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ARMOR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JEAN T. MALONE, JR., MAJOR, USMC
B.A., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1996

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ABSTRACT

ARMOR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by Maj Jean T. Malone, USMC,
217 pages.

This study investigates the role of armor in military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW missions are likely to be the most prevalent operations conducted in the foreseeable future by the U.S. military. Consequently, it is important that the military understands which forces to use in MOOTW and how to use those forces effectively. The U.S. will probably not be able to devote specific units to train and execute MOOTW missions. Therefore, the forces that are trained and assigned to regular combat contingency plans will also be those forces that carry out MOOTW. Armored units of different types comprise a significant portion of the forces available to the United States. These forces will likely be used when the United States commits forces to MOOTW. Consequently, it is important to determine whether or not armor can be effective in MOOTW. If it can be effective, then what is the best way to employ it to enhance its usefulness to the force as a whole?

To determine whether armor can be effective in MOOTW, this study will examine the use of armor in some relatively recent MOOTW conducted by United States forces. The three operations studied in detail are the Marine mission in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984, the "intervacion" in Haiti in 1994, and the use of armor to control Cuban refugee camps in Panama. The use of armor in these three missions is analyzed and the missions are compared to each other. Additionally, the missions are compared to United States armored operations in Panama during 1989. This operation is used as a comparison because of the wide range of missions conducted by armor throughout the period. This includes the MOOTW missions prior to operation Just Cause and those conducted after the combat portion concluded. In addition, the doctrine available on the use of armor in MOOTW is cited as it relates to the operations conducted by armor in the case studies.

The study concludes that armor is effective in MOOTW. To be effective in these operations it is important that military commanders understand how to employ the armor assigned to their forces. Armor can be very useful in executing MOOTW, but employed indiscriminately or improperly, it can be a liability. The study recommends that combined arms be used in MOOTW and that the use of armor in MOOTW be added to doctrine.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO.</td>
<td>U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, 1982-1984</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE.</td>
<td>OPERATION SAFE HAVEN</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR.</td>
<td>OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (MARINES)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE.</td>
<td>OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (ARMY)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX.</td>
<td>ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMOR IN MOOTW</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE. MAP OF LEBANON</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO. MAP OF BEIRUT</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE. MAP OF PANAMA</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR. MAP OF HAITI</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE. MAP OF CAP-HAITIEN</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX. BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEVEN. M-551 SHERIDAN</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIGHT. M-1A1</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NINE. LAV-25</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN. M-60A1</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEVEN. AAV-7</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWELVE. M-113 APC</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAV - Assault Amphibian Vehicle
ACE - Armored Combat Engineer Vehicle
AO - Area of Operations
APC - Armored Personnel Carrier
APDST - Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot Tracer
AVLB - Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
BCT - Brigade Combat Team
Bde - Brigade
BFV - Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BLT - Battalion Landing Team
Bn - Battalion
BP - Battle Position
CALL - Center for Army Lessons Learned
CINCUSACOM - Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force
Co - Company
CO - Commanding Officer
FAD'H - Force Armee d' Haiti
Ft - Fort
HEIT - High Explosive Incendiary Tracer
HMMWV - High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
ID - Infantry Division
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRTO - Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF - Joint Task Force
LAF - Lebanese Armed Forces
LAR - Light Armored Reconnaissance
LAV - Light Armored Vehicle
LIC - Low Intensity Conflict
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAU - Marine Amphibious Unit
Mech - Mechanized
METL - Mission Essential Task List
MEU - Marine Expeditionary Unit
MNF - Multinational Force
MOOTW - Military Operations Other Than War
MOUT - Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MP - Military Police
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA - National Command Authority
NEO - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NGO - Nongovernmental Organization
OOTW - Operations Other Than War
PDF - Panamanian Defense Force
PL - Phase Line
PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organization
PVO - Private Volunteer Organization
QRF - Quick Reaction Force
ROE - Rules of Engagement

RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

S-2 - Intelligence

S-3 - Operations

S-4 - Logistics

SF - Special Forces

SOP - Standard Operating Procedure

SOC - Special Operations Capable

SOUTHCOM - Southern Command

SPMAGTF - Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

TF - Task Force

Tm - Team

TOC - Tactical Operations Center

TOW - Tube launched, Optically Sighted, Wire Guided antitank missile

TPT - Target Practice Tracer

UN - United Nations

USMC - United States Marine Corps

USCINCSO - United States Commander in Chief South
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Definition of the Problem

Background

From 1945 to 1989 the United States military, and in particular the Army, focused primarily on the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union in the European continent. The competition between the two countries and the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union made Europe the most logical area for a direct confrontation. The anticipated nature of this conflict caused the United States to design its forces in a certain way to meet the challenge. The fall of the Soviet Union caused this paradigm to change. No longer could the United States focus the bulk of its forces on one small area of the world as the major security threat. The main premise that was the foundation for the Army's, and to a lesser extent the Navy and Air Force's, force structure, size, equipment procurement, training, and doctrine no longer exists.

The composition, size, and doctrine of the Soviet Armed Forces drove the way the United States structured and trained its forces. The Soviet Armed Forces were geared to the strategic offensive. Their Navy provided little in the way of global reach for heavy Army forces. However, facing the United States and allied forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) across the inter-German border was a massive, highly mobile, mechanized force that was built around the tank
and infantry fighting vehicle. A typical Soviet motor-rifle division contained 287 tanks, 150 infantry combat vehicles, and 221 armored personnel carriers. A tank division had 341 tanks and 232 infantry combat vehicles. These divisions were combined to form two types of armies, all-arms armies, and tank armies. An all-arms army included 1,151 tanks, 832 infantry combat vehicles, and 1,100 armored personnel carriers. A tank army had 1,416 tanks and 993 infantry combat vehicles. These armies were then combined to form fronts. Each front would have two all-arms armies and one tank army giving them a total of up to 5,600 tanks, 3,000 infantry combat vehicles, and 3,000 armored personnel carriers each. The Soviets had about 41 of these armies that could be called on to either defend the country or launch an attack into the West. The Soviet strategy for war was predicated on the offensive. They planned to hit hard, fast, and in overwhelming force.

The West knew the structure of the Soviet forces and their proposed plan of attack. Consequently, from 1945 to 1989 the United States planned and organized its forces to fight the Soviets and win. The United States maintained a large standing army and stationed much of it overseas, close to the anticipated sites of military action. America formed alliances with other countries and structured forces around complementing capabilities. The United States Army based its organization on the heavy division. In the latest configuration of the heavy division the tank was the centerpiece, supported by infantry fighting vehicles, mobile artillery, and air power. The firepower, armor, and mobility inherent in tanks would allow the heavy divisions to maneuver and trading space for time and casualties, to defeat the Soviet
threat. The equipment for the force was constructed for action within
the European theater and the organization of the force for the
anticipated enemy. The Army was trained to fight in large formations,
and supporting organizations were formed to supply and maintain these
units. Many of the support functions were consolidated at higher levels
for economy and efficiency. Platoons, companies, battalions, and even
brigades and divisions rarely operated on their own and were perpetually
surrounded by larger and still larger units.

The Army that fought and won the Cold War is faced with a new
challenge. Today there is an increasing requirement for a force capable
of addressing a more diverse threat across the operational continuum.
Global contingency response is the most probable mission for the future.
Although in sheer numbers contingency missions have been far more likely
than war throughout United States history, the main threat to the
security of the United States was seen as total war with the main enemy,
the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States, and the Army in
particular, focused on high-intensity conflict. In order to deal with
this dichotomy, the theory in the Army was that a force trained and
ready to participate in high-intensity conflict was capable of handling
any lower level contingency operation. With the fall of the Soviet
Union, and recent contingency experience, this theory has come under
intense scrutiny. Currently, with the likelihood of high-intensity
conflict growing more distant, the idea of focusing on the lower level
contingency mission is getting more attention. "In the 1990s and
beyond, the United States will have to rely even more on rapid
The threat today can be in almost any portion of the globe and against a foe equipped with the latest technology or one with relatively primitive weapons. Many third world countries have been upgrading and expanding their armed forces. It is quite possible that an opponent could be equipped with thousands of armored vehicles and an army with hundreds of thousands of men. However, the more likely scenario is that the United States will need to respond to a contingency operation against a third world country whose armed forces are not a significant threat to the U.S. military. This scenario will probably be an action short of total war on the part of the United States, and may fall into the category of military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The challenge facing the United States Military is to adapt the armed forces that were so successful in the Cold War to the current threat. This is not to say that the need for heavy tanks and heavy divisions has passed. It has not. Desert Storm is an excellent example of the continuing need, and effectiveness, of heavy divisions. Desert Storm-like contingencies could be very possible in the future. Consequently, the need to maintain forces to fight heavy force battles is a must. Considering that the more frequent anticipated use of American forces in the near future will involve small regional contingencies, the question becomes how can these same forces be used effectively in MOOTW.

The missions that fall under MOOTW are many and varied. The threat is not the same as that presented by the Soviet Union and much
less easy to template. Many contingency situations will be highly complex and reflect regional values, history, culture, and religion. There may not be a readily identifiable foe or even a definite "right" or "wrong" side to identify. MOOTW operations are often very political situations with highly restrictive rules of engagement and close oversight by civilian authorities. This does not lend itself to resolution with conventional military operations.

As part of the examination of American military capabilities in MOOTW, this study will focus on the use of armored forces in MOOTW operations. Since its introduction in World War I, the tank has played a major part in almost every American conflict. On several occasions its capability to contribute was called into question, and it had to be proved effective in action. In the past most of these questions centered around terrain and support, could a tank operate in close terrain and could sufficient supply support be provided to tanks in close terrain environments?

In World War II the Marine Corps was initially reluctant to use tanks in the island campaigns due to the nature of the terrain and the overall size of the land area. By the Okinawa battle, however, Major General Lemuel Shepherd, Commanding General of the 6th Marine Division said, "If any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than any others during the campaign, the tank would certainly be selected."4

In the Vietnam War the same miscalculation was made by the Army. During the initial buildup of forces in Vietnam, General William C.
Westmoreland saw no need for armored forces and did not request any be provided. Later on he changed his opinion saying:

The ability of mechanized cavalry to operate effectively in the Vietnamese countryside convinced me that I was mistaken in a belief that modern armor had only a limited role in the fighting in Vietnam. Roads were poor, many bridges were too weak to support tanks, rice paddies constituted muddy morasses, much of the country was mountainous jungle impenetrable by tanks, and if armored vehicles churned up crops, we alienated the people we were trying to support. Yet much of the land was in fact solid terrain, and roads and bridges could be improved to accommodate tanks. While their use among the rice paddies and mountainous jungle would be limited, their firepower and psychological impact elsewhere would be reason enough to employ them. Thus it was with enthusiasm that in September 1966 I welcomed arrival of the first armored unit equipped with the big Patton tank.

By the end of the war, however, many armored units, both tank and cavalry, were operating in Vietnam with great success.

In considering forces for participation in MOOTW missions, the same type of intuitive reasoning used to initially discard tanks and armored vehicles from the Pacific and Vietnam campaigns may be used again. Tanks and armored vehicles are viewed as massively destructive weapons, mounting heavy firepower, and best employed in mass over open terrain. This is an accurate view and fits in exactly with American doctrine of how to employ armored units. Because neither the Pacific or Vietnam theaters provided areas that allowed this doctrinal use of armor, it was concluded that tanks and armored units could not be effective. This conclusion was proven wrong.

In MOOTW missions the doctrinal use of armor in mass formations, striking deep against the enemy rear, and destroying everything in its path, is not seen as necessary or even desirable. (There is doctrine for use of armor in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and other less common missions, but the most well-known and practiced
doctrine for armor is in mass formations.) This may cause armor forces
to be ignored when force lists for MOOTW missions are created. The
decision not to use armor because the prevailing doctrinal employment
concept is inapplicable may be just as wrong in the future as it was for
the Pacific and Vietnam campaigns.

An examination of the uses of armor in MOOTW is necessary in
order to determine whether or not it has a place in forces assigned to
these missions. This paper will conduct that examination using four
recent historical examples of armor in MOOTW situations. These four
examples provide a wide range of missions in which armor was involved.
By studying these a conclusion can be drawn as to whether armor can be
effectively employed in MOOTW.

The first example is the U.S. Marine intervention in Lebanon
from 1982 to 1984. This example shows the evolving nature of MOOTW
operations and the requirement to constantly assess the mission and
forces necessary to carry it out. Initially the Marines went into
Lebanon to conduct a rescue of U.S. and foreign nationals from the
Beirut area in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and drive
on Beirut. Following that, Marines, along with French and Italian
troops, landed to guarantee the safe passage of Palestine Liberation
Organization fighters from Beirut. These missions fit nicely into the
MOOTW spectrum and were performed successfully by the Marines.

The next mission assigned to the Marines in Lebanon has been the
source of a great deal of discussion and controversy. That mission was
stated as "presence." It does not fit nicely into one of the MOOTW
categories of missions, and yet it was certainly a military operation
other than war. The Commandant of the Marine Corps described the mission in this way:

Our Marines are situated in the middle of Beirut International Airport—this is a highly active commercial airport—the international terminal for a country of over three million people. We are there as guests not invaders, so our facilities are provided in coordination with the Lebanese government.

Picture, if you will, the commercial activity at this airport—people cars, trucks, major new construction, repair, new drainage systems under construction. This is a civilian environment, a hub-bub of activity by civilians, not military.

It is not a tactical strong point as some may envision. Our mission is not, in a direct sense, the physical security of the airport—that specific mission is assigned to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Our basic mission is presence, and the logical question is—how do you define presence. Well, first let me tell you that presence as a mission is not in any military dictionary. It is not a classic military mission.

But the chain of command at the time correctly took presence to mean—be visible—provide a backdrop of U.S. presence which would be conducive to the stability of Lebanon—a sovereign Nation with a duly constituted government. I guess the best description is that we are a visible manifestation of U.S. strength and resolve to Lebanon and to the free world

The Marine forces involved in Lebanon were a succession of Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs). (The Marine Corps has since renamed the MAU to Marine Expeditionary Unit, or MEU.) The ground forces of a MAU are built around an infantry battalion. The armored forces attached to this battalion consisted of a platoon of M60A1 tanks and a platoon of assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs). During the operation in Lebanon the Marine forces conducted offensive and defensive operations, humanitarian missions, show of force, and training missions. The use of armored forces in these missions will be examined to determine their effectiveness and utility as part of the overall force.

The second example is the use of Panama as a holding area for Cuban refugees. Fidel Castro, in a political move designed to embarrass the United States, removed the restrictions on emigration of Cubans to
America, and set off a wave of refugees attempting to enter the United States. The United States decided that acceptance of these refugees onto U.S. soil was not in the country's best interest. Consequently, permission was obtained from Panama to set up a refugee holding center in Panama. The U.S. Army was responsible for the organization, administration, and security of operation Safe Haven. During this mission the Army found that the employment of armor was beneficial even with no possibility of combat. This example is worthy of examination as a mission on the very low end of the MOOTW scale where armor was utilized as part of the force list.

The third study will cover the United States "intervasion" in Haiti. In this operation a permissive invasion was conducted in order to restore a democratically elected president to power. The Haiti campaign differs from Lebanon in that little actual fighting took place. Resistance to American forces was minimal, and the major effort was directed towards restoring the government as a functioning entity. Initially, military forces were used to threaten the controlling dictatorship and to convince them to voluntarily resign from leadership of the country. Once this occurred, the military helped create a stable environment in which the government could operate to regain control of the country.

The forces involved in Haiti were mostly infantry and service support personnel. However, there were Marine light armored vehicles (LAVs) and assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs), along with Army Bradley fighting vehicles and Sheridan tanks deployed to the island. An examination of how armored forces were used in this low-threat
environment will show how well armored forces fit into a MOOTW mission involving almost no combat.

The United States operations in Panama in 1989 are used in this study as examples to compare with the three case studies that are reviewed in detail. The military operations in Panama showed an evolution in the MOOTW missions that were undertaken. The United States had forces permanently stationed in Panama in accordance with long-term agreements with the Panamanian government. Initially, additional forces were deployed to Panama to protect American military and civilian personnel stationed there and to assert U.S. treaty rights. As the situation in Panama continued to deteriorate, with harassment of Americans continuing, and the domestic situation worsening, the United States forces expanded their operations. These operations were designed to impress upon the Panamanian government the seriousness with which America took the situation and to bring about a modification of Panama's actions with respect to its own people and the United States. The focus of American efforts was to end the internal crises in Panama, hopefully without the direct use of United States forces. These efforts were unsuccessful and led to the invasion of Panama by conventional U.S. forces in strength. Finally, with the defeat of the regular Panamanian Defense Force units, U.S. forces turned to other MOOTW missions by assisting with the restoration of the infrastructure of the country and providing support to the elected government. These three phases provided a broad spectrum of MOOTW missions.

Before Operation Just Cause and during Operation Nimrod Dancer, American forces conducted freedom of movement exercises designed to
demonstrate American determination to enforce its treaty rights. In addition there were missions of protecting personnel and facilities. A number of training missions were conducted, including a significant number of live fire exercises. Finally, U.S. forces supported to a limited extent one of the two coup attempts against General Noriega, the military dictator of Panama.

The situation in Panama became ever more unstable, and on 16 December 1989, the trigger point for American action in Panama occurred with the death of First Lieutenant Robert Paz. First Lieutenant Paz, USMC was killed when Panamanian troops at a roadblock fired on his car.11 With this event the United States decided to intervene with military forces to emplace an elected government in Panama. During Operation Just Cause, open combat took place in Panama. Even so, the operations were different from those conducted during war. The rules of engagement and planning for the operation clearly reflected a MOOTW mission.

Concurrent with Operation Just Cause, the United States began Operation Promote Liberty. Promote Liberty had the following mission statement:

When directed by NCA, through CJCS, USCINCSO conducts joint civil affairs operations in the Republic of Panama to protect US lives and property; secures US interests; and ensures law and order and essential services in support of the civil administration of an interim duly constituted and recognized government of Panama.12

These missions were of a non-combat nature and focused on nation building (what would currently be called nation assistance) and restoring Panama as a viable entity.
The forces involved in the Panama missions were significantly larger than those in the Lebanon mission. Approximately 30,000 personnel participated in the Just Cause portion of the operation. Armored forces consisted of Sheridan tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, M113 personnel carriers, and Marine LAVs. These units conducted a wide variety of operations throughout each phase of the Panama mission. Comparing the missions conducted by the armored forces involved in Panama with the three case studies, should reveal a great deal about the effectiveness of armor in MOOTW.

Each military service is tasked with preparing its forces for war and operations other than war as appropriate. MOOTW will probably be the most frequent missions undertaken by American forces in the foreseeable future. These highly complex and varied missions will require trained and properly configured forces to carry them out successfully. Armored units make up a large percentage of the available combat forces in the United States military, and yet little doctrine or guidance exists as to how to use these units in a MOOTW environment. By studying the recent use of armored units in MOOTW missions, a conclusion can be drawn as to whether these units are effective. This will allow United States commanders to determine the proper mix of units for a particular MOOTW mission. The study may also be used to assist in the development of new doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for armored vehicles in MOOTW. Additionally, it may provide information that can be used to structure the armed forces in the future.
Definitions

In order to understand the framework for the discussion of the use of armored units in MOOTW it is necessary to define the terms that will be used in this study.

Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Army classifies its activities during peacetime and conflict as operations other than war. During peacetime, the U.S. attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives. Joint doctrine identifies these same activities as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

In FM 100-5, Operations, the Army identifies thirteen activities that fall under the MOOTW umbrella. These are noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids.

This study will deal with the following activities under the MOOTW umbrella: noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, and attacks and raids.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs): NEOs relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. These operations may involve US citizens whose lives are
in danger but could include selected host nation citizens or third country nationals.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief:** Humanitarian assistance operations use Department of Defense personnel, equipment, and supplies to promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, and to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man made disasters.

**Security Assistance:** Providing defense materiel, military training, and defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further national objectives.

**Peacekeeping Operations:** Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nations and as such, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its physical presence at violence-prone locations. It collects information through means such as observation posts, patrols, and aerial reconnaissance.

**Peace Enforcement:** Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to interventions and may be engaged in combat activities. Peace enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions.
**Show of Force:** A show of force is a mission carried out to demonstrate US resolve in which US forces deploy to defuse a situation that may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.

**Attacks and Raids:** The military conducts attacks and raids to create situations that permit seizing and maintaining political and military initiative. Normally, the US executes attacks and raids to achieve specific objectives other than gaining and holding terrain. Other key terms in this study are:

**Armored Vehicle:** For the purposes of this study an armored vehicle is any armored vehicle in which a crew is intended to fight from the vehicle. This includes tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and light-armored vehicles. It excludes trucks and other wheeled soft-skin vehicles. It is understood that some armored vehicles, such as light-armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers, have elements which dismount to fight. Despite this, the vehicle still retains a crew which fights the vehicle itself and therefore is included under the category of armored vehicles.

**Effective:** "Producing a definite or desired result. Making a striking impression; impressive. Effective is applied to that which produces a definite effect or result." Effectiveness in this study will be determined by a subjective evaluation of the circumstances and results surrounding particular incidents involving armor in each of the operation studied. For example, if a crowd is gathering and armor is dispatched to disperse it, and if the crowd does disperse when the armor arrives, then the armor would be judged to be effective.
Limitations and Delimitations

This study will examine only the operations in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984, Panamanian Refugee camps for Cubans, and Haiti in 1994 to determine the effectiveness of armor in MOOTW. These operations are relatively recent major MOOTW operations that are seen as representative of the operations that may be conducted in the future. Of the thirteen activities identified under the MOOTW umbrella, only those that anticipate the use of combat forces will be examined. This study focuses on the effectiveness of armor, consequently those missions that do not require the use of combat forces are not relevant.

Significance of the Study

The United States will face a continuing need to conduct MOOTW missions in the future. In order to be successful in these highly complex and varied missions, it may be beneficial to train and configure units to conduct MOOTW. By examining how armored forces were used in previous operations, a determination can be made as to whether they were effective or not. This can be further defined to determine which units or vehicles were more effective than others and what tactics or techniques were more effective than others. By answering these questions information can be gained that will help to determine the structure of American forces in the future, the types of units that are identified for MOOTW missions, possible force packages for MOOTW missions, and the training that needs to take place for the conduct of MOOTW missions.
Methods and Procedures

This study will examine the use of armored vehicles in an MOOTW environment in order to answer the question: Can armored units be effective in MOOTW? The answer to that question will be determined based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of the armored units employed in four historical situations. The operations in Lebanon, Panama, the Cuban refugee camp, and Haiti are recent examples of MOOTW and representative of the types of missions that could be assigned in the future. A detailed examination of armor employment in these operations should reveal whether armor has been effective in MOOTW scenarios.

To determine the effectiveness of armor it will be necessary to delineate the missions assigned to armor in these operations. Once the missions are identified, an analysis will be conducted to decide whether armor was successful in these missions. Subsidiary questions in the analysis include: What type of armored vehicle is most effective in MOOTW? Are different vehicles more suitable for specific missions? What tactics and techniques were effective for armored vehicles in MOOTW? What training can be conducted to enhance armor's effectiveness in MOOTW? What is the psychological impact of armor in MOOTW missions? Is the psychological impact different for friendly forces, local population, international community? Are armor forces supportable in a MOOTW environment? The answers to these questions should allow for an evaluation of armor's effectiveness in MOOTW. Each of the three scenarios will be compared to each other to determine common lessons learned on the use of armor. Additionally, specific incidents from
operations in Panama will be used to highlight points brought out in the

case studies. The aspects of each mission will be compared to determine

whether the experiences from one mission are applicable on a wide scale

or unique to only one specific mission scenario.

The data to answer the thesis question will be collected from

published books on Lebanon, Panama, and Haiti operations. In addition,

articles in newspapers, magazines, and professional journals will be

used as resource material. The thesis will also draw on interviews with

personnel involved in the operations and those who have previously

studied the issue of armor in MOOTW or related issues. Finally, after-

action reports and lessons learned from both Marine Corps and Army

sources will be used in the evaluation.

The Marine operations in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 have been

written about extensively. The main topic has been the mission and the

circumstances surrounding the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team

(BLT) headquarters building. The Marine Corps history of the period in

Benis M. Frank's book *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984* gives the

official perspective of the operation. It is an extremely detailed

review of the the history of the Marine presence in Beirut. It is based

primarily on the monthly command chronologies and biweekly situation

reports of the Marine Amphibious Units which were deployed to Lebanon as

well as other related official documentation. The book relates the

history of the operation but does not attempt to determine why the

mission failed. The book does not address armor operations as a

separate topic, and references to armor are only in passing as part of

the larger mission. However, each time that armor is used in any major
mission during the operation it is reported. In this way an account can be kept of when armor was employed, and for what purpose during the operation.

_The Root_, written by Eric Hammel, is probably the most detailed and through examination of the Marine operations in Lebanon. Besides relying on the written record of the operation, Hammel conducted over 200 interviews with participants. The book reflects this as many personal stories and views of the events are provided. It discusses several actions by armor and gives a personal view of how it was used.

_Savage Peace_ by Daniel P. Bolger is a review of some relatively recent American MOOTW missions. Bolger attempts to analyze the missions and arrive at some lessons learned on the higher level. His goal is to examine and to explain the nature of MOOTW operations. Bolger examines the Lebanon operation as an example of how not to conduct MOOTW. Because of this, his book is valuable from a critical point of view.

Several additional books are valuable to gain a full perspective of the operation. These include: _From Beirut to Jerusalem_ by Thomas L. Friedman, _Peacekeepers at War_ by Michael Petit, and _Recon Marine_ by Charles Dalgleish. The first provides a large-scale view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the others are personal accounts of participation in the Lebanon operation.

Articles in military and civilian publications have been utilized along with a case study conducted by the Rand Corporation. The author also conducted interviews with General A. M. Gray, USMC, Retired (RET), and Major C. Dalgleish, USA, both of whom participated in the
operation. Finally, the author drew on his personal experience in Lebanon as a member of the 24th MAU during the operation.

Information on Safe Haven was gathered from interviews with two of the main characters in the operation. Brigadier General James L. Wilson was the commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Safe Haven. He was responsible for the operation of all four camps in Panama and the planned camp in Surinam. He requested the armor to augment the camp security forces and was responsible for all operations and procedures in the camps. Colonel Steven Rasmussen was the operations officer of JTF Panama. He was on the initial team that planned the Safe Haven operation. He was on site during the riots that took place in December of 1994 and observed the actions of the Cuban refugees and the American attempts to deal with the crises. He endorsed the request for armor augmentation to the security force and observed their actions after their arrival.

Additional information on Safe Haven was gained from news reports in various papers, such as the New York Times and the Army and Air Force Times. The Army Knowledge Network was researched for information written by officers involved in the operation.

The Haiti operation is very recent history, and there has been little military history published concerning it. Consequently, the main source for information on the operations in Haiti has been personal interviews with the participants. These include the Commanding Officer, S-3, Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) company commander and the Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) platoon commander of the Marine Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) that participated in the
operation. On the Army side, the Liaison Officer for Team Victory, and
the company commander and one of the platoon commanders of 3-15
Mechanized Infantry were interviewed. Several members of the 3-73rd
Armor were interviewed including the Commanding Officer (CO) of Company
A, the Executive Officer (XO) of Company B, the Assistant Operations
Officer (S-3A) for the Battalion, and the Support Platoon Leader. The
Operation Uphold Democracy Joint After Action Report and the Operation
Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions reports from December 1994, and
April 1995, provided insight into lessons learned from a military
operations standpoint. In addition, published reports on the operation
in both military and civilian publications have been used.

For the Panama operation, the book *Operation Just Cause* by
Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker provided a detailed
account of the mission from beginning to end. It was particularly
useful from the tactical perspective. For the political side of the
Panama situation the study relies on the book *Divorcing the Dictator* by
Frederick Kempe. This book deals almost exclusively with the political
side of the period and says little about tactical operations. For the
period after the invasion, the book *The Fog of Peace: Planning and
Executing the Restoration of Panama* by John T. Fishel was the major
source document. Supplementing these were numerous articles from
military and civilian journals. Chief among these was "Sheridans in
Panama" by Captain Kevin J. Hammond and Captain Frank Sherman, "LAVs in
Action" by Colonel Robert P. Mauskapf and Major Earl W. Powers, and
"Joint Task Force Panama Just Cause-Before and After" by Dr. Lawrence A.
Yates. Also used, were interviews conducted by the Center for Military
History with participants from the 18th Airborne Corps, 4th Bn, 6th Infantry of the 5th Infantry division, and the 82nd Airborne division.
Endnotes


6William C. Westmoreland, General, USA, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY and Company, Inc., 1976), 178.


8Eric Hammel, "The 'Root Redux'," Proceedings (June 1993), 78.

9Paul X. Kelley, General, USMC, Remarks by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Senate Armed Services Committee (31 October 1983).


12USCINCSO, OPORD 2-90 (Blind Logic, 20 December, 1989), 11.

13Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01 (21 November 1994), 1.

14U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-0.

1There has been some discussion within the Army as to the use of the term MOOTW. Recently TRADOC sent the following message explaining their position: "As U.S. military forces became increasingly involved in worldwide operations following the break up of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army coined the term "OOTW" to provide an overarching concept for our doctrine as we entered a new historical period for the
U.S. Army. The term "OOTW" has served us well to provide increased visibility for new types of operations over the past several years we have reached a point in our post-cold war doctrinal development so we can now speak with more precision about Army operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking, and other specific missions. Since 'OOTW' has served its purpose, we should begin to retire the term, while main- taining and enlarging the vital lessons learned in specific areas.". Despite this, the term MOOTW remains current joint doctrine and will be used in this study.


CHAPTER TWO

U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN LEBANON 1982-1984

Background

Lebanon is a country in the Middle East bordering on Israel in the south, Syria in the east and north, and the Mediterranean sea in the west. The country has a rich history as a financial center and as a cosmopolitan society. Beirut, the capital, has earned the title of the Paris of the mid-east. The population is a mixture of the Christian, Muslim, and Druze religions. The government during the period this study covers was popularly elected with certain positions reserved for members of each religious group.

In 1970 King Hussein evicted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan, and many of them moved to south central Lebanon. The PLO carried on its war against Israel from Lebanon, bombarding Israel with artillery, rockets, and infiltrating terrorist teams across the border. Israel responded to this by arming Christian groups in Lebanon in an attempt to create a security zone along its northern border. By 1975 the fighting among the PLO, Israel, and the Christians and the tensions between the different religious groups combined to plunge Lebanon into a multisided civil war. In 1976 the Syrians, fearful that Israel would move into Lebanon, occupied much of the northern and central portions of the country. Initially welcomed by
the ruling Christians, it soon became clear that the Syrians were there
to stay and intended to set up a puppet government of their own.

