which ran on 21 September is testimony to the benefits of being open and cooperative with the media."\textsuperscript{141}

One other problem with the DNMP, curiously brought up by Andrew Schneider of \textit{Script Howard News Service} and member of the DNMP, was the lack of control of top secret documents given to the media.\textsuperscript{142} Prior to the invasion, as part of their briefing, media were given packets but were not told how to properly dispose of them. After the invasion planes returned, classified documents were left lying around by media with complete disregard to the sensitivity. In response, Fugget, the XVIII Airborne Corps media relations officer, stated that there was no way for public affairs personnel who were scattered among the invasion force to police up the material.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{Execution}

On 18 September 1994, with USACOM receiving approval from the National Command Authority (NCA) to execute OPLAN 2370, the public affairs portion of the plan began in earnest.\textsuperscript{144} Under OPLAN 2370, XVIII Airborne Corps PA expected to be the lead army PA agency. Both Vane and Major Hinnant, the 82nd PAO, were scheduled to jump into the Port-au-Prince International Airport (PAPIA) to begin conducting media operations at first light. According to Vane, they were to gather any media located at the airport and begin making announcements about target take downs as soon as the information was available. To assist them and add credibility, the Corps' deputy chief of staff was identified as a subject matter expert to address the media. Meanwhile, JIB members and the 22nd MPAD were scheduled to air land on D-Day to begin establishing the JIB at the USIS building near the U.S. Embassy.\textsuperscript{145} When Vane received word that the invasion had been called off, he was aboard a C-130 aircraft that was headed toward a drop zone located on the PAPIA.
Because Corps’ planning focus was on the forced entry plan, as was USASOC’s, the only PA activity truly focused on the permissive entry plan was the 10th Mountain Division.

While the mission had undergone significant changes, the basic PA intent remained unchanged: get on the ground to facilitate initial media coverage, establish a JIB to coordinate broader coverage while working to also provide detailed information. At the same time it was important to organize the available public affairs assets into a structure capable of coordinating media activities and needs while concentrating on development and dissemination of command information products.

**Joint Task Force 190**

Because of the way the JTF 190’s mission unfolded, Culp and Sergeant Patricia Long became two of the first public affairs personnel on the ground in Haiti. When Culp arrived on 19 September he set up operations at the PAPIA and began working with the media on the tarmac, overseeing the first stage of the public affairs operation. Culp conducted media operations in much the same manner as Vane had envisioned himself conducting them. Since the division had established a command center in the passenger terminal, Culp could easily keep up with the progress of the operation and attempt to get subject matter experts to provide answers to specific queries.

He was, however, faced with an additional challenge. This one created by Major General David C. Meade, the 10th Mountain Division/Multi-National Force (MNF)/JTF 190 commander, and his apparent fear of how the division would appear in the initial media coverage. Meade’s guidance to his commanders prior to going ashore to Haiti was that the soldiers were not to talk to the media at all. All media contacts were to be conducted by public affairs personnel who were directed to tell the media that the soldiers were not in a position to discuss the operation.
This new guidance contradicted weeks of media training and guidance already put out to the soldiers of the division and the rest of the forces involved. Culp stated that he believed that the intent of Meade's guidance was to ensure that the "right message" would get out. It appears that given the changing mission, Meade was not confident that his soldiers could be trusted to transmit the correct message.

Shortly after arriving, Culp and his public affairs organization moved to the light industrial complex (LIC) located near one end of the PAPIA. After moving to the LIC, Culp focused on coordinating coverage of his division while increasing his efforts toward establishing a command information program. "His location within the JTF 190 headquarters provided an important source of operational information" though his ability to communicate with the JIB "was tough, at first." The information was provided to the JIB so that they could incorporate it into the daily media briefings.

Once in the LIC, daily contact between Culp and the media began to drop off as he relied increasingly on the JIB to coordinate media coverage of the JTF. The media and others have pointed to the location of the JTF 190 public affairs office as one of the bottle necks they faced when dealing with the JTF. Because the media required an escort to enter the LIC and because Culp did not have the personnel to provide a full time escort at the main gate, they often could not get in, even with a press pass and JIB accreditation letter. Some in the media focused on this setup as a hinderance to their ability to gather news.

Just logistically, it was difficult to get things done. The public affairs apparatus was set up there yet it was impossible to call in from the outside and yet you couldn't just drop by because you had to get past the gate. When you were dealing with the 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs apparatus as a whole it was just logistically impossible. If you were going to play by the book and set up interviews you couldn't really do it easily.

The JIB tried several times to get the JTF to change the policy but to no avail. Interestingly, while this was the case for the media it was not the case for Haitian nationals who were roaming the
complex. This raises the question of whether this was an attempt by the JTF 190 commander to control media access to his soldiers and commanders. Regardless, some opportunities for media coverage of the JTF were missed.

This criticism was not directed at the soldiers. For the most part the media felt that the soldiers were open, and talked frankly and honestly about their experiences.

The Army generally, like if you just went out and talked to soldiers on the street or once you got past the public affairs apparatus and they set something up for you, I thought was great. I thought people were open, I thought cooperative and I thought the whole operation ended up making the Army look good. In some cases the media completely by-passed the public affairs structure (this occurred in all units, not just JTF 190) and went straight to the soldiers on the streets to get stories. Often they would be told by the soldiers to check with the PAO first. Generally, this occurred more often than not from older and higher ranking soldiers. The younger soldiers would freely answer questions.

In another situation involving JTF 190 Tom Ricks of the Wall Street Journal had been granted an interview with Meade. The interview was to take place at the Joint Visitor Bureau (JVB) located in the departure lounge at the PAPIA. While waiting for the Meade to become available, Ricks began to interest himself with the map boards in the area. Unfortunately the maps were "classified" and he was immediately confronted by soldiers who were threatening to take away his notebook. The JTF 190 PAO was notified and Ricks was asked not to use the material, which he agreed to do. The incident was a good example of how not to practice security at the source. If a reporter is in the area and there is classified material in the open it should be removed or covered unless you want it to be known or the reporter should simply be informed of its classification and asked to avoid it.

Other stories and media opportunities often focused around JTF 190 soldiers and their activities in Port-au-Prince. The large number
of soldiers in the area, the unrest, and the Haitian on Haitian violence kept Culp busy coordinating with the JIB for interviews of soldiers and commanders. A large media draw was the MP patrols conducted in Port-au-Prince. Fortunately, the commander of the 16th MP Brigade, Colonel Michael Sullivan had "seen the light" and welcomed the opportunity to have media accompany his soldiers. It was this type of openness by some commanders that assisted the JTF in obtaining balanced coverage. Sullivan's willingness to let his soldiers demonstrate their professionalism became apparent when media such as CNN, Newsweek and John McWethy of ABC News began seeking his unit out. This helped to provide a balanced picture, especially since the media had come down hard on the division for failing to act in a number of situations. This was the case when the media thought the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were unclear to the soldiers and when the media began reporting widespread unrest and looting around the end of September. The decision to increase the presence of MPs in Port-au-prince and the provisions to allow the media to accompany the patrols helped to get the message out that the situation in Port-au-Prince was in fact more stable than had been previously reported.

**Task Force Raleigh**

The TF Raleigh PAO arrived in Haiti on 20 September aboard a CH-53 helicopter bound from Guantanamo Bay along with other elements of 3rd SFG. The quantity of SOF helicopters and other lift assets was scaled back after the forcible entry option was cancelled. This meant that the 50th PAD, which had recently arrived in Guantanamo Bay and was attached to 3rd SFG, was pushed back in the arrival sequence. In fact it took the four-person detachment almost a week to link up with the TF PAO in Haiti. The long duration before the link up was in large part due to ensuring that the PAD's palletized equipment arrived in proper order.

The TF Raleigh PAO's lack of involvement in the final stages of the PA planning left him at a distinct disadvantage in terms of knowing
the overall PA mission. When the mission changed, since there was a lack of basic knowledge, the situation got even worse. The TF Raleigh PAO's intent was to link up with the JTF 190 PAO or the JTF 180 PAO to get PAG once on the ground in Haiti. At Guantanamo Bay the PAO had contacted the USASOC PAO back at Fort Bragg to see about getting hold of the "dealing with the media" cards that XVIII Airborne Corps had developed. The best that the USASOC PAO could do was read the content of the cards over the phone. These were then made into paper slides and given to the commanders prior to the invasion. It was not the best solution, since each soldier did not receive a copy and it is doubtful they were aware of them.\footnote{157}

Prior to leaving Guantanamo for Haiti the TF Raleigh PAO tried to get guidance from the USACOM PAO on what the PAG was. Tyrel's response, in general terms, was that it was not his concern and that the question should be asked of the JTF 180 PAO or JTF 190 PAO.\footnote{156} The TF Raleigh PAO was cleared to fly out to the USS Mount Whitney to talk with Vane but because return transportation was not firm he cancelled his plans. Once the TF Raleigh PAO linked up with the JTF 190 PAO in Haiti it was clear that no new guidance was forthcoming. Culp was busy dealing with the media on the tarmac, attempting to coordinate interviews and answer queries. It never really struck Culp that TF Raleigh belonged to JTF 190, and he should provide some sort of guidance. From that point, the TF Raleigh PAO never ran issues through the JTF 190 PAO. Instead, he worked directly with the sub-JIB while receiving occasional guidance from the USASOC PAO still located at Fort Bragg.

From a JTF 180 perspective, Willey and Vane (once he arrived) were so tied up in media activities at the USIS building that they were not in a position to coordinate anything with lower level public affairs officers. Most of their energy was focused toward the media and higher level public affairs activities at USACOM, ASD (PA), and the White
House. Meanwhile, the lack of communication assets acted to compound
the PAG void for the TF Raleigh PAO leaving no viable way to resolve it.
In the absence of any new guidance, the TF Raleigh PAO went with the
JTF's mission statement and the media cards developed by XVIII Airborne
Corps PA as the source of messages. In fact the information from the
media cards became his de facto public affairs guidance. 139

The first attempt to focus media attention on the special forces
soldiers was when Potter suggested that the PAO get the media up to Camp
d' Application to cover the dismantling of the FAH'D's heavy weapons
company. The media were informed but not by the TF Raleigh PAO.
Shelton had also told his PAO "to make sure the press knew" what "was
going to take place" and the JIB and the PAO reacted appropriately. 140
The resulting coverage sent a clear image that the U.S. military was in
charge. Although arguably the poor condition and old age of the FAH'D
weapons may have made some people wonder if the amount of force used by
the Americans was really necessary.

