UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II:
UNITED NATIONS UNITY OF EFFORT AND
UNITED STATES UNITY OF COMMAND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

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This study investigates UN unity of effort and U.S. unity of command of forces in Somalia from Operation Restore Hope throughout United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The United States, having directed a successful United Task Force coalition effort, transferred command to the UN in May 1993 and took a supporting role. The study documents military history in Somalia and analyzes command relationships of American units and multinational contingents. Research demonstrates that, following the transition to UNOSOM II, unit of command did not exist for the U.S. force commander in Somalia (USFORSCOM) and unity of effort was not achieved by the UN. Command of U.S. forces was retained by individual unit commanders or by the geographic commanders in chief (CINC) himself. The senior American officer in-theater, USFORSCOM, dual-hatted as the deputy UN force commander, was not in the direct chain of command of U.S. contingent forces. Likewise, UN contingents failed to support the UN Force Commander. This study suggests that unity of command of U.S. forces in theater is a prerequisite for successful military operations whether they are U.S.-led or UN operations.
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ABSTRACT

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II: UNITED NATIONS UNITY OF EFFORT AND UNITED STATES UNITY OF COMMAND by LCDR James C. Dixon, USN, 155 pages.

This study investigates UN unity of effort and U.S. unity of command of forces in Somalia from Operation Restore Hope throughout United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The United States, having directed a successful United Task Force coalition effort, transferred command to the UN in May 1993 and took a supporting role. The study documents military history in Somalia and analyzes command relationships of American units and multinational contingents.

Research demonstrates that, following the transition to UNOSOM II, unity of command did not exist for the United States force commander in Somalia (USFORSOm) and unity of effort was not achieved by the UN. Command of U.S. forces was retained by individual unit commanders or by the geographic commander in chief (CINC) himself. The senior American officer in-theater, USFORSOm, dual-hatted as the deputy UN force commander, was not in the direct chain of command of U.S. contingent forces. Likewise, UN contingents failed to support the UN Force Commander.

This study suggests that unity of command of U.S. forces in theater is a prerequisite for successful military operations whether they are U.S.-led or UN operations.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

The humanitarian relief effort in Somalia was a huge undertaking right from the beginning. Since January 1991, when Mohammed Sead Barre fell from power after having been dictator for more than two decades, the last remnants of a national government had ceased to exist. Anarchy and civil war dominated the country that military task force commanders first saw in August 1992. A police force, justice system, public schools, public utilities, transportation systems, and open marketplaces expected of a twentieth century civilization were nonexistent. Quality of life, to any standard, had declined dramatically in Somalia.¹

Nearly one-seventh of the seven million Somali population had disappeared as a result of the civil war that had been ongoing since 1988.² There were fourteen dominant clans, each heavily armed and territorial. Most Somalis were "governed" by their local clan elder or warlord. Those people who had not been killed as a result of these constant rivalries often became victim to the devastating drought that claimed more than 300,000 Somalis by starvation by mid-1992.³

Subsequently, a premium was placed on food and supplies brought into the country. This economic assistance provided a currency for the warlords and gave them the incentive to tighten the downward spiral on
society. Armed clansmen commandeered food from warehouses and convoys, then sold it at high prices or hoarded it. The humanitarian relief mission that spread throughout the country was embraced by most Somalis, but the militant factions that had profited from years of civil war were not eager to have the status quo upset by foreign presence."

With the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 on 24 April 1992, the world signalled its resolve to end the deteriorating situation. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) intervened by sending 50 observers, who not surprisingly were unable to make any noticeable differences. President Bush then ordered United States forces to assist UNOSOM I with Operation Provide Relief."

Somalia is located within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCENT), commanded at that time by Marine General Joseph P. Hoar (figure 1). The first American military forces ordered to Somalia, consisting of 570 personnel, arrived in August 1992 under the command of Marine Corps Brigadier General Frank Libutti. Initial relief operations secured the airfield in Mogadishu, allowing United States Air Force flights from Kenya to bring supplies for distribution. The effort soon included 3,000 United Nations troops, with the Pakistanis first sending a 500-man battalion. The military intervention was to have lasted only until January 1993, at which time relief flights would become a civilian responsibility. However, lawlessness in Mogadishu increased to the point that President Bush directed increased Central Command (CENTCOM) presence."
The passage of UNSCR 794 in December 1992 was a call for action
to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a U.S.-led joint and
combined task force, was commanded by Lieutenant General Robert B.
Johnston, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF). By
mid-December, nineteen nations had promised to participate in the
mission. UNITAF's phased operation began with securing transportation
nodes in Mogadishu and establishing the former U.S. Embassy as a
headquarters. Operations progressed throughout Somalia with the
development of humanitarian relief sectors (HRRs), geographic areas to
be secured for distribution of food and supplies (figure 2). With
assistance from 1 MEF Marines and Tenth Mountain Division soldiers,
French troops occupied the sector of Oddur, Belgians occupied Kismayo,
Italians occupied Gialalassi, and the Canadians secured Belet Uen. In
addition, U.S. forces occupied sectors in Bardera, Baidoa, and
Mogadishu. Command and control of the HRRs was simplified greatly
because, with the exception of Morocco, coalition forces were either
American or NATO allies.

CENTCOM's challenges in Somalia during the period of UNITAF were
threefold. First was the need to state a clear, achievable mission for
the force operational commander. The mission that was passed to
Lieutenant General Johnston was "to secure the major air and sea ports,
key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free
passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief
organization operations and assist UN/NGOs [nongovernment organizations]
in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices." Second, with
the U.S. providing the preponderance of manpower, CENTCOM was tasked with building the international military coalition. CENTCOM established guidance for sequencing forces into the area with the desire that all nations would have a visible presence. Finally, with United Nations control of activity in Somalia as the subsequent objective, CENTCOM had a primary task of effecting this transition. Conflict arose with CENTCOM's reluctance to expand its mission beyond the original National Command Authorities (NCA) directive. However, the United Nations saw any additional action taken by UNITAF forces, such as disarmament, as part of UNITAF's original mission because it would make the subsequent UN job easier. The handling of "mission creep" became a delicate issue for U.S. commanders as the transition to UN control approached.

UNOSOM II was organized following the passage of UNSCR 814 on 26 March 1993. Enforcement under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter initiated by UNITAF continued under UNOSOM II. The potential for hostilities was high as the U.S. reduced its combat strength in Somalia. Though security of the relief agencies appeared fragile, the U.S.-dominated forces of UNITAF had been successful. The sustainment of that security under UN control was not without apprehension.

Crisis Response Task Forces Become the Norm

The National Security Strategy of the United States is a combination of political, diplomatic, economic, and military strategies envisioned by the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense to safeguard national interests and meet global commitments. The National Military Strategy articulates how the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders intend to fulfill the fundamental military demands of the National Security Strategy.¹³ The current military strategy almost certainly guarantees future operations similar to those experienced in Somalia.

The National Military Strategy consists of the following four pillars:

1. Ensuring strategic deterrence and defense
2. Exercising forward presence in vital areas
3. Retaining the national capacity to reconstitute forces
4. Responding effectively to crises¹⁴

The changing military in the United States resulting from shrinking budgets and downsized Armed Forces puts tremendous pressure on each Service to undertake any and all missions, thus protecting its individual piece of the fiscal pie. The military is finding itself participating in numerous operations other than war, operations in which the goal is not to win a war but to assist in conflict resolution or to promote peace. By emphasizing crisis response in the National Military Strategy, the military's top leadership is setting the stage for accepting more missions like those in Somalia.

Crisis response in the international arena has become synonymous with coalition building. The plight of Somalia was met with a flood of humanitarian assistance from forty-nine nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and the military assistance of twenty-three nations and 38,000 troops.¹⁵ Throughout the efforts of UNOSOM I, the transition to Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia (renamed UNITAF), and later as UNOSOM II, the
real crisis that emerged was how to keep the coalition unity of effort coherent and how to establish unity of command for U.S. and UN forces.

Difficulties in command and control had grave implications during operations in Somalia. Violent opposition to UN forces was first evident in November 1992 as Pakistani forces were attacked in Mogadishu. 'Coalition members increasingly needed the military assistance of others for security and combat power. However, command relationships became items of national concern, mission statements became segregated by HRS, and parallel chains of command caused stress and delay in action. Without clear, crisp unity of command required in a combat military environment, each additional loss of life weakened subsequent attempts at unified command and control by the UN Force Commander in Somalia (UNFORSOM).

In order to succeed in the next crisis response, all military task forces and coalition players must cooperate fully under one unified command. A common ground for mutual support and trust in leadership must be found if viable coalitions will be formed. The American people certainly like a winner and are very hesitant to put American servicemen at undue risk, and Somalia taught them that other nations, likewise, hold the interests of their personnel "close to home."

The problem of achieving unity of command among American forces in a coalition command is the basis for this research. Nations remain very particular as to whom they will relinquish command of their troops, and for what specific mission and time. Countries participate in UN coalition operations to support their own national interests, sometimes even at the expense of the UN effort. Coalitions are formed to
emphasize to the warring parties that support is on a large, broad scale, with the hope of deterring aggressive or unacceptable behavior by the belligerents. However, any coalition that is formed must be cohesive in the face of violence and risk, and it must fully trust the commander who is placed in its lead.

During UNOSOM II, daily uncertainty in the operations and questions over the end state caused each contingent to make the best of a deteriorating situation. The commander of U.S. forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) saw his small contingency of American troops become just one of many distinct U.S. task forces under separate command. Force protection and self-reliance issues challenged cohesion, unity of effort, and unity of command. U.S. forces that were incrementally introduced into the theater were not automatically placed under USFORSOM's command. Since military forces rely upon unity of command for direction and coordinated activity, a single command structure was paramount in achieving the common goal. Without unity of command, sustainment of the coalition, or even a viable national contingent, was at peril.

Research Question

Did the UN have unity of effort and did the USFORSOM commander have unity of command of U.S. forces during UNOSOM II operations? The United States deployed the largest military force to Somalia and then expanded or contracted the force as the situation dictated. Command and control of American units was changed several times from August 1992 until the withdrawal of U.S. troops in March 1994. Marine Corps
officers had command of joint task forces during Provide Relief and Restore Hope while Army generals commanded elements of U.S. forces during UNOSOM II. All were under combatant command of CINCCENT, whose headquarters was located in Tampa, Florida. The later deployments of Task Force Ranger and a new Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia introduced additional layers of command and control confusion to the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that was already there. Coalition commanders sought the military assistance of these American assets, but control was several levels removed from the USFORSOM commander.

To complicate the picture for the U.S. commander in Somalia, initial coalition missions were directed from UN mandates. The UN civilian chain of command placed restrictions on Somalia task force commanders via the Secretary General and his Special Representative. United Nations Security Council Resolutions determined guidance for rules of engagement (ROE). The changing mission in Somalia and the changing ROE were critical factors in affecting unity of command. A final complication surfaced due to UNOSOM I's being engaged in Chapter VI peacekeeping operations while UNITAF and UNOSOM II efforts were characterized by Chapter VII peace enforcement (appendix A).

An important distinction is made between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the areas of consent, use of force, and impartiality. In peacekeeping, the belligerents clearly consent to the presence of the peacekeeping force, while in peace enforcement this consent is not absolute. Force is used during peacekeeping operations only in self-defense or when mandated. With peace enforcement, force is a means of compelling or coercing to achieve the desired objective. Finally,
impartiality is more easily maintained in peacekeeping, as an enforcement mission is perceived as partial to one or more belligerents.10

Command and control was upset by some unwillingness of certain coalition partners to work with each other. Governments restrained their units from participating with others for political reasons, as Indian and Egyptian troops would not reinforce Pakistanis. This lack of cooperation turned out to be a critical hurdle that the UN force commander could not overcome, in as much as the Pakistani contingency drew the security mission of a large portion of Mogadishu and required significant reinforcement that too often was not forthcoming.

This thesis analyzes command and control issues that arose from the UNOSOM II effort. The roles of United Nations agents, the National Command Authorities, CENTCOM, and coalition governments were intertwined in the success or failure of command. The command structure of UNOSOM II forces and United States forces led to parallel chains of command that were similar for each nation contributing forces to the coalition. As combative situations arose in Somalia, the authority to commit forces and the willingness to participate became more unclear. The nature of UNOSOM II's command and control issues provide insight in understanding interventions in future coalition operations.

Definition of Terms

Several terms used throughout the thesis discuss key ideas. Command and control principles are specified. The different types of peace operations are defined to clarify the changing mission
requirements that military forces can anticipate. Finally, a common understanding of command relationships identifies the channels that commanders use to commit troops.

Coalition Force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.20

Combined Operation. An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.21 For the purpose of this thesis, the terms multinational and combined are synonymous.

Command and Control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.22

Joint Task Force (JTF). A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing JTF.23

National Command Authorities (NCA). The President and the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the Armed Forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Peace Enforcement.} The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Peacekeeping.} Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Rules of engagement (ROE).} Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Unity of Command.} The direction and coordination of the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Unity of Effort.} Coordination through cooperation of all forces—even though they may not necessarily be part of the same command structure—toward a commonly recognized objective.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{Definitions of Command Relationships}

\textbf{Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM).} Nontransferable command authority exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. It is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving
organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.  

**Operational Command (OPCOM).** A NATO term used to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, and to reassign forces. OPCOM does not include administrative or logistic responsibility, the authority to prescribe the chain of command, organize forces, delineate functional responsibilities, or specify geographic areas of responsibility.  

**Operational Control (OPCON).** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.  

**Tactical Command (TACOM).** A NATO term giving a commander authority to assign tasks to forces for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. This differs from TACON in that the commander with TACON cannot assign tasks but merely controls the necessary movement and maneuver to accomplish the previously assigned mission.
Tactical Control (TACon). The detailed and, usually, local
direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish
assigned missions or tasks. 34

Thesis Delimitations

The thesis will analyze command and control relationships of
U.S. forces in Somalia during UNOSOM II operations from May 1993 through
March 1994. Because the command structure of UNITAF formed the
foundation for combat and logistics forces that were in theater at the
beginning of UN control, UNITAF command relationships will be
acknowledged and examined as an inheritance for the USFORCOS commander.

The peacekeeping organizational structure of the United Nations
drives political and strategic objectives affecting peace operations.
The establishment of the Somali theater during Operation Restore Hope
and UNOSOM II was driven by the UN and civilian relief organizations.
Organizational chains of command are delimited to the UN political and
military structures and to U.S. doctrine.

U.S. and UN peace operation doctrine is the foundation of
command and control research. Command of U.S. forces, within the
context of a UN operation, is specifically of interest. The analysis of
command relationships will include American doctrinal relationships as
opposed to the OPCOM and TACOM relationships of NATO. Sources of
information include a number of U.S. After-action reports (AAR) and
United Nations reports on UNOSOM II. Articles and text written by
American commanders during the timeframe provide constructive lessons
for future operations. Lessons learned by coalition militaries
concerning command of United Nations peace enforcement efforts are not studied.

This study focuses on command relationships of U.S. forces in a United Nations structure. It identifies demands placed upon USFORSOM's authority to command. The demands of NGOs during the humanitarian relief efforts restricted unity of effort rather than unity of military command, and the effects of NGOs are not examined. The study identifies political and military challenges to unity of command.

Summary

As the United States embarks down the path of increased involvement in joint and combined operations, forward presence around the world, and regional crisis response described in the National Security Strategy, the American public will expect its military forces to be utilized and commanded in the most responsible and professional manner. It is critical to the health of the Armed Services that unity of effort and unity of command be preserved not only in coalition action but among American forces in a theater. American soldiers will increasingly find themselves either dependent upon the competent support and reinforcement of coalition forces or under the operational control of an unfamiliar commander. The success of the most recent coalitions has hinged on maintenance of the coalition as a viable military force, and it is the duty of effective command and control to provide the basis for uncompromised unity. Only with confidence and trust of those in command can the U.S. military continue the present course and win.
The United States emphasizes that American forces remain under the command of U.S. commanders to the maximum extent possible. Granting operational and tactical control to another commander is not done unless the need is critical. But when control is withheld to the extreme and is maintained even at the expense of the senior flag-level U.S. officer in the immediate theater, it can restrict operations and unnecessarily increase risk.

American forces expect unity of command from their leadership. They expect that any U.S. forces introduced to the operation will be united in purpose and will be coordinated and synchronized into main and supporting efforts. Separate U.S. chains of command can lead to confusion on the ground and delayed response to a dynamic situation. This can ultimately lead to a failed operation or to the failure of this country to achieve its national objectives, with great potential for the unnecessary loss of American lives.

The significance of this study rests with the command relationships that are adopted in future U.S. operations. The momentum is clearly moving in the direction of increasing joint and combined military action, under U.S. or UN leadership. Effective unity of effort and unity of command are the key components.
Endnotes


8Richards, 133.


10Richards, 135-136.


13Freeman, 64.

14Ibid., 62.


17Arnold, 29.

18Richards, 133.

19Allard, 15.


21Ibid., 12.

Ibid., 77.

Ibid., 78.

Ibid., 207.


FM 100-23 (1994), 111.

Ibid., 112.


FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.


Joint Publication 1-02 (1994), 274 to 275.

FM 100-7 (1995), 2-8.

Joint Publication 1-02 (1994), 375.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

Review of Literature

Doctrinal manuals of the United States Armed Forces have an extensive amount of literature concerning joint and combined command and control. Numerous government publications address command relationships and unity of command as foundations for successful military operations.