The Syrian occupation restored some stability to the country.
However, the central government lost much of its credibility, and a
number of armed groups essentially divided up the country into their
personal fiefdoms. These included the PLO, Muslim Druze Progressive
Socialist Party, Maronite Christian Phalange, Christian South Lebanon
Army, Amal Shiite Muslims, Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad
groups, and the official Lebanese government. There were numerous
small splinter groups within each faction that often went their own way
despite the desires of the leader of their particular faction. In
addition the factions formed loose alliances on occasion, often crossing
religious lines for the sake of expediency. Each of these groups was
heavily armed, with arsenals that included tanks, armored personnel
carriers, antitank missiles, 122MM rockets, and 130MM guns. Clearly,
these groups were a significant threat to any force entering Lebanon.

By the summer of 1982 the Israelis decided that they would no
longer endure the constant bombardment of their country by the PLO. On
June 6, they launched operation "Peace for Galilee" with the stated goal
of pushing the PLO 25 miles back into Lebanon in order to provide a
security zone for Israel. "The Israeli advance into the Bekaa Valley
soon slammed into the Syrians, who fought hard but suffered grievous
losses in the air and on the ground." To avoid a widening of the
conflict a cease-fire was declared by 11 June 1982. The Israelis had
been very successful on the ground and despite their stated goal of a 25
mile advance, they continued all the way to the outskirts of Beirut.
The PLO reeled before the Israeli advance and found itself bottled up in Beirut.

Despite the declared truce Israeli forces continued to hunt down the PLO and destroy them. They pushed farther and farther into Beirut in an attempt to completely eradicate the PLO. Concurrent with this fighting in Beirut, the Israeli-backed Christian Phalange attacked into the Muslim Druze held area in the Shuf Mountains in an effort to destroy the Druze.¹

The initial United States direct involvement in the conflict began when Colonel James Mead's 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)⁴ was ordered to conduct an evacuation of noncombatant personnel (NEO) from Lebanon. On the 23rd of June 1982 the NEO began in the port city of Jounieh (spelled Juniyah in some accounts). During this operation 581 people of more than two dozen nationalities were evacuated in a very routine operation. The beaches at Jounieh were filled with sunbathing Christian men, women, and children. If not for the distant sound of gunfire it would have been hard to tell there was a conflict at all.⁵ This reception may have influenced how the MAU viewed its future missions.

The PLO and some Syrian army units were surrounded in Beirut. The Israelis continued to tighten the noose around them by fighting their way into the suburbs and continually conducting artillery and air attacks on the city itself. No other Arab country joined the fight against Israel at this time, much to the disappointment of Yasir Arafat, the head of the PLO.⁶ Consequently, Arafat agreed to evacuate his forces from Beirut rather than fighting to the end. Israel, under
intense pressure from the United States, agreed to allow the evacuation. The Arabs wanted a force under the United Nations (UN) to supervise the evacuation, but this was unacceptable to the Israelis. Finally, a multinational force (MNF) composed of Americans, French, and Italians was approved by all sides. This set the stage for the first American mission into Beirut.

The First Mission: Evacuation of the PLO

The conduct of the mission to evacuate the PLO from Beirut was agreed to in a series of meetings chaired by Ambassador Philip Habib of the United States. Essentially, the mission of the multinational forces was to interpose themselves between the PLO and Syrians on one side, and the Israelis and Christian Phalange on the other, as the PLO and Syrians evacuated Beirut by sea and agreed land corridors. The U.S. mission statement was to:

Support Ambassador Habib and the MNF committee in their efforts to have PLO members evacuated from the Beirut area; occupy and secure the port of Beirut in conjunction with the Lebanese Armed Forces; maintain close and continuous contact with other MNF members; and be prepared to withdraw on order.

In carrying out this mission the Marines were instructed to have no contact with the Israelis or the PLO and to conduct any necessary coordination through the Lebanese Armed Forces. An arbitrary force ceiling for the MNF units involved had been set by the committee of 800 French, 800 Americans, and 400 Italian troops. The French forces were the first to go ashore on the 21st of August 1982. Between the 21st and the 25th, the scheduled date for the Marine landing, the French successfully evacuated approximately 2,500 PLO fighters without a significant incident. On the 24th of August, President Reagan sent a
message to Colonel Mead on the USS GUAM that was read to all hands over
the ships loudspeakers;

You are about to embark on a mission of great importance to our
nation and the free world. The conditions under which you carry out
your vital assignment are, I know, demanding and potentially
dangerous. You are tasked to be once again what Marines have been
for more than 200 years—peace-makers. [Italics are mine] Your role
in the Multinational Force—along with that of your French and
Italian counterparts—is crucial to achieving the peace that is so
desperately needed in this long-tortured city. I expect that you
will perform with the traditional esprit and discipline for which
the Marine Corps is renowned. Godspeed. Ronald Reagan

At 0500 on the 25th of August, the first Marines came ashore and were
met by a large press contingent, as well as by Ambassador Habib; U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon Robert S. Dillon; the French and Italian
ambassadors; the Lebanese Armed Forces commander; and a host of other
dignitaries.10 By 0600 the French had turned over the port area to the
Marines and the MAU was ready to start processing PLO forces for
embarkation on to the ships assembled to evacuate them.

Analysis of the Threat

As discussed in the paragraph above, the mission of the MNF and
the Marines was to interpose themselves between the warring factions in
order to evacuate the PLO and Syrian forces encircled in Beirut. These
warring factions were very heavily armed with conventional weapons that
included tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers,
and all the modern accoutrements of war. They had been engaged with
each other in conventional conflict for a period of several months and
sustained thousands of casualties. The conflict was continuing despite
the truce in Beirut, with Christians and Druze battling in the Shuf,
Syrians and Israelis fighting in the Bekaa Valley, and continued Israeli
bombardment of parts of Beirut itself. Even as Marine units conducted evacuation operations, Israeli missiles engaged Syrian jets over the city.11 The situation that the Marines were entering was fraught with danger. There was an ongoing conflict between heavily armed forces that had a long history of fighting and a deep seated hatred of each other. A shaky truce was in effect in parts of the theater, but a renewed conflict could break out at any time. The forces that the Marines were supposed to evacuate were not well disposed to the United States, who had long been the strongest supporter of their avowed enemy, Israel. Additionally, the PLO was only a loosely controlled force with many splinter factions that might, or might not, follow Arafat's orders. Finally, there were others in the city besides the PLO who were heavily armed and could possibly target either the Marines or those they were trying to protect. This is illustrated by the following event that took place on 28 August during the PLO evacuation:

An old Soviet T-34/85 [tank] drove up to within several hundred yards of the Marine position and pointed its 85mm gun at the Marines. The tank also had a 7.62mm machine gun near the turret and a 12.7mm DShKM anti-aircraft machine gun mounted near the turret hatch. A man dressed in a black jump suit and Soviet tanker's helmet climbed out of the commander's hatch and walked up to the Marine position. I was within earshot of the conversation that took place between him and a Marine lieutenant. "Hello, my name is Achmed." "Achmed, what do you plan to do with that tank?" asked the Marine lieutenant. "I plan to help you evacuate the PLO." "But Achmed, the tank has to stay where it is. It can't cross with the PLO." said the Marine officer. "Oh, it is not a PLO tank, it is my tank. I am Mourabitoun." "But aren't you leaving with the PLO?" "Why? I am Lebanese not Palestinian. I do not have to leave."12 There are also videotapes of the evacuation of the PLO that show the PLO fighters firing wildly into the air as they moved towards the port. Joining in are multiple 23MM anti-aircraft guns and tanks. It seems evident that the threat to the Marine forces included heavy weapons
manned by personnel with little discipline and dubious loyalty, all thrust together in a highly volatile environment.

**Marine Forces**

The Marines were limited to an 800-man force as per the agreement made by Ambassador Habib. Colonel Mead elected to use his infantry companies and some other units as infantry to conduct the mission. He decided to leave his tank platoon, artillery battery, and heavy weapons aboard the ships. Several reasons are advanced in different books for Colonel Mead's decision not to use these assets. In the official Marine Corps history it says: "Because the MAU was landing in Lebanon on a peacekeeping mission in a permissive environment—i.e., one which was not hostile—Colonel Mead decided he would not need his tanks, his artillery, or his attack helicopters ashore at this time."13 In *Savage Peace* Bolger says; "Intentionally, the Marines carried only personal arms. Mortars, tanks, and artillery remained offshore, to avoid any appearance that the Americans had joined the conflict. Given that the United States is Israel's staunch ally, the Marines had to go out of their way to appear entirely neutral."14 In *The 'Rook* Hammel says:

> No offensive weapons, not even mortars, were to be taken ashore because, it was feared, the fragile agreement underlying the evacuation might dissolve if the PLO and Syrians felt there was real danger of a major confrontation. Both groups were doubtless and understandably paranoid about placing themselves in the hands of three nations that had at least formal relations with the Israeli enemy. Even the pair of Cobra helicopter gunships that accompanied the MAU would remain aboard ship.15

In *Recon Marine* Dalgleish quotes his Company Commander as saying; "The op order calls for the BLT's heavy weapons, tanks and artillery, to stay

31
on ship. The 81MM Mortar Platoon will go ashore as a provisional rifle platoon, but you will take one section of mortar tubes ashore and keep them out of sight."16

Not only did Colonel Mead decide not to take his armor and artillery assets, he also directed that all personal weapons would remain unloaded.

The MAU went ashore armed with unloaded individual and crew-served weapons, for a deliberate decision was made to demonstrate that the Americans were on a peace-keeping mission. Additionally, they had to show that they trusted the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain security.17

Colonel Mead felt that the Marines were "comfortable with our rules of engagement, which had been kept simple and therefore readily understandable."18 This was not always the case, as evidenced by First Lieutenant Charles Dalgliesh saying, "I don't buy that." upon hearing the BLT S-3 announce that all weapons would be unloaded to impress on the different factions that the Marines were really peacekeepers.19

**Analysis of the Use of Armor**

Colonel Mead decided to conduct his mission with light infantry forces operating under peacetime rules of engagement. The reasons for this decision seem to be mostly political in nature. They included the following: All the major political factions involved had signed the agreement to allow the evacuation of the PLO. Therefore, no major fighting was anticipated and no need for any heavy forces. The United States wanted to reassure the PLO that no heavy fighting was anticipated, so they did not deploy armored vehicles. There seemed to be a feeling amongst the American leadership that somehow armored vehicles and heavy weapons were not consistent with a peacekeeping
mission. The United States wanted to express confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to control the situation, and bringing heavy weapons would have indicated that this was not the case. In no case does any source say that the employment of armor or artillery was logistically insupportable or that there was some tactical or technical reason that armor and heavy weapons could not be employed in the area of operations (AO). It would seem that it was a political decision on the part of the command that was oriented on sending a specific message to all the factions involved. That message was one of confidence in the LAF, the peaceful nature of the American presence, and the limited and transitory nature of American involvement.

The assessment of the situation confronting the Marine forces makes it clear that this was a potentially hostile environment. It certainly was when one evaluates the factions' capabilities without determining their intentions. They were all heavily armed with tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles. The possibility that these could be used by plan or by the initiative of some lower level actor was great. During the evacuation several Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers, about ten vehicles in all, made occasional sweeps at the periphery of the American area—a forceful reminder that the evacuation would proceed only as long as the Israelis wanted it to. The presence of tanks in the hands of independent operators, like the incident with the T-34/85 described previously, shows that the Marines could have easily become targeted by heavy firepower despite any signed agreements. The wild firing by PLO forces with all types of weapons could have easily sparked a conflict with the Marines where the Marines would have
been heavily outgunned. The environment in Beirut at this time was anything but peaceful and the possibility of an all-out conflict was high.

One reason advanced was that the Marines did not want to employ armor because they did not want to be seen as joining the conflict or as a threat to the PLO. Conversely, it would seem that without the armor the Marines lost credibility to protect the PLO from their enemies since Israel and the Phalange employed heavy forces, and the Marines had only lightly armed infantry. The PLO had already made the decision to put themselves under the power of the United States. The MNF was there to disarm them of all weapons except small arms, and then ship them out under the guns of the U.S. Navy. Clearly, if the United States intended to destroy them it could do so easily at sea.

There is also a theme that runs through all the accounts of why armor and heavy forces were not included in the mission that seems to maintain that heavy forces are incompatible with peacekeeping operations. This certainly was not felt to be true by the other MNF participants. Both the French and Italians brought armor with their forces. The Italian 2nd Bersaglieri (Mechanized) Battalion "Governolo" were mounted in M113 armored personnel carriers, and the French deployed their Panhard armored cars. In fact on one occasion French armored vehicles forced their way through a Marine checkpoint. Both French and Italian forces used their armored vehicles for patrolling and security of fixed positions with a great deal of success.
Conclusion

In retrospect it would seem that the decision not to send armor and heavy weapons as part of the Marine force to evacuate the PLO was the wrong one. This is true despite the successful conclusion of the mission. The environment was a hostile one with every possibility of conflict between the Marines and any number of factions within the AO. The presence of the available tank platoon and a mechanized infantry company would have greatly lessened this risk. The political concern about the presence of armor threatening the PLO would seem to be misplaced. The PLO had already made the decision to trust the MNF and put itself under their power. The other MNF nations did employ armor and there were no problems encountered or complaints from the PLO. The concern about the need to express confidence in the LAF would also seem to be misplaced. There is no reason to assume that the use of armor by the Marines would have sent a signal of distrust of LAF capabilities. Additionally, the performance of the LAF was highly suspect and relying on them to protect U.S. forces was unrealistic. The armor forces available to the MAU could have, and should have, been used to good effect in the mission. Considering the risks that were accepted with conducting the mission, the Marines were lucky that it was as successful as it was.

Return to Beirut: Background

On 10 September 1982 the mission to evacuate the PLO was completed. The MNF was disbanded, and the Marines reembarked and headed for the Italian ports of Naples and Taormina. Bashir Gemayl had recently been elected the President of Lebanon. Bashir was a Christian
and had been elected in accordance with the constitution that set aside the President's position for a member of the Christian faith. Bashir was also the son of the founder of the Christian Phalange. The Phalange was one of the major factions involved in the ongoing power struggle in Lebanon. The Christians and the Israelis were tentative allies against the Moslems and the Druze. Bashir made a deal with the Israelis wherein he would ask for all foreign forces to leave Lebanon, both Syrian and Israeli. However, the Israelis would be allowed to maintain a security zone along their northern border inside Lebanon. For the Syrians this would mean a complete loss of all their efforts in Lebanon. They would be removed from the country while the Israelis would remain and a government sympathetic to Israel would be in control of Lebanon. For the Druze and Moslem militias the situation would be even worse. Their major supporter the Syrians would be gone, while the government with the active help of the Israelis could suppress them at its leisure. For the Syrians this was unacceptable, and on the 14th of September 1982 they had Bashir Gemayl assassinated. The Israelis panicked because they foresaw the loss of all they were trying to accomplish with the Peace for Galilee invasion. On 15 September they attacked into Beirut in order to destroy any remaining elements of the PLO ignoring their oral promise to the United States not to do so. One Israeli objective was to seize the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, where they felt as many as 3,000 guerrillas may have remained behind. After taking the area around the camps, the Israelis issued Order Number 6 which stated that "refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists and the Lebanese Army." During
the next three days Phalange units entered the camps and conducted mass executions of the refugees, including women and children. Red Cross estimates put the number killed at between 800 and 1,000.\textsuperscript{23} During this period, Amin Gemayl, Bashir's brother, had been elected President by the legislature. Immediately after the executions at Sabra and Shatila became public, Gemayl asked for the reconstitution of the MNF to replace the Israelis and the Phalange until the LAF could take charge. On 20 September the United States, France, and Italy announced the return of the MNF.\textsuperscript{24} On the 29th of September the Marines returned to Beirut.

The Mission

The mission of the Marines upon their return to Beirut has been the subject of a great deal of study. Despite this, there is a considerable range of opinion as to what, exactly, the Marines were supposed to accomplish. What is important to this study is how the Marines interpreted their mission and how this led to their employment of armored forces. The mission statements given the Marines are provided below in order to assist the reader in understanding how the Marines approached their mission and how they decided to use armor within that approach.

President Ronald Reagan's message to Congress on 29 September 1982 said:

Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multi-national presence requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces. In carrying out this mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense and will be equipped accordingly.
The JCS Alert order to CINC, U.S. European Command, 23 September 1982 said:

In order to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area, when directed, U.S. Commander in Chief Europe will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, be prepared to conduct retrograde operations as required.

Additional guidance:
1. U.S. forces would not be engaged in combat.
2. Peacetime Rules of Engagement would apply (fire in self-defense and defense of collocated LAF units).
3. Be prepared to extract U.S. forces if required by hostile action.

USCINCEUR OPREP-1, 24 September 1982 said:

2. Land U.S. Marine Landing Force in Port of Beirut and/or vicinity of Beirut Airport. U.S. forces will move to occupy positions along an assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut Airport to vicinity of the Presidential Palace. Provide security posts at intersections of assigned sections of line and major avenues of approach into city of Beirut form the southeast to assist LAF to deter passage of hostile armed elements in order provide an environment which will permit LAF to carry out their responsibilities in city of Beirut. Commander U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, EUCOM liaison team, and LAF, Commander, U.S. Forces will provide air/naval gunfire support as required.

Additional missions:
1. Conduct combined defensive operations with other MNF contingents and the LAF.
2. Be prepared to withdraw on order, in event of hostile action.25

In addition to these mission statements, Admiral James D. Watkins told a congressional committee, "We are not in a peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping could well be a combat operation. This is not a combat operation."26
What exactly was the mission? The statements are clear that it was not supposed to be a combat mission. It was also not a peacekeeping mission, according to Admiral Watkins. The statements spoke of "presence," and creating an "environment for the LAF to carry out its responsibilities." It talked of assisting the LAF to deter the passage of hostile elements, providing security posts and conducting defensive operations in coordination with the LAF. Without a doubt the Marines returned to Lebanon not knowing exactly what it was they were supposed to accomplish. It is worth quoting a Rand study on the mission of the Marines in Beirut:

The near unanimous view is that the mission statement was deeply and basically flawed. Particularly insofar as it radically overstated the nation building capacities of the Lebanese government and the military prowess of the LAF, and insofar as it underestimated the predictable malice of the Moslem militia factions and their Syrian supporters, it was an exercise in fantasy-projection. Nation building should be understood as a top to bottom construction of a civil society, in terms of constructing physical infrastructure and of building psychic bonds of loyalty between government and citizens. That the United States envisioned such an effort was clear, but in no sense was this tasked to U.S. forces, in the manner of some operations in Viet Nam. Instead, this was clearly understood to be the responsibility of the "legitimate" Lebanese government, which would thereby signal increase its credibility and reach. The job of the American forces was to back up the LAF as and when needed. Although some aspects of the U.S. deployment had clear nation building elements, this was ancillary to MNF 2."

The other factor that influenced Marine thinking on the mission was the physical capability of the MAU to conduct operations. The sector assigned to the Marines had a 4-mile perimeter as opposed to the 2.8-mile frontage recommended for a Marine rifle battalion. This did not include the need to occupy a position at the Lebanese-American university, supply a platoon to defend the U.S. Embassy, or defend the encampment at Black (later Green) Beach. Further complicating the
defense was the fact that much of the Marine perimeter abutted against congested urban slums and streets. Also, within the perimeter was a functioning international airport that was visited by 2,000 to 3,000 vehicles every day. Along the beach and through the perimeter ran the coast highway, which served as the major traffic route along the coast of the country. Consequently, the Marine perimeter could not be shut tight against all comers. The significant activity taking place within the perimeter meant that a major effort had to be made for internal security throughout the Marine sector. It was physically and politically impossible for the Marines to close off their sector and defend it like a battle position.

If the Marines had interpreted their mission as a peacekeeping one, despite Admiral Watkins comments, they probably could not have carried it out. There was no peace to keep, since no agreement had been signed by the factions in Lebanon. If peace enforcement was desired, it would have required the use of a force more than ten times larger than the MAU. In fact, the Lebanese government lobbied for just this sort of massive intervention. The United States was unwilling to commit to this large scale operation.

The Marines were left with little option except to interpret their mission in the narrowest sense. The Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Division, who sourced the MAUs that went to Lebanon said;

This was not a warfighting mission. This was a presence mission, whatever that is. . . . It was not a take the high ground, destroy enemy, or anything like that." He further went on to say; . . . you need to preface every comment or thought about Lebanon with, rightly or wrongly, the U.S. government . . . as well as the other governments involved . . . all agreed, and all supported the policy, rightly or wrongly, that the protection of the peacekeeping
forces would come from the Lebanese Armed Forces. That's fundamental.\textsuperscript{31} The Commanding Officer of the 24th MAU certainly felt that his mission was a diplomatic one. "It was important to me, in the interpretation of that mission, that there was a presence mission. That means being seen."\textsuperscript{32} To the Marines their mission was one of diplomacy and presence. They did not have the mission to seize any objective or impose peace. In fact they had been repeatedly told that theirs was not a combat mission. Even had they ignored these instructions, there was insufficient force to carry out either a defensive perimeter or a peace enforcement mission. Consequently, they were left with the missions of "presence" and self-defense. The next section will examine how the Marines used their armor assets to effect their mission.

Armor in MNF 2

The armor assets available to each of the successive MAUs that were deployed to Lebanon consisted of a platoon of approximately 14 assault amphibian vehicles (AAVs) and a platoon of 5 M60A1 RISE tanks. As the 32nd MAU under Colonel Mead returned to Beirut, the decision was made for the tanks and artillery to remain aboard the ships. The artillery battery personnel were pressed into service as a provisional rifle company and employed as the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) reserve. The tank platoon was sent ashore without their vehicles with the mission of CP security.\textsuperscript{31} This was in keeping with the diplomatic nature of the mission and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The S-3 of the MAU explained the ROE in this way:

Basically, it was minimal force necessary . . . we did not have magazines in, that was the decision that was made. Fortunately, as
it turned out, it was a very right decision. Minimal force necessary and we did have a right to self protection . . . we told our Marines, "If a guy shoots at you and you feel it is directed fire . . . then you use minimal force necessary to take care of the situation. If he is shooting at you with small arms, you can return the fire with small arms. Just because a man is shooting at you with small arms doesn't mean that you can call in naval gunfire on them or a flight of F-14s with napalm or something like that." 34

The AAV platoon did come ashore, however, and was quickly able to be of service in more than just the ship-to-shore movement. No sooner had the Marines come ashore than they were confronted by a serious problem of unexploded ordnance littering the airport. The MAU engineer platoon and additional mine-clearing detachments were flown in to clear the area. The unexploded ordnance was so dense that the mine-clearing crews had to be changed every 10 minutes to maintain efficiency. In spite of this precaution, a Marine on the detachment was killed when one of the devices went off. The solution to the ordnance-clearing problem was the AAVs. An analysis of the munitions indicated that they were almost all low-order antipersonnel devices that could have little or no effect on heavy vehicles. The AAVs were used to drive back and forth across the airport to detonate the munitions and clear the area. This proved very successful, and the MAU was able to occupy the airport and proceed with the mission. 35

The Marines were encouraged by the reception they received in Beirut. The population seemed to welcome the Marines and look on them as a stabilizing and neutral force. This was particularly true when compared with the Israelis who continued their patrols in the area. Israeli patrols along the Sidon Road fired at any vehicle parked along the road with tank main gun fire and would also fire into buildings if they detected movement or perceived a threat.
On 30 October 1982, Colonel Tom Stokes 24th MAU conducted a
relief in place with Colonel Mead's 32nd MAU and took over the MNF
mission. Colonel Stokes' assessment of the mission was the same as
Colonel Mead's. The guidance and forces provided remained essentially
the same. Colonel Stokes followed Colonel Mead’s example with respect
to armor employment. He brought his AAVs ashore where they were used to
transport the reaction force and block certain choke points. He left
his tanks and artillery aboard the ships. He also published a set of
general ROE that remained throughout the entire Marine presence in
Beirut with little change.

In every possible case, local civil/military authority will be
used. Marines will use only the degree of military force necessary
to accomplish the mission or reduce the threat. Wherever possible,
avoid injury to noncombatants or damage to civilian property.
Response to hostile fire will be directed only at the source.
Marines will act in self-defense only. 16

Once again the ROE may have discouraged the use of armor. The unwritten
ROE that the S-3 of the 32nd MAU spoke of about only responding with
like weapons was still very much in force.

The Marines mission expanded in November 1982 with the Secretary
of Defense approving motorized and foot patrols into the suburbs of
Beirut. These were well received by the inhabitants and the month
passed relatively quietly for the Marines. On 3 December, Colonel
Stokes decided to move his artillery battery ashore and on 6 December
the tank platoon followed. His announced reason was that the artillery
and tanks were suffering from a lack of training and needed to maintain
proficiency. However, many felt that the Colonel wanted that
capability ashore. 17 Also during the month of December, the AAVs began
using the Italian force’s tracked vehicle course to maintain the

43
proficiency of drivers and mechanics. Another reason to move the artillery and tanks ashore was that the United States had taken on an active role in training the LAF. This included training with artillery and tanks.

The major armor threat to Colonel Stokes mission came from an unexpected source. The Israelis to the south of the Marine positions made repeated attempts to penetrate the Marine perimeter with armored vehicles and dismounted infantry. Again and again the Israelis pushed confrontation to the brink by indiscriminate firing and attempting to drive through Marine checkpoints. To counter this, the MAU placed TOW antitank systems to cover anticipated routes into the perimeter and the tank platoon was ready to respond if necessary. After direct conversations between Colonel Stokes and the Israeli commander, the incidents tapered off.

On 15 February 1983, Colonel Mead and the 22nd MAU (the 32nd MAU had been renumbered) returned to Lebanon. The situation had not really changed since the last time the MAU had been to Lebanon according to Major Jack L. Farmer, the new S-3 of the MAU. He still saw the mission as 80 percent political and 20 percent military.

In late February, Lebanon experienced severe snow storms in the mountain areas, and several villages were isolated and travelers stranded in their vehicles. President Gemayel requested assistance from the MNF, and it was immediately authorized. A Marine column of nine AAVs was dispatched with emergency supplies. The vehicles encountered deep snow, blocked roads, and extremely difficult switchbacks. In some cases, the AAVs had only half of their tracks on the road at all. The
AAVs performed exceptionally well in this mission. The bow of the AAV is designed to push water aside, and it had almost the same effect on snow allowing the vehicles to move along roads covered by as much as 16 feet of snow. While the numbers of people rescued were not great, the mission itself brought the Marines a great deal of good will from the populace.40

Marine patrols into the Beirut suburbs continued, and attacks and harassment of these patrols increased. On 18 April 1983, a pickup truck filled with explosives detonated outside the American Embassy. The building was demolished with 17 Americans and 44 Lebanese killed. The MAU responded immediately with the reaction force mounted in AAVs. The AAVs helped secure the area around the blast site and physically blocked access to the area. On one occasion, a vehicle refused to stop for a Marine checkpoint near the Embassy and an AAV engaged with its .50 caliber machine-gun. The vehicle was disabled and crashed with all the occupants being apprehended. In addition to putting in tight security around the Embassy, Colonel Mead established stronger defenses around the airport and the MAU area. This included blocking roads with AAVs and positioning his tank platoon in a central location as a rapid reaction force.41

In May 1983 the 22nd MAU was relieved by the 24th MAU under Colonel Tim Geraghty. Colonel Geraghty had been specially selected for the position. He was an infantryman by trade, but he had served in the Middle East a few years earlier while seconded to the Central Intelligence Agency. He was reputed to have knowledge of the local intrigues.42 Colonel Geraghty realized that the situation was changing
in Lebanon. He understood that the Marines were being seen as taking
sides in the conflict. Consequently, the relaxed atmosphere stressed by
Colonel Mead was a thing of the past.41

Colonel Geraghty’s fears of an increased American role in the
conflict were correct. The U.S. took an ever more visible role in
supporting the LAF. U.S. Army forces were brought in to train the LAF,
expanding on the efforts the Marines had begun. Supplies of ordnance,
artillery and tanks were delivered to the LAF. The Israelis had
withdrawn south and the Marine perimeter was now completely surrounded
by militia factions. Constant harassing fire from small arms, rocket
propelled grenades (RPGs), artillery, and crew served weapons became the
order of the day. Colonel Geraghty responded with as little force as
possible to stop the attacks, on occasion firing illumination rounds
over militia artillery to send them a signal that they could be
destroyed. He also continued preparing defensive positions, and the MAU
filled and emplaced over 500,000 sandbags between 29 May and 23 October.

To strengthen his defense Colonel Geraghty used his armor as a
reaction force and also as a threat to the militias. Colonel Geraghty
reported that he had "increased the visible presence of the tank unit to
be prepared to fire if necessary." It turned out that this and more
was necessary. The Marines became engaged in heavy firefights with
militia members. Tanks and AAVs were used as relief columns to come to
the aid of hard pressed outposts. The AAVs evacuated wounded under
fire. Tank main gun fire destroyed a 106MM recoilless rifle and many
militia bunkers were engaged and destroyed by the tank gunfire.
By this time, August through October 1983, it was clear that the Americans were participants in the fighting. American naval gunfire and air strikes were employed against the Syrians and the Druze. The LAF, which by this time was almost a purely Christian organization, was being supplied and trained by American forces. Additionally, the LAF was attacking from positions inside the Marine perimeter. Despite this complete change in the situation, the ROE and mission of the Marines remained the same. On 23 October 1983 a truck laden with explosives was driven into the Marine BLT headquarters building within the perimeter. The resulting explosion destroyed the building and killed 241 people.

On 19 November 1983 the 22nd MAU returned to Beirut to assume control from the 24th MAU. After the bombing, it was clear to everyone that a consolidated defense was required. The headquarters was moved into subsurface bunkers, and the service support group remained embarked aboard the ships. The tanks and AAVs were immediately sent ashore and participated in the defense of the perimeter. On 6 December, firefights broke out around the Company G positions. When small arms and machine-gun fire could not silence the Amal positions, tanks and Dragons (medium range antitank missiles) did the job, destroying two bunkers. The next night, the fighting began again, and once again tanks silenced the Amal. On the 8th of December, Amal representatives met with the LAF liaison officer attached to the Marines and told him that if the Marines did not stop improving the positions around Company G, they would fire again. When the Marines continued, the Amal opened fire. This time the Marines responded with intense fire, including tank, antitank, artillery and small arms. They destroyed every position in sight.
While this was going on, the Amal called the American Embassy to ask how they could arrange a ceasefire. They complained that the Marines weren’t “responding in kind, that they thought they had an agreement. Well, they didn’t have any agreement, but that had been the rules of engagement, and they were aware of them, I guess. Prior to this time, and certainly prior to the 23 October bombing, the rules of engagement decreed that Marines would respond proportionally to any life-threatening fire from any quarter. Well, after 23 October, that made no sense. And so the fire the Marines returned on 8 December was intense enough to destroy the positions firing upon them and lethal enough to cause Amal casualties.45

One other incident concerning the use of tanks towards the end of the Beirut mission is worthy of note.