The problem for the SF was that with the exception of the
FAH'D's heavy weapons company event, there was not much to cover. At
this point, besides the force at Camp d' Application, the rest of the
force was waiting at the PAPIA for orders to move out to the hinterland.
Most of the action was taking place at conference tables between Cedras
and the JTF leadership. And because the negotiations were in a
sensitive state, they did not need media attention.

The situation changed once the SF were given permission to begin
moving into the countryside to establish a U.S. presence to foster a
stable and secure environment. The TF PAO, having coordinated with the
USASOC PAO, decided to make the insertions the means to communicate this
message. This had been part of the original plan. However, because the
initial forced entry operation was not open to the media there was not a
clear way to accomplish it.
When TF Raleigh began using PAPIA as their staging base to move into the countryside, linking the media up with units became relatively easy. However, the PAO met some initial opposition from some TF Raleigh staff officers opposed to the idea of getting the media on board the initial aircraft going out to the countryside. Their argument was that things might not go well and that it would be better to bring the media in after the forces had time to establish themselves. The counter argument was that the media needed to see the impact of U.S. forces arriving in these towns and that going in later would not provide the real story. The matter was put to the TF Raleigh's chief of staff Colonel Halluski for a decision. His decision was to let the media go in with the first lift if they wanted to.16

As a result of Halluski's decision there was some very positive coverage of SF soldiers. Although there were a number of great stories about these insertions, two stand out for their ability to communicate the mission and capabilities of the special forces in operations like Uphold Democracy. One was a television piece by John McWethy of ABC News and the other by a John Harris of The Washington Post. In fact, the ABC piece describes the capabilities of a 12-man special forces team so well that today the USSOCOM Commander-in-Chief incorporates it into his public briefings.

Before moving to the LIC along with the rest of the TF Raleigh personnel, the TF Raleigh PAO coordinated coverage and answered media queries in the same manner as the JTF 190 PAO had, by canvassing the tarmac. After moving to the LIC he still worked out of the PAPIA. The usual means of coordinating coverage entailed the TF Raleigh PAO hitchhiking from the LIC first thing in the morning to the PAPIA. Once there he would link up at the sub-JIB with whatever media had been coordinated to cover the day's SF insertion and escort them to wherever the helicopters were taking off. After ensuring that the media were linked up with a unit escort or helicopter loadmaster, he would check in
with the sub-JIB. At the sub-JIB, the SOF liaison officer (LNO), Sergeant Major Thomas Heally, and he would discuss upcoming operations and determine whether there was any additional media interest. If there was, he would get the appropriate information, check with the unit and the unit air liaison element for the availability of space. If there was space, the media visit would be briefed at the nightly command and staff meeting to Potter and later Boyatt. Their support and openness toward the media set a tone that the rest of the TF followed.

An example of how far this openness went occurred when there was a shooting incident between an SF team and several mutinous FAH'D soldiers in Beladere. During the shooting a FAH'D soldier had been seriously wounded. The seriousness of the situation and the command's concern over the need to use force led Colonel Mark D. Boyatt to personally fly up to investigate the incident. However, Boyatt had previously agreed to take Ricks of the Wall Street Journal with him to visit several SF units that same day. Instead of canceling Ricks' visit, Boyatt held to his commitment. Ricks was even present during Boyatt's initial investigation, and there was no attempt to hide the facts of the case from Ricks. As a result of the investigation the warrant officer in charge was removed and sent back to the United States while Ricks made only a small mention of the troubling incident in an otherwise favorable article on the U.S. mission in Haiti.162

The fortunate part of the SF stories was that in most cases the media with the unit would have to stay until a resupply helicopter could transport them back to the PAPIA. While many reporters did not want to leave Port-au-Prince for that reason, those who did experienced first hand the positive reception that the SF soldiers and U.S. presence had. In some cases literally thousands of people would come out to watch the special forces move into a town. To the media it was a moving image and usually figured prominently in the story. Having to stay with the soldiers in the new site for more than a few hours allowed them to see
first hand the challenges the SF soldiers met on a continual basis. It also allowed the media something they always want—an exclusive story. The idea of inclusion was in full force with these insertions.

Eventually the SF soldiers were established in 27 different locations around the country. After all the initial insertions were complete the media were offered the opportunity to fly with Potter or Boyatt as they conducted daily visits to units by helicopter, as in the case described above. These media opportunities allowed the media to spend a day with a senior leader discussing the task force's mission and the operational status, as well as talking to individual soldiers in the hinterland. The Wall Street Journal, Time, USA Today and CNN were among the news organizations that took advantage of these opportunities.

However, this does not mean that all media encounters were centrally planned or coordinated. For example, Bob Shacoquis, a contributor to Harper's Magazine and the New York Times stayed with a detachment of SF soldiers for an extended period. The TF Raleigh PAO was not even aware of the visit until he began working with a Harper's Magazine editor on the story in January 1995, two months later. Regardless, the relationship had been established and Shacoquis is in the process of writing a book that will focus to a large extent on the SF soldiers and their part in the operation. Shacoquis' writing efforts now have the support of the USASOC chain of command. Obviously, not all media encounters work out this way. However, this reinforces the soldiers' need to know how to independently handle the media without a PAO standing over their shoulder.143

As U.S. aviation assets began to leave the country, the problem of finding space aboard helicopters increased. While there continued to be media interest in the SF, the availability of helicopter seats, not only for the media but also for the military, began to decrease. Occasionally small observation helicopters were used to transport media. Eventually interest in the Operation Uphold Democracy story began to
dissipate and the media departed country, except for the occasional reporter.

Equipment remained a significant problem for the TF Raleigh PAO. The PAO's only equipment in-country was a laptop computer and bubble jet printer. Communication and transportation assets identified in the early planning phase were completely ignored during tasking and development of the time-phased force deployment list. Without someone to steward the requirements through the process, it was a lost cause. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the TF PAO came from a TDA unit. As a result he did not have any TO&E equipment to use. To the end there were shortfalls that were never fully rectified. Eventually a TRI-TAC (an air force equivalent of the army's field telephone system) phone was put in at the PAO's desk in the task force headquarters. This was a marginal solution since the phone line often failed, sometimes for several hours. Efforts to get dedicated transportation were pushed aside by the operators in the fight for limited resources.144

Once the 50th PAD closed on the LIC they began to produce command information pieces to submit to the JTF Update/MNF Update. Unfortunately, the PAD did not possess the necessary equipment to produce a command information field newsletter/newspaper, its basic function, without external support. As Captain Warren Otsuka, 50th PAD commander stated, "the PAD from Ft. Stewart was inadequately prepared to support the JSOTF's [TF Raleigh's] public affairs, command information and documentation program."145 The PAD's equipment consisted of a borrowed 386 laptop without desktop publishing software or a printer. Their video production capabilities were no better. However, using the TF Raleigh PAO's computer capabilities, one that did have a desktop publishing capabilities and a portable printer, and by signing for cameras from the TF Raleigh intelligence section, they were able to produce articles for the MNF Update. Eventually the number of stories
they generated overloaded the capabilities of the 22nd MPAD to include them in the two-page thrice weekly MNF Update. The result was that, with the assistance of the 22nd MPAD's risograph they produced their own weekly field news letter, The Rucksack Forward for TF Raleigh. Copies of the news letter were also sent back to Fort Bragg to produce CI products there. They continued with this function until the unit returned in early 1995.

Joint Information Bureau

When the mission changed, it was not immediately clear who would become the "real" JIB. Since there were two plans, two JIBs were developed, one for the 2370 and the other for 2380. This planning concept especially effected the 10th Mountain Division. From the early planning, Culp thought that Willey would be the director of the JTF 190 JIB, the one that Willey and he had developed together. However, at some point shortly before execution, as Willey stated in his after action report, he was designated the JIB director for both JTF 180 and JTF 190. In reality, Willey was located at the USIS building, downtown next to the U.S. Embassy, and had the public affairs assets assigned against the JTF 180 JIB. Culp, meanwhile, used the resources that had been originally targeted for the JTF 190 JIB as the basis for forming a relatively robust JTF 190 public affairs office.

The two significant challenges facing the JIB as it began operations were transportation and communications. Transportation problems, both into country and in country, plagued the JIB from the first day. The JIB personnel and equipment did not arrive as scheduled and once the personnel arrived they had no transportation, for about two weeks. Until its equipment arrived, the JIB used USIS material. Since none of the JIB's transportation or equipment had arrived, independent thought and initiative got the JIB "running" during the first couple days.
For the most part this initiative came from Willey and unexpected help of pool escorts that accompanied him into Haiti. When Willey and these escorts arrived they arranged for transportation to move them over to the USIS to initiate JIB operations. By the second day, Willey was conducting twice daily media briefings, which was one of the three priorities Willey had set after getting established. The other two were responding to phoned and face-to-face media queries and coordinating coverage of JTF 180 and JTF 190 units.169

The official JIB structure consisted of about twenty-two personnel. Of that, there were four officers and NCOs from each the Army, Air Force, USMC, and Navy. There were also six support personnel assigned including four drivers, one mechanic and one supply NCO.

This JIB setup was helped by the unexpected arrival of several PAO augmentees (DOD, Army Public Affairs, the 2d Fleet, and Coast Guard), but was hindered by the departure, on no predictable schedule of the JTF 180 PAO personnel, one of which was . . . [the] media chief.169 The departure of the media chief, Fugget, and four other JTF 180 personnel left only Willey and a master sergeant to handle the Army’s part of the operation.

Fortunately, the USIS facilities were relatively well suited for media operations. However, there were only about four to six phones at the USIS building for the media. The quality of the connection was better than those phones available at the PAPIA.170 And, while there was usually a long wait to file stories, the media did not have to contend with the large numbers of soldiers at the PAPIA who also wanted to call home. Eventually workers at the USIS building used Haitian contacts to get additional commercial phones installed.171

While this helped the media solve their filing problems it was of little help to the fledgling JIB that was attempting to get the latest information from the JTF headquarters. There was a distinct lack of communication equipment available specifically for public affairs personnel to coordinate their activities. This hampered the JIB's
efforts to answer the "demands for information" that "were many and immediate." To communicate with the USS Mount Whitney, often the JIB had to call USACOM at Norfolk over the one commercial line in order to be patched over to the ship. Regardless of the need for operational security, because of the system's setup, much of the communication was placed into secure channels which acted to further lengthen the time needed to answer a basic query or exchange information. The eventual establishment of a Mobile Subscriber Equipment system patched into the USS Mount Whitney helped to resolve the communication problems between the JIB and the JTF headquarters aboard ship.