The command structures and definitions of U.S. command relationships are found in U.S. joint and service publications. Included in these manuals are command and control structures of joint operations, joint task forces, and multinational operations, as well as military operations in low-intensity conflict and peace operations.

Defining Effective Command

Effective command is a combination of effective decision making and effective leadership. Making proper decisions is based upon situational awareness, intelligence, competent staff input, and anticipating the consequences of one's decisions. Leadership is the inspirational direction of subordinates and the establishment of teamwork. Effective command is flexible and allows the commander to synchronize action. It allows the commander to allocate resources as he sees necessary and to shift resources as the situation changes.\(^1\) The
most effective commander is one who maintains central authority to perform all of these control functions.

For the coalition contingent commander, effective command is also based upon knowing the commitment of the participating forces and their capabilities to perform missions. Coalition command is made difficult by the lack of definitive command arrangements and varying views of the operational and strategic objectives.

To overcome the obstacles of multilateral operations, commanders can engage in several actions to improve unity of effort and command effectiveness. First among these is establishing rapport with other contingent commanders. Mutual support, direct support, and assumption of tactical command are based on mutual trust, respect, and the ability to show a willingness to compromise. Second, commanders must share respect for the worth and importance that each military partner brings to the coalition. Unity grows from the acceptance of, or at least the consideration of, ideas generated by others. Next, the assignment of missions appropriate to a contingent's capabilities or national prestige enhance cooperation and success. Effective command also means effective liaison with coalition forces to enhance efficiency and understanding. Standardization of operations, understanding of command relationships, and common rules of engagement affect command in a multinational environment. Finally, the commander's ability to focus all effort on a common goal is a key ingredient toward effective unity of command.

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Understanding UN Operations

United Nations documents provide an international perspective on operations in Somalia. Security Council Resolutions mandate action and specify the intent of an international body on a scope much broader than the desires of the United States alone. Mission analysis, for instance, became a point of increasing tensions during UNOSOM II operations, and United Nations resolutions document the evolution from Chapter VI peacekeeping to Chapter VII enforcement operations. Additionally, periodic situation reports (sitrep) between commanders in Somalia and the United Nations headquarters in New York provide insight into the day-to-day issues, successes, and shortcomings of the combined force command. The success or failure of the coalition directly affected decisions made on behalf of the U.S. contingent.

Lessons Learned

After-action reports of U.S. forces provide "lessons learned" accounts of American commanders in operations during UNOSOM II. Each report documents strengths and weaknesses of the command relationships among U.S. forces as well as within the coalition. Changes in the preparations and expectations for future peace operations build upon previous successes or failures. Command and control issues presented in "lessons learned" reviews are currently a primary means of post-conflict analysis of an operation. The compatibility and responsiveness of the command structure to the uncertainty in the streets of Somalia was studied from these sources. AARs and compilations of lessons learned
provided good "case studies" of unilateral and multilateral command structures.

Unity of Effort versus Unity of Command

Unity of command suggests that all forces are under a single responsible commander. This commander must have the authority to direct all of the forces at his disposal to achieve the common objective. On the other hand, unity of effort is sought among coalition commands and involves coordination of military force, cooperation among nonmilitary agencies, and mutual support by all parties. Coalitions must share a single purpose, thereby developing unity of effort if not unity of command.

The literature review presented doctrinal methods to organize for effective command and control. References delineated the doctrinal chain of command for a U.S. Joint Task Force or for a UN operation in which the U.S. is a participant. What was missing from the literature was the mechanism that tied together unity of command with unity of effort during multinational operations. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, specifies unity of command as one of the Army's nine principles of war. "Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander . . . . Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command." Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, lists unity of effort as one of its six principles and states that it is a derivative of unity of command. The contradiction arose with the realization that if governments retain command over their forces, the
multinational force commander or contingent commander, by definition, relinquishes unity of command. All national authorities can be expected to retain command over their contingent. Therefore, in a combined operation, the force commander can only expect to command forces with some form of indirect operational or tactical control. Unity of command, though a principle of war, is not feasible.

What is interesting about the U.S. command of American troops in Somalia is that the local commander was not able to exercise unity of command as the U.S. on-scene commander. As violence, or the threat of violence, in the theater increased and as the coalition became more fragile, the opportunity that a single commander would be trusted with operational control decreased. The principle of unity of effort applied between military forces and nongovernment agencies, but unity of command was desired among military forces. Operational and tactical control must be at the real-time disposal of the force commander.

Joint Doctrine on Command

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, states that "unity of command is the guiding principle of war in military command relationships." Emphasis is placed on keeping the chain of command short and the command structure clear. U.S. forces will be one part of a larger effort and must not be of the opinion that they are the focus of attention. Mutual respect and a cooperative relationship must exist between national contingents. Joint Publication 1 bases the multinational effort on an attitude of equality and mutual
confidence among partners. Effective command places a premium on simplicity, clarity, mutual respect, and cooperation.

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, provides a broad reference for doctrine and policy governing the command of unified and multinational forces. The chain of command of U.S. forces is specified from the National Command Authorities through combatant commanders to the forces that are organized to make up their commands. Command relationships are defined to include Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), and Tactical Control (TACON). There are three general principles that are necessary to achieve unity of effort among coalition forces. These concepts can also be applied to determining effectiveness of command. First, common understanding of the objective and the concept for achieving it are required. Second, coordinated policy, planning, and liaison are necessary to ensure mutual understanding. Last, the development of trust and confidence is essential. Joint Publication 0-2 draws attention to the problem of unity of command, specifically that "unity of command may not be politically feasible but should be a goal if at all possible."

During multinational operations involving the United Nations, Joint Publication 0-2 states that the president will always retain command authority over U.S. forces. This is borne out as well in the May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) entitled The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The president can consider placing American troops under the operational control of a "competent UN commander" during UN operations. However,
the larger the U.S. contingent, the less likely the president will be to give OPCON to a foreign commander. Most likely, a commander can expect to only receive U.S. forces TACON. During UNOSOM II, the American force was not the preponderance of military personnel and was still under foreign control only indirectly. TACON and OPCON were maintained by a U.S. force commander. Foreign UN commanders cannot expect to change missions, separate units, or deploy U.S. forces outside the intentions of the president.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, discusses command and control for operations other than war (OOTW) and multinational operations. Effective coalitions should establish flexible command relationships that facilitate unity of effort and maintain unit freedom of action. American forces must be prepared to fulfill supporting roles in these operations as well as leading ones. All coalition efforts will require some forces to participate in following and contributing capacities, positioned to respond with versatility to the uncertainties of OOTW missions or peace operations.

Multinational operations require commanders to consider many factors in establishing effective command and control. Joint Publication 3-0 discusses matching the types of missions assigned to a contingent force with the capabilities of that force. UNOSOM II forces were of varying sizes and readiness, and the decisions of troop placement by the commander to control Somali relief sectors were influenced by the capabilities of the forces. Command policy affecting the rules of engagement and the employment and source of reserves is critical. The sharing of information among coalition partners, the

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involvement of all members in decision making, and the establishment of priorities for military effort are all important issues for the commander and his multinational staff. These factors determine whether or not a force commander can achieve effective command and unity of effort.

Parallel and Lead-Nation Command

To achieve strategic and operational objectives, nations participating in peace operations, such as UNOSOM II, must provide the multinational commander with sufficient authority over their forces to accomplish the mission. While this requirement may be satisfied with the OPCON or TACON command relationship for U.S. forces, not all nations are willing to subordinate their troops to foreign command. Joint Publication 3-0 describes two basic coalition command structures: parallel command and lead-nation command. The parallel structure exists when individual nations retain control over their forces and operate through national chains of command. The advantage in choosing this structure is its obvious simplicity because it already exists prior to operations. On the other hand, lead-nation command is used when one nation provides the preponderance of force and employs smaller contingents in support. In reality, the parallel structure always exists, at least in the background, due to the country retaining the command authority to withdraw its forces. In Somalia, operations began as U.S.-led and eventually transitioned during UNOSOM II to UN-led operations. Parallel chains of command existed between the United Nations force commander and each major national contingent. The
parallel command relationships that made up the UN force structure were challenges to effective command and control of the coalition and the U.S. force.

Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, discusses command and control doctrine for U.S. troops either in a lead-nation or supporting role. During United Nations peace efforts, force commanders should expect contributing nations to respond to the policies and priorities of their own national command authority. An operation sponsored by the UN will employ a single force commander, appointed by the UN Secretary General. The commander will report directly to the Secretary General or to the Secretary's Special Representative. The use of U.S. troops is subject to NCA approval and agreement with the theater Commander in Chief (CINC). The American force commander, in his supporting role, will act as an advisor to the multinational commander. In Somalia, the U.S. force commander was dual hatted as the deputy UN force commander, reporting to both the United Nations and CINCCENT.

**Command of UN-Sponsored Operations**

Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, provides doctrine on command relationships at the highest echelons of an operation sponsored by the United Nations. Interactions of the Services, CINCs, and United Nations ambassadors result in a collective command effort. Effective command by the United Nations is heavily affected by politics, with interactions among the Secretary General, the Secretary's Special Representative, and
the Secretary's various deputies. At the UN's lower levels are the military force commander's personal staff, a military staff, and a civilian staff. The personal staff consists of political advisers, legal advisers, public affairs officers, and liaison officers of the belligerents. On the military staff are international officers from the various military disciplines, such as operations, intelligence, and logistics. Lastly, the UN civilian staff works for the UN Secretariat in New York providing administrative and financial assistance for the UN force.\textsuperscript{14}

Joint Publication 3-07.3 states that the UN force commander is generally selected from the nations participating in the operation. For operations in Somalia, the UN force commander Lieutenant General Bir was from Turkey, even though only 300 personnel from a total force of 30,000 were from that country.\textsuperscript{15} During UNITAF operations, the Turks had been under operational control of the U.S. Marine Force (MARFOR) in Mogadishu. With the transition to UNOSOM II, the contingent from Turkey was OPCON to the Italian brigade but remained in Mogadishu as a security force for the UN force commander.\textsuperscript{16}

According to U.S. doctrine on UN-sponsored operations, the commander of each national coalition force reports directly to the UN force commander. In cases of large operations (in which UNOSOM II can be classified), the UN force commander will designate brigade or larger headquarters in different regions to better manage the mission. In Somalia, the country was separated into relief sectors with brigade headquarters under the direction of local coalition commanders. In these situations, command relationships of these area commanders may not
be specified, but it is assumed that the local sector commander still 
receives direction from the UN force commander. A sector commander with 
an agenda derived from his national authorities vice the UN force 
commander could certainly undermine not only unity of command but unity 
of effort and jeopardize the reinforcement of committed units. However, 
it is clearly stated that individual unit commanders are ultimately 
responsible for the conduct of their missions, for communicating changes 
to the mission, and for responding to the needs of committed units.¹⁷

Joint Publication 3-07.3 describes command and control of U.S. 
forces and contingent forces in UN peace operations. Command of U.S. 
forces flows from the geographic CINC to the UN force commander through 
the U.S. contingent commander (the senior American officer). All 
contingent forces should know who is empowered to give orders and under 
what circumstances as defined in the force commander's directives. 
Forces in the coalition must not take orders from sources outside the 
established command structure or from parties involved in the 
conflict.¹⁸

Direction to U.S. forces comes from the National Command 
Authorities, of which the Secretary of Defense is a part. The 
Department of Defense provides guidance and tasking to the combatant 
commander through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint 
Staff monitors developments throughout the peace operation. The 
combatant commander is responsible for commanding U.S. forces and for 
supporting operations under the direction of the multinational force 
commander.¹⁹
Joint Publication 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations, addresses organizational structures for joint forces. The relationships among Service components and functional components apply to a joint force headquarters. The organization of the staff and the responsibilities of the staff components establish the foundation for U.S.-led commands or multinational liaison efforts.

Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, specifies a three-pronged peacekeeping organization including a political council, a military peacekeeping command, and a military area command. This organization provides mechanisms for negotiation with the belligerent parties, overall control of participating multinational forces, and specific geographic control by forces of single nations. UNOSOM II included elements of the political council (i.e., UN Headquarters), the military peacekeeping command (i.e., the Special Representative and UN force commander), and the military area command (i.e., the UN force commander and his HRS commanders).

Command and control of peacekeeping forces is specified in administrative documents, such as Terms of Reference (TOR) and Letters of Instruction (LOIs) as stated in FM 100-20. The TOR for U.S. Forces Somalia, United Nations Operation in Somalia describes the purpose, establishing authority, command relationships, organization, and logistics support of American forces in UNOSOM II (appendix B). The use of American forces during UNOSOM II, including the Quick Reaction Force, was retained by CINCCENT and was TACON to the USFOROSOM commander only in certain circumstances. U.S. forces were not directly TACON to the UN force commander. In an LOI, major commands sending units to a
multinational force further specify command relationships with the military peacekeeping command, the geographic unified command, and the parent command.\textsuperscript{21} Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, acknowledges that unity of command is less a priority than unity of effort.

President Clinton's Policy Reform of 1994

Although it was mentioned previously in this literature review, the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations of May 1994 has great implications for using military force and establishing command relationships with coalitions. Written in the timeframe immediately following UNOSOM II, the Clinton policy addresses ways to improve future efforts to conduct peace operations. Issues relate to the effectiveness in which a coalition accomplishes its missions, and the tone of the policy is suggestive of events in Somalia. For example, a major issue in the Clinton policy is for decision makers to be more disciplined when deciding whether or not to support U.S. participation in coalition peace operations, particularly when combat may be involved. To this end, "both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective [emphasis not added]."\textsuperscript{22}

Throughout the progress of operations from Operation Restore Hope to UNOSOM II, the United States held very closely to command of American forces. While Lieutenant General Johnston commanded the UNITAF coalition, U.S. troops had success with the mission of providing security to the relief effort. However, as violence and unrest
escalated following the transition to UN control, security and protection issues increasingly became more difficult. It was in this context that President Clinton ordered a review of the way that the U.S. commits American lives to multinational military operations. The resulting policy posed an isolationist attitude and lack of confidence in a non-U.S. command, such as the one seen during UNOSOM II operations. Command relationships among American forces were ineffective in producing unity of command. However, wording of the Presidential directive suggests that command structures that were overly protective and that failed in Somalia may reappear in the future.

The Clinton policy states that when there are large numbers of U.S. troops, the likelihood of relinquishing operational control to a UN commander diminishes. If it appears that operations may lead to combat, or if combat troops will be deployed, the Department of Defense will be the lead agency, whereas traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter will fall under the auspices of the State Department. Also, the guaranteed support of a peacekeeping effort by the U.S. will not be a given, as the U.S. will identify those operations that it will choose not to support. The policy goes on to say that participation in a peace operation is contingent upon other more urgent needs of limited military resources at the time, and that national interests will take precedent over multinational peace initiatives. The decision to engage in an operation will not be made in haste.

During UNOSOM II, there was great conflict over the missions of the coalition and what the desired political end state should be that would constitute success in Somalia. This uneasiness was manifested in
the Clinton reform policy by calling for the use of military force only when the commitment is not "open-ended . . . but instead linked to concrete political solutions." The policy suggests that an operation not be undertaken unless there were specific objectives and a timeframe for completion of the mission. Troops committed to the multinational force must be provided the means to successfully achieve the objectives. The decision to commit U.S. forces must be based on necessity for the coalition to succeed and on whether command and control arrangements would be acceptable.

Concern for the command relationships of U.S. forces in a UN coalition was paramount in the writing of Clinton's peace operations policy. The report was critical of the "understaffed" UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and called for change at the UN headquarters to provide needed improvement in command and control capabilities. It stated that operational control is "advantageous" when maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command. OPCON is granted to a foreign commander only after issues of mission, size of U.S. force, risk, length of operation, and rules of engagement are considered. Each of these issues was contentious in Somalia. Within the context of the Clinton policy, OPCON is given only for a specific time or for a particular mission and includes authority for the commander to assign tasks to deployed units (appendix C). The American force must be led by U.S. officers. A foreign commander cannot change the mission or send troops outside the area of responsibility that had been determined by the President, nor can he further organize or separate American units.
The parallel chain of command that each coalition force, including the U.S., had during UNOSOM II continues as a pre-condition on command under multinational peace operations. U.S. commanders will keep the capability to report to both the UN force commander and higher U.S. military authorities. The American Congress must be informed when U.S. military units take part in UN operations in which the UN is part of the chain of command. Moreover, U.S. commanders will refer to the UN mandates to ensure that missions assigned to U.S. forces are within the bounds of Security Council resolutions. Finally, the reform policy explicitly states that the United States reserves the right to terminate operations with the UN at any time.

Research Methodology

The research methodology offers a means of answering the questions of whether or not the UN force commander had unity of effort and if the USFORSOM commander had unity of command during UNOSOM II. Humanitarian relief in Somalia was a political and military effort. The military instrument of power that was applied in this UN operation was pushed and pulled in many directions in response to civilian organizations, the diplomatic focus of the United Nations, and national contingent concerns that placed constraints upon the deployment of forces. The USFORSOM commander's desire for unity of command and operational control of American units was challenged by CENTCOM and UN force chains of command. Conflicts that arose from coalition concerns also caused repercussions for the U.S. force commander in Somalia.
Analysis began with a description of the United Nations command structure. In addition to the chain of command of forces under the direction of the UN force commander, key players in the UN political decision making process were determined. UN Security Council Resolutions mandated actions under the auspices of the Secretary General and his Special Representative. During a review of historical incidents experienced during UNOSOM II operations, the roles of the UN and its organization were analyzed for their positive or negative impacts on U.S. command and control.