At Tank Platoon’s position, I spoke to Pete Walton, . . . who proceeded to tell me about some recent action. "Yesterday, a Druze 23mm gun shot up our area and destroyed my tent with all my personal gear in it. Well, that pissed me off. I was in my tank at the time, luckily, and fired back. The 23mm gun was on the terrace of that apartment building about 700 meters away, according to the tank’s rangefinder," he said pointing. I looked at the building which looked like the front had been sheared off with a knife, while he kept describing the incident with zeal. "We hit the terrace above it with a 105mm HE round, not on purpose mind you, but the terrace collapsed, bringing down eight other terraces, including the one with the 23mm. I guess the gun and crew were buried in the rubble. A little while later, the Amal tried to use a school bus as cover for an attack. They drove close to our lines and we didn’t fire because we thought it was a school bus, then they opened up from inside the bus. We fired several rounds at the bus, which hit home and lifted it up in the air, rolling it on its side. Nobody got out of there. Today, I heard that the Amal told the press that the Marines were shooting innocent children in school buses. What lying bastards," he said angrily.46

Conclusion

The Marines in Beirut used armor in a variety of ways depending on the situation that was facing them at the time. Initially, they chose not to bring the tanks ashore and use only the AAVs. This was based on an analysis of the situation that concluded that tanks were not necessary for the mission. The AAVs were used as physical blocks at checkpoints and also for medical evacuation and resupply operations.
The AAVs were exceptionally valuable in the totally unexpected mission of transporting supplies into the snowbound mountains beyond Beirut. As the threat to the Marines grew, the tanks were brought ashore and initially used to send a message to the militia that the Marines could respond with force. Finally, the armor was used in more traditional mission as a quick reaction force, and to destroy enemy with gun fire. There are no reports of the armor being used to participate in the motorized patrols conducted by the Marines. It is clear that the Israelis did use armor for their patrols into the same areas. Why the Marines chose not to do so is not known.

Armor did play an integral role in the Marine mission in Beirut. From the time the Marines came ashore to conduct "presence" until the time they left, armor was employed in a wide variety of missions. Its availability during the noncombat humanitarian missions was a strong plus for the force as a whole. Its combat power was a definite plus as the situation became more and more threatening. Tanks moved from one side of the perimeter to the other and on each occasion silenced the enemy, while taking no losses of their own. Without a doubt the presence of armored forces enhanced the Marine capability to carry out their mission.

While we can be certain that the presence of armor was a benefit to the Marine forces deployed to Beirut, it seems clear that it could have been employed much more effectively. Again and again Marine commanders seemed to make the wrong decisions concerning the use of armor. Much of this may be attributed to a flawed mission and a misreading of the situation as a whole by senior leaders, and not be
directly related to armor. However, the way that armor was used sheds some light on what it can, and cannot, be expected to accomplish in certain situations.

There is no doubt that the Marine commanders felt the employment of armor would send a psychological message. They seemed to believe that this message would be one of aggressiveness and intent to engage in combat operations. This message would be at odds with "presence" mission and the aura of neutrality that the Marines, at least initially, were trying to portray. The question is whether the deliberate decision not to employ tanks in Beirut was recognized as a message at all, and if so, was it a sign of neutrality, or weakness.

The threat from other armored vehicles has been previously established in this study. The fact that this threat existed was known to all parties in the conflict. Israeli, Syrian, militia, and Lebanese government armored vehicles were all active in the area. The Italian, French, and later the British members of the MNF all employed armored vehicles of one type or another with their forces in Lebanon. The Lebanese population had been involved in a civil war for years and had suffered incursions from Israeli and Syrian units on several occasions. They were quite used to seeing armored vehicles employed as part of any military force in the area. Consequently, would the employment of five M60A1 tanks and an artillery battery have been seen as a direct threat or an escalation in the conflict--probably not. Was it even noticed? The general population, having no idea what a MAU consisted of, probably did not even notice that the tanks and artillery were not brought ashore. The militias surely noted that the Marine forces did not bring
armor ashore. Whether this sent a message of peace, or one of weakness to them, can only be speculated on. However, the treatment received by the Marines, at least initially, was no different than that accorded to the other MNF members, who were employing armor. The initial conclusion is that while armor can send a psychological message, in this instance that message was not received by the target audience, or if it was received, was misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. Consequently, the Marines forfeited their armor for no gain at all and endangered themselves in doing so.

As the situation in Beirut deteriorated, the Marines brought their armor and artillery ashore. Colonel Geraghty mentioned in a previous quote that he positioned his armor to make it more visible in an attempt to deter snipers that were firing on the Marine positions. This threat of force failed to achieve any results. The militias knew the ROE, both written and unwritten. They were aware that the Marines were supposed to respond proportionately. Therefore, even though the tanks were prominently displayed, the militias knew they would not shoot in response to small arms fire. The threat of using the tanks was hollow and achieved nothing, except maybe to demonstrate that the Marines were not really committed to defending themselves. Colonel Geraghty may have made his position worse by, in essence, threatening to use the tanks and then not following through when challenged.

Neither the tanks nor the AAVs were used to block roads or entrances around the main Marine positions. AAVs were used for this purpose at the Embassy. This may have been due to the Marines trying to avoid a "bunker mentality" and maintaining an appearance of normalcy.
around Beirut and the international airport. If so, it was a failure considering the LAF and the militias all employed roadblocks with armored vehicles in areas under their control. In fact, the LAF had one just outside the Marine boundaries leading into the airport. Consequently, all the Marines succeeded in doing was exposing their positions to an even greater extent than they already were exposed. Only after the bombing of the BLT headquarters did the Marines employ armored vehicles in blocking positions around their main positions.

Once the Marines decided to use the tanks to respond to militia fire, they were very effective. Clearly, the combat power of the M60A1s was critical to the Marines in the last few weeks before withdrawing. The willingness of the Marines to meet militia fire with overwhelming fire from the tanks towards the end of the operation may have set the stage for the successful withdrawal. Without a doubt the militias would have liked to punish the Marine forces as they withdrew, inflicting further casualties and giving the impression of chasing the Marines into the sea, thereby enhancing the militias prestige. The fact that the Marines were able to withdraw without pressure, and without being fired on, may have been due to the willingness to employ their tanks freely in the weeks leading up to the withdrawal.

An examination of the history shows that armor could have been used very effectively during Marine operations in Lebanon, and at times it was. It was definitely an asset to the commanders in each of their missions. However, the overall conclusion must be that the Marine armor assets were not very effectively employed. Armor may have been very effective in Lebanon, but due to a flawed mission, an incorrect
appreciation of the situation, poor ROE, and poor decision making it was only truly effective just prior to the operations end point.
Endnotes


2. Ibid., 170.


*A MAU is a task organized Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) built around a ground combat element of a reinforced infantry battalion, a combat service support element, and a composite aviation squadron, all commanded by a common command element. Currently, the Marine Corps employs much the same structure for forward deployed forces, but they have been renamed Marine Expeditionary Units, or MEUs.*


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. Frank, 12.


15. Hammel, 18-19.


17. Frank, 17.


54
Dalgleish, 31.

Hammel, 25.

Ibid., 28.

Friedman, 156-160.

Ibid., 163.

Bolger, 172.

Ibid., 174-175.

Ibid., 173.


Schneidel, 14.

Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation (New York, NY: Athenaeum, 1990), 446.


Bolger, 182.

Dalgleish, 53.


Hammel, 40-42.

Ibid., 53.

Ibid., 57.

Frank, 43-46.

Ibid., 52.

Ibid., 53-54; and Hammel, 67-70.

Frank, 65.

43 Hammel, "The 'Root Redux," 94.

44 Frank, 92.


46 Dalgleish, 315.

47 Author's personal experience in Lebanon, 1983.
CHAPTER THREE
OPERATION SAFE HAVEN

Background

During 1994 the United States faced a crisis brought on by a large number of refugees from Cuba and Haiti attempting to gain entry to the country. The repressive regime and severe economic depression in Haiti were driving the people there to take to the open ocean in flimsy rafts to escape to the United States. In Cuba there has been a long-standing tradition of flight by some of the people to escape the communist rule of Fidel Castro. In the past the Cuban government has taken steps to prevent emigration by their people and has closely patrolled the waters and air surrounding the island nation. However, in 1994 the Cuban government announced their willingness to let all Cubans who so desired to leave the country. This announcement set off a wave of Cubans attempting to make their way to the United States by any means possible. Cuba suggested that the U.S. should accept 100,000 or more Cuban refugees. U.S. policy had been to accept Cuban refugees who made their way to the U.S. as victims of political repression and to allow them to settle in the U.S. The U.S. government decided to change this policy based on the massive numbers of Cubans involved in the current wave of immigration. The Clinton administration responded by offering to take about 20,000 Cuban refugees annually instead of the 2,000 a year that had been coming in. This offer was rejected by Cuba, and the U.S.
responded by intercepting the Cuban refugees at sea and interning them in camps until some provision could be made for their legal entry to the U.S., or return to Cuba. Initially the U.S. chose to hold the Cuban refugees at the USMC base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Because of the Haitians already held there and the large numbers of Cubans fleeing Cuba, the Base quickly reached its maximum capacity. The administration was loathe to admit the Cubans to the U.S. and began looking for some other site to hold them. An initial request to the Panamanian government to hold some refugees in the Panama Canal Zone was rebuffed. A change of administrations in Panama reversed this policy, and led to a formal offer on 31 August 1994 to accept up to 10,000 refugees in Panama for a period of up to six months.\(^1\)

The agreement with Panama for the acceptance of the Cuban refugees stipulated that the refugees were to be held within the Panama Canal operating area on property under U.S. control. Consequently, a Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed under the command of Brigadier General James L. Wilson, USA, and designated JTF Safe Haven. Of the four camps under the command of JTF Safe Haven two were run by the Army, one by the Navy (actually mostly USMC personnel), and one by the Air Force. The JTF was tasked with constructing four separate camps that could accommodate 2,500 refugees each.\(^2\) There was a need to get these camps running quickly was the first group of Cuban refugees arrived on 6 September 1994, about a week after the formal offer to accept them had been made by Panama.
Camp Operations

As required by the agreement with Panama, the camps were constructed on ground under the control of the U.S. Each of the camps was about 20 acres in size, situated on clearings surrounded by the jungle that lines the Panama Canal. The Cubans were housed in cement-floored tents that held about 14 people each. The tents were arranged in 10 blocks of 18 tents each. Running water was provided to the area and outdoor toilet facilities were constructed. There were also large areas for sports, and community tents were provided for indoor recreation. A doctor and a dentist were provided for each camp and a civil affairs soldier was assigned to each block of tents.

The guidance given to JTF Safe Haven was to treat the Cuban refugees as they would want their own families treated if they were fleeing oppression. The mission given the JTF as recalled by Brigadier General Wilson was, "to provide humanitarian support for Cuban asylum seekers in the form of shelter, security, and basic essentials of life support while their asylum status was determined." Consequently, the security for the camps was kept at a very low level. The Cuban population was not expected to be composed of harmful or disruptive elements, but families that were genuinely fleeing an oppressive government. The spirit in which the camps were administered was described by General Barry McCaffery in his statement to the House National Security Committee:

Some 8,677 Cuban migrants were eventually flown to Panama. They were greeted with open arms by our troops and military community. The camps in Panama featured vocational-technical training, schools for children, sports leagues, religious activities, and libraries. We made a conscientious effort to treat
these migrants with civility; guns, clubs, or barbed wire were not visible in either the reception centers or the four migrant camps. In fact, the wives of the U.S. military personnel in Panama met the Cubans as they arrived and provided them with clothing and amenities within their capabilities. A more regulated and secure camp environment had been originally suggested by the Provost Marshal, including the use of barbed wire, patrols, armed guards, and guard dogs. This was soundly rejected in SOUTHCOM, and the kinder, gentler approach described by General McCaffery was adopted. So it was a conscious decision on the part of those involved to forgo heavy security in favor of a more free environment for the Cubans.

Internal security of the camps was conducted by Army Military Police (MP) and Air Force Special Police, some of whom were deployed from the U.S. specifically for this mission. The rules of engagement (ROE) prevented them from entering the camps while armed. In fact, instructions were sent from USCINCSO that troops deploying for duty with Safe Haven were to leave their personal weapons at their home stations. Some owning commanders refused to deploy their troops without weapons, and eventually authorization was granted to store the weapons in Panama. External security was provided by MPs combined with the Policia Nacional de Panama, conducting patrols out of sight of the camps. The ROE prevented the use of deadly force except in the case of defense of the life of U.S. personnel, or another Cuban. Even then, it was only permitted when lesser force had been tried and failed. One security method that was allowed was that Special Operations Forces and Counterintelligence set up a net of informants within the camp. Clearly, the security of the camps relied on the cooperation of the
Cuban refugees. The forces provided for security purposes were in no way adequate to deal with any major incidents that might occur. Even the small forces provided for security were not equipped to handle serious threats involving small numbers of people.

Initially the Cubans accepted the camps and the forces of MPs and support personnel who worked in and around the camps experienced few problems. The MPs that entered the camps were unarmed and traversed the camps individually. Support personnel went about their jobs without interference, and even civilian contract personnel conducted their business in the camps with ease. As time went on the Cubans began to grow more adversarial towards the Americans. They were uncertain about their future and began to doubt if they would ever be allowed into the U.S. Eventually this resentment broke out in open attacks against the Americans on 7 and 8 December 1994. A policy analyst at the U.S. Committee for Refugees, who visited the Panama camps in October of 1994, said of the December riots: "This is indicative of the frustrations that the camp residents are feeling, not about conditions in camp, but about the political situation they find themselves in."

December Riots

On December 7th and 8th, Cubans in the camps began to riot. It seemed to start in Community Camp One run by the Army, and the next morning it spread to Community Camp Two run by the Air Force. The Cubans began to attack the unarmed Americans in the camps. They used rocks, sticks, and whatever came to hand. In many cases they took the end struts from their folding cots and hammered nails through them to fashion a primitive mace. The Cubans attacked not only the Americans,
but also the food and sanitation contractors who happened to be in the camp at the time. They seized several trucks and rammed them through the chain link fence that surrounded the camp. The unarmed American forces were unable to stop the surge of the Cubans out of the camps and military vehicles were stoned and shoved aside. Some High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and military trucks were stolen by the Cubans, and American soldiers were run down by these vehicles. The Cubans also set fire to parts of the camps and burned down some of the tents, including library and school tents. In addition, they attacked administration buildings destroying computers and other office equipment. Thousands of Cubans eventually participated in the riots.

The camp security personnel were completely overrun and the Cubans began marching down the roads towards Panama City. In one case, a Marine Major and 25 Marines held a bridge leading into an American dependent housing area against a large mob of Cubans. Only by firing over their heads with his pistol (the only weapon amongst all the Marines) were the Cubans prevented from entering the housing area. American troops were called from all over Panama to react to the escaping Cubans. As the troops poured in, the battles between the Americans and Cubans grew in size. Colonel Steven Rasmussen, USA, J-3 JTF Panama, described the confrontation between the Cubans and Americans like this:

I, in fact, was in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] at the time the breakouts took place, and was the senior man present at the time. Gen. Wilson, who was the commander of the camps, his camp had been overrun and he was out of communication for that period of time. We were sending reinforcements out. I sent the Engineer Bn out and I issued weapons to them and sent them out with bayonets, but no ammunition. About an hour later I got a call back from the CINC XO . . . and he said no weapons. We pulled the weapons back. So what we ended up having was just this big pushing contest. There were about three of four thousand migrants and we at the time had
maybe, two thousand soldiers that we could get out in this big pushing contest. With Engineers and Communications Bns and anybody we could get out there. We took a lot of casualties in rock throwings and that kind of stuff. Our guys just had their helmets and flack jackets in some cases and just kind of had to stand up to that.14

The Americans were unable to force the Cubans back into the camps or end the fighting until the commander authorized the use of riot shotguns loaded with bird shot. As the Americans fired into the Cubans they broke and ran, returning to the camps.15

The riots had caused immense damage to the camps and a large number of Cubans had escaped into Panama. The fighting injured 240 U.S. troops of which 18 had to be hospitalized. At least 32 Cubans were seriously injured and two were killed when they drowned attempting to swim to the other side of the Panama Canal. First Lieutenant John Thomas, a spokesman for Operation Safe Haven described the fighting as a "free for all". He further characterized the injuries by saying: "A large portion of the injuries are minor . . . but there are a variety - anything you can name ranging from dehydration, bruises and cuts, to broken bones."16 Without a doubt the security arrangements for the Cuban refugee camps were inadequate. Consequently, the JTF and USCINCSO decided to augment the security forces with additional personnel and equipment.

Armor in Safe Haven

As a consequence of the riots the JTF requested additional security personnel be provided for control of the camps. The goal was not to change the operation of the camps into a prison but to ensure
that the security force was capable of controlling any further outbreaks of violence. The JTF Safe Haven commanders determined that in order to do this an armored force was required. Colonel Rasmussen described their thought process on the need for armor like this:

"What you really needed in those circumstances, if you weren't going to shoot the migrants, you needed some kind of armor protection. And you don't need M1s, but what you needed was Bradleys or something like the Marines LAV-25. You needed something like that, because you see what we found was that's super protection against rock throwers. If you are not going to shoot them, or somehow reply in force, the only thing you can do is just contain them. We took terrible casualties from rock throwing because the mud in Panama was so bad that we put crushed rock down as a base of all the camps. Well these were all grapefruit size jagged edge hunks of broken rock and they would start pelting soldiers with those and there was no protection. Later on we got riot control gear with shields, which was OK, but the best protection was the 113s [M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier] we got in there."

Brigadier General Wilson had the same reasons for requesting armor be provided to the JTF. He felt that the need to be able to enter the camps and stop the rioting was answered by the armored vehicles. They would provide a quick reaction force that could respond to any of the four camps quickly and afford protection to a riot control force. When asked if he had tried to use soft skin vehicles in this role prior to requesting the armor, Brigadier General Wilson said he had, but had found them ineffective. He described their use like this:

"The result was that they [HMMWVs] were severely damaged by these rocks . . . when you have over 500 people that are flailing these kind of projectiles at you and congregate in a group like that the HMMWV vehicle was not adequate."

The ability to protect the force from the rioting Cubans and to react quickly to any of the four camps were the driving forces behind the JTFs request for armored vehicles.
One of the things that Brigadier General Wilson was not interested in was firepower. He was still very much operating under the guidance that had been issued by General McCaffery when the camps were initially constructed. That was to treat the Cubans as refugees from oppression, not as prisoners. Therefore, Brigadier General Wilson was more interested in a personnel carrier than a fighting vehicle. He would have accepted almost any type of unit equipped with armored vehicles except for tanks. Brigadier General Wilson felt that tanks would not have been acceptable in the situation surrounding Safe Haven. This was mostly due to the political aspect of the operation. Brigadier General Wilson viewed tanks as offensive weapons, not just as a force protection expedient. He felt they would have been viewed negatively by the media, the Panamanian population and the Cubans themselves. He reiterated that while riots had occurred, and people were injured, no one had been killed, and there was no indication that the Cubans were armed with other than home made weapons. Consequently, he saw the use of tanks as a case of over kill, and not politically expedient.¹⁹ Conversely, Colonel Rasmussen felt that tanks would have been used in the mission if that was all that was available. He felt they could have carried out the mission and he did not see a major difference between them and other armored vehicles. He said,

"The media, or the public, or the Cuban migrants, they don't know the difference between a tank and a Bradley and a 113. The media said we had tanks there all the time. We never had a tank there, all we had was the 113. You could use anything."²⁰

The unit that was actually selected for the mission was the 8th Engineer Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. The sole reason for their selection was the fact that they were equipped with the M-113
vehicle and that they were readily available.²¹ There was no thought of their engineer skills being put to use or any other aspect of their training. They were soldiers who were available and had the necessary vehicle to do the job. The 8th Engineer Bn was alerted to deploy and left for Panama in approximately 48 hours. They were brought into Panama by C-5 aircraft and road marched from the airfield to the camp area.

Clearly, the need for armored forces was not recognized until the riots broke out within the camps. The low-key nature of the camps and the emphasis on their appearance and possible impression on the refugees and outside observers, mitigated against an adequate security force. Once this force failed, the need for armor was quickly realized by the JTF and USCINCSO. Even then, the type of armor that was requested was limited, at least in the JTF commanders mind, to a perceived defensive rather than offensive force.

**Training**

The 8th Engineer Bn had almost no training in riot control operations when they were alerted to deploy to Panama. This is unsurprising since riot control is not anywhere near the top of the missions a mechanized engineer Bn anticipates executing. With only 48 hours to deploy there was no time to try to train for the mission either. Consequently, the 8th Engineers arrived in Panama without any idea of how they were to operate in support of the JTFs mission.

Upon arrival in Panama the Bn was given riot control training by the MPs and issued equipment for individual dismounted operations. The use of the armored vehicles was new to the MPs in this situation just as
it was to the 8th Engineers. Together they worked on a plan to integrate the M-113s into a tactical method to disperse and control rioting Cubans. There was no doctrine available to help create this plan and the MPs and Engineers conducted experiments to see how it could best be done. One aspect that was clear from the beginning, was that the armored vehicles would always operate in concert with dismounted MPs. The MPs may be reinforced with dismounted engineers, but MPs would always be part of the force. If necessary, the dismounted personnel could take refuge in the vehicles and the Cubans had nothing that could be used to affect the vehicles. Training for this mission was done on-the-job, and consisted of experimental methods arrived at by the best guess of the people on the ground.

**Operations**

The 8th Engineers were positioned to respond to any of the four camps run by the JTF. Once at a camp the vehicles were to be used to either secure the perimeter of the camp, or assist in entering a camp to put down a disturbance. In securing a perimeter, the vehicles could be driven right up to the fence surrounding the camp and placed against the fence to support it. Previously, Cubans had simply pushed the fences over with the force of their bodies. This was impossible for them with the M-113s supporting the fence. In this aspect the flat sides of the M-113 were perfect for pressing up against a fence and supporting it, and nothing could be thrust through the fence that could harm the side of the M-113. Another use of the M-113 in perimeter security was to position the vehicle at a gate or choke-point leading out of the camp. In the past the Cubans had stolen trucks and other soft skin vehicles
and broken through gates. With an M-113 positioned on the other side of
the gate this was no longer possible. Colonel Rasmussen stated that
these types of tactics were used with great success, once the M-113s
were available. He said, "Whenever we had a threat, that's exactly what
we did. If there was activity that looked like there was a little riot
or something developing, we immediately went into that reaction drill
and never again had anybody break out of the camps."24

The use of choke-points outside the camp area was planned for
also. In the December riots the Cubans had left the camps and began
marching towards civilian areas. It was planned to use armor to prevent
this from happening again, even if the Cubans were able to force their
way out of the camps. Colonel Rasmussen said,

The nice thing about it was there were plenty of chokepoints
along there [the route to Panama City and the housing areas]
bridges, narrow passes, that kind of stuff where the armor could set
up and that was a very effective barrier against migrant movement.
In December . . . we finally stopped them at a couple of
bridges . . . that kind of location was an ideal location for the
armored vehicles which we then later got in to provide the
checkpoints. So we felt very comfortable that we could prevent the
migrants from ever getting into Panama . . . I think maybe one of
the reasons why we ultimately moved the armor [permanent armor
presence] out of Panama . . . was simply because it wasn't armor
terrain. But in retrospect, the armor was perfect for use in that
terrain because of the way they could block the choke-points.25

The other mission of the M-113s was to protect the dismounted
forces as they moved into a camp to put down a disturbance. The
vehicles were to move through the camp and, in conjunction with the
dismounted soldiers, disperse the crowd. In keeping with the ROE none
of the M-113s ever mounted their machine guns. The mission of moving
into the camp was never carried out. At no time did the M-113s ever
have to enter the camp after they deployed to Panama.26

68
One aspect of the M-113 operations that contributed greatly to the security and smooth functioning of the camps was the psychological impact of the armored vehicles on the Cubans. This impact had really not been considered by the JTF prior to requesting the vehicles, but became a major asset to the force. Both Brigadier General Wilson and Colonel Rasmussen believed that the mere presence of the M-113s intimidated the Cubans and prevented them from considering additional rioting. When asked about the intimidation factor Colonel Rasmussen said,

I think that was half of it. When we brought in the armored vehicles the migrants got a message right away that the situation had changed. If you have a light infantryman there who is being a guard, and then you have a light infantryman there who is being a guard and he has pepper spray and riot control agents and stuff. Well its a little more effective, but its still a light infantry-man standing there and he's still vulnerable to the kind of things that the migrants could produce. Tent poles tent pegs, stones, ... bunk adapters. If a light infantry soldier is not going to shoot you, and you are going to start hitting him with that thing, that's a pretty effective weapon against just a helmet and LBE [Load Bearing Equipment] for example. Even if you have a riot control shield and a baton, things are just a little more equal than we like them to be. As soon as you rumble the armored vehicles in there then what that did was that sent the message that all the foolishness was aside and you could hit an armored vehicle all you want to with a bunk adapter and you are not going to do any damage to it. So there was a quantum leap in the level of defensive measures we were going to take, and that message was not lost for a minute on the migrants.  

Brigadier General Wilson recognized the intimidation value and scheduled a number of training exercises for the 8th Engineers and the MPs in full sight of the camps. The M-113s and MPs would practice their movement techniques and cooperative tactics where they could easily be seen by the Cubans.

Brigadier General Wilson also felt the M-113s gave a great deal of confidence to his other forces and that this allowed them carry out
their jobs in a more proficient manner. They now knew that they could be supported and protected if it came to a fight like the December riots.

**Aftermath**

Subsequent to the deployment of the 8th Engineer Battalion to Safe Haven there were no more major problems with the Cuban refugees. JTF Safe Haven continued to operate the camps in Panama until the six-month period expired. During that time the U.S. had conducted the intervasion in Haiti. This allowed some of the Haitian refugees living in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to be repatriated to Haiti. Most of the Cubans in the Safe Haven camps were then moved to Guantanamo Bay. JTF Safe Haven was disestablished, and the troops returned to their parent units.

**Conclusion**

The mission to provide refuge for Cubans fleeing the repressive government in Cuba was supposed to be a humanitarian operation with very little chance of conflict. The people involved were not military, or guerrillas, or criminals. They were families, and extended families, including the very young and the very old. The camps were provided with all the amenities that could be made available on short notice in the austere environment, and the refugees were met with kindness and goodwill. No weapons at all were available to the refugees except those they could manufacture themselves. Despite this peaceful and benign environment, a major conflict occurred that left approximately 240 Americans injured. Armored forces were called in, and proved to be the most effective asset available to restore order and preserve peace in
the camps. The message sent with the deployment of armor was one of zero tolerance for any more violence. This message was effectively received by the Cubans. Despite the fact that their demands for entry into the U.S. were never met, no more incidents occurred in the Safe Haven camps. Clearly, the armor was very effective in preventing additional incidents and if they had occurred would have been key in combating them. Colonel Rasmussen, in his interview, pointed out that the lesson of utilizing combined arms forces in almost every situation has to be continually relearned. Even in this extremely low-key operation, armored forces should have been employed from the very beginning. Perhaps their presence could have prevented the initial riots from occurring. If not, they surely would have proved an asset in controlling the situation.
Endnotes


2Ibid., A-1.

3"New Refuge in Panama for Cubans," Army Times, 12 September 1994, 2; and Colonel Steve Rasmussen, USA, J-3, JTF Panama, interview by author 28-29 March 1996.

4General Barry R. McCaffrey, Statement before the House National Security Committee at SOUTHCOM in Quarry Heights, Panama, 8 March 1995, 6.


7General McCaffrey statement, 6.

8Colonel Rasmussen interview.

9Major Richard Varela, CALLCOMS INPUT FORM Issue 2H (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Knowledge Network, undated).

10Major Richard Varela, CALLCOMS INPUT FORM Issue 2I (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Knowledge Network, 12 October 1994).


12Ibid., A-1.

13Colonel Rasmussen interview.

14Ibid.

15Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C. Dopf, USA, Chief, Operations Division, USARSO, interview by author.


17Colonel Rasmussen interview.

18Brigadier General Wilson interview.

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72
28 Colonel Rasmussen interview.
29 Ibid.
30 Brigadier General Wilson interview.
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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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35 Brigadier General Wilson interview.
36 Colonel Rasmussen interview.
37 Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (MARINES)

Background

Haiti occupies the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola and has a land area of 10,714 square miles. It has a population of about 6,432,000 with the capital of Port-au-Prince holding approximately 475,000 of these. Haiti essentially consists of two mountainous peninsulas that enclose the Gulf of Gonave and are separated by valleys and plains. The climate is tropical, with little seasonal variation. The annual average temperature is 80 degrees Fahrenheit and annual rainfall varies from 20 inches on the coast to 100 inches in the mountains.

Haiti has one of the highest population densities in the world with 600 people per square mile. The people are of African descent, with small minorities of mulattos (of African and European descent) and Europeans. The official languages are French and Creole. The literacy rate is very low and public education is inadequate. About 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas with few modern conveniences available. The predominant religion is nominally Roman Catholic, but most of the Haitians practice Voodoo, which combines Christian and African elements. The economy of the country is in poor shape with a per capita income of about $440. The economy is based on peasant
agriculture; however, the land has suffered greatly from erosion caused by deforestation.

The French established a colony on the western end of the island in 1697, while the Spanish colonized the eastern end. In 1791 the slaves on the island rebelled and gained control of the colony. The French tried to reestablish control but were defeated, and the island became independent in 1804. The entire island was governed by several autocratic rulers until 1844, when the eastern part of the island broke away from Haiti and established the Dominican Republic. For the next hundred years, Haiti was ruled by a series of inept and corrupt leaders. From 1915 until 1934, the United States occupied Haiti with Marines and attempted to bring stability to the country. With the withdrawal of the Marines in 1934, Haiti eventually returned to its common state of anarchy and unrest. In 1957 Francois Duvalier became president. Until his death in 1971 he provided a strong central government, enforced by his brutal security force, the Ton Ton Macoutes, created to check the Army, until his death in 1971. His son Jean Claude succeeded him and maintained total control of the country. Thousands of Haitians began leaving the country for political and economic reasons. Civil unrest flared against Duvalier in 1985, and in 1986 he fled Haiti for exile in France. From 1986 to 1990 a series of strong men ruled Haiti, but each fell in successive coups. In 1990, in freely conducted presidential elections, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was named president. In September 1991, after only eight months in office, Aristide was deposed by a military junta controlled by General Raoul Cedras. Aristide fled to exile in the United States.
Conditions in Haiti continued to worsen under General Cedras. These were exacerbated by the trade sanctions imposed on Haiti by the United States. Consequently, Haitians attempted to escape by any means available. Waves of Haitian refugees climbed aboard anything that would float and tried to make their way to the United States. The policy announced by President of the United States George Bush was that all refugees would be returned to Haiti. This policy became an issue in the 1992 presidential campaign. Candidate Bill Clinton was persuaded by his advisors, key among them Anthony Lake, that the policy of returning fleeing Haitian boat people was inhumane and morally wrong. Clinton announced that if elected he would reverse that policy.