According to the JTF 180 PAO, the JIB had two basic functions. First, it was a way to accredit media, to get them to sign media guidelines and ground rules, log them in as a means to track what media were covering the operation, and provide them an accreditation card which commanders could then use as a means to allow the media access to their units. What occurred, however, was something short of accreditation.

The media arriving at the JIB were registered as opposed to accredited. Accredited implies verifying credentials, something that the JIB could not accomplish given the circumstances in Haiti. Registering entailed merely having the media present identification and then sign a log stating what organizations they represented. Once registered, media representatives were given a typed sheet of paper, signed by a JIB representative, that gave notice to U.S. forces that the media had in fact checked in with the JIB and could therefore be afforded access to U.S. forces in Haiti. Meanwhile, the media ground rules and guidelines were simply posted on a JIB wall for the media to review. This left media accreditation the responsibility of the Haitian government. It also meant that a violation of the ground rules could result only in the termination of official access to U.S. forces. Registering at the JIB was also a way for the media to get military
transportation out of the country during the short period that the military was providing transportation.\textsuperscript{175}

The other function of the JIB was a coordination center for media opportunities. The JIB and sub-JIB were the primary conduits for the media to arrange coverage of a particular unit. Often, the media were unaware of what might be a good story and went to the JIB or sub JIB seeking guidance on or directions to a story. As Vane contends, very few media really know the military.\textsuperscript{176} So, going to the JIB provided a means to "find" a story with the help of the JIB personnel. In these cases the JIB would get the particulars from the media representative and then contact the appropriate PAO, usually the 10th Mountain Division PAO. The division PAO would then set up times and places for the unit escorts to link up with the media. Unfortunately, while the personnel manning the JIB were all professional, there was only one Army officer among them. Therefore, it was hard for the other services to explain what was going on when they themselves had no experience with army operations.

Willey, as the JIB director, recognized the problem and attempted to fix it by getting some of the JIB personnel out to see what the forces were doing so that they could provide better explanations to the media's queries. Unfortunately, he could only afford to do this after most media had decided to leave country. Even Willey, once the story focus in Haiti shifted to the special forces soldiers in the country, did not have a clear idea of what was being done by these soldiers. To his credit, he attempted several times to visit them in the country. Finally, towards the end of October, Boyatt brought him on a helicopter tour of SF units in the country. Willey stated that if he had had the opportunity earlier he would have been able to explain the mission with greater insight and have done a better job communicating the importance of the mission to the media.\textsuperscript{177}
The JIB was not always as well connected as they wanted to be. As is often the case with media, there were times when they were aware of late breaking events before the JIB and would still expect official answers from the JIB. John Harris of the Washington Post described one example. Willey was asked at a JIB media conference by a reporter whether it was true that there was a barricade situation down at the Port-au-Prince docks. Willey's reply was that he could not confirm the situation. Meanwhile CNN had split the television screen with two images. One showing Willey's at the news conference and the other showing barricades down at the docks. This once again demonstrated the need for equipment to communicate between the JIB and the JTF.

For several days early in the operation, the bulk of the personnel designated for the JIB remained stranded at the airport waiting for transportation that was aboard ship. After some inactivity, the public affairs personnel at the airport established a sub-JIB and began to communicate with the main JIB first through some of the commercial telephones in the airport and then, later, through an MSE line that was installed, although the phone's reliability was always in doubt. The sub-JIB occupied several locations at the PAPIA before space for a fairly permanent office was contracted for.

Meant to be a temporary fix, the sub-JIB played a key role in facilitating coverage of the operation. Since most of the initial operational activity occurred at the airport and because PAOs made themselves available, the media began to stop by the airport, and consequently the sub-JIB, as they made their way around town to check on latest news events and story ideas. At its peak, the sub-JIB had six personnel assigned, four army and two Marines. Significantly, one of the Army personnel was Heally from USSOCOM. His permanent presence at the sub-JIB allowed him to push the special forces story on a continual basis while being close enough to the LIC that the TF Raleigh PAO could conduct daily face-to-face coordination of media requests with him.
Because both JIBs drew on some of the same assets, at times it was unclear who was responsible for what. This was especially true of the assets belonging to the 22nd MPAD. When Peterman, the 22nd MPAD commander, was told by Vane to redeploy the bulk of his MPAD, he left a five person team to work CI for the JTF. For a while it was unclear to Captain Rick Kirk, the officer left in charge of the team, which JTF that meant. As a result he was receiving conflicting guidance as to the units which he should focus his command information efforts. Kirk started out working for the JIB, then the combat camera commander, then the JTF 190 PAO, then went back to the JIB before finally ending up with the JTF 190 PAO. Throughout the process, however, he continued to provide CI products back to Fort Bragg.\textsuperscript{180}

The 2370 plan called for the 22nd MPAD to have its equipment, along with much of the JIB's, on the first ship unloaded at Port-au-Prince.\textsuperscript{181} When the plan changed, the ship containing the MPAD's equipment was reprogrammed to be the seventh ship unloaded. Because of berthing restrictions at the port, this turned into a two week wait for equipment. Kirk used his initiative to begin writing the JTF Update (later called the CJTF Update and still later MNF Update) by using borrowed laptop computers. To publish the newsletter, he got the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force to produce it three times a week using their printing assets.\textsuperscript{182}

Until U.S. newspapers began to arrive in country on semi-predictable basis, Kirk also produced a news letter called USA Reports. Unlike the JTF Update, this newsletter focused on news and sports scores from the United States. After about four weeks, USA Today and the Fayetteville Observer Times, contracted for by XVIII Airborne Corps Public Affairs, began to arrive. Doctrinally the responsibility for newspaper contracting and distribution does not belong to public affairs. The responsibility belongs to the G-1/Adjutant General or personnel administration section of a commander's staff; however, some
commanders still require the PAO to be the principle agent to manage newspaper delivery. Regardless, Kirk's new mission was to distribute the newspapers equitably among the command. He distributed the papers based on the number of soldiers per unit.

Because the initial USA Today contract called for the 3,000 papers to be delivered to Fort Bragg and not the Army Post Office in Haiti, newspaper delivery was manpower intensive. Personnel at Fort Bragg would palletize these 3,000 papers three times a week and then ship them down to Haiti aboard aircraft on a space available basis. Once in Haiti, the papers were delivered to the JTF mail room where Kirk would pick them up and distribute them to units. The goal was to get one paper for every five soldiers. Obviously as the number of soldiers in country decreased, the ratio got better. Frequently, the papers would arrive four or five days late and often several days worth of old papers arrived on the same day.183 Regardless, the papers were highly valued by the soldiers and played a large part in boosting morale. In addition, the paper distribution mission received a lot of command attention. Unfortunately, command attention was focused on results and not identifying the transportation assets necessary to accomplish the distribution of papers to deployed soldiers. Until the issue of staff responsibility is resolved and the distribution process receives command emphasis, newspaper distribution will remain a problem.184

Joint Task Force 180

The JTF 180 PAO arrived in Haiti on 22 September aboard a chartered aircraft whose mechanical problems forced it to make an unscheduled maintenance stop in the Dominican Republic. Once in country, Vane split his time between the JIB at the USIS building and the USS Mount Whitney. According to both Willey and Vane this arrangement worked quite well.185 While on board ship, Vane was quickly able to answer operational questions and schedule media briefings for
the CJTF and network news shows. During the time when Vane came ashore he left a captain, Rivers Johnson, aboard ship to answer the JIB's continuous stream of questions.\textsuperscript{186}

Besides establishing a firm working relationship, Willey and Vane communicated because they had to. Willey was responding to media interests and Vane was a means to answer the questions and set up story opportunities through his position as the JTF PAO. In fact, Vane made it clear to the personnel at the JIB that "if there was a story requiring liaison with a brigade commander" that they were to go through him since he knew them and what they liked and what stories they were willing to do.\textsuperscript{187}

Meanwhile, in an attempt to focus the media, Vane and the JIB Director began inviting subject matter experts to speak at the daily briefings. While providing experts to speak to the media was part of the original plan, events occasionally drove the need to get specific individuals. When this happened, the "key people were notified in advance, given Q's and A's, were rehearsed and prepared and put in front of the media quickly after an issue surfaced."\textsuperscript{188} As Vane said, "you have to take on the obvious" and sometimes the way you do that is to place someone with expertise and credibility in front of the media to "take the pressure out of the bottle."\textsuperscript{189} This was done when the staff judge advocate, the JTF commander's legal advisor, spoke after there were questions about soldiers not understanding the ROE. The purpose was to clarify to the media that although the mission had changed the soldiers were aware of the ROE and would enforce it. The result was to decrease the controversy surrounding the issue.

This was also the case when Shelton spoke to the media after several days of news reports concerning looting and Haitian on Haitian violence in Port-au-Prince. Shelton's credibility helped diffuse the situation when he stated that the American public watching CNN was seeing events in Haiti "through a straw."\textsuperscript{190} The JTF commander's
comments helped to put the looting incidents in context. He contended that they were, for the most part, isolated acts of violence. Yes, it was a problem, yet compared to the overall success in maintaining stability and security, it was a small problem. The results of using Shelton as a spokesman were seen when news reports shortly thereafter began to indicate that the incidents were in fact isolated in nature.191

The subject matter experts also helped by providing sources of additional media opportunities. For example, by having the 16th MP Brigade commander speak, as he did several times, they were able to increase media coverage of the MPs conducting patrols.192

After the DNMP and unilateral pools were disbanded, there was not any significant pooling of media by JTF 180. Early on the media were pooled to get aerial video footage of activity in Port-au-Prince. However, besides that the only pool occurred when U.S. Marines were involved in a fire fight with Haitian police and attaches. In this case, Vane organized the pool, arranged transportation, and escorted the media to Cap Haitien. The pool was disbanded shortly thereafter.