Next, the command of United States military forces were analyzed. The chain of command of American forces was diagrammed to illustrate effects the National Command Authorities and the theater unified commander (CINC) had on the USFORSOM commander. Moreover, because the American commander Major General Montgomery was dual hatted as deputy UNFORSOM commander, the review of operational incidents identifies unity of command conflicts arising from parallel chains of command for the U.S. contingent.

The success or failure of the coalition affected U.S. command relationships. As UNOSOM II operations were reviewed, difficulties that the UN force commander had in maintaining the coalition illustrate his effectiveness in achieving unity of command. The effects that humanitarian agencies and nongovernment organizations had on command and control were analyzed only to the extent that they affected the commander's ability to employ his forces. As previously discussed, NGOs have a greater impact on unity of effort than the commander's unity of command.
Command and control was defined in chapter one as the commander's ability to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations. The commander's authority is empowered through personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures that focus his forces on achievement of the objective. To assess USFORSON's unity of command, this author developed criteria that were used throughout the analysis of military events. The analysis of command and control during UNOSOM II is illustrated with examples of the criteria from military operations. Positive and negative contributions to the commander's unity of command were identified. Criteria selected for study were chosen for their relevance to future UN-mandated military coalitions.

The criteria used to measure unity of command were force responsiveness, cooperation, parallel chain of command conflict, contingent support of UN mission, and staff liaison. As events were identified, assessments of these factors were used to determine the overall success in the UN commander's success in achieving unity of effort and the U.S. force commander's ability to achieve unity of command. Each of these criteria is defined in the paragraphs below.

**Unity of Command Assessment Criteria**

**Force responsiveness.** This attribute describes whether or not the U.S. force readily reacted to the influence and appeal of the commander. Was the commander able to draw upon contingent forces he felt was appropriate for the needed action? Did the force respond to the commander's direction?
Cooperation. Cooperation between or within contingent forces describes the collective efforts to work together toward a common end or purpose, including mutual support. Was the U.S. force commander able to employ units to provide mutual support and reinforce military action? Were national forces employed as part of the whole or did circumstances arise in which forces could not be relied upon to contribute to the collective effort?

Parallel chain of command conflict. It is accepted that each national contingent answered to both the UN force commander and to its source of command authority (i.e., the NCA). The parallel chain criterion describes the channels the national contingents had to go through before being made available to a commander. The criterion describes the degree to which forces answered to more than a single chain of command. Was force utilization delayed or disrupted due to conflict? Did a commander suffer operationally as a result of having to gain authority first from a parallel chain of command, or perhaps from never gaining access to a contingent?

Contingent support of UN mission. The definition and clarity of the military mission were critical to gaining the cooperation of contingent forces. The original mission was taken from UN mandate. As time passed, mission clarity became less focused and support for military action from national contingents resulted from differing views of mission objectives. Did changing missions in Somalia play a role in the force commander’s ability to command and control contingent forces?

Staff liaison. The value of a competent staff and supporting liaison officers cannot be underestimated in controlling a contingency
in a multinational effort. The staff works to integrate and coordinate
the efforts of each international unit, overcoming language, training,
and doctrinal differences to ensure adequate planning and reasonable use
of force. Did the U.S. force commander have an adequate and informed
staff capable of integrating American units and of overcoming obstacles
in a cooperative multinational effort? Were contributing nations
represented on the commander's staff? Did the commander use his staff
to provide information for estimates to support his decision making?

Summary

There is a wealth of doctrine on command of multinational peace
operations. An effective U.S. chain of command must retain clear
command authority of American troops from the National Command
Authorities through the theater CINC to the subordinate commander,
whether or not he is a U.S. officer. The literature distinguishes
between unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command is a
principle of war while unity of effort is a principle of operations
other than war (OOTW). The common denominator in either category of
operations is the use of military units. The military is accustomed to
a single operational chain of command, with orders coming from a single
source. Operations in Somalia, like an increasing majority of
operations undertaken recently by U.S. Armed Forces, were military
operations that had difficulty achieving unity of command, let alone the
broader concept of unity of effort.

The research and analysis of this thesis identify success and
failure in command and control efforts during United States and United
Nations command of operations in Somalia. As the number of OOTW missions increases for the U.S. military, the possibility of American troops falling under the operational or tactical control of a variety of commanders increases. Likewise, changing task organizations and echeloning of forces into theater alters existing command structures. To assess that unity of command is a prerequisite to success suggests that direction of military force should come from a single commander. Unity of command should also apply to military forces from different nations, where OPCON and TACON relationships can exist. True unity would certainly result only after a level of mutual trust and confidence was developed between national contingents and the commanders of each force.

To be successful in multinational operations, the military forces involved must go beyond unity of effort and provide the force commander with unity of command. There can be no hesitation to reinforce another sector or another coalition member, especially a unit from one's own country. The force commander must be allowed to direct, coordinate, and control the personnel and resources provided in theater. Finally, actions that begin in Congress, the White House, or the United Nations must fully support commanders in the field.
Endnotes


3FM 100-5 (1993), 2-5.


"Ibid.


9"Ibid., VI-3.

10"Ibid., VI-6.

11FM 100-23 (1994), 23.

12"Ibid., 25.


16Outline Plan for COMUNITAF OPLAN 2, 9 March 1993, Annex E.

17Joint Publication 3-07.3 (1994), III-2 to 3.
Ibid., III-4.

Ibid., II-3.


Ibid., 4-8 to 4-10.

Clinton Administration Policy, 1.

Ibid., 2.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 10.
CHAPTER THREE
INHERITING OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

The command structure of UNOSOM II can be better understood if the analysis begins with command relationships that had been developed prior to the transition on 4 May 1993. After passage of UN Security Council Resolution 794 in December 1992, the United States assumed the lead position in a multinational force "for the purpose of protecting humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Operation Restore Hope was initially executed as a JTF organized by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), General Joseph Hoar. This task force, JTF Somalia, was formed around the staff of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), commanded by Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC. I MEF was chosen for the lead due in part to the fact that it had recently completed a command exercise in which it was specifically tasked as a joint headquarters. Because a Marine Expeditionary Force is a standard organizational unit for the Marine Corps, the staff of I MEF was relatively large and was an established working group that could readily adapt to the changing situation. Under the initial concept of operations, the large Marine component would be gradually replaced by elements of the U.S. Army. Even though the preponderance of military force would then be Army, the Marine flag officer was to remain in command of all forces until the UN change of
command was official.² By the end of March 1993, the majority of Marine elements had left Somalia for redeployment to the U.S. or were afloat offshore in a supporting role, and the Army component had become the lead ground force.³

As more and more nations joined the coalition, the United Nations felt it appropriate to rename the American JTF to suggest the united effort of the larger number of participating nations. Thus, JTF Somalia became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The staff that the Marine Corps established was then augmented by foreign liaison officers, many of whom were NATO allies accustomed to using common command and staff procedures. Unfortunately, during the transition to UNOSOM II in April and May 1993, the large UNITAF staff familiar with standard operating procedures was disbanded and replaced by the oncoming United Nations staff, a more ad hoc organization.

Separating Humanitarian Relief Sectors

Determining a plan of how coalition forces could begin to provide security for the relief agencies throughout the vast reaches of Somalia was one of the initial challenges for Lieutenant General Johnston's staff. During mission analysis, it was unclear what the definition of success would be in providing secure relief operations. Was the intent to garrison every major town in Somalia? To make the scope of this problem more achievable, the land was divided into nine zones, each with a main city that could be used for distributing food and other relief supplies to the population. These zones, or Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs), were put under the control of
contingent military forces all under Johnston's operational control. It was hoped that success could be measured better on the smaller scales of nine individual sectors.

Upon arrival in Somalia, UNITAF forces consolidated in the capital city of Mogadishu. Johnston's headquarters and staff were located in the vacant U.S. Embassy building, which would become the hub for continued United Nations operations. Mogadishu, with its large population, became the first HRS. Because of its airport and sea port facilities, Mogadishu became the focal point from which contingent forces and relief convoys initiated their efforts. As more assets were made available for expansion into the country, HRSs were also established in Baledogle, Baidoa, Gialalassi, Belet Uen, Oddur, Bardera, Kismayo, and Marka (figure 2).

The decision to make various UNITAF forces responsible for security in individual HRSs made the effort in Somalia much more manageable from a commander's standpoint. Nations were generally given an HRS in which to carry out the assigned mission as they saw fit. Forces from the United States operated in a majority of relief sectors, often in concert with a coalition force. U.S. Marines (MARFOR) took control of the Bardera sector and U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) were responsible for Marka. The largest single contributor to the Mogadishu sector was the MARFOR, with numerous coalition players assisting in this effort. In addition, American forces shared responsibility in Baledogle with the Moroccans, in Baidoa with the Australians, and in Kismayo with a Belgian force. The HRS of Gialalassi was assigned to the Italians, Belet Uen to the Canadians, and Oddur to the French.
Command and control of an HRS with several supporting nations was not an easy task. In the most populated sector, Mogadishu, there were forces from nine countries participating with U.S. Marines and soldiers. The MARFOR was in operational control of forces from Botswana, Egypt, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. The HRS commander, a USMC colonel, was in command of 1,800 Marines and an equal number of coalition troops in Mogadishu. One of his most significant command problems was that he had only a battalion-sized staff command element. Moreover, the unit providing this headquarters was an artillery battalion not used to directing operations of a force that was almost completely made up of infantry soldiers. Consequently, commanders and staff throughout Somalia were forced to use liaison as effectively as possible to coordinate operations in their sector.6

The UNITAF commander separated Somalia into sectors in order to make his job of controlling theater operations easier. It made sense to assign coalition forces to different sectors. Each region was relatively equal in size and was divided along geographic lines or convenient terrain features. The locations of major cities were considered. Another logical means of separating areas was by political boundaries. Of course, without current or accurate information on these subjects, and with the operation in its infancy, the commander acted on his best judgment in dividing the countryside. Relief sectors were modified as more became known of clan boundaries, NGO operating areas, and historical relationships.6 Difficulties arose with the existing boundaries when United Nations personnel arrived and made arbitrary
sector boundaries that conflicted with those already established by the military. Although no significant problems arose from this situation, the fact that there was no early liaison between the military and its civilian counterparts was significant.  

As the time neared for the United Nations to assume control of Somalia operations, a debate concerning the consolidation of humanitarian relief sectors began. The UNOSOM II command structure was planned to have five separate brigade-sized elements under the UN force commander. The major contributing nations would include brigades from Belgium, France, Italy, Pakistan, and India (figure 3). Each of the five HRSs in the UNOSOM II organization would be controlled by a brigade commander who would report directly to the UN force commander. The brigade commanders would have coalition forces assigned OPCON to them or working independently in their HRS under an OPCON relationship with the UN force commander himself. Because the United States would have a much smaller role in UNOSOM II operations than during UNITAF, decisions had to be made about relieving the American units that were in control of an HRS. Also, the Canadians and Australians planned to vacate their sectors. The transition to UN control necessitated the smooth and timely transfer of sector command between military forces.

Several considerations led to the evaluation of new relief sectors. Some of these included sector size versus the ability of the coalition nation to control it, aligning sectors along Somali clan borders, distances between major distribution centers, and whether forces were staying in or leaving the coalition. For example, with the Canadian contingent leaving Belet Uen, would it be practical to combine
that sector with either Oddur or Gialalassi? Would the Belgian force be
able to control the Kismayo sector by itself once the Americans left or
should Kismayo be absorbed by the Bardera HRS? Early planning had the
Indian brigade assuming responsibility of the Bardera sector from the
Marines, but as of the 4 May transition date India was still not
committed to the UN effort. The Australian force was vacating the
Baidoa area, and discussion followed as to whether or not Baidoa should
be consolidated into the Oddur sector or the Bardera sector. The
Mogadishu HRS had the highest probability for violence, but its
consolidation with Baledogle and Marka was still considered because of
clan territorial lines and because each had developed road networks.
Sectors that bordered Kenya (Bardera with Kismayo) or Ethiopia (Oddur
and Belet Uen) were not combined because of the extensive international
border that would be created by the larger single sector and the
increased risk of violence across these borders.

The Indian brigade finally arrived in Somalia in mid-September
1993, nearly five months after the UN assumed command. This caused the
organization of four new areas of responsibility instead of the five
initially desired by the coalition commander. The Belgian brigade
controlled Kismayo and Bardera. Marka and Mogadishu were consolidated
under Pakistani control, with assistance of a company-sized element from
Kuwait. The Baidoa HRS, comprised of Oddur and Baledogle as well, was
maintained by the larger French brigade. Italy was responsible for an
area combining Gialalassi and Belet Uen. The U.S. QRF was based in
Mogadishu with the UN Force Command headquarters, the UN Logistics
Support Command, and numerous smaller coalition forces. 10
UNITAF Force Command Structure

The Unified Task Force in Somalia was structured doctrinally according to U.S. joint force publications. Serving Lieutenant General Johnston as component commands were four Service components, the representative Naval Force component commander (NAVFOR), Air Force (AFFOR), Marine Force (MARFOR), Army Force (ARFOR), and one functional component, the Special Operations Force (SOFOR). In addition, a subordinate U.S. logistics command was formed, Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC). The UNITAF commander exercised OPCON of the Service components and the Support Command and was TACON of the SOFOR (figure 4).

Coalition forces were placed under a command relationship equivalent to the U.S. joint term OPCON (figure 5). The United States assumed responsibility for some coalition logistics support that had been arranged through individual national commands. Some coalition forces were directly OPCON to the UNITAF commander. These contingents, Canada, France, Italy, and India, tended to be among the larger forces participating in the relief effort. Yet for a majority of the smaller coalition forces, the UNITAF commander then transferred OPCON to either his U.S. component commanders or to other coalition commanders when agreed to by mutual consent.11

U.S. Army Forces

The Tenth Mountain division was directed to lead American Army forces in Somalia during UNITAF operations and was designated the ARFOR on 3 December 1992. Elements of the division were sent from their home
station Fort Drum, New York, to augment the MARFOR that had initiated operations ashore on 9 December. The ARFOR commander was Major General S. L. Arnold, and his assistant division commander for Operations from the Tenth Mountain division, Brigadier General Lawson Magruder, became commander of the task force sent to Kismayo.\textsuperscript{32} The ARFOR consisted of Tenth Mountain troops, an Engineer Group, and coalition forces from Australia, Belgium, and Morocco. There were some 5,000 additional Army troops drawn from units outside the Tenth Mountain division.\textsuperscript{33} All of the U.S. Army units, task organized for the mission, were referred to as Task Force (TF) Mountain and soon incorporated the coalition forces mentioned above (figure 6). Initial TF Mountain forces included units from Tenth Mountain's Aviation Brigade, the 2d (Commando) Brigade, a combined Belgian/U.S unit called Task Force Kismayo, and combat service support personnel.\textsuperscript{34} These units were tasked by the UNITAF commander to work with other coalition nations to expand the relief sectors and establish secure areas for the distribution of food and supplies.

The first phase of TF Mountain's operation was to airlift units into the HRS of Baledogle in mid-December and relieve the Marines who had secured the airfield there. As other Tenth Mountain division units were airlifted into Somalia, they became part of TF Mountain and were immediately involved in missions to open other relief sectors. In phase two of the U.S. Army's involvement, an aviation battalion task force was airlifted to the southern city of Kismayo, and in conjunction with the 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion, conducted an amphibious assault to establish the Kismayo HRS. The Belgians and American task force assumed the identity of Task Force Kismayo. Only days following TF Kismayo's
arrival in that port city, another battalion from Fort Drum performed an
air assault to secure the airfield at Belet Uen and was relieved shortly
thereafter by the Canadian Airborne Battle Group coalition force. The
Tenth Mountain battalion at Belet Uen was TACON to the Canadians for
this assault because it occurred before the arrival of the ARFOR
headquarters.\textsuperscript{15} Final operations during phase three of TF Mountain's
deployment to Somalia resulted in the Belet Uen battalion relocating to
Marka by means of a combined assault with the Italian San Marcos
Battalion.

During these early operations, the ARFOR was given OPCON of the
1st Royal Australian Regiment and the Royal Moroccan Forces, and TF
Kismayo had TACON of the 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion for operations
in that HRS.\textsuperscript{16} The Australian Regiment, which remained under ARFOR
control, assumed control of HRS Baidoa from the U.S. Marines in mid-
January 1993. The Moroccans assumed control of the Baledogle HRS on 28
January.\textsuperscript{17} The speed at which Army units from the Tenth Mountain
division (TF Mountain) organized and established command relationships
for combined missions was staggering.