Once elected president, Clinton began to revise his policy on Haiti. He was advised by Coast Guard analysts that as many as 200,000 Haitians were ready to flee by boat to Florida. Clinton knew that he could not afford politically to have this happen. He therefore announced that Bush's policy of returning Haitians to Haiti would remain in effect; however, he would pursue a policy of negotiations and stiffener and stiffer sanctions to cause General Cedras to return power to Aristide.

The first months of the Clinton administration were centered on events in Bosnia and Somalia, but the problems with Haiti were always in the background. Aristide contracted with a lobbyist to present his case for American intervention in Haiti, and enlisted influential Hollywood actors and the Congressional Black Caucus to press his case. Inside the administration the desire for concrete action in Haiti began to take hold.
Clinton's zigzag Haiti policy came to be dominated by a group of moralists who form a liberal web knotted together during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. They all speak the Carteresque "human rights first" policy. Vice President Al Gore and Lake passionately wanted the United States to use force to stop the atrocities. Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued against it.1

The administration's Haiti policy was being run by Lawrence Pezzullo, a Foreign Service officer, and Samuel Berger, a deputy to Anthony Lake, who was now the National Security Advisor. With U.S. sponsorship, the United Nations Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and an assets freeze against Haiti in June 1993. Pezzullo and Berger had been negotiating with both Aristide and Cedras to try and work out an arrangement whereby Aristide could be restored to power. On 3 July 1993 they seemed to have succeeded when both sides signed an agreement stating that Cedras would step down by 30 October 1993, and Aristide could return to Haiti. It quickly became evident that neither side, particularly Cedras, was really committed to the agreement, and that it was not going to be implemented.

In an attempt to revive the agreement, the White House originated a plan to send unarmed U.S. and Canadian military advisors to Haiti aboard the USS HARLAN COUNTY, a tank landing ship. Secretary of Defense Aspin opposed the move but was overruled by Lake and the White House advisors. On 11 October 1993, the HARLAN COUNTY steamed into Port-au-Prince carrying 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian trainers. The berth that was supposed to be open for the ship was blocked with small boats, and the dock was crowded with approximately 100-armed demonstrators. The HARLAN COUNTY put back to sea to await orders. The decision was made that an invasion by the force on the HARLAN COUNTY was a needless
risk of U.S. lives. On 12 October, the HARLAN COUNTY returned to the U.S. It seemed the U.S. policy towards Haiti had collapsed. "We'd never invade Haiti," White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers told a member of the U.S. Atlantic Command at a Pentagon gathering a few months later. "Getting in is easy. How do you get out?" "That's good to hear," the navy officer replied. "I'm glad someone in Washington has some sense."5

Despite the Press Secretary's words, the administration began looking seriously into conducting an invasion of Haiti.

Led by Lake and Berger, National Security Council officials pushed for aggressive action against the military regime. They wanted to crank up the sanctions and lay the groundwork for possible invasion. They were joined by senior advisor George Stephanopoulos and Strobe Talbott, the new deputy secretary of state, who had been handed the Haiti brief and soon decided that sanctions alone were unlikely to drive Cedras from power.6 In late April 1994, Pezzullo resigned and warned that the United States was heading irrevocably down a path toward unilateral military
tervention in Haiti.

Facing increasing political pressure from the left to act in Haiti, Clinton announced a change in his Haiti policy. He would end the direct return of Haitian refugees. Instead they would process them at sea and offer victims of political repression asylum. The new policy turned into a disaster. The administration had predicted that they would intercept about 2,000 Haitians a week, but by mid-June the number was 2,000 to 3,000 a day, with hundreds more being drowned. A quick decision was made to house the Haitians in third countries until Aristide could be restored to power in Haiti. It was becoming ever more important to the administration to solve the Haiti problem quickly.
On 5 July 1994, the USS INCHON, with 1,800 Marines aboard, was ordered to a position off the coast of Haiti. Officials leaked the word that the Marines might invade, but it was a bluff. The intent was to frighten Cedras into blocking the boat people. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense William Perry was authorized to try to seal off Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic using Pentagon resources. By late August with no solution in sight, the administration decided to invade Haiti.

On 15 September 1994, in a televised speech, President Clinton announced that General Cedras had to go and that all diplomacy had been exhausted. That same night Clinton contacted former President Jimmy Carter and asked him to lead a delegation to Haiti for one last try to prevent an invasion. Carter agreed, taking Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell with him to Port-au-Prince. The Carter team met with General Cedras and the Haitian leaders on the 17th and 18th of September. A peace agreement was worked out and agreed to at 8 P.M. on the 18th while planes carrying elements of the U.S. invasion force were in the air headed for Haiti. The agreement was somewhat ambiguous as to the status of General Cedras and the relationship between the Haitian forces and the U.S. forces. Nevertheless U.S. forces were coming to Haiti in what was now being termed an "intervasion" rather than an invasion.

The Marines

On 20 July 1994, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean (SPMAGTF Carib) was formed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
under the command of Colonel Thomas S. Jones, USMC. SPMAGTF Carib was created to provide a forward-deployed military presence tailored for anticipated missions in the ongoing Haitian crises. The SPMAGTF would replace the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) that had been sent to the waters off Haiti earlier in the month.⁸

In designing the SPMAGTF, Colonel Jones first considered the anticipated missions and possible enemy threat forces. Specific information on the enemy capabilities was difficult to come by, but he did know that the Force Armée d'Haiti (FAD'H) had about 8,100 active duty personnel organized into nine military departments and the metropolitan (Port-au-Prince) region. They were indifferently equipped with older weapons from several sources. The FAD'H was known to have five V-150 light armored vehicles along with at least two 90MM guns and three 20MM machine guns. The air force had about two dozen fixed-wing aircraft of varied types and eight helicopters.⁹ Colonel Jones believed his missions could possibly be a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) or an amphibious assault, and he wanted the flexibility to conduct both if necessary.

The ground force that Colonel Jones put together consisted of the 2nd Battalion (Bn), 2nd Marine Regiment, Company B (-), 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Bn, Battery B, 1st Bn, 10th Marine Regiment, (Battery B was directed to leave their M198 155MM howitzers at Camp Lejeune. They were organized and trained as a provisional rifle company for the deployment.) and one platoon from the 2nd Assault
Amphibian Battalion. The aviation combat element was HMM-264 consisting of 12 CH-46E Sea Knights, four AH-1W Super Cobras, three UH-1N Hueys, and four CH-53E Super Stallions. Rounding out the SPMAGTF was the combat service support element, CSSD-29. In designing this force Colonel Jones was greatly constrained by the ships available to him. These were the USS WASP, LHD-1, and the USS NASHVILLE, LPD-13. These two ships gave him less space than a normal MEU and caused Colonel Jones to make some tough decisions concerning force structure.

The armor included in SPMAGTF Carib was Company B, 2nd LAR, consisting of 9 LAV-25s (variants mounting the 25mm Bushmaster gun in a turret mount with 360 degree rotation. Each LAV-25 carries three to four scouts in the rear compartment that are permanently assigned to the vehicle.), two LAV-Ms (variants with an 81mm mortar mounted in the hull), two LAV-Ls (variants with an open cargo area in the hull for logistics), an LAV-C2 (variant with a command and control suite installed in the hull), and an LAV-R (variant for recovery operations with a crane and winch capability). The assets that the Company left behind included one platoon of LAV-25s and the section of LAV-ATs (variant that includes a turret for launching TOW antitank missiles). The Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) platoon consisted of 13 AAV P-7s (variants to carry approximately 18 Marines and equipped with a one man turret mounting a 50 caliber machine gun and a 40mm grenadelauncher), one AAV C-7 (variant with a command and control suite), and one AAV R-7 (variant for recovery operations).

Colonel Jones decision on which vehicles to include in the force was greatly affected by the space available on the two assigned ships.
It also revolved around the mix of landing craft that he chose to take. The decision on using Landing Craft Air Cushion or Landing Craft Utility, and how many of each, impacted on the space available for vehicles in the ships. Colonel Jones felt that he required the AAVs in order to conduct the ship to shore movement. He knew that the FAD'H did not possess a precision guided missile capability and so the landing could be conducted from close in rather than over the horizon. The AAVs were the way to get his infantry ashore and protect them from most of the weapons the FAD'H was known to have. As for the LAVs Colonel Jones said;

I had gained an appreciation for LAVs, after being a battalion commander in the desert . . . and I saw them operating in Panama. Obviously they gave us a lot of utility that in an operation other than war that we thought we might need, as far as quick reinforcement, reaction force, movement from point A to point B. The chain gun we felt was very effective . . . we didn't need big firepower because we didn't feel we could use a lot of firepower, because the area in Cap-Haitien where so much collateral damage could be resulted in with major firepower.\(^1\)

Colonel Jones said that he was encouraged by the commander of the 24th MEU, Brigadier General Ayers, who had been in Somalia, to consider adding the M1A1 tank to the force list. Colonel Jones did consider the tank, but rejected it for a number of reasons. He decided that the threat presented by the FAD'H was not sufficient to require the M1A1 to accomplish his mission. Available shipping also played a critical part in his decision. Taking the tanks would mean that something else would have to be left behind. Colonel Jones also considered the terrain that surrounded his objectives. Each of his initial objectives were in a populated area. The streets were narrow and the houses were of poor construction. Additionally, he knew that many of the households held
jars and other containers of gasoline that the people had been hoarding. He felt that if he utilized the firepower of the M1A1 he could easily start a fire that would cause a great deal of unintentional destruction.\(^{14}\)

Colonel Jones and his staff considered all the information available to them in designing the force structure for the SPMAGTF. They definitely wanted the combat power resident in the AAVs and LAVs. The mobility and protection that these vehicles provided were key factors in the decision making process. Consequently, Colonel Jones decided to take an LAR Co(-) and a platoon of AAVs. The decision to reject the M1A1 tank was based on an evaluation of the threat, mission, and terrain. However, it seemed clear in the discussion with Colonel Jones that the utility of the M1A1 in MOUT was recognized, and had more shipping space been available, he may very well have included it in his force list. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Greenwood, the SPMAGTF S-3, had this to say about the inclusion of the M1A1 on the force list:

If I had been in a Somalia scenario, where they did more work out of sector in a nonbuilt-up area, believe me if I'd been in Somalia I'd have wanted the M1 too. Given our threat and given where we were operating almost exclusively in a built up area there, and I don't mean to imply that tanks can't be used in a built-up area, but I think they would have had limited utility given the threat and the built-up area environment there at Cap-Haitien. Again, its not the same as Somalia, I would have taken lots of tanks in Somalia.\(^{15}\)

The decision on whether or not to include armor in the force list was an easy one for Colonel Jones. He definitely wanted it, the question was only how much and of what configuration.
Training

The SPMAGTF was organized on 20 July 1994, and departed Morehead City, North Carolina, on 13 August 1994. Consequently, there was little time for the units comprising the SPMAGTF to train together prior to deployment. The AAV platoon had a few days of training with the 2nd Bn infantry which was focused on ship to shore movement and forcible entry operations. The LAR company conducted its own training, but did not operate with the SPMAGTF forces prior to embarkation aboard ship. None of this training centered around peacekeeping operations, and nothing outside doctrinal training was conducted.16

After the SPMAGTF deployed, Colonel Jones conducted training directed towards the missions he considered most likely, that of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and amphibious assault. The SPMAGTF was able to conduct some rehearsals in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but none of the armored vehicles were allowed ashore for this training. The SPMAGTF proceeded to the island of Vieques, in Puerto Rico, and was able to conduct a full-scale rehearsal of the anticipated operation.17 Here they made a forcible entry onto the island and practiced assaulting their assigned objectives. Once this portion of the rehearsal was complete, the SPMAGTF practiced NEO operations. Both AAVs and the LAR company participated in these operations and felt confident in both their assault and NEO missions by the end of the exercise. The news covered the training exercise and their reports clearly conveyed the type of training taking place;

On a moonless night, the helicopter rotors whirred and the amphibious armored vehicles churned onto beaches, leading a mock air-and-sea assault on a Caribbean island. The nighttime attack may be a prelude to similar action in Haiti. The 1,300 Marines who
took part in the exercises are specially trained for quick takeovers of a port, an airport and an embassy. They did so during the mock invasion before dawn Wednesday, said Col. Tom Jones. The camouflage-uniformed soldiers blocked access from the designated "bad guy headquarters," a building several blocks behind the fake embassy—roughly the same positioning of the seaside U.S. Embassy from Haitian army headquarters in Port-au-Prince. The soldiers also evacuated people designated to represent U.S. diplomats, American expatriates, downed helicopter crews and several local nationals who Washington would want to safeguard, such as key supporters of ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. "We are prepared for any kind of situation, and I believe we are prepared for this," Col. Jones said. He did not elaborate on whether "this" meant Haiti.

While the Marines felt confident in their ability to accomplish an amphibious assault or a NEO, they did not spend time in training for peacekeeping operations. Neither Captain Robert Clark, the LAR company commander, or First Lieutenant Brian Andersen, the AAV platoon commander trained for crowd control, checkpoint operation, or cordon and search missions. The reason for not doing so was simple. They concentrated the limited time available for training on the missions that they considered most likely, and most important, those of assault and NEO. Additionally, the lack of training on peacekeeping operations reflected the attitude of the SPMAGTF commander, Colonel Jones. Colonel Jones said,

I had done a number of exercises in my two years as a regimental commander. I had been to Pickle Meadows twice. I did the month in Alaska with a light division and I did a month in Fort Bragg with a contingency division. Of course one of the big concerns with the Army is what do you do special to train for operations other than war. On the one hand [the light division] spent a lot of time and dealt with very specific orientation on NGOs and PVOs and those type things. The [contingency division] on the other end of the spectrum said we are a combat outfit and we will modify our training based on what pops up. I'm in the latter point of view I think. My Commanding General is a very smart guy named Jones, and he sort of agreed. He'd been to Bosnia and to northern Iraq as a MEU commander. We felt like if the guys were good disciplined, and we had a pretty well disciplined force, they could react to the proper targets a lot easier. I came away from that convinced of that. I do think there are some nuances to operations other than war that
might be helpful to look towards, that weren't maybe materialized in Haiti. Haiti was a piece of cake compared to what some of them are.  

Colonel Jones spoke further about his ideas on training in an article published in the Marine Corps Gazette.

If Haiti offers any indication, future scenarios will be characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and ambiguity. No formula of specific solutions will apply; leaders will have to adjust to absolute uncertainty. Training shortcuts and quick fixes will not help Marines learn to cope with this environment. "Flip-a-switch" or "teach-a-class" solutions are poor substitutes for training evolutions that subject Marines to increasing mental and physical stress. Not all folks are naturals; some never adjust. Those who "walk the last 100 meters" must have leaders able to cope with and literally thrive upon tenets of page 64 of FMFM 1.

Captain Clark and First Lieutenant Andersen seemed to agree with Colonel Jones that the key ingredient in their success was the ability of their Marines and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to adapt to the situation, be flexible, and to think on their own. While their training in running checkpoints and crowd control consisted of only discussions and sand table exercises while aboard ship, both felt that their troops executed these missions well. Both felt that a training package directed towards the specific missions that they performed in Haiti would have been beneficial, but pointed out that those missions were unknown, and were leery of having to dispense with other training to fit in peacekeeping training.

Clearly, the Marines relied on the training that they received during their normal training exercises to bring them through the Haiti operation. The short time frame between the activation of the SPMAGTF and deployment severely limited the ability of the SPMAGTF to implement a training plan to address a specific situation. During the training time that was available, the Marines logically concentrated on the
missions that they deemed most likely to occur. The Marine commanders were satisfied with the results obtained during the actual conduct of the Haiti operation. They believed their Marines succeeded by relying on small unit leadership and good judgment in dealing with each situation as it came up. The success of the mission is undeniable. It may be fortunate that the situation went relatively smoothly. As Colonel Jones said; "Haiti was a piece of cake." As will be discussed later under operations, no one ever fired at the vehicles, and full scale riots did not break out. When questioned about what they would have done if Haitian civilians placed themselves in front of the vehicles and refused to move, neither armored commander had a plan of action to deal with this, much less trained their troops to execute that plan. The training that the Marines received prior to going into Haiti proved sufficient for the situations that were actually encountered. However, it may not be correct to draw the conclusion that this doctrinal training is sufficient for future MOOTW missions.

**Rules of Engagement**

The rules of engagement (ROE) for the SPMAGTF were the subject of some confusion for the Marines involved. This was partially due to the change of mission from one of forcible entry to a permissive entry, and partially due to continual modification of the ROE as time went on. Captain John T. Quinn's article described the ROE situation in this way;

These rules had been formulated by the U.S. Atlantic Command over the course of the previous months, but with a seemingly endless series of minor modifications to the ROE throughout September threatening to thoroughly confuse the picture, Jones held off publishing them to the MAGTF until the situation became clearer. Along with the ROE, Jones made a point of emphasizing to leaders at all levels that the "hearts and minds" of the Haitian people were
the ultimate objective of the operation at hand. He urged leaders
to think about the consequences of their actions ashore, but to use
force decisively if force was warranted. He cautioned them that the
security of the MAGTF and of the residents of Cap-Haïtien were
inseparable, and that the best protection for Marines was for the
local populace to know that they shared fully the benefits of that
security. Lastly, Col. Jones pledged that he would not second-guess
the battlefield judgment of his subordinates.26

In a further discussion of ROE the Center for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) reports;

There were three sets of ROE established for the forced entry
operations. The first set of ROE was to be used during the period
of hostility. These ROE were printed on white cards. The second
set of ROE was printed on blue cards, and were to be used during the
transition to civil-military operations. The Aviation community has
a set of ROE that covered the periods of hostilities, transition,
and peacetime. These ROE were printed on yellow cards. All three
sets of ROE were drafted into the OPLAN for this mission. All color
coded cards were disseminated prior to the execution of the forced
entry by the divisions.26

The CALL document further says that when the forced entry mission was
scrubbed, the second card was instituted immediately, and that within
eighteen hours of landing the ROE was changed to a peacetime ROE. This
was modified again on D+2 and new cards were available by D+4.27

It is interesting that none of these cards were mentioned in the
interviews with the Marine commanders and that Lieutenant Colonel
Anthony Zell, the Marine Air Combat Element Commander, has no memory of
any ROE cards being issued to his men.28 Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood
may have provided the answer in his interview where he said:

We had a lot of trouble with the ROE because of the typical
problem you get down at the small unit level. The stuff that
Washington issues and comes down through the CINC is great for
lawyers, but it's not simple enough to remember. My commander's
policy was, if ROE has to be printed on a card, and the trooper or
Marine has to carry a card in his pocket to remember it, its still
too complicated. So we kind of synthesized it and came up with our
own ROE. It was basically . . . self defense and anybody that made
provoking threats or gestures with a weapon, you were going to take

88
them out. This was before and after the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement.29

The ROE as it applied to armored vehicles was the subject of a little confusion amongst the Marines themselves. Colonel Jones believed that the use of the 25MM chain gun on the LAVs, the Cobra gunships, and the up-gunned weapons station of .50 caliber machine-gun and 40MM grenade launcher on the AAVs, would have to be approved through him before use. He said, "As we went in, the use of the chain-gun, the use of the Cobra gunships, the use of the up-gunned system, that still came back through me. That was a modification to the ROE."30 By this Colonel Jones meant that these weapons were to be used only for self-defense without his concurrence. Any use as fire support or suppression would have to be approved through his headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Zell, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood, Captain Clark, and First Lieutenant Anderson, all believed that their vehicle commanders and pilots had the authority to engage targets with those weapons systems if the situation called for it.31 After coming ashore, Captain Clark issued instructions to his platoon commanders that the 25MM rounds were not to be cycled into the firing positions on the chain gun, and that he wanted to be informed of any desire to utilize the chain gun before it was fired. He did this on his own without instructions from higher command.32 First Lieutenant Andersen told his AAV commanders that they were not to fire the up-gunned weapons station without permission from the local commander, whether that was section level, platoon level, or a supported unit commander.33

What is clear is that the Marines were very cognizant of the damage their weapons could inflict on the population and the structures
in Cap-Haitien. They were keenly aware that employing these weapons was a step that should not be taken lightly. What also came across clearly in each of the conversations with the Marine commanders was that protection of the force was the highest priority. Colonel Jones was not going to second guess his commanders' actions in the field. He believed they were well trained and capable of making the right decisions. He communicated this to his subordinate commanders, and they understood his intent and acted accordingly. The Marines never fired their vehicle weapons during the operation. However, it is clear that they would have utilized these weapons if they felt the situation called for it and the Marine command would have supported them. The key is that the Marines understood the commanders' intent for ROE and acted accordingly.

AAV Operations

The agreement forged between former President Carter and General Cedras set the stage for the intervention. U.S. Army and Special Operations Command forces were going to land in Port-au-Prince starting on the morning of 19 September 1994. The Marines would land at Cap-Haitien the next day.34 For the AAV platoon this meant that their initial task would be conducting the ship-to-shore movement with Company G, 2nd Marines embarked. The AAV platoon was part of Task Force Irish, which included Company G and the LAR Company. A Navy SEAL team had completed a reconnaissance of Blue Beach, the planned landing beach, and the landing went off without a problem at 0700 on 20 September 1994.35

Once ashore, the AAV platoon was tasked to transport Company G to seize Battalion Landing Team (BLT) objectives within the city. As First Lieutenant Andersen's platoon of 14 AAVs made its way through the
city, it became apparent to him that AAVs were going to have a difficult
time transiting the narrow city streets. "The city was too narrow in a
lot of places for us to drive through without damaging property." The
damage that the AAVs did to the city was slight. Some buildings were
grazed, but no buildings were structurally affected. Damage to the
roads was negligible, but it was difficult to tell since they were in
such bad shape to begin with. First Lieutenant Andersen also felt
constrained by the crowds that ran along side the convoy as it proceeded
through the city. He was very conscious of the possibility of catching
someone in the tracks of the vehicle, particularly the children. On
occasion the crowd would assist the column by pushing cars out of the
way so that the vehicles did not run over them. At the same time, First
Lieutenant Andersen was concerned for the security of his men. He
realized that anyone armed with an antitank rocket could disable his
first and last vehicles trapping the whole column in a narrow street
with no place to go. First Lieutenant Andersen said; "after that
mission we concluded that we could no longer do it safely, and it would
probably be better to let another unit do it." Specifically, First
Lieutenant Andersen knew the LAVs were available to conduct mechanized
patrols in the city and he considered those to be the perfect platform
for the mission. Colonel Jones agreed with First Lieutenant
Andersen. He had a great respect for the capabilities of the LAV and
saw the problems with the use of the AAV. He had this to say about the
AAVs,

"... we could in fact move them through the city. We just had to
be more careful how we did it. There were certain parts of downtown
Cap-Haitien that you could not, or would not, have wanted to put an
AAV in had you gone against somebody that had guerrilla type
tactics. They could have sabotaged you quite readily if you weren't careful.  
Consequently, the AAVs were not given patrolling missions after the first movement through the city.

The mission assigned to the AAV platoon was port security. Colonel Jones saw the port as a key position. The logistics support for the operation was flowing through the port, and as new units arrived their equipment was stored there pending distribution. This made the port a lucrative target for the masses of Haitian civilians who were anxious for some type of relief from their squalid living conditions. Colonel Jones described the Haitian crowds that gathered around the port as 'energized'. As the crowds pressed in around the port, the fear was not only for the theft of military equipment and supplies, but for a total loss of control in the area if rioting broke out. 

The AAV platoon positioned their vehicles around the port and blocked streets leading into the area. The AAVs were an actual physical barrier to the crowds and concertina wire was strung between the vehicles themselves. The size of the AAV itself was intimidating to the Haitians. An AAV is 10 feet 9 inches high, 10 feet 9 inches wide, and 26 feet 1 inch long. They presented a vertical steel wall to the Haitians. Atop the AAV was the turret with the machine-gun and grenade launcher. The turret also possessed a sighting system allowing the crew to focus in on any part of the crowd where a disturbance was breaking out. The height of the AAV allowed the crew to have an exceptional 360° field of view. Colonel Jones, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood, and First Lieutenant Andersen all reported that the size, sound, and menacing nature of the AAVs never failed to impress the Haitians, and they
invariably gave way when the AAVs approached.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood said that the psychological aspect was a key element in deciding to let the AAVs continue to operate in the town and port area.

That [the psychological factor] was a key decision in why we let the battalion employ the Amtracs in their security mission in the downtown area of Cap-Haitien. There was some thought that once we got ashore of pulling the Amtracs back to the beach and kind of putting them in a harbor site. Both the BLT commander and the MAGTF commander, Colonel Jones, prudently decided that they could be a major psychological impetus to what the security operations were trying to achieve in denying access, crowd control, and so forth.\textsuperscript{42}

As a physical and psychological barrier, the AAVs were extremely effective in securing the port area.

Another example of the use of AAVs in crowd control situations, was when the AAV platoon responded to a call for help from a food distribution station. The crowd was getting out of control, and the AAVs were dispatched to assist the Marines involved. First Lieutenant Andersen described the mission in this way;

The SPMAGTF command element had a food distribution site set up at a school in the middle of town. They had one LAV C\textsuperscript{2} present as the commander's vehicle, but generally it was five tons with some HMMWVs. They were all armed and everything, but they were standard size vehicles. The crowd started becoming intense, and they ran out of food obviously. They were trying to think of a way to get the company of Marines out of that food distribution point safely, as well as the five tons and the HMMWVs. I received a call from BLT 2/2s CO over the radio to send up a section of vehicles to assist in crowd control. Eventually the entire platoon . . . ended up at that location. We put the AAVs back to back, or bowplane to tail end, and we cordoned off the area. They were a physical barrier. The people respected that barrier and they did not climb over the AAVs, they did not touch it. In addition, the AAVs have a bowplane, which we use in the water. It raises up to assist in water, and we were able to raise that off our front, and that kind of pushed the people away as we drove into position. The people were not violent, and they got out of the way, and once we became a physical barrier, they stayed back.\textsuperscript{43}
The use of the AAVs was successful in this mission and was invariably successful in crowd control situations throughout the Marine presence in Cap-Haitien.

A quick reaction force for the SPMAGTF was formed within a day of landing. The AAVs were not included in this force. This was attributed to the fact that the LAVs were seen to be a more suitable vehicle for the mission. The presence of the LAVs excluded the AAVs from this mission, but this does not mean the AAVs could not have been used if the LAVs were unavailable.

The SPMAGTF utilized the AAVs to take the maximum advantage of their capabilities, and to complement those of the force as a whole. The AAV was the vehicle of choice to make the assault landing, and First Lieutenant Andersen said that the Haitians backed away in shock as they saw the size of the vehicles emerging from the water. The AAVs were able to transport troops through the city to their initial objectives, but the fear of damage to the city and the availability of LAVs led to a more restrictive use as the operation progressed. The AAVs were seen as very successful in crowd control and security of fixed sites. The bulk of the vehicles, the firepower they possessed, and the observation they provided through their height and sighting system proved a great asset. The psychological aspect of armor had a definite effect on the local population. There is little doubt that the presence of the AAVs intimidated the Haitians and may have well have stopped any disturbance from taking place.
LAV Operations

The LAVs of Company B followed the AAVs ashore on Blue Beach in the initial assault into Cap-Haitien. The LAVs then moved with Task Force Irish to secure the JTF and BLT objectives assigned to them. The LAR Company moved through the perimeter established by Company G and secured the local police station. From there, the Company moved through the town to seize the two main routes leading into the city.

Subsequently, the Company moved to the airfield to link-up with Task Force (TF) Hawg, the heliborne TF that had assaulted into the airfield. During the move to the airfield, the Company was assisted by an Army OH-58 helicopter that scouted ahead and reported on trafficability and presence of FAD'H forces.46

During this initial mission, Captain Clark believed that the presence of the LAVs had a psychological effect on the Haitians. He said;

I can't recall actually factoring into the plan a psychological impact that we would have, but it did have one. When they saw, to them, what were these large vehicles . . . bristling with weapons. I think it had the impact of letting them know that we were here, and that we were armed and ready to deal with the situation. It wasn't just a token force. We put into that town, for the area, some significant size force. From the standpoint of the civilian populace of the town they were quite happy to see us and I think not just because they were U.S. forces landing, but because as we pushed through, these large vehicles, which I think they felt were there to protect them against the Haitian armed forces, gave them a positive feeling towards us. More so possibly than if we had just put infantry on the deck.47

Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood believed the LAVs had a definite psychological impact. He said;

With the LAVs, their ability to move from one sector of the city to another rapidly was certainly a psychological plus that we factored into what we were going to do down there.48
The Marines felt that the presence of LAVs at once intimidated and reassured the Haitians. The size of the LAV was impressive to those unfamiliar with main battle tanks, and the rapidity with which they could move from one area to another showed the populace that the vehicles could get to a problem area quickly. At the same time as this capability intimidated the Haitian civilians, it also gave them confidence that the Marines could protect them from the FAD'H.