Conclusion

The public affairs mission during Operation Uphold Democracy occurred relative to two subject areas: The public affairs force and the military-media relationship. The discussion of the public affairs force gave the origins of current public affairs doctrine and argued that DoD Directive 5122.5 provides de facto current doctrine in the absence of published future doctrine. Additionally, the section described how the public affairs force is structured and included a brief explanation of the Army's public affairs education and training process.

The second section, the military-media relationship, highlighted the importance of previous military media experiences to give a better understanding of why the military was careful to consider the media, both in the planning and the execution of the operation. In addition to
the general background, addressed in chapter 1, these two topics provide
the context for the public affairs mission.

The last section of the chapter discussed Operation Uphold
Democracy from a public affairs perspective. The sequence of the
discussion followed that of the operation. It began with a description
of how the three major army components; XVIII Airborne Corps, USASOC,
and 10th Mountain Division, went about planning and executing the public
affairs portion of the operation. In summary, this chapter provides the
basis for the next chapter's analysis of the operation.
Endnotes


2U.S. Army, Doctrine is..., permanent wall display, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.


7Ibid.

8Ibid., 163.


11Ibid., 23-25, 52.

12Richard M. Bridges "Have We Learned Our Lesson?" Army (August 1995): 29.

13Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)), encl. 3.

14FM 100-5 (1993), 1-3.

15Ibid., 2-5.


The Battle of the Black Sea is the Army's official name for the battle that occurred on 12-13 October 1993 involving elements of the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and 10th Mountain Division that were confronting Somali clan members.


FM 46-1 (1992), 1-10.


McClain, 13.


Warren Otsuka, 50th Public Affairs Detachment Commander, telephone interview by author, 26 January 1996, notes, Fort Stewart, GA.


Authors experience as a guest instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center and School, Fort Bragg, 1994 to 1995.


Michael Bryan, Deputy Director Public Affairs Proponent Activity, telephone interview by author, 9 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Meade, MD.


Interview, Bryan, Author.
U.S. Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1995), 182.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview, Bryan, Author.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (1995), 182-183.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter, No. 92-7, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 1992), 18.

James Beinkemper, Joint Readiness Training Center Public Affairs Officer, telephone interview by author, 26 January 1996, notes, Fort Polk, LA; George Krivo, National Training Center Media on the Battlefield Office (Visual Information Officer), telephone interview by author, 11 January 1995, notes, Fort Irwin, CA.

Marty Culp, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs Officer, telephone interview by author, 15 December 1995, tape recording, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.


Ibid.

Ibid., 35-36.


Ibid., 648.

Aukofer, 35-36.

Ibid., 37.

Ibid., 38.

Ibid., 38-39.


Aukofer, 39-40.


Aukofer, 40.
“Ibid., 30.

“Braestrup, 88-93.

“Ibid., 108.

“Ibid., 113.

“Ibid., 123.


“Aukofer, 194.

“Ibid.

“Ibid.


“Interview, McGraw, Author.


“Interview, Culp, Author.

“Timothy Vane, Public Affairs Officer JTF-180, telephone interview by author, 9 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

“Author’s observations while during planning for Operation Uphold Democracy, Fort Bragg, 1994.

“Interview, Vane, Author.

“Fugget, Kenneth, Media Relations Officer XVIII Airborne Corps, telephone interview by author, tape recording, 15 November 1995.

“Interview, Culp, Author.

“Timothy D. Vane, Public Affairs Officer JTF-180, interview by Steve E. Dietrich, 10 October 1994, tape recording, USS Mount Whitney, Army Historical Archive System.

“Interview, Fugget, Author.

“Interview, Vane, Author.
87Ibid.
89Interview, Fugget, Author.
84Ibid.
85Interview, Vane, Author.
86Ibid.
87Interview, Vane, AHAS.
88Ibid.

91Baxter Enis, U.S. Atlantic Command Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 7 February 1996, tape recording, Norfolk, VA.
92Brian Kilgallen, Plans Officer, Department of Defense Public Affairs, interview by author, 13 November 1995, tape recording, the Pentagon.  
93Ibid.
94Interview, Vane, AHAS.
95Interview, Vane, Author.
96Winning the Information War Briefing Slides, (1994).
97Ibid.
98U.S. Army, Media Guidelines for Deployed JTF 180 Participants Cards, (Fort Bragg: XVIII Airborne Corps PAO/Joint Task Force 180 PAO, no date given).
99Ibid.
100Interview, McGraw, Author.
101As the Public Affairs Officer for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (a subordinate command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command), I took part in the planning, deployment, and execution of Operation Uphold Democracy. My experience included a three month stay in Haiti as the Task Force Raleigh PAO beginning with the initial insertion of TF Raleigh forces on 20 September 1994.
102Interview, McGraw, Author.
103Ibid.
104Interview, Culp, Author.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
110 Interview, Fugget, Author.
114 Interview, Culp, Author.
115 Interview, Vane, Author.
116 Interview, Enis, Author.
117 Interview, Culp, Author.
118 Interview, Kilgallen, Author.
120 Allen Dooley, Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 13 November 1995, tape recording, Washington, DC.
122 Interview, Kilgallen, Author.
123 Steve Devane, Staff writer, *Fayetteville Observer Times*, telephone interview by author, notes, 6 February 1996, Fayetteville, NC.
124 Aukofer, 193.
125 Ibid., 193.
126 Interview, Devane, Author.
127 Interview, Ricks, Author.

Interview, Enis, Author.


Interview, Kilgallen, Author.


Authors observation while in Guantanamo Bay, 1994.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Memorandum for PA, PAD, SUBJECT: Trip Report - Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), (26 September 1994), 2.; Interview, Kilgallen, Author.; Interview, Vane, Author.; Interview, Enis, Author.

Doble, 1.; Interview, Culp, Author.


Doble, 2.

Andrew Schneider, Assistant Managing Editor, Scripps Howard News Service, interview by author, 13 November 1995, tape recording, Washington DC.

Interview, Fugget, Author.


Interview, Vane, AHAS.

Interview, Culp, Author.; Patricia, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 17 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Drum, NY.

Ibid.

Ibid.

After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, (No date given), 6.

136 Interview, Culp, Author.

137 Interview, Harris, Author.


139 Interview, Harris, Author.

140 Ibid.

141 Sullivan, Michael, Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade, telephone interview by author, 7 February 1996, tape recording, Baileys Cross Roads, VA.

142 Interview, Vane, Author.

143 Author's observation, Guantanamo Bay, 1994.

144 Ibid.

145 Interview, Vane, Author.

146 Interview, Shelton, AHAS.

147 Author's observation, Haiti, 1994.

148 Ibid.; Mark D. Boyatt, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). telephone interview by author, 6 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

149 Authors observation, Haiti, 1994.

150 Ibid.

151 Department of Defense, Joint Universal Lessons Learned Comments -- Working Paper. (Subject: Deployment Preparation, Task Force Raleigh, No date given, 1.

152 After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 1.


154 Interview, Fugget, Author.

155 After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 2.

156 Interview, Devane, Author.

157 Interview, Fugget, Author.

158 Dobbs, 2.
171 Interview, Vane, AHAS.
172 Interview, Fugget, Author.
173 Interview, Vane, AHAS.
174 Ibid.
175 Authors observation, Haiti, 1994.
176 Interview, Harris, Author.
177 Interview, Fugget, Author.
178 Rick Kirk, Commander, 22nd MPAD, telephone interview by author, 15 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.
179 Interview, Vane, Author.
180 Interview, Kirk, Author.
181 Ibid.
183 Interview, Vane, AHAS; After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 6.
184 Interview, Vane, AHAS.
185 Ibid.
187 Interview, Vane, AHAS.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

United States and Army Public Affairs involvement in Haiti did not occur in a vacuum overnight. As discussed earlier, Operation Uphold Democracy occurred following a long history of U.S. Government and American media involvement in Haiti. In addition, the operation occurred in relation to an evolving military-media relationship where the needs and capabilities of the media are sometimes differ with military needs and capabilities. Finally, it occurred relative to Army Public Affairs doctrine, force structure, and training. However, the question remains, given all of the above, whether Army Public Affairs was effective? As defined in this paper, "effective" means that the desired objectives or results were achieved.

While there were many objectives for Army Public Affairs during Operation Uphold Democracy, fundamentally its purpose was to adhere to the policy and principles contained in DoD Directive 5122.5. That is "to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about" Operation Uphold Democracy. By addressing this policy and determining the Army's adherence to the DoD Principles of Information and its companion Principles for News Coverage of DoD Operations, a subjective determination of how effective the Army Public Affairs was during Operation Uphold Democracy can be made.

Listed below are the five DoD principles of information. Following each are discussions concerning the Army's effectiveness in following or applying the associated principles. Following that is an

**DoD Principles of Information**

**Principle 1**

Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification [also known as "maximum disclosure with minimum delay"]. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

Perhaps more than any other principle this first one stands out as an indicator of the military's willingness to provide information concerning the operation to the American people. As Andrew Schneider of *Scripps Howard News Service* said, "other than an embargo until the start of the invasion... there were no restrictions on what we could report or how we could report it." Media were consistently allowed access to sensitive information. "They received detailed [classified] briefings on plans from USACOM; from the JTF commander at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and from representatives of the individual units they would cover." This occurred with both the DNMP and unilateral media. As Schneider of *Scripps Howard News Service* who was initially with DNMP assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division said, "they bent over backwards once they realized we were serious, it was just full access to everybody. I mean we could get into virtually any briefing anywhere, ask anyone anything... it just couldn't be any better." Many commanders were of the same opinion. According to Sullivan, the 16th MP Brigade commander,

the way we did it in Haiti is the way we ought to do it each and every time. That gives the American people a true representation of what the hell is going on, because they are going to read in the papers and they are going to believe what they see. And if you got reporters there who are on the ground early on, who know what the plan is and can watch it being executed, they can write from a much more informed perspective. You're going to get much more balanced reporting. I think that is what everybody wants--balanced reporting."
Boyatt, commander of the 3rd SFG was also a supporter of media access. According to Boyatt,

The worst thing that we could do was look like we were trying to fence them, block them, or control them or monitor or influence the information that they were receiving. So we didn't do any of that. The policy of course was wide open. They took what they could get, if they [we] had room on a helicopter and they wanted to go they went, we didn't limit them from seeing [using] anything that they saw or hearing [using] anything that they heard except for the few things that were in fact classified back at the headquarters. 7