**ARFOR Command Difficulties**

The ARFOR identified several command difficulties in performing
their assigned tasks in Somalia. Many problems centered on conducting
operations in a country where no government existed. U.S. units were
often asked to conduct negotiations with local elders or clan leaders.
The military was not typically designed to conduct diplomatic matters,
nor were U.S. units trained or inclined to do so. The ARFOR, as a front
line component of UNITAF, was tasked to work with Department of State officials as well as representatives from the United Nations. These inter-agency functions were unfamiliar and uncomfortable for the ARFOR headquarters to perform. Army unit commanders found themselves trying to coordinate operations covering a wide variety of concerns within their HRSs rather than concentrating on the more straightforward security aspects of the relief mission.18

In addition, to use an Army division staff as a JTF headquarters required the staff to expand its horizon from the tactical level of war to the operational and strategic. The majority of U.S. Army doctrine suggests that a corps staff, at a minimum, should be used in directing ARFOR operations.19 The division staff had three shortcomings in performing as an ARFOR headquarters. First, the division’s focus on tactics needed to be expanded to include the operational requirements of an ARFOR. Second, the division staff was not accustomed to interpersonal relationships with organizations at echelons above corps (EAC), such as the CENTCOM Army component command, ARCENT. Lastly, the division was not in direct control of the deployment of force to Somalia, a task that was performed by the Joint Staff and CINCENT staff.20

Geography presented still another difficulty to the ARFOR because the area of operations spread over several HRSs that did not border on one another. The amount of territory alone put great stress on ARFOR communications, as the ARFOR commanded units over a 21,000 square mile area and controlled operations from Kismayo to Belet Uen, a distance of over 500 miles.21 This separation of force caused hardship
when the TF Mountain Commando Brigade was called upon as the UNITAF Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to move from its position in Mogadishu to support a TF Kismayo show of force in February 1993. For this operation, the ARFOR Aviation Brigade was tasked to support the QRF mission by providing airlift assets, attack helicopters, and command and control. TF Mountain units were generally located throughout Somalia, with the Commando Brigade headquarters in Mogadishu, a battalion TF in Marka, and Aviation Brigade units based at Baledogle’s airfield. To further complicate the command structure, there was a planned rotation of Tenth Mountain division units in March and April 1993, including the exchange of the 2d (Commando) Brigade with a fresh Fort Drum unit, the 1st (Warrior) Brigade. 22

Service component command and control relationships of the earliest Restore Hope operations were not clearly specified. Baledogle was initially controlled by the MARFOR, but the ARFOR assumed command of Baledogle and its airfield after Army units became the dominant land force. This was done without specific direction from higher headquarters. 23 Likewise, the Marines "assumed" command over the airfield in Baidoa. With regard to the Navy's role, command of the port in Mogadishu was to be transferred from the NAVFOR to the ARFOR once the port became a "common user" facility. The official designation as a "common user" seaport was never made, yet the ARFOR assumed command for the port facility in mid-January. Moreover, the Naval component commander was referred to by several titles on message traffic and written orders, such Commander Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) and Commander Naval Forces (COMNAVFOR). The lack of a command identity or a
formal written command structure led to confusion as to who was in control of a facility at a particular time.  

The Joint Task Force Support Command

Initial logistics support for the U.S. mission was provided by the 1st Marine Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The FSSG is the support element of a MEF (Forward). This force can sustain its operations on land for about thirty days before needing to be augmented. The austere logistics capabilities of the Marine Corps, combined with the lack of any infrastructure in Somalia, necessitated the decision to form a more robust support organization. As more American troops arrived in Somalia with their logistics assets, and as some coalition forces arrived, the need for a more highly developed organization to sustain the force became apparent.

With the deployment of Tenth Mountain division units, the logistics capabilities of the ARFOR were seen as the remedy to the support problem in theater. Initial Operations Orders (OPORDs) designated the ARFOR as commander of all Army forces in theater, including Army logistics units. However, the UNITAF commander soon took operational control of these Army units and consolidated forces into a Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) built around the Army’s 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM). Unfortunately, the UNITAF headquarters never published a command and control OPORD annex that specified the new command relationship. The JTFSC was an all-Army force that no longer worked directly for the ARFOR commander. Even several weeks after the JTFSC was organized some members of the UNITAF staff were unaware that
they had control of the Army units making up their own JTF Support
Command.25

This unofficial command arrangement complicated several aspects
of the UNITAF operation. The Army was limited by the number of
personnel it could deploy to Somalia. The establishment of the JTF
Support Command effectively removed that number of Army personnel
assigned to the ARFOR by reassigning them within the JTF. Army
commanders who planned the deployment of additional ARFOR assets now
determined that more room existed for a greater allocation of airlift
and sealift of "Army" units. Of course, joint force planners and Army
planners were at odds on this issue as a result of the awkward command
structure. With logistics units no longer part of the ARFOR, deployment
lists to achieve prescribed Service component numbers became very
confusing for planners.26

The creation of the JTFSC led to further confusion concerning
command of subordinate Army units. Medical evacuation (medevac) units
and aviation maintenance units were two examples of Army units that were
listed in the JTF Support Command structure but may have been more
effectively controlled by the ARFOR headquarters. At one point during
UNITAF operations, the ARFOR command element was the Tenth Mountain
division Aviation Brigade staff, which would have been a more adequate
headquarters for medevac and helicopter maintenance units than the
COSCOM headquarters.27

Army units were not the only forces that were negatively
impacted by the establishment of a joint logistics command. The ARFOR
headquarters would have preferred to keep control of these Army troops,
and the Marine Corps generally agreed. In a report submitted by the Marine Corps Combat Development Center on Operation Restore Hope, the mission of the JTFSC was to "provide logistics and medical support for U.S. forces and as directed/required coalition forces . . . ." Because there was nothing unique about the support or the units, the Combat Development Center concluded that the ARFOR should have kept command of their logistics forces to eliminate confusion. This also would have eliminated the need for the UNITAF commander to issue an order tasking the JTFSC to "assume OPCON of Moroccan forces for security" because the ARFOR could have provided that security itself.

As far as coalition forces were concerned, only the Egyptians and Pakistanis arrived in Somalia with self-sufficient logistics. The United States had to provide some degree of logistics support to nineteen other nations at some point during UNITAF operations. An assumption in American military doctrine is that foreign coalition partners will support their own combat forces logistically. When this did not occur, a great dependence on support from the JTFSC developed. A problem arose during UNOSOM II transition planning when the redeployment of logistics forces was reviewed. Providing uninterrupted support to coalition forces that were remaining as part of UNOSOM II presented a command and control dilemma that complicated U.S. withdrawal. Additionally, the same would be true of cutting logistics dependence during the future withdrawal of U.S. troops in March 1994 as well.

A peripheral issue involving command and control relationships of the JTFSC was in maintaining legal jurisdiction over forces assigned.
The Army forces that were attached to the Support Command no longer fell under the jurisdiction of the ARPOR commander. Because a separate command had been created, a new general court-martial convening authority had to be designated unless the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Johnston, wanted to exercise this authority himself. Thus, from the legal standpoint, the creation of the JTF Support Command added an extra layer of command and control and increased the possibility of soldiers misunderstanding policy guidance.31

Political Command and Control Issues

Besides organizing a military Joint Task Force with its American commander and command structure, President Bush paved the way for American political influence by naming Ambassador Robert Oakley as Special Envoy to Somalia. There was no formal government in Somalia with which an ambassador could enter into negotiations. However, the president did not want the military effort to be seen as the only aspect of U.S. involvement in the region. President Bush gave neither Oakley nor General Hoar, CINCCENT, the lead individually by making one or the other solely responsible for all U.S. activity. As Robert Oakley stated, "The President was . . . urged to name a senior political representative who would complement the military commander."32

The combined contributions of Ambassador Oakley and UNITAF commander Lieutenant General Johnston were intended to provide unity of effort among political and military entities. In the U.S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, unity of effort is specified as one of six principles of operations other than war (OOTW), a category in which the
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts of Operation Restore Hope would be classified. While military command structures seek unity of command in the performance of missions, unity of effort is desired when the military is only one instrument of power employed in achieving an objective. In Somalia, the military component was required to work with the UN, various international relief agencies, and political figures to resolve conflict. Whereas only military forces are typically organized for unity of command, all of the military, political and humanitarian agencies needed to operate with unity of effort to best achieve the collective goals desired.

Ambassador Oakley served in a number of functions to support U.S. interests in Somalia. He was used extensively in his political role in the establishment of humanitarian relief sectors. Prior to UNITAP's occupation of an HRS by contingent military forces, Oakley was escorted into the area to inform local Somalis of the operations that were about to take place. The arrival of Oakley or one of his representatives was then followed with leaflets to announce arrival of the coalition force. Only after these two techniques would the military component arrive in the sector to begin security missions. This routine was used effectively during the earliest phases of Restore Hope by introducing into each sector a representative who was other than military and who gained the trust of the local population.

Daily discussion and coordination occurred between the military and the Department of State's Ambassador Oakley. UNITAP experienced difficulty in defining an acceptable end state for operations as the situation changed, and Oakley assisted in determining the conditions and
criteria for military intervention. The policy that resulted consisted of the four NOs: no bandits, no Somali checkpoints, no technicals--land vehicles mounted with heavy weapons, and no visible weapons.\textsuperscript{34}

Oakley's contribution to this policy sent a signal to the Somalis that intervention had political motivations as well as military value. Political solutions invariably took heat off of the military commanders.

As missions in the HRSs expanded to the area of weapons confiscation, Ambassador Oakley was instrumental in providing a single, coherent policy throughout sectors. Initially, each sector commander, when given the mission to plan for the turn-in or confiscation of weapons, arrived at a different method and means of accomplishing that mission. Commanders thought that unique policies were necessary because of the varying degrees of cooperation that could be expected from each clan in each HRS. However, the need for a single policy became more clear both from the Somali point of view of consistent treatment of all factions and from the viewpoint of the military forces who would have greater difficulty enforcing different policies. Ambassador Oakley, with inputs from HRS commanders and the UNITAF commander, wrote the concept for implementation of a weapons program that was the basis for the single policy that evolved.\textsuperscript{35}

The State Department's direct involvement in resolving conflict between Somali factions was paramount to the military's ability to perform its mission of securing the relief sectors. The HRS commanders were put into positions as political negotiators with clan leaders when Ambassador Oakley or other State Department officials were unavailable. As stated in the Tenth Mountain division's Restore Hope After Action
Report, "there were not adequate state department or UN personnel within the theater to provide assets to assist . . . towns and villages to begin to reclaim their own government and security." The military found it more challenging to provide force protection when its neutrality was compromised each time it was forced to serve a dual purpose as military agent and political agent. The presence of Ambassador Oakley or other political officers at the table vice a military officer was necessary for better civil-military relations.

There were times when negotiations between faction leaders and military officers were held with little or no political interaction external to the military effort. A critical series of discussions centered on disarming the warring factions in Kismayo between Somali rivals General Morgan, a relative of Siad Barre, and Colonel Omar Jess, a lieutenant of Aideed in this southern region. The TF Kismayo Commander, his Chief of Staff, and other UNITAF officers met repeatedly with Morgan and Jess from January through March 1993 to decrease the number of weapons in the region. Kismayo was one of the more violent sectors, with the Belgian and U.S. coalition clashing with Morgan's forces in the city of Beer Xaani on 24 January and finally occupying the area on 4 February. Over the next ten days, twenty-two Morgan supporters were captured and detained by the Belgians in Kismayo.

The importance of having a diplomat in the region was evident during subsequent negotiations with clan leaders in Kismayo. Morgan vehemently complained about the treatment his men received while detained by the Belgians, reporting of "rough handling and kicking to the groin." The intervention of UNITAF forces to quell the
disturbance in Beer Xaani was perceived by Morgan as not being neutral in the Somali conflict. The elders in Kismayo wanted a meeting with Ambassador Oakley in which he would reassure them that UN forces were in fact neutral. The elders further requested that Oakley "please do not bring any politicians from Mogadishu," suggesting their trust in him alone.41 In February 1993, Oakley provided Jess and Morgan with ultimatums (signed by Oakley and Johnston) for both leaders to turn-over their heavy weapons to UN forces and move their troops to military cantonments out of Kismayo.42 By early March, the ultimatums had been complied with by both parties.

Positive diplomatic relations with Oakley in Kismayo were important later during the transition to UNOSOM II operations. In a memorandum from ARFOR Special Assistant Colonel Hamilton to the UNITAF commander, the neutrality of the coalition was a critical issue in the eyes of the Somalis. HRS Kismayo's security was assessed as very fragile because the perception was that the Belgian commander was more supportive of Jess than of Morgan. During the Beer Xaani firefight, for example, the Belgians expelled Morgan with the assistance of Jess' men as guides, giving the appearance of a combined effort. The Belgian commander had developed a trust with Jess and supported Jess' claim as the local authority in Kismayo. The political ties between the Belgians and Jess would be a destabilizing influence once the U.S. left the Kismayo HRS to Belgian control.43 This serves as an illustration in which the neutrality of a UN contingent was seen as compromised and where a greater degree of diplomatic influence may have relieved tensions.
A final example of the military's role as political mediator was the UNITAF commander's dialogue with sixteen Somali factions to establish enforcement procedures following the Addis Ababa agreement signed in January 1993. "The high level negotiations, along with announcements of ultimatums, would probably have been more appropriate had they been performed by diplomatic personnel, thus leaving the military to maintain impartiality.

The Civil Military Operations Center

Command and control was likewise affected by civil-military relationships with government agencies and nongovernment organizations. The means of establishing a working relationship between UNITAF and the relief agencies and of coordinating the efforts of all parties was through the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and regional Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOC). The directors of the HOCs were responsible to the United Nations and were assisted by a deputy for civil affairs and a deputy for military affairs. Each HOC was to be chaired by a UN representative, but only two centers had their full complement of UN or State Department personnel. As the size of the CMOC grew, it incorporated officials from the UN, UNITAF headquarters, military coalition liaison officers, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Department of State, and forty-nine NGOs.

The CMOC was initially established in Mombasa, Kenya during the earliest days of Operation Restore Hope and was then relocated to Mogadishu. The CMOC was headed by a Marine colonel from U.S. Central Command. This organization served as the interface for military
operations involving relief agencies and was the means for these agencies to request military assistance. The CMOC was chartered to validate requests, coordinate between agencies, and monitor the military support of relief activities.\textsuperscript{48} The intent of this relationship was for decisions affecting humanitarian relief activities to be made in the CMOC. In turn, the various HOCs were provided with a representative from the CMOC, generally from the Operations J3 directorate.

Increasingly, however, decisions were being made by Lieutenant General Johnston's UNITAF staff, particularly by the J3 himself, Major General Anthony Zinni, and not by the CMOC.\textsuperscript{49} Aside from his position as J3, Major General Zinni was a dominant player on the UNITAF staff for another reason. Though doctrinally staff organizations require the chief of staff to be senior to all other staff members, this was not the case. Thus, it was difficult for Major General Zinni's independent influence as J3 to be overruled in the CMOC or the UNITAF staff.\textsuperscript{50}

The importance of having a Humanitarian Operations Center in each sector was realized as more organizations arrived in theater. HOCs provided a means to share information between the military and relief agencies, promoting unity of effort and enabling economy of force for military personnel.\textsuperscript{51} Four-man Civil Affairs teams were placed in each HOC. A command and control issue that arose with the increase of humanitarian agencies and NGOs was the varying level of assistance that certain agencies desired from the military. Coordination was ongoing in the HOC because the help desired was not consistent and could not be assumed from one NGO to another.\textsuperscript{52}
Interaction provided through the CMOC and HOCs was key to the success of operations in Somalia throughout the UNOSOM II time period. Daily coordination of military activities with Ambassador Oakley's office, village elders, and humanitarian relief agencies was important for each HRS commander. The value of these centers was evident in building relationships with entities that were not under military "command." Daily discussions in the presence of local Somalis and relief workers allowed the military to maintain its credibility while remaining impartial. Operations conducted in the absence of legitimate national government channels magnified the importance of the Civil Military Operations Center concept.

Liaison with the Coalition

During the UNITAF timeframe, and later following the transition to UN control, the effectiveness of U.S. military operations was dependent upon the framework laid by the political process and the unity of effort of the humanitarian agencies. However, unity of command depended on the changing security environment throughout Somalia and on interactions with the coalition forces. Coordination among coalition partners was a priority from the beginning of UNITAF operations. Initial liaison elements became operational in the UNITAF headquarters and with the MARFOR upon arrival in country. Within the headquarters, each coalition had a liaison cell with an appropriate linguist. U.S. component staffs (i.e., the ARFOR headquarters) formed a chief liaison office that served as the focal point of all coalition activity."
Liaison officers played significant roles in all aspects of control and coordination for the force commander. Particular importance was evident when establishing relationships with agencies in which the military commander may not have been as familiar. Military liaison was critical with government agencies (United Nations, U.S. Department of State), coalition forces, the U.S. Services, humanitarian relief agencies, and other civilian organizations. The UNITAF staff had to be prepared to discuss operations with all of these groups. On the other hand, the ARFOR staff, for example, was generally tasked to provide liaison officers to coalition military forces while being shielded by higher headquarters from sending personnel to civilian organizations.

Communications between the force headquarters, American troops, and coalition forces, particularly those with a language barrier, can always be a great source of frustration. The liaison teams played an important role to decrease problems due to language and interoperable communications systems. One means that enhanced command and control was use of a Special Operations Forces Coalition Warfare Team (CWT). The CWT and attached linguist relay information from the force headquarters to the contingent in the field. During early Restore Hope operations, these CWTs were redeployed back to the United States, leaving an inadequate number of personnel remaining in Somalia to perform this command liaison function. Marine forces worked around the coalition liaison problem by establishing a Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST) cell in the UNITAF headquarters.