The second mission carried out by the LAR Company was security of a sector of the city. The infantry companies were assigned sectors in the heart of the city while the LAR Company's sector was on the southern edge of the city and into the countryside. In this mission B Company set up static section (two LAVs) positions within the sector at key points. These vehicles were to observe and maintain control within their assigned areas. In accordance with the guidance given by Colonel Jones, they were not to permit any abuse of the civilian populace by the FAD'H. One of the security checkpoints was visited by a reporter who described the checkpoint:

For the past two days, a parade of Haitians has approached the Marines' armored personnel carrier parked outside the dilapidated Cine Jet II theater asking for help, lavishing praise, even asking for dates. Since Tuesday's landing, the days have fallen into a frustrating routine for the six-man crew of the armored personnel carrier, call-signed Calvin. Another APC 50 yards down the road is call-signed Hobbes. At dawn, they move out from the perimeter of barbed wire around the port and take up positions along the main road in Cap-Haitien. At dusk, they go back behind the wire.49

The Haitians were curious about the vehicles, but they were also respectful. Crowds would gather and stare at the Marines, and Captain Clark said he often felt like he was an attraction in a zoo. The crowds did not touch the vehicles; however, and the Marines did not encourage
them to come forward. No vehicle tours were offered and the vehicles were off limits to the populace.50

Another mission that the LAR Company performed was to participate in a quick reaction force. The Company would normally have only two to three static checkpoints manned in the sector and the rest of the company's vehicles would be in the port area ready to participate as a quick reaction force. At the same time, the armored HMMWVs of the heavy machine gun platoon formed another part of the BLT's reaction force. The quick reaction force was tasked to move to any part of the area of operations to respond to any identified threats. On one occasion, a report of a sniper caused the LAVs to be dispatched. They responded quickly and secured the area. A search of a suspected building hideout revealed a Haitian armed with a revolver. He was captured without resistance by the Marines and taken back to the BLT command post.51

The LAVs of the reaction force responded during the one firefight that occurred during the Haiti operation to date. A Marine foot patrol from E Company became involved in a dispute with members of the Haitian police. A Haitian police officer made a threatening gesture with his weapon towards the Marines and the Marine lieutenant responded by killing the Haitian. Additional Haitian police began firing, and the Marines surrounded the police building and began returning fire. A news report described the scene:

A quick reaction force immediately responded, sealing off the northwest section of this city of 75,000. Civilians ran from the shooting, locking themselves behind shuttered doors and windows. A Marine armored personnel carrier that rushed to support the platoon then turned on its headlights to illuminate the street scene, as
Marine riflemen pointed their weapons at the open windows on the top floor of the two-story yellow stucco building.\(^2\)

A three hour stand off ensued with the Haitians finally surrendering to the Marine forces.

After about a week in Haiti, the LAR Company was ordered to begin mobile patrols throughout their sector. Captain Clark began sending out section size patrols that moved through the city. These were designed as a show of force to intimidate the Haitian police and the FAD'H, and also to reassure the Haitian civilians. One newspaper report described it this way:

In a show of force to intimidate the police and comfort civilians, the Marine commander, Col. Tom Jones, ordered light armored tanks to roll through the streets and Cobra helicopter gunships to fly overhead. About 80 Marines were assigned to stand watch at more than a dozen police precincts this evening to keep order.\(^3\)

Captain Clark said that his patrols operated throughout his assigned sector on a 24-hour basis and encountered little difficulty in moving through the city. He felt that there were sections of the city that would have been difficult to maneuver through and these were left to dismounted forces. His vehicles moved with about 50 meters separation between them. The crews had the hatches open with their heads sticking out. They felt this was the only way to get the observation they needed to operate in the city. The concern for hitting a pedestrian had not lessened, and the tight confines of the city made close-hatched operations impracticable. Additionally, if the gunner on the vehicle tried looking through his sights while in the town the close proximity of the buildings served to disorient him given the magnification of the sights. This could be overcome while stationary, but on-the-move it was
impossible to be effective while looking through the sights. The 25MM gun had sufficient elevation to be able to track targets in the second and third stories of buildings which proved a real asset in the urban setting. Communications were conducted over very high frequency (VHF) radio between vehicles and also dismounted Marines. This proved surprisingly reliable considering the urban environment and its effect on line-of-sight capabilities. Overall, Captain Clark felt the mobile patrols were highly effective in establishing a strong Marine presence throughout the city. The vehicles were maneuverable, relatively easy to operate, and brought more firepower to bear than any possible opponent could generate. Finally, the scout element in each vehicle provided a ready source for all around security when stationary, and the capability to check out sites that were inaccessible while mounted.

Subsequent to the firefight at the police station, almost all resistance to the Marines by the Haitian forces ceased. In fact, Lieutenant Colonel Claude Josaphat, the Haitian commander in the area, disappeared along with many of his men. Marine patrols continued up to their departure on 2 October 1994.

The LAR Company did experience a few logistics difficulties during the operation. They exhausted their on hand supply of alternator belts, and Captain Clark directed that one be taken from an LAV M and placed on an LAV 25. The LAV M remained in a stationary position at the port and was capable of conducting indirect fire from that position if necessary. The LAV C² had both of its fuel pumps break. This occurred towards the end of the mission and a fuel pump had to be removed from another vehicle to get the LAV C² back aboard ship. Captain Clark
reported that he was never able to receive any replacement parts from anywhere outside CSSD-29. If it was not on hand, it could not be had. This could turn out to be a significant problem for deployed forces. A system of resupply that is capable of quickly getting needed parts out to the deployed forces is critical. With the small numbers of vehicles that can be deployed because of limited shipping, the force can not afford to have them in a not mission ready status. This is particularly galling when the problems are easily solved within a matter of minutes given the correct parts. Conversely, Colonel Jones was very pleased with his logistics support. He believed that the relatively short distance between Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, and the U.S. made for an easy resupply situation. He specifically mentioned AAV parts that were resupplied during the operation and his overall assessment of the logistics was very positive.  

The LAVs were exceptionally valuable to the SPMAGTF commander. He said that he knew they would be valuable when he began the mission and that they not only met, but exceeded his expectations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Initial Impressions backs this up by stating; "The Marine LAVs were exceptionally versatile in an OOTW urban environment." The LAVs were able to maneuver through the city without damage to themselves or to the city itself. They brought with them more firepower than was available to any other force in the city. The vehicles themselves were well suited to operation in an urban environment with sighting systems and weapons system elevation capability adequate to engage multistory buildings. The Marines did not have the forces to place guards on every street. The LAVs gave them the
ability to move throughout the city and to concentrate quickly in a threatened area. The psychological effect of the vehicles was felt in every operation. Haitians never failed to make way for the vehicles and the arrival of the LAVs at a particular site always had a calming effect on the situation. Of the LAVs, Colonel Jones said; "I would never go without them again if I had the decision to make." 59

Conclusion

The armored forces employed in Haiti by the Marines were extremely effective and were a major factor in the success enjoyed by the Marine forces as a whole. The Haitian mission was low threat from the standpoint of conventional combat. This was even more so after the Carter, Powell, Nunn agreement was concluded ensuring peaceful access to the country. Despite this low threat, the requirement for armored forces was evident and they played a key role in achieving the mission.

The selection of vehicles and configurations turned out to be almost exactly what was needed. The AAVs were critical in the ship to shore movement and were effective in the operations they were assigned once ashore. The LAVs were outstanding assets, and the LAV 25 proved highly effective in urban terrain. The LAV Ms were employed the least of any LAV variant. The need for indirect fire from their 81mm mortars was never manifested, and they remained in the port area for the duration of the mission. In fact, one was disabled to provide parts to keep an LAV 25 running. 60 This may be misleading as to the usefulness of the LAV M. If open conflict between the FAD'H and the Marines had broken out, as was very possible, the ability to react to any part of the city with indirect fire assets may have been crucial. As it was
however, the LAV Ms were underutilized. Looking back on the mission, Colonel Jones felt that the numbers and types of vehicles were sufficient, but if he had it to do over again he would have added another LAV C³. As it was, the BLT CO had a command vehicle and the MAGTF CO did not. Colonel Jones would have liked one for each command group.

Colonel Jones felt that the decision not to include the M1A1 was the correct one. The urban area assigned to the SPMAGTF would have been extremely difficult for tanks to operate in without severely damaging the city. The possible threats to the Marines were nothing that could not be handled by the LAVs and AAVs assigned to the force, and to the uninitiated one big vehicle is as intimidating as another, whether it is a tank or an AAV. Finally, the lack of shipping available drove the force mix to a great extent, and taking the tanks would have meant leaving other assets behind.

The operations of the armor forces were critical to the mission. Colonel Jones used his armor to best support his objectives. He came ashore in an amphibious assault with AAVs leading. The Haitians were immediately impressed as the AAVs emerged from the water and kept away from the Marine forces. The impression of overwhelming force was sent from the very start by this action. As the AAVs and infantry set up the perimeter to protect the landing of additional forces, the LAVs used their maneuverability and speed to strike directly for the objectives and to link-up with the heliborne force at the airfield. Later the AAVs were used for site security and crowd control missions. These uses worked to their strengths of size, firepower, and intimidating effect.
It also avoided their weakness of limited maneuverability in an urban environment. The LAVs were utilized to patrol and to act as a quick reaction force. This used their strengths of maneuverability and firepower to provide a strong Marine presence throughout the area of operations. Presence was important in showing the FAD'H that the Marines were everywhere and would not let them continue unilateral control even in some parts of the city.

The psychological aspect of armor operations in this particular case cannot be overstated. The Haitian population had not been exposed to armored vehicles in the past and the sheer size and bulk of the vehicles intimidated them. This was true for the civilians who were only trying to get food at the distribution points, and for the FAD'H who may have been contemplating some type of aggressive action. The armor gave tangible evidence of the overwhelming force possessed by the Marines. This effect may have worn off in time, or have been diluted if the armor was directly challenged and failed to respond. For the short time the Marines were in Cap-Haitien this did not occur.

The presence of armor in this mission was of great benefit to the Marine commander even though none of his armored vehicles ever fired a shot. They performed the missions tasked to them with skill and professionalism. Clearly, a MOOTW mission such as the Haiti operation should include armored forces.
Endnotes


2 "How Did We Get Here," Newsweek, 26 September 1994, 27.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 28.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 30.


10 Quinn, 50.


12 Captain Robert Clark, USMC, 30 November 1995; and First Lieutenant Brian C. Andersen, USMC, 18 December 1995.

13 Colonel Jones interview.

14 Ibid.

15 Lieutenant Colonel Tom Greenwood, USMC, 4 December 1995.

16 First Lieutenant Andersen interview; and Captain Clark interview.

17 Colonel Jones interview.


19 Captain Clark interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

20 Colonel Jones interview.

22 Captain Clark interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

23 Colonel Jones interview.

24 Captain Clark interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

25 Quinn, 51.


27 Ibid.

28 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Zell, USMC, Conversation with author, 1 February 1996.

29 Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood interview.

30 Colonel Jones interview.

31 Lieutenant Colonel Zell conversation; Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood interview, Captain Clark interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

32 Captain Clark interview.

33 First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

34 Quinn, 52.

35 Ibid.

36 First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Colonel Jones interview.

40 Ibid.

41 Colonel Jones interview; Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

42 Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood interview.

43 First Lieutenant Andersen interview.
"Colonel Jones interview; and First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

49First Lieutenant Andersen interview.

"Captain Clark interview.

47Ibid.

48Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood interview.


50Captain Clark interview.

51Ibid.


54Colonel Jones interview; and Captain Clark interview.

55Captain Clark interview.

56Colonel Jones interview.

57Ibid.


59Colonel Jones interview.

60Captain Clark interview.

61Colonel Jones interview.

62Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (ARMY)

Background

To execute the operations plans being developed for Operation Uphold Democracy, the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), established Joint Task Force (JTF) 180. JTF-180 was formed around the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps and eventually became a Combined JTF/MNF (a multinational force includes forces from at least two different nations). Subordinate to CJTF-180 was CJTF-190 which commanded the Army combat forces allocated to the operation, except for some involved in special operations missions.1

CJTF-190 included elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 24th Infantry Division (ID), and eventually the 25th ID. CJTF-190, like their counterparts in the SPMAGTF, were planning on a forcible invasion of Haiti. The armor allocated to this force was the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry (Mech) (3-15) of the 24th ID. Also available was the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor (3-73) of the 82nd Airborne Division. With the advent of the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement that permitted a peaceful entry into Haiti the force list for CJTF-190 changed. The 82nd Airborne units, already in the air and heading for Haiti, were turned around and sent back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Consequently, the 3-73rd would not arrive in Haiti until much later in the operation.
The 3-15 Mech was assigned as a mobile reserve for JTF-190. In the initial plan the entire 3-15 Mech was intended to deploy to Haiti. However, as the mission changed from one of forcible entry to one of peaceful entry, followed by peacekeeping, only one company along with a maintenance detachment was actually deployed. This force was designated Team Victory, and it consisted of 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) (a BFV has a 25MM chain-gun and a dual TOW anti-tank missile launcher mounted in a turret capable of 360 degree rotation. There is a 3-man crew and a 6-man infantry squad with each vehicle.); six M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) (An M-113 APC is a tracked vehicle mounting a .50 caliber machine-gun in an external mount. Of the six M113s, four carried an engineer platoon, one a maintenance detachment, and the last was configured as an ambulance.); two Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges (AVLB) (An AVLB is an M60 tank chassis with a folding bridge mounted on top. The bridge can be self-deployed by the vehicle and used by other vehicles to cross obstructions.); two M9 Armored Combat Engineer vehicles (ACE) (An ACE is a tracked armored vehicle with a 2-man crew and a scoop designed for engineer operations.); finally, there were two M88A1 Recovery vehicles (M88) (These are tracked vehicles equipped with a crane lift, a blade, and a winch for recovering or servicing damaged or mired tracked vehicles. Each vehicle has a .50 caliber machine-gun in a mount above the commanders hatch.).

The 3-15 Mech designed Team Victory based on what they believed the mission and threat required. The threats that they identified were
the V-150 light armored vehicles owned by the FAD'H, infantry attacks with small arms and grenades, and command detonated mines. However, one of the Team Victory platoon commanders, First Lieutenant John Monahan, felt that the intelligence assessment was "weak". He said that while the intelligence briefs identified the heavy weapons company with the V-150s they failed to adequately cover the different groups in the area and how they were armed. 3-15 believed that as the mobile force for CJTF-190, they needed armor and firepower sufficient to destroy the V-150s, and the capability to maneuver through the confined areas of Port-au-Prince. The BFV was capable of destroying the V-150s and at the same time they felt they could maneuver it through the narrow streets of the city. The engineer platoon, ACEs, and AVLBs were there to ensure that any obstacles to movement could be quickly reduced or overcome. There was some doubt as to whether the bridges in the country would support the BFVs, and that was the reason for including the AVLBs. A robust maintenance detachment was included with the two M-88s. It was felt that the light divisions of CJTF-190 would be inexperienced in, and possibly incapable of, supporting the maintenance of mechanized forces. Consequently, Team Victory would have to rely on its own ability to repair any damaged or inoperable vehicles.

One factor that weighed heavily in designing Team Victory was 3-15's recent experience in Somalia. Most of the battalion had been deployed to Somalia and their outlook on Haiti was heavily influenced by what occurred there. This is particularly true concerning the loss of personnel by Task Force Ranger. Captain John Valledor, the Team Victory commander, said; "It was felt that the BFV had the firepower and the
protection required in the event that we encountered a situation similar to that experienced by Task Force Ranger in Somalia in October 93." Major William Dickens, the Team Victory liaison officer to CJTF-190, supported this view saying:

You have to go back to the Somalia operation. This was the same brigade and half the Bn, 3-15, which sent folks with Task Force 1-64 to Somalia. So there was a lot of emotionalism with what happened there in Somalia. My opinion is Bradleys went on that operation [Uphold Democracy] for the same reason we sent an armored task force to Somalia after we had light forces on the ground for months over there. It was a political decision that we were never sending light forces without some sort of armored force with them. Consequently, 3-15 was very focused on ensuring that Team Victory had the firepower it needed to defeat any kind of threat that could possibly be encountered in Haiti. The lessons learned from Somalia on being self supporting to a large degree, and having a rounded out team of not only BFVs but support vehicles were applied to Team Victory. Finally, in Somalia, 3-15 had started out as a team and ended up being a Task Force. They believed that this was possible for Haiti also and wanted a strong support base if they had to increase the number of deployed Companies in the future.

Team Victory did not include any tanks. In fact, this was an area that 3-15 did not have any real say in. Major Dickens reports that the decision on the use of tanks was made at a much higher level;

It was analysis done at higher than this division [24th ID]. So when they called down from the National Command Authority, through the JTF and all that, it was directed we were taking a mech Co Tm and no armor. The rest of it, all the support around the mech Co Tm was our decision, or our recommendation back up, but the no tanks, that was directed from higher. The Team Victory leaders were not greatly concerned with this prohibition. They felt that the weight and size of the M1A1 was such
that it would not be able to maneuver through the city of Port-au-Prince or the surrounding area. They also felt that the threat presented by the FAD'H did not warrant the use of the M1A1. 

Another capability that was excluded from the team was indirect fire assets. Team leaders felt that they would not be able to employ indirect fire assets in the urban areas and that these were not required. If it turned out that indirect fire assets were required 3-15 felt that these could be brought in later.

The actual mission anticipated by Team Victory was one of forcible entry by lodgment forces, with Team Victory following by D+2. The Team would be off-loaded from ships at Port-au-Prince and from there it would move to secure the international airport near the city. Subsequently, Team Victory expected to be employed to destroy the Haitian armored assets and then to act as CJTF-190's mobile reserve. Once the situation changed to one of peaceful entry the situation became a little unclear. Major Dickens said;

Once the decision was made that it was not going to be the take down. We were coming into a friendly situation if you will, being invited in. The mission became very nebulous. We were to arrive and do whatever the JTF wanted us to do. Initially that was secure the airfield. During the take down part we were supposed to come in, off-load, and secure the airfield also. So in both plans or initial mission was to come in and secure the international airport.

The Team also expected some type of peacekeeping mission after initial operations. How this mission would play out, and what exactly their role would be was very vague though. Their ideas on this were heavily influenced by the battalion's Somalia experience, even though Company B, the Team Victory BFV Company, had not deployed to Somalia.
Within the latitude given them by higher command, 3-15 designed Team Victory based on the mission and the anticipated threat. They relied on their corporate experience from Somalia and the threat analysis from Haiti. As Major Dickens indicated, there may have been an element of politics involved in including armor at all. Regardless, 3-15 carefully considered what they were trying to accomplish and the possible missions and designed a force they felt would do the job.

Training

Team Victory was able to conduct a training package centered on peacekeeping operations just prior to their deployment to Haiti. The Team received notice that they were deploying to Haiti ten days before their scheduled departure. For the first three days after notification Team Victory embarked their vehicles and equipment. Subsequent to this, the Team participated in a training course that was created by the battalion commander and three company commanders who had participated in the Somalia operation. Captain Valledor described the training this way:

We were lucky. Three of the company team commanders had recent experience in this similar kind of environment with Bradleys. They and the Bn commander put together lanes, situational lanes, and we used their equipment, on some of the lessons learned that they had in Somalia. The training focused around the establishment of roadblocks and check points, convoy security, convoy escort, downed aircraft recovery, and some basic tips on presence patrolling.14

Captain Valledor felt that the training was extremely beneficial for Team Victory. He said that, "almost to the letter these [the previously listed missions] were the missions we received."15 This was important because Major Dickens, Captain Valledor, and First Lieutenant John R. Monahan all felt that the missions they received in Haiti had very
little in common with their Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks that they normally train to in garrison. First Lieutenant Monahan felt that the training was useful and important to his platoon. He believed though that the training package was oriented on what the Battalion had experienced during the last phase of the Somalia operation, and that this did not translate exactly into what needed to be done in Haiti. However, he thought that very useful lessons were taught in riot control, the use of obstacle plans in crowd control, communicating with supporting aircraft, and ROE in a peacekeeping operation. Practice in each of these things was limited due to the short time frame. As an example of one of the lessons he learned, First Lieutenant Monahan referred to how he would keep his support elements in the center of his patrol or convoy during peacekeeping operations as opposed to keeping them in the rear of the unit as he would during normal combat operations. Major Dickens was less enthusiastic about the effect of the training than Captain Valledor or First Lieutenant Monahan. He felt that little of the training actually addressed what the team was required to do in Haiti. He described the benefit of the training in this way:

I think it helped focus our guys that what we were doing, or what we were about to do, was different than what we train normally to do, which is more METL related mid to high intensity conflict level stuff. So it helped them kind of ratchet down a little bit. To be worried about civilians, to be worried about securing themselves, to run convoy ops, that sort of thing.

Captain Valledor said that there were missions that he conducted in Haiti that were not part of the training package. These included cordon and search, and fixed site security.
It was clear in the interviews with Major Dickens, Captain Valledor, and First Lieutenant Monahan that they felt the training package was beneficial to their ability to carry out the mission in Haiti. On the question of whether peacekeeping training should be included as a METL task, at least Major Dickens was a little hesitant. He felt that there just was not enough time to train to their current METL tasks and any added peacekeeping ones. Given this, he felt that it was far better to be trained for mid to high intensity conflict, and have to react to peacekeeping missions than to do it the other way around. He fully believed in conducting peacekeeping training once the mission was assigned, but not on a normal basis. He did not believe that a unit well trained in their METL tasks could easily transition to peacekeeping. They would need some type of training to be prepared.\textsuperscript{20} Captain Valledor described his feelings about the utility of peacekeeping training in this way;

\begin{quote}
We had to learn on the fly. If I had to do it all over again, that's not the way I want to deploy. We were lucky. The Haitians, Cedras's Army, did not force me to apply lethal force within the first three weeks we were in the theater. Had that happened, it would have been hairy. Luckily they gave us the opportunity to learn these new techniques with the light division. Once we learned them we felt pretty comfortable we could execute the mission. If there were any way to train commanders on these tasks before they go into the theater, you need to do that. As a minimum, what I recommended to my division in our AAR, is that heavy Co commanders need to be familiar with the tactics techniques and procedures that are outlined in the manuals that cover these operations.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

First Lieutenant Monahan also had some strong feelings on training for MOOTW. He said;

\begin{quote}
One thing, and I've had people disagree with me that haven't been on a peace enforcement mission, but any veterans from Somalia or soldiers who went to Haiti agree one hundred percent is this; The officers, as in the young lieutenant that just gets there to a new situation like that, he needs to know how to use the slice elements.
\end{quote}
He needs to know that engineers are more useful than just putting a breach in an obstacle. He needs to know what a CA team is and what a CI team is and what's the difference between the two of them. Going in there knowing how effective a PSYOPS team is, and how to use an interpreter.\textsuperscript{12}

The training that Team Victory was able to accomplish prior to deploying to Haiti was of great help to them. It did not cover all the missions they conducted, and in some cases was not what they needed at all. However, it seems that the battalion did the best that they could in the time available to prepare Team Victory for the mission. It is probably very fortunate that 3-15 was the same battalion that deployed to Somalia and had a resident corporate memory of what types of missions were necessary and how to conduct them, because all the participants interviewed say that it was nothing like their normal METL tasks. Consequently, Team Victory was probably the best trained heavy mechanized unit that could have been sent on operation Uphold Democracy.

**Rules of Engagement**

Team Victory was in the same situation concerning ROE as the rest of the forces participating in Uphold Democracy. Up until almost the last minute they were expecting to have to conduct a forcible entry and felt that they would have to participate in at least a limited amount of conventional combat. Team Victory was originally supposed to be under the operational control (OPCON) of a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. To effect liaison, the Team Victory commander had made a trip to Fort Bragg to meet with the brigade and receive his instructions. At this meeting Captain Valledor received the ROE.\textsuperscript{23}

With the change of circumstances to peaceful entry the ROE immediately changed, and the brigade that Team Victory expected to work with went
back to Fort Bragg. Consequently, Team Victory was faced with a new ROE and working with a new units standard operating procedures (SOP).

Team Victory did receive the ROE cards that were issued by the CJTF. These did not specifically address the use of armor. All three of the officers interviewed by the author, Major Dickens, Captain Valledor, and First Lieutenant Monahan, interpreted the ROE such that a Bradley vehicle commander had the authority to respond to a threat with any of the weapons systems on his vehicle that he thought was necessary. Under the ROE they were supposed to minimize collateral damage, but how to accomplish that and defend themselves was a judgment call on their part. They also interpreted the ROE to say that they could respond to threats of violence with fire. They did not have to actually receive fire in order to respond.

Despite this interpretation of the ROE, the Team Victory commander was very cognizant of the destructive power of his weapons, and the impact they would have in the urban area he was operating in. Captain Valledor made an early decision not to allow the use of the TOW missile by his men. He said;

I made an assessment on the ground from day one that the threat did not require a TOW missile. I ordered all my crews to store the TOW missiles in the carrying configuration within the Bradley as opposed to having it up in the turret. So the launcher itself had no TOW missiles in there. Also, that minimized the chance of having a sniper or a stray round impacting on the launcher, causing one of those rounds to ignite. Another reason cited for the decision not to use the TOW missile was that the fields of fire available in the city were too short to allow a TOW missile to arm before impact. A TOW requires 65 meters of flight
before the warhead arms itself and this range was difficult to acquire while in the city.

The second concern that Captain Valledor had, was with the ammunition available for his 25MM guns. Team Victory deployed to Haiti with a mix of ammunition that was based on their fighting METL tasks. This consisted of High Explosive Incendiary Tracer (HEIT), and Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot Tracer (APDST). Captain Valledor felt that these types of ammunition would cause an inordinate amount of destruction if used inside the city. The APDST, while non-explosive, is designed to penetrate armored vehicles. Consequently, shooting it in the city would mean that the projectile would not only penetrate the building being shot at, but probably several others behind it. The HEIT rounds are explosive and are more of an area munition rather than a point munition. Some of the effects are shrapnel flying around, fires, and the possibility of dud explosives being left in the area. These are all undesirable effects during peace operations in a city. As a solution to this problem Captain Valledor asked that he be allowed to use Target Practice Tracer (TPT) ammunition in his vehicles. The TPT round is a non-explosive lead projectile used for gunnery training purposes. Captain Valledor felt that these more than met the requirements for his mission in Haiti. There were limited amounts of TPT in Haiti, but when the 25th ID arrived in theater they gave their permission for Team Victory to switch to TPT.27

Another ROE issue, which affected not only armor but the whole force, was the question of how to deal with abuse of the Haitian people by the FAD'H. The armor forces probably faced this challenge more than
others because the vehicles attracted crowds of people that the police and the FAD'H tried to disperse. Team Victory personnel described it this way:

Some of the things we would see is just because we were Americans a lot of the Haitian crowds would come up and just want to look at us and talk to us. We were, like, the big show in town. In response to that, the Haitian police and the FAD'H, which were still in power at the time, would literally come out and run into a crowd and just beat the crap out of these people. The ROE at the time forbid us to give aid to any of these people. So we have American soldiers who have much more firepower than the Haitian FAD'H and the police, and we have to stand by and watch these Haitian civilians that are just there watching us--they're not causing any problems--getting beat, some of them actually dying because of the wounds that they suffered. It was tough on a lot of the soldiers at these guard posts and checkpoints just standing there watching it. They were calling up to higher asking, "Hey, can we do something? Can we do something?" Higher would call back down, "No. You can't do anything." Later on by the end of the week, that ROE had been altered so that we could go out and stop--stop these things from happening.49

One ROE restriction that came later in the operation was the requirement to use a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) as a lead vehicle for any BFV movement through the city. This practice was soundly condemned by all the Team Victory leaders. They felt it caused more problems than it solved and was actually more dangerous than just using BFVs alone.49 First Lieutenant Monahan described it this way:

There was a COL in the 10th Mountain division, I won't say his name, but it was his policy that even though we had been rolling around the streets of Port-au-Prince for four months, that his policy was that an armored vehicle rolling around the streets was unsafe. Therefore, to keep the cars out of the way or any vehicles out of the way I'm going to put a HMMWV in front of all of your company columns or platoon columns. Whatever it is that you are doing you will always have a HMMWV in front of an armored vehicle. That was one of the stupidest things I saw, because like I said earlier, the people didn't have very much respect for the wheeled vehicles, but a tracked vehicle they would pull off to the side. A HMMWV up close on a civilian vehicle they wouldn't move. You put a
Bradley with its barrel oriented on the back of the vehicle they are going to pull off to the side. This incident highlighted the fact that while ROE changed for the force as a whole from time to time, the armor faced a situation that was changing even more often. As battalions rotated through duty as the Quick Reaction Force, they would inherit Team Victory. Consequently, Team Victory was constantly having to work with a new battalions SOP and commanders personality.

The ROE that Team Victory operated under was the same as that for the force as a whole. No special restrictions were put on the armor. Team Victory had the complete authority to use any of its weapons systems within the established ROE. The restrictions that Team Victory established were mostly self-imposed and reflected the judgment of the commander on the scene. They were very cognizant of the power they had and clearly understood the situation. CJTF-190 for the most part relied on the leadership and good judgment of the lower commander to make the right decision instead of tying his hands with extremely detailed ROE. This worked very well for Team Victory during Uphold Democracy.