Principle 2

A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents. 6

This appears not to have been a problem in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. Obviously, while at home station prior to deploying, service members had the same access to information as the American people. During the planning process the importance of command information was highlighted by Vane. In his briefing, "Winning the Information War" Vane contended that command information products should be treated as official high priority material. In fact, an element of Vane's definition of success for the JTF included the requirement that soldiers and units be kept informed through command information. The importance that the JTF 180 commander placed on command information was demonstrated by the high priority the 22nd MPAD's equipment was given aboard transport ships bound for Haiti. Another indication of the importance given to command information by commanders was the relatively large number of PADs deployed to Haiti. Once CI products reached the United States, their impact reached beyond the JTF members to include families and home station communities. These products eventually reached a service-wide audience when the material was input into the Armed Forces Information Network. 9

The commander's reliance on PADs leads to a significant problem: Many PADs within the Army do not have the equipment necessary to accomplish their basic mission--supporting CI programs. As a minimum a
PAD should have the capability to produce a field newspaper or newsletter. There were a variety of reasons for the 50th PAD's equipment problems but mostly it was that they did not have any or that it was simply outdated. Therefore, the lack of basic production equipment in the 50th PAD prevented them from accomplishing their CI mission without extensive external support. The root of the problem with AC PADs is that they belong to FORSCOM not the units they are attached to, therefore, they receive little funding support. While certain PADs are "taken care" of by parent units, others, like the 50th PAD, are left to fend for themselves. Additionally, the "garrison mentality" of many cost conscious public affairs planners has created a situation where PADs must rely on installation assets, such as Training Support Centers to produce products. It was this mentality that eliminated the 50th PAD's capability to produce command information products when it was deployed into the austere environment of Haiti.10

As a command information tool, the JTF 190 commander often directed the content of the CJTF Update newsletter. As a commander, it was within the scope of his position to present the command's view.11 However, in addition to the command's view there was a concerted effort to keep the soldiers informed through independent means. Included in these efforts were contracts for local and national newspapers from the United States and CNN television hook-ups that made independent news sources available to the members of the JTF. The arrival in late October of a portable Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) broadcast station was a great help in providing a "free flow of general and military information".12 However, because of its requirement to "meet the needs of its customers" the AFRTS station manager began to replace network news shows with situation comedies. AFRTS personnel were not in a clearly established chain of command so efforts by the JTF 190 PAO and TF Raleigh PAO to strike a balance between news and entertainment were largely unsuccessful.13
Principle 3

Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.14

While it cannot be certain, there were no known attempts to withhold information simply because of its critical or embarrassing nature. One of Vanes's points in his "Winning the Information War" was that units, soldiers and commanders should not create or become an issue.15 In other words, provide the information up front using "maximum disclosure with minimum delay." There were numerous examples of information being provided to the media that the military would rather not have provided. Boyatt's willingness to let Ricks accompany him on a preliminary investigation into a troubling shooting incident is such an example.

Furthermore the overall open and independent reporting precluded much chance for anything being withheld from the media. Boyatt contends that the aggressive way in which the TF Raleigh PAO in Haiti sought out the media to have them go out and see what we were doing and being aggressive up front preempted, in my opinion anyway preempted, and prevented any misunderstandings or possible bad press or media from trying to misinterpret something. The very aggressive PAO posture, I think, was key to the media not being a distractor during the operation, because what they did in the Haiti operation was report what they saw for the most part very accurately and the few warts or small things that cropped up were treated exactly as such, small things not sensationalized and not harped on. The really important part of the mission is what the media picked up on because they were given full rein. They saw the truth and they reported that.16

Likewise, in many cases the media were more aware of "ugly" situations before the military. Sullivan, the MP brigade commander was so impressed with CNN's capabilities to pick up on rioting and looting that he had a CNN hook-up in his operations center as another intelligence means.17

Principle 4

Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threatened the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.18
Again the media were fully briefed on parts of the classified plan. Schneider describes the openness this way:

They showed us the CIA tapes, the simulations of the lead aircraft going with the jumpmaster's highlights that he picks out, we knew exactly who was going to hit the palace, who was going to hit the ranger [the FAH'D's heavy weapon company] base . . . it just couldn't have been any better."

However, there was balance struck. The media were not provided detailed information on the special mission units that were taking part in the initial stages of the operation and the special tactics, techniques and procedures they employ. This was also the rationale employed for not having media accompany SF units during the initial assaults of the planned invasion. If media had accompanied the special forces it probably would have resulted in some good press. However, good press has to be weighed against the benefits of allowing potential adversaries information they could use to harm soldiers in future operations. This was also the concern of the SOF at Guantanamo Bay when the pools arrived. The mere presence of certain assets can telegraph intent and capabilities to potential enemies.

Another example of how certain information was withheld was the notification of next of kin for those wounded and killed in Haiti. It is the military's view that families should be afforded some privacy before being inundated with media. In the case of Sergeant First Class Gregory Cardott's death, a balance between legitimate news and the family's desire to grieve was reached. The assistance they received from USASOC public affairs was key to ensuring that they were prepared when the family decided they wanted to talk to the media.

This was, perhaps, the one area that did not receive enough attention by the PA personnel involved in the initial planning. While ASD (PA) and USACOM addressed this sensitive issue in the media ground rules they published, not much else was mentioned about the process, until a special forces soldier was wounded on 3 October 1994 in Les Cayes by a FAH'D soldier. His name was released by the JIB's media
relations officer in Haiti after the TF Raleigh PAO had received word that the next of kin had been notified. This was not the proper procedure. However, there was also no reason to withhold the name of the soldier after his family had been notified.20

Safety or privacy was not the issue, however, when the JTF 190 commander directed that his soldiers not speak to the media during the initial phase of the operation. Fear of not getting the "right message" across does not meet the criteria of adversely affecting national security or threatening the safety of service members. Furthermore, it might actually harm the mission by antagonizing journalists or encouraging rumors.

Principle 5

The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.21

It is evident that the compartmentalization of the plan created coordination problems at every level of public affairs organization throughout the planning of the operation. This resulted in the significant problems associated with the deployment of the DNMP and unilateral pool. However, it is also evident that the intent of the public affairs planning process was to facilitate news gathering by the media to fulfill the military's obligation to provide the public with information on the operation.

Vane's briefing given to White House, DoD, and USACOM representatives was one of many coordination efforts by planners to expedite the flow of information to the American people on the capabilities and conduct of its armed forces. Likewise, in Haiti the Interagency Coordination Committee (ICC) ensured that the American ambassador in Haiti, the President's representative, was fully informed on how the military was implementing national policy, so that everybody
was aware of what was occurring in Haiti during a very dynamic period.\textsuperscript{21} In this regard, it was through the ICC that many media opportunities were identified and made available to the media.\textsuperscript{23}

However, it was evident that the coordination process for the pools, was broken or in some cases did not exist. In Guantanamo Bay the disconnect in coordination was apparent to everyone. Unfortunately, the perception by some in the media was that the breakdown was caused by an unwillingness of commanders at the lower level to provide support to the media.

For instance we could talk to the folks at the Pentagon throughout the Haiti deployment, and they were very good. They tried to reach out the best they could to resolve issues, but you didn't get the sense that word got from the actual command down to the troops in the field.\textsuperscript{24}

Public affairs personnel in the Pentagon were making agreements with bureau chiefs as well as editors for units deploying to or in Haiti without coordinating with those units to ensure they had the resources to meet the agreements. The establishment of the unilateral pool was perhaps the largest case of an agreement made without first checking with the units that would have to support them. The apparent lack of support was not the commander's fault. Most commanders were willing to accommodate media if they had the resources to do so and were aware of the requirement. As one DNMP escort said, "coordination/taskings must be accomplished through operations channels and message traffic" not through public affairs channels.\textsuperscript{25} In the case of the pools the situation was even worse because the message traffic was misrouted to an installation PAO because DoD was unaware that there were JTF PAOs on the ground at Guantanamo Bay with the SOF.

\textbf{Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations}

Below, as stated in DoD Directive 5122.5 and as addressed in Joint Pub 1-07, are the Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations. Following them is a discussion of the Army's effectiveness with regard to adhering to them.
Principle 1

Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.26

By all accounts this appeared to be the case during Operation Uphold Democracy. John Fialka, a harsh critic of Army Public Affairs during the Gulf Conflict, summed up the vast majority of media opinion this way: "The Army is much more receptive to the press that I can ever remember. I just came back from Haiti. When I was with the special forces, there wasn't anything I couldn't do." John Harris commented, that while the public affairs apparatus "was a pain in the neck to deal with and was "overwhelmed," the soldiers were open and cooperative with the media.28

While there was discussion by the planners of the need to conduct security reviews of media products, in the end there were none conducted. Nor has there been any discussion by the media of attempts of military censorship. It was clear to both the media and the military that security at the source was to be the primary means of ensuring operational security and soldier safety. Bradley Graham of the Washington Post stated that he thought Shelton was definitely taking a chance, and he [Shelton] knew he was experimenting to a degree . . . . There weren't any systems for reviewing our files. So Shelton knew they were going farther this time and really trying to advance the media/military relations.29

Yet, the example of Ricks at the JVE looking at classified maps while waiting to interview Meade indicates that understanding and training on the military side is not at the level that it needs to be.

With an interesting analysis, Vane looked at measuring the effectiveness of allowing open and independent reporting differently. In his view, given the large amount of editorial material written opposing public affairs policies in the Gulf Conflict, it is the absence of same media discussion and critique that indicates the highly effective way the principle was employed in Haiti.30
Principle 2

Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists in the area.\(^3\)

The problems with media pools rested in the interpretation of size and the lack of coordination involving the pools. Bernath stated,

We built this plan with a foundation of what the lessons learned were. We wanted this to be in the model of the two primary tenets of what the medial pool is supposed to be. It's supposed to be as big as the operation can support, and as short as possible until free and open coverage can replace the pool. A normal pool is 13 people, but we had ships, and we had planes, and we had availability, so we ended up with 25 [33], and we also worked in 68 unilaterals.\(^3\)

While it is recognized that DNMP "requirements are short-fused and legion" this does not preclude coordination.\(^3\) Public affairs personnel could coordinate with units for thirteen media representatives to accompany an invasion the size of OPLAN 2370. Even coordinating twenty-five media representatives is manageable, however, when the number of media representatives and escorts begins to approach the size of an infantry company, public affairs personnel will have a difficult time convincing commanders to give up soldiers spaces for media spaces. This is especially true when PA personnel do not enforce media guidelines concerning space and weight limitations.