The CFST was effective in addressing force integration problems as they surfaced. This team was initially organized by the MARFOR to
assist the Marines in effectively integrating coalitions into Marine sectors of Somalia. The mission then expanded to assist the UNITAF commander with controlling the arrival and distribution of all contingent forces. Some CFST responsibilities to the UNITAF force commander included assessing the coalition's combat capabilities and potential employment, providing an intelligence briefing to arriving troops, briefing CENTCOM rules of engagement (ROE), delineating command and control relationships of the UNITAF force, and facilitating the transfer of OPCON of coalition forces to the appropriate ARFOR, MARFOR, JTFSC, or coalition commander.27

The importance of liaison officers was most evident in four main areas: ensuring logistics support, providing civil affairs, interpreting rules of engagement, and clarifying commander's intent. Enough differences existed between coalition forces that liaison officers proved to be invaluable in reducing confusion over mission statements and mission tasking that came from the UNITAF headquarters.28 With regards to ROE, many nations brought their own ROE that were not explicitly in line with CENTCOM. Liaison between coalitions and the UNITAF staff lawyer was useful in disseminating a standard ROE and ensuring some uniformity between forces that found themselves working sectors together. All coalition forces received a centralized briefing on rules of engagement prior to movement to a sector.29 In these respects, coalition liaison greatly enhanced the force commander's unity of command.
UN Security Council Resolution 814 - Changing the Mission

On March 26, 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 814 and started down a distinctly different path from one of securing the efforts of relief agencies in Somalia. The new resolution broadened the mission to include rebuilding the failed nation-state. The Bush Administration had previously taken the firm position that providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief was to be the extent of the U.S. mission. On the other hand, United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had always desired intervention on a grander scale to include rebuilding the political infrastructure of Somalia and making it once again a part of the world community.60

To perform the additional missions, UNITAF numbered about 44,600 coalition troops of which 31,000 were American. The U.S. force included 15,000 Army, 11,200 Marine, 1,000 Air Force, and 3,800 Navy personnel at its peak strength. Other countries contributing forces to UNITAF included Australia, Botswana, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe (figure 5).61 By contrast, the UNOSOM II effort provided a total force of 29,732 soldiers from twenty-nine nations. The U.S. provided only 4,200 troops of which 1,100 were combat forces. The largest contingencies were from India (5,000), Pakistan (4,500), the United States, and Italy (2,600). However, when the critical transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred on 4 May 1993, the coalition consisted of only 17,200 personnel from twenty-one participating countries.62
In March 1993, CINCCENT sent a message to Lieutenant General Johnston revising the UNITAF mission. The text of the message was an admission that the transition to UN control and success of UNOSOM II operations required U.S. forces to perform additional tasks to pave the way for an expanded UN mission. Some of these tasks included assisting the repatriation of refugees and displaced personnel, disarming Somali factions, and de-mining terrain. These mission changes supported the desires of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. The acceptance of such missions and reluctance of some coalition partners to participate in them altogether would hinder the UNOSOM II effort.

The Organization of UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II was politically organized using a standard chain of authority for United Nations peace operations (figure 7). Beneath the UN Secretary General were a number of Under Secretary Generals (USYGs), one of which directed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The USYG for Peacekeeping Operations was responsible for the day-to-day management of operations and communication with the field. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) served as the political agent on the ground heading the political mission and leading negotiations for the Secretary General. The SRSG was responsible for coordinating activities of the Political, Administration, and Humanitarian Relief Divisions and the Zone Directors with the nongovernment organizations. Finally, the UN force commander, with operational or tactical control over contingent military forces, was under the responsibility and control of the Special Representative.
During UNITAF operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary General was Ismat Kittani. The previous SRSG, Mohamed Sahnoun, had requested greater flexibility in coordinating activity and sought increased autonomy from the "inertia at the UN and its agencies." Sahnoun resigned his position in disgust in October 1992, interrupting the political process that he had begun. With this less than successful history of UN intervention, the U.S. jumped at the opportunity offered by Boutros-Ghali to name a new Special Representative prior to UNOSOM II operations. The Clinton Administration, eager to maintain as much control as possible, named Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. Navy Admiral, to this position. Admiral Howe had been Deputy National Security Advisor to President Bush. Other Americans high in the UN command structure were the deputy UN force commander Army Major General Thomas Montgomery and the UN staff operations officer. The UN force commander Lieutenant General Bir had extensive experience with NATO command structures and command relationships with U.S. forces, as Turkey was a member of NATO.

The Transition to UNOSOM II

Although the U.S. military effort in Somalia had only begun in December 1992, the development of a plan to turnover operations to the UN was formulated as early as 8 January 1993. The physical drawdown of U.S. forces was to begin on 18 February in a four-phased program. Phase one was a reduction of American forces from the 1st Marine division and the Army's Tenth Mountain division to a heavy brigade force each (two infantry battalions and aviation). The JTFSC would remain unchanged.
Phase two was the reduction of force to a light brigade (less one infantry battalion) from each service component. Phase three had the majority of the Marine force redeployed and the ARFOR reduced to one light brigade. In this capacity, the ARFOR provided the Quick Reaction Force and a supporting logistics element. Finally in phase four, U.S. forces assumed a direct support (DS) role for UNOSOM II under the direct control of the deputy UN force commander Major General Montgomery.72

In parallel to the physical drawdown of forces, the turnover of command and control to UNOSOM II was planned to occur in three phases. The change of command did not necessarily coincide with the U.S. reduction in force. The three phases of the transition of command were: preparation for transition, UNITAF/UNOSOM II staff interaction, and transition execution. Each HRS was on its own time schedule according to when the UN contingent force assuming responsibility would arrive in Somalia and be able to provide security of the sector. In this regard, the independence of each HRS meant that one HRS did not have to wait for completion of the first phase throughout Somalia before proceeding to the second phase.73

During the preparation phase, HRS commanders of forces that would not be remaining in Somalia were to transfer control of the sector to designated coalition commanders who would remain a part of the UN operation.74 For the U.S. ARFOR, this meant turning over Kismayo to the Belgian commander and Marka to the Pakistani commander. With the departure of the last flag-level officer from the Tenth Mountain division, the commander of the U.S.-led JTFSC was designated as ARFOR commander.75 Army combat forces scheduled to redeploy were put OPCON
to the UNITAF commander as part of the QRF. As UNITAF forces were reduced in number and national contingents planned for their departures from the theater, many forces that were OPCON to an HRS commander were transferred OPCON to the UNITAF commander (figure 8). As such, the Belgians, Moroccans, and Australians who had previously reported to the ARFOR now worked directly for Lieutenant General Johnston. Meanwhile, the NAVFOR was tasked to redeploy Army and Marine units from both Kismayo and Mogadishu. After the UNOSOM II headquarters was established in Mogadishu, the next phase of the change of command began.

In the staff interaction phase, staff elements of UNOSOM II began a process of "staff twinning" with the UNITAF staff in order to become familiar with the situation that had developed in each sector. The UNOSOM II staff participated in the daily routine with their UNITAF counterparts. Prior to the end of phase two, each HRS was under the command of a coalition partner who would be remaining with UNOSOM II, but these commanders still fell under the UNITAF command structure.

The third and final phase in the transition of command to UNOSOM II was the consolidation of the HRSs to ones more in line with the five brigade concept of the UN force commander. This phase was completed with UNITAF standing down following the change of command. The intent during this phase was to coordinate every UNITAF command and control issue with UNOSOM II staff personnel.

**Summary**

Upon the disestablishment of UNITAF, the U.S. forces remaining in Somalia were put under the control of the deputy commander of UNOSOM
II. The UN force commander exercised command of American troops through his deputy. The authority of the UN command was a command relationship that was stated as "a restricted form of the U.S. relationship OPCON."31 The UN force commander was given the authority to organize forces within UNOSOM II but was not able to further task organize American units or affect their internal logistics. It was made clear that the senior U.S. commander in Somalia Major General Montgomery was in the direct U.S. chain of command.

The command relationships of coalition forces that had participated in UNITAF operations and were remaining in Somalia under UNOSOM II were not changed when UNITAF disestablished. The OPCON relationship that existed between a coalition force and UNITAF merely transferred to an OPCON relationship with the UN force commander.32 Moreover, CINCCENT's personal command relationship was not to be misunderstood (figure 9). U.S combat forces assigned during the UNOSOM II timeframe were not even referred to as part of the coalition.33 The command structure of U.S. forces will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter four.
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CHAPTER FOUR

COALITION COMMAND AND CONTROL

General

This chapter discusses command and control of forces that were deployed in Somalia during United Nations control of operations. The American ARFOR units that remained from the UNITAF period included the Tenth Mountain division’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF), an Intelligence Support Element (ISE) from CENTCOM, Special Operations Forces, and the UN Logistics Support Command (formerly the JTFSC).¹ Throughout U.S. involvement until the withdrawal in March 1994, additional units arrived in theater under varying degrees of command by the UN force commander or his American deputy, or were included as completely independent units altogether. As the situation evolved and the threat of violence escalated, U.S. treatment of command and control played an increasingly important role in the success or failure of operations. This chapter analyzes command of UNOSOM II Army QRF units, Task Force Ranger, JTF Somalia, and the UN Logistics Support Command and identifies coalition commander’s concerns.

Command Relationships of U.S. Forces

The principle of unity of command is fundamental to doctrine of the U.S. military. During UNOSOM II, all U.S. forces were under the Combatant Command (COCOM) authority of CINCCENT General Hoar. All U.S.
forces that entered CENTCOM's area of responsibility at one time or another fell directly under General Hoar's combatant command. With COCOM, he assigned subordinate commanders (as he had done with Lieutenant General Johnston and Major General Montgomery), organized and employed forces, assigned tasks, designated objectives, and gave authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, including logistics. CENTCOM determined the force structure, determined the rules of engagement (ROE) under which U.S. forces would operate, and established command relationships to organize the forces.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces in Somalia were delineated by CINCCENT to provide command relationships between American forces and UN forces (appendix B). Specifically, the TOR stated that USFORSOM "will perform duties as assigned by USCINCENT and Commander, UNOSOM II pursuant to UNSC Resolution 814." The CENTCOM commander clearly retained authority to prescribe command relationships of each unit. The chain of command through the senior U.S. officer in Somalia was different for non-combat and combat troops. The tone of the TOR suggested that control of combat units would be kept close to home and that the UNFORSOM commander, through the U.S. commander, would only have limited control in specific situations.

The Terms of Reference did provide some flexibility for the UN force commander to use American combat forces, but only through his deputy commander first. The command relationships specified by CINCCENT went to painstaking effort to ensure that the senior ranking U.S. officer, Major General Montgomery, was mentioned in the chain of command of U.S. forces. CINCCENT retained operational control (OPCON) of U.S.
forces in Somalia. Tactical control was granted only to the USFORSOM commander, not to his position in the UN force structure.

Command relationships of U.S. forces were slightly contradictory to the TOR in the UNOSOM II Operations Plan One (OPLAN 1) dated 2 May 1993, just two days prior to the transition. This document stated that "on order" relationships to the UN force commander would include OPCON of the U.S. logistics support command, TACON of the QRF, direct support of UNOSOM II by the Intelligence Support Element, and OPCON of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). The SOF assets were actually TACON via the USFORSOM commander. This illustrates the difficulty in establishing a satisfactory command structure when the force commander is other than a United States officer. The accepted structure of the first American forces during UNOSOM II's effort is shown in figure 9.

**Evolution of the QRF During UNOSOM II**

Development of an ARFOR Quick Reaction Force in Somalia began during UNITAF operations with the 2d Brigade of the Tenth Mountain division, the Commando Brigade, and then in March 1993 to the Warrior Brigade, 1st Brigade. The ARFOR QRF was OPCON to the UNITAF commander. However, the QRF and its availability to the UNOSOM II force commander changed as new units rotated in and out of the country.

During the UNITAF timeframe, the U.S. QRF brigade task force mission was:

- to reinforce coalition forces in sector and reestablish a secure environment for the conduct of humanitarian relief operations; and, be prepared to conduct other security missions as directed by UNITAF/UNOSOM.
The QRF was OPCON to the UNITAF commander and was TACON to the commander of an HRS once committed. QRF responsibilities were transferred between the ARFOR's Commando Brigade and the Warrior Brigade during the March rotation of these units, and TF Mountain Warrior (the Warrior Brigade QRF) began its official duties on 9 April 1993. In preparation for UNOSOM II control, the Warrior Brigade turned HRS Marka over to the Pakistanis but remained the QRF.6 Uncertainty in the ARFOR over the QRF's upcoming role was summed up in the following statement from the Tenth Mountain division AAR:

UNOSOM II stood up on 4 May and the theater reaction force will provide direct support to UNOSOM II who is responsible for all of Somalia. At this point, the future of the QRF commitment is not known.7

The UNOSOM II Quick Reaction Force mission statement changed after the bulk of U.S. forces left Somalia. The QRF mission read:

When directed by the commander, U.S. Forces Somalia, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force will respond to hostile threat and attacks that exceed UNOSOM II military force capabilities and assist in military oriented operations that are beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM II military forces.8

The QRF was to be used in situations that overwhelmed the local contingent's capabilities or when too many small disturbances in one HRS caused a force to be spread too thin. Because the QRF had air mobility, it could be used when a commander needed to react more quickly than his own transportation assets would allow. Other tasks in which the QRF might be employed included helicopter reconnaissance, attack, or airlift support, or operations in an area common to two relief sectors where a problem spilled over into the adjacent sector. The Quick Reaction Force was given "on order" tasking that included the assumption of tactical
command by the on-scene HRS commander. This assumption of TACON was contrary to CINCCENT's intent without Montgomery's approval.

The TF Mountain Warrior brigade task force that was in place at the time of the transition to UNOSOM II consisted of an infantry battalion, an aviation battalion task force, a support battalion, and elements from military police units (figure 10). The special operations forces were controlled by a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). The original command relationship of the special operations forces during UNOSOM II was not clearly stated in any OPLAN and was never formalized until the arrival of JTF Somalia in October. The SOCCE and its forces received logistics support from the ARFOR but were not under their operational control. The USFORSOM commander "eventually assumed [TACON] control of the SOCCE."10

With the transition to UNOSOM II, the mission of the QRF became more and more specific and was controlled tightly by the U.S. command structure delineated in CINCCENT's Terms of Reference. The QRF could provide very specific support to UN objectives. No longer a part of UNOSOM II's command structure, the use of QRF combat capabilities was under the auspices of CENTCOM via USFORSOM. Major General Montgomery, as deputy UN force commander, received the QRF TACON if a mission fell within the agreement issued by CINCCENT or he received TACON once QRF commitment was granted by CINCCENT.11 The role of the QRF became one of "direct support" to UN forces, a relationship in which a specific coalition could receive support of the QRF once commitment was consented to but there was no transfer of OPCON or TACON to the unit being supported. The intent of the QRF remaining under separate control from
the UN structure was to have unity of command within CENTCOM and to minimize the potential for mission creep.\textsuperscript{12} Forty-seven U.S. personnel on Montgomery's UN staff assisted him with oversight of the Army QRF and theater logistics command.\textsuperscript{13} Figure 11 diagrams the transition of ARFOR QRF units from UNITAF command to CENTCOM command.\textsuperscript{14}

From August until the establishment of JTF Somalia in October, the Tenth Mountain division's 10th Aviation Brigade, Falcon Brigade, was the in-country command headquarters of the QRF.\textsuperscript{15} The brigade's initial organization mirrored that of TF Mountain Warrior. Mission tasking continued to flow through the USFORSOM commander to the Falcon Brigade headquarters.\textsuperscript{16} By 30 October, following the TF Ranger incident and incorporation by JTF Somalia, the Falcon Brigade had been augmented to consist of two infantry battalion task force teams vice a single infantry battalion, an aviation battalion task force, an armored battalion task force, the support battalion, and an engineer battalion (figure 12).\textsuperscript{17} This new force strength stressed the command capabilities of the aviation brigade staff because the typical aviation brigade performs aerial mobility, firepower, assault, and reconnaissance tasks, while the addition of light infantry and heavy armored units to the task force brought new and challenging aspects of mission planning and execution.\textsuperscript{18}

With JTF Somalia's introduction into theater, the concept of a separate standing Quick Reaction Force went away. The JTF used its forces to meet mission requirements and essentially assumed the QRF role for UN operations. Forces available for the reserve were decreased to only company-sized teams of infantry, mechanized, and helicopter units.
The Commander, JTF Somalia, and his operations officer (J3) had authority to commit the QRF to assist U.S. troops and UN forces in need of immediate support. If the QRF was committed, JTF Somalia was required to notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Chain of command issues between the JTF Somalia commander and the USFORSOM commander are addressed later in this chapter.

**UN Command of Coalition Forces**

The United Nations Force Commander Lieutenant General Bir arrived in Somalia on March 15, 1993. He was assisted by Major General Montgomery of the U.S. as deputy UNOSOM II commander and by Brigadier General Cox, a Canadian serving as Chief of Staff. Each country sent forces under direct national command similar to the National Command Authorities of the United States. Each coalition force deployed to assist the UN effort but could be retained or removed altogether by its national government. The separate chains of command ran parallel to that of the UN force commander, generally coordinated in unity of effort but not necessarily allowing unity of command. The parallel chains of command presented the UN force commander with a unity of command challenge from each contingent.

National contingent commanders used the parallel chain of command to ensure their forces were used to meet national objectives. Officers maintained communications with their home country command via national command links located at the UN headquarters in the U.S. Embassy compound. The UN force commander was forced to "consult" with his commanders and negotiate orders that he wanted to give. This
very much slowed the planning process and limited the responsiveness in a changing tactical environment.