**Operations**

Team Victory arrived at the Port-au-Prince airport in C-141s on D+1 as scheduled. Almost as soon as the team debarked, Captain Valledor was told by the 10th Mountain division commander to locate a place to put his team. The division commander also provided Captain Valledor an OH-58 to conduct a reconnaissance of the area. Locating a position for the team was difficult with all the aircraft arriving and
the numbers of troops in the area. The next problem facing Captain Valledor was linking-up with his vehicles which were coming in by ship. Two days after Team Victory arrived in country the ships came into port. Team Victory was flown to the port by helicopter and met up with its equipment. Getting the vehicles from the port area back to the airfield proved more difficult than expected. The vehicles had been off-loaded and placed on a far corner of a pier. They were literally surrounded by other large containers and equipment. It took more than three hours for the team to extract itself from the pier area.\(^31\)

Once Team Victory returned to the airfield they were tasked with three missions. The first was airport security, the second was to act as part of the quick reaction force for the theater, and the third was to assist in strike operations to locate and seize caches of weapons and ammunition.\(^32\)

In the initial mission of airfield security the Team Victory engineer platoon was extremely busy. For the first three weeks of the operation they were the only heavy engineer assets in the country. They dug revetments on the airfield to protect the aircraft and supplies, and they dug survivability positions throughout the area as directed by the CJTF. Later on in the operation the engineer platoon was tasked with conducting route reconnaissance and bridge classification throughout the area of operations. Overall, the engineers estimated that they classified over 30 bridges, conducted reconnaissance over 150 miles or road, and dug over 400 holes of different types for the CJTF.\(^33\) One of the results of the bridge classification effort was to show that almost all the bridges were capable of supporting an M-88 recovery vehicle, the
heaviest vehicle in Team Victory. Consequently, the AVLBs were never utilized. In fact Captain Valledor said that he never encountered a bridge, river, or creek that required an AVLB in order to get his BFVs across.\textsuperscript{34}

The first tactical mission that Team Victory undertook was the retrieval of the heavy weapons belonging to the FAD'H. These were located at a site about 30 kilometers from Port-au-Prince. The Special Forces had already secured the site without a fight. Team Victory road marched out to the site and retrieved "6 V-150s, some 75MM light howitzers, a number of anti-aircraft guns and other small howitzers.".\textsuperscript{35} None of the vehicles were in a running condition and the rest of the weapons were in poor repair. Consequently, it took Team Victory about two days to tow all the equipment back to the airport. Later on in the operation this led to another mission for Team Victory. Captain Valledor describes it this way;

There was no specific plan on what to do with that equipment once Aristide returned. However, three days prior to his return we received a message that originated somewhere in the 18th Airborne Corps, and the message was to demilitarize all that equipment. The task was to be completed during the hours of darkness, that the Haitian people would not see us destroying their equipment. There was a sense of urgency to do that and have the mission complete before Aristide's return out of fear that once he took power he would want the equipment back. And we certainly didn't want him to have that equipment around to use in the future. The way we accomplished the task was to have the engineers use thermite grenades inside the V-150s and melt the breaches. Another technique we used was to go ahead and stack all the light howitzers, the other artillery pieces and the anti-aircraft guns side by side, and I had my M-88 recovery vehicle crush all that equipment monster truck style. We conducted the entire operation at night, and once it was completed we literally bumped these V-150s into holes that we dug like bumper cars. We were effective in destroying all of that equipment and during the hours of darkness so that the Haitians wouldn't see it.\textsuperscript{36}
Team Victory also conducted 'strike' missions of different types to seize weapons and ammunition, and also to apprehend thugs or Haitians that were terrorizing the local populace. In several of these missions Team Victory operated with Special Forces (SF), unusual for a heavy mechanized company. In the countryside, 8-12 man SF teams were operating in sectors as large as 30 kilometers. The CJTF would receive complaints from the Haitian people that they were being terrorized by these local thugs and would direct the SF teams to investigate. The SF was unable to catch up with the thugs however, since every time they approached the thugs would just scatter into the mountains. Team Victory was called in to work with the SF on this problem. They decided that they would employ Team Victory to flush the thugs from the city and the SF would intercept them as they ran for the hills. This is exactly what happened. A Team Victory platoon of M-113s or BFVs would roar into the town and began to search. The thugs would leave the town and head for the hills right into the waiting arms of the SF who had placed men on each of the trails leading from the town. This tactic was almost inevitably successful throughout the operation.17

Another tactic that worked on these strike missions was to emplace the BFVs in an outer cordon around an area while the light infantry would conduct a search. The sighting systems of the vehicles were excellent for scanning the terrain and locating escaping people. The dismounted infantry squad from the vehicles assisted in the outer cordon. Anyone running into the outer cordon of BFVs always gave up rather than test the firepower of the vehicles.
On other strike missions where the target was a specific building or group of buildings a different technique was employed. Local intelligence would tip off the CJTF to a possible location of a weapons cache. The task force would identify the specific area and try and confirm the information. If they decided to strike they would conduct an aerial reconnaissance a day prior to the operation. Team Victory personnel went along on the reconnaissance. The next day Team Victory vehicles would roar into the targeted site and position themselves around the building or buildings. Then the search would be conducted. Second Lieutenant Matthew J. Saxton, a Team Victory platoon leader described the reaction to this technique this way:

When we pulled up to a house and had two platoons of dismounted on the ground on either side, the people would hear all the ruckus and come out and see a Bradley sitting there, the resistance kind of melted away, and more often than not they would just open their doors and allow the American forces free access into their quarters or into their businesses or whatever we happened to be doing the raid on. I think the presence alone of the Bradley defused a lot of the situations where there possibly may have been a hint of hostility or aggression towards the American forces. When they saw the 25mm barrel pointing down at them, their resistance melted away, and they never had any thoughts of any aggression towards American forces.38

One of the most prevalent missions conducted by Team Victory was that of presence patrolling. These patrols were made in both company and platoon size and ranged from patrols inside the city to patrols lasting three days and extending to the border with the Dominican Republic. Captain Valledor spoke about his patrolling effort this way:

My Bradleys were required to conduct mounted patrols in greater Port-au-Prince twice daily. One patrol during daylight hours, and one patrol during the hours of darkness. On occasion it would be an entire Co Tm whenever the higher headquarters required us to show the flag in a presence patrol, but on the average I had one platoon during the day and one platoon at night that would conduct a patrol in downtown Port-au-Prince. For a couple of reasons, one it was a
presence patrol to show the Haitian population that we were there, all over the place. Number two, it allowed my crews to become very familiar with the terrain they were operating in to the point where they became very knowledgeable of all the streets and main avenues in Port-au-Prince. Like a taxi driver in a big city, my Bradley platoon leaders and crews could go anywhere in Port-au-Prince without the use of a map. They became that familiar with the terrain.\textsuperscript{39}

This knowledge of the terrain was extremely valuable to the team in its mission as a quick reaction force. Each time a new infantry Battalion took over the QRF mission they could rely on Team Victory to have a thorough knowledge of the entire city and ensure that the force made it to the required site in the most direct manner. The presence patrolling out into the countryside had much the same reason as that in the city. The CJTF wanted to demonstrate to the FAD'H that the American forces could reach all across the country with overwhelming force.\textsuperscript{40} During these 'out of sector' patrols many Haitians came into contact with American forces for the first time. First Lieutenant William T. Viar, a Team Victory platoon leader, reported that, "... what we found out is the farther away that we got from Port-au-Prince the better response we got from the civilian population."\textsuperscript{41} This should not be interpreted to mean that the population in Port-au-Prince was not supportive, they were. It was only by comparison with these first time experiences that the difference could be seen. First Lieutenant Viar went on to say, "At times we'd have entire towns come out of their houses and, basically, follow us for up to three, four and five miles away from their towns. They would have just little parades following us along cheering."\textsuperscript{42} The roads in and out of these villages were very narrow and not in good repair. Those in the hills could be very dangerous and some were as small as 14 meters wide. Captain Valledor found his M-113s to be more

124
maneuverable than the BFVs and at times he relied on the M-113s to go into the more difficult areas. On occasion, even the M-113s were too large to navigate the confined trails and he would dismount his infantry and proceed through the town on foot.\footnote{43}

At the same time that Team Victory was conducting its presence patrols it was also part of the QRF. The QRF was rarely called on but, Team Victory was staged closer to the inner city at an airfield when the celebrations took place to mark the anniversary of the coup. This was part of their QRF mission and they were ready to respond if the celebrations got out of hand and turned violent.\footnote{44}

One of the more unusual operations undertaken by Team Victory was during Aristide's return. Captain Valledor describes it like this;

So when Aristide returned, my Bradley company was on the West wing of the palace. We provided security at the West wing. And three of my Bradleys were positioned right behind the palace staying at the barracks. And we were the get-away vehicles for, number one, Aristide; number two, GEN Shelton; and number three, the Secretary of State in the event things got bad in the front of the palace. We had rehearsed the evacuation from the palace down to the football stadium, which is five minutes away. That was going to be the site for the evacuation of those three VIPs. . . . And that's where we were for those two days. We did a full rehearsal the day prior to Aristide's return and the day of Aristide's return.\footnote{45}

This was an unusual mission for Team Victory, but one for which they were clearly the most capable force for the job.

On two occasions Team Victory was tasked to detach platoons and send them with other units. This is in addition to the loss of their heavy engineer assets that were continually tasked with supporting the CJTF as a whole. The first time came shortly after the teams arrival in country. Team Victory dispatched a platoon to augment the unit conducting port security. There was a great deal of concern for the
equipment and supplies coming into the port and there was a perceived need for armored vehicles to enhance the security of the area. This lasted for about a week before the platoon was returned to Team Victory. The second occasion came when the Marines withdrew from Cap-Haitien and turned it over to the Army. A platoon from Team Victory was detached and sent to the Brigade that relieved the Marines. The platoon secured the port area at Cap-Haitien, conducted patrols in the area, and served as part of the QRF. The main problem with having a platoon in Cap-Haitien was the inability of the infantry brigade to logistically support it, particularly with repair parts. The maintenance detachment with Team Victory was not designed to be divided up into elements to support individual platoons. Consequently, logistic support proved to be a major problem during the entire time that platoon remained separated from Team Victory.

The operations of Team Victory underwent a major change when the 25th ID took over from the 10th Mountain division. The presence of patrols, strikes, and out of sector patrols all became a thing of the past. Team Victory retained its QRF mission but it was confined to the airfield unless actually called out. Captain Valledor remarked on the change of mission that: "Apparently, it's all politically based. Once the UN announced that Haiti was a peaceful and stable environment, there was a conscious decision not to send Bradleys in downtown Port-au-Prince." The only time that the Bradleys were able to leave the airfield was when the National Prison burned down. Other than that the vehicles were parked motor pool fashion inside the airport perimeter."
Apparently the 25th ID determined that there was no longer a need for armored vehicles to be visible in the area.

The CJTF used Team Victory to establish an American presence throughout the country. They took advantage of the mobility, firepower and shock effect of the BFVs to ensure that everyone in the country was aware of the American presence and knew that they could defeat any threat. Team Victory played an important part in urban and rural operations. The twice daily presence patrols inside the city and the patrols in the countryside kept Team Victory on the move and proved that the Americans were active and could turn up anywhere at anytime. Team Victory's participation in the strike operations overwhelmed any planned resistance to searches and seizures. Team Victory formed an important part of the QRF. As the only armored mobile force in the CJTF they provided the punch necessary to resolve any disturbance that occurred. In the special missions that the team was assigned, such as the planned evacuation of Aristide, and the recovery of the FAD'H heavy weapons, they were clearly the best unit for the accomplishment of the mission. The CJTF valued the team and used them effectively throughout the operation until the turnover to the 25th ID. In what seemed to be a purely political decision, the 25th ID decided to restrict the use of Team Victory. Nevertheless Team Victory was a major asset to the CJTF and performed missions that no other unit in the country could have done.

**Tactics and Techniques**

During the course of the operation Team Victory discovered techniques and tactics that worked well for them in the MOOTW situation
they found themselves in. These were often different than the tactics and techniques they used in training for their normal METL tasks. These techniques are interesting in that they give indications of how best to use armor in MOOTW.

When the platoons from Team Victory conducted their presence patrols they altered the way they had practiced movement techniques in the past. First Lieutenant Monahan described his patrols this way:

I would send a Bradley section forward . . . my wingman as the lead element, then myself so I was forward where I could see what was going on. I would be followed by an engineer 113 with an engineer squad. I would then have a medic track and then I would have a maintenance track for any quick repairs so we didn't have to leave a vehicle stranded. Then I would have a Bradley section behind that being my platoon sergeant and his wingman bringing up the rear. Patrol speed varied on the traffic and crowd presence."

Additional techniques that First Lieutenant Monahan described included dismounting his infantry at anticipated danger areas and using them to conduct a reconnaissance and secure the area before moving through. He used his engineers to conduct bridge reconnaissance and ensure the roads ahead were suitable for Bradley traffic.

The crews altered their techniques on these patrols also. The Bradley crew is trained to operate with the gunner and driver down inside the vehicle with the hatches closed. The commander would be either inside or with his head out of the hatch, depending on the situation. While patrolling in the city Team Victory made the decision to have all the crewmen operating with their heads out of the vehicle. One reason they decided to do this was because of all the traffic in the streets. It is very difficult to see around the sides of the Bradley when the crew in operating with the hatches closed. Another reason is
that the Integrated Sight Unit (ISU) used by the gunner in the Bradley is designed for long range scanning. When patrolling through the city the buildings on either side of the street were only a matter of feet away from the vehicle. The effect on the sights was such that the gunners could only see a blur in front of them. The short ranges in the city made the ISU almost useless and the gunners ineffective. Additionally, the need to scan up to the top of surrounding buildings made staying inside the vehicles impractical. Consequently, the decision was made to have the gunners stand with their heads out of the turret and scan the area while the commander moved the turret with his override control.\textsuperscript{49}

Another difficulty that was noticed was the difficulty in traversing the Bradleys' turret while moving through the streets of Port-au-Prince. The normal practice during tactical movement for BFVs is for the gunner to move the turret back and forth over a designated area to scan for targets. During movement in the confined city streets it was discovered that the gun tube would impact on oncoming vehicles or even on buildings. Because of this, the turrets had to remain stationary while the crew scanned the area.

The normal practice for Bradley movement at night is for them to use the night sights. In Haiti however, Team Victory reported that they never used the night sights. They had to use the headlights to drive while on patrol. First Lieutenant William T. Viar, said; "It would be, like, a mortal sin. [driving with headlights]. Out here we've not used our night sights to drive once. We always have our headlights on for safety reasons."\textsuperscript{50}
The thermal sights on the Bradleys proved beneficial in several instances. Team Victory was tasked on occasion to set up observation points in and around the city at night. They would select a point where they could observe the major avenues leading into the city. With the thermal sights they were able to monitor the traffic coming into and out of town without any of the Haitians noticing. The thermals also came in handy during the "flying checkpoint" missions performed by the QRF Bn. In these missions the light battalion tasked as the QRF would use Team Victory to set up checkpoints at night in order to control access to the city, and search for contraband and weapons. Captain Valledor described the use of the thermals in this mission:

The ROE prevented us from searching females. We had to have female MPs in order to search females in the event she had a weapon. The problem arose that we had a vehicle with females and we couldn't search them for weapons. We were able to use the Bradley thermal sights at close range to scan people for hidden weapons underneath their shirts and dresses. That was a neat way of not violating the ROE and at the same time identifying contraband and weapons. One particular case there was a woman that had a machete underneath her dress, you could not see it with the naked eye, but it could clearly be seen through the thermal sight on a Bradley. At every checkpoint we established a spot at which the Bradley would search individuals through their clothing for hidden weapons.51

This developed into a standard procedure during the initial set up of a checkpoint where a soldier would stand in front of a Bradley and hide his pistol beneath his uniform and have the Bradley scan to detect it. Not all Haitians were willing to cooperate with this search, but the team had the authority to enforce compliance. If a suspected weapon was detected, the team was also authorized to conduct a body search of a male or female subject.52

On another occasion First Lieutenant Monahan's platoon was taking part in a night raid on a house suspected of holding a weapons
cache. As the light infantry took position around the house the BFVs scanned it with their thermals. The infantry scouts reported that no one was visible in or around the house. Using their thermal sights, the BFVs were able to detect several people inside the house as they passed by the windows, and also a man on the roof. This report developed into a small confrontation as the light infantry scouts continued to insist that no one was there. Finally, the infantry was convinced and as it turned out the people were exactly where the BFVs had spotted them. After this the infantry came to rely on the night sights on the BFVs.

The M-88 Recovery Vehicle figured prominently into the operations of Team Victory. The first priority for the M-88 was the recovery of any of the BFVs or M-113s that broke down. This was a normal and expected operation for the M-88 crew. Captain Valledor always included an M-88 with his patrols for another reason. He positioned the M-88 in the rear of the team and used its smoke generator to mask the rear of the column from anyone wanting to take a shot at the vehicles after they had passed. Another use for the M-88 was as an intimidator of the civilian crowds. Captain Valledor reported that as the Haitians became more used to seeing the BFVs in the streets they started to lose their fear of them. No longer did the crowds immediately step aside when a BFV came down the street. This did not apply to the M-88 though. As Captain Valledor put it:

Wherever the M-88 Recovery Vehicle moved in Haiti, the Haitians would stay clear of that thing. They were deathly afraid of the M-88. Its size, its power, its noise, the vibration that it created in the area around where it was maneuvering scared the daylights out of the Haitians. They respected that vehicle. I used that to my advantage. Whenever we had crowd problems I would move my M-88 to the front of the column and have him lower his spade, and I had no
problems getting through crowds. They wouldn't come near that thing. It was just like Moses parting the seas.⁵³

The M-88s ended up being a true combat multiplier in many ways in the conduct of the missions in Haiti.

On occasion Team Victory had to participate in crowd control operations. If it was a situation where the team was on the move, Captain Valledor would use his M-88 as described above and was invariably successful in enforcing his will on the crowds. Once the M-88 started the crowds moving Captain Valledor would follow up with dismounted infantry armed with fixed bayonets and pepper spray. In a stationary situation the "routine was to occupy city streets. Close the streets off with a Bradley section, and have concertina wire hand grenade distance in front of my Bradleys, patrolled by my dismounted infantry. That was pretty effective in keeping the crowds back."⁵⁴ Along with this the BFV crewmen would overwatch the infantry patrolling the wire. If the BFV crewmen observed anyone causing a disturbance they would traverse the turret so the 25MM gun would point towards the disturbance. This always had the effect of quieting the problem.⁵⁵ One technique that was tried was to use the smoke generators on the Bradley to simulate CS gas and encourage the crowd to move on. This worked the first two times it was tried, but failed the third time. The Haitians learned quickly that the smoke was harmless. Captain Valledor specifically rejected using the smoke grenade launchers on his vehicles to move the crowds. The smoke grenades are phosphorus and could have easily burned people or caused a fire to start in the city. Captain Valledor considered their use to be against the ROE in crowd control situations.⁵⁶
All of the Team Victory commanders interviewed felt that they could move throughout Port-au-Prince very successfully. They had to be careful with traversing the turrets in some areas and there was the always present danger of people not getting out of the way to consider. Despite this, they moved at will around the city and into the countryside. They never injured a person even though they patrolled continuously, day and night, for almost three months. There were some parts of the slum section of the city that they could not enter with the BFVs. These were places that no vehicle could enter. They had to be patrolled on foot. In these areas Team Victory would dismount the infantry and move the vehicles in a circle around the area to be patrolled as the infantry went through it. They also found that a Bradley was more maneuverable than a five ton truck in the small streets. Whereas a Bradley could do a neutral steer, pivoting on it's own axis to turn around, a five ton was forced into a number of forward and back maneuvers to get around. Team Victory was very pleased with its ability to maneuver through the city. They did not feel that the BFVs were at a disadvantage at all compared to wheeled vehicles in Port-au-Prince.97

Team Victory developed tactics and techniques that worked for them given the mission and environment in Haiti. They were very successful in adapting their knowledge and training to the situation at hand. It was a learning process however. They developed these tactics and techniques as the mission progressed. The Team Victory commanders showed a great deal of flexibility and ingenuity in using their assets to the best advantage in Haiti. They displayed a willingness to adapt
to the needs of the mission rather than try and make their known tactics fit the situation. It is quite clear that Team Victory was able to make itself extremely effective in carrying out the will of the CJTF. In this case armor was able to develop the tactics and techniques needed to address the situation and proved themselves a vital part of the overall force.

**Logistics**

When Team Victory deployed to Haiti there was the expectation within the 3-15 Mech that other companies would be following on later. Consequently, a large maintenance and support detachment was sent with Team Victory so that it would be in place to support the follow on elements. This turned out to be fortuitous. Team Victory was tasked with so many missions that their operational tempo was extremely high. They could not afford to have vehicles that were incapable of performing the mission when at a minimum one platoon was tasked to the Immediate QRF, one was conducting a day patrol, and the third was preparing for the night patrol. Additionally, the team was attached to a light division that was unused to supporting mechanized units. Captain Valledor said; "One of the biggest lessons learned is that when you have a heavy team with a light Battalion or division, they are just not suited to support you. You have to bring your own. If you don't bring your own support you are not going to get it." This became particularly important in that the miles put on the Bradleys was far in excess of the normal operating mileage anticipated. With the constant presence patrolling conducted by the Team every vehicle (except the AVLBS) operated about 1,200 miles per month. The maintenance and supply
detachment was extremely busy keeping the team up and ready for their missions.

For a period of about three weeks Team Victory split off one platoon and a support detachment to the brigade that took over from the Marines in Cap-Haitien. Splitting out a support detachment for this mission proved difficult for the team. Team Victory was not designed to operate with one platoon 150 miles away from the rest of the unit. The mission was successfully supported and the platoon provided a needed capability to the brigade, but it was a strain on the team given its high operational tempo.59

During the presence patrols conducted by the team out into the countryside it was found that aerial resupply was the preferred method. Helicopters could fly out and deliver supplies to include fuel, to the team as it operated close to the border of the Dominican Republic. A fuel truck would have had a difficult time on the narrow roads and steep inclines.

During recovery operations with the M-88 recovery vehicles some problems were experienced. Haiti has a lot of mountainous terrain and steep roads. This, along with the narrow and poor road system, made the recovery of disabled vehicles a real challenge. The M-88s were difficult to control when towing a BFV and trying to make sharp turns on hilly streets. Team Victory experienced an inordinate number of sheared bolts of the M-88s final drives while trying to recover vehicles. They successfully completed each recovery, but the stress on M-88s was greater than in normal operations. Eventually however, both of Team Victory's M-88s were inoperable because of sheared final drive sprocket
bolts. It took about ten days for the sprockets flown in and replaced on the vehicles.69

Logistics is a key capability in armor operations in MOOTW, as it is in all operations. What Team Victory experienced however, is that a normal logistics support package for a Company is not enough in a MOOTW scenario. The high operational tempo, austere theater, split operations, and lack of support from higher level contingency forces, make the logistics package even more critical to armor in MOOTW. A much larger than normal support and maintenance package will have to be deployed with armor units that are tasked to MOOTW scenarios.

Conclusion

The CJTF made effective use of Team Victory during operation Uphold Democracy. The team was composed of the correct elements for the situation in Haiti. The AVLBs were not used much at all, but they were included based on the anticipated mission and terrain, and could have proved very useful if the bridges had been less stable than they were. The Bradleys were able to move through both the urban and rural areas with little difficulty. The engineers and maintenance detachments were large enough to support the team and were used consistently to enhance Team operations. The CJTF and 3-15 did an excellent mission analysis, and constructed the correct Team for the operation.

The CJTF made extensive use of the team during operations in Haiti. They used the mobility, firepower, and shock effect to create an overwhelming American presence throughout the entire area of operations in Haiti. The team displayed exceptional flexibility in the missions
they conducted. Despite the fact that they were operating in an environment for which they had minimal training, Team Victory established dominance over the elements of the FAD'H and the civilian population. They did this without having to fire a single round. The overwhelming presence of the armored vehicles of Team Victory were key in preventing disturbances from occurring. The patrolling conducted by Team Victory along with the operation of checkpoints in different areas of the city on different occasions, created a sense of control and security for the CJTF and the population. In addition to those actions, the strike operations carried out by Team Victory demonstrated to everyone in the theater that the CJTF could act decisively and project its power throughout the area of operations.

Team Victory was able to maneuver its vehicles almost anywhere in Haiti. They proved themselves effective in strike, crowd control, security, and presence operations. The team added a strong element of firepower to the CJTF that helped to establish the credibility of the force, and provided the quick reaction that was required to respond to emergencies. The armored vehicles of Team Victory were definitely an effective element of the CJTF and without them the CJTF would have had a much more difficult time in carrying out the mission.

3-73 Armor

The 3-73rd Armor Battalion is part of the 82nd Airborne division. It is equipped with the M-551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle. The Sheridan is a tracked vehicle with a turret that rotates 360 degrees. The vehicle is 20 feet, 8 inches long; 9 feet, 3 inches wide; and 9 feet 8 inches high. It has a weapons system consisting of a
152MM gun/missile combination. A gun round or a Shillelagh missile can be fired out of the same tube. The vehicle also has a .50 caliber machine-gun mounted in front of the commanders hatch and a 7.62 MM machine gun mounted coaxial with the main gun tube. The vehicle has a crew of four consisting of a commander, gunner, loader, and driver. The Sheridan can be air dropped and is the only armored fighting vehicle in the American inventory with that capability, hence its inclusion in the 82nd Airborne division.

The 3-73rd was included in the 82nd Airborne's plan for the invasion of Haiti. The Battalion was planned to provide armor support to the 82nd as they assaulted the island. In the initial parachute drop on Haiti five Sheridans were included in the assaulting force. The rest of the Battalion was supposed to follow by sea lift. The 3-73rd was aware of the V-150s in the FAD'H heavy weapons company. They did not regard these as a formidable threat though. They believed that they were included in the task organization in order to present the Haitians with a show of overwhelming force. The power represented by the Sheridans was supposed to impress on the Haitians the futility of resistance to the American forces. This was what 3-73 considered to be its primary contribution to the mission.

When the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement was consummated at almost the last minute before the execution of the invasion, the 82nd returned to base. Along with them came the five Sheridans of the 3-73rd. At this point the leaders of 3-73 believed that they were no longer a part of the CJTF that was conducting the peaceful entry into Haiti. They were part of the 82nd, and it had been removed from the force list. The
3-73rd had been in "lock down" in marshaling areas for nine days awaiting the order to execute the invasion. Consequently, when the invasion was called off, the Battalion stood down and released everyone for a four day weekend. Two days into this the Battalion received word that armor was required for the CJTF and that they had the mission. An emergency recall was instituted and the 3-73rd was on its way to participate in Uphold Democracy.61

The selection of the 3-73 and the task organization for the Battalion to participate in Uphold Democracy was done in a haphazard manner. The requirement for armor was enunciated from the JTF and 3-73 was selected based on its availability. The decision was to use the elements of 3-73 that were already staged aboard ship for the planned invasion. This consisted of 29 Sheridans, three M-577 command vehicles, and a number of wheeled support vehicles from the Battalion. The 29 Sheridans corresponded almost exactly to the number that was required for two companies, even though there were vehicles from three different companies on the ship. The decision was made to deploy 3-73 with A and B Companies along with a robust maintenance and logistics detachment. Bravo Company would simply take over the Charlie Company vehicles on the ship and leave some of their own behind to replace them. Captain Jeff Broadwater, the S-3A of 3-73 described it like this; "We ended up having 29 tanks and assorted wheels on the boat and that's basically what drove the personnel breakdown. It turned out to be two companies and the TOC [Tactical Operations Center]."62 Captain Kevin Dice, the CO of Company A 3-73, expanded on this saying; "To the best of my knowledge it was not our decision. When the JTF commander stated he wanted armor, they
looked around at what was available and our stuff was there on the boat. I think that's how we ended up with 29 tanks." Consequently, it seems that no new mission analysis was conducted to determine the structure for 3-73 in its new peacekeeping mission. The 3-73rd was selected because they already had elements embarked aboard ship, and the organization of 3-73 was decided based on what happened to be on the ships to support the invasion force.

**Training**

The 3-73rd was planning on conducting an invasion of Haiti as their primary mission. Therefore, they concentrated on their normal METL tasks in training for the mission. The 3-73rd, as the only armor in an Airborne division, operates somewhat differently than other armor units. It is common for them to work with dismounted infantry and they are more used to separating into smaller more dispersed elements than other armored units. This training, while a little different from other armor training, is still concentrated on war fighting however. There was no training conducted by 3-73 prior to Uphold Democracy that concentrated specifically on peacekeeping. However, one of the Companies had participated in a training exercise in August of 1994 that included a number of cordon and search missions, and these type of missions were frequent in Haiti. Also, during the time in the marshaling areas the Companies reviewed military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and went over checkpoint procedures. In discussing the reason behind the lack of peacekeeping training by the battalion Captain Dice had this to say;
We try to focus our operations and make them as much like combat operations as we could, not peacekeeping. We didn't want to do. We didn't want to search people, we didn't want to do crowd control. We wanted to have a specific target, block it off, and basically control the area. We did not want to get wrapped up in peacekeeping.67

In fact, of the nine members of 3-73 questioned by the author, none reported any type of peacekeeping training taking place. Clearly, the intention of the 3-73rd Armor was to avoid any type of peacekeeping techniques to the greatest extent possible, and to concentrate on their METL tasks.

The 3-73rd Armor was unable to conduct any type of training prior to Uphold Democracy with the unit that they would end up supporting in Haiti. As was previously mentioned, the 3-73rd was planning on supporting their parent unit, the 82nd Airborne division, for the invasion of Haiti. After the cancellation of the invasion the 3-73rd was sent to Haiti to support the 10th Mountain division. Consequently, the 3-73rd and the 10th Mountain had not trained together and there was no chance to develop a working relationship before the conduct of actual missions.

Rules of Engagement

The ROE given to the 3-73rd upon arrival in Haiti was the same as that distributed to the rest of the JTF. The Sheridans had the right to engage anyone who they believed was acting in a threatening or hostile manner. They did not have to wait until they received fire to open fire. 3-73 was conscious of the firepower they possessed and the destruction that they could cause in the city. They were also instilled with the idea of using a measured response to any provocation. When

141
asked what a measured response meant to him, Captain Dice gave this example; "If an individual was out using a pistol, we were not going to use the 50 cal in a crowded area. If he were shooting at us from a window, in a building, then we would probably use .50 cal." The tankers were also equipped with pepper spray, CS grenades, and small arms. They had the right to use pepper spray on their own, but needed permission from brigade to use the CS grenades. The bottom line for 3-73 was that each time they left on a mission they had all weapons systems, except the main gun, locked and loaded. They believed that they had permission to use any of the weapons systems on their vehicle at their discretion.

Operations

The 3-73rd organized their two companies with 14 Sheridans in A Company and 15 in B Company. The Battalion was put in support of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain division. Most of the time the two companies were attached to separate Battalions of the 1st Brigade. With these Battalions, A and B Companies conducted cordon and search, QRF, and screen missions. The Companies never operated at less than task force strength. A task force included at least one Sheridan Company and a light infantry Battalion. Additionally, for the month that 3-73 was in Haiti they operated almost entirely within the confines of Port-au-Prince and the immediate surrounding area. The 3-73rd also operated as a battalion with attached companies of MPs. Unlike the Marine LAVs and AAVs, and the 3-15th mech, 3-73 had no infantry of their own to operate with. They had to be attached to another unit or have a unit attached to them in order to conduct the operations they were
tasked to perform. The 3-73 never conducted the presence patrols that were a staple of the LAVs and Team Victory. They rarely participated in fixed site security missions, for the most part remaining in their compound until they had a specific mission.\textsuperscript{72}

One of the missions that 3-73 conducted was a screen to control crowds that were gathering to demonstrate in support of Aristide. The battalion became ready for operations on 26 September 1994. The 30th of September marked the third anniversary of the coup that overthrew Aristide. On this occasion Aristide supporters were planning a huge demonstration to show their support for the Presidents planned return to the country. The JTF was going to allow the demonstration to take place but they were concerned that violence between Aristide and Cedras supporters could break out. Additionally, they wanted to prevent the destruction of any key facilities or residences by an unruly crowd. To achieve these goals the JTF wanted to show strength throughout the area and maintain a professional presence that could quickly react to any violence that occurred. 3-73 Armor became a key unit in this plan. The concept for the operation shows how 3-73 was to be used:

\begin{quote}
Concept: Maneuver, 1BCT defends A.O. warrior w/3-73 AR (Main Effort) forward conducting a screen along PL Copper. O/O prior to direct confrontation with crowds, 3-73 AR bounds rearward to battle positions 1 & 2. 1-22 and 1-87 defend in sector. O/O 3-73 AR bounds rearward to BP 3 & 4. 3-73 provides company size reaction force after crossing PL Tin.
Task Organization: 3-73 AR had two Sheridan companies, two MP companies and three loud speaker teams. 1-22 IN had two Infantry companies, an MP company (-) and one loud speaker team. 1-87 has one Infantry company, an Engineer company (-), an MP platoon and an ADA company (-) serving as infantry.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

During this mission the Sheridans were employed in 14 two tank teams.