There were, however, other challenges. As Vane said,

it's too much to handle at the corps level 48-hours before deployment—especially when equipment is to be handed out, escorts married up with, equipment to be cross loaded and a time schedule for departing planes to be met. It also is too much when some reporters didn't like the assignment they got. It appeared as if too much was left to the lowest level to sort out on the ground as events unfolded.\(^3\)

Criticism of the pool process was not limited to the public affairs practitioners at corps and below. McCouch, one of the DNMP escorts stated,

DoD escorts became glorified airport Red Caps. The media pool showed up with everything including the kitchen sink. Aside from the approximate 3,000 lbs. of personnel gear the 33 journalists...
brought with them, NBC News was allowed to transport a one-ton earth station. This resulted in the escorts dragging bags most of the time for the media because they could not possibly carry all that they brought. DoD/PA placed no limits on them at Andrews AFB, MD prior to departure.35

While the above description may seem petty, the impact on limited resources was not. The aircraft transporting the media were occupying space on a very crowded and busy Guantanamo Bay airfield, during preparations for an extremely complicated invasion. The inability to quickly off and on load media equipment did not help the situation. Once off loaded from the arrival aircraft, the pool's equipment took two CH-46 helicopter lifts to get it aboard ship. The NBC earth station, which stood six feet high, required its own helicopter and because it was configured on a C-141 pallet the helicopter crew had to break the pallet down before placing the equipment on board the aircraft.36 Even the unilateral pool escorts recognized that the

effect of delivering 20 [additional] media on them [JTF units] relatively unannounced might have been lessened by having more warning. Something like 10 or 15 reporters would be more reasonable for future operations.37

The media which were generally supportive of the good faith efforts made by the Pentagon to deploy the pools also recognized problems associated with the efforts to deploy a tiered pool system. Bill Headline of CNN and several other prominent news executives are quick to point out the need to efficiently and effectively deploy the DNMP before beginning to think about expanding pool operations to include a tier concept such as the one used in Haiti with the unilateral pool. "My first concern over the tier concept is that the pool [DNMP] doesn't work all that well yet, and I don't want to see efforts to improve the pool sidetracked by planning for the next step."38

Principle 3

Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.39
The situation aboard the command ship USS Mount Whitney placed the media in a position in which some preferred that military would have enforced the principle. As it was, Graham of the Washington Post and a team from Life Magazine were given unique access to Shelton. This access violated the spirit if not letter of the DNMP guidelines. For certain it put several DNMP escorts in the position of having to explain an arrangement that, perhaps in their own mind, was not justifiable. While this was obviously a conscious decision on the part of Shelton it clearly did not sit well with those excluded from the restricted nature of the arrangement. As Fialka of the Wall Street Journal contends, "generals should not be allowed to take out their pet reporters."^t

After the initial pools disbanded following the cancellation of the invasion, pools were rarely formed during the operation. The only significant pooling of media occurred after the 24 September firefight between U.S. Marines and Haitian Police and attaches. With this pool the primary purpose was to provide media transportation from Port-au-Prince to Cap Haitien.41 The media understood this and appreciated the efforts made to get transportation for them. They would not have been so appreciative, however, had they had their own transportation to get there.

Principle 4

Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.42

Aside from not being a combat zone, credentialing did not occur in Haiti. The JIB registered over thirteen hundred media representatives; however, there was no attempt to credential them. The difference between the two is significant. The registering "process does not bespeak of qualifications, experience or approval; it only
acknowledges presence." In addition, other than providing DoD and USACOM ground rules to the DNMP and the unilateral pool the ground rules received little if any attention. As Vane contends,

"no two reporters that I talked to had the same understanding of what the agreement was between DoD and the media. Some thought that the pool had to last between 24-36 hours after D-Day, some didn't know, and some thought it fine to be released after H-Hour."" Had the operation gone as planned the need for a better understanding of the ground rules might have been more significant. Even understanding the ground rules, however, the JIB or any public affairs organization would have had a difficult time enforcing one element of the principle: the expulsion of a journalist. The premise that you can disregard the laws of a sovereign nation and unilaterally exclude journalists is difficult to defend or prosecute. While the threat of its use might work in a Gulf Conflict scenario it is difficult to enforce in a military-operations-other-than-war (MOOTW) environment. In a MOOTW environment reporters are constantly moving back and forth between lines as was done in Somalia, Haiti and currently Bosnia. The lack of civil order and the nonlinear and permeable nature of the military lines makes it very easy to do.

The final element of this principle covers the media's responsibility to assign experienced reporters to cover military operations. It was evident in Haiti, even among the media, that there has not been much movement with this argument. One media party continues to argue that the media is doing a disservice to itself and its audiences when it fails to send reporters who are knowledgeable on military operations. The other party, including reporters like Daniel Glick of Newsweek object to the argument that reporters without military experience will create problems. In an American Journalism Review article, Glick "doesn't think he was somehow failing the national pool by not being a Pentagon correspondent for the last 20 years . . . . 'I come up to speed on stories all the time.'" Nonetheless, failure to reach the appropriate speed in a short period could cause problems for
the media. As Schneider recalled, some correspondents stood watching a soldier [in Haiti] fire an M-16 at a steel door, apparently unaware that they could be hit by ricocheting bullets. "On several occasions, Willey made pleas to the media to allow the soldiers room to operate and not to get too close to the action, not because he wanted to prevent coverage but because he was concerned about soldier safety."  

Principle 5

Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases."

Although several reporters commented on problems associated with gaining entrance to the 10th Mountain Division location in the LIC, for the most part the reporter's comments focused on the lack of ease and timeliness involved, not a complete lack of access. The striking point here was that the SF were seen as, perhaps, providing more access than some of the conventional units. Ricks of the Wall Street Journal contends that the Army had some "internal contradictions in Haiti." In a kind of role reversal, the commander in Port-au-Prince was not very receptive to the media while SF commanders like Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kay in Les Cayes were saying to reporters, "glad you are here let me show you what we are doing." In another example, the TF Raleigh commander brought Lucia Newman from CNN to Les Cayes following the shooting of a U.S. Special Forces soldier by a FAH'D soldier. Initially Potter opposed the idea because he was "going down there to chew their [FAH'D] ass" and did not want to focus attention on the incident. However, when confronted with the argument that he could show the forceful U.S. response, which included bringing in an infantry company from the 75th Ranger Regiment, he agreed to take her along. The resulting story by Newman put the incident into perspective while showing the versatility of SOF. The Rangers would use necessary force to prevent further incidents while the SF soldiers would continue to work within the community to improve conditions.
Principle 6

Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.\textsuperscript{52} All the reporters interviewed made similar comments.\textsuperscript{53} Likewise, the PAOs in Haiti were very conscious of this criticism from the past and made every attempt possible to avoid the perception of it. In fact, on a number of times the TF Raleigh PAO left Potter alone with a reporter just for that reason. Being left alone with a senior leader was something that the media immediately recognized and appreciated as a sign of mutual respect and understanding. That is not to say that at times having a PAO stay with a senior leader is a bad idea, especially if the interview concerns a sensitive area or if there is reason to believe that the interview might be misinterpreted. Of course, the level of experience, training, judgement of the PAO as well as the person being interviewed should also be a determinant.

From a military perspective, pure numbers also drove adherence to the principle. Given that in a ten week period there were more than thirteen hundred media registered by the JIB, there was no way that less than fifty public affairs personnel in country could do anything more than facilitate coverage and act as liaisons.\textsuperscript{54} As discussed before, the TF Raleigh PAO rarely accompanied media to units. For the most part the PAO ensured that the media were aboard helicopters bound for the proper location and that they had the name of the individual in charge at the other end. The 10th Mountain Division PAO worked in the same manner, identifying the media opportunity, notifying the appropriate unit, linking the media up with a unit escort and if possible getting feedback from both the media and the unit on how the coverage went.

116
Principle 7

Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.\textsuperscript{35}

Some media pointed to the availability of transportation as a problem once the JTF's mission changed from a forced entry to a permissive entry operation.

Some of the press ended up stranded on ships, or even in a staging area on one of the Bahamian islands and at Fort Bragg. That took several days for the military to straighten out. It became a headache for senior commanders who were getting phone calls from angry media-organization representatives saying, "Hey you've had my correspondent stranded for two days!"\textsuperscript{36}

Again this was, perhaps, the result of too many media for the units to adequately handle. Once the plan changed, the media, which were not part of the original plan, were moved further down the priority scale as the military scrambled to get a different force structure to Haiti.

However, once the media were in Haiti transportation did not appear to be a problem. The media were able to contract their own transportation and the JTF 190 operations order specified that the media were to be permitted use of military transportation in country if available.\textsuperscript{37} For the media in Port-au-Prince, they simply had to coordinate with the JIB or unit for permission to ride along as part of a mounted MP patrol. While there were some instances where permission was denied, usually they were easily accommodated. Steve Devane recalled that early in the operation he was not allowed on an MP patrol, although he had been on several patrols already. In this case a captain, who had just arrived in country, was the one to deny the ride. Devane is certain that if he had a few more minutes before the patrol departed he could have solved the problem.\textsuperscript{38}

The media were also afforded transportation aboard a CH-47 helicopter, from PAPIA up to Cap Haitien, on a regular basis. Again it was a simple coordination process with the JIB. This also applied to regular media visits to the USS Mount Whitney originating from PAPIA.
Perhaps the most successful use of military transportation was when the media accompanied SF soldiers into the hinterland. Here they were not just using transportation to transit to another location but were actively involved in an operation. This is something that JTF 190 failed to take advantage of when they conducted a limited number of helicopter operations.

**Principle 8**

Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalist will, as always, file by any means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battle field situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

The recurring theme in all after action reports, JULLS, briefings and interviews was the lack of equipment among the public affairs force and media escorts, particularly communication and transportation equipment. The media were quick to point this failure out.

Despite the pact [principles of coverage of military operations], pool members encountered problems. Some reporters couldn't file electronically because the military's communications equipment apparently was incompatible with their laptop computers. Some pool correspondents felt they were competing with unilaterals for access and information.