Some nations restricted their forces from participating in missions that were perceived as having the potential for seeing hostilities. Some contingents were fully prepared for missions while others were not. The force from Zimbabwe originally numbered 1,000 personnel and arrived seeking equipment and financial reimbursement for pay and allowances for their troops. The Zimbabwe force was subsequently reduced to only 130 when these requests were rejected.²² There were coalition members that sought "safe" missions that were defensive in nature while others were more at ease with offensive postures. Still other coalition members initially balked at a mission but could be coaxed into assuming a broader one.²³ At one point, there were eight nations defending the airfield at Mogadishu, not because it was big or was under constant threat but because for either political or military reasons that was all these contingents were equipped to do.²⁴

Though each coalition member understood that the UN resolution mandating operations was written under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, each interpreted its own role as one of providing humanitarian assistance, disarmament, nation building, or peace enforcement. There were missions that were interpreted as being beyond the intent of the UN mandate. Other contingents were not allowed to assist forces operating outside their given HRS. Moreover, some nations went as far as establishing relationships with Somali leaders external to the UN force commander's knowledge in an attempt to find a separate solution.
Success with a coalition force was based on positive discussion between the UN force commander and the national commander on the roles a contingency would play and the shared expectations in the performance of those duties. Upon arrival, detailed exchanges were necessary that clarified what the force was willing to participate in as well as any support requirements that it needed. As assignments were made to coalition forces, it was critical to hear the commander's interpretation of what he understood the mission to be. When determining what a contingent would or would not do, the best results were achieved by giving as detailed a briefing as possible on the conduct of the operation. This would permit the commander the opportunity to divulge what his force was willing to do. In some circumstances, the coalition commander accepted or refused a mission based simply on national pride or political agenda instead of a military reason.

Command relationships among coalition forces were written as operational control (OPCON) in the UNOSOM II OPLANs. It is unclear as to whether the definition of this term is equivalent to that used in U.S. doctrine. In general, references to a coalition chain of command appear only to suggest that mutual support will be provided for operations in an HRS. There is no suggestion that the coalition commander with OPCON can further task organize a nation's force.

The significance of being able to task organize a force is illustrated with an example from the U.S. ARFOR during Operation Restore Hope. There were many military police (MP) units deployed to Somalia as part of the security force. The Tenth Mountain division provost marshal had OPCON of all MP assets within the ARFOR. Because of the OPCON
command relationship, the provost marshal was able to place various military police platoons in direct support (DS) or general support (GS) of other units. He put platoons with TF Kismayo and the Commando Brigade and left a platoon in Mogadishu. One MP company was placed OPCON to the MARFOR and was tasked directly by the Marines.27 The importance of tailoring the military force for a specific set of missions can be achieved by the OPCON relationship in U.S. doctrine. However, in multinational operations, the capabilities of a UN commander to command his forces do not extend to further task organizing the forces of a national contingent. Thus, the UN's reference to OPCON is more closely aligned with the U.S. term tactical control (TACON).

Regardless of the UN definition of command relationships, it is clear that some national contingents were subordinated to others during UNOSOM II operations. In the new HRS combining Kismayo and Bardera, forces from Botswana transferred their OPCON relationship under the MARFOR to OPCON under the Belgian commander, who in turn was OPCON to the UN force commander. As the French brigade assumed control of the Oddur, Baidoa, and Baledogle HRSs, it received OPCON of Moroccan, Greek, and Zimbabwe forces. Interestingly, the Australian contingent, which would leave Somalia after the UNITAF effort, chose to operate independent of French command in Baidoa. The Australians, who during UNITAF controlled the Baidoa HRS, relinquished command to the French and remained in Baidoa TACON to the UNOSOM II commander until their departure.28 In Gialalassi, United Arab Emirate troops were OPCON to the Italian brigade, although the UAE effort concentrated in providing security of the Mogadishu port facility.
In similar fashion, control of the Mogadishu/Marka area was transferred to coalition forces. Prior to the headquarters element of the Pakistani brigade arriving in Somalia, Pakistani battalions were OPCON to the UNITAF commander. After the Pakistanis assumed control of the newly combined Mogadishu and Marka HRS from MARFOR and ARFOR units, OPCON of the battalions was transferred back from UNITAF to Pakistani control. The Egyptian contingency was OPCON to the Pakistanis to conduct security of the Mogadishu airport. Kuwaiti and Nigerian forces also aligned themselves OPCON to the Pakistani commander. As far as U.S. units were concerned, after Pakistan assumed command of Marka, designated Army units reconfigured into the QRF and consolidated in Mogadishu.29

Problems associated with the multinational flavor of UNOSOM II operations ran contrary to the principle of unity of command of the military forces. The UN force commander was never certain whether or not his directives would be followed. This placed great strain on relationships between coalition commanders and the UN headquarters and resulted in increased risk and jeopardized operations.30

For U.S. forces in Somalia, this meant that increased situational awareness had to be maintained by ground forces to ensure they understood the capabilities of coalition combat troops and their willingness to assist in mission accomplishment. It necessitated a sense of reality among the American soldiers because support from coalition partners was not as readily available or reliable as they might have been accustomed to receiving from their sister units during previously conducted U.S. training exercises.
A Seamless Transition?

Following the transition from UNITAF in May 1993, the UN force commander was anxious to show the various political and militia factions in Somalia that there had indeed been a seamless succession of authority and force among the coalitions. A show of force was planned in Mogadishu using the U.S. Quick Reaction Force and armored patrols by the Italian brigade. Similar operations were performed by units in each HRS. Intent of the military operations was to demonstrate the resolve of the UN and its capabilities to continue the mission of securing humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{31}

The UN’s ability to control violence was first tested on the third day of the UNOSOM II mission in the Kismayo sector. On the evening of 6 May, approximately 150 Somalis engaged elements of the Belgian Parachute Battalion, wounding one Belgian officer.\textsuperscript{32} Following the engagement, the Belgian commander stated that he felt he had insufficient forces to adequately patrol the Kismayo sector. Clan fighting between Mohamed Hersi Morgan and Omar Jess had never subsided in the region surrounding Kismayo, and the Belgians requested reinforcements to prevent future attacks.

The UN force commander wanted to use the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to assist the Belgian brigade in maintaining security. However, the QRF mission dictated by CENTCOM would not allow it to be used except in the emergency relief of committed UN troops. Seeing that the immediate conflict in Kismayo had subsided, the QRF could only be deployed if the QRF picked up the sector security mission from the Belgians while the Belgians performed the additional mission requiring

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reconnaissance into outlying areas. Through back-channel discussion
with CENTCOM, permission was granted for the QRF to assist the Belgian
effort by conducting air assault training missions in their vicinity.\textsuperscript{33}

Following the 6 May incident in Kismayo, the Belgian commander
remained hesitant to expand patrols in his HRS without additional
coalition support. His brigade had been able to disrupt the armed
Somalis and defeat the attack; however, the brigade lost its aggressive,
offensive spirit in maintaining firm control. In spite of the UN force
commander's assessment that the Belgian force possessed the means to
adequately perform its mission, the Belgian commander appeared to be
unwilling to put his men at further risk. The inability of the force
commander and Belgian commander to agree on a sufficient force in the
Kismayo sector effectively removed the Belgian brigade from a unified
chain of command within UNOSOM II.

Kismayo was not the only location for increasing violence.
During the transition to UNOSOM II, the U.S. force was reduced from
about 28,000 to 4,200 personnel, only 1,100 of which were combat troops.
With this decrease in commitment by the United States, violence renewed
between pro-Aideed forces and pro-Ali Mahdi forces that separated
Mogadishu. The "seamless transition" was difficult for American forces
who occupied the pro-Aideed section of the city because the UN had
recognized Ali Mahdi as the interim president of Somalia.\textsuperscript{34} Command of
U.S. troops was made difficult as forces were introduced to meet the
threat.
The Need for Task Force Ranger

The impetus for the addition of U.S. combat troops into Somalia occurred in June 1993. The increasing presence of militia forces in Mogadishu under the direction of General Aideed drew mounting concern of the UN force commander. On 5 June, Aideed's men ambushed a force of Pakistani peacekeepers, killing twenty-four. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Admiral Howe, recommended a UN response that was manifested in adopting UN Security Council Resolution 837 a day later on 6 June. The text and tone of this resolution were meant to instill fear into the Somali warlords, stating that continued armed conflict with UN forces simply would not be tolerated. It was also worded to reflect the desires of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, who wanted to present a hard line and change the direction for the use of military power by the coalition. In its text, UNSCR 837:

Reaffirms that the Secretary General is authorized under resolution 814 to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment;

Re-emphasized the crucial importance of early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions . . . of neutralizing radio broadcast systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II.

An important consideration of the passage of this resolution laid in the fact that embedded within the resolution was a change of mission for the UN forces. Many coalition members, including the United States, did not agree that disarmament of Somalis was specified in the previous UN mandate and still should not be a current mission. However,
there was no requirement within the Security Council of the United Nations to first gain a consensus, or at least tacit agreement, from member nations with ground forces in the theater. Disagreements on the use of force by contingent commanders proved to be a recurring problem for the UN force commander.  

Immediately following the attack on the Pakistanis, the UN Force Command made efforts to stabilize the situation in Mogadishu. Many relief agencies and UN staff civilians had departed the country until security could be reassured. Also, some military contingents were becoming uncomfortable with the peacekeeping process and were second-guessing the UN force’s capabilities to control violence.

Command and control became an issue with the addition of French and Moroccan troops to reinforce the UN troops in Mogadishu. Both the French and Moroccan governments authorized the use of their armored units in support of the Pakistanis only if they remained OPCON to Lieutenant General Bir.  

This demand put the UNOSOM staff in the difficult position of having to direct both the operational and tactical employment of forces. Bir complained through the Special Representative to the Secretary General in a memorandum stating that the UN force commander "must have full authority over contingent forces and not be limited by requests for approval from national authorities before execution of military operations."  

Between 7 and 12 June, Moroccan and Italian forces assisted the Pakistanis with operations in Mogadishu that were controlled and directed by the UN Force Command and not by the Pakistani brigade headquarters.
The collective effort of the UN coalition was tested during an assault on the Aideed enclave on 17 June in the capital city. The operation began when U.S. AC-130 gunships TACON to Major General Montgomery conducted strikes against troop concentrations and weapons caches and then progressed to ground forces clearing the enclave. Forces from Morocco, Italy, France, and Pakistan contributed on the ground. At one point, the Pakistanis failed to establish a key strong point in the enclave to deny the enclave's use by enemy militias because the Pakistani commander thought his force was insufficient to secure the area.  

It had been only two weeks since the previous ambush of the Pakistani contingent, and the commander showed hesitancy to proceed aggressively as planned. Heavy fighting continued in which UN casualties were forty-six wounded and five killed. The Moroccan forces suffered the greatest casualties with forty-one wounded and four dead, one of the fatalities being the battalion commander. The ability of the UN to direct reinforcement operations was becoming heavily taxed both internally according to the staff's capabilities and externally from the mutual support being provided by coalition partners.

The achievement of the tactical objectives during operations in June came at a very high price for the UN. The Moroccan national authorities ordered the withdrawal of Moroccan forces and denied their future employment in Mogadishu. French troops indicated a reluctance to remain in Mogadishu and their government ordered them to return to the Baidoa HRS which had been their established sector. When asked to continue with operations in Mogadishu, the French Chief of Defense emphasized a letter that he had written to the UN force commander on 14
June stating the French force was to be used outside its HRS for a limited time and for a specific mission only. This letter stated the French government's position that: "It seems that it is not appropriate, generally speaking to call for reinforcement[s] coming from neighboring areas, which jeopardizes their dispositions."43

Fighting in Mogadishu escalated in July, putting further strain on the UN commander's ability to hold his coalition together. Italian forces were attacked on 2 July following a search operation and suffered casualties of thirty wounded and three killed. This engagement effectively ended the Italian brigade's influence in the city. The UN force commander's frustration mounted after he was unable to reverse the attitude in this large contingent whose aggressive participation had been central to the security of the UNOSOM II relief effort. On 6 July, UN Force Command sent a cable to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations:

National authorities and local commanders feel free to ignore direction and urging for aggressive action. On the one hand, [one national contingent] is reluctant to operate until further reinforced with tanks and additional APCs. On the other, the [another national contingent] is insistent on further negotiations with faction elders who have no actual influence on the ... militia.44

To further complicate the UN force commander's hand, the Italian contingency began unilateral negotiations with Aideed's forces. This led other UN military participants to wonder if any operational information was being compromised to Aideed.45 This activity was reported in the 7 July UNOSOM Situation Report (SITREP):

[National] military officials have forbidden them [their national force] to conduct indiscriminate violent reprisals against Aideed's forces. This prohibition places [their brigade commander]
in a difficult position because he is required to negotiate before engaging in military operations against Aideed. [Another contingent] is hesitant to take any new action to disrupt militia activity until the arrival of tanks.\textsuperscript{45}

Obviously, the United States was outraged by the attacks on UN forces in Mogadishu. With the passage of UNSCR 837, the UN had issued a warrant for Aideed's arrest. Although the role of U.S. combat troops had been dramatically decreased since the transition, the U.S. now made a unilateral commitment to find Aideed and bring him to justice. In August, the USFORSIM commander appealed to CINCENT concerning the requirement for more combat power in the form of attack helicopters and armored vehicles.\textsuperscript{47} On 22 August, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) deployed to Mogadishu. This task force, TF Ranger, consisted of U.S. Army Rangers and special operations helicopters.\textsuperscript{48}

**Early American Policy Works Against UNOSOM II**

While Admiral Howe worked to augment the U.S. military forces necessary to execute the mission of searching for and arresting Aideed, the Clinton Administration began its search for a diplomatic means to cease hostilities. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated, "If there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems, it must be much more than a military solution."\textsuperscript{49} President Clinton pursued this new diplomatic tack with both the State Department and with his personal message to the UN General Assembly, where he outlined stricter engagement criteria for U.S. forces in Somalia.\textsuperscript{50} The seemingly contradictory policies of escalating military troop commitments with a desire to negotiate peace among the warring factions highlighted concerns of commanders seeking
support for their actions. With the NCA committing to two strategies, support in the U.S. chain of command appeared fragmented.

Though TF Ranger deployed in late August, CENTCOM later requested an augmentation of armored units to aid in force protection. This request occurred at the same time the Clinton Administration was initiating its new diplomatic strategy. Secretary Aspin thought this might unnecessarily escalate the military imbalance in the negotiation process and refused to send reinforcing equipment and manpower.\textsuperscript{51}

**Alone in Somalia—Task Force Ranger**

The special operations task force, known as Task Force Ranger, was committed as a U.S. force that did not fall within the UN chain of command at all. Still part of CINCENT's geographic area of responsibility, TF Ranger was commanded in Somalia by Major General William Garrison. Although the UN force commander, the USFORSOM commander, and the Special Representative did have the authority to veto a TF Ranger operation, none had operational or tactical control of task force units.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover, for security reasons, Major General Garrison was required to give the UN Force Command only a thirty minute advance notification of task force operations.\textsuperscript{53} This put severe restrictions on the UN force commander's ability to anticipate enemy responses, determine effects and repercussions on future coalition actions, and position forces to assist the unilateral U.S. effort.

Because TF Ranger reported directly to CINCENT and not to USFORSOM, Major General Montgomery was not involved in the planning phase of any Ranger operations. Nor was he or his staff allowed the
opportunity to evaluate a plan until just prior to the commencement of its execution. There was no opportunity to assess pitfalls in the plan and no time to assess UN coalition support. This proved to be costly for the American servicemen during the TF Ranger firefight on 3 and 4 October in which eighteen Rangers were killed. It took several hours for the UN command to develop a plan and respond to support the U.S. action."

The Arrival of JTF Somalia

As a result of the TF Ranger clash with Aideed's militia, President Clinton decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. The Rangers were redeployed to Fort Benning in October while the president now chose to augment remaining American troops with heavy equipment to enhance force protection in the face of an increasing threat of violence.\(^5\) During the month of October, the strength of the U.S. contingent in Somalia would swell to exceed 7,000 personnel.\(^6\) President Clinton also made the decision to maintain close control (i.e., through CENTCOM) over new forces by opting for the establishment of another Joint Task Force vice sending additional personnel under the operational control of the UN force commander. Despite the internal failures of TF Ranger, a lack of confidence in the abilities of the UN to provide adequate force protection prompted the Administration's retreat from the UN force commander's authority.

The separate task force was again called JTF Somalia. It consisted of heavy armored tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. In addition, two naval Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs), each with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit that was special operations capable, were deployed as part of the JTF. The JTF deployed its own headquarters and, with the exception of those personnel assigned to the UN Logistics Support Command, absorbed command of all U.S. Army forces already in-country, including the Army's Quick Reaction Force. The Tenth Mountain division once again served as the nucleus of this headquarters and task force. This was true in all but selection of the Commanding General Major General Carl Ernst, who was chosen over the Tenth Mountain division commander.

As the Rangers were being redeployed to the United States, other SOF forces were heading to the theater. Attached to Major General Ernst's JTF Somalia were four Air Force AC-130 gunships forward deployed in Mombasa, Kenya. In addition, a SOF command, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), was formed separate from JTF Somalia to complement Ernst's force with psychological operations, civil affairs, and ground teams in Somalia that would assist the AC-130s in their tactical reconnaissance and fire support roles. The JSOTF was in CINCENT's chain of command via a special operations coordination (SOCCORD) element and worked through coordination channels instead of under the singular control of the JTF Somalia commander or USFORSOM commander (figure 13).