The HMMWV mounted MP companies were integrated into the Sheridan
companies with MPs stationed in front of and between each of the Sheridan teams. Each Sheridan Company had a loud speaker team with them. As the crowds advanced 3-73 would fall back from them but at all times keeping the tanks and troops visible to the Haitians and ready to intervene if trouble started. Sheridan teams were stationed at each key intersection while MPs kept the link between the teams. 3-73 Armor essentially kept track of the crowd as it was on the move and fell back to where the infantry battalions had established battle positions (BPs) around key facilities and residences. As the 3-73rd passed the infantry they halted behind the BPs and reconstituted one company as a QRF to respond to any threatened area. The operation was very successful in that the march was completed without loss of life and little damage to the city.

Cordon and search missions were also conducted by the Sheridan Companies. These were usually carried out in support of a light infantry battalion. A suspected building or area was designated by local intelligence as a site to be searched. A reconnaissance was conducted and the battalion would surround the site and conduct the search. The Sheridans were used as an outer cordon around the site. They were ready to provide fire support to the infantry to prevent anyone from leaving or entering the site without permission. A significant contribution by the armor to these missions was that their mere presence established the sense of overwhelming power on the American side. The Haitians were clearly intimidated by the presence of the tanks and the Americans never came under fire during a cordon and search that the armor participated in.
The Sheridan Companies also acted as QRF for the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division. Most of the time A Company was tasked with this mission, with B Company picking it up on a rare occasion. As the QRF the designated company had to have a platoon ready to move on a 30 minute notice. The platoon was not formally attached to any infantry QRF, but was available to support whichever unit in the 1st Bde that required assistance. If the platoon was not sufficient for the requirement, its parent company would be tasked to provide further support.74

The 3-73 Armor was in Haiti from 26 September 1994 to 25 October 1994. They did not have the time to participate in the large number of operations that Team Victory did. They also operated in support of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain rather than in support of the CJTF as Team Victory did. Consequently, the 3-73 was only involved in missions in Port-au-Prince rather than around the entire country. These factors, and the fact that 3-73 had no organic infantry, made their operations less comprehensive than those conducted by Team Victory, or the Marines. The organic infantry issue was critical in the differences between 3-73 operations and those of Team Victory. This accounted for the 3-73 attitude of backing off, literally and figuratively, from dealing with the population. They left those "peacekeeping" chores to the military police. They stayed in the background as the MPs handled the checkpoints, searches, and most of the interaction with the Haitians. It is unknown why the Sheridans were never tasked with the presence patrolling missions that Team Victory was conducting on a twice daily basis. There does not seem to be a reason that 3-73 could not have been
successful in this role, and perhaps lessened the load on Team Victory. Nevertheless, 3-73rds operations were successful in Port-au-Prince. They were key in presenting and maintaining an aura of overwhelming American power. Undoubtedly their presence at flash points and search sites, and the knowledge that they could respond anywhere in the city, inhibited the FAD'H and others from taking any direct action against the American forces.

Tactics and Techniques

The psychological aspect of the tanks in Haiti was noted by each of the 3-73 members questioned. They believed that this was a large factor in the tanks being included in the force in the first place. They believed that the presence of the tanks had a significant impact on the Haitian population. The Haitians initially were very afraid of the tanks and backed far away whenever the Sheridans showed up. This fear seemed to lessen in time as the Haitians grew more confident in the fact that the Americans were not there to harm them, but any threatening moves with either the weapons systems or moving the tank immediately got their attention and compliance. Staff Sergeant Philip Turner, a Sheridan section leader in Haiti, described some of the techniques he used to intimidate the crowds when necessary. He would pivot the tank in the general direction of the crowd with the gun tube at a maximum elevation. He would also rev the engine of the tank and flash his headlights if necessary. Finally, the Sheridan is equipped with a closed bore scavenging system designed to remove pieces of the combustible cartridge after a round has been fired. When activated, this system makes a fog horn sound with a large rush of air. Staff
Sergeant Turner would activate this system to get the crowds attention. These minimal actions never failed to impress the Haitians and gain their compliance.75

The Sheridans were able to maneuver through Port-au-Prince with little difficulty. The ground pressure per square inch of a Sheridan is less than that of a HMMWV. Consequently, they were able to move on the roads without damaging them as long as the tanks refrained from neutral steers or quick cornering. The Sheridans did not experience any difficulty with the narrow streets of the city. Their relatively small size and good maneuverability brought them through the streets rapidly. Additionally, they never encountered a bridge that was unable to support their weight. In order to maintain vision the crews operated out of the hatches. In one company this extended to the driver, while the other company generally kept the driver down inside the vehicle with the hatch closed. The tank commander, with his free mounted .50 caliber machine gun, was able to observe and cover the taller buildings and the flanks of the vehicle. The gunner normally kept the turret oriented forward between the fenders, or to the rear between the rear fenders. Captain Dice described their technique like this;

What we found out in Germany going through our MOUT city was you almost kind of do a different scanning technique and really the gun tube orientation is kind of backwards. How we did it was the number 2 vehicle in the column would really be scanning forward of the number 1 vehicle and in front of him, high, and either left and right with the coax. So in order to get elevation really the tank behind him was watching the tank in front of him.76

The loader was normally standing up out of his hatch to observe the flank of the tank. The loader would wear a kevlar helmet instead of his normal combat vehicle crewman helmet in order to better hear what was
going on around the tank and to communicate with those on the ground. The loader was armed with his M-3 .45 caliber submachine gun and ready to engage anyone that threatened the tank from close range."

Cooperation with the infantry came relatively easily to 3-73 who were used to working with dismounted elements. In one of the infantry battalions that a Sheridan company, supported the infantry was allowed to ride on the back of the Sheridans, as is common in operations with the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne. In the other battalion that had a Sheridan company the battalion commander felt that mounting troops on the back of the tanks was unsafe. He ordered his infantry to follow the tanks in wheeled vehicles. Communications with the infantry was through the use of FM radio or on the tank-infantry phone. The tank-infantry phone was utilized to give a crew specific instructions on what window in a particular building to focus on, or other detailed instructions. The Sheridan crews preferred the tank-infantry phone for detailed close coordination with infantry on the ground. In this way conversations could be held without interference from other radio nets."

The Sheridan crews tried to stay away from dealing with the Haitian population. This was in keeping with the training and philosophy they received at their home station. They were a combat unit and planned to leave "peacekeeping" missions to the MPs. The 3-73rd felt that they needed to retain the flexibility to react to an emergency and could not become tied down in crowd control or other situations not involving combat. Staff Sergeant Wilson said; "Most of the time when we were out in a crowded area we had enough MPs that they could handle the crowd control. That way we wouldn't get tied up in a crowd control
situation. If we were needed to flex to a certain area we could still do that. Consequently, if the Sheridans ever encountered crowds that were too slow in moving or showed hostility they left the action to the infantry or MPs that were accompanying them. They did have pepper spray available, and CS grenades were issued, (although these had to be approved for use by Brigade) but they rarely, if ever, employed them.

**Logistics**

The logistics support organization for 3-73 was determined by what was aboard the ships when the Battalion was told they would be part of the peaceful entry force. This turned out to be a substantial organization for the two companies that were deployed. Captain Dice described the logistics support by saying;

> We brought a maintenance detachment as part of our Bn. It was a very robust support slice. It probably numbered about 50 people just for maintenance. The hard part was PLL, things that we ran through. We had a civilian LAR rep basically, he was also attached to our Bn, and he would call back to Bragg and parts would be flown in. So I think we were pretty much living on the edge parts replacement wise. We were getting kind of shaky by the time we left. It was an ad hoc support system. It didn't come from DMMC, you know, obviously 10th Mountain. It was pretty much being flown straight from Bragg to our Bn.  

Despite this ad hoc system, the Battalion managed to keep its vehicle operational readiness rate in the high 90s during the month they were in Haiti. This readiness rate was not attributed to support from the CJTF however. Captain Jim Montgomery, the executive officer (XO) of B Co, and First Lieutenant Charles Freeman, Support Platoon leader for 3-73, both felt that the 10th Mountain division was incapable of supporting the 3-73rd. First Lieutenant Freeman reported that when he presented his Class III requirements to the 10th Mountain it "blew their mind."
Basically, the 3-73rd had to rely on its own devices to maintain vehicles and equipment. To do this they kept in constant contact with Ft. Bragg and had things flown out to them directly. This included things such as road wheels and voltage regulators. First Lieutenant Freeman felt that the relative closeness of Haiti to the U.S. and Ft. Bragg was a major factor in being able to maintain the support the vehicles required. If the Battalion had been forced to use the logistics support provided by the 10th Mountain and the CJTF the readiness rate of the Battalion would have probably fallen off a significant degree.

**Conclusion**

The 3-73rd performed effectively in Uphold Democracy. Like the other armored units in the CJTF they never fired a round, yet their very presence may account for the lack of resistance encountered by the Americans. The Haitians were clearly impressed by the Sheridans and rapidly made way for them to pass. The Sheridans did not remain long in Haiti, but for the time they were there they significantly enhanced the combat power, and maybe more important the sense of overwhelming force, generated by the CJTF.

It is apparent that little thought went into designing the 3-73rd to participate in a peacekeeping mission. They reacted on the fly as the invasion was canceled and took what was available. A mission analysis for the peacekeeping operation seems to be totally lacking. Despite this, it seems that the task organization of the Battalion worked very well in Haiti. The Sheridans themselves were excellent vehicles for the mission and the terrain. They carried a great deal of
firepower and yet their relatively small size and weight allowed them to easily traverse the narrow streets of the city without collateral damage. If anything, it would seem that the Sheridans were under-utilized in Haiti. They conducted specific missions in support of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Mountain, but rarely carried out missions of their own. There are probably a couple of reasons for this. First, the 3-73rd seemed to have the attitude that peacekeeping was not one of their missions. They considered themselves a combat unit and peacekeeping was for people like MPs. This approach to the operation led them to limiting themselves to supporting other units as they conducted their missions. The only exception seems to be the screen mission during the third anniversary of the coup. The 3-73 did not want to engage the population, conduct checkpoints, or run patrols. The MPs and infantry were readily available for these jobs and 3-73 was just as happy to leave those missions to them. A second reason for the tentative use of the Sheridans could be the lack of experience on using armor within the 10th Mountain division. The armor did not want to expand the scope of their operations, and the division had no knowledge of how to use the armor, so with the exception of QRF, cordon and search, and one screen, the Sheridans remained quiescent. The lack of organic infantry may have also led to a limited use of the Sheridans. If 3-73 had been task organized by the 1st Brigade with an infantry company or MP company, and given a sector, then they may have been even more effective than they were. Instead, they had their companies parceled out to infantry battalions that were seemingly reluctant to use them.
The logistics support for the 3-73rd was a problem. Someone within the CJTF decided that armor was required for the peaceful entry option, but the 10th Mountain was unprepared to support it. It would be a fallacy to look at the high readiness rate of the 3-73rd while they were in Haiti and term logistics support a success. The Battalion had to support itself to a great extent and only the high priority of the mission and the relative nearness of Haiti to the U.S., allowed the logistics requirements to be met. The 3-73 logistics personnel are to be commended for their efforts to make support happen, but the system was clearly broken.

Despite the problems of a quick reaction mission with little time for analysis, a haphazard organization, little training in the mission, unfamiliarity with the supported units, and a broken support system, the Sheridans of 3-73 contributed to the overall military success of the intervation. The leaders and crews proved to be flexible and able to adapt to the changing circumstances in Haiti. They behaved professionally and carried out assigned missions without resorting to the use of the massive firepower at their disposal. The vehicles themselves were an excellent choice for the mission and terrain in Haiti. The support system was made to function by personnel using their imagination and initiative to get the job done. Clearly, the 3-73rd was effective in carrying out their assigned missions in Haiti. The use of armor was justified and required in this situation. It is probable that the 3-73rd could have been even more effective in Uphold Democracy if some of the problems addressed earlier had been identified and corrected before deployment.
Endnotes


4Ibid., 13.

5Captain John C. Valledor, USA, 15 December 1995.

6Ibid.

7First Lieutenant John R. Monahan, USA, 18 December 1995.

8Major William E. Dickens, USA, 18 December 1995.

9Captain Valledor interview.

10Major Dickens interview.

11Ibid.

12Ibid.

13Major Dickens interview; and Captain Valledor interview.

14Major Dickens interview.

15Ibid.

16Captain Valledor interview.

17Ibid.

18Major Dickens interview.

19Captain Valledor interview.

20Major Dickens interview.

21Captain Valledor interview.

22First Lieutenant Monahan interview.

Major Dickens interview; Captain Valledor interview; and First Lieutenant Monahan interview.

Captain Valledor interview.

Captain John Valledor, Taped interview #MDIT-EA-400-0027, Center of Military History, 26 October, 1994, 8.

Gillon, 48; CMH Valledor interview, 9; and Captain Valledor interview.

Gillon, 19-20.

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First Lieutenant Monahan interview.

Gillon, 16; and CMH Valledor interview, 4.

CMH Valledor interview, 7.

Gillon, 24-25.

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Gillon, 17.

Ibid., 32.

Ibid., 33.

Gillon, 26.

Captain Valledor interview.

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Gillon, 27.

Ibid.

Ibid., 28-29.

CMH Valledor interview, 13.

Ibid., 16.

Gillon interview, 39.

Gillon interview, 39; and CMH Valledor interview, 27.

First Lieutenant Monahan interview.
CMH Valledor interview, 9-10; and Gillon, 42.

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Captain Valledor interview; and First Lieutenant Monahan interview.

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CMH Valledor interview, 16-17.

Captain Kevin Dice, USA, CO CO A, 3-73 Armor; Captain Jeff Broadwater, USA, S-3A 3-73 Armor; Captain Jim Montgomery, USA, XO CO B, 3-73 Armor; First Lieutenant Charles Freeman, USA, Support Platoon Leader 3-73 Armor; and Staff Sergeant Richard Wilson, Platoon Sergeant 3rd Platoon CO A 3-73 Armor; 5 March, 1996.

Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

Ibid.

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Center for Army Lessons Learned Uphold Democracy documents, Team Chief Working File, 4 October, 1994.

76 Dice, et al. interview.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.
CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMOR IN MOOTW

Method

To determine the effectiveness of armor in MOOTW operations, the different aspects of armor in the case studies will be examined and compared with each other, and with examples from American operations in Panama in 1989-1990. The American operations in Panama covered a wide spectrum of missions and has been well documented. Consequently, the examples of Sheridan, M-113, and LAV uses in Panama are useful in comparing the operations in Lebanon and Haiti. In addition, the doctrine that exists, and is applicable to these missions will be compared to the actual operations. The doctrine for the use of armor in MOOTW is very limited but some information exists in FM 100-23, Peace Operations, and FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

Training

There is probably no more controversial issue in the conduct of MOOTW than the subject of training. Training for MOOTW is controversial because commanders are hesitant to take time away from their already crowded Mission Essential Task List (METL) training to devote to MOOTW. Additionally, as has already been mentioned, the doctrine for peacekeeping operations and MOOTW in general is limited. Procedures for
training armored forces in these missions are not well established and are nebulous at best. Many commanders seem to believe that MOOTW is nothing more than an extension of normal combat missions, under slightly different conditions. Therefore, they believe that training for METL tasks prepares their men for MOOTW. This base of training, combined with intelligent, flexible, and enthusiastic troops and officers is all that is necessary to execute the mission successfully. This is certainly the view of Colonel Thomas S. Jones, the SPMAGTF Carib Commander, and the contingency division that he visited before deploying to Haiti. This view is supported by FM 100-23 to some extent. It says:

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The first and foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting skills. Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list (METL). However, units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime METL. The amount of training required and when the training is given will depend on the particular peace operation mission. However, the philosophy used to determine the how much and when training questions for operations other than war can be summed up as just enough and just in time.¹

The dichotomy in this quote is evident. On one hand it states that no new tasks should be added to a unit's METL, but then says that units selected for these duties need time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartime METL. The manual states later on that a planning figure of from four to six weeks should be used for the conduct of specialized training in preparation for MOOTW.² Clearly, the FM foresees the need for specialized training to conduct MOOTW. Yet it also says that no MOOTW training should be added on a regular basis. The expectation seems to
be that sufficient warning will be provided for a MOOTW mission to allow units to conduct the specialized training necessary. This expectation was not realized in the examples in this study.

In Haiti, Panama, and Lebanon, the missions began as contingency responses. The initial forces assigned to these operations did not have the four to six weeks of training time that FM 100-23 calls for. The probability is high that Haiti, Panama, and Lebanon are the rule rather than the exception. MOOTW missions will likely continue to be quick deployment scenarios where the opportunity to conduct specific training is limited at best.

The Marine armor involved in the Lebanon operation did not really experience a training deficiency. This was because the Marine armor was rarely employed in anything other than a static defense, or at most moving from one side of the perimeter to the other to respond to a threat. The Marine commanders showed extreme reluctance to use their armor for anything outside of a stationary defense. The AAVs were employed to carry supplies to the outlying areas of the country during the blizzard, but this was merely driving along a road with no particular MOOTW training required. It seems that even after Marine commanders were aware that the Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) were destined for Lebanon during their deployments, no alteration of standard missions was considered, and no specialized training took place.

Consequently, while the Marine armor was adequately trained for the tasks they were asked to perform, they were only asked to undertake a very limited spectrum of missions. The most telling mission for the tanks was to deliver overwhelming firepower, accurately, into the
militias surrounding the Marine perimeter. They were well trained for this mission and executed it flawlessly.

The 8th Engineer Battalion, that deployed to operation Safe Haven, was part of a completely unforeseen requirement. The battalion was only given 48 hours notice before they had to leave for Panama. There was no time for any type of training before the unit boarded the aircraft. None of the training that the 8th Engineers did in their normal METL tasks prepared them for the riot control duties they had in Safe Haven. All the training that they received was conducted once they arrived in Panama. The training that they were able to conduct in Panama was created on the spot in coordination with the MPs. No doctrine was available to use as a guide for employing armor in a riot control environment.

A more telling lesson on training can be learned from the Marine and Army armor in Haiti. Both the Marines and the Army were concentrating on the mission of invasion rather than peacekeeping. In the case of the Marines and the 3-73rd, almost no MOOTW training took place at all for the armor. At most, the armor units discussed the differences in MOOTW regarding ROE and a few specialized missions. Team Victory had the most training of any of the units. This consisted of five days of situational lane training created and conducted by the Battalion itself. All of the armor unit commanders felt somewhat uncomfortable when faced with MOOTW instead of a combat mission. This included Team Victory. Captain Valledor, Team Victory's commander, described his unit as having to "learn on the fly", and felt himself lucky that no incidents came about within the first few weeks in
country. The Marine armor commanders reported the same type of feelings of being thrust into an unknown situation and not knowing how to operate. In each case the commanders adjusted to the situation and experimented with new techniques as the mission continued. They tried new and different ways of moving, searching, interacting with the population, and resupplying. Some of these techniques directly clashed with the way they were trained to conduct their METL tasks. An easy example is the positioning of the support vehicles in the center of the column rather than the rear. This was found to be the best way to operate when conducting movement in a MOOTW environment, but went completely against standard procedure. Having a loader ride standing up out of the hatch, armed with a submachinegun, and wearing a kevlar helmet is completely out of the question in normal operations, but proved to be effective in MOOTW. Each of these techniques were developed as operations were being conducted. In addition, no one had a plan as to what to do in the event that their vehicles were surrounded by crowds. Different responses from people interviewed ranged from firing over their heads, to employing pepper spray, to continuing to advance slowly and pushing the crowd out of the way. No unit was ready with a plan or a procedure to address this situation that had been practiced, or even discussed, throughout the unit. All the units involved in these operations had to train as they carried out the mission. The problem with this is obvious. Unprepared units that are experimenting with different techniques in a real situation make mistakes. The whole object of training is to prepare for the real thing before it has to be accomplished, so the mistakes can be corrected and
procedures refined. This did not occur in Lebanon, Safe Haven, or Haiti.

The training situation encountered in Haiti and Lebanon was not unique. This was experienced in Just Cause also. The scenario was much the same, with the armor units concentrating on the combat missions, and ignoring the MOOTW missions that inevitably followed. First Lieutenant Robert Cejka, S-2 of the 2nd Battalion 504th Parachute Regiment, described their readiness for the aftermath of Just Cause like this,

The issue is that from around the 23rd of December on we were in stability operations. Nobody knew what that meant. As a matter of fact, the term stability operations in my mind was made up. Somebody had to call what we were doing something, so they called it stability operations. There is no known doctrine. The issue with stability operations is that it was a made-up term. I actually got into some manuals and tried to look to see what a stability operation meant, and it wasn't until I conferred . . . with the S-5, the cyops [sic] guys, and we just sort of put or heads together and up with a laundry list.3 The Sheridans of 3-73 were operating with the 2-504 during part of Just Cause. They seemed to have no more idea of stability operations than 2-504 did.

The Marines had much the same type of experience. They concentrated on the combat missions and were unprepared for the types of missions they actually had to carry out after Just Cause. Captain Richard R. Huizenga, the CO of Company C 2nd LAI Battalion, talked about the training for operation Promote Liberty in this way,

We had an extensive pre-deployment training package. The problem is our training had nothing to do with what we did. Our training centered around running roadblocks of the PDF, how to handle confrontations with the Panama Canal Commission and the PDF, how to identify PDF weapons and that sort of thing. What we ended up doing in the Promote Liberty operation had nothing to do with that. You know, we were working civic action, joint patrols with the PNP, letting them use our radios, our vehicles, teaching them, stability operations, presence missions, that sort of thing. We had
no training in that. I don't know if we as the Marine Corps do enough training in that, civil action, stability of an underdeveloped or let's say developing nation or economy.  

Once again an armored force was well trained and ready for combat, but not ready for the MOOTW missions that they had to perform.

There is no indication that recent experiences have changed the way that armored units conduct training. None of the commanders interviewed reported that MOOTW training was now being conducted on a regular basis at their home stations. Almost every one of the lower level (Company CO and below) people that were interviewed, believed that MOOTW training should be conducted on a regular basis. A notable exception was the leaders of 3-73 Armor. They continued to maintain that they did not do peacekeeping operations. There seemed to be a clear boundary in their minds that allowed them to participate in a MOOTW like Uphold Democracy, but keep their tactical mission separate from peacekeeping. They were quite willing to admit that they changed their methods of operation and conducted missions outside their METL tasks, but they were adamant that it was not peacekeeping.

An interesting perspective on training subsequent to Uphold Democracy was submitted by Staff Sergeant Daniel Johnson, a Sheridan gunner, he said,

Real world lessons that are learned should not be forgotten! Our recent rotation through JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] with the same units we worked with in Haiti was insulting! Instead of being correctly and effectively integrated within, or in support of infantry operations we were consistently used as the "Fire Dept" during the LIC [Low Intensity Conflict] phase! We were only called upon (90% of the time) to secure areas in order to evacuate casualties! Used properly we would have been assessing enemy casualties instead of friendly. Not only were Real World successful lessons not passed on (to new Infantry Co Commanders, platoon leaders etc.) they were forgotten!
Clearly, Staff Sergeant Johnson did not feel that he was getting the training necessary to participate in future MOOTW operations. Most of the field grade leaders interviewed were hesitant to endorse any type of training package specifically oriented towards MOOTW. The major objection was not that they did not see this training as beneficial, but that some current training would have to be eliminated in order to make room for MOOTW. In the larger scheme of things they did not see this as to their advantage. They believed that it was far better to be trained and ready to participate in high to mid intensity conflict and to "ratchet down", as Major Dickens put it, to participate in MOOTW.  

Despite their lack of training in the missions that they had to perform, the armored forces deployed to MOOTW missions executed those tasks effectively. They developed the techniques that they needed as they conducted the mission. The fact that they were able to do so is a tribute to the flexibility, intelligence and creativity of the officers and men of those armored units. In the interviews conducted with the participants in the various operations, again and again they referred to the quality of the Marines and soldiers as the key to the successful accomplishment of their missions. These troops were able to utilize the basic skills, leadership, and common sense that characterizes today's professional military. Even so, the success of the mission and the effectiveness with which the armor was employed can not be allowed to obscure the fact that the training was insufficient for the mission.

The training provided to armored units prior to deployment to MOOTW missions is inadequate to prepare them to execute those missions. FM 100-23's planning figure of four to six weeks training in MOOTW prior
to deployment is probably sufficient. However, having this time available seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Consequently, training in MOOTW missions should be provided on a more regular basis to armored units that are often deployed to MOOTW missions. This would include the Marine LAR Bns, 3-73 Armor, and possibly specific mechanized units in the 24th ID.

Organization/Structure

The organization and structure of the armored units that are deployed to MOOTW is a key consideration. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units that are designed for high to mid intensity conflict are not well configured to carry out MOOTW. In each of the cases studied in this paper, with the exception of Lebanon, the organization and structure of the armored forces employed was task organized to a great extent to carry out the mission. The factors that drive the organization of an armored force for MOOTW are different from those that are used to organize a force for combat. In MOOTW the ROE may restrict the ability to conduct overhead fire, or use heavy firepower. The need to preserve the infrastructure may deny to use of heavy assets on streets or bridges within the area of operations. The political considerations surrounding a certain operation may forbid the use of some types of weapons. Consequently, the organization of armor for MOOTW is subject to a range of considerations that do not affect a force oriented toward conventional combat operations.

One of the first decisions each of commanders in the operations studied had to make was what type of armored vehicle was the correct
choice for the mission. On only one occasion was a main battle tank selected. That was the Marine operation in Lebanon. This may have been more of a non-decision rather than a decision. Initially the MAU that went into Lebanon was forward deployed into the Mediterranean. Therefore, the force structure that was on the ship was all that was available to the Marine commander. This force included a tank platoon that was normally deployed on each MAU. Even though this was available, the commander chose not to use it during the first missions ashore in Lebanon. In his opinion the type of firepower represented by the tank and the psychological impact that the employment of the tank would have was inappropriate for his mission. Eventually the tanks were brought ashore, and in the limited missions they were allowed to do they were very effective. The Marines conducting the Lebanon operation never seemed to consider the option of completely reorganizing the MAU for the specific mission in Lebanon. They added to the MAU structure by attaching a counterbattery radar, and enhancing the intelligence assets, but a complete mission analysis with the object of identifying an appropriate force structure from the ground up was not conducted. Consequently, each successive MAU deployed to Lebanon retained the same armored force of AAVs and M60A1 tanks. Because of this adherence to the standard MAU structure, the why of tank involvement in the Lebanon operation seems to be based on inertia rather than conscious thought.

In the case of SPMAGTF Carib, the Marine task force deployed to Haiti, Colonel Jones considered the use of M1A1s in the force structure. He could have employed them if he so desired, but he chose not to. His reasons for declining to use the M1A1 were his analysis of the enemy
threat, his analysis of the terrain he would be operating in, and the restricted amount of square foot storage space on the two ships available to him. Colonel Jones felt that the limited threat posed by the FAD'H V-150s could be easily handled by assets other than tanks. He was concerned that the narrow streets of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien would not provide the room necessary to maneuver heavy tanks. The capability of the local bridges to support the weight of the tanks was a further concern. Finally, he did not have the luxury of taking all the vehicles that he desired because of the limited shipping space. Some tough decisions had to be made and he rejected the tanks in favor of vehicles he felt would be more useful in a multi-role environment. Colonel Jones chose to use a task organized Company of LAVs and a platoon of AAVs to conduct his mission. He had experience with LAVs during operation Desert Storm and was familiar with their capabilities. He had great confidence in their ability to move around the area and to defeat the FAD'H threat. He included the AAVs in his organization to provide mobility to his infantry, and to conduct the ship to shore assault.

Team Victory had the decision to use M1A1s taken away from them. According to Major Dickens, word came down from higher than division that only Bradley Fighting Vehicles were to be used in the Team. This was not greatly lamented by the 3-15 mech. They felt that the threat and the terrain made the M1A1 an unsuitable choice for the operation.

The 3-73 armor used the only vehicle they had available which was the Sheridan. Because of their intention to insert by air the Sheridan was the only vehicle that would meet their needs.
Additionally, within the 82nd Airborne division there are no other tanks besides Sheridans. Consequently, the 3-73 really did not have an option on what vehicle to deploy with.

The 8th Engineer Battalion was selected for operation Safe Haven based solely on its possession of the M-113 APC and its availability for deployment. The organization of the battalion was modified in Panama so that the engineers always worked in coordination with the MPs. They were used almost strictly for riot control duties, and not for engineer tasks for which the organization had been designed. This ad hoc structure worked for the limited tasks that the battalion had to undertake in Safe Haven.

The operations in Panama had the same considerations as those in Haiti. The restricted terrain, aerial insertion, the threat, and the requirement for surprise all drove the choice on which armored vehicles to deploy with. In this case the U.S. forces used LAVs, M-113s, and Sheridan tanks. LAVs were deployed specifically for the missions conducted prior to Just Cause, as were the M-113s, and the Sheridans were used because of their aerial insertion capability.

**Weight/Size**

It is interesting that a major concern among all the commanders questioned regarding the use of the M1A1 was its size and weight. Even Colonel Jones, who seems to have given the tank more consideration than any other commander, was concerned about the size and weight. Upon the conclusion of the operation in Haiti almost all the commanders interviewed believed that the tank would have been too big to successfully operate in Haiti. The interesting part of this is that
Team Victory regarded the M-88A1 Recovery vehicle as an extremely valuable asset during their missions. They took this vehicle with their company patrols, and used it throughout their operations. The "Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions" book remarks that; "The M88A1 recovery vehicle can be a key asset in mechanized operations in MOUT [military operations in urban terrain]." The M-88A1 has dimensions similar to those of the M1A1. The M1A1 is 26 feet long by 11 feet 11 inches wide, and 7 feet 9 and a half inches high. The M-88A1 is 27 feet long by 11 feet 3 inches wide, and 10 feet 3 inches high. The M1A1 and the M-88A1 are also within a few tons of each other in weight, and Captain Valledor reported that he never encountered a bridge he could not cross while in Haiti.

The AAV is also of a size with the M1A1. The AAV is 26 feet 1 inch long by 10 feet 9 inches wide, and 10 feet 9 inches high. The M-88A1 and the AAV were each able to maneuver through the confined streets of Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince. True, they were not as maneuverable as the LAV, Sheridan and BFV, but they were able to make their way through. Consequently, it may just be a perception that M1 tanks are too large to participate in these types of MOOTW rather than a fact.

It was mentioned in Chapter One that Army commanders initially rejected the use of tanks in Viet Nam because of their perception that the terrain was unsuited to armored operations. This perception was later proved to be false and tanks were employed very effectively in that country. There may be a parallel here with MOOTW operations. It is difficult to say since main battle tanks were not used in Panama and
Haiti, and were only assigned very limited missions in Lebanon. What is clear is that the M1A1 should not be rejected out of hand because of its size and weight when a force list is created for MOOTW operations.