While some in the media viewed the filing and access problems as a result of the mission change, some in the military thought differently. Vane's biggest concern was if the DNMP had gone into Haiti in an invasion scenario and actually been forced to use military equipment to file there wouldn't have been any to use. While there were limited filing assets aboard ships, there was not an effective system to transport the material from Haiti to those ships. Nor was the electronic filing system in Haiti any better.

The experience of McCrith, a DNMP escort in Cap Haitien exemplifies Vane's fears. The DNMP escorts had with them four INMARSATs
or portable satellite phone systems. However, none of the escorts were trained on them, nor were the phones checked out before the operation. Problems with the operation of two handsets, the lack of compatible fuel for the INMARSAT's generators, and the lack of proficiency on the equipment severely degraded the ability of the escorts to help the media file their stories. 61 An article in American Journalism Review about the DNMP, focused on the same issue. "Transportation and communication difficulties hindered the correspondents' efforts to transmit reports."62 Had the media needed to rely solely on the military INMARSATs in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien the situation would have been worse.

Principle 9

These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system. 44

According to Joint Pub 1-07, "the support of the DoD National Media Pool is a priority mission for the joint task force commander." 45 On the surface, it can be said that the DNMP received a high level of support from the DoD level on down to the eventual units that they were assigned to cover. Upon closer examination, however, and as the previous chapter addressed, there were significant lapses in coordination. As one DNMP escort said,

The SecDef's get out of jail free letters need to be used only when the properly tasked support doesn't come through, not in lieu of proper taskings. Too often the DoD personnel thought, incorrectly, that the letter of introduction signed by SecDef Perry would make up for the lack of coordination--it didn't. If the units don't have the support because they didn't plan for it, you won't get the support no matter how may letters you produce.44

The media were also concerned that "like pools in the past, the Haiti pool . . . suffered from logistical problems." 47 However, generally, the media were satisfied with the military's efforts to support the DNMP. The Associated Press Washington Bureau Chief, Jon Wolman, stated that "the Pentagon made a good faith effort to comply with the" principles.48 The large number of unilateral media lessened
the ability of the military to focus its efforts toward the DNMP. As
Jacqueline Sharkey wrote in an American Journalism Review article,

ironically, many of these problems resulted not from White House or
Pentagon attempts to control access to information—as has sometimes
happened in the past, most recently during the Persian Gulf War—but from the Pentagon's effort to allow more open and independent
coverage.69

Operation Uphold Democracy followed a long history of U.S.
Government and American media involvement in Haiti. During the
operation the unique needs and changing capabilities of the media were
juxtaposed against the Army's public affairs doctrine, force structure
and training. In addition, the military-media relationship impacted the
way in which the military planned the operation. In that context this
chapter addressed the ability of public affairs to meet its desired
objectives.

While there were many objectives for Army Public Affairs during
Operation Uphold Democracy, fundamentally it was to adhere to the policy
and principles contained in DoD Directive 5122.5. That is "to make
available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress,
and the news media may assess and understand the facts about" Operation
Uphold Democracy.70

In summary, it appears that public affairs was generally
effective in adhering to the policy and principles in the directive.
While not definitive, the suggestive indicators, personal observations
of media representatives, commanders, and public affairs personnel, lead
one to believe that in most cases the spirit of the principles were
followed. This is particularly true of open and independent reporting
and in granting access to some units. However, as in past operations
there remains significant problems associated with the deployment of the
DNMP. In retrospect, the perceived success associated with public
affairs and its employment of pools in Haiti was probably more
fortuitous than planned when viewed in light of some commander's
attempts to minimize access and the DNMP problems.
Endnotes


2Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.


5Andrew Schneider, Assistant Managing Editor, Scripps Howard News Service, telephone interview by author, 13 November 1995, tape recording, Washington, DC.

6Michael Sullivan, Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade, telephone interview by author, 7 February 1996, tape recording, Baileys Cross Roads, VA.

7Mark D. Boyatt, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), telephone interview by author, 6 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

8Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.


10Author's observation, Haiti, 1994.

11Rick Kirk, Commander, 22nd MPAD, telephone interview by author, 15 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

12Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.

13Author's observation's, Haiti, 1994.

14Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.

15Interview, Boyatt, Author.

16Ibid.

17Interview, Sullivan, Author.
1. Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.

2. Interview, Schneider, Author.

3. Author's observation, Haiti, 1994.


5. Shelton, 7.


10. Aucupfer, 108.


13. Timothy Vane, Public Affairs Officer JTF-180, telephone interview by author, 9 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.


122

Ibid., 2.


Aukofer, 116.

Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 3.

Aukofer, 106.

Timothy D. Vane, Public Affairs Officer JTF-180, interview by Steve E. Dietrich, 10 October 1994, tape recording, USS Mount Whitney, AHAS.

Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 3.

Bridges, 32.


Ibid., 45.

Author's observation, Haiti, 1994.

Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 3.

Tom Ricks, Pentagon Correspondent, Wall Street Journal, telephone interview by author, 7 November 1995, tape recording, Washington, DC.

Ibid.

Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 3.

Steve Devane, Staff writer, Fayetteville Observer Times, telephone interview by author, notes, 6 February 1996, Fayetteville, NC.

Author's observations, Fort Leavenworth, 1996.

After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 4.
55Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)), 2 December 1993, encl. 3.

56Aukofer, 116.

57Marty Culp, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs Officer, telephone interview by author, 15 December 1995, tape recording, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.

58Interview, Devane, Author.

59Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)), 2 December 1993, encl. 3.

60Sharkey, 44.

61Interview, Vane, Author.


63Sharkey, 44.

64Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)), 2 December 1993, encl. 3.

65Bridges, 38.


67Sharkey, 44.

"Ibid.

68Ibid.

69Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)), 2 December 1993, encl. 2.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The global media environment subjected Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti to real time scrutiny. Faced with this facet of the information age, the Army Public Affairs' challenge was "to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about" Operation Uphold Democracy.¹ Determining whether Army Public Affairs was effective in accomplishing that challenge was the purpose behind this paper. The conclusions offered here follow the research model (Figure 2) used to meet that purpose. Addressed first are those conclusions which concern the military-media relationship. Next, are those conclusions that pertain to the public affairs force. Finally, the conclusions involving the primary research question, the effectiveness of public affairs during Operation Uphold Democracy, are discussed.

Military-Media Relations

Operation Uphold Democracy demonstrated significant progress toward improving the relationship between the media and military. In view of the efforts put forth by the military during Operation Uphold Democracy, the media, in general, believe that the military can and will allow open and independent coverage of its operations. As Fialka said, "I do believe that their doctrine has changed. The Army is much more receptive now to the press than I can ever remember."² This fundamental belief has softened the feelings between the two sides. There appears to be less hostility on the part of the media toward the military and in turn the military is less defensive toward the intentions of the media.
Nonetheless, this change in the relationship is fragile. On the military side it will take a large effort, like that begun by TRADOC to incorporate public affairs training in its schools, to ingrain a more open PA posture in soldiers, particularly officers assuming command. Since public affairs is a command, not a staff responsibility, it is commanders who will continue to have the most impact on the status of the relationship. The difference commanders make could be seen in the way JTF 190 tended to handle the media and the way TF Raleigh worked with the media. Additionally, in the future, commanders like Sullivan and Boyatt may not have the luxury of being able to have positive media experiences before becoming advocates of open and independent reporting. Commanders must use the lessons of Operation Uphold Democracy as a new benchmark and plan the next operation accordingly. They should not apply the lessons blindly, but rather with the understanding that the media will remain a part of the operational environment.

Likewise, the media should conduct its own education process, particularly as new members join its ranks, since few if any will have had experience with the military. Again as Fialka contends, you have to begin with some kind of training that shows you what it is you’re going to cover, what the lethals are where you should be, what the operation is going to be, what the military thinks, how the military thinks, what it wants to do.³

However, while the idea of editors allowing writers the opportunity of peacetime training for wartime reporting is good, in most cases it will not pass the litmus test of most news organizations--is it worth the dollar cost? Editors and news organizations simply cannot afford to offer that type of training. Therefore, the concept of including the media as soon as practicable into military operations remains the best solution to the lack of military knowledge among members of the media. It then becomes a commander’s responsibility to bring media representatives up to speed on an operation or face the possibility of an operation being inaccurately portrayed. As Sullivan contends, when
you got reporters there who are on the ground early on, who know what the plan is and can watch it being executed, they can write from a much more informed perspective. You're going to get much more balanced reporting. I think that is what everybody wants—balanced reporting.6

Doctrine

Given that the policy and principles contained in DoD Directive 5122.5 are the cornerstone of current or future Army public affairs doctrine—the de facto Army public affairs doctrine is fundamentally sound. As previously stated, one way to determine the effectiveness of doctrine is to see if what is taught in institutions is practiced by soldiers in the field. As Shelton, the JTF 180 commander stated, the Principles for News Coverage of DoD Operations defined "the parameters for media coverage of US troop deployments and were followed by the JTF in all phases of the operation."5 The versatile, authoritative, descriptive, and "how to think" nature of the policy and principles made them instrumental to their employment during the operation.

While the above is necessary for successful doctrine, it is as Willey contends, "the self-starting, mission-oriented independent leaders and troops, who could use their good judgment and experience to make the right decisions about public affairs issues" that made the true difference.6 The challenges faced by PA in Haiti are indicative of challenges that PA will face in all future operations. Therefore, "top-notch, school trained, [and] experienced public affairs troops" are key to successful operations.7 Thus, Operation Uphold Democracy appears to validate the current officer "accession and development philosophy" which focuses on "experience in branch assignments . . . augmented by quality professional training and experience in PA techniques."6

Nevertheless, there were problems with the ability of the public affairs force to follow the de facto doctrine. Among them was USACOM's inability to develop and disseminate PPAG in an efficient and timely manner to subordinate units. The issues regarding this and the negative effect at the installation level have already been addressed.

127
Mostly, however, the problems with doctrine stemmed from a lack of equipment and deficiencies in organizational structures. For example, the equipment shortages in the 50th PAD made it ineffective without external support. While the shortages created problems for army units, the situation would have been catastrophic had the DNMP deployed as part of the invasion force and needed to use assets the military agreed to make available. The ad hoc nature of JIBs and employment of TDA PA personnel only reinforces equipment problems. Because there is no associated equipment for these soldiers, invariably there is going be a shortage, whether caused by miscalculation, lack of planning time, or just limited available resources.