The command relationship between USFORSOM and Commander, JTF Somalia (CJTF) was never clear. JTF Somalia was sent to Somalia not as a UN force but as an augmentation to the U.S. force with a mission of force protection. Sources indicate that Major General Montgomery (USFORSOM) did have TACON of Ernst's JTF. However, constraints
imposed by a TACON relationship did not allow USFOR'SM's authoritative
direction over JTF operations, nor did it allow him to organize, assign
tasks or designate objectives for the JTF. Only OPCON would have given
Montgomery these freedoms. As it was, CENTCOM did require all JTF
contingency plans to be routed through USFOR'SM. Also, on at least one
occasion, JTF Somalia "received strategic direction from USFOR'SM as
well as from CINCENT."\textsuperscript{61}

Another problem that resulted from keeping JTF Somalia separate
from the UN chain of command manifested itself in logistics support.
CENTCOM's new JTF did not come with its own logistics support because
there was already a predominantly U.S. Army logistics element under UN
operational control and many JTF Somalia planners assumed this logistics
chain would suffice. The forces afloat posed no logistics problem and
were self-sufficient. However, the JTF Somalia ground units ashore were
not immediately supported because of the distinct command relationships.
Because the JTF was only TACON, there was no official requirement for
the UN or USFOR'SM to provide logistics support to it, but merely to
direct it in limited tactical movements. In the haste to reinforce a
United Nations operation but retain command of U.S. forces, CENTCOM had
overlooked logistics support.\textsuperscript{62}

Aside from the operational and logistic difficulties of parallel
commands, commanders' personalities arose as an issue. By having a
second two-star general in the command structure of American forces at
this time, there developed an unfortunate conflict between the two
commanders that detracted from mission effectiveness. The hierarchy in
the U.S. chain of command between Montgomery and Ernst was never
specified by CINCCENT, as if the two commands were intended to be separate. In addition, the USFORSOM staff was not large enough to plan adequately as a higher headquarters for the JTF, another reason that courses of action evolved independently.63 It was not until Ernst left Somalia a few months after his arrival in October that Montgomery resolved the conflict by absorbing the title of Commander, JTF Somalia in addition to his other duties.64

The addition of JTF Somalia to CINCCENT's theater of operations was a matter of concern also for the command relationships between U.S. forces afloat and those ashore. CENTCOM had intended for the Marine and Naval forces of the two ARGs to act as an offshore, over-the-horizon Quick Reaction Force that would supplement the Army's QRF until it was redeployed in March 1994. This ARG QRF was kept under OPCON of CINCCENT, and approval to use the afloat force remained with CENTCOM. The relationship between JTF Somalia and the ARG was TACON, which allowed for its participation in missions if granted by CENTCOM and only in the force organized by CENTCOM. Only the OPCON command relationship allows a commander to task organize his force. General Ernst's inability to task organize forces in the afloat QRF limited his operational planning. Offshore assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), had to be requested through CINCCENT to be used by JTF Somalia.65 This obstacle to efficient planning was only one hurdle for the JTF Somalia staff to overcome.
The JTF Somalia Staff

The organization and establishment of the JTF staff was a very short-fused operation. CENTCOM issued a warning order to the Tenth Mountain division on 7 October 1993, just three days following the Somali attack on Task Force Ranger. Advance personnel from Fort Drum departed New York three days later, and JTF Somalia accepted responsibility for operations on 20 October. The principle staff officers were not even able to meet together as a full staff prior to the handover date. On 20 October, only sixty percent of the JTF staff was in Somalia, "yet it was now charged with performing its assigned mission to:

Provide force protection for U.S. forces in Somalia and facilitates; continue U.S. support of UN operations. As required, conduct operations to secure lines of communications to ensure the continued flow of supplies. Prepare to withdraw U.S. forces."

The JTF staff was made of representatives from all services, with eighty percent being Army, ten percent Marine, and the remainder among Navy, Air Force and Special Operations Forces. The majority of staff officers were again from the Army's Tenth Mountain division. Joint and coalition planning demands placed on the staff were difficult to achieve efficiently due to a large portion of the staff having little or no experience in joint and combined operations. A Corps-level staff is generally more robust and better able to plan and coordinate large-scale operations. The JTF staff again was stretched in its abilities to accomplish its missions."

Intelligence support for the JTF staff came from the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) that was in country prior to JTF
Somalia's deployment. The ISE was under OPCON of CENTCOM because federal law prohibits putting intelligence assets outside a U.S. chain of command. In a situation similar to the problems over providing logistics described previously, intelligence support for the ISE was split between UN and JTF forces. The ISE had provided direct support (DS) intelligence to the UN force commander through the USFORSOM commander. The arriving JTF staff did not bring a large intelligence component and did not anticipate having to operate independent of Army intelligence units already there. Because CINCENT's command relationship with the ISE existed in support of the USFORSOM commander and UN operations, JTF Somalia lacked intelligence support when UN requirements saturated the ISE's collection and dissemination capabilities.

Civil Affairs (CA) was another area in which the JTF Somalia staff lacked manpower. When the JTF stood up, there was no Civil Affairs officer assigned to the staff. All support was provided by the CA officer working within the UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). This officer was the only contact the JTF command had with local Somalis and NGOs. In February 1994, the staffs of the JTF and UNLSC combined, at which time the JTF became better equipped to handle civil-military tensions.

The UN Logistics Support Command

The majority of forces committed by coalition nations to the UNOSOM II effort were combat troops and not service support troops. In a request from the UN Secretary General to the U.S. Department of State
on 9 March 1993, what the UNOSOM II force needed most were logistics support and communications capability.\textsuperscript{71} The five HRS sectors each required an Area Support Group (ASG) to provide logistics support to the contingent brigade force. These ASGs were in addition to a centralized general support command, the UN Logistics Support Command. It was difficult for the UN force commander to plan logistics support when coalition nations were slow to commit to the UN effort during UNOSOM II's establishment.

The U.S. logistics forces in country during the UNITAF timeframe were relied upon heavily for initial UNOSOM II support. American troops were expected to provide "all or most of two Area Support Groups and the general support group and supplement the forces of India, Pakistan, and Italy as required for the other three Area Support Groups."\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, the UN request included U.S. communications support of up to one year from the transition date in May. This was deemed necessary to keep established command connectivity with the outlying brigade sectors while the UN contracted and installed replacement communications systems.

The UNLSC was a composite command under operational control of the UN force commander. Some problems associated with a multinational logistics command included sustaining combat operations without a combat-capable command headquarters and providing rear area security. In some instances, the USFORPROM staff was charged with planning sustainment operations of the U.S. QRF but was not staffed with the logistics expertise to perform this role. One Army forward support battalion was attached to the QRF but was unable to direct UN planning
efforts. With regards to rear area security, two rear area support bases were situated on urban terrain that could not be adequately defended from hostile activity if it had occurred. The USFORSOm commander was unable to exercise proper command authority over U.S. forces to provide a more secure environment.  

Summary

President Clinton directed the withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of March 1994. As U.S. units redeployed, commitment to UNOSOM II gradually decreased. The ARFOR logistics units attached to the UNLSC downsized and effectively ceased support of the UN force in mid-February. The commander of JTF Somalia Major General Ernst departed Somalia on 15 February, leaving Major General Montgomery in command of remaining JTF forces. At this time, Montgomery also relinquished his position as the UN deputy commander. From mid-February until the withdrawal of U.S. troops was completed, American forces had no mission in support of UNOSOM II operations. Naval units in a TACON relationship under Montgomery assumed the force protection mission for U.S. units.

This unilateral redeployment by the United States did not mark the end of UNOSOM II operations. Following the American withdrawal, twenty nations remained in Somalia. Two-thirds of these forces represented Pakistan, India, and Egypt. There were still nearly 1,000 U.S. citizens—diplomats and relief aid workers—that stayed behind. In addition, a 50-man Marine contingent remained in Somalia to protect the diplomats and specialists assisting the UN effort. The U.S. Navy kept an Amphibious Ready Group, with its embarked 2,000-man Marine
Expeditionary Unit, off the coast through May. 75 The final chapter on U.S. military participation in Somalia was Operation United Shield, conducted in February 1995, completing the evacuation of all United Nations forces. 76
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CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

Purpose

This chapter analyzes whether or not there was unity of effort among UN forces and whether the U.S. force commander in Somalia, USFORSOM, had unity of command of American forces during UNOSOM II operations. Unity of command is a doctrinal principle of war while unity of effort is a principle of operations other than war (OOTW). The obvious conclusion for operations in Somalia, a UN-led OOTW mission, is that the USFORSOM commander should not have expected to achieve unity of command of U.S. forces. However, unity of command should be applicable for a contingent commander whether or not an OOTW mission exists. The doctrinal answer is to apply the given force structure and command relationships in the most effective way to accomplish the desired end state. However, when a secure environment turns hostile, and the situation more closely resembles combat, is unity of effort sufficient for either a single contingent force or for the coalition?

The analysis of command and control relationships focuses on the author's five unity of command assessment criteria discussed earlier. These criteria include force responsiveness, cooperation, parallel chain of command conflict, contingent support of UN mission, and staff liaison. Events during UNOSOM II, as well as some activities prior to
the transition, were categorized according to their impact on the senior leader's ability to command. Each criterion was developed to suggest whether or not unity was enhanced or hindered.

**Force Responsiveness**

Unity of command suggests that the commander can readily direct the forces in theater to accomplish the mission. The situation may require the shifting of assets and the flexibility to allocate forces in a dynamic environment. The commander must be able to develop teamwork and should have the means to synchronize forces and events. With unity of command, the commander is the central authority who influences and directs operations.

The UN coalition experienced many problems related to the UN force commander's ability to direct operations. When the Indian brigade arrived in country in September and replaced the French contingent in the Baidoa/Kismayo HRS, the Zimbabwe force was directed to relocate to Mogadishu. The Zimbabwe troops refused to leave the stability of their sector for the uncertainty and violence of the capital. Also, the Indian brigade failed to respond to the force commander's tasking to assist in disarming Somalis in Mogadishu, refusing to operate near the Pakistani troops that were based there.²

Command relationships in the coalition should maintain the freedom of action of the commander to use units as he sees fit. Some national contingents used the separation of effort by relief sector as a way to become "territorial" in conducting security operations. They became increasingly more reluctant to participate outside their assigned
HRS. This attitude limited the force commander's ability to direct action and achieve the desired force response. President Clinton's peacekeeping reform policy mentions that U.S. forces are not to be sent outside their assigned area of responsibility, thus reinforcing other nations' desires to isolate their forces within a coalition effort.

The force responsiveness criterion also suggests that all policymaking originate with the commander. Because the military effort in Somalia sometimes included political negotiations with warring factions, it was important for the Somalis to get information from authoritative sources. Concerning the UNITAF conflict with Jess and Morgan in Kismayo, it appeared that the Belgian force had entered into talks that favored Jess. During UNOSOM II, the Italian contingent became frustrated and participated in unilateral discussions with Aideed. Neither of these incidents reinforced the authority of the UN force commander.

Coalition forces, including U.S. forces, were increasingly reluctant to perform all missions assigned. The responsiveness of forces to a commander was greatly reduced if the commander was forced to "consult" with a coalition commander on whether or not the force could be relied upon to participate in a mission. The independence of national forces became more of a problem as time went on during UNOSOM II operations. Following the coalition's attack on Aideed's enclave in Mogadishu on 17 June in which coalition forces incurred casualties, the Moroccans and French refrained from further operations there. Likewise, the Italians withdrew from aggressive patrols in Mogadishu after suffering casualties on 2 July. Needless to say, as coalitions withheld
support, the force commander found it even more difficult to find willing participants in subsequent conflicts.

The command relationships among U.S. units in Somalia did not allow the USFORSOM commander to achieve unity of command either. As deputy UN force commander, the senior American officer could not alleviate the problems of his coalition boss. The CINCENT Terms of Reference kept USFORSOM out of the planning loop and reduced his flexibility as a leader to use in-country forces to support the UNOSOM II effort. The rules describing when the Quick Reaction Force could be used in UN operations limited response time even though the QRF was intended to be an emergency asset. When TF Ranger arrived, it too answered to CINCENT and not to USFORSOM. The Rangers were probably fortunate that casualties were not more significant than they were. JTF Somalia, sent to the theater as a force protection package, was not only outside of the USFORSOM commander's control, but contributed to an adversarial relationship driven by personality. Neither the JTF nor the supporting special operations JSOTF were TACON to Montgomery; moreover, these two organizations did not even fall under the same command structure themselves. The JTF had no dedicated logistics support or intelligence support. The ARG assets associated with JTF Somalia were OPCON to CINCENT, not the JTF commander, and were certainly not readily available to USFORSOM.

The ability of the U.S. force commander to effectively elicit quick and decisive response from the contingent forces in theater was inadequate. As operations became more likely to encounter hostilities, and as new units arrived under someone else's control, the USFORSOM
commander was less able to provide force protection and aggressively put pressure on the militant Somali factions. Force responsiveness for the coalition commander and U.S. commander was weakened because of a lack of unity of command.

Cooperation

The assessment criterion of cooperation describes the collective efforts of contingent forces to provide mutual support toward a common goal. Units of a contingent are normally expected to reinforce one another, thereby increasing combat effectiveness. The commander commits his forces to take advantage of amassing unique capabilities to achieve a synergistic effect. Cooperation does not reflect on a single commander's ability to direct activity but focuses on the willingness of a unit to contribute to the efforts of another unit.

To begin, the UN coalition was a combination of national contingents that did not promote unity from a historical perspective. In some respects, it is unfortunate that the Pakistanis were given the responsibility for securing the Mogadishu sector. This HRS had the highest probability for hostile action due to the large population and the broad support for two rivals, Aideed and Ali Mahdi. There was conflict between the Pakistanis and more coalition partners than with any other coalition, and particularly in this sector, cooperation among member nations was most critical. For example, the Egyptian force refused to subordinate its troops to the Pakistani brigade commander.²

A majority of the cooperation issues faced in the UN coalition centered around the force protection capabilities of coalition forces.
There was a reluctance to send one's contingent unless there was armor reinforcement in the operation. Also, the security provided by U.S. attack helicopters came to be seen as a necessity prior to commitment of forces. Following the 3 October attack on the Rangers, President Clinton criticized the UN and the coalition, stating that the UNOSOM II mission had

"deteriorated" since the United States handed it over to the international agency . . . "This didn't happen to us when we had 28,000 troops there and we could control the situation" and that the quality of troops of other nations was insufficient . . . ."
The people who have come in to replace the United States forces are doing the best they can, I'm sure," but too many are afraid to venture outside "their own areas and don't exactly follow orders."  

These harsh criticisms by the President of the United States probably did not help the UN effort in the long run. It is true that casualties may have been avoided if contingent cooperation had included aggressive reinforcement of coalition partners and continuous pressure against hostile forces. But to have a head of state doubt the efforts of a military coalition in an extremely precarious situation did little to promote unity of effort. The prerequisite here for cooperative effort, as described previously in chapter two, was mutual respect.

In general, the commitment of U.S. forces throughout the UNOSOM II effort was the backbone of the coalition. Command relationships made it more difficult to respond in a timely manner, perhaps, but the reliance on American warfighting capabilities and show of force was the impetus required for continued coalition participation. The incident in Kismayo on 6 May, immediately following the transition to UNOSOM II, in which a U.S. QRF response was requested after a Somali uprising, suggests the obstacle to unity of command of American forces. Recall
that in this case, the Belgians were reinforced only after the USFORSM commander received permission from CINCCENT to use the QRF to assume the security mission in Kismayo while the Belgian force performed the additional required task of reconnaissance of outlying areas.

Parallel Chain of Command Conflict

Each coalition force and each component of the U.S. force that arrived in Somalia participated in the mission in support of its country's national interests. Every contingent was subordinate to a national authority, and each force operated within the bounds of a national chain of command. Parallel conflict refers to the fact that forces will always answer first to their national command structures before taking direction from a United Nations or another external chain of command. For U.S. forces this was no different. Units supported a command structure from the NCA to the supported Commander in Chief CINCCENT to the commander in Somalia. However, defining the local on-scene commander was the contentious factor in U.S. unity of command.

Military units generally expect to operate under a very short and clear chain of command. During UNOSOM II operations, one would have expected Major General Montgomery, as USFORSM commander, to be the senior commander in the U.S. chain. Of course, because he was dual hatted as the deputy UN force commander, this opened the door for his total authority over American forces to be questioned. CINCCENT was unable to resolve the conflict of integrating a U.S. chain of command within the UN chain of command.
Coalition national authorities, including the U.S. NCA, had debilitating effects on the UN force commander's authority to command forces. Especially with the escalation of violence in Mogadishu during the summer months, contingents sought permission from their capitals prior to accepting tasks assigned by the UN command. Some contingents turned the blame not on the part of national authorities but on the indecisiveness of the UN Headquarters in New York to present a clear strategic plan for bringing Aideed to justice. The Pakistanis, taking much of the heat for problems in Mogadishu, emphasized:

After each of those major encounters . . . Aideed was on the verge of defeat but the UN civilian officials called off military action for fear it was becoming internationally unpopular.

Likewise, the Italians had requested permission in June to arrest Aideed, but the request was denied pending investigation of the circumstances surrounding the 5 June attack. The effects of the UN as a political entity played a large role in how the UN force commander was allowed to direct operations. The "bureaucratic infighting and inertia at the UN" precluded concise strategic direction for Lieutenant General Bir and Major General Montgomery to act upon.

For U.S. forces, the chain of command that ran through CINCCENT heavily outweighed the authority of the USFORSOM commander to affect UN support operations. Whether it was American arrogance or a lack of confidence in the coalition's capabilities, command over U.S. combat forces resided further and further away from UN control. Following the disestablishment of UNITAF, the QRF was for all practical purposes not a component of the UN operational effort. Command of the QRF remained with CINCCENT except in privileged circumstances in which USFORSOM had
TACON. An HRS commander could not retain TACON of the Quick Reaction Force.