**Deployability**

Directly related to the question of size and weight is the question of how to deploy armored vehicles into a theater. Each of the MOOTW missions in this study required a rapid response into an austere theater. Equipment was not prepositioned, and the commanders were faced with decisions on how to get their forces into the area of operations. Because of the size and weight of armored vehicles they are a particular challenge when it comes to deployment. The options on moving them are limited and reaction times are often slow.

In Safe Haven, the M-113s of the 8th Engineers were flown into the country by Air Force transport. This was relatively easy since an airfield capable of accepting the aircraft was available and U.S. forces were on the ground and in control of the airfield. The 8th Engineers were able to respond with M-113s within 48 hours of being alerted. This is certainly a case of rapid response by armored forces.

In Just Cause, the Army had the advantage of having some armor in the country before the operation took place. A mechanized infantry Bn was stationed in Panama at the time and Marine LAVs had been put in the country to assist in operations leading up to Just Cause. Finally, a platoon of M-551 Sheridan tanks was flown into Panama at night, and concealed in a hanger until Just Cause began. Other Sheridans were dropped into Panama with the assaulting waves of paratroopers. Of the
eight Sheridans that were dropped, two were damaged beyond repair and were unable to participate in the operation.

In Uphold Democracy armor was deployed in the assault waves during the Marine amphibious landing, and led the way for the Marines in seizing their initial objectives. In the initial plan to invade Haiti, four Sheridans were scheduled to parachute in with the 82nd Airborne division. When the invasion was called off these vehicles were returned to the U.S. and all Army armor deployed to the country by sea.

In Lebanon the armor available to the Marines deployed to the area by sea. The armor was a permanent part of the forward deployed MAU, and was available as soon as any other portion of the MAU was.

The challenges of deploying armor in MOOTW should not be underestimated. However, it clearly can be done based on the experience of the operations looked at in this study. Often several methods were used to deploy the armor into the area. If it can be prepositioned this relieves a great strain on the force projection assets available. Prepositioning may be done in the open or in secret, depending on the situation. The weight of armor, particularly main battle tanks, makes movement by air time consuming and inefficient. Nevertheless this is an option and has proved successful in the past. This is particularly so with LAVs and M-113s. The deployment of armored forces by parachute is limited to the M-551 Sheridan. Even with this small vehicle only limited numbers will be available immediately, and some attrition is to be expected on landing. Movement by sea is the most efficient, but also the slowest method. If an operation can be anticipated and forces deployed in ships to the area, the time to availability is greatly reduced.
Armor can be successfully deployed to participate in MOOTW operations. It is not an easy task, and may take a number of different methods to successfully achieve the size of force desired. It can be done though, and the U.S. needs to ensure that it retains the capability to project armored forces to support MOOTW operations.

**Potential for Damage to the Infrastructure**

The issue of damage to infrastructure is one of the considerations when choosing armor for MOOTW. Often the armor will have to move along improved roads, in urban areas, and sometimes it has to patrol the same route repetitively. These considerations bring the issues of size, weight, and method of movement to the fore. Tracked vehicles are known for the damage they can do to roads. This is not necessarily a given though. A good set of rubber track pads goes a long way towards mitigating any potential damage to a road system. Additionally, careful driving techniques and the restriction of neutral steers (a neutral steer is the ability of a tracked vehicle to partially lock its tracks in place and pivot on its own axis) can greatly decrease the damage done to roads by tracked vehicles. Members of the 3-73rd were quick to point out that the ground pressure per square inch generated by a Sheridan tank was actually less than that generated by a HMMWV. The leaders of the AAVs, Sheridans, and BFVs deployed to Haiti felt that their tracked vehicles did almost no damage to the Haitian road system during their time there. Of course the road system was poor to begin with, and damage may not have been immediately noticeable. There is also the conflicting view represented by the "Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions" book. It states that; "All above [BFV, M1 Tank, M-113,
AAV] have tracks which tear up the streets and consequently are counterproductive to winning popular support."

Another perspective is given by Captain Richard R. Huizenga, an LAR Company commander in Panama, he said,

We've debated it from, "Do you need tracks?" and all like this. A low-intensity conflict, you cannot have tracks. Tracked vehicles are a nonplayer because the roads are already bad. The Army found it with C, 3d of the 6th Mech Infantry Company. Take them through a little town supposedly to help them, and you end up trashing the roads, and then they're asking, "Please don't come to town." Whereas we can go anywhere in Panama we want and if we police after ourselves, there's no trace that we've ever been there except the good feelings that we've projected."

Conversely, Captain Frank Sherman and Captain Kevin Hammond, in their article on Sheridan operations in Panama, found that "Wheeled vehicles experienced flat tires from glass, jagged metal, wire, downed poles, and bullets.".

It would seem that several considerations concerning infrastructure damage have to be weighed when determining which armored vehicle to choose to undertake MOUTW. A wheeled vehicle is clearly less damaging to a country's infrastructure than a tracked vehicle. The amount of damage that a tracked vehicle does to a road system can be very little though. The additional consideration of the ability of a tracked vehicle to deal with glass, jagged metal, etc. and continue the mission unimpeded, may make the trade off of a little road damage acceptable.

**Protection/Firepower**

The consideration of what type of protection and firepower are required for the operation is key to deciding on the armor for the mission. The firepower required for the Marine operation in Lebanon
turned out to be significant. The tanks were called on to engage heavily reinforced bunkers and to fire into concrete walled buildings to destroy those who were firing on the Marines.

This type of firepower was called for in Just Cause also. The Sheridan tanks were instrumental in suppressing Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) positions inside buildings and protected positions. It was reported that the 152MM guns of the Sheridans were capable of blasting eight foot holes in concrete walls that were six to eight inches thick. This capability was extremely valuable to the conduct of operations during Just Cause. Without the Sheridans, the infantry would have had no way to penetrate these thick walls and would have been reduced to clearing the buildings room by room. A proposition that is expensive in casualties to both sides. Along with the firepower delivered by the Sheridans in "Just Cause" the LAV-25s also came into play. In Team Armor the Sheridans and LAV-25s worked together as teams. The 25mm gun of the LAV was used to suppress enemy positions as the infantry approached them. It was found that the gun was very accurate and intense fire could be delivered on specific windows and doors while the infantry moved in close. Additionally, both the 152MM and the 25MM were seen as capable of destroying the V-150s available to the PDF.

The firepower of the 25MM guns on the BFVs and LAVs deployed to Haiti was seen as necessary to combat the V-150s possessed by the FAD'H. These guns could penetrate anything the FAD'H was capable of bringing to the fight. The antitank missiles available could not be used very effectively in close conditions of the city and the guns needed to be there.
Another consideration on firepower is the aspect of too much firepower. Captain Valledor's concerns about firing through several buildings when only trying to engage the first one have been previously noted. His solution of changing to TPT ammunition was innovative, and probably would have succeeded in getting the job done without much collateral damage, if he had ever had to employ his 25MM guns. This aspect of too much firepower is a key consideration in employing the M1A1 tank. The 120MM cannon on the M1A1 was designed to defeat other tanks. The high velocity and flat trajectory are critical for maximum penetration and accurate target hits at long ranges. In the close confines that Lebanon, Panama, and Haiti presented these attributes are more of a hindrance than an asset. Additionally, only two rounds are regularly deployed with the M1A1. These are both designed for penetration of armored vehicles and are not configured for close-in destruction of buildings, bunkers, etc. The M60A1 tanks with the 105mm cannon that were deployed to Lebanon had a more varied choice of rounds that made them more effective in a close-in MOUT environment. These were a high explosive round, a smoke round, and a canister round. With these a tank could be very effective when employing its main gun against buildings, bunkers, or personnel. Development and deployment of these rounds for the M1A1 should be pursued immediately.

MOUTW armor employment will require a commander to give consideration to the amount of protection that he believes will be required. The proliferation of hand held antitank missiles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) means that all vehicles are vulnerable even to an enemy that does not have his own armored force. RPGs were a major factor in
Lebanon, Panama and Haiti. In Lebanon and Panama RPGs were prevalent on the battlefield. The ability of an opponent to move a hand held rocket into the close-in environment of many MOOTW operations gives him an easy way to strike at U.S. forces. Any vehicles, including armored ones, are extremely vulnerable to this type of attack when they are operating in columns on roads or in a MOUT environment. Light armored vehicles such as the LAV, AAV, M-113, and the thin hulled Sheridan can be easily destroyed by RPGs. In cases where RPGs proliferate the M1A1 and the BFV will be the vehicles of choice. The M1A1 can stand up to an RPG assault and has an excellent chance of surviving and continuing to fight after multiple hits. A BFV has a chance to survive these types of hits also. The lighter armored vehicles are not capable of withstanding hits from these weapons. The PDF was well equipped with RPGs but were unable or unwilling to employ them in significant numbers. Consequently, the light vehicles in the U.S. forces did not take casualties from them.

The protection offered by armored vehicles is often looked at in terms of combat only. The ability of the armor to withstand hits from small arms, antitank missiles, and other types of gunfire. This is an easy trap for a commander to fall into since he is used to analyzing the "enemy" in terms of the firepower they can bring to bear on his force. This was certainly the case with operations Uphold Democracy, Safe Haven, and Just Cause. In each case the commanders involved paid a great deal of attention to the armaments of the opposition. The V-150 armored vehicles possessed by the FAD'H and the PDF were key in the decision of whether to bring armor or not, and if so, what type. The lack of weapons in the hands of the Cuban refugees were central to the
decision on how to equip the Safe Haven forces. While this analysis of opposition firepower capabilities is necessary and correct, it should not be the only consideration in protection issues.

The question of protection provided by armored vehicles is tied into the differing nature of many MOOTW missions from combat. In many MOOTW the restrictive ROE forbids responding with firepower to any number of threatening situations.

In operation Nimrod Dancer, one of a series of lead-up operations to Just Cause, Marine units equipped with LAVs were tasked to conduct freedom of movement patrols along designated routes within Panama. As the Marines moved along the route they encountered a hasty roadblock. The roadblock consisted of several vehicles placed across the road and a crowd of civilians surrounding each side of the road. When the Marines stopped for the roadblock the crowd began to grow agitated. They threw rocks and refuse at the vehicles, all the while chanting and protesting. Since hostilities had not broken out between Panama and the U.S. at this time, and the crowd was composed of unarmed civilians instead of military personnel, the use of deadly force was not allowed by the ROE. Because the Marines were in LAVs, they were able to close the hatches and force their way through the roadblock by shoving the civilian vehicles aside with the LAVs. While enclosed in the LAVs, the rocks and the rubbish being thrown at them had no effect. The Panamanians could not hurt the Marines, and the Marines did not have to take any offensive action to protect themselves. The power of the LAV allowed the Marines to shove the roadblock vehicles out of the way. During the process of shoving the civilian vehicles aside, one of the
LAVs was rammed by a civilian in a pickup truck. The LAV withstood the blow with only a flat tire and continued to move through the roadblock.\textsuperscript{15}

In operation Safe Haven the M-113s of the 8th Engineer Battalion afforded the same type of protection to Americans that the LAVs did in Nimrod Dancer. Soldiers were able to withdraw into the M-113s if necessary to protect themselves from the rioting Cubans. The Cubans could do very little to affect the M-113s and the Americans were able to defend themselves without taking offensive actions.\textsuperscript{16}

An entirely different situation would have existed if the Americans had been on foot, or in soft skin vehicles. On each occasion the opposing forces would have been able to attack and injure Americans, and the response could only have been an offensive one designed to protect the force. A Panamanian protester ramming a soft skin vehicle with a pickup truck could have easily stopped the Marine movement through the roadblock, and injured Marines at the same time. This would have caused an escalation in the conflict that the U.S. wanted to avoid. Safe Haven shows a graphic example of soft skin vehicles being damaged, overturned, stolen, and of no protection to American forces. Drivers were literally pulled from their vehicles by the Cuban refugees.\textsuperscript{17} This would not have happened if the Americans had been able to seal themselves off in armored vehicles.

In another aspect of protection, the armored vehicles in Uphold Democracy and Safe Haven were often used as a physical barrier between the Americans and others. The AAV platoon responded to the growing uneasiness at the food distribution station in downtown Cap-Haitien.
The vehicles were able to force their way through the crowd and interpose themselves between the Marines and the crowd. They provided a steel 10 foot high physical barrier that prevented the situation from getting out of hand. This same type of use as a barrier was described by Colonel Rasmussen when discussing Safe Haven. There, the M-113s were placed next to fences to support them against the pressure from the crowd, and in front of gates to prevent vehicles from being rammed through them. In Lebanon also, Marines used armored vehicles to block roads and as a physical barrier to protect the force.

The firepower and protection issue is one that deserves a lot of consideration in MOOTW. Too many people seem to believe that little of each will be required in MOOTW. The experiences of Lebanon, and Just Cause certainly mitigate against this. In each of these operations significant firepower and protection was required to execute the mission. On occasion in these operations combat occurred that was every bit as intense as that experienced in conventional warfare. The Haiti operation was different in that almost no incidents of live fire took place at all. However, if the FAD'H had chosen to conduct a guerrilla war or terrorist attacks in the cities the same requirements for firepower and protection would have needed there. The type of firepower and protection available with armored vehicles is definitely required in MOOTW. No other type of vehicle can bring the attributes of firepower and protection that armored vehicles can.

In Uphold Democracy and Safe Haven, the aspect of protection was clearly more important than that of firepower. The armor was able to provide this when no other type of equipment could have done so. The
presence of armor gave the commanders the option of being able to 
protect their force without having to inflict a large number of 
casualties on the opposition. When conducting an analysis of a MOOTW 
mission it will be necessary to take this aspect of armor operations 
into consideration. It may well prove to be the best tool a commander 
has to successfully complete his mission.

Psychological Aspects of Armor

The psychological aspect of armor in MOOTW may be the most 
important, and misunderstood, part of the employment of armor in these 
missions. It is difficult to clearly pin down the what the 
psychological impact of armor employment is in MOOTW situations. It is 
a highly subjective area and almost always depends on the people 
involved in the situation, and their personalities and experiences. 
There is little doubt that there is a psychological impact in almost 
every case however. Armored vehicles by their very nature cannot fail 
to make an impression. They are most often large, loud, heavy, and look 
unusual, when compared to more traditional civilian and military 
vehicles. They attract attention and are inevitably remarked on by the 
press when they are employed.

In each MOOTW the psychological impact of armor must be examined 
to see how it will be perceived in a particular case. This analysis 
must be based on a true reading of the situation and not on a commanders 
personal feelings or his understanding of armor. The target population 
can be sophisticated, or naive, concerning armor and the military in 
general. Used properly, and with an accurate analysis of the situation,
the psychological impact of armor may be the greatest asset a force brings to a MOOTW arena.

Almost universally, the commanders interviewed believed that the employment of armor sent a message to everyone involved in a MOOTW. What this message was, however, differed greatly between the respondents and the operation they were involved in.

In the initial employment of Marines in Lebanon Colonel James Mead decided to keep his tanks and artillery aboard the ships. He felt that the armor would be viewed as an offensive weapon and not in keeping with his peacekeeping or presence mission. He clearly felt that employment of tanks would send the message that he was there to fight, which he was not. This was probably a faulty analysis of the situation. Other members of the MNF were employing armored vehicles and almost every other armed force in Lebanon had armor of different types. The population had been involved in a war for years and had seen tanks, self propelled artillery and infantry fighting vehicles. They knew exactly what they were and tanks had long ago lost their shock value when just driving through the area. It is doubtful that the Lebanese population even noticed that the five tanks available to the Marines were left aboard ship or that they would have given them even more than a passing glance once they had been brought ashore. There was almost no comment at all when they eventually were brought ashore. The Lebanese militias, if they even noticed the lack of tanks, probably took it as a sign of weakness rather than one of peaceful intent. After all, it is difficult to make a Bn of armed Marines look peaceful, whether they have tanks or not. Consequently, the message of peaceful intent that Colonel Mead was
trying to get across was probably lost in the shuffle at best. At worst, it was misinterpreted as a sign of weakness by the opposition.

Later on in the Lebanon operation, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, the CO of the 24th MAU, decided to make his tank platoon more visible to the militias in order to discourage the small arms sniping that was occurring. There was no affect on the sniping by this action. Colonel Geraghty's message failed through a lack of credibility. The militias were well aware of the ROE that called for a proportional response to incoming fire. They knew that no matter how visible the tanks were, they would not fire if only small arms fire was being received. This was clearly demonstrated once the BLT building was bombed, the ROE changed, and the tanks were allowed to fire. The militias protested to the Marines that they were not 'following the rules'. Because of this knowledge possessed by the militias, Colonel Geraghty's attempt to send a message with his armor failed.

In Just Cause, the Army commanders clearly wanted to send a message of overwhelming force to the PDF. This was one of the reasons armor was included in the force as a whole. Obviously, armor had more than a psychological role in Just Cause. The firepower and combat capability provided by the Sheridans, M-113s and LAVs was crucial to the success of the campaign. The psychological message was also a major aspect of the campaign though. The fact that tanks and armored vehicles were present was meant to send a message to the PDF that resistance was futile. During the combat operations the news of the armor battering down PDF positions with their guns clearly made it around the PDF. Shortly into the operation it only took the presence of a Sheridan on
site to bring about the surrender of PDF forces that were holding out. In another case, American resupply convoys were being attacked by PDF forces as they made their way to the combat forces. To prevent this, Sheridans were assigned to accompany the resupply convoys. Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, Commanding General of the 18th Airborne Corps, said:

We learned early on that if you had a Sheridan tank in a convoy, they would not mess with it. We "got smart" on how to run convoys relatively unopposed while we set about to clean that area out with infantry.²⁸

Lieutenant General Stiner wanted to send a message to the PDF that extreme force would be used to protect the resupply convoys. Judging from the safe operation of the convoys after the tanks were used, the message got through.

In Uphold Democracy both Marine and Army commanders wanted to make use of their armor assets to send a message to the FAD'H that resistance would be futile. The JTF commander requested the 3-73 to come to Haiti after the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement went into effect. He knew that there was not going to be any combat against the FAD'H heavy weapons company, but he wanted the armor in the country to impress the FAD'H with the power of the American forces.

Both Marine and Army commanders utilized their armor to conduct patrols throughout their areas of operation. The Marine LAVs did the vast majority of them in the Marine sector and Team Victory, with their Bradleys, did the patrolling in the Army sector. The message that the commanders were sending to the FAD'H, and any other observers, was that
they could be present anywhere in the country on short notice, and in overwhelming force. The fact that almost no resistance to the American forces took place could be attributable to this tactic.

In conducting cordon and search missions, the armor in Uphold Democracy was used to overawe the personnel who were in the search areas. When Bradleys and LAVs showed up outside a building the people inside got the message that it was futile to resist. The Bradleys and LAVs never had to actually fire to get access to a building. The message of overwhelming force obviously got through.

Armored forces not only were used to send a message to the possible combatants but also to the civilian populace. Armored vehicles were used to impress the civilians in Just Cause, Safe Haven and Uphold Democracy. The vehicles were used as roadblocks, checkpoint control, and patrols to both intimidate and reassure the population at different times. When possible crowd disturbances were breaking out armored vehicles were dispatched to the scene where they became physical barriers and also served as a message that the U.S. forces would not tolerate a disturbance. During many of the interviews the respondents commented on the immediate calming effect that the appearance of armored vehicles had on a crowd. The sight of an armored vehicle could make a hostile or unruly crowd calm down and behave quickly.

One aspect of this impact that armored vehicles had on crowds was that it did not seem to matter what type of armored vehicle showed up. The civilians in Haiti were relatively unsophisticated concerning military vehicles. They did not know the difference between armored fighting vehicles, tanks, personnel carriers, or even a maintenance
vehicle. Captain John Valledor, the CO of Team Victory, reported that the most effective vehicle he had for crowd control was the M-88 Recovery Vehicle. He said that eventually the Haitians became somewhat used to the Bradleys, but they never got over their fear of the M-88. When the M-88 came through with its large size, deep rumble, and recovery gear clanking, the Haitians moved far away. They had no idea that the Bradleys had far more firepower than the M-88.

The unsophistication of the audience not only applies to the civilian population, but to the media as well. On many occasions the media confuses what type of vehicles are employed in an operation. News reports from Haiti refer to the Marine LAVs as personnel carriers, or little tanks and the press said that tanks were in Safe Haven when only M-113s were there. The fact that the population and the media often confuse the type of vehicle being used is interesting in contrast to the sharp difference that many in the military draw between them. The 3-15th Infantry, who sourced Team Victory, was told that tanks were not to be taken. They could construct the Team the way they wanted, but tanks were not an option. This direction came down from the National Command Authority, according to Major William Dickens of the 3-15th. Apparently, tanks were deemed off limits for some reason.

In the minds of many military commanders themselves, a distinction exists between employing tanks and other armored vehicles. Brigadier General James Wilson, the Safe Haven JTF commander, said that while he very much wanted the M-113s in Safe Haven, he would probably not have employed tanks in the mission if that was all that was
available. He strongly believed that tanks were offensive weapons and inappropriate for use in controlling crowds. He was not alone in this opinion concerning tanks. Many of the military people that were interviewed had the same feeling that tanks were in a completely different category than other armored vehicles. These were seen as offensive weapons, while other vehicles could be viewed from a force protection perspective. This seems to be a common belief among military personnel, but the distinction is probably lost on civilians. They really do not know the difference between one armored vehicle and another. Clearly, tanks could have fulfilled every mission that the M-113s undertook in Safe Haven.

Without a doubt, the employment of armor sends a message in MOOTW. What that message is depends greatly on the population and their experiences and level of sophistication concerning military vehicles. Military commanders are going to have to understand how the target population views armor, rather than how they as professional military members do in order to ensure the right message is being sent. Armor is also clearly an intimidator. It can quickly restore order to a situation by creating an impression of overwhelming force and thereby preventing any violence at all from taking place. It may be that armor is most valuable as a psychological weapon in MOOTW. It probably prevented much more violence by its mere presence than it caused with its weapons systems in the operations studied.

Logistics

Supporting armor in a MOOTW environment is a difficult proposition. Most of the MOOTW missions are performed in an austere
environment, with little or no American facilities on the ground. In each case studied, the requirements to support armor in MOOTW was more difficult than other operations. Often the area of operations was much larger than that encountered in normal combat operations. The environments in these areas were undeveloped, with poor transportation systems, either because they had been destroyed, or they had never existed. An additional challenge was that the units were constantly on the move, putting far more miles on their vehicles than was normally the case. This was particularly true with Team Victory, who tripled their normal yearly mileage while in Uphold Democracy.

In most of the cases studied, the support assets deployed to maintain and resupply the armored forces were far in excess of what a unit their size normally requires. This proved to be extremely fortunate. In each case there were only small armored units in the operation and these were constantly required. The operations tempo was very high and the armored forces could not afford to have vehicles that were not combat ready. Team Victory faced the detachment of one platoon that was sent almost 150 miles away to support another brigade. It is very unusual to split a company like that in normal operations. However, in MOOTW it is not unusual at all for small elements to operate at great distance from their parent units. The ability of the support elements to be able to support widely separated operations is key in MOOTW.

To support armored operations the logistics personnel had to devise methods to meet the unique requirements of MOOTW. In Haiti, Team Victory made use of a Forward Arming and Refueling Point, using
helicopters to bring forward fuel and supplies, when they patrolled out to the border of the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{16} In the aftermath of Just Cause, Marine LAV units were given a $5,000 cash advance to buy supplies when they were on a patrol over 350 miles from other U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{27} The need to conduct creative support methods is clearly a part of MOOTW.

One logistics concern that was common to all the Army units studied, was the ability of the light forces to support armored units. Team Victory, and 3-73 armor were very disappointed in the way the 10th Mountain Division and the 18th Airborne Corps was able to support. They both felt that they had to rely totally on their own assets to get support, particularly maintenance support. They both felt the 10th Mountains effort to support them was almost nonexistent. In each case they had to maintain close contact with their home stations in the U.S. and get support through their parent units, and outside the system. This problem needs to be carefully studied by the Army. Light units are going to have armor attached during MOOTW and they must be able to support. In Haiti and Panama the armored units were not too far removed from the U.S., and were able to get support from the parent units. This will not always be the case, however.

Logistics for armor in MOOTW is an area of concern and needs careful planning. Logisticians can expect that usage rates, mileage and hours will increase greatly from normal combat or peacetime rates. The ability to provide support to small detachments operating long distances away will be necessary. The need to move supplies over a poor transportation system may require much closer cooperation with air assets than is normally the case. Innovative methods, such as providing
cash to buy fuel for forces operating far from support areas may have to be used. Clearly the challenge facing the logistician supporting armor in MOOTW are many. It can be, and has been, done successfully however.

Summary

Armor is an exceptionally effective asset to have in MOOTW. It has an impact far out of proportion with the size of the units and the numbers of vehicles involved. Armor can be used in many ways in MOOTW and is a very effective tool to send a message or create a desired climate. It allows the rapid movement of combat power over the large operating area that usually characterizes a MOOTW. It is an intimidator when credible. It is also an excellent way to reassure a population that the force is there to stay until the problem is resolved, and has the power to resolve the problem. As the Operation Uphold Democracy After Action Report said;

The presence of armor, armed aircraft, and a large and obviously very capable force on the ground set the conditions that allowed platoon level operations with linguists and military police to take control of dangerous situations before they escalated.\textsuperscript{38}

The training of armored forces for MOOTW is an area of concern. They are not receiving the training necessary to make them truly effective upon initial employment to a MOOTW. Doctrine does not exist as such to allow the units to train at this time. All the training done by armored units in the study was make-shift and created by local experience. This is not the way to prepare for a mission. The U.S. military needs to realize that MOOTW are going to continue, armored units need to be used, and they need to be trained. This may call for the designation of certain units to be the initial MOOTW contingency
units. The reluctance to do this is understandable, but something must be done to train armored units for this mission.

The U.S. needs to maintain the capability to deploy armored units to MOOTW. This skill should be practiced to ensure it is understood by those involved. Air, sea, and surface methods will all be required.

The logistics of supporting armored forces in MOOTW needs to be examined in detail. This will be particularly important to the light forces. They are doing a poor job in this area so far and the requirement will not go away. It can be done and should be done. The need is to determine the most efficient way to accomplish the mission.

Armored vehicles are a major force multiplier in MOOTW. Colonel Rasmussen, in his interview, said that we seem to have to continually relearn the value of combined arms in almost every situation. He is exactly right. Combined arms operations are necessary in MOOTW. It does not matter if it is the lowest threat environment imaginable. Unfortunately, this lesson will probably continue to have to be relearned by MOOTW participants, unless doctrine is rewritten to include the mandated inclusion of armor in each of these missions. Armor is too easily dismissed by those preparing for MOOTW. If added to doctrine it would ensure that this vital asset is not overlooked. Armor adds greatly to the capability of any force, and in each of the cases studied was one of the key, if not the key force in the operation.
Endnotes

1FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 86.

2Ibid., 87.

3Captain John C. Valledor, USA, interview by author, 15 December 1995.

4Captain Robert Clark, USMC, interview by author, 30 November 1995; First Lieutenant Brian C. Andersen, interview by author, 18 December 1995.

5Dr. Robert K. Wright, interview with Major Jonathan Chase and First Lieutenant Robert Cejka, Department of the Army, Center of Military History, Oral History Branch, 4 June, 1990, 149-150. Stability Operations was the Army's doctrinal term for MOOTW, Low Intensity Conflict, and Counterinsurgency operations in 1973. There is currently discussion within the Army to return to using the term Stability Operations to describe these missions.

6Mr. Benis M. Frank, interview with Captain Richard R. Huizenga, USMC, Marine Corps Oral History Program, 17 May, 1990, 4-5.


8Major William E. Dickens, USA, interview by author, 19 December 1995.


11Ibid. 10.

12Frank, 15.


14Ibid., 15.


191
Colonel Steven Rasmussen, USA, interview by author, 28-29 March 1996.

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Frank, 18.


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Figure 1. Map of Lebanon. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Figure 3. Map of Panama. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Figure 4. Map of Haiti. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Figure 5. Map of Cap-Haitien. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 21 ft., 2 in.
Width: 10 ft., 6 in.
Height: 9 ft., 9 in.
Weight: 49,802 lbs.
Engine: Cummins Diesel VTA-903, 500 hp.
Speed: 41 mph/land, 4.2 mph/water
Range: 300 miles
Armament: M0242 25MM chain gun, TOW antitank missile launcher, M-240C machine gun

Length: 20 ft., 8 in.
Width: 9 ft., 3 in.
Height: 9 ft., 8 in.
Weight: 34,868 lbs.
Engine: Detroit Diesel 6V53T, 300 hp.
Speed: 44 mph/land, 4 mph/water
Range: 375 miles
Armament: 152MM gun/missile combination, .50 cal machine gun, 7.62MM machine gun

Figure 7. M-551 Sheridan. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 26 ft.
Width: 11 ft., 11 in.
Height: 7 ft., 9.6 in.
Weight: 136,000 lbs.
Engine: Lycoming Textron AE7 1500
Speed: 45 mph
Range: 289 miles
Armament: 120MM cannon, .50 cal machine gun, two 7.62 cal machine guns

Figure 8. M-1A1. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 21 ft.
Width: 7 ft., 2.5 in.
Height: 8 ft., 2.5 in.
Weight: 27,559 lbs.
Engine: Detroit Diesel 6V53T, Turbo, 175
Speed: 63 mph/land, 6 mph/water
Range: 485 miles
Armament: 25MM chain gun, two 7.62MM machine guns

Figure 9. LAV-25. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 22 ft., 7 in.
Width: 11 ft., 9.6 in.
Height: 10 ft., 8 in.
Weight: 112,000 lbs.
Engine: Continental AVDS-1790-2D 750
Speed: 30 mph
Range: 298 miles
Armament: 105mm cannon, .50 cal machine gun, 7.62MM machine gun

Figure 10. M-60A1. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 26 ft., 1 in.
Width: 10 ft., 9 in.
Height: 10 ft., 9 in.
Weight: 50,349 lbs.
Engine: Detroit Diesel 400
Speed: 59.6 mph/land, 8 mph/water
Range: 300 miles
Armament: .50 cal machine gun, 40MM grenade launcher

Figure 11. AAV-7. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
Length: 16 ft.
Width: 8 ft., 9.5 in.
Height: 8 ft., 1 in.
Weight: 24,595 lbs.
Engine: Detroit Diesel 6V-53 Turbo 215
Speed: 42 mph/land, 3 mph/water
Range: 300 miles
Armament: .50 Cal machine gun

Figure 12. M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. Reprinted by permission from Grolier Electronic Publishing Inc., 1993.
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