Possible solutions to these problems include fixing the equipment deficiencies associated with AC PADs and increasing the use of RC units to meet operational needs. This would also help reduce the number of deployments that AC PADs are tasked to conduct. However, before the RC is employed, their equipment problems need to be rectified also. In addition, the discussion of developing a full-time contingency JIB, staffed with experienced PA practitioners, has gone on long enough. Action should be taken to make it a reality, otherwise the problems related to equipment shortfalls are sure to continue. Manning a JIB with experienced personnel who are properly equipped with communication and transportation assets would solve most problems.

Even those fixes, however, would not help a JIB or any other PA organization with the impractical requirement to credential and enforce ground rules that Principle 4 of Media Coverage of DoD Operations calls for. Since this principle also states that news organizations should make their best efforts to provide experienced journalists to cover the military, it probably ought to be reviewed and, perhaps, eliminated as unrealistic.

It was also evident that problems persist with the deployment of the DNMP. Even with the constraints and problems associated with the
secrecy of the plan there is room for improvement in planning, tasking, and coordinating PA and pool issues. As several pool escorts and PAOs argued, ASD (PA) must stop the practice of coordinating through PA channels and begin the practice of tasking through operational channels. This requires experienced PAOs with operational backgrounds who can use their knowledge and experience to work with planners to get taskings into plans. This, perhaps, would prevent the problems associated with the unilateral pool as well. Certainly, however, Headline's suggestion that getting the DNMP deployment problems fixed before trying to add on another pool like the unilaterals should be taken seriously."

**Mission**

While there was great debate about the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Operation Uphold Democracy, the center of that debate was in Washington with Congress, not in Haiti. However, the perceptions of Congress and the public were to a large degree based on news accounts and images that were portrayed in the media. Therefore, Army public affairs was effective during Operation Uphold Democracy because it was able "to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress and the news media" could "assess and understand the facts" about Operation Uphold Democracy.¹⁰

To a great extent it was the unparalleled media access to the preparation, deployment and execution of the operation that painted the perceptions. As Schneider contends,

> they bent over backwards once they realized we [the media] were serious, it was just full access to everybody. I mean we could get into virtually any briefing anywhere, ask anyone anything . . . it just couldn't be any better.¹¹

Allowing the media access and the opportunity to experience what the soldiers were experiencing, helped ensure the media's reports were told timely, accurately and within context of their environment. In analyzing the operation it is clear that on some days the coverage was, perhaps, more favorable for the military than on other days. However,
the purpose of PA is not to sway public opinion, it is to provide information. Therefore, Vane's efforts to address contentious issues head on, "to take the pressure out of the bottle," were key because they helped frame perceptions without necessarily forming them. This distinction is fine but important. Likewise, the media focus on looting and civil disorder was balanced by the stories capturing the unique capabilities of American service members like MPs and SF. Harris' reflections on the subject are typical of many media representatives and indicate the importance of forthrightness when dealing with the media. "I thought people were open, I thought cooperative and I thought the whole operation ended up making the Army look good."15

During Operation Uphold Democracy, where the intent was "to make timely and accurate information" available, over 1,300 media were registered by the JIB during a ten-week period.14 In TF Raleigh alone, which was relatively small force, over eighty-six media visits were coordinated in a sixty day period from September 1994 to November 1994.15 In addition, during the period from July 1994 to December 1994, USSOCOM gathered over 200 different print stories on SOF and their involvement with Operation Uphold Democracy.14

A final measurement of effectiveness is Vane's contention that the absence of media discussion and critique concerning public affairs policies in Haiti are indicators of the successful nature of the PA mission. Likewise, the absence of post-operation media bashing by members of the military seems to indicate an effective employment of PA as well as a change in attitude by many.

The extent that the military-media relationship during Operation Uphold Democracy will impact on future operations is unclear. What is clear is that the media have walked away with greater expectations for the openness of future operations. This expectation, alone, should not make Haiti the template for future operations. Instead the lessons from Haiti ought to be applied in the context of the next operation.
However, for the military, one lesson that ought to remain fixed is that there are benefits in allowing access in the form of free and independent reporting. As Sullivan argues, access allows stories to be told "accurately and with understanding." And the fact of the matter remains, if the military does not tell its story than someone else will. The question then is: How accurate and in what context?

While the media may be apprehensive about the prospects of becoming "too close" with the military, actually the more you know about a subject the better you should be able to explain that subject to others. Furthermore, the idea of inclusion reinforces the media's inherent responsibility to remain objective. By increasing the level of understanding, inclusion allows the media to report events in the context that the event occurred.

Meanwhile, the media's lesson should be that the military will allow access as long as it does not jeopardize missions and the safety of soldiers. As former Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney asserts, future military operations may be more difficult than was the case in Haiti. The Haitians did not have an air force or air-defense system. "There wasn't a damn thing they could do about C-141's dropping troops onto the airport over in Port-au-Prince." However, most media representatives understand that and are willing to work within appropriate guidelines. The obvious proof is that the media voluntarily withheld information concerning aircraft departing Pope Air Force Base for several hours.

Recommendations for further research

The military-media relationship is a dynamic one and one that warrants constant analysis to avoid both past and future problems that could potentially discredit both sides and do a disservice to the public in the process. To avoid future problems there are several areas that deserve more attention than this work was able to provide.
First, while challenges facing the deployment of the DNMP were addressed in this thesis, much more could be done to examine its effectiveness and the procedures by which it is deployed.

A second area to explore is the doctrinal missions and organization of current public affairs organizations with a view toward identifying specific needs and perhaps more importantly the funding means available to address those needs. The work might also address the issue of transportation and communication assets in more detail, possibly making specific recommendations.

A final recommendation for further research rests with filters within media organizations. Given free and independent coverage of military operations, reports by the media on the ground can still differ from those presented to the public. Editors play a large part in the way a story is presented. A study that focuses on the differences between the "ground truth" reports of media representatives and the products seen, read, or heard by the public might help identify additional solutions concerning the military-media relationship.

Conclusion

The challenge for Army Public Affairs in Haiti was "to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may [could] assess and understand the facts about" Operation Uphold Democracy. Though there were significant lapses in coordination and shortages of equipment, public affairs personnel were able to apply central principles to effectively accomplish the public affairs mission. However, future contingency operations may not be as forgiving of mistakes and shortages. Preventing future failures will require commanders who will address media considerations up front and pay the resource costs associated with a public affairs force that can move with the Army into the information age.
Endnotes

1Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2 December 1993), encl. 2.


3Ibid., 108.

4Michael Sullivan, Commander, 16th Military Police Brigade, telephone interview by author, 7 February 1996, tape recording, Baileys Cross Roads, VA.


6Department of Defense, After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti: Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 6.

7Ibid.

8U.S. Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1995), 182.

9Aukofer, 116.

10Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.

11Andrew Schneider, Assistant Managing Editor, Scripps Howard News Service, telephone interview by author, 13 November 1995, tape recording, Washington, DC.

12Timothy D. Vane, Public Affairs Officer JTF-180, interview by Steve E. Dietrich, 10 October 1994, USS Mount Whitney, AHAS.


14Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2; and After Action Report (Public Affairs) -- Operation Uphold Democracy, Director, Joint Information Bureau, No date given, 4.

15Author's observations, Haiti, 1994.

17 Interview, Sullivan, Author.

18 Aukofer, 103.

19 Ibid., 97.

20 Department of Defense Directive, Number 5122.5, SUBJECT: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) (2 December 1993), encl. 2.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Government Documents


Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 92-7. Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992.


CONPLAN 2380-95 Brief to CINC ACOM. Fort Bragg: HQ XVIII Airborne Corps, August 1994.

Media Guidelines for Deployed JTF 180 Participants Cards.
Fort Bragg: XVIII Airborne Corps PAO/Joint Task Force 180 PAO, No date given.


Periodicals and Magazine Articles


Newspapers


------. "Haiti Massacre; President Flees; Zamor Executed," 28 July 1915.


Reports


Discussions and Interviews

Beinkemper, James. Joint Readiness Training Center Public Affairs Officer. Telephone interview by author, 26 January 1996, notes, Fort Polk, LA.

Berry, Ken. Editor, Mid-Week Magazine. Discussion with author, 11 November 1994, Haiti.

Boyatt, Mark D. Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). Telephone interview by author, 6 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

Bryan, Michael. Deputy Director Public Affairs Proponent Activity. Telephone interview by author, 9 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Meade, MD.

Culp, Martin. 10th Mountain Division and JTF 190 Public Affairs Officer. Telephone interview by author, 15 December 1995, tape recording, Washington, DC.

Devane, Steve. Staff writer, Fayetteville Observer Times. Telephone interview by author, notes, 6 February 1996, Fayetteville, NC.


Fugget, Kenneth. Media Relations Officer XVIII Airborne Corps. Telephone interview by author, 15 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.


Kirk, Rick. Commander 22nd MPAD. Telephone interview by author, 15 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.

Long, Patricia. 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 17 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Drum, NY.


Sweet, Donald. 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs. Telephone interview by author, 17 November 1995, tape recording, Fort Drum, NY.


Vane, Timothy D. Public Affairs Officer JTF-180. Telephone interview by author, 9 February 1996, tape recording, Fort Bragg, NC.
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, VA 22314

3. Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
   Combat Studies Institute
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

4. Col Richard M. Bridges
   Military Review
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1231

5. Col W. Stuart Towns, Ph.D.
   9690 Coachman Court
   Pensacola, FL 32514

6. Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
   Department of the Army
   Washington, DC 20310-1500
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 7 / Jun / 96

2. Thesis Author: Major Damian P. Carr

3. Thesis Title: U.S. Army Public Affairs During Operation Uphold Democracy

4. Thesis Committee Members
   Signatures:

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
   SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   S---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------S
   A Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s) A
   M
   P Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12 P
   L Critical Technology (3) / Sect. 4 / 31 L
   E Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32 E
   ---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------SAMPLE---------

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
   / / 
   / / 
   / / 
   / / 
   / / 

7. MMAS Thesis Author’s Signature:
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals.)

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. **Foreign Government Information.** Protection of foreign information.

2. **Proprietary Information.** Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. **Critical Technology.** Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. **Test and Evaluation.** Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. **Contractor Performance Evaluation.** Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. **Premature Dissemination.** Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. **Administrative/Operational Use.** Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. **Software Documentation.** Protection of software documentation—release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. **Specific Authority.** Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. **Direct Military Support.** To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).