Additionally, control of SOF units remained outside Montgomery's purview. In fact, the use of SOF assets throughout the UNOSOM II period was never consolidated under a single command. Command relationships of SOF forces were unclear, although they operated in numerous HRSSs. SOF contingents performed autonomous operations from Mombasa; TF Ranger's chain of command excluded the deputy UN commander; and the JSOTF that "accompanied" JTF Somalia's mission was distinct to CENTCOM. The effort required to understand, coordinate, and synchronize the actions of these individual players exceeded the abilities of the UN staff. The senior U.S. commander was not allowed to question operations in a timely fashion and had little, if any, input into their operations prior to their execution. The tremendous capabilities that the SOF units brought to Somalia were lost to the USFORSOM and UN commanders.

Certainly the Terms of Reference delineated by CINCCENT did not promote unity of command for anyone other than himself and he was half a world away. The lack of unity manifested itself in difficulties in logistics and intelligence support as well as response of combat forces to coalition needs. Unity of command was hindered by the USFORSOM commander's inability to call on contingent forces without first reading the rules to see if the current situation fit the structure. There were too many bosses and not enough cohesion. As the months went on, common ground between coalition objectives and contingent interests disappeared.
Contingent Support of the UN Mission

The changing mission in Somalia played a critical role in achieving military cooperation from national contingents. What began as a security effort in support of NGO activity evolved to disbanding Somali checkpoints and disarming locals of heavy and light weapons. Nations participated in response to UN mandate and within their interpretations of those objectives. National command authorities may have given the direction for forces to act, and escalating violence may have reinforced this direction, but the changing military mission was the underlying impetus for a lack of unity of effort among UN forces and for the lack of American unity of command.

Several factors relating to support by a contingent force included support of new UNSC resolutions, objections to command relationships, and differing national priorities. Forces arrived in country expecting to participate in certain ways to carry out the specific UN resolution that initiated the need for a military response. As additional mandates were accepted by the Security Council, UN Headquarters expectations of what the military component should do did not align with the original intentions of many national contingents. The rules were changing in ways that the current players were unwilling to enforce. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's longstanding desire to expand the UN's involvement in Somalia as a nation builder was gradually being realized by successively stronger resolutions, but at the expense of a cohesive coalition.

The sequence of UN resolutions began with UNSCR 751 in April 1992, seeking international intervention, followed in December with
UNSCR 794 requesting U.S. military action. Other key mandates included the resolution establishing UNOSOM II and then the one calling for the arrest of Aideed. The message gradually shifted from a defensive mindset to one of offensive action. The contributing nations failed to achieve a consensus on the objectives for their military effort, and the UN force commander was not able to break through the isolationist, "take care of your own sector" mentality that developed. As the end state became less clear, more contingents responded to a call for action by questioning the objectives and whether or not it was the coalition's mission to perform the desired task.

Another factor that made mission support difficult was the command structure of the UN organization, or in the case of the U.S., the command and control relationships of American forces. The Italians were concerned about being TACON to the Pakistani brigade commander in Mogadishu. The Italian contingent agreed to perform the assigned mission only if under Italian command. French and Moroccan forces participated outside their assigned sectors only when OPCON to the UN force commander, because they refused to subordinate their forces to an HRS commander. The same can be said of U.S. forces. This only resulted in overburdening the UN staff.

The ways in which the American forces were structured reinforced the attitude toward command relationships of the rest of the coalition. Each nation appeared to be in it for themselves. Every U.S. contingent force was in it for itself. Each American contingent was to have only one boss, and in most cases that boss was in Florida. CINCCENT's control over the QRF, the SOF forces (including TF Ranger), JTF Somalia,
and the Naval forces afloat effectively moved the senior commander of forces in Somalia from Montgomery's tent to Hoar's office. There was no senior U.S. officer with any common authority in Somalia.

The dynamic situation on the streets of Mogadishu required an on-scene commander of U.S. troops. The command structure did not allow this. Missions were not integrated, and therefore, mission success was not achieved. Chains of command were unclear to the man on the ground. Units were unsure of their roles in relation to other UN forces. The USFORSOM commander did not have unity of command of American units and did not have the capacity to use their combat capabilities in support of the UN effort.

Staff Liaison

The commander's staff performs many of the aspects of control and coordination that affect command. Particularly in a multinational environment the staff is the nucleus for liaison between contingents, resulting in more effective planning, synchronization, and simply gaining an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of the other forces available. Staff participation overcomes differences in training and doctrine. Proper staffwork allows for the ideal of centralized planning and decentralized execution.

The staff employed by the UNITAF headquarters was a fairly homogeneous collection of officers and liaison officers built around the large I MEF staff. With the coming of the UN command in May 1993, Lieutenant General Bir's staff was more of an ad hoc organization. Of course, it was to have a more international flavor than its predecessor,
with the deputy force commander and operations officer being the most prominent Americans. These considerations, in combination with the fact that contingents required the staff to retain tactical control over operations in many instances, caused the staff's limitations to be exceeded in quick order. The staff simply did not have the expertise to perform the tactical level analysis that should have been kept at the HRS command level.

A contingent staff was obliged to integrate itself into the UN way of operating. Foreign troops had to be evaluated and folded into the effort. Liaison was vital to achieving mutual understanding of the mission assigned and of mutual support that could be anticipated from a force. The ROE had to be understood and accepted by each coalition partner, or differences had to be made public so that the extent of reinforcement could be known. The acceptance of command structures was critical prior to the execution of maneuvers that could lead to potentially hostile reactions. Moreover, liaison was always prudent to clarify the commander's intent and to hear the foreign commander's interpretation of his mission.

The USFORSOM commander had forty-seven staff officers assisting him in the UN military headquarters. Not all had the benefit of being in Somalia at the time of the transition from UNITAF, and not all benefitted from the "staff twinning" process. A generalization is that staffs are always "economy of force" entities, in which there is never the right mix of operational and tactical expertise. In the case of the staff elements of subsequently arriving American units, it often appeared that an assumption had been made that the incoming force could
augment itself with personnel from staffs already in Somalia. Repeatedly, TF Ranger, JTF Somalia, and the JSOTF staffs relied on the intelligence, logistics, civil affairs, and liaison expertise of the USFORSOM staff and UN Logistics Support Command.

Many staff elements were tasked with operations that exceeded their designed capabilities. Particularly during UNITAF missions, the Tenth Mountain division staff in Somalia, also acting as the ARFOR, was heavily burdened, often with international coalition concerns or political responsibilities. Similarly, the Quick Reaction Force was task organized into a combat unit with capabilities that exceeded an infantry or aviation battalion staff's normal ability to integrate armor units as well. During UNOSOM II, staffs were part of independent American units and did not have the necessary mindset to integrate their operations with UN forces. If they had been more aware of the international implications of operating in the proximity of these contingents, the planning process and liaison may have been more deliberate.

The independent nature of TF Ranger and JTF Somalia did not put a great deal of emphasis on the coordination and synchronization aspects of their respective staffs. Likewise, the staff of the USFORSOM commander was not privileged in most circumstances to participate in their operations. Finally, the command relationships that CENTCOM retained over the JSOTF and Amphibious Ready Group left a preponderance of staffwork to be done outside the theater of operations.
Summary

Did the UN have unity of effort during UNOSOM II operations?

No. Was there unity of command among U.S. contingent forces in Somalia?

No. Preserving unity of command and achieving unity of effort with military forces are paramount to mission success. During UNOSOM II operations, there were many disconnects between the command structures of UN forces with American forces and among U.S. forces themselves that caused confusion and distracted from the accomplishment of assigned tasks. Unity of effort for the UN force commander would have given him the ability to directly influence planning and execution. A clear political strategy and a consensus on military objectives were critical for the UN military command. Once a coalition military force arrives in theater as part of a United Nations effort, it must answer to that single individual responsible for achieving the mandated objectives.

The United States was no better in its ability to draw up clear chains of command. Command of individual units was dispersed between a geographic Commander in Chief located in Florida and various general officers in Somalia. Command of some units went through the UN deputy commander because he was the senior U.S. commander, while OPCON and TACON of units introduced later were kept separate from this U.S. officer. Clearly, there were breakdowns in logistics support, operational planning, staffing and liaison, and mutual support in combat that resulted directly from the ineffective command relationships that existed among U.S. forces.

Unity of command of military forces must be retained by the senior on-scene commander. In the case of UNOSOM II, that senior
commander was Major General Montgomery. Montgomery was in a position to
directly influence the role of American forces in the UN mission. He
was the commander who was in the best position to assimilate available
intelligence information, to be familiar with the political
undercurrents of UN Headquarters in New York, and to understand the
status of coalition partners.

Unity of effort during United Nations operations will always
require a certain amount of trust and confidence in the senior commander
from the contributing national authorities. Concern here is
understandable. However, American command structures can do more to
ensure unity of command within U.S. forces. The CINC cannot undermine
the authority of the force commander he assigns to the theater as on-
scene commander. The theater commander must be given operational
control (OPCON) of all component forces. Unity of command is what
American troops expect, and unity of command allows them to have the
best opportunity for success. This did not happen in Somalia and is a
major contributing factor to the failed actions there.

This research concludes with some topics that are outside the
scope of this thesis but demand further attention. The United States
will find itself again in the position to subordinate military troops to
a foreign commander. What will it take for Americans to feel
comfortable with this idea? Until another military force is able to
achieve the status and respect that the U.S. enjoys today, will American
commanders ever entrust their troops TACON or OPCON to a foreign UN
command? The U.S. mindset exhibits a lack of confidence in other
commanders, and the American arrogance forces the NCA and CINCs either
to seek leadership positions in multinational coalitions or to refuse to participate altogether.

Second, the UN must overcome its political "inertia" and allow its military component to perform its mandated mission unhindered. Nations that cannot constructively contribute to the military effort must be constrained from participation when UN resolutions seek military solutions. National contingent forces must be told "No" if they cannot enhance the military capabilities of the coalition. Moreover, the UN must focus on the diplomatic efforts and negotiations that coincide with military intervention to allow the UN Force Command to remain impartial when required. Asking the military component to perform State Department functions as well is not optimum for conflict resolution.

Third, UN missions must be feasible in a fiscally constrained world. The decision must be made early as to whether or not success is achievable in a timely manner and whether the mission is vital to international security or humanitarian interests. Military intervention must not occur prior to laying the groundwork of determining what diplomatic, economic, or military effort can have a positive impact on the situation. Determining the criteria for intervention is critical.

Finally, are there times when a unilateral action by a United States military force will be preferable to the multinational effort that is becoming the standard solution to today's problems? Doctrine is shifting to suggest that if joint operations are good then combined operations are better. Yet because U.S. military capabilities are significantly better than most, would it not simplify unity of effort and unity of command to go it alone? Would the rest of the world not
understand if the U.S. were to suggest that better results could be achieved without thirty nations and forty-nine NGOs? Of course, it is always best to divide financial responsibility for military operations, but to increase the risk of failure when the price is American lives may not be the best trade off.

Achieving unity of effort in an international coalition is of critical importance. There are many variables that will affect that objective, most being outside the influence of American military commanders. However, structuring command relationships between U.S. contingent forces that result in unity of command is directly impacted by the geographic Commander in Chief and must be a priority. To not provide our troops with unity of command in the theater is inexcusable.
Endnotes


3Ibid., 145.

3Ann Devroy and John Lancaster, "Clinton to Add 1,500 Troops in Somalia, Considers a March 31 Withdrawal Date," The Washington Post, 7 October 1993, A38.

4UN New York Code Cable from the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subj: UNOSOM II Troop Contributors Meeting of 21 July 1993, 4.


8Nemeth, 21.

9Fragmentation Order Number 39 to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, 101400C June 1993, 1.
UNOSOM II

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (4 MAY 93)

UNSG

SRSG

UN FORCE CDR

BELGIAN BDE HQ

FRENCH BDE HQ

ITALIAN BDE HQ

PAKISTANI BDE HQ

INDIAN BDE HQ

SEPARATE UNITS

upon arrival

Figure 3. UNOSOM II Organization. Source: UNOSOM II OPLAN 1 021200C May 1993, Annex J, Appendix 1.
Figure 4. UNITAF Organization. Source: US Department of the Army. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1993): Appendix D.
Figure 5. UNITAF Command Structure. Source: Outline Plan for COMUNITAF OPLAN 2, 9 March 1993, Annex E, Appendix 1.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Figure 6. Operation Restore Hope ARFOR Organization. Source: US Department of the Army. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1993): Appendix E.
UNOSOM Command Structure

Figure 7. The UN Chain of Command for UNOSOM II. Source: General Montgomery, "U.S. Forces Somalia," Lecture delivered to the U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1994.
 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING UNITAF TRANSITION

COMMAND Equivalent to U.S. term OPCON

Figure 8. Command Relationships during UNITAF Transition. Source: Outline Plan for COMUNITAF OPLAN 2, 9 March 1993, Annex E.
UNOSOM II AND USFORSOM

U.S. FORCES SOMALIA STRUCTURE

Figure 11. Transition in QRF Command and Control. Source: 10th Mountain Division Task Force Mountain miscellaneous notes. Subject: "Operation Restore Hope" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1993).
APPENDIX A

United Nations Operations
Under Chapter VI and Chapter VII

Peacekeeping operations are specified under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, whereas Chapter VII refers to peace enforcement. The use of military force during peace enforcement operations is one of the main differences between the United Nations Charter and its predecessor, the League of Nations. Since 1948, the UN has been involved in over thirty peacekeeping operations while enforcement has been used in only a few instances.¹

The following articles are derived from the UN Charter and illustrate the basis for collective action taken by the United Nations. Responsibility for mandating peace enforcement operations rests with the UN Security Council.

**Chapter VI Pacifc Settlement of Disputes**

**Article 33**

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

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Chapter VII Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 39

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

Article 41

"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."

Article 42

"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

In addition, Article 46 calls for the Security Council to develop plans in using armed force with the assistance of a Military
Staff Committee (MSC). Article 47 details the Terms of Reference of this MSC, to include command relationships and the strategic employment of forces.
APPENDIX B

USFORSON Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference for U.S. Forces in Somalia directed the following command relationships:

USCINCCECENT retains command of USFORSON and delegates operational, tactical, and/or administrative control of USFORSON as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

USCINCCECENT exercises command of USFORSON through the Commander, USFORSON, who is dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II.

USCINCCECENT retains operational control of the quick reaction force (QRF) and intelligence support element (ISE).

Commander, USFORSON has administrative control of USFORSON.

Specific command relationships not outlined in the TOR will be coordinated between Commander, UNOSOM II; Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II; and USCINCCECENT. USCINCCECENT retains final approval authority for all command relations involving US forces.

Personnel assigned to the support force [consisting of US personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II staff, US military combat service, and combat service support personnel] will be under the operational control of the Commander, UNOSOM II, through the Commander, USFORSON, and also serve as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II.

Tactical control of the QRF is delegated from USCINCCECENT to Commander, USFORSON, in the following situations:

Deployment for normal unit training exercises within Somalia.

Situations within Somalia that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forces and require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or for show-of-force operations.
QRF tasking outside of the above guidelines requires explicit USCINCENT approval. However, when a situation arises requiring immediate action and prior approval is impossible or impracticable, the Commander, USFORSUM, is authorized to make the execution decision.

The ISE assets will remain under the supervision and control of the US at all times. Consistent with US releasibility requirements, the ISE will directly support UNOSOM II operations.
APPENDIX C

The OPCON Relationship in Transition
From UNITAF to UNOSOM II

The following excerpt is taken from the Commander UNITAF Outline Plan for COMUNITAF OPLAN 2 explaining restrictions in the command of U.S. forces during the transition to UNOSOM II operations:

(2) UNITAF U.S. Forces. Upon disestablishment of the UNITAF, residual U.S. forces in Somalia will be designated U.S. Contingent Somalia under the command of the Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II (Commander, U.S. contingent). COMUNOSOM II will exercise command of the U.S. contingent through his deputy commander.

(a) The degree of authority COMUNOSOM II exercises over U.S. forces is a restricted form of the U.S. relationship OPCON and is authority to:

1. Establish authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations necessary to accomplish mission assigned UNOSOM II.

2. Employ forces as COMUNOSOM II deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

3. Assign command functions.

4. Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of forces.

5. Establish a system of local defense and delineate areas of responsibility as deemed desirable.

6. Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibility.
7 Prescribe the chain of command within UNOSOM II.

8 Organize commands and forces within UNOSOM II to carry out UNOSOM II missions.

(b) COMUNOSOM II will not have the authority to:

1 Establish authoritative direction for internal logistics, discipline, administration, internal organization, or unit training.

(c) U.S. Contingent Somalia will consist of a Logistical Support Command.

(d) U.S. Army and Naval forces OPCON to USCINCCENT.

1 The USCENTCOM Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and a U.S. Army force will be designated as the Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to be employed as an emergency force in support of UNOSOM II when the military capabilities of UNOSOM II are exceeded.

2 The QRFs will be committed by USCINCCENT to support UNOSOM II on a case-by-case basis when directed by the National Command Authority. If QRFs are committed, the COMUNOSOM II authority over the QRF is limited to exercising general direction of forces, to include designation of targets and objectives, time and duration of the supporting action, and other necessary instructions.

3 In each case where the QRF is committed a mutually agreed-upon establishing directive will be published and include, as a minimum, the following:

- a Strength of QRF allocated.
- b Place, time, and duration of the commitment.
- c Priority of mission relative to other ARG missions.
- d Authority of the QRF to depart from its mission in the event of an emergency elsewhere.
- e The general or special authority of COMUNOSOM II to issue operational or other instructions.
Endnotes


3INCA Assessment, 1-21.

4Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, April 1993.

5Outline Plan for COMUNITAF OPLAN 2, 9 March 1993, E-3 to E-4.